and he shall find them managed much after the same rate Nor hath these differences onely divided these Monarchies where the Succession was never well settled at first but even those that have been better constituted and where one would belieev the Discent of the Crown had been sufficiently settled by a long Discent of Kings for many hundreds of years And of this Scotland hath been a famous Example where after the death of King Alexander III and his Grandaughter Margaret of Norway two or three several Competitors claimed a Right to succeed But omitting others it was agreed that it lay between John Baylliol and Robert Bruce Earl of Carick both of them drawing their Discent from David Earl of Huntingdon Great Uncle to the last King in whom they all agreed the Right to the Crown would have been had he survived Baylliol claimed as eldest Son to Dornagilla Grandaughter to Margaret the eldest Daughter of the said Earl David Robert Bruce claimed as eldest Son of Isabel the second Daughter of the said David So that if Baylliol alledged his Discent from the eldest Daughter Bruce was not behind-hand but pleaded though it was true he was descended but from the second Daughter yet he being a Grandson and a degree neerer ought to succeed whereas Baylliol was but great Grandson to Earl David And though Dornagilla Baylliol's Mother was in the same degree with himself yet he being a man ought to be preferred before a woman in the same Line and that if the Laws of Scotland would have given it to Dornagilla if it had been an ordinary Inheritance yet Discent of the Crown was not to be ruled by the Common Laws of other Inheritances In short this Dispute did so divide the Nobility into Factions and puzzle the Estates of the Kingdom that not being able to decide it they and all the Competitors agreed to refer the Controversie to Edward I. King of England one of the wisest and most powerful Princes of his time who upon long advice and debate with twelve of the learnedest men of both Kingdoms at last adjudged the Crown to Baylliol or as the Scotch Historians relate because he would do him Homage for it which Bruce being of a higher spirit refused Yet this did not put an end to this great Controversie for though Baylliol was thereupon admitted King yet falling out not long after with King Edward to whom he owed all his greatness and having the worst of it the Nobility and States of Scotland revived Bruce's Title and declared him King who after a long War with England enjoy'd the Crown quietly at last and left it to his Issue whose Posterity in our present King enjoy it to this day To this I shall adde one Example more from Portugal within these hundred years King Henry called the Cardinal dying without Issue there was a great Controversie who should succeed for he died suddenly just as the States of the Kingdom were assembled to settle the Succession for he declared himself unable to decide it So that he onely left by his Will twelve Governours of the Kingdom who should govern during the interregnum but that the Crown should descend to him that should appear to them to have the best Title Four eminent Competitors put in their claims 1. Antonio called the Bastard who nevertheless pretended that he was lawful Son to Don Lewis second Brother to Henry the last King So that he had no more to do but to prove himself Legitimate 2. Alexander Duke of Parma who claimed as Grandson to Mary eldest Daughter to Don Duarte youngest Brother to the last King Henry and Son to King Emanuel 3. The Duke of Braganza who claimed as Son to Katherine second Daughter of the said Don Duarte yet alledged his Title to be best because he was the next of the Bloud-Royal who was a Native of Portugal as the Heir of the Crown as he pretended ought to be by a Fundamental Law of that Kingdom yet it seems that Law was not then so well known or otherwise there was no reason why these Governors should not have admitted him King as soon as ever they met 4. Philip the second King of Spain who claimed as Son to Isabella Daughter of Emanuel King of Portugal and so a degree nearer than the rest to Henry the last King The States and Governours differing the States were dissolved and during their recess the Governours not agreeing among themselves the King of Spain raised an Army and entering Portugal seiz'd the City of Lisbon and consequently all the rest of the Kingdom submitted to him and so made himself King by force And yet we have seen in his Grandson's time the Estates of Portugal declare this Title void and the Crown setled in the Posterity of the Duke of Braganza who still enjoy it by vertue of this Fundamental Law And that this Fundamental Law could not be altered but by the consent of the Cortes or States appears by the late Alteration of this Constitution upon the Treaty of Marriage of the present Prince Regents Daughter with the Duke of Savoy And how much even Kings themselves have attributed to the Authority of their Estates appears by the League made between Philip the Long King of France and David King of Scots wherein this Condition was exprest That if there should happen any difference about the Succession in either of these Realms he of the two Kings which remained alive should not suffer any to place himself on the Throne but him who should have the Judgment of the Estates of his side and then he should with all his power oppose him who would after this contest for the Crown So that our Author without cause lays the fault upon the wilful ignorance of the People in not remembring or acknowledging the right Heir of the Crown when the ablest and wisest men of the Age they lived in could not by the meer Laws of Nature and Reason determine which was he And our Author should have done well to have set down some certain Rules how the People might be assured without a positive Law before made that they acknowledge the right Heir and not an Usurper to his prejudice CHAP. II. Observations on the Directions for Obedience in doubtful times and other places of his Patriarcha and other Treatises BUT since this Author rather than the disposal of a Crown shall fall to the decision of the People or States of the Kingdom will give an Usurper a good Right to it against all persons but him that hath the Right we will now examine how much of that is true which he lays down in his Directions for Obedience to Governours in doubtful times and how far men are bound in Conscience to obey an Usurper whilst he that hath Right is kept out by him First he takes it for granted that all those that so eagerly strive for an original Power to be in the People do with one accord acknowledge that originally the Supream Power was
for who hath greater need of Prudence then he who deliberates of such great Affairs Who of more exact Justice then he who is above the Laws Who of a more severe modesty than he to whom all things are Lawful Who of greater Fortitude than he who keeps all things in safety Yet because the Judgment of any one man in discerning that which truly conduces to the publick safety may be easily deceived neither is there in all Men that strength of mind that they may know how in so great a Liberty to govern their Passions and Lusts as Herodian Li. 1. Cap. 4. well observes that it is difficult in the highest Liberty for a Man to restrain himself as it were to bridle his own desires Therefore it seemed most convenient to divers people not to commit so great a power to one mans sole discretion and he no more free from Errors than others but rather more subject to Vices and therefore would rather prescribe the Prince a certain Form or Method of dispatching of publick Affairs after it was at first found out what sort of constitutions or forms of dispatching publick Affairs did best suit with the Genius of the people and the Nature of the Common-wealth to be constituted Neither is there any injury done to the Prince who was at first raised to that Dignity by the free consent of the people upon those conditions For if it seemed grievous to take the supreme Authority because he could not manage it as he pleased he might have refused it if he would so the Conscience of the Oath by which they are obliged upon their taking this Authority ought to restrain them and their Successors