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A35993 An answer to a printed book, intituled, Observations upon some of His Maiesties late answers and expresses Diggs, Dudley, 1613-1643. 1642 (1642) Wing D1454; ESTC R14255 51,050 121

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swallow up the Subjects right or the Subjects right the Kings just prerogative No dissolution ought to be of rule convayed by the consent of societyes into such and such hands but by the same power by which it had it's constitution This J grant being rightly understood but because the sense may be easily mistaken J shall enlarge my selfe upon it It is most agreeable to reason that the same power should by equall right abrogate as it did at first constitute For it is not possible any body should lay a necessary obligation upon it selfe to doe thus when it had liberty to doe otherwise except in relation to some other person to whom I may part with that right I had without possibility of recalling it And this either by actuall donation so when I have given away my money J cannot challenge it as due on my repentance or by promise which is an earnest of my performance In these cases J cannot use my liberty because it would be to the injury of another according to that rule grounded on great equity Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam L nemo D. de reg jur In a popular state there is but one simple power and therefore the people upon consent may establish an Aristocracy or Monarchy when they please But in the other two where the authority is placed in the hands of a few or of one there are two parties in the contract and therefore even the whole people have not any power of dissolving this government unlesse this one or those few will voluntarily resigne up their power into those hands from which they received it and that such resignation be not to the injury of a third party It were strange if the people in subjecting it selfe to command should aime at any thing but it's own good in the first and last place No question rule and subjection divided paternall powers finding it necessary to yeeld to one Regall and instead of many to submit to one common father did spring from reason directing man-kind to its greatest convenience Therefore the people ayming chiefly at their own good yet perceiving this was not to be attained except they had a common protector to administer justice equally amongst them they found it necessary in a higher degree to provide for his good in recompense of their security and out of their particular estates to grant to him honourable demaines to whose care and justice they owed the peaceable possession of all So the good of either is mutually involved and that the people may be happy they must first provide for the happinesse of their ruler What followes I shall think unworthy any answer He breaks out into a most scandalous and false invective against the late government That the subject groaned under some grievances cannot be denied and we owe to the goodnesse of his Majestie that we are free even from the feare of them for the future J speak sincerely what I think though the wit of malice should set before us the most exact table of all our sufferings let it not impose upon us what we never felt and compare us to any other nation of the Christian world we in our worst times were least unhappy Because we have no reason to be in love with any evils I shall not endeavour to excuse them by comparison with our present miseries Though neither be desirable yet we are too sensible which we have justest reason to complain of I hope under this word protect the King intends not onely to shield us from all kinde of evill but to promote us also to all kinde of Politicall happinesse according to his utmost de voyre I never before did apprehend in the word Protect this large notion we may expect all happinesse from His goodnesse we cannot challenge it from His duty How should we conceave that the Prince is obliged by oath to take care for his people in such a degree as the most affectionate mother never yet took for her dearest children If it were so then all his Majesties Royall ancestors who did not provide for their people in such a high degree of happinesse as he by the advise of this present Parliament hath done were perjured as having all taken the oath to Protect Every particular subject hath a just title and may challenge an interest in whatsoever is meant by the word Protection Is the King therefore bound to promote every particular person to all kinds of politicall happinesse to advance all to honours offices power command Though all single persons ought to look upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of Grace with all thankfulnesse and humility yet the King himselfe looking upon the whole state ought to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it c. all hath proceeded but from his meere duty It was believed heretofore the greatest happinesse of a Prince that he was able his greatest glory to be willing to oblige his people But now he is made not capable of doing any courtesie When he hath done all that he can he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant I am confident never any age was guilty of the like irreverence and disrespect to Princes as is shewne in this book If all single persons ought to look upon the late bills passed by the King as matters of Grace then they truly are so for no obligation can lay upon a man to believe things otherwise then they are This ground destroyes the power of beneficence in a Prince and the duty of gratitude in Subjects We should think it very hard if we who are but subjects should be dealt with by the same rule All owe a duty to their King to their country yet upon extraordinary services we beleive we deserve well of both The example of the House of Commons will better instruct him who have severall times presented their thanks and humble acknowledgment of his Majesties gracious favours and have likewise received thanks from most Counties in the Kingdome for procuring those bills so beneficiall to the subject and yet surely the trust reposed in them by those that chose them and the end for which they met did no lesse oblige them in point of duty to doe whatsoever might conduce to the generall good of the Kingdome The King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people nor ought he to think that perisht to him which is gained to the people By the same argument the people may share all that he hath and he is bound to believe he has lost nothing If King and people have severall rights what law is there which binds the King suo jure cedere and enables the people to preserve their rights nay to challenge his And if they have not but the interests of King and people be either altogether one and the same or so inseparably united as they cannot be severed then it
