that being obtained by Force Fraud or other Engine and to serve the particular Interest and End of a Party and not acting according to the True and Native Freedom and Integrity of their Institution excuseth not this from being really a Faction though sometimes it be speciously Guilded over with the Countenance of Publick Authority And for the most part the Factions of Rome before mentioned were of this latter Sort or Kind and managed under the shadow and umbrage of the Civil Authority though in their Original they arose from the Pride and Ambition Envy and Emulations Jealousies Designs Disgusts and Animosities of particular Persons who could not brook any whom they suspected might be Rivals of their Greatness Honour or Power and these prevailing bore down the Magistracy of Rome before them Now though it may be true That those Decrees of the Authority ☞ Establish'd by Law though by these means obtained are binding while they stand in Force yet the manner of obtaining such Decrees by these and the like means are Unjust and Factious and in true Intrinsick Justice do not Excuse or Justify the Obtainers thereof from Oppression and Injustice c. And as these several Factions were extreamly Cruel and Severe unto one another as is before mentioned so they were all infinitely pernicious to the Common-wealth which by the Competitions of these Turbulent Spirits was torn in pieces For ☞ these Factions were in Truth no other than certain Excrescences Tumors and Diseases arising in the Roman State by the Power Ambition and Unquiet Spirits of certain busy Men in Rome that either thought their Worth neglected or not sufficiently rewarded or were provoked to Animosities by mutual Jealousies and Emulations one of another And although it is true in the several Vicissitudes and the prevalency of any Faction they did so handle the Senate and People by Artifices and Tricks Threats and Affrights that they minted their Factions oftentimes with the Stamp and Face of the ☞ Senate and Publick Authority yet the Truth was They were really still no other than Factions and Parties which like Prevalent and Noxious Humors or Putrid Distempers in the Body over-powered the true State and Genius of the Civil Government and rendred the whole Body in Disorder and it could no more be esteemed the true Complection of the Roman Government than a Fever or a Calenture though it overspread the whole Man. And although the Paroxysms or Fits of the Roman State which it was put into hereby were various and contrary each to other according as one or the other prevailed like the hot Fit and cold Fit of an Ague yet still the Common-wealth of Rome was Sick and laboured under the Distemper ☜ of either Faction whichsoever of them prevailed I do confess faith my Author that commonly all Factions to gain to themselves Credit at least make some pretence for the good of their Country something that they would pretend to reform and it may be really there was something in the State of Rome that was necessary to be reformed and the Disorder might be so Powerful Stubborn and Obstinate that they thought it could not be done by ordinary means and that at the first attempt might be the Thing that they or at least many of them really and it may be only or at least principally aimed to set right But Wise Men see That many ☜ times Reformation was pretended but the great Design was private Interest or Revenge or if some Men in the simplicity of their Hearts meant well to the State of Rome that were engaged in those Factions yet when once a Faction is set on foot Men that have other Designs either of Ambition or Covetousness mingle in it and commonly in a little time become prevalent and distort all to their private Ends and Advantages and engage others in the like who are fed or do feed themselves with the like hopes They well know that in a very little process of time variety of Success and Occurrences and New Emergencies and Counsels carry Factions quite beyond their first Designs into greater Rapine Fury and Cruelty and Revenge then ever they themselves it may be at first thought they should have been guilty of And as my Author goes on In the first motion of Enterprizes of this nature as he touch'd upon before the Pretences are commonly Fair Modest nothing pretended but Reformation of Abuses and great Moderation professed and this to cover partly their Designs partly to gain to themselves Credit and good Esteem with good Men or at least with the Vulgar Therefore this Wise Man Pomponius Atticus as saith my Author would never be drawn into any of those Factions in the State of Rome for he knew well that if he were once engaged he must follow not only the Fortune but also the Commands and Counsels of the Party and their Governors and so be engaged in all the Villanies and Injustice that attended their Success and the motions of a Powerful prevailing Successful Faction being ordinarily very Ungovernable he knew besides that very often a Faction grows utterly unlike to what it was at first so that if he could have perswaded himself to have engaged in any