Monarchy than in a Republique But tracing this no further I will now rest upon this that whatsoever the King has alleaged against raising of Armes and publishing of Orders indefinitely is of no force to make Sir Iohn Hotham or those by whose authoritie hee acted Traytours unlesse it fall out that there was no ground nor necessitie of such defence So much of danger certaine I will now suppose the danger of the Commonwealth uncertaine the King sayes the Parliament denyes the King commands the Parliament forbids The King sayes the Parliament is seduced by a traiterous faction the Parliament sayes the King is seduced by a Malignant Party the King sayes the Parliament tramples upon his Crowne the Parliament sayes the King intends Warre upon them to whether now is the Subject bound to adhere I will not insist much upon generall presumptions though they are of moment in this case for without all question 't is more likely that Princes may erre and have sinister ends then such generall conventions of the Nobility Gentry and Commonalty so instituted and regulated as ours are in England The King does highly admire the ancient equall happy well poyzed and never enough commended constitution of this Government which hath made this Kingdome so many years both famous and happy to a great degree of envie and amongst the rest our Courts of Parliament and therein more especially that power which is legally placed in both Houses more than sufficient as he sayes to prevent and restraine the power of Tyranny But how can this be if the King may at His pleasure take away the being of Parliament meerely by dissent if they can doe nothing but what pleases Him or some Clandestine Councellours and if upon any attempt to doe any thing else they shall be called Traitors and without further arraignment or legall proceeding be deserted by the Kingdome whose representations they are what is there remaining to Parliaments are they not more servile then other inferiour Courts nay are they not in a worse condition then the meanest Subject out of Parliament and how shall they restraine tyranny when they have no subsistance at all themselves nay nor no benefit of Justice but arbitrary Surely if these principles hold they will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect a government more tyrannicall then ever was knowne in any other Kingdome wee have long groaned for them but we are likely now to groane under them but you will say the King hath a power of dissent he may use it at his pleasure if hee have none then he is a meere Cypher and the Parliament may tyrannize at pleasure either the one or the other must bee predominant or else by a mutuall opposition all must perist and why not the King predominant rather then the Parliament We had a maxime and it was grounded upon Nature and never till this Parliament withstood that a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe and no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament freely elected and held that ever did injure a whole Kingdome or exercise any tyranny nor is there any possibility how it should The King may safely leave his highest rights to Parliaments for none knowes better or affects more the sweetnesse of this so well-ballanced a Monarchy then they do and it hath been often in their power under great provocations to load that rule with greater fetters clogs but they would not Let us marke but the nature the right the power the wisedome the justice of Parliaments and we shall finde no cause to suspect them of such unmatchable treasons and conspiracies as are this day and never was before charged upon them for our Chronicles makes it apparent that there is scarce any other Nation wherein Monarchy has been more abused by rash inconsiderate Princes then in this nor none at all wherein it hath been more inviolably adored and loyally preserved from all diminution I wish it were not some incitement to those execrable Instruments which steale the Kings heart from us that they thinke the Religion of Protestants too tame and the Nation of the English too incensible of injuries but I hope God will the more tenderly resent these things The composition of Parliaments I say takes away all jealousies for it is so equally and geometrically proportionable and all the States doe so orderly contribute their due parts therein that no one can be of any extreame predominance the multitude loves Monarchy better then Aristocracy and the Nobility and Gentry prefer it as much beyond Democracy and we see the multitude hath onely a representative influence so that they are not likely to sway and yet some influence they have and that enough to preserve themselves from being overswaid We also in England have not a Nobility and Gentry so independent and potent as in France Germany Denmarke c. Nor as they were here immediately after the Conquest by reason of their great Feoffes whereby to give Lawes either to the Crowne or the people but they stand at such faire and comely distances between the King and people and also betweene themselves that they serve for an excellent Skreene and banke as the Kings words are to assist both King and people against the encroachments of each other And as the middle Region of the aire treats loving offices betwixt heaven and earth restraining the fumes and exhalations of Sea and Land that they ascend not too high and at the same instant allaying that restlesse Planets scorching flames which else might prove insufferable to the lower Elements So doth both Houses of Parliament as peaceably and sweetly arbitrate betwixt the Prince and his poorest Vassals and declining Tyranny on the one side and Ochlocracy on the other preserving intire to the King the honour of His Scopter and to the people the patrimony of freedome Let us not then seeke to corrupt this purity of composition or conceive that both Gentry and Nobility can combine against the King when they have no power but derivative the one more depending upon the King and the other upon the people but both most excellently to affect the good of the whole and to prevent the exorbitance of any one part Next the right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great that no change of goverement can be advantage to them in that temporary capacity except they could each one obtaine an hereditary Crowne which is a thing utterly impossible Next their power is meerely derivative so that except we will conceive that both King and people will be consenting to the usurpation nothing can be done and if wee conceive that they may by fraud gaine their consent nothing can withstand them Lastly their wisedome hath beene ever held unquestionable and their justice inviolable no Prince that ever cast himselfe thereupon was defrauded no Prince that ever declined the same proved prosperous In sum Parliamentary
and can make appeare to the world as some of his Papers mention wherein they have attempted or plotted any thing against his person and Crowne which was the onely motive why hee sought to absent himselfe from London and to possesse himselfe of Hull and to frame such an impeachment against some of both Houses if this can be affirmed and proved the Parliament shall be held guilty in all their Votes Ordinances and Commissions concerning Sir John Hotham and the Militia c. Although it be the first time that any free Parliament was ever so criminous but if this cannot bee prooved it must be granted that according to the Votes of Parliaments the Kings departure did by frustrating Parliamentary proceedings in a time of such calamitie and distresse greatly indanger two Kingdomes and whosoever advised the King to that departure and to the charging of Treason since layd upon the Parliament and all such as have obeyed them in seeking to prevent publicke mischeefes are as pernicious enemies to this State as ever received their being from it The businesse of Hull is most instanced in let that be first survayd Sir John Hotham is to be lookt upon but as the Actor the Parliament as the Author in holding Hull and therefore it is much wondered at that the King seemes more violent against the Actor then the Author but since through the Actor the Author must needs be pearced if the Act be found Treason let us consider of circumstances the same act may be treasonable or not if such and such circumstances vary for example to possesse a Towne and shut the gates against a King is Treason if there be not something in the act or in the intention or in the Authoritie of him that shuts the gates to qualifie and correct the nature of Treason in that act The first thing then to be lookt on is that the King was meerely denyed entrance for that time his