from going about to make themselves absolute by secret Machinations and Designs Much less to subvert the Laws of the Kingdom by force Plin. Paneg. Since an Oath is not more Religiously to be observed by any than he whom it most chiefly concerns not to be perjured For that is too weak which some maintain that since Kings are ordained by God who injoyns them a true discharge of their Duty which cannot be performed without the exercise of the most absolute power and therefore God is to be supposed to have conferred such a proportion of power on all Kings as that they ought not to suffer the least part thereof to be diminished or circumscribed and that the People can neither rightly require or oblige their King to it no more than there can honestly be made such a bargain between a Husband and a Wife that he should connive at her stolen pleasures But as we have already sufficiently proved that as all Civil Government is from God yet is so left in Mans disposal at least to those that God did not give any particular Laws to what sort of Government they would set up as Phil. Melancthon in his Epitomy of Moral Philosophy honestly teaches That the forms of Kingdoms are different and in some places there are some degrees of Liberty more than in others For God approves all Forms of Government that are agreeable to Right Nature and Reason and as I think there is no where any Divine precept extant that a free People being about to chuse it self a King should chuse Cajus rather than Titius no more is there any certain form Divinely establish'd under which and no other Authority is to be conferred on Princes Neither are these Men any way helped by that place of 1 Sam. 8. where some will have only the bare unjust practice of Kings that the true right of all Kings is to be there described But Grotius Lib 1. c. 4. § 3. Taking a middle way lays down that there the bare actions of a King is described yet what hath the effect of a right to wit an Obligation of non resistance So that however a King may act against his Duty when he commits such things yet that his Subject sought no more to resist than if he had acted thus by the highest Right and therefore it is added that the People pressed by those vexations should cry to God because there remained no humane remedies So that this was called the Right of the King in that sence as the Roman Praetor was sayed jus reddere to judg right even then when he decreed unjustly however I conceive the true sence of this place may be thus understood there had been hitherto a Democracy among the Hebrews but that which often resembled that sort of Kingdome which Aristotle calls Heroical The Judges incited by a divine instinct did for the most part rescue the oppressed People from their Enemies or else in Peace Judged Causes but in other matters were rather endued with a power of perswading than commanding but yet their Equipage and State being small was not born or encreased by any Publick Taxes yet the People weary of this Government would have a King after the manner of other Nations That is who should appear in great State and Splendour and should maintain a constant Guard or at least should still exercise his Subjects in Arms that they might still be able to meet their Enemies in the Field see Sam. XIII 2. XIV 48 52. Now Samuel that the People might consider of it soberly before hand lays open to them the Prerogatives of such a King and the inconveniencies of that Government You would have a King remarkable by a great deal of Splendour but such a one must be attended with a numerous Train and so will take your Sons and appoint them for himself and to be his Horsemen and to run before his Chariots You would have a King who should maintain an Army but it will be necessary that he appoint him Captains over Hundreds and Captains over Fifties and this must be of your Sons who were used before to look after your own business only the greatness of his affairs and the state of his Office will not permit this King to till his own Land Therefore of your Sons will he set some to Ear his Ground and Reap his Harvest and to make his Instruments of War and since besides he must need a great deal of Attendance and that it will not become the Dignity of his Wives or Daughters to look after the Houshold-affairs Therefore he will take your Daughters to be Confectioners to be Cooks and to be Bakers he will likewise stand in need of many Servants to dispatch the businesses of War and Peace and who all must have Salaries and therefore he will take your Fields and your Vineyards and your Olive-Yards and give them to your Servants and to this purpose he will take the Tenth of your Seed and of your Vineyards and give to his Officers and to his Servants and he will likewise when he hath need take your Men-servants and your Maid-servants and your young Men and your Asses and put them to his work In short he says no more than this If you will have a King he must be maintained like a King and a
observe a Law Note the Antiquity of of this excellent Law whereby they oblige their Judges by Oath that if the King require an unjust Sentence from them they should refuse him And in the same place it is noted that Antigonus 3. writ to his Cities that if by his Letter he should command anything contrary to his Laws they should not obey it but should think he failed thorough ignorance or misinformation and oftentimes importunate Requests are cluded this way whilst the Prince seems for quietness sake content to grant what he knows will be made void by this Senate or Court of Parliament As it hath been often in France yet when the King is resolved that his Will shall hold good and looks upon the contrary Reasons of this Parliament as not weighty enough to convince him it cannot then any longer contradict the Kings Will for it is not presumed that the King by constituting such a Court would irrevocably abdicate his Right of absolute power So that this Senate or Parliament hath indeed but a Derivative power from the King to be limited as he himself shall please although perhaps he will not exert this power but upon weighty considerations nor does this Court make the power of the King less than absolute since it only gives him occasion to review his own Acts and as it were Appeals from himself when surprised with Passions Prejudices or misinformation to himself in a more indifferent and considerate Temper The like may be said of the Assembly of Estates if they meet only for this purpose that they should be the Kings greatest Council by which the Requests and complaints of his People which often times are concealed in his private Council may come to the Kings ears who is then left free to Enact what he thinks expedient Vid. Gro. Li. 1. c. 3. § 10. But a Kingdom is truely limited when the Subjects at first conferred it on the King on this condition that he should assemble the Estates concerning some Acts without whose consent this Decree should not be valid yet it ought to be in the Kings power to call and dissolve this Assembly and to propose the business to be dispatcht therein unless we should go about to set up an irregular Common-wealth and leave the King no more than an empty Title but if these States being so convocated do of their own accord Propose those things which they conceive conducing to the good and safety of the Kingdom yet the Decrees or Acts constituted concerning them take their force from the Kings passing them Yet such an assembly of Estates do differ from Counsellors properly taken in this that although both of them can only move the King by reason only yet the King may very well reject the Reasons of these latter but not of the former neither ought the King to think himself contemned if these Estates do not consent to some things of his proposing For as he promised at first to have always before his Eyes the good of the Common-wealth of which a great many choice men are supposed to Judg more certainly than one A King may most commonly blame his own imprudence Passions or ill Fortune if the States happen to differ from him from whence it likewise appears that their fear is vain who think that by this means it is at the disposal of the Estates whether the Common-wealth shall be safe or not For it