Faction he must have resolved to have kept those plausible Principles which first led him to that Engagement and then he had been quite out-run by his own Party or else he must have resolved to hold pace with his Party in all their Changes and Practices and then he must out-run his Innocence his constant Integrity himself Thus not only in Prudence but from the very Habit Complection and Constitution of his Mind was this Wise Man Pomponius Atticus admirably secured against all Temptations to Factions For as my Author observes there is in most Men ☞ a certain Intemperance of Passions that render them very obnoxious to fall into Factions but among them there are Three sorts of Passions or rather indeed Putrifactions of Passions and Diseases of the Soul namely Ambition or the Desire of Honour Power Place or Preferment next Covetousnes or the Desire of Riches or Vindictiveness or the Desire of Revenge and of which the crafty Heads of Factions make great use that where they find a Man that is under the Regiment of any of these Distempers 't is a thousand to one but they win him over yea the Magick and Enchantment that ariseth from those Intemperances of the Mind that without any Solicitation from without they carry Men headlong that way they think shortest to satisfy themselves and therefore are easily caught and entangled in a Faction as that which promiseth the most compendious Method for the Attainment of their Desires But the Complection or Constitution of the very Soul of Atticus saith my Author was such that those Distempers of Ambition ☞ Covetousness or Revenge dwelt not there And by this means he was Proof against Temptations from within or from without to side with a Faction which he avoided
COLLECTIONS OUT OF THE Late Lord Chief Justice HALE'S Pomponius Atticus In Reference to FACTIONS That arise in a STATE or KINGDOM And the Mischievous Consequences thereof LONDON Printed in the Year MDCLXXXIX COLLECTIONS OUT OF THE Late Lord Chief Justice HALE'S Pomponius Atticus c. AS States and Kingdoms saith that worthy Author have certain Periods of their Duration and Consistency appointed them in the Divine Providence and sometimes end in a final Decision so there are some Things in the very Constitution of some Governments that are occasions of Factions necessarily arising in them As in Rome when the Government was partly Aristocratical and partly Popular and with some shadow of Monarchical Power in the Consuls And if that Government had been Aristocratical by a Senate of Three hundred Persons Reason and Experience shews that Factions are apt to arise in such a Council but much more when the Common People were Sharers also in the Government c. and in Truth the said Roman Government gave too much Head and too much Power to Ambitious and Intemperate Spirits Thus Marius arose a Citizen of Rome to be too Great who being a high Spirited and Factious Man who had been Six times chosen Consul and once he made himself so and Sylla after him was such another and the like might be instanced in Pompey Caesar Anthony Bratus Octavius c. that they grew too Big for the Common-wealth and the Senate and People bore only the Name but were but Cyphers for they exercised as great and greater Monarchical and Tyrannical Power than ever did Octavius when he came to be Augustus The Roman State in its first Institution seem'd to be principally Monarchical yet ended in a Senate first of a Hundred afterwards of Three hundred Persons called Patres or Patricii And after the Expulsion of their Kings they fell into a Common-wealth consisting of their Senate and Two Consuls yearly Elected who had a Power in some Things Regal afterwards their growing Contests between the Consuls and the Patricii of the one part and the rest of the People of the other part the Constitution of their Common-wealth was much altered by the Admission of a Popular Power of the Tribunes Elected by the People Thus this mix'd Republick grew Great and Powerful and continued many Years in great Strength and Power though there arose sometimes Jars and Contests between them c. But there arose at last the said Marius a Rough Firey and Bold Person a Man of Wit and Courage a Good Souldier a Successful Ambitious Man that could not endure any Opponent or Rival who began that Fire in the Common-wealth of Rome that scarce ever left Burning till the Common-wealth was at last necessarily resolved into the Monarchy of Augustus In all which Civil Wars and Disorders all those Rapines and Violences those Murders and Banishments that in the space of about Fifty Years after the Sixth Consulate of Marius filled the City and Empire of Rome were the Success of that Faction that he began and of that Breach that he first made in the Texture and Contignation of the goodly Structure of the Common-wealth of Rome And indeed all the Troubles and Changes that hapned afterwards between Caesar and Pompey between Brutus and Anthony between Anthony and Augustus did spring from those Parties and Factions whose Foundations were laid in Marius and Sylla And it is truly noted by the