generall right was not denyed and no defying language was given no act of violence was used though the King for divers houres together did stand within Musket shot and did use termes of defiance and this makes the act meerely defensive or rather passive And therfore how this should administer to the King any ground to leavy guards at Yorke many men wonder or that it should seeme the same thing to the King as if hee had beene pursued to the gates of Yorke Did the King without any feare treate Sir John Hotham as a Traytor in the face of his Artillery and after to enter Hull with twentie Horse onely unarmed and continue such a harsh Parley so many houres and yet when hee was in Yorke in a County of so great assurance could nothing but so many bands of Horse and Foot secure him from the same Sir John Hotham The next thing considerable is the Parliaments intention if the Parliament have here upon turned any of the Townesmen out of their estates or claymed any interest in it to themselves or have disseized the King utterly denying his right for the future or have made any other use of their possession but meerely to prevent civill warre and to disfurnish the Kings seducers of Armes and Ammunition let the State bee branded with Treason but if none of these things bee by any credit though their enemies should bee judges the most essentiall propertie of Treason must needs here bee absent in this act The next thing considerable is the Parliaments Authoritie if the Parliament bee not vertually the whole kingdome it selfe if it bee not the supreame judicature as well in matters of State as matters of Law if it be not the great Councell of the Kingdome as well as of the King to whom it belongeth by the consent of all nations to provide in all extraordinary cases Ne quid detrimenti capiat Respub let the brand of Treason sticke upon it nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have prevayled or if their grounds of jealousie were merely vaine or if the jealousie of a whole kingdome can bee counted vaine or if they claime any such right of judging of danger and preventing them without the Kings consent as ordinary and perpetuall and without any relation to publike danger let the reward of Treason be their guerdon But if their authoritie be so sacred their intention so loyall their act free from offensive violence and if the King might have prevented the same repulse by sending a messenger before hand or by coming without such considerable Forces in so unexpected a manner let not treason be here misplaced Had Faux falne by a private mans Sword in the very instant when he would have given fire to his trayne that act had not bin punishable and the Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authoritie yet there were other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason and he is not comprehensive of the value of a whole State nor of the vigour of our nationall union which does not so interpret it how much more unjust then is it that the whole State of England shall be condemned of Treason for doing such an act as this when its owne safetie wherein none can have so much interest as it selfe was so highly touched Let not all resistance to Princes be under one notion confounded let the principles and ingredients of it be justly examined and sometimes it will be held as pious and loyall to Princes themselves as at other times it is distructive and impious Let us by the same test try the actions intentions and authoritie of the Papists now in Ireland and compare them with this businesse at Hull and we shall see a diametricall contrarietie betweene them Their actions are all blood rapine and torture all ages all sexes all conditions of men have tasted of their infernall crueltie Their intentions are to extirpate that Religion which hath indeavored so long to bring them from Idolatry and Atheisme and to massacre that nation which hath indeavoured so gently to reduce them from poverty and beastiall barbarisme Their chiefe leaders in this horrid tragedy are Jesuites and meere Bandettoes and the Authority of King Parliament and Magistracy is the principall thing which they strike at and seeke to overwhelme in this deplorable deluge of blood such a direct contrariety then being betwixt the true Rebells in Ireland and the misnamed Rebells here in England the same men which condemne the one if they would be true to themselves they ought to commend the other for we have had experience often in England and other nations have had the like that Kings have marched forth amongst their enemies to encounter with their friends so easily are they to be flattered into errour and out of errour to seeke the ruine of those which ayme at nothing but perdition And yet questionlesse when Richard the second was invironed with the Forces of Spencer and his confederates vowing to sacrifice their blood in his
have too much wrong done them for what is more plain then this That the Venetians live more happily under their conditionate Duke then the Turks do under their most absolute Emperours Neverthelesse if we consider the noble Trophees of Rome which it gained under Consuls and conditionaâ—e Commanders we may suppose that no defect at all could be in that popular and mixt government And our neighbours in the Netherlands are a good instance for they being to cope with the most Puissant and free Prince of Christendom being but the torn relique of a small Nation yet for their defence would not put themselves under a Dictatorian power but they prepared themselves for that so terrible encounter under the Conduct of a Generall much limitted Neither have those straitned Commissiâ—ns yeelded any thing but victories to the States and solid honour to the Princes of Orange and what more the mightiest Monarchs of our age have atchieved or enjoy'd besides the filling of a phantasticall humour with imaginary grandour I speak not this in favour of any alteration in England I am as zealously addicted to Monarchy as any man can without dotage but I know there are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such I desire to be most studious of In some things I know t is dangerous to circumscribe Princes but in others there may be great danger in leaving them to their pleasure and scarce any hope at all of benefit and amongst other things the choice of publike Officers if the State have at least some share therein with the King what considerable inconvenience can happen thereby to the State or King is not in me to foresee but if it have no share experience sufficient teacheth us what great disasters may happen And so for the disusing and dissolving of Parliaments if the Parliament divide some part of that power with the King I see great good but no harm at all that can ensue either to weaken the Crown or disturb the subject thereby But it will be said in the next place If this disables not the King from protecting the Subject yet it diminishes his own Right and leaves him but the shadow of Royalty This is grounded upon a great mistake for some men think it a glorious thing to be able to kill as well as to save and to have a kinde of a Creators power over Subjects but the truth is such power procures much danger to ill Princes and little good to any for it begets not so much love as fear in the subiect though it be not abused and the fear of the subject does not give so perfect a Dominion as love Were Hannibal Scipio c. the lesse honoured or beloved because they were not independent surely no they were the lesse feared and for the same cause the more honoured and beloved Or were Alexander Pyrrbus c. the more honoured or beloved because they were independant I believe the contrary and that they had lived more gloriously and died lesse violently if a more moderate power had rendred them lesse insolent in their own thoughts and lesse feared in other mens Was Caesar the private man lesse successefull in his Warres or lesse dear in all his souldiers eyes or lesse powerfull in his Countrey-mens affections then Caesar the perpetuall Dictator No if the Imperiall Throne of the World added any thing to Caesar 't was not excellence nor true glory 't was but the externall complements of pomp and ostentation and that might perhaps blow up his minde with vanity and fill the people with 〈◊〉 it could not make Caesar a nobler gallanter greater Caesar 〈◊〉 he was I expect no lesse then to be laught at at â—ourt and to be hâ—ld the author of a strange paradox by those men which stick not to say That our King is now no more King of Scotland then he is King of France because his meer pleasure there is not so predominant in all cases of good and evill whatsoever but I regard not those