equally follows the people ought not to account that a profit or strength to them which is a losse and wasting to the King nor ought they to think that perisht to them which is gained to him Regall dignity was erected to preserve the commonalty It was so for out of the sense of those miseries which the want of due administration of justice produced routs became societies and placed a head over them to whom they paid the tribute of reverence for the benefit of Protection But that which is the end is farre more honourable and valuable in nature and policy then that which is the meanes The conclusion implied is therefore the Commons more honourable then the Soveraign J will frame some other arguments upon the same principle see how he approves them Angels are ministring spirits for the good of men but the end more honourable and valuable then the meanes therefore men more honourable then Angels Once more in a closer paralel Christ is made the head of the Church for the salvation of man but that which is the end is far more honourable and valuable c then that which is the meanes therefore man far more honourable and valuable then Christ If any should think these instances doe not fully conclude because the highest end of Angels ministration and the obedience of Christ is the glory of God he must consider Gods glory is the supream end of government also And therefore this being common to both cannot difference the case Though we grant the good of the people is more valuable he cannot hence infer a greater worthinesse or more power to be in them though the safety of patients is most to be regarded yet the Physitian is much better qualified to effect that end Marriage was ordained for the lawfull procreation of children that is honourable amongst all men we doe not read this is so The rule doth hold in such meanes as are only valuable by that relation they beare unto their ends and have no proper goodnes of their owne But a King is not so to his people if we looke back unto his first extraction when he was taken from among the people to be set over them we must needs behold him even then as a man of some worth honour and eminency which the superaddition of Royalty did not destroy but encrease To be a meanes of his peoples preservation is very consistent with the height of honour The case is not unlike in the noblest professors the Divine the Lawyer the Physition compared to their severall charges they the meanes these the ends shall we from thence conclude the poore client a better man then his learned counsell or the simple patient then his Doctor This directs as to the transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all politiques to the Paramount law that shall give law to all humane lawes whatsoever and that is Salus populi How many nations hath this abused principle brought to ruine and confusion It is unquestionable in the constitution of all Governments this is the prime end as being most agreeable with the joynt interest both of rulers and people It is as much without doubt that after estates established the governours proportion all their lawes to this end for who that is wise will not provide for their safety as well as he can in whose destruction his own is involv'd notwithstanding this the multitude not comprehending the reason which made all people commit themselves their lives and fortunes to the trust of their rulers who were wiser and therefore could better foresee dangers and had the greatest share in the present state and therefore would more carefully endeavour to prevent them readily hearken to crafty men who seeme to pitty their sufferings and tell them they are not so well governed as they might be Thus Absalon stole away the hearts of his Fathers Subjects O that I were made judge in the land 2. Sam. 15.4 that every man which hath any suit or cause might come unto me and I would doe him justice There is little good to be expected from those who will doe wrong that they may have opportunity to do right Such men have great advantage on weake understandings because there is no state wherein it might not be wished that somethings were amended and they presse upon them present inconveniences and frame some new form wherein they promise them they shall be free from all and therefore desire their assistance in bringing this happy change about The people full of great hopes cry up these men as the only fit instruments of state who pretend only to take care for the publique and though they have nothing yet would be thought not to desire any thing Having thus gained the affections of the people their next worke is to pick a quarrell with great officers they conceave because they accuse so zealously it will be presumed they are innocent themselves that by displacing them they may make roome for themselves If such men will not easily out of their preferments the people are acquainted these are the only rubs which stand betwixt them and an happy government these are the close enemies to the State and so much the more dangerous because they carry their malignant designes so secretly they cannot find proofes against them Salus populi is now concerned the whole Kingdome is in danger no way to scape this imminent perill but by tearing these men from the Prince if in a Monarchy or putting them out of the Senate if in an Aristocracy Amongst these distractions and unsettlement of Government what course is to be taken The best way I know but 't is difficult is to make the people wise and make it appeare there is no reall danger except from their tumultuous endeavours to avoyd those which are imaginary Let them rely upon their governours who have most to loose especially if they have given them great late signes of their affection to care of them this is the most probable way of safety but if they should miscarry which they can have no reason to suspect they will perish with a great deale of discretion It seemes unnaturall to me that any nation should be bound to contribute its owne inherent puissance meerely to abet Tyranny and support slavery The inconveniences of Tyranny conclude nothing against just monarchs we are acquainted only with those happy names of King and Subject It is so farre from being unnaturall that any nation should be bound by which I suppose he meaneth consent from which an obligation naturally followes for it is as with him in the Comoedy voluntate coactus sum meâ to contribute it's power to that end that some have made it their choice others their refuge Seneca tells us speaking of the state of Rome in Iulius and Augustus his times Salva esse Roma non poterat nisi beneficio servitutis How is it against nature for the Turkes to be obedient to the grand Seigneur or the
able to hinder His good people from enjoying the full benefits of His Royall Grace if such a consent appear to Him to doe it The following discourse keeps all in generalls which easily deceive weaker apprehensions and hath its strength from this ground that it cannot reasonably be supposed the great publique Councell of the Kingdome should not give the most faithfull advice Therefore Princes if they may not be led by their owne opinions rather then by the sacred and awfull Councells of whole Nations unreasonably complain they are denyed liberty of Conscience and ravisht out of their own understandings I appeal to any mans judgment whether any thing can be urged for the authority of a Lay-Councell that it ought to enforce a submission of judgment a performance of dutyes arising from trust agreeable thereto which may not with at least equall advantages be pressed for the same binding power in Councells Ecclesiasticall To instance in that of Trent if a Papist should as Campian doth bragg of that to him as the representative body of almost all the Western Church wherein was a concourse of so many choise able eminent Divines such as had addicted their whole times to the study of truth and therefore in all probability could not be deceived themselves such as had conversed so long with Heaven and Heavenly things they knew sufficiently how much it concerned them not to deceive others and conclude it therefore unlawfull for any to pretend conscience