Florentine Politician That the Romans when Victors over their Neighbouring Nations never used any Mediocrity but either used so great Benesicence towards the Conquered that they thereby obliged them from a future Revolt or else dealt so severely with them that they utterly disabled them from it c. But in their Civil Wars as they never used Mediocrity so they never used the former extream but always the latter omitting no Severity that might render the subdued Party uncapable of ever making Head again and this they evidenced by their bloody Slaughters Consiscations and Proscriptions not only as to Opposites and upon such as they suspected were not real Friends but if any were Neutral his Wealth became his Crime and rendred him Obnoxious to Confiscation or Banishment Now to acquaint us what a Faction in a State is The said worthy Author thus Discourseth By a Faction in a Common-wealth I do not mean that Government which is by Law or Custom settled and therefore where the settled Government is Monarchical I do not take the Adhearing to the King a Faction or where the Government is Aristocratical or by a Senate as was sometime in Rome or mix'd partly Aristocratical and partly Popular c. that Establish'd Government ☜ or the Adherance to it was no Faction but it is so far from it that the Adhearance to the Government Legally Establish'd is the Duty of every Subject and Citizen But this I call a Faction When a party of Men shall Conspire and Unite themselves against the Establish'd Government to subvert or alter it and this is the greatest Faction Crimen laesae Majestatis Secondly When a party of Men shall Unite and Confederate themselves together to gain either Something to themselves or to others by Force or Fraud against the Will and Consent of that Power that by Law is intrusted with the Concession or Denial thereof Thirdly When any Person intrusted by the Sovereign Power with a Particular Power or Authority shall endeavour by Force or Fraud to extend that Power wherewith he is intrused beyond the bounds of it As if the Tribunes of the People in the State of Rome should by stirring up the People or by Force or by Secret Confederacy incroach upon the Power of the Senate c. And therefore in such an enterprise they are no more Excused from being a Faction by their Authority than if they were without any such Authority for herein they Act as Private Persons Fourthly When Two or more Great and Eminent Persons or Parties and it may be of a considerable Interest in a State or Government engage one against another at first it may be privately and then after more openly and visibly crossing each other and at last to Affronts and Rencounters and all this while the True real Government sit still and look on either out of Fear or in Policy and many times look on contenting themselves with the Complement and Profession of Subjection till at last one Party get the better and at last pull off the Disguise and gives Laws to his Lawful Governors Fifthly When some particular Persons that are or are not in any Authority in a State or Common-wealth design some Matter either for themselves or against any other and to effect that Design do by Secret Means or Power or Fraud or otherwise draw over the Power of that State wherein they live to be their Engins and Instruments under the Countenance and Signature of their Authority to effect their Design For though ☞ the Authority of the State is engaged therein yet
as a Pest or a Plague Sore wherein he was sure if he were once engaged he should loose either his Safety or his Innocence or both And as he was so happy as never to have received any such Injury as might provoke Revenge so he had such a Calm Serene Even frame of Mind that that Passion could get no hold upon him and he had abundantly well learned the best Lesson of the Stoical Philosophers Not to injure himself by Passion or Perturbation ☞ because another did him Wrong Besides saith my Author Atticus did it upon an Account of greatest Prudence For it was evident to him by great Experience and by a wise Prospect of Things That these Factions and their Successes were strangely mutable and uncertain Tanta varietas iis temporibus fuit fortunae ut modo hi modo illi in summo essent fastigio aut periculo i. e. Though Successes of Factions ☞ were so uncertain and the Vicissitude so strange and various that those that now prevailed and seemed in an impregnable Condition were suddenly tumbled down And again those that seemed in an irrevocable and desperate Ruin regained the Government even to a Miracle therefore by engaging in any Faction he was sure to undergo the common Fate which that Faction had which was either wholly to be ruined if the adverse Party prevailed or at best in case the Party wherein he should be engaged prevailed yet they were but in a tottering uncertain unquiet restless Condition and were not like to hold that Power or Interest which they had so difficultly gotten Secondly He did it saith my Author on the account of common Justice and Honesty For these Factions in the State ☜ of Rome were not