fond things which cannot see in humane nature what is depraved in it and what not and what proceeds from vain and what from true glory and wherein the naturall perfection of power and honour differs from the painted rayes of spurious Majesty and Magnificence To me the Policy of Scotland seems more exquisite in poynt of prerogative then any other in Europe except ours And if the splendor and puissance of a Prince consist in commanding religious wise magnanimous warlike subjects I think the King of Scotland is more to be admired then the King of France and that he is so to the meer ingenuity of Government I ascribe it But some will allow That to follow the pattern of Antoninus freely and voluntarily as he did is not dishonourable in a Prince but to be under any Obligation or Law to do so is ignoble And this is as much as to say That Law though good yet quateâ—â—s Law is burthenous to mans nature and though it be so but to corrupted nature in asmuch as it retains from nothing but that which nature in its purity would it self restrain from yet corrupted nature it self is to be soothed and observed I have done with this point 't was spoken in honour of Hen. 7. That he governed his subjects by his Laws his Laws by his Lawyers and it might have been added his subjects Laws and Lawyers by advice of Parliament by the regulation of that Court which gave life and birth to all Laws In this Policy is comprized the whole act of Soveraignty for where the people are subject to the Law of the Land and not to the will of the Prince and where the Law is left to the interpretation of sworn upright Judges and not violated by power and where Parliaments superintend all and in all extraordinary cases especially betwixt the King and Kingdom do the faithfull Offices of Umpirage all things remain in such a harmony as I shall recommend to all good Princes The Parliament conceives that the King cannot apprehend any just fear from Sir John Hotham or interpret the meer shutting of Hull gates and the sending away of Arms and Ammunition in obedience to both Houses to be any preparation for Warre and Invasion against him at York and therefore they resolve to raise Forces against those Forces which the King raises to secure himself from Sir John Hotham The King hereupon charges the Parliament of levying Warre against Him under pretence of His levying Warre against them This is matter of fact and the World must judge whether the Kings preparations in the North be onely sutable to the danger of Sir John Hotham or no and whether the Parliament be in danger of the Kings strength there or no Or whether is more probable at this time that the King is incensed against the Parliament or the Parliament against the King or that the King is more intentive to assayl the Parliament or the
Parliament the King 'T is true the King abjures any intention of making Warre against his Parliament but what he intends against the malignant party in or out of Parliament is not exprest and the King abjures invasive Warre against them but whether he think not himself first invaded already is not exprest and the specifying of a faction in Parliament of some few malignants secures none for none can plead force and none ought to plead folly in Treasons of this nature and the major part of the Houses can neither plead absence or dissent and those which can must not be their own purgators Besides the act of Sir John Hotham is disputable the King adjudges it Treason the Parliament adjudge it no Treason and the King has not declared whether he will refer this to the tryall of the sword only or to some other tryall and if so To what kinde of tryall the judgement of a Parliament shall be submitted If we call another Parliament to judge of this so we may appeal in infinitum and why another should be cleerer then this we cannot imagine If we could constitute a higher Court for this appeal so we might do in infinitum also but we know no higher can be imagined and if we appeal to a lower that were to invert the course of nature and to confound all Parliaments for ever if we call all the Kingdom to judge of this we do the same thing as to proclaim Civill Warre and to blow the Trumpet of generall confusion And if we allow the King to be the sole supream competent Judge in this case we resigne all into his hands we give lifes liberties Laws Parliaments all to be held at meer discretion For there is in the interpretation of Law upon the last appeal the same supremacy of power requisite as is in making it And therefore grant the King supream interpreter and t is all one as if we granted him to be supream maker of Law and grant him this and we grant him to be above all limits all conditions all humane bonds whatsoever In this Intricacy therefore where the King and Parliament disagree and judgement must be supream either in the one or other we must retire to ordinary justice And there we see if the King consent not with the ordinary Judge the Law thinks it fit that the King subscribe rather then the Judge And if this satisfie not We must retire to the principles of Nature and there search whether the King or Kingdom be to be lookt upon as the efficient and finall cause and as the proper Subject of all power Neither is the oath of supremacy indangered hereby for he that ascribes more to the whole universality then to King yet ascribes to the King a true supremacy of power and honour above all particulars Nor is our allegiance temerated For when the Judge on the Bench delivers Law contrary to the Kings command This is not the same thing as to proceed against the Kings person upon any judgement given against him The King as to His own person is not to be forcibly repelled in any ill doingâ— nor is He accountable for ill done Law has only a directive but no coactive force upon his person but in all irregular acts where no personall force is Kings may be disobeyed their unjust commands may be neglected not only by communities but also by single men sometimes Those men therefore that maintain That all Kings are in all things and commands as well where personall resistance accompanies as not to be obeyed as being like Gods unlimitable and as well in evill as in good unquestionable are sordid flatterers And those which allow no limits but directive only And those no other but divine and naturall And so make all Princes as vast in power as the Turk for He is subject to the directive force of God and natures Laws and so allow subjects a dry right without all remedy are almost as stupid as the former And those lastly That allow humane Laws to obleage Kings more then directively in all cases where personall violence is absence and yet allow no Judges of those Laws but the King Himself run into absurdities as grosse as the former I come now to those seven doctrines and positions which the King by way of recapitulation layes open as so offensive And they run thus 1. THat the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law So that all the right of the King and people depends upon their pleasure It has been answered That this power must rest in them or in the King or in some inferiour Court or else all suites must be endlesse and it can no where rest more safely then in Parliament 2. That Parliaments are bound to no precedents Statutes are not binding to them Why then should precedents Yet there is no obligation stronger then the Justice and Honor of a Parliament 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publike necessity without the King and dispose of anything They may not desert the King but being deserted by the King when the Kingdom is in distresse They may judge of that distresse and relieve it and are to be accounted by the vertue of representation as the whole body of the State 4. That no Member of Parliament ought to be troubled for treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicions only And when leave may be seasonably had and when competent accusers appear not in the impeachment 5. That the Soveraign power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no negative voyce This power is not claimed as ordinary nor to any purpose But to save the Kingdom from ruine and in case where the King is so seduced as that He preferres dangerous men and prosecutes His loyall Subjects 6. That levying forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanied with his presence is not levying warre against the King But warre against His authority though not person is warre against the King If this were not so The Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining Himself and the Kingdom could not save both but must stand and look on 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose the King T is denyed That any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairly elected To stand in comparison with these I shall recite some such positions as the Kings papers offer to us And they follow thus 1. THat regall power is so derived from God and the Law as that it has no dependence upon the trust and consent of man and the King is accountable therefore to God and His other Kingdoms not to this And it is above the determination of Parliaments and by consequence boundlesse 2. That the King is supream indefinitely viz. As well universis as singulis 3. That the King has such a propriety in His Subjects Towns Forts c. As is above the propriety of the State and not to be seized by the Parliament though for the publike safety 4. That so farre as the King is trusted He is not accountable how He performs So that in all cases the Subject is remedilesse 5. That the being of Parliaments is meerly of grace So that the King might justly have discontinued them and being summoned they are limited by the writ and that ad consilium Only and that but in quibusdam arduis And if they passe the limits of the Writ they may be imprisoned That if the King desert them they are a voyde assembly and no honour due to them nor power to save the Kingdom That Parliamentary priviledges are no where to be read of And so their representation of this whole Kingdom is no priviledge nor addes no Majesty nor authority to them That the major part in Parliament is not considerable when so many are absent or dissent That the major part is no major part Because the fraud and force of some few over-rules them That Parliaments may do dishonourable things nay treasonable Nay That this hath been so blinded by some few malignants That they have abetted treason in Sir John Hotham Trampled upon all Law and the Kings prerogative And sought to inslave the whole Kingdom under the Tyranny of some few And sought the betraying of Church and State And to the same erected an upstart Authority in the new Militia and levyed warre upon the King under pretence that He levies warre upon them That Parliaments cannot declare Law but in such and such particular cases legally brought before them That Parliaments are questionable and tryable elsewhere These things we all see tend not only to the desolation of this Parliament but to the confusion of all other And to the advancing of the King to a higher power over Parliaments then ever He had before over inferiour Courts Parliaments have hitherto been Sanctuaries to the people and banks against Arbitrary tyranny But now the meer breath of the King blasts them in an instant and how shall they hereafter secure us when they cannot now secure themselves Or how can we expect justice when the meer imputation of treason without hearing tryall or judgement shall sweep away a whole Parliament nay all Parliaments for ever And yet this is not yet the depth of our misery For that private Councell which the King now adheres to and preferres before Parliaments will still inforce upon our understandings That all these doctrines and positions tend to the perfection of Parliaments And all the Kings forces in the North to the protection of Law and liberty I finde my Reason already captivated I cannot further FINIS
OBSERVATIONS upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Expresses IN this contestation betweene Regall and Paliamentary power for methods sake it is requisite to consider fâ—â—se of Regall then of Parliamentary Power and in both to consider the efficient and finall causes and the meanes by which they are supported The King attributeth the originall of his royalty to God and the Law making no mention of the graunt consent or trust of man therein but the truth is God is no more the author of Regall then of Aristocraticall power nor of supreame then of subordinate command nay that dominion which is usurped and not just yet whilst it remaines dominion and till it be legally againe devested referres to God as to its Author and donor as much as that which is hereditary And that Law which the King mentioneth is not to be understood to be any speciall ordinance sent from heaven by the ministery of Angels or Prophets as amongst the Jewes it sometimes was It can be nothing else amongst Christians but the Pactions and agreements of such and such politique corporations Power is originally inherent in the people and it is nothing else but that might and vigour which such or such a societie of men containes in it selfe and when by such or such a Law of common consent and agreement it is derived into such and such hands God confirmes that Law and so man is the free and voluntary Author the Law is the Instrument and God is the establisher of both And we see not that Prince which is the most potent over his subjects but that Prince which is most Potent in his subjects is indeed most truely potent for a King of one small City if he be intrusted with a large Prerogative may bee sayd to be more Potent over his subjects then a King of many great Regions whose prerogative is more limited and yet in true realitie of power that King is most great and glorious which hath the most and strongest subjects and not he which tramples upon the most contemptible vassells This is therefore a great and fond errour in some Princes to strive more to be great over their people then in their people and to ecclipse themselves by impoverishing rather then to magnifie themselves by infranchising their Subjects This we see in France at this day for were the Peasants there more free they would be more rich and magnanimous and were they so their King were more puissant but now by affecting an adulterate power over his Subjects the King there looses a true power in his Subjects imbracing a cloud instead of Juno but thus we see that power is but secondary and derivative in Princes the fountaine and efficient cause is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis Major yet he is universis minor for if the people be the true efficient cause of power it is a rule in nature quicquid efficit tale est magis tale And hence it appeares that at the founding of authorities when the consent of societies convayes rule into such and such hands it may ordaine what conditions and prefix what bounds it pleases and that no dissolution ought to be thereof but by the same power by which it had its constitution As for the finall cause of Regall Authoritie I doe not finde any thing in the Kings papers denying that the same people is the finall which is the efficient cause of it and indeed it were strange if the people in subjecting it selfe to command should ayme at any thing but its owne good in the first and last place T is true according to Machavills politicks Princes ought to ayme at greatnes not in but over their Subjects and for the atchieving of the same they ought to propose to themselves no greater good then the spoyling and breaking the spirits of their Subjects nor no greater mischiefe then common freedome neither ought they to promote and cherish any servants but such as are most fit for rapine and oppression nor depresse and prosecute any as enemies but such as are gracious with the populacy for noble and gallant Acts To be deliciae humani generis is growne fordid with Princes to be publike torments and carnificines and to plot against those Subjects whom by nature they ought to protect is held Caesar-like and therefore bloody Borgias by meere crueltie tâ—eachery hath gotten roome in the Calender of witty and of spirited Heroes And our English Court of late yeares hath drunke too much of this State poyson for eyther wee have seene favorites raysed to poll the people and razed againe to pacifie the people or else which is worse for King and people too we have seene engines of mischiefe preserved against the people and upheld against Law meerely that mischeefe might not want incouragement But our King here doth acknowledge it the great businesse of his coronation oath to protect us And I hope under this word protect he intends not onely to shield us from all kind of evill but to promote us also to all kind of Politicall happinesse according to his utmost devoyre and I hope hee holds himselfe bound thereunto not onely by his oath but also by his very Office and by the end of his soveraigne dignitie And though all single persons ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of Grace with all thankefulnesse and humility yet the King himselfe looking upon the whole State ought to acknowledge that hee cannot merit of it and that whatsoever he hath granted if it be for the prosperity of his people but much more for their ease it hath proceeded but from his meere dutie If Ship money if the Starre Chamber if the High Commission if the Votes of Bishops and Popish Lords in the upper House be inconsistent with the welfare of the Kingdome not onely honour but justice it selfe challenges that they be abolisht the King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people nor ought he to thinke that perisht to him which is gained to the people The word grace sounds better in the peoples mouthes then in his his dignitie was erected to preserve the Commonaltie the Commonaltie was not created for his service and that which is the end is farre more honorable and valuable in nature and policy then that which is the meanes This directs us then to the transcendent {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of all Politiques to the Paramount Law that shall give Law to all humane Lawes whatsoever and that is Salus Populi The Law of Prerogative it selfe it is subservient to this Law and were it not conducing thereunto it were not necessary nor expedient Neither can the right of conquest be pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people as the Authors or ends of all power for meere force cannot alter the course of nature or frustrate the
