omen to Italy All the other Princes of Italy opposed him afterwards in his designs instructed by the fall of the King of Arragon to have an eye to their own danger except only the Florentines who still continued in adhering to the French the counsel of the most poâ—ent Citizens prevailing over the opinion of the more wise So as the French preparing to return with mighty Forces into Italy they had friendship with none nor had they any other receptacle save with the Florentines with whom they had already made a new agreement to be by them assisted with men and monies Pisa was at the same time straitly beleaguer'd by the Florentines and had she not been succor'd by the Venetians all her other aids were so weak as she must speedily have faln into the Florentines hands who being freed of the expence and trouble of that Siege would be more powerful and more ready to assist the French and to facilitate the enterprises which they were to attempt in Italy Then if it were judged by the common opinion of all men to be just honest and laudable to take upon them the defence of the safety and liberty of Italy against the French how can those actions be blamed which did tend as it is seen necessarily thereunto by keeping foreign Forces afar off and by bereaving them of their â—riends assistance The affairs of the King of France did at this time ebb and flow but for the most part ebb in the Kingdom of Naples Great were the King of Arragons hopes of recovering the State being therein assisted powerfully by the same Venetians The King of France though his Forces were in a readiness was doubtful whether he should come into Italy or no. So as at such a conjuncture of time every least thing which tended either to the augmenting or lessening of his hopes was of great moment Pope Alexander moved by these respects did much press the Venetian Senate to be resolute in assisting the Pisans whilst he himself was somewhat doubtful and 〈◊〉 The Venetian Senate had the Florentines in good esteem and laying aside the memory of what was past would have had them for their friends if they would have separated themselves from the French who were then the 〈◊〉 Enemy and have entred into that Confederacâ—e whereinto all the rest of the Princes of Italy were entred and by whom they had many fair offers made them particularly to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of their State if they would put on a generous 〈…〉 those Forts which as 〈◊〉 Towns for their fidelity â—ere held by French garrisons and do this by Force of Arms not by Treaty 〈◊〉 Agreement But if these things could not be listned unto out of a 〈…〉 such a resolution that they might keep the Florentines busied about Pisa and the French from those succors whereby the troubles and dangers of Italy were increased But I find that these transactions have been diversly interpreted and the Senate blamed who did not aim at succouring the oppressed Pisans not at the common safety of Italy but at their own thirst of bringing the City of Pisa under their Dominion To this it is answered that where the actions are evident no judgement is to be given contrary thereunto nor ought the secrets of hearts to be searched which is reserved to a more excellent power then what humane discourse can arrive unto it is certain that the defence of Pisa which was oft-times denied them was at last undertaken by the Venetians when they being forsaken by all others they were necessitated for the aforesaid reasons so to do The Pisans offered to put themselves wholly into the power of the Commonwealth and to set up her colours in their City the Venetians would not yeeld hereunto nor accept of this large offer but the Pisan Ambassadors were sent back with many thanks for their affection and were heard in what they desired though in a differing manner for the Commonwealth took upon her to defend the liberty of the City with the forces and authority of the Commonwealth which she did for many years with such fervencie and general consent sparing neither expence labor nor danger as she could hardly have done more in her own defence they sent both Foot and Horse several times to the Pisans under their best Commanders as also moneys and victuals and shipping to accommodate the City with all things necessary and to free them from the siege of the Florentines by Sea Yet to give a greater testimony of what their minds and intentions were in this when it was propounded to put the City of Pisa into Caesars hands and to remit the right of their cause to him the Venetians did not onely not oppose it but counseled them so to do desirous that this controversie might be ended whilst their faith and the common interests were preserved safe and when there was yet some opinion that the Florentines allured by this advantage and hope might have adhered unto the league but on the one side in progress of time the Florentines obdurate resolution was discovered of governing themselves by Counsels apart from the rest of the Italians and on the other the deep deceits of Lâ—dâ—wick Sforza who under the shadow of procureing peace and quiet growing jealous of the greatness which the Venetians might aâ—â—ive at by the acquisition of Pisa and calculating other mens by his own did in reality endeavor to secure himself from this his imaginary fear by hindring the Venetians from pursuing that enterprise to the which not long before he had exhorted them The Venetian Senate was inforced to maintain the cause which they had undertaken to keep from breaking their faith unto the Pisans and to free themselves from the infamy and repute of weak advice to which they should be subject as if they had condescended for fear of Lâ—dâ—wicks Forces or else as not knowing his cunning when it was already known to all men that the endeavor of agreement with the Pisans which was agitated under the name of the Collegues was managed onely by him and according to his will and interests But say I pray is this the onely enterprise wherein the sincerity and candidness of the Commonwealth is to be known in just things and such as do concern the common good of Italy How often hath she maintained Wars to the end that there might be a right and an Italian Governor in the Dukedom of Milan which cannot be denied since the effects thereof be so apparâ—nt as she would not lay down Arms before she had compast this her intent as she did by that famous agreement which was made in the City of Bâ—lâ—guia the year 1529. in which year by means of the Venetian Senate Maximilian Sforza was restored unto his State to whom the Dukedom of Milan did of right belong and their endâ— in the business concerning Pisa may likewise be discovered since when the agreement was come unto the Venetians had no respect to their own advantage but