which is but private opinion against so publique and unanimous determination Notwithstanding these high probabilities and what will much more justify mens absolute obedience and captivating their reasons some plausible arguments for a divine assistance and immediate directions in all their decisions which the Houses will not pretend to yet it shall goe hard but he will find some answer as esily he might whereby to justifie his liberty of dissenting in some things which when he hath done he may with very little alteration apply to civill Councells and be satisfied Suppose it thus though amongst probable Arguments that drawn from authority of wise men carry with it greatest weight yet it must give place to a greater reason Now to every man belongs a judgment of discretion which must decide for what concernes his particular duty So in the Kings case the Votes which carry in them the authority of both Houses shall bear great sway and if it be in things extreamly dubious they may turn the scales of their side But if greater reason seem to contradict them his Majesty will not hoodwink His understanding and blindly follow whither they please to lead him He will walke by the greater Light For example his Majesty perceiving how much His people may suffer under arbitrary power is resolved never to make use of it thinks it lesse fitting any other should But it is told him now the use of it will be for their good by reason of apparent imminent dangers His Majesty understands the bottome of plausible pretences knows to how great mischiefes a way would be opened if it were sufficient upon such specious grounds to have a right to over-rule all known and certain Lawes Concerning the action at Hull he confesses to take possession of the Kings town and shut the gates against Him is Treason if circumstances doe not vary the nature of the act as in this Case he pretends they doe For the first thing to be lookt on is that the King was meerly denyed entrance for that time His generall right was not denyed If then a Subject take up Armes against his Soveraign in a temporary warr it must not come within the compasse of Treason and he may legally possesse himselfe of the King's forts and maintaine them against Him so He confesse he hath no right in them No defying language was given If a man take away my purse shall he be acquitted from felony because he did not give me ill language too No act of violence was used This he may say who hath pickt anothers pocket but it is no sufficient plea against the Law But he used no violence though the King for diverse houres together did stand within Musket shot c It is no argument of innocence that he had opportunity to be more highly guilty and abstained The King used tearmes of defiance and this makes the act meerly defensive or rather passive If this were true there was never any warr but defensive for those who by some great injustice offered provoke a Nation to right it self fight as well to maintain their lives as what they unlawfully possesse How this should administer to the King any ground to leavy guards at York many men wonder or that it should seem the same thing to the King as if He had been pursued to the gates of York Certainly it was a sufficient ground not only to raise a guard for His safety but an Army to punish that high indignity and right His Honour but out of tender care of His Peoples safety least they should chance to suffer upon mistakes He afforded him so long time of repentance that the Kingdome might first be satisfyed and then his justice If the Parliament have hereupon turned any of the Townes-men out of their Estates His Majesty did not charge the two Houses Sir Iohn Hotham kept Him out without any publike order from them But if it had been done de facto the same law would have justified this act as well as the other But since not only the Country about but the Inhabitants within the Town have suffered in their Estates and libertyes Or if claimed any interest in it to themselves So much the lesse reason to seize on it if he cannot so much as pretend title to it or have disseized the King utterly denying the right for the future If any Law can be produced to justifie taking away the Kings goods for a time the case will be cleered Or have made any other use of their possession but meerly to prevent civill warr There is not any way more likely to create a Civill warr then endeavours to prevent it by illegall courses And to disfurnish the King's seducers of Armes Ammunition therefore the most essentiall property of Treason intention must needs here be absent in this act The Law hath judged otherwise in the case of the Earle of Essex whose plea was he intended the removall of evill Counsellors If the Parliament the shutting the King out of Hull was not their act be not vertually the whole Kingdome it selfe The King excluded it is not If it be not the Supream judicature as well in matters of State as matters of Law Till new lawes are enacted the Subject cannot justify any act but what is warrantable by the old If it be not the great Councell of the Kingdome as well as of the King to whom it belongeth by the consent of all Nations to provide in all extraordinary cases ●e quid detriment capiat
their particular lodgings whether the way to the house were not so beset with clamarous multitudes that they must passe thorough the midst of them whilst they inform them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take The other two may be reduced to those It is no wonder many stay away since they must be absent even whilst they are there The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom publique affaires shall be transacted may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Councell could the King conceive this dishonourable for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty Is that the reason why each man preserves his own rights because he takes all the rest of mankind for deadly enemies Can he with honour confesse himselfe unfit to manage that trust which the law hath committed to him with equall reason they may challenge to themselves the nomination of all Bishops Ministers Sheriffs Justices c and dispose of all the Preferments in England The substance of the request seemes to be no more but this that it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments c What an affected mistake is this He is ashamed to call it by the true name and therefore styles that advice which is properly command if it be not in His power to reject their counsell seem it never so unreasonable If the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of His own good liking only or upon recommendation of such a Courtier here he is devested of no power but if it be upon the recommēdation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majesty and devesting himselfe of power If this will content them they shall have as much power as He grants to His Courtiers Counsellors are not names of authority they are the Princes eares His eyes this relation is neare enough He sees and heares by them yet they must not passe their bounds they must be like to the outward senses still and make a bare representation the office of reason is peculiar to him to passe judgement thereon Their information is not alwayes faithfull he may consult reason and by the benefit of that correct their errour misrepresenting an object as crooked which in it selfe is streight If not out of duty to their King and a just sense of His honour yet out of love to themselves and a naturall