the True Lawful Settled Government thereof for therein Atticus and all good Men ought to have been engaged for it had been their Duty and Glory to have assisted it and a certain Baseness and Pusillanimity of Mind to have deserted it But those Factions were certain Excrescences Tumors and Diseases as is mentioned before arising to the Roman State by the Power Ambition and Unquiet Spirits of certain busy Men. And as a Third Expedient he used for his safety it was this That although he was always ready to oblige all Men by all Offices and Kindnesses Yet he never would receive over-great ☜ Kindnesses from great Persons as also avoyding publick Offices Atticus was so far from seeking that saith my Author that he would not take them when offered this being his Principle that he would do all the good Offices he could either for particular Persons or for the Common-wealth in the state and capacity of a private Person And it seems a Wonder to me saith the Author of this Discourse to see the Folly and Vanity of Men so fondly to hunt after publick Offices and that they should be so much mistaken and no better to understand themselves for those even that are more Honourable and more Profitable yet are more Dangerous and Hazardous And the Truth is saith he That it hath been the Skill and Art of the Wiser sort of Mankind to annex to such great Employments those Blandishments of Honour Esteem and Profit to invite Men to the undertaking them as Physitians guild their Pills that they may be the easier swallowed it is true these are indeed Necessary for the good of others But it is most certain that any Man that Ambitiously hunts after them nay that Man that doth not Industriously decline them if possible he may ☜ understands not himself nor his own Peace and Happiness or Contentment For first he draws necessarily Envy upon himself and Envy is a busy active Humour and restless until it unhorses those upon whom it fastens or break it self in the attempt whosoever Possesseth that which many Desire hath as many Enemies and Enviers as he hath Rivals and Competiotrs and as many Competitors as there are Ambitious or Covetous Men in the World. And as all great Offices have commonly somewhat of Power annexed to them and although Societies of Men can never subsist in Order without some Power be over them yet particular Persons commonly hate and envy any Power in any but themselves Further also a Man that undertakes a publick Employment yields up and loses his own Tranquillity and Rest and Quiet that his private Station yields and even divests himself of himself And as his Faults and Defects in that Condition are more easily observed and seen so they are very diligently watched and observed yea he wants not such Spectators as make it their Business to be diligent Searchers and Observers of them and then they are sure to be the Objects of most severe Censure and Animadversion And further the Mischiefs of his Mistakes are of a vast and comprehensive Concern and the ill Consequences irreparable yea let a Man manage his publick Employments with all the Integrity and Wisdom imaginable yet the Race is not to the Swift nor the Battel to the Strong so that ill Success will attend the best and wisest Endeavours sometimes Again there is no publick Office in the World but must necessarily make a considerable part of Mankind his Enemy for he cannot satisfy and please all he that is disappointed in his Expectation or that finds less than he Expected hates him and it will not be material to the safety of him that is hated whether there be Cause or not for his Enemy's Indignation is as high as if it were just And though it may be objected that he makes as many Friends as he doth Enemies this mends not the matter for supposed Injuries are longer remembered than real Benefits But supposing saith my Author that in a calm and sedate Time this wise and good Man might have been perswaded to take an honourable publick Employment yet considering the ☞ Time wherein he lived his declining of publick Employments was not only Excusable and Justisiable but also very Commendable and an Abstinence full of Prudence and great Discretion For he that takes a publick Employment in a troubled State is without the intervention of a marvellous Providence first and before any other exposed to the Shock of all publick Commotions if he oppose the Faction he is in danger of Ruin for opposing their Designs if he take their part he is under an Engagement not only in the hazard of their Fortune but also in pursuit of all those desperate Enterprises that such a Faction thinks Necessary or Convenient for their Establishment and then he will lose his Reputation and his Innocence and be entangled in a most base Servirude c. And if ever there come a turn of Affairs he shall be sure to be one of the first that is crushed by the prevailing Party and this Cicero found to be true to his cost And therefore Cato Vticensis who the greatest part of his Life had been concerned in publick Offices yet when he found himself over-born by the Cesarian Party learned though