liberty of Rome recover'd by Caesars death 51. That he endeavored it when 't was too late 53 C. CArthaginians why they came to aid the Romans against Pyrrhus 23 For a long time friends to the Romans ibid. Should rather have been afraid of the Romans then of Pyrrhus 25. Were stronger at Sea then they 36. Often subdued 45 Catâ— Major causing sigs to be brought from Carthage into the Senate-house gives counsel that that City should be destroyed 45. How such counsel might be useful 49 Cato Uticensis what things they were which ingratiated him with the Senate and the People 55. Did many times prevail against Caesar ibid. Founded his greatness upon nobler courses 57. What demonstrations he received from the People of their singular favour to him 58. Because his manners were not suitable to the form of that Republick he could not hold out his reputation among them to the utmost 59 Charls the Great having freed Italy from the slavery of the Northern Barbarians made his son Pipin King of Italy 183 Charls the Eighth King of France his passage into Italy for the conquest of Naples 140. At his return assaulted by the Italian Princes and whether they were well advis'd in it discoursed upon at large ibid. Charls the Fifth Emperor compared with Solyman 22. His great wars with Francis the First King of France and his famous expeditions 157. Why his enterprises against the Kingdom of France proved vain 158. Why he shunn'd hazarding a set battel with Solyman 162. How the State of Milain fell to him 165. Whether he was well advised in not parting from before the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come to assault it 185 A City well ordered how it should be qualified 10. For preserving of unity among the Citizens whether the courses which Caesar took or those used by Cato were more available 5â— When it is grown to a great height 't is a hard matter to order it aright 14. That which aspires to a large Dominion must have two things 1â—1 What is most necessary for its long continuance especially such a one as is cast into the form of a Republick 104 Of how great importance the situation is 114 Citizens of singular quality banish'd from Athens for ten years 3 104 To make them vertuous three things necessary 7. By what means they may acquire greatness 56. That quietness and concord between them is of main importance for the felicity of the State and how it may be preserved ibid. 121 A Citizen very potent how to be corrected that he disturb not the common Quiet 95 Cleomenes King of Sparta accounted the riches of the Persians not worth the trouble they would stand his Soldiery 98 Colonies when first used by the Romans and how beneficial to them 63 172 Of the Venetians why sent into Candy ibid. Constantine the Great divided the Empire between his three Sons 67. Why he transferred the Empire to Constantinople 71 Constantine son to the above-named what part of the Empire fell to his share 67 Consalvo Ferrante why kept under by King Ferdinand 106 Consuls of what authority in Rome 2-4-5 Customs how profitable good ones are to Cities 10 D. DAlmatians with much difficulty subdued by the Venetians 119 Decemvirate held the form of a Republick 50. Why Rome was able to free herself from its tyrannie 51. Why driven out from thence 52 Docius Emperor of Constantinople routed by the Goths flieth and is drown'd in a Fen 75 Discords sprung up in Rome from War not from Peace 48 Dictator upon what occasions chosen by the Romans 12. Of what relief to Rome and who was the first 62. Esteemed necessary in times of great danger and what his dignity was 86 E. EDucation good how useful to a City or State 9 Elephants imployed by Pyrrhus in his wars against the Romans 26 Emperors of Rome favour'd assisted and maintained by the Soldiers and the People 69-72-73 Thirty at one time assum'd that title 70. Why some were chosen to be their Companions in their lives and their Successors after their deaths 72. When those of Caesars race ended ibid. Which were slain by the Soldiers for desiring to reduce them to good discipline 73 Empire of the Romans when it began 68. When it began to decline 6â— The causes of its declination and ruine 71. When it was void of worthy men and valiant Commanders 89. became tributary to the Goths 76 Equality or parity of goods why observed in Sparta 3. Of all the Citizens in government is not good 6. What equality is convenient for a Common-wealth that it may last long 104 Event the surest way to know what is likely to follow 19. That War is far more subject to divers unexpected events then any other actions of ours 31 That it is the master of Fools 38. Not the event of things but the advice wherewith they were done makes them either praise-worthy or blameable 132 F. FAbius Maximus his action and worth 29 c. Deserved to be praised not only for Prudence but for Courage 31. Feared by Hannibal ibid. overcomes Hannibal when Conqueror ibid. Why he took a contrary course to that of Scipio's 33 Fame and Reputation of great importance in all our actions but especially in War 85 Ferdinand King brother to Charls the Fifth why it would have been far better for him quietly to have suffered John King of Hungary to be his neighbour then to pull upon himself the Turks forces 196 Ferdinand King of Spain why he kept under Consalvo 106. Not just in his league with the Venetians 152 Florence why she could not keep herself in a firm state of Government free from civil