care of their own safety Subjects are bound in all legall wayes to expresse their dislike of this proposition For they must expect to suffer all those evills which Faction can produce and what happinesse can be hoped for in a Kingdome divided in it selfe This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our own bowells which would first break out in the Countyes electing and divide the familyes of the gentry by irreconcileable hatred For it cannot be imagined but that power will bandy against power and relations against relations to put Sons or Kinsmen into that roade which only leads unto preferment Nor would the flames be quenched but rather burn more fiercely even in the Houses as being pent in a narrow room to which the insolency of some attaining offices to which they are not equall the shame and discontents of others repulsed and the ambition of all would adde continuall fuell But the greatest misery of all is were their corruptions never so high we could have but slender hopes of redresse Since the prevayling party jealous of their own honour would easily maintain the reputation of their choice and perhaps it would be necessary for them to wink one at another He that cannot think it probable that out of private ends they should so farre neglect justice and honour let him only examine whether in some Parliaments most known offendours and active instruments in the peoples misery by striking in with the prevailing side have not been more safe then innocency could have made them There are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such J am most studious of Certainly it were to be desired we might enjoy the benefits of power and not be subject to the possible abuse thereof But since this cannot be fully provided for because the same hand which is enabled to protect may injure the aimes of wisest States have been not so much to take away the power because then they should be likely to suffer under a weak Protector as the will of oppression The most probable means to effect this is after a certain rule is agreed upon and Lawes are established to acquaint a governor what he ought to doe in performance of that trust committed to him so to order his interests that to advance the peoples good shall be for the Princes advantage Subjects will have great reason to promise to themselves a full happinesse from the faithfull discharge of his Regall office to which he is so strongly tyed by those bonds of justice and profit This the wisdom of our Ancestors hath provided for in a high degree and so temper'd this governement that both King and people will be joyntly happy or joyntly miserable The severall goods of each forme are here united we have great Democraticall advantages and yet may avoyd the evills of a popular State as long as Monarchy is kept up in its due height and tumultuous insolent multitudes are not protected from a legall tryall we have the good of Aristocracy counsell of the best experienced such as have studied nations and men nor yet are we acquainted with the disease of it faction amongst the Nobility The Counsell of many is profitable but the resolve of one is necessary Since they looking upon one another as equalls would be very apt to quarrell for when one contradicts what another hath advised the debate between them seems to be which is the wiser man Their discourses are like so many pleadings for honour and we know what issue such suites would come to when the thing in controversy is so highly valued if there were not a judge to determine And this is the benefit of Monarchy which is so restrained by some power proper to the Houses it cannot degenerate into a tyranny For how should this enter in The old lawes the security of our libertyes cannot be taken away till both Houses give consent but grant an illegall violent Government should break in upon us by what meanes could it be maintained The King can have no supply of money without the House of Commons and without these sinewes his arm would not be strong enough to hold the reines which should govern that provoked beast the multitude But He may take it by force He cannot doe it in person and it is not to be imagined any considerable number of His people will be active in their owne
slavery Besides what can he propose to himselfe The people will give more then can be forced from them so he looses by it and then how much doth he hazard against lesse then nothing He hath least reason to break the lawes willfully because he injoyes most by them and experience having shew'd the benefit of observing them and the ill of the contrary He cannot but doubt the People would fail of their duty if he doe in performance of trust and cast of the bond of obedience if he doe that of Protection These things duly weighed render that malice inexcuseable which hath long time exercised the people with most unreasonable feares of lands and liberty and Religion being in danger and this notwithstanding the King 's many sacred Protestations to the contrary before God and all the world and the whole course of his proceedings which evidently tend to the securing all Now I think it doth fully appeare that the doctrine of that Remonstrance laid down by His Majesty by way of recapitulation in seven positions is most justly offensive being such as doth threaten ruine to both Church and State not permitting us either to obey the King or serve God as we ought 1. That the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law so that all the right of King and People depends upon their pleasure This power must rest in them or in the King or in some inferior Court or else all suits must be endlesse and it can no where rest more safely then in Parliament The two Houses are not the Parliament The subject of such power is the intire body which consists of three estates Some things are cleare and evident in Law and want no declarer if otherwise all the Subjects right would lye in the brest of the Iudge If the two Houses should Vote younger Brothers ought to inherite by the Law of England could this destroy the right of the first born 2. That Parliaments are bound to no Presidents Statutes are not binding to them why then should Presidents yet there is no obligation stronger then the Justice and Honour of a Parliament This is an excellent ground to justifie their innocence against all the world For if they can make it appeare they are not bound to keepe any law no man can accuse them for the breach of any What obligation can justice lay on them who by astrange vertue of representation are not capable of doing wrong It will become justice because they did it when he hath declared what Honour is I shall be able to judge of that bond it may perchance not stand with their honour not to be able to prove men guilty after they have once accused and imprisoned them Statutes stand in full force to the two Houses as being not voyd till repealed by a joynt consent of all the Estates 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publique necessity without the King and dispose of any thing They may not desert the King but being deserted by the King when the Kingdome is in distresse they may judge of that distresse and relieve it and are to be accompted by the vertue of Representation as the whole body of the State To dissent after he hath granted what ever can in reason be desired is not to desert the Houses Upon pretence of distresse to take illegall courses is as if they should perswade us we are not in health and therefore they must breake our heads to