tenour of Law and if it could there were more reason why the people might justifie force to regaine due libertie then the Prince might to subvert the same And t is a shamefull stupidity in any man to thinke that our Ancestors did not fight more nobly for their free customes and Lawes of which the conqueror and his successors had in part disinherited them by violence and perjury then they which put them to such conflicts for it seemes unnatural to me that any nation should be bound to contribute its owne inherent puissance meerely to abet Tiranny and support slavery and to make that which is more excellent a prey to that which is of lesse worth And questionlesse a native Prince if meere Foree be right may disfranchise his Subjects as well as a stranger if he can frame a sufficient party and yet we see this was the foolish sinne of Rehoboam who having deserted and reiected out of an intollerable insolence the strength of ten tribes ridiculously sought to reduce them againe with the strength of two I come now from the cause which conveyes Royalty and that for which it is conveyed to the nature of the conveyance The word Trust is frequent in the Kings Papers and therefore I conceive the King does admit that his interest in the Crowne is not absolute or by a meere donation of the people but in part conditionate and fiduciary And indeed all good Princes without any expresse contract betwixt them and their Subjects have acknowledged that there did lie a great and high trust upon them nay Heathen Princes that have beene absolute have acknowledged themselves servants to the publike and borne for that service and professed that they would manage the publike weale as being well satisfied populi Rem esse non suam And we cannot imagine in the fury of warre when lawes have the least vigour that any Generalissimo can be so uncircumscribed in power but that if he should turne his Canons upon his owne Souldiers they vvere ipso facto absolved of all obedience and of all oathes and ties of allegiance vvhatsoever for that time and bound by higher dutie to seeke their owne preservation by resistance and defence vvherefore if there bee such tacite trusts and reservations in all publike commands though of the most absolute nature that can be supposed vve cannot but admit that in all well formed monarchies vvhere kingly Prerogative has any limits set this must needs be one necessary condition that the subject shall live both safe and free The Charter of nature intitles all Subjects of all Countries vvhatsoever to safetie by its supreame Law But freedome indeed has divers degrees of latitude and all Countries therein doe not participate alike but positive Lawes must every vvhere assigne those degrees The great Charter of England is not strait in Priviledges to us neither is the Kings oath of small strength to that Charter for that though it bee more precise in the care of Canonicall Priviledges and of Bishops and Clergymen as having beene penned by Popish Bishops then of the Commonalty yet it confirmes all Lawes and rightfull customes amongst vvhich vve most highly esteeme Parliamentary Priviledges and as for the word Eligerit whether it be future or past it skills not much for if by this oaths Law Justice and descretion be executed amongst us in all judgements as vvell in as out of Parliament and if peace and godly agreement be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amongst us all and if the King defend and uphold all our lawes and customes vve need not feare but the King is bound to consent to new Lawes if they be necessary as vvell as defend old for both being of the same necessity the publique trust must needs equally extend to both and vve conceive it one Parliamentary right and custome that nothing necessary ought to be denyed And the vvord Eligerit if it be in the perfect tense yet shewes that the peoples election had beene the ground of ancient Lawes and customes and vvhy the peoples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever I cannot discover That vvhich results then from hence is if our Kings receive all royalty from the people and for the behoofe of the people and that by a speciall trust of safety and libertie expressely by the people limited and by their owne grants and oathes ratified then our Kings cannot be sayd to have so unconditionate and high a proprietie in all our lives liberties and possessions or in any thing else to the Crowne appertayning as vve have in their dignity or in our selves and indeed if they had they vvere not borne for the people but merely for themselves neither were it lawfull or naturall for them to expose their lives and fortunes for their Country as they have beene hitherto bound to doe according to that of our Saviour Bonus Pastor ponit vitam pro ovibus But now of Parliaments Parliaments have the same efficient cause as monarchies if not higher for in the truth the vvhole Kingdome is not so properly the Author as the essence it selfe of Parliaments and by the former rule t is magic tale because vve see ipsum quid quod efficit tale And it is I thinke beyond all controversie that God and the Law operate as the same causes both in Kings and Parliaments for God favours both and the Law establishes both and the act of men still concurres in the sustentation of both And not to stay longer upon this Parliaments have also the same finall cause as Monarchies if not greater for indeed publike safety and liberty could not be so effectually provided for by Monarchs till Parliaments were constituted for the supplying of all defects in that Government Two things especially are aymed at in Parliaments not to be attayned to by other meanes First that the interest of the people might be satisfied secondly that Kings might be the better counsailed In the summons of Edw. the first Claus. 7. 111. 3. Dors. we see the first end of Parliaments expressed for he inserts in the writ that whatsoever affayre is of publike concernment ought to receive publike approbation quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbari debet or tructari And in the same writ he saith this is lâ—x ne tissima provida circumspectione stabilita there is not a word here but it is observeable publique approbation consent or treatie is necessary in all publike expedients and this is not a meere usage in England but a Law and this Law is not subject to any doubt or dispute there is nothing more knowne neither is this knowne Law extorted from Kings by the violence and injustice of the people it is duely and formally establisht and that upon a great deale of reason not without the providence and circumspection of all the states Were there no further Antiquity but the raigne of Edward the first to recommend this to us certainly so there ought no reverence to be withheld from it