can scarcely be supposed that the King should be so negligent as to omit laying open to his Estates the necessities of the Kingdom or that the Estates being fully satisfied of them will ever go about to betray their own safety But this is certain since those who have conferred the limited power cannot be presumed either to intend to destroy or dissolve the Common-wealth or by their confederacy to order things so that the end of all Common-wealths cannot be obtained in it therefore there ought to be that favourable interpretation made of those Conventions that they really desire the common safety and would by no means do any thing contrary thereunto so likewise in making this compact that whatsoever they have so agreed to they are still to be supposed to have that intention that nothing should be done by reason of those conditions or parts which should prejudice the common safety and publick utility or whereby the Convulsion or Dissolution of the Common-wealth might follow But if such a chance should happen it would be most convenient that if the affair will allow of delay it should be proposed in the Assembly of Estates but where this cannot be done it may be the Kings Duty dexterously to correct those complaints that may break out to the destruction of the Common-wealth which also is of the the same force in respect of publick Laws Pint. in the Life of Agesilaus which the safety of the people and the supream Law commands sometimes to be silent As Agesilaus commanded the Laws of Licurgus to sleep for one day that those might return without ignominy that had fled at the Battel of Levetra However Mr. Hobs will allow no distinction between limited power and absolute but will have all supreme power to be absolute when it is to be observed that in all those assertions which are too rudely laid down by him there is a restriction to be added from the and of all Common-wealths as in what he lays down in his de Cive cap. 5. § 6. that he to whom in a Common-wealth there belongs the right of punishing can by right compel all to all things he pleases or as he expresses this limitation in the same place which are necessary for the common peace and safety and Cap. 6. § 13. when by the right of the supreme Governour he says there is connected so great an obedience of all the Subjects as is requisite for the Government of the Common-wealth so when in the place aforegoing he saith who ever hath so subjected his own will 'to that of the Prince that he may do whatever he pleases without punishment as also make Laws Judg differences punish whom he pleases use the strength power of all men according to his own will perform all these things by the highest right he hath then granted him the greatest power which can be granted But it is now to be considered by what intention or on what grounds men were moved to institute Common-wealths from whence it is clear that no body is understood to have conferred more power by his Will upon the Monarch then a reasonable man can judg necessary to that end and that although the ordering what may conduce to this end in this or that occasion does not remain in those that have transferred their power but in him on whom that power is transferred therefore the supream Ruler can compel the Subjects to all those things which are really condusing to the good of the Common-wealth but he ought not to go about to compel them to
the Second Point proposed and consider what kinde of Right this is and how far it extends Since therefore the Father's greatest interest in his Child proceeds from his having bred it up and taken care of it and that this Duty is founded on that great Law of Nature that every Man ought to endeavour the common good of Mankinde which he performs as far as lies in his power in breeding up and taking care of his Child it follows that this right in the Child or power over it extends no farther than as it conduces to this end that is the good and preservation thereof and when this Rule is transgressed the Right ceases For God hath not delivered one man into the power of another merely to be tyrannized over at his pleasure but that the person who hath this Authority may use it for the good of those he governs And herein lies the difference between the Interest which a Father hath in his Children and that property which he hath in his Horses or Slaves since his right to the former extends only to those things that conduce to their Good and Benefit but in the other he hath no other consideration but the profit he may reap from their labour and service being under no other obligation but that of Humanity and of using them as becomes a good-natur'd and merciful man yet still considering and intending his own advantage as the principal end of his keeping of them Whereas in his Children he is chiefly to design their good and advantage as far as lies in his power without ruining himself and though he justly may make use of their labour and service while they continue as part of his Family yet it is not for the same end alone that he uses his Horses or Slaves but that his Children being bred up in a constant course of Industry may be the better able either to get their own living or else to spend their time as they ought to do without falling into the Vices of Idleness or Debauchery So that it is evident the Father has no more right over the Life of his Child than another man being as much answerable to God if he abuse this Right of a Father in killing his innocent Son as if another had done it Neither hath he from the same Principles any right to maim or castrate his Child as this Author allows him to do in his Directions for Obedience much less sell him for a Slave Therefore it is no part of the Law of Nature unless he cannot otherwise provide for it but of the Roman or Civil-Law that a Father should have power to sell his Son three times For the Father is appointed by God to meliorate the condition of his Child but not to make it worse since it is not himself but God that properly gave him his being So that I hope I have sufficiently proved there is a great difference between a Child and a Slave or a Servant for Life though this Authour will have them in the state of Nature to be all one But for the better clearing of this point how far the power of Parents over their Children extends I think we may very well divide as Grotius does the life of the Child into three periods or ages De J.B. l. 2. c. 5. § 2. The first is the time of imperfect judgment or before the Child comes to be able to exercise his Reason The second is the period of perfect Judgment yet whilst the Child still continues part of his Fathers Family The third is after he hath left his Father's and either enters into another Family or sets up a Family himself In the first Period all the actions of Children are under the absolute dominion of their Parents for since they have not the use of Reason nor are able to judge what is good or bad for themselves they could not grow up nor be preserved unless their Parents judged for them what means conduced to this end yet this power is still to be directed for the principal end the good and preservation of the Child In the second Period when they are of mature Judgment yet continue part of their Fathers Family they are still under their Fathers command and ought to be obedient to it in all actions which tend to the good of their Fathers Family and concerns and in both these Ages the Father hath a power to set his Children to work as well to enable them to get their own Living as to recompence himself for the pains and care he hath taken and the charge he may have bin at in their Education For though he were obliged by the Law of Nature to breed up his Children yet there is no reason but he may make use of their labour as a natural recompence for his trouble And in this Period the Father hath power to correct his Son if he prove negligent or disobedient since this Correction is for his advantage to make him more careful and diligent another time and to subdue the stubbornness of his Will But in other actions the Children have a power of acting freely yet still with respect of gratifying and pleasing their Parents to whom they are obliged for their Being and Education since