forward our recovery They represent the people to some purposes not the King to any and therefore are but a part of the State 4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicion only and when leave may seasonably be bad and when competent accusers appeare not in the impeachment If by suspicions be meant only a bare not considing in this in justice cannot be sufficient ground But upon Articles drawn and proofes in readinesse which it is not fit to produce while the accused partyes are at liberty they may be medled with for designes of this nature may brook no delay because it might prove dangerous to the King's safety or at least afford them liberty to escape If the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent or upon too much confidence should not be willing hath not the Law provided in such a case for triall of Treason 5. That the soveraigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no negative voyce This power is not claimed as ordinary nor to any purpose but to save the Kingdom from ruine and in case where the King is so seduced as that be proferres dangerous men and prosequutes his loyall Subjects Not as ordinary that is they will only be King's as long as they please and when they are weary of Reigning the Kingdome shall be out of danger and then it shall be his turne to command againe To save it from ruine the Law hath better provided for the Peoples safety by prohibiting all illegall executions of power grounded upon what specious pretences soever And in case where the King is seduced that is when he is not so wise as he should be because he does not think as they doe and refuses to satisfy the humors and interests of some And prefers this seems to be the true cause of all preferments doe not goe the right way dangerous men i. e. such as desire he should govern according to the known Lawes of the Land And prosequutes his loyall Subjects i. e. is driven from London to Yorke where He long time patiently expected the undeceiving of His People 6. That leavying Forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanyed with his presence is not leavying warre against the King but warr against his Authority though not Person is warre against the King If this were not so the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himselfe and the Kingdom could not save both but must stand and look on It is against common sense to fancy a King ruining Himselfe and Kingdom He can neither be willing nor able Upon a mad supposall mad consequences will follow 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings 'T is denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairely elected This is most certain but takes not off those words upon which this Proposition is grounded These might well have been omitted as being more fully handled in the book But least he should complaine any thing was past over I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer The Propositions collected out of His Majesties Declarations are but the brief of his Observations to all which I have already spoken To conclude if the people hearken to reason they must needs think His Majesty will be more ready to prevent all reall danger then any Subject whatsoever because He is sure to beare the greatest share in the losse It alwaies was the master Policy amongst the wisest Legislators to grant to them the greatest power of government to whom the preservation of the present state would be most beneficiall because their private interests were the same with the publique from which if they swarv'd by error or misinformation their own disadvantage did soon appeare FINIS
not content with this Negagative affirmes Sempronius is bound to consent to what ever he thinks fit if so is not this money wholely at Titius his disposall Can any one be so stupid as to tell Sempronius notwithstanding this He hath a full power How did ship-money destroy our propriety but by this very consequence Law and Reason informe us that Ejus est velle qui potest nolle L. in bello §. medio D. de captiv postlim Hence Tryphonius determines that a Captive cannot consent to his sonnes Marriage Why Cum utique nec dissentire posset And Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is alledged in derogation of Parliaments that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble or treate in all cases of a publicke nature yet without the Kings concurrence and consent they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power the very name of Parliaments is not due to them If this Man had a mind to deale candidly he would deliver the Kings sense truly and let Him speak His own words The summe of which is onely this the two Houses have not power of making lawes and altering the established goverment without Him But this Allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under Very tragically expressed and with high confidence but not any colour of reason For are we not left in the same state in which we were His Majesties denying to bring in a new government doth not take away the old If He thinke it not convenient to alter that forme which the least deceitfull Argument long experience under so many of His glorious Ancestors hath proved happy can any who is not in love with error inferre hence this subjects us to a lawlesse and most unbounded regiment Vpon the same reason by the Kings desertion other Courts must needs be vertuelesse and void It were a strange consequence to conclude that because that may be done without the King to which His consent by law is not required therefore that may be done without him to which his consent is by law necessary Many Kings have dissented from Bills yet the people were never so mad as to feare a desertion of all Courts It is against common sense to fancy that He which enjoyes all by the benefit of Laws should hinder the due administration of Justice according to those Lawes so willfully endanger not onely his rights but safety by putting His Kingdome into tumults and combustion Every wise man may have as strong security he shall not suffer from the onely not impossible execution of such a power because it is so manifestly destructive of the Kings own interest and made evident to be so as well by experience as by reason as any man can have reason not to be afraid of himselfe because he hath a full power over himselfe and may destroy himselfe when he pleases The intent of the King is that the great Assembly of the Lords and Commons doe not represent and appeare in the Right of the whole Kingdome or else that there is no honour nor power nor Iudicature residering in that great Majesticall Body then which scarce any thing can be more unnaturall A most impudent collection the meaning in breife is onely this when the particular consents of three are necessary it 's not in the power of any two to effect whatsoever they please A most prudent establishment in favour of present government that we may have no innovation without the mutuall agreement of King and people It is attempted to divide further between part and part in Parliament Who these attempters are I enquire not I suppose he meanes those who devided the Lords into good and bad the Members of the House of Commons into well and ill affected So making the major part not fully concluding They are not denyed to conclude as far as the power of that House extendeth but this cannot reach to an absolute and finall decision It is a wonderfull thing that the King's papers being fraited scarce with any thing else but such doctrines of division 