maine ground of all those bitter invectives almost which are iterated and inforced with so much eloquence in all the Kings late papers See if wee are not left as a prety to the same bloudy hands as have done such diabolicall exployts in Ireland or to any others which can perswade the King that the Parliament is not well affected to him if we may not take up armes for our owne safety or if it be possible for us to take up armes without some Votes or ordinances to regulate the Militia or to make our defence manly and not beastiall and void of all Counsell the name of a King is great I confesse and worthy of great honour but is not the name of people greater let not meere tearms deceave us let us weigh names and things together admit that God sheds here some rayes of Majesty upon his vicegerents on earth yet except we thinke he doth this out of particular love to Princes themselves and not to communties of men wee must not hence invert the course of nature and make nations subordinate in end to Princes My Lord of Strafford sayes that the Law of Prerogative is like that of the first table but the Law of Common safety and utility like that of the second and hence concludes that precedence is to be given to that which is more sacred that is Regall Prerogative Upon this ground all Parasites build when they seeke to hood-winke Princes for their owne advantages and when they assay to draw that esteeme to themselves which they withdraw from the people and this doctrin is common because 't is so acceptable for as nothing is more pleasant to Princes then to be so deified so nothing is more gainefull to Courtiers then so to please But to look into termes a little more narrower and dispell umbrages Princes are called Gods Fathers Husbands Lords Heads c. and this implyes them to be of more worth and more unsubordinate in end then their Subjects are who by the same relation must stand as Creatures Children Wives Servants Members c. I answer these termes do illustrate some excellency in Princes by way of similitude but must not in all things be applyed and they are most truly applyed to Subjects taken divisim but not conjunctim Kings are Gods to particular men secundum quid and are sanctified with some of Gods royaltie but it is not for themselves it is for an extrinsecall end and that is the prosperitie of Gods people and that end is more sacred than the meanes as to themselves they are most unlike God for God cannot bee obliged by any thing extrinsecall no created thing whatsoever can be of sufficient value or excellencie to impose any dutie or tye upon God as Subjects upon Princes therefore granting Prerogative to be but mediate and the Weale Publike to be finall wee must rank the Lawes of libertie in the first Table and Prerogative in the second as Nature doth require and not after a kind of blasphemy ascribe that unsubordination to Princes which is only due to God so the King is a Father to his People taken singly but not universally for the father is more worthy than the son in nature and the son is wholly a debtor to the father and can by no merit transcend his dutie nor chalenge any thing as due from his father for the father doth all his offices meritoriously freely and unexactedly Yet this holds not in the relation betwixt King Subject for its more due in policie and more strictly to be chalenged that the King should make happy the People than the People make glorious the King This same reason is also in relation of Husband Lord c. for the wife is inferiour in nature and was created for the assistance of man and servants are hired for their Lords meere attendance but it is otherwise in the State betwixt man and man for that civill difference which is for civill ends and those ends are that wrong and violence may be repressed by one for the good of all not that servilitie and drudgerie may be imposed upon all for the pomp of one So the head naturally doth not more depend upon the body than that does upon the head both head and members must live and dye together but it is otherwise with the Head Politicall for that receives more subsistence from the body than it gives and being subservient to that it has no being when that is dissolved and that may be preserved after its dissolution And hence it appeares that the verie order of Princes binds them not to be insolent but lowly and not to aime at their owne good but secondarily contrarie to the Florentines wretched Politiques And it followes that such Princes as contrarie to the end of government effect evill in stead of good insulting in common servilitie rather than promoting common securitie and placing their chiefest pomp in the sufferance of their Subjects commit such sins as God will never countenance nay such as the unnaturall father the tyrannous husband the mercilesse master is not capable of committing nay we must conceive that Treason in Subjects against their Prince so far only as it concernes the Prince is not so horrid in nature as oppression in the Prince exercised violently upon Subjects God commands Princes to study his Law day and night and not to amasse great treasures or to encrease their Cavaliers or to lift up their hearts above their brethren nor to wast their owne demeanes lest necessitie should tempt them to rapine But on the contrarie Machiavels Instructions puffe up Princes That they may treat Subjects not as brethren but as beasts as the basest beasts of drudgerie teaching them by subtiltie and by the strength of their Militia to uphold their owne will and to make meere sponges of the publike coffers And sure if that cursed Heretike in policie could have invented any thing more repugnant to Gods commands and Natures intention he had been held a deeper Statesman than hee is but I conceive it is now sufficiently cleared that all rule is but fiduciarie and that this and that Prince is more or lesse absolute as he is more or lesse trusted and that all trusts differ not in nature or intent but in degree only and extent and therefore since it is unnaturall for any Nation to give away its owne proprietie in it selfe absolutely and to subject it selfe to a condition of servilitie below men because this is contrarie to the supreme of all Lawes wee must not think that it can stand with the intent of any trust that necessarie defence should be barred and naturall preservation denyed to any people no man will deny but that the People may use meanes of defence where Princes are more conditionate and have a soveraigntie more limited and yet these being only lesse trusted than absolute Monarchs and no trust being without an intent of preservation it is no more intended that the People shall be remedilesly oppressed in a
quarrell and in defiance of the adverse trayterous Peeres he which would have told him that those Swords drawne for him were in truth drawne against him and his best friends and those Swords on the other side drawne against him or rather against his seducers were indeed drawne for him should have found but poore acceptance for without doubt the King would have thought such a suggestion an abuse to his sences to his reason to his conscience and an impudent imposture worthy of nothing but scorne and indignation And if it had beene further pressed that the voyce and councell of the Peeres was the voyce and councell of the major and better part of the Kingdome whereas Spencers party was but of inconsiderable fortunes and his Councell was but private and might tend to private ends it is likely the King at the last resort would have referred all to his owne will and discretion but I have now done with the businesse of Hull and therein I thinke with all objections against the Loyaltie of the Parliament for the same reason will extend to all their Votes and actions concerning the Militia c. and in summe all ends in this if Kings bee so inclineable to follow private advise rather then publique and to preferre that which closes with their naturall impotent ambition before that which crosses the same are without all limits then they may destroy their best subjects at pleasure and all Charters and Lawes of publike safetie and freedome are voyd and God hath not left humane nature any meanes of sufficient preservation But on the contrary if there bee any benefit in Lawes to limit Princes when they are seduced by Privadoes and will not hearken to the Great Councell of the Land doubtlesse there must be some Court to judge of that seducement and some authoritie to inforce that iudgement and that Court and Authoritie must bee the Parliament or some higher Tribunall there can be no more certaine Crisis of seducement then of preferring private advise before publike But the King declines this point and saith that hee doth not undervalue the whole Parliament or lay charge of Treason upon all he doth confesse that divers have dissented and divers beene absent c. hee deserts onely and accuses the faction and conspiracy of some few in Parliament Wee are now at last fallen upon an issue fit to put an end to all other invectives let us sticke close to it The King promises very shortly a full and satisfactory narration of those few persons in Parliament whose designe is and alwayes was to alter the whole frame of government both in Church and State and to subject both King and people to their owne lawlesse Arbitrary power and government a