without their care they could not have attained to that age But since this Duty is not by force of any absolute Subjection but only of Piety Gratitude and Observance it does not make void any act though done contrary to those Duties as Marriage and the like for the gift of a thing is not therefore void though made contrary to the Rule of Prudence and Frugality In the third Period they are in all actions free and at their own dispose yet still under those obligations of Gratitude Piety and Observance toward their Parents as their greatest Benefactors since if that they have well discharged their Duty toward their Children they can never in their whole lives sufficiently recompence so great benefits as they have received from them But it seems the Authour is not satisfied with these distinctions Observations on Grotius de J. B. p. 62. but saies He cannot conceive how in any case Children can ever naturally have any power or moral Faculty of doing what they please without their Parents leave since they are always bound to study to please them And though by the Laws of some Nations Children when they attain to years of discretion have Power and Liberty in many actions yet this Liberty is granted them by positive humane Laws only which are made by the Supreme Fatherly Power of Princes who regulate limit or assume the Authority of Inferiour Fathers for the publick benefit of the Commonwealth So that naturally the Power of Parents over their Children never ceaseth by any separation but only by the permission of the transcendent Fatherly Power of the Supreme Prince Children may be dispensed with or priviledged in some cases from obedience to subordinate Parents For my part I see no
his Parents Commands pretending they are mad or drunk when really they are not he is without doubt doubly guilty both of Hypocrisie and Disobedience But this does not hinder Children in the state of Nature from judging of the reasonableness or lawfulness of their Parents Commands and of the condition they are in when they gave them for otherwise a Child ought to be of his Fathers Religion though it were Idolatry if he commanded it or were obliged to break any of the Laws of Nature if this Obedience were absolute And it is a lesser evil that the Commands of Parents should be disobeyed nay sometimes their persons resisted than that they should make a Right to command or do unreasonable and unlawful things in a fit of madness drunkenness or passion destroy either themselves or others But it may be replied that though Fathers in the state of Nature have no Right to act unjustly or cruelly toward their Children or to command such unlawful or unreasonable things yet however they are onely answerable to God for so doing and there is out of a Commonwealth no superiour power that can question the Fathers actions for since his Children are committed by God to his care he onely is answerable for them and for his actions towards them since no other man hath any interest or concern in them but himself So that if he kill maim abuse or sell his Son there is no man that hath Right to revenge punish or call him to an account for so doing and if no others that are his equals much less his Wife and Children who are so much his Inferiours and who ought in all things to be obedient to his Will Therefore this Power though it be not absolute in respect of God yet is so in respect of his Wife and Children and so in all cases where the Children cannot yield an active Obedience to their Fathers commands they are notwithstanding obliged by the Law of God See Ephes 6.1 Colos 3.20 to a passive one and patiently to submit to whatever evils or punishments he pleases to inflict though it were to the loss of Life itself To which I answer That though it is true a Father in the state of Nature and considered as the head of a separate Family hath no Superiour but God and consequently no other person whatsoever hath any Authority or Right to call him to an account and punish him for this abuse of his paternal Power yet it doth not follow that such absolute submission is therefore due from the Children as does oblige them either to an active or a passive Obedience in all cases to the Fathers Will so that they neither may nor ought to defend themselves in any circumstance whatsoever There is a great deal of difference in the state of Nature between calling a man to an account as a Superiour and defending a mans self as an equal For a man in this state hath a right to this latter against all men that assault him by the principle of Self-preservation But no man hath a right to the former but onely in respect of those over whom he hath an Authority either granted him by God or conferr'd upon him by the consent of other men So that the evils which an Aggressor or Wrong-doer suffers from him he injured though in respect of God the Supreme Lawgiver they may be natural Punishments ordained by him to deter men from violating the Laws of Nature yet they are not so in regard of the Person who inflicts them For God may sometimes appoint those for the Instruments of his Justice who otherwise do injury to the person punished as in the case of Absalom's Rebellion against his Father David So that in this case the evils the wrong-doer suffers are not properly Punishments but necessary Consequences of his Violence and Injustice and in respect of the Inflicter are but necessary means of his preservation So that if a Son have any Right to defend himself in what belongs to him from the unjust violence of his Father he doth not act as his Superiour but in this case as his Equal as he is indeed in all the Rights of Nature considered only as a Man Such as are a Right to live and to preserve himself and to use all lawful means for that end Therefore since as I have already shown that a Father hath no higher Right or Authority from God over the person of his Child but as it tends to his good and preservation or as it conduces to the great end of Nature the common Good and preservation of Mankinde So when the Father transgresses this Authority his Right ceases and when that ceases the Sons Right to preserve himself and in that to pursue that great end begins to take place Therefore out of a Civil state if a Father will endeavour evidently without any just cause to take away his Sons Life I think the Son may in this case if he cannot otherwise escape nor avoid it and that his Father will not be pacified neither with his submission nor entreaty defend himself against his Father not with a design to kill him but purely to preserve his own Life and if in this case the Father happen to be kill'd I think his Blood is upon his own head But if any object to me the Example of Isaac's submission to his Father when he intended to sacrisice him To this I answer that as this act of Abraham's is not to be taken as an Example for other Fathers so neither does the Example of Isaac oblige other Sons For as Abraham had no right to offer up his Son but by God's express Will so it is rational to suppose that Isaac being then as Chronologers make him about nineteen or twenty years of Age and able to carry wood enough upon his back to consume the Sacrifice and of years to ask where the Lamb was for the Offering was also instructed by his Father of the cause of his dealing so with him and then the submission was not paid to his Father's but to God's Will whom he was perswaded would have it so But if any man yet doubts whether resistance in such a case were lawful I leave it to his own Conscience whether if his Father and he were out of any civil estate whose assistance he might implore he would lie still and suffer his Father to cut his throat only because he had a minde to it or pretended revelation for it So likewise if a Father in this state should go about to violate his Sons Wife in his presence or to kill her or his Grandchildren I suppose he may as lawfully use the same means for their preservation if he cannot otherwise obtain it as he might for his own since they are delivered to his charge and that he only is answerable for them For since the Father doth not acquire any property in the Sons person either by begetting or educating him much less ought he to have it over those