't is more wonderfull that in a well governed state such disrespectfull language of Princes from private pennes should passe unregarded unpunished tending all to the subversion of our ancient fundamentall constitutions which support all our ancient liberties and to the erection of Arbitrary rule should find such applause in the world There is a vast difference between declaring what divisions are and causing them to be to shew is not to teach division But it is beyond admiration if the King's aimes are such as He would have the world beleeve that they should find such applause Especially if we consider the persons from whom men that have much more to loose then some who may ayme at getting greater fortunes by pretending they are in danger to loose what they have Men that are knowen not to value their lives equall to their liberties men of as great wisdome as honesty neither of which would permit them to be active to make themselves miserable and pull upon their posterity and Countrey perpetuall slavery What impudence of malice is it to accuse the King to intend that when the world sees how much He hath suffered meerly to prevent it Could our Ancestors ever have beleeved there should come a King who would plead for Magna Charta who would hazard His Crown in defence of the subjects Liberty and desire nothing more then the utter abolition of all Arbitrary rule If the King have parted from his Parliament meerely because they sought His oppression He had no other means to withstand their tyrany Let this proclaim them a voyd assembly His Majesty never layd such charge to the Parliament yet it is most evident there was too great reason elsewhere to justifie His feares when notwithstanding His deepest Protestations to maintaine the true established Religion they still imputed to Him inclining to Popery when notwithstanding His utmost endeavours to suppresse that unhappy Rebellion in Ireland and after the Houses had taken that worke into their care His frequent pressing them to send over sufficient supplyes and not to spend their time in businesses of little moment whilst their poore Brethren were dayly butcherd yet the people were made beleeve He was a favourer of their bloody designes when the baser sort of the people were permitted to come even to the Parliament in Clamarous and unwarrantable multitudes and there was a kind of discipline in disorder tumults being ready at command upon a watch-word given when seditious Pamphlets hourely came out and many Presses laboured day and night to abuse the King when factious Preachers were incouraged whilst they did cast publick obloquies on the Lawes which stood in full force and which if they had been duly executed would have justified themselves by restoring Us to our former Peace and happinesse which We so long injoyed as
which pretends to take care of their safety His way of arguing is very plausible and seemeth to carry more strength because it worketh upon our understanding by our affection The summe is this in case of apparent and imminent danger the Peoples safety is not to be neglected they ought not to be exposed as a Prey to the enemy who if he take them unprovided will destroy them all therefore most fit they should be put into a posture of defence now none so fit Iudges of this apparent and imminent danger as the two Houses wherefore they to order this Militia So that it must be in their power to command Men raise Horses seize on all the Ammunition send for what supplies of mony they think necessary for repelling these dangers else they are not sufficiently enabled for that great work the peoples preservation Here we are falne back again into what we so much complained of Arbitrary power nor is the thing taken away but placed in another body all that we have gained is only this we shall not be beaten by the same hand Was not this the very case of Ship-mony upon supposall of a necessity and the Kingdom being in danger very fit to secure it and the people this cannot be done without money the danger will not allow the delay of asking the Subjects consent and going the ordinary way of Law therefore an extraordinary course them becomes legall and very reasonable it is the Subject should be content to part with some rather then loose all now who fitter to judge of this necessity then the King as being most fully informed by His advantage of intelligence from His Embassadors Agents c. of the designes of forraigne Princes and States To wind our selves out of this Labyrinth we will goe on those grounds on which they argued against Ship-mony for as the Argument runnes parallell so will the answer This therefore was laid downe as a sure ground of reason that it was better for the Kingdom though it were in reall danger in arenâ consilium capere to shift for it selfe as well as it was able by a suddain defence then that the Law should provide such a remedy which would be so easily so frequently abused upon every pretence of danger to prevent such an evill which could extreamly seldome or almost never happen for an Army and Navy could not be so secretly provided but that we must have some intelligence of it So in the case of the Militia it is much better that by being continued in the old legall way it should hazard it selfe to such a possible danger then that Law should provide such a remedy for what probably will never happen as being abused upon pretences may every three years put the Kingdom in combustion To repell danger any way but by Law is the greatest danger of all Let the world judge whether the pronouncing Sr Iohn Hotham's act Treason be not contrary to the clearest beams of humane reason and the strongest inclinations of nature for every private man may defend himselfe by force if assaulted though by the force of a Magistrate or his own father and though he be not without all confidence by flight He is strongly resolved upon the conclusion that will bring it in upon such premises Sr John Hotham his asseizing on the Kings Towne and Ammunition was it seemes in his own defence who assaulted him did His Majesty drive him into Hull what can he think of the Gunpowder-traitors was their resistance a just defence then certainly every Rebellion is a just warre Indeed what is that thing which we call obedience if a man may refuse to submit to Law in his own defence Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard being utterly uncapable of flight must yeeld their throats and submit to assassinates if their King will not allow them defence There is great difference betwixt a Subjects defending himselfe and offending his King His fears are over-witty if they will not permit him to think himselfe safe except he get into one of the Kings sorts for his better security See if we are not left as a prey to the same bloody hands as have done such diabolicall exploits in Ireland c. if we may not take up armes for our own safety or if it be possible for us to take up armes without some Votes or Ordinances to regulate the Militia Subjects upon in vasion would not have wanted Commission to take up armes till then they are safe enough by the benefit of the Law which could not possibly have better provided for their safety then by denying them a power to take armes as often as ambitious choletick men for their own ends shall perswa●e them they are it danger For by this meanes being easily deceived whilest they endeavoured to avoyd false they would run themselves headlong into true perills The King saies the Parliament denies c. to whether now in this uncertainty