little of this Logicke is better then a great deale of Rhetoricke as the case now stands If the King will please now to publish the particular crimes of such as hee hath formerly impeached of Treason and the particular names of such as now hee sets forth in those Characters and will therein referre himselfe to the strength of his proofes and evidence of his matter it is impossible that any jealousie can cloud his integretie or checke his power any longer Then it will appeare to all that he hath not left us out of any disaffection to Parliaments or out of any good opinion of Papists Delinquents and other Incendiaries but that hee was necessitated to depart from us that hee might be the better able to preserve to us our Religion Lawes and liberties and that none of his solemne oathes of cordiall love to us hath wanted integretie and faith This will satisfie all lovers of Justice that he gives not light credit to weake whisperers or malitious informers whose ayme may bee to bring this Parliament to some ignoble tryall or to confound it without any tryall at all by generall aspertions and meere calumnious surmises this will proclaime his cander and sinceritie and set a brighter luster upon his Justice then any oratory whatsoever By the performance of this promise he shall not doe onely right to himselfe but also to the whole kingdome for the distracted multitude being at last by this meanes undeceived shall not onely prostrate themselves and all their power presently at his feet but for ever after remaine the more assured of his good whether to publike liberties and Parliamentary Priviledges Howsoever nothing but the awfull promise of a King could make us thinke so dishonorably of Parliaments or suspend our judgements so long of them for an Aristocracy in Parliament cannot bee erected without meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutible for the power of Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tiranny amongst us is not discernable the whole kingdome is not to bee mastered against consent by the Traine Band nor the Traine Bands by the Lords or debutie Lievtenants nor they by the maior part in Parliament nor the maior part in Parliament by I know not what septem-virat there is some mistery in this which seemes yet above if not contrary to nature but since the King hath promised to open it we will suspend our opinion and expect it as the finall issue of all our disputes The maine body of the difference being thus stated I come now to the observations of some other severall obiections against this Parliament and exceptions taken against arbitrary power in all Parliaments and I shall observe no order but consider them as I finde them either dispersed or recollected in the Kings late Expresses The Parliament being complayned against for undutifull usage to the King above all former Parliaments hath said that if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modesty and dutie The King because some Parliaments formerly have deposed Kings applyes these words to those Presidents but it may iustly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truely consent to the dethroaning of any King of England for that Act whereby Richard the second was deposed was rather the Act of Hen. the fourth and his victorious Army then of the whole Kingdome The Parliament is taxed of reproaching this Kings government to render him odious to his subiects whereas indeed all the miscariages and grievous oppressions of former times are solely imputed to the ill Ministers and Councellors of the King And all the misfortunes of these times since November 1640. are imputed to the blame of the Parliament the Kings words to the Parliament are That the condition of his Subjects when it was at worst under his government was by many degrees more pleasant and happy then this to which the Parliaments furious pretences of reformation hath brought them to In this case the Parliament being accused of so haynous crimes did uniustly betray themselves if they should not lay the blame upon the
Kings evill Councellors the onely enemies and interrupters of Parliaments Neverthelesse the King takes this as a way of the Parliament to let them into their franke expressions of him and his actions and takes all things spoken against his ministers as spoken against himselfe how miserable here is the condition of the Parliament eyther they must sinke under uniust charges or be censured for the reproachers of their king nay they are undutifull if they tell not the King himselfe that he ought not to onerate himselfe with the blame of his Councellors The Parliament because it could not obtaine no equall Justice from the Court-Caveleers who are conceived to be the first moovers of those stirres and tumults which happened at Westminster did reserve the hearing of some of the contrary side it selfe upon this it is objected that the Parliament incited those seditious and protected the actors in it whereas they desire Justice yet and that both sides may be brought fairely to an equall hearing and before such hearing they desire that no parties may be condemned And whereas the Parliament upon those rude commotions are condemned as unheard and of that which is unproved and never can be proved That they leavyed Warre upon the King and drove him away yet they desire that that meer imputation may not draw any further opposition to their proceedings and the necessities of the State for if the King could not stay at London with safety yet being now at York in safety he may concurre with the advice of his Parliament the distance of the place needs not cause any distance of affection since the King conceives He hath so few enemies and assures himself of so many friends in Parliament The Parliament sayes That none of its Members may be apprehended in case of suspicion where no information or witnesses appear to make good the Prosecution without acquainting the Parliament if leave may be conveniently obtained In opposition to this a case is put Of a Parliament-man that rides from York to London and takes a purse by the way the Parliament doth not priviledge Robberies so done for though no such thing be likely ever to be done yet if it be in that case the evidence of the fact in that instant allowes not onely the apprehending but the casuall killing of such a Robber Who sees not many differences betwixt such a case and that of the five Members of the lower House where neither Witnesses not Informers nor Relaters nor any particularity of crime could be produced and yet by the same act the whole House might have been surprized And all the world knows That the impeached Members still suffer by that Charge and yet can obtain no right against any Informers though it be now converted to their disadvantage The Parliament does not deny the King a true-reall Interest in any thing held by him either in jure Coronae or in jurae Personae yet meerly because it affirms That in the same thing the State hath an Interest Paramont in cases of publique extremity by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation Hereupon the King replies That this utterly abolishes His Interest in all things so that by this device He is made uncapable either of suffering wrong or receiving right a strange violented wrested conclusion and yet the Kings Interest in Hull and in the lives of his subjects is not such an Interest as in other moveables neither is the Kings Interest taken away from him the same things are still reserved for him in better hands then he would have put them The Parliament maintains its own Councell to be of honour and power above all other and when it is unjustly rejected by a King seduced and abused by private flatterers to the danger of the Common-wealth it assumes a right to judge of that danger and to prevent it the King sayes That this gives them an arbitrary unlimitable power to unsettle the security of all mens estates and that they are seduceable and may abuse this power nay they have abused it and he cites the Anabaptists in Germany and the 30 Tyrants at Athens That there is an Arbitrary power in every State somewhere t is true t is necessary and no inconvenience follows upon it every man has an absolute power over himself but because no man can hate himself this power is not dangerous nor need to be restrayned So every State has an Arbitrary power over it self and there is no danger in it for the same reason If the State intrusts this to one man or few there may be danger in it but the Parliament is neither one nor few it is indeed the State it self it is no good consequence though the King makes so much use of it That the Parliament doth abuse power because it may