Authour is to be Servant to his Eldest Brother or to whomever else his Father pleased to bequeath him Is not the case the same And as for the quiet of the Family which is supposed to be preserved by the Sons absolute submission rather than his resistance in any circumstance I think it would rather increase Dissentions by encouraging of Fathers to use their Power over their Children not as Reason but Drunkenness or Passion may impel them Whereas this Right of Children in defending their Lives and not being obliged to give them up at their Fathers pleasure will rather make Parents act moderately and discreetly towards their Children when they know they are not obliged to stay or bear with them upon other conditions than that they may enjoy their Lives in safety and the ordinary means thereof with some comfort Not that I give Children any Right as I said before to disobey their Parents or resist them upon every slight occasion but rather to bear with their Infirmities as far as it is possible And to suffer divers Hardships and Inconveniencies from them rather than to resist or leave them considering the great obligation they owe them So that I do not allow this Remedy but in case of extreme Necessity yet of which the Sufferer only in the state of Nature can be Judge since in that state where there is no Umpire without both their consents but God only every man is Judge when his Life is in danger And if the Peace of Mankinde were to be procured merely by a mans Sufferance and Submission without any respect to this Right then it would be his duty to give himself up to be robb'd or kill'd by any one who had the wickedness to attempt it because himself being innocent may go to Heaven and the other being guilty of an intent to rob or murder may be damned if he be killed And besides it would more conduce to the preservation of Mankinde that but one man should be lost whereas by resistance they may both perish Yet I suppose no man is so sottish as to hold he ought quit his own preservation in these cases or if he do hold it for discourse sake I am sure he would not be so mad as to observe it For this were such an Argument as to hold Because some men may abuse that Law of Self-preservation to another mans destruction Therefore it were unlawful to defend a mans self at all As for the Examples of those Nations and Common-wealths who have permitted Fathers to exercise a Despotick Power over their Children The Law of Nature or right Reason is not to be gathered from the Municipal Laws or Customs of any particular Nation or Commonwealth which are often different and contrary to each other Therefore as to the Jewish Law though I will not say it was contrary to the Law of Nature yet it was extremely rigorous and severe in all its dispensations and does not now oblige Christian Common-wealths in this particular as in divers others much less in the state of Nature And as for the Romans they saw the inconveniencies of this Absolute Power and retrenched it by degrees until it came to be no more than now with us and in most Countreys of Europe So likewise the Arguments which Bodin brings for the absolute power of Parents over their Children depending upon the Roman and Jewish Law may be easily answered from these grounds Having as I hope clear'd this main point of Paternal Authority and of Natural Obedience without giving an extravagant power to Parents on the one hand to abuse their power or a priviledge to Children on the other side to be stubborn or disobedient to their Parents If then this Paternal Authority extend farther than I have seated it I shall own my self beholding to any Friend of the Authour 's or his Opinions to shew me my errour But if they cannot I desire they would consider whether this natural Right of Kings which the Authour asserts precedent to any compact or civil constitution can extend farther than the natural Authority of Fathers from whom they are supposed to derive it and on which it is founded And if it appears that Princes have such Power as our Fathers then all that the Authour hath writ on this subject signifies just nothing Therefore I shall now proceed to examine the rest of his Principles and shall I hope prove that supposing this Fatherly Power as absolute as the Authour fancies yet that his Divine Absolute Monarchy cannot however be derived from thence The Authour seems to think it a Question very easie to be answered If any one asks what comes of this Right of Fatherhood in case the Crown Fatherly power escheat for want of an Heir whether it fall to the People Patriarch P. 20. or what else becomes of it To which his Answer is That it is but the Negligence or Ignorance of the People to loose the knowledg of the true Heir for an Heir there is always If Adam were still living and now were ready to die it is certain that there is but one Man and but one in the world who is next Heir although the knowledge who should be that one Man be quite lost So that this fine Notion signifies nothing now for Adam being dead and his right Heir not to be known it is all one as if he had none since for ought I know to the contrary the Authors Footman may be the Man But to help this the Author hath found out a couple of Expedients such as they be The first is Directions for Obedience p. 69. That an Vsurper of this Power where the knowledge of the right Heir is lost being in by possession is to be taken and reputed for the true Heir and is to be obeyed by them as their Father And if this will not do he gives us another and tells us Patriarch p. 21. The Government in this case is not devolved upon the multitude but the Kingly power escheats in such cases to the Fathers and independent Heads of Families For every Kingdom is resolved into those parts of which it was first made Each of which we will examine in their turn To begin with the former let us see if it be so easie a thing as the Authour makes it to know who was Adam's or any Monarch's right Heir setting the Municipal Laws of the Country aside so that the People cannot be excused of wilful Ignorance or Negligence if they loose this knowledg Where by the way I observe that as easie a thing as it was to know who was Adam's right Heir and upon whom by the Laws of God and Nature the Crown is to descend upon the Death of the Monarch yet he no where positively answers this important Question For sometimes he is to claim by descent as in this instance of the Heir of Adam sometimes by his Father's last Will as in the case of Noah's Sons according as the Examples out of
the World If any think that particular Multitudes at their own discretion had power to divide themselves into several Commonwealths those that think so have neither Reason nor Proof for so thinking and thereby a Gap is opened for every petty factious Multitude to make more Commonwealths than there be Families in the world In which Dispute I conceive the Jesuit hath gone too far in asserting an undivided Soveraignty in the whole Multitude collected together before any Civil Government instituted That being onely the Compact or Agreement of those that entred into it and binding none else at first So likewise this is a meer Chimera of the Author's that Adam or Noah were absolute Monarchs and Heirs of the World so that no man could withdraw themselves from the Obedience of their right Heirs without being guilty of Rebellion Whereas I have already proved that all the Sons of Noah and their Descendants were independant Governours of their Families without any subordination to the eldest Son or Heir And if every Brother had a Right to set up an Independant Family or Principality distinct from that of the eldest I would fain know what became of this absolute Right of Adam or Noah and by what authority this undivided Soveraignty which God had conferred on Noah was thus crumbled into parcels If by Gods appointment then it seems God did not countenance this notion of the right Heir of the world If they did it of their own heads then all the ancient Patriarchs or first Peoplers of the world were guilty of Rebellion and Usurpation against their elder Brother and his Descendants But if the Author's Friends think he hath the advantage because I grant that the World was peopled after the Flood under the conduct or government of