is the Subject bound to adhere It is possible circumstances may afford us some light for our direction We may consider whether the Houses doe not barely say and whether His Majesty doth not descend so farre as to give reasons for what He does and to shew the Kingdom the ground of His actions by particular citation of the Lawes which justify them We ought to agree whether swerving from Law be to be judged by the action or by the authors that is if the King should have done whatever they did and the Houses what ever He did whether all would not then have been legall because done by them The King doth not desire to captivate any mans understanding to His authority but is willing to make all the world the judge of His actions neither is a blind obedience a part of any mans duty to the Houses The best way to discerne a right will be to consult the rule which is Law and not measure the legality of an act by the doer Some things are matters of fact here we may be guided by sense and judge as we see As whether the King has seized on any thing wherein the Subject hath a property or whether the Subject hath not seized upon something wherein the King hath a property whether the King hath raised warre against the Parliament that is whether His Guard was an Army and whether Hull is now London We had a maxime and it was grounded upon nature and never till this Parliament withstood that a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe True in a state where the collective body assembles and the reason of it is evident for though every man aime at his greatest particular interest yet except it be agreeable to the interest of the major part it will never passe into an Act and if it be advantageous for the most it is to be esteemed publique Now what service this can doe the two Houses I cannot see because they are a representative body If
he please to consult Livy or Tacitus he may find what most unworthy ends the Senate of Rome proposed to themselves and be quickly satisfied in the falsehood of this Maxime taken in his sense The truth is he raises probabilities into demonstrations and because it is not so likely it being a work of greater difficulty that four hundred should contrive things for their private interests as that four should the takes it for impossible Whereas experience clearly confutes him in other states we find nothing more common That we in England have so seldome suffered under such corruptions proceeds from causes which are peculiar to this government It was a court for the most part but of short continuance so that they had not time to mould and fashion their aimes and when called together againe the body was much altered But the chief reason and that to which the Subject especially owes his security is this that the finall determination is not in one nor two houses but the joynt consent of three Estates is necessary So that nothing is likely to passe but what is for the interest of the major part and what is so is publiquely advantagious It is more possible they may now prosequute private interests since they challenge a power to themselves sufficient to advance their designes which heretofore they never pretending to could not hope to compasse particular ends The King may safely leave His highest rights to Parliaments If this be all the motive he may as safely keep them Why did the Lawes entrust Him with them if it were fitting for Him to make no use of them None knows better or affects more the sweetnesse of this so well ballanced a Monarchy I believe they affect Monarchy why then doth this Author endeavour to take it away by denying the King a power of dissent which our Ancestors inviolably preserved as a most happy restraint of Aristocracy or Democracy It hath been often in the power of former Parliaments to load that rule with greater fetters and cloggs but they would not A very good argument there is little reason now to doe it After a commendation of the exact temper and due proportion between the three Estates the many affecting Monarchy better then Aristocracy and the Nobility preferring it as much beyond Democracy He exhorts us not to seek to corrupt this purity of composition Very good counsell but which he overthrowes in the words immediatly following We must not conceive that both Gentry and Nobility can combine against the King Therefore it will be fitting for the King to leave all to their disposall who certainly can doe nothing but what is fitting In how few words hath he destroyed that constitution which he told us was so perfect it could admit of no change but for worse But we could not stay here if the Kings negative were once taken away like decaying bodies our health would dayly impaire The next step must be the Lords sitting in a personall capacity no reason they should deny what the Kingdom hath voted to be necessary or convenient either let them not speak at all or let the greater part of Commons joyne with the lesser part of Peeres The right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great that no change of government can be advantage to them except they could each one attain an hereditary Crowne May they not attain as much as Malignant Counsellors are pretended to aime at Honours Offices Wealth Power Commands Their power is meerly derivative so that except we will conceive that both King and People will be consenting to the usurpation nothing can be done Then it is confest the King hath a right of dissenting Except both King and People here a power is given to the People collectively beyond the Lords Commons and King If the King be an affector of true Liberty He has in Parliament a Power as extensive as ever the Roman Dictators was for the preventing of publike distresses The Dictator had absolute Authority nor was he circumscribed in power but in time only There lay no appeale from him neither was he questionable for any action after his government expired Though the humor of that people could not endure the name of King they had the same thing for in imminent dangers whether from forrain invasions or intestine seditions necessity of state forced them to submit to his Authority which relieved them in their greatest extremities Hence we may make the truest judgement what forme of government the wisest Romans esteemed most convenient their actions which proceeded from feare were unfeigned interpreters of their thoughts That they fell back still into their old rule and were not as wise to prevent dangers by conserving that Authority as they were to encounter them by erecting it must be imputed to the inconstant temper of the people who in times of peace were as proud and insolent as when ruine threatned which their wantonnesse pulled upon themselves they were basely humble Since then the Romans preferred even the unbounded power of one to a popular sway wee have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this government wherein Monarchy is so wisely ballanced that as we are not exposed to the dangers which attend the rule of the many so we may avoyd the inconveniences which might probably flow from the Arbitrary power of one He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of His own Subjects and yet that Army which He went to destroy and advanced their colours against Him was more loyall then that which himselfe commanded Had he made a Conscience of unjust slander or had he any sense of the honour of his Nation these words had never fowled the paper That which the King here calls conscience and reason can be nothing else but meer private opinion What other possible notion can any man have of conscience is it not the light of reason informing us in our duty If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Counsell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation If the Counsell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Counsell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto there would be no such contestation It is a very unfaithfull way of judging to measure the goodnesse of Counsell by the person advising not by the thing advised His Majesty allwayes examined what not who and hath given His Subjects a most certain pledge of His Royall affection in passing so many good Acts and was resolved to grant as long as any thing could in reason be desired After He hath fully satisfied the publique interest even to the utmost extent of what most understanding and disingaged men wish for he is not bound to undoe again in part and so farre to comply with the interests of private men as to place a power in some by which they shall be