The King would think it hard that we should conclude so against him and yet the King challenges a greater power then Parliaments and indeed if the Parliament may not save the Kingdome without the King the King may destroy the Kingdom in despight of the Parliament and whether then challenges that which is most Arbitrary and of most danger but the King sayes This Parliament has abused their power I wish Kings had never abused theirs more And the Parliament answers That this is but his nude avirment and in controversies that ought not to condemn private men much lesse ought Parliaments to fall under it And as for Mr Hooker he does not say That the Anabaptists in Germany did deceive Parliaments with their hypocrisie and therefore inferre that Parliaments ought no further to be trusted the stirres of the Anabaptists in Germany conclude no more against Parliaments then the impostures of Mahomet in Arabia do And as for the 30 Tyrants of Athens we know they were not so chosen by the people as our Knights Citizens and Burgesses are nor created or called by any Kings Writ as our Peers are nor did they so meerly depend upon their own good abearing and the good liking both of King and State as our Lords and Commons now do neither had they so many equalls and Rivalls as both our Houses contain we know their power was not founded upon the consent of the Citizens but the strength of their Souldiers neither were their Souldiers such as our Train Bands but meer mercinaries of desperate or perhaps no Fortunes whose Revenue was rapine whose Trade was murther I fear they were more like our Cavaliers at Yorke then the Militia at London Were our new Militia any other our old Trayn Bands or our new Lievtenants and Deputies any other then the same Lords and Gentlemen with very little variation which before were very well reputed of both by King and Commons and not yet by either excepted against or did the whole fate of the kingdom depend meerly upon the new Militia this new device of an Aristocrasie might seem the more plausible but as things now stand this new
all men which neither Kingdom Parliament King nor all the Royallists can oppose What a strange unlathomable machination and work of darknesse is this But this is said to be done by cunning force absence or accident If it be by cunning Then we must suppose that the Kings party in Parliament has lost all their Law policy and subtilty And that all the Parliament except some few are luld-a-sleep by Mercuries Minstrelsie or that some diabolicall charme has closed up all their various eyes If it be by force Then we must suppose that our Aristocraticall heads carry about them great store of that Serpents teeth which yeilded heretofore so sudden and plentifull a harvest of armed men being but cast into the furrows of the earth Though their armies have been hitherto invisible yet we must suppose That they are in a readinesse to rise upon the first Alarum beaten If it be by absence then we must suppose That this Aristocraticall machination is easily yet to be prevented for t is not a hard matter to draw a full apparence together and that we see has been done lately by the order of the House it self Nay we see t is not the House but the opposite part that desires to scatter and divide and draw away and as much as in them lyes to hinder a full assembly And therefore This is not the way If it be by accident Then we must be contented to expect and have a little patience Fortune is not alwayes constant to one certain posture nor do the Celestiall bodies confine themselves to one unaltered motion The Parliament requests of the King That all great Officers of State by whom publike affaires shall be transacted may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Councell The King takes this as a thing maliciously plotted against him as a proposition made in mockery of him as a request which He cannot yeeld to without shewing Himself unworthy of that trust which Law reposes in Him and of His descent from so many great and famous Ancestors He conceives He cannot perform the Oath of protecting His people if He abandon this power and assume others into it He conceives it such a Flowre of the Crown as is worth all the rest of the Garland not to be parted with all upon any extremity of conquest or imprisonment nor for any low sordid considerations of wealth and gain whatsoever He conceives That if He should passe this He should retain nothing but the Ceremonious Ensignes of Royalty or the meer sight of a Crown and Scepter nay the Stock being dead the Twigs would not long flourish but as to true and reall power He should remain but the outside the picture the signe of a King Could this be If all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty the substance of the request seems to be no more but this That it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments rather then His own meer understanding or any inferiour Councellors in those things which concern the liberties and lifes of the whole people And how could this request seem equall to a demanding of the Crown to a dethroning of the King and to a leaving of the Kingdom destitute of protection if Parliaments were not supposed mortall enemies to Princes and Princes not supposed but openly declared enemies to Parliaments if the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his own good liking only or upon recommendation of such a Courtier here he is devested of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himself of Majesty and devesting himself of Power Ordinary reason cannot suggest otherwise hereupon but either Parliaments affect not Kings nor their own good nor would make good elections or else Kings affect not Parliaments nor the Kingdoms good and therefore they oppose such elections meerly because they are good but let us observe the Kings reasons against Parliamentary elections For first He conceives them prejudiciall for the people Secondly Dishonourable to himself Man is by nature of restlesse ambition as the meanest vassall thinks himself worthy of some greatnesse so the most absolute Monarch aspires to something above his greatnesse Power being over obtained by haughty mindes quickly discovers that it was not first aimed at meerly to effect Noble actions but in part to insult over others and ambitious men thirst after that power which may do harm as well as good nay though they are not resolved to do harm yet they would be masters of it Qui nolunt occidere quenquam Posse volunt And yet let this power be added the minde still remains unfilled still some further Terrestriall omnipotence a sharing with God and surmounting above mortall condition is affected Our Law has a wholesome Maxime That the King may onely do that which is just but Courtiers invert the sense of it and tell him That all is just which he may do or which he is not restrained from doing by Law Such and such things Princes ought not to do though no Law limited them from doing thereof but now those things which by nature they abhorre to do yet they abhorre as much to be limited from That disposition which makes us averse from cruelty and injury we account a noble and vertuous disposition but that Law which shall restrain us from the same is stomacked at and resisted as a harsh bit to put into our mouths or bonds upon our arms Antoninus Pius is greatly renowned for communicating all weighty affairs and following publike advice a dapprobation in all great expedients of high concernment and he was not more honourable then prosperous therein Had he been a meer servant to the State he coulâ— not have condescended further and yet if he had done necessarily what he did voluntarily the same thing had been in the same manner effectuall for t is not the meer putting or not putting of â—aw that does after the nature of good or evill Power then to do such an evill or not to do such a good is in truth no reall power nor desired out of any noblenesse but rather windy arrogance and as it is uselesse to men truely noble so to men that love evill for evill ends t is very dangerous What will Nero more despise then to condescend as Antoninus did yet 't were more necessary that Nero were limited then Antoninus for excessive power added to Nero's cruelty serves but as Oyl poured upon flame When Princes are as potent as vicious we know what Ministers swarm about them and the end is That as vast power corrupts and inclines them to iâ—l Councells so they perish at last by Councellors worst of all T is pretended that Princes cannot be limitted from evill but they may be disabled from doing good thereby which is not alwayes true and yet if it were the people had better want some right then