distinct Heads or Fathers of Families this does not grant any natural Right in those Heads of Families to have an absolute power over their Descendants since perhaps God divided the Language of the World by so many Tribes or Families for the better conservation of the mutual Love and Concord of neer Relations since men would more readily obey their Ancestor or common Father than a meer stranger or for other reasons best known to his infinite Wisdom So that there was a necessity that those of the same Stock should upon the dispersion march off together since none else understood one another Yet the Scripture does not tell us whether in this division and plantation of the World the Headship of these Families was according to eldership of birth or whether they elected the fittest man of their Tribe or Family to be their Leader And if the eldest were the man it was not from any Right over them but either of reverence to his Wisdom or to avoid the Dissentions that might arise by other kind of choice on Eldership though indeed it confers no Right of it self yet is often preferred as a kind of natural Lot So that every one of these Heads of Families being independant from each other they could never agree upon a Ruler over them but by Compact among themselves And if so he was their Leader that all the rest liked and agreed upon So that there needed no Compact of all the People of the world since every Father of a Family being independant upon any man else had a power to confer his Authority of governing himself and his Family upon whom he pleased which Power whether and how far it was from God and what kind of Authority it was we shall examine hereafter So that though I grant all Government might be at first instituted by Fathers of Families yet this does not prove any despotick Power that such Fathers had over their Children or Descendants and so consequently could confer no such Authority over them So that all the rest of the Authors Queries about the distinct power of the Multitude vanish since though there never was any Government where all the promiscuous Rabble of Women and Children had Votes as being not capable of it yet it does not for all that prove all legal Civil Government does not owe his Original to the consent of the People since the Fathers of Families or Freemen at their own dispose were really and indeed all the People that needed to have Votes since Women as being concluded by their Husbands and being commonly unfit for civil business and Children in their Fathers Families being under the notion of Servants and without any Property in Goods or Land had no reason to have Votes in the Institution of the Government So likewise all the Authors Objections and Cavils p. 44. how the greater part of a Multitude could over-rule the rest in the state of Nature signifie nothing since if many men meet to chuse a Governour the first Question must be whether the Votes of the major part shall not conclude the rest and then all that agree that they shall are bound by their own consent and those that will not agree to it are still in the state of Nature toward all the rest and are free to go and set up a Government by themselves that they all can agree to Nemine Contradicente And if they disturb those that have agreed that they will be concluded by the majority they may be lawfully used as Enemies And for Proxies or Representatives though the beginnings of most Kingdoms and Commonwealths like the head of Nilus are hard to be traced up to their Heads or Fountains and no man can positively tell the manner of their beginning yet if they began from some small quantity of men collected into one Army or City there needed no Proxies at all since every man might give his Vote himself But since the Author puts me to name any Commonwealth out of History where the Multitude or so much as the greatest part of it ever consented either by Voice or Proxies to the election of a Prince I will name him two Commonwealths The first was Rome where all the People or Freemen consented to the election of Romulus being formerly proposed See Dionysius Halicarnasseus lib. 3. And the second shall be that of Venice where though it is true the whole promiscuous Rabble did not chuse a Prince yet all the Masters of Families or Freemen at their own dispose had a Vote in the choice of the first Duke and Senate which plainly proves some Governments to have had their beginning by the consent of the People And though some Governments have begun by Conquest yet since those Conquerours could never perform this without men over which they were not always born Monarchs it must necessarily follow that those Souldiers or Volunteers had no obligation to serve them but from their own agreements with their General and for those advantages he proposed to them in the share of those Conquests they should make Read likewise our Historians of the manner of Will. the Conquerors coming over and you will finde those that helped him in that expedition were Volunteers to whom
Conditions this kind of Servant hath the same remedy against his Lord as an hired Servant may have And of this sort were our ancient English Villains who though they could claim no property against their Lords either in Goods or Lands yet if the Lord killed his Villain the Wife had an Appeal of Murder of the death of her Husband Since no man can be supposed so void of common sense unless an absolute Fool and then he is not capable of making any Bargain to yield himself so absolutely up to anothers disposal as to renounce all hopes of safety or satisfaction in this life or of future happiness in that to come So that I conceive that even a Slave much more a Servant hired upon certain Conditions in the state of Nature where he hath no civil power to whom to appeal for Justice hath as much Right as a Son or Child of the Family to defend his life or what belongs to him against the unjust violence or rage of his Master Nor do I think any places of Scripture if well considered command the contrary For as for the places in St. Paul's Epistles Ephes 6.5 Servants be obedient to them that are your Masters according to the flesh with fear and trembling And Coloss 3.22 Servants obey in all things your Masters c. does not extend to all things that are but only to things lawful for them to do that is that were not against the Principles of Christian Religion And in this it is that St. Peter 1 Pet. 2.18,19 commands Servants or Slaves which there were all one to be subject to their Masters not onely to the good and gentle but also to the froward For this is thank-worthy or grateful if a man for conscience towards God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 endure grief or trouble suffering wrongfully Which words seem to import that Servants ought to bear with a great deal of bad usage from their Masters but does not command them in the state of Nature to give up their Lives or Goods to their Masters without any resistance But if any shall urge the Example of Christ alleadged in the third verse who suffered even to death for us I conceive that does not extend to a suffering or submission unto all things but to such things for which Christ himself suffered viz. for Conscience toward God that is for matters of Religion which is likewise most agreeable to the sence of the words that follow For what glory is it if when you are beaten for your faults you take it patiently but if when you do well and take it patiently c. Now who ever can imagine a Servant to be beaten for doing his duty Therefore doing well here signifies the profession of Christianity which they were not to deny though they had unbelieving Masters Therefore since no interpretation of Scripture ought to be against Reason that can never tell a man that he ought to yield up himself so wholly to anothers disposal as to give his Master an absolute right and power over him to kill or maim him without cause or to be so basely and penuriously used as perpetually to suffer hunger cold and nakedness or the like so that his life should rather become a burden and a punishment than a satisfaction For since we have no notions of happiness but in life nor in that farther than it is accompanied with some contentment of mind no rational man