leave given He sayes nothing can take of this it was fully intended the Members should have had a legall and speedy tryall for His Majesty conceives it high injustice to clap men up upon a bare charge and after they are in prison forget there are such men in the world The Parliament does not deny the King a true reall interest in anything held by him either in jure Coronae or in jure Personae but only affirmes that in the same thing the State hath an interest Paramont in cases of publique extremity by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation The King is a part of the state and therefore the other part hath not any power warranted by Law to doe what they think fit to His prejudice upon pretence of publique extremity This is ship-money again in every mans lands goods the State hath an interest Paramount in cases of publique extremity by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation Here 's the difference the head without the body was the State before now it is the body without a head The King hath graciously freed us from that inconvenience and we hope He will not suffer us to be opprest with this The prudence of our lawes hath provided against either but were there a necessity we must fall into one we ought in reason to choose the former we are acquainted with that and therefore could better digest it It would be a great affliction to fall from such hopes and what we lookt on as a remedy to find that our disease but especially it would be lesse burthen to our estates to satisfy one then five hundred But the King's things are still reserved for him in better hands then he would have put them Though this were true it were an ill president for the Subject who must be bound to give up his meanes as oft as they conceive they could dispose it more wisely as they yet keep them away from him for his good so hereafter they may spend them against him for his advantage Let what will be pretended the Subject cannot be so stupid as not to understand these who undertake to manage the Paramount interest of the State may seize on any subjects fortunes by the same right they take the King 's That there is an Arbitrary power in every State somewhere 't is true 't is necessary and no inconvenience followes upon it If he mean by arbitrary a legislative power this is granted yet not to a part but the whole body But this speakes not to the case for still they give us a certain rule to live by The old lawes are in force till repealed and when new are once enacted we must conform our actions to those standing rules He is to justifie there is such a Paramount Law which shall make all our other lawes truly Oracles that is capable of contrary meanings So that now a man may be justly punisht for doing such a thing because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law a week after he shall be justly punisht too for not doing the same thing because he hath disobeyed the equity of the Law Aristotle tells us and 't is very wisely said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rhet. l. 1. c. 1. Those lawes are with greatest prudence established which define most cases and leave nothing which possibly may be determined to the brest of the judge The reason of it is this Lawes are made without any respects to persons it cannot be foreseen what parties would be engaged but Judges doe not allwayes abstract from these they may be mislead by the relation of Kinsman friend Patron or other interests Now how fully may these corrupt ends be satisfied by this equitable construction of Law Mr Hooker does not say that the Anabaptists in Germany did deceive Parliaments with their hypocrisye No man told you he did we only learne thus much from that story of their foul injustice and cruelty that upon proportionable principles such mischiefes being then may be again For example if a power be placed in a certain body of men by which they are allowed to breake all inferiour lawes if they think it is for the good of the people c and if this body be backt by the greater part of the people as having gained on their affections by fair promises of a perfect reformation and that they shall at length enjoy the purity and simplicity of the Gospell in this case may it not be a sufficient motive to take away mens estates because they cannot confide in them is it not just to take from enemies of the State the power of hurting it 'T is very obvious that for those men of whom they have no good opinion to have wealth may be a crime to have honours treasonable As for the thirty Tyrants of Athens we know they were not chosen by the people as our Knights Citizens c This circumstance alters not the case if after they are elected they challenge as unquestionable and as irrevocable power But the main intent of that instance was to shew there may be a tyranny of many and that much more miserable then that of one in many respects If the inordinate desires of one are hardly satisfied how much more may we suffer under those of many we cannot hope to weary them If we must be slaves better to have one master then foure hundred Though the blowes were equall that from a Royall hand would not smart so much it wounds the very soul to be trampled on by equalls The weight of present evills would lesse afflict then the fear of future There may be continuall supply of torment new and hungry flyes may succeed in the room of the old and suck strongly not regarding many have already been glutted Neither can we expect an end of these miseries such a body is immortall whereas the vices of a Prince are personall and dye with the man we may be restored to happinesse by His successor I will in briefe relate the story of their reigne They had got into their hands the power of declaring what was Law and this by the consent of the people In the beginning they call some men into Question who were much hated by the Citty and though the law could not take hold of them so farre yet they past sentence of death This was very plausible to most who judged of this proceeding by the rule of their present affections not looking so farre into the future as to consider what ill consequences this might produce for by the same way innocent men might be cut off if they were pleas'd to call them enemies of the State After this they gave some part of publique authority to three thousand of the Cittizens and disarmed all the rest by this means and the benefit of a Militia from Sparta the Citty was wholly in their disposall In a short time they had