can be supposed to consent to renounce all the pleasures and ends thereof and which onely make life desireable much less the Right of living and preserving himself So that even such a Slave may without doubt in the state of Nature run away from his Master and set himself at liberty if he can since his Master hath not performed his part of that tacite condition of his Service which was that this Master should for his Labour provide him all the necessaries of life and suffer him to enjoy the ordinary satisfactions of it Nor is the worst of Slaves that is one taken in War so absolutely at his Masters dispose as that because he hath him in his power he hath therefore a Right to use him as he will For first as long as the Conquerour keeps his Slave as a Prisoner and makes him work in Fetters though he hath given him his life for the present yet there does not thence arise any Obligation in the Slave to Obedience so that the Slave may yet run away if he can nay kill his Conquerour unless he will come to other Terms with him and make him promise him his Service and Obedience upon the granting him his Liberty and enjoyment of the ordinary Comforts of Life And if he cannot enjoy these I believe there is no sober Planter in Barbadoes who are most of them the Assignees of Slaves taken in War but will grant such a Slave may lawfully run away if he can Therefore it is not true what Mr. Hobbes says That no injury can be done to a Slave for his reason is not valid that because a Servant hath absolutely subjected his will to that of his Lords therefore whatever he does he does it by his Master's will in which his own is included so that volenti non fit injuria this proves no more than that the Slave hath no just reason of complaint though his Master give him Victuals that does not suit with his palate orprescribe him Work which may not please his humour So on the other side what rational man will affirm that this Slave hath given up the natural Rights of living and being preserved as a man but that injury may be done to this Slave as any other Servant if the Task imposed upon him be beyond his strength to perform or if he be beaten or like to be put to death without cause or that he hath not Food sufficient to enable him to do his work for he may still require at his Masters hands the usage of a man and of a rational Creature So likewise though this property in the person of a Slave taken in War may be assigned over to another yet the Right of commanding a Slave by his own consent cannot be so farther than it was agreed upon in the Bargain between him and his Lord for if he convenanted to be a Slave onely to his Lord and no man else the Lord cannot in justice assigne nor sell him to another without his consent nor leave him to his Heirs since there might be certain peculiar reasons wherefore a man might subject himself to this man and not to another So likewise in absolute Empires which began purely from Conquest though it is taken for granted that they may be aliened at the Will of the Conquerour yet it is otherwise in Subjects who have submitted themselves upon certain Conditions and who have some Liberties remaining to them and much more in those Kingdoms which are limited by their Institution for there not properly the Persons of the men but the
own Consent as a Slave by Compact or without his fault as a Slave taken in a just War and that no Master of a Family hath such Right in the person of one of these but that he may do him injury if he take away his life or punish him without cause and that such even such a Slave may lawfully set himself free if the Master do not perform his part of the Bargain And having in the last place shewn what power a Husband hath over his Wife in the state of Nature and from whence it takes its Original it is now time to answer those Arguments and Objections made by this Author and others That the Prince or Governour so elected by the Fathers of Families or Frcemen at their own dispose which I hold to be equivalent to the whole People hath not onely his Nomination from them but that it is from God alone that he derives his Soveraign Power and Authority with which he is endued upon his first acceptance of the Supreme Power and if he should accept it with any limitation it were to restrain that Power which God hath conferred upon him by his being made the Supreme Magistrate and would hinder him from performing that great Duty as he ought In answer to which I have already proved that no such unlimited Power was conferred by God to any private man in the state of Nature as a Father Husband or Master and therefore could not be given to any Civil Soveraign who is supposed to have no more power than the Father of the Family had before A second Objection is That no particular man hath in the state of Nature any power over his own life and therefore cannot have any over the life of another man and if one man hath not this power neither have the People which is but a universal consisting of singulars any such power and consequently cannot confer it on any other man therefore every Prince must have this Soveraign Power of life and death not from the People but from God In answer to which I shall first of all deny the consequence that because God hath not given a man a power over his own life therefore he can have none over the person of another For God gave man a Right to preserve but not to destroy himself and so cannot dispose of his own life whenever he is weary of it Therefore since the first Law of Nature is Self-preservation it is lawful for a man to use all means conducing to this end that do not prejudice another mans Right in his particular life or happiness so that if any man assault me in the state of Nature I may defend my self and consequently kill the Assailant if I cannot otherwise escape But perhaps it will be replyed that the intention here is not principally to kill the man if it may be otherwise avoided and that this Right is given men onely to preserve their lives from being taken away at another mans pleasure but that no private man hath power to revenge an injury done to another or ones self in the state of Nature with death but God or him to whom God hath committed this power according to St. Paul Rom. 12.19 Dearly beloved avenge not your selves c. I shall prove that this place does not destroy that which I maintain for I grant that all Revenge taken as the satisfaction some men take in the very doing evil or prejudice to another is unlawful even by the light of Nature Secondly Likewise where Magistracy is instituted who is to bear the Sword for the punishment of evil doers I grant all return of like for like to be unlawful since he is appointed as a publick Judge to right those that are injured and maintain the common Peace But no Text forbids men to punish injuries done either to themselves or those they have a concern for in the state of Nature for this is not Revenge but a natural Punishment to deter men from committing violent and unjust actions that disturb the peace of humane Society since the wrong doer declares himself thereby a publick Enemy to all Mankind And on this account Cain feared that not his Father onely hut every one that met him would slay him that is punish him for the death of their Brother or Kinsman And if this were unlawful then all War must be so in the state of Nature and Princes being always in that state in respect of each other could never make any War for the gaining of Rights usurped or to punish for Injuries received So that this power which a man in some cases hath over the life of another is onely given him by God for the common good and preservation of Mankind of which every particular person is a part and so this power conferred upon the supreme Magistrate is no more nor extends higher than that though there are more things requisite to the publick peace and safety of a Civil Government than are to humane Society in the state of Nature And from hence do supreme Powers derive their Right of making positive Laws and ordaining higher Punishments for Offences than the Laws of God or Nature do expresly appoint as for Thest Coining and the like Nor is the Antecedent true that no man in the state of Nature hath a power to dispose of his own life For though it may be true that no man hath a Right to make away himself whenever he dislikes his being here yet it does not therefore follow but that for a greater good to the publick any man nay a Prince himself may lay down his life for his Peoples good And therefore I doubt not but the Example of Codrus the Athenian King was not onely lawful but highly commendable in facrificing his life for the good and safety of his People supposing that all their Estates and Liberties depended upon that one Battel much more for a private man to lay down his life to save some publick person highly useful to humane Society And this much does the Apostle Paul himself seem to admit Rom. 5.7 when he says For scarcely for a righteous man will one die yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die Where by a righteous man Expositors understand one who had sufficiently done his duty in an ordinary private capacity yet contributed little to the publick good whereas by a good man is understood some person highly useful and beneficial to others and for such a one a man may not onely dare to die but actually lay down his life if occasion be A second Objection is That if the supreme Magistrates Authority be derived from the People then this Authority must be either inferiour or superiour to it If inferiour how can the People be commanded or governed by that which is inferiour to its self If superiour how can the Effect be more noble than the Gause since neither any particular Person nor the whole Multitude had Soveraign Authority and therefore
Vote to chuse Parliament-men but Freeholders or as in old times none but those who served in the Wars in person had Votes in the Withena Gemote or Great Council And yet this was no standing Army no more than those in Greece So likewise neither are these words fairly rendered in the same page 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that in a Popular State The Soveraign Power is in the Sword and those that are possessed of the Arms but are thus to be rendered In this kind of Government i. e. Popular those govern and have greatest Power who bear Arms and fight for the rest which is but reasonable I shall not trouble my self with the rest of those Contradictions and Faults he find◠with Aristotle since I look upon this Treatise of Politicks as the most confused he hath writ onely it seems this Author did but skim over Aristotle when he so confidently asserts That the natural Right of the People to found or elect their own kind of Government is not once disputed by him which whether he asserts or no let these words judge lib. 5. Pol. cap. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which may be thus Englished But of Kingdoms by discent this may be supposed the cause of their dissolution besides those al◠ready mentioned viz. when it happens to many of them who not being endued with the power of a Tyrant but onely with a Kingly Authority become contemned whilst they will unjustly abuse their Subjects for then there is an easie dissolution of the Government for he is not a true King over those that like not his Government but a Tyrant P. 20 21. He finds fault with Aristotle for making the main distinction between right Forms of Government and those that are imperfect or corrupt to consist solely in this That where the profit of the governed is respected there is a right Government but where the profit of the Governours is onely regarded there is a corruption or transgression of Government By this it is supposed by Aristotle that there may be a Government which he calls a Tyranny onely for the benefit of the Governour That this Supposition is false may be proved from Aristotle himself to instance in the point of Tyranny And therefore the Author endeavours to make him contradict himself thus Tyranny saith Aristotle lib. 3. cap. 7. is a Despotical or Masterly Monarchy Now he confesseth l. 3. c. 6. That in truth the Masterly Government is profitable both to the Servant by nature and the Master by nature And he yields a solid reason for it viz. It is not possible if the Servant be destroyed the Mastership can be saved Whence it may be inferred That if the Masterly Government of Tyrants cannot be safe without the preservation of them whom they govern it will follow That a Tyrant cannot govern for his own profit onely And thus his main definition of Tyranny fails as being grounded on an impossible Supposition By his own confession no Example can be shewn of any such Government that ever was in the world as Aristotle describes Tyranny to be for under the worst of Kings though many particular men have unjustly suffered yet the Multitude or People in general have found benefit and profit by the Government If Aristotle were alive I doubt he would say this Author plaid the Sophister with him and did not onely misquote his words but pervert his meaning For first Aristotle does not say in that place he quotes or in any other that I know of That Tyranny is a Despotical or Masterly Monarchy And therefore all he builds upon this Concession is false It is true indeed Aristotle says That the Government of the Master is profitable both to the Servant by nature and the Master by nature that is upon his supposition that they are either so by nature But the Author omits what immediately follows because it would vindicate Aristotle's true meaning for his next words are Nevertheless it i. e. the Masterly power regards chiefly the profit of the Master and of the Servant but by accident but Oecumenical Government or that of a Master over the Wife Children and Servants is for their sakes whom he governs and for the common good of them all Hence it appears plainly that Aristotle when he says that a Tyranny is for the benefit of the Governour alone he does not mean that the Subjects can have no benefit at all by it since it is the Tyrants interest they should live and get Children or else he would quickly want Subjects Thus the Children of Israel under the Tyranny of Pharaoh had Meat Drink and Cloaths and were not so low kept but they got Children apace and yet we find God thought them opprest and heard their cry But Aristotle clears the point when he distinguishes an absolute Masterly power over a Slave from that of a Father of a Family the Master in the former considering onely his own profit and the preservation of the Slave but by accident and so an ill-natured brutish Master takes care of the life of his Slave that works in the Mines or Sugar-works in the Indies not out of any love to the person of the Slave but because he cannot subsist without him So a Grasier or Butcher takes care of his Cattel that they thrive and do well as they call it yet every body knows that they take this care onely for their Carcasses which yield them so much ready money at the Market So that indeed a Tyrant onely considers his own good in the welfare of his Subjects and looks upon them as no better than brute Beasts in which he hath an absolute property to shear or kill as he thinks it most conduces to his own profit without considering to what end he is set over them As the Grand Seignior makes use of the bodies of his poor Christian-slaves for Subjects I cannot call them to fill up Ditches and to blunt the edge of his Enemies Swords But that all Kings are bound to preserve the Lands Goods and Lives of their Subjects the Author himself confesses Patriarcha p. 94. Though not by any municipal Law so much as the natural Law of a Father which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Forefathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their Subjects So then I hope there is some difference between the Government of a Father over his Children and that of an absolute Lord over his Slaves notwithstanding our Author's Quotation out of Aristotle whereby he would make them all one viz. That a Kingdom will be a Fatherly Government Which is true if you take it in the best sence for that affection that Kings like Fathers should have for their Subjects And so it is plain Aristotle intended it by the words immediately foregoing thus For the Society of a Father with his Sons has an appearance of a Kingdom not that it is so indeed But to make an end with Aristotle I will give you one