dissentions 54 The Florentines succoring the Dukes of Milain and Ferrara with men and monies hindred the Venetians in those enterprises 124. Not well thought of and indeed hated by the Italian Princes for the correspondence which they held with the French 128. How their Fortresses put them to much trouble and damage when they were seised upon by the French brought in by their King Charls the Eighth 171 Forts or Fortresses of how great furtherance to a State 148. The doubts for which it may seem they are not available 168. Other more certain and no less grievous 171. Why called i ceppi della Toscana ibid. Arguments and reasons to demonstrate the great benefit of Forts 172. How to be rightly disposed and regulated 176. The defence and praise of rearing Forts ibid. The doubts and arguments against them resolved ibid. Fortune what is to be understood by that name 18 The Fortune of the Romans overborn by Hannibal 41. Why she easily rose up again changing for the better 45. When she proved cross they still kept the same minds 48 Fortune very cross to the Venetians 106 France the Romans put sore to it ere they could take it in 48. Whence the late troubles and discords arose 106 The French oftentimes assaulted Rome 61-63 How timorous they shewed themselves when the wars in
fear which he infuseth into the Enemy but the farther off the War is catried and the nearer the Enemy is assaulted in the Centre and very heart of his State the more are such advantages got If the Romans who were alwaies wont to molest other mens Affairs should be forced to fight within their own Confines and were to wage War not to inlarge their Dominions but to defend themselves and what they held deerest they would prove less then themselves because their courage would fail them and the splendor of the Roman name would be obscured which did so much help to the atchieving of their Enterprises Therefore the Romans knowing by experience the disadvantage of making War at home and open enmity being professed between them and Phillip King of Macedon fearing least the Carthaginian War being ended he would assult Italy as Hannibal had done but a little before would be the first who should pass with their Army into Greece and carry the greatest trouble and danger of War into the States of others But the longer and more difficult the way was for Hannibal to conduct his Carthaginians into Italy so much greater Honor would he win when he should have overcome these difficulties That without great constancy and worth in the Commander and Soldiers so hard an Enterprise could not have been undertaken such craggy mountainous feats passed over and their way be made by the Sword amidst an Enemies Country To this was added that there were many in Italy who were not pleased with the Romans Empire by whose Colonies sent by them into other peoples Countries they were robbed not onely of their Goods but of their Liberty That the fame given out that Hannibal would free these from the Roman slavery and the whole world from the fear of their ambition and power might alienate the minds of such as were Neighbors to the Romans and reconcile them so much the more to him Hannibal did likewise consider as he whose intention it was not to make Inâ—odes into the Roman Territories to make a sore and long War with them that there were many in the Carthaginian Senace who were not well pleased with this enterprise some being moved by respect of the contrary Faction others by envy to his glory and others by zeal they bore to their Countries quiet That if he should be with his Army in some neighboring Country and that the Romans should be but weakly invaded and not soundly set upon it might in likelihood fall out he should be sent for home and Peace be concluded He feared likewise lest his Army which was composed of divers Nations when his Soldiers should find themselves near their own houses they might the more easily disband Being therefore onely intent to come with his Forces into Italy he would shun all occasions of trying his men against the Romans in a pitch'd Field when Publius Scipio went to encounter him at the Banks of Rhodanus Moreover it would not satisfie the high and magnanimous end which he had prefixt unto himself of freeing Carthage his Country from the Tribute to the which she was made liable by the Romans to molest them in any part further from the State but he must march against the very City of Rome the Seat of the Empire to allay or at least to weaken much their power Other smaller things might have given some trouble to the Romans and have retarded their greatness but in the same danger and uncertainty of War whereby she had provoked so powerful an enemy against her the reward and the benefit were not equal in both the cases Very great and difficult undoubtedly was such an enterprise but befitting Hannibal who as it was said had through the magnanimity of his spirit proposed unto himself to imitate the deeds of Hercules and had taken up arms against the Romans not out of any hatred he bore them but for the dignity of Empire So as what would have infused fear into another did set his mind the more on fire He thought likewise by force of necessity to infuse into his Soldiers that strength and constancy of mind which was as an excellent vertue in himself whilst fighting should be enforced all occasion of flight being taken away to put all their hopes of safety in their Swords This most expert Commander knew likewise wherein his Forces did exceed and therewithal he would make trial of their worth Wherefore passing with his Army safe over the Mountains he foresaw he should find large Plains in Italy wherein he might fight the Romans upon great advantage his Army abounding in Horse and the Infantry being the Romans chiefest strength Then as this counsel was taken by Hannibal with reason so if this action be particularly considered it may be said that he was very successful therein for the first time that he had to do with the Roman Armies in Italy thought the Armies of two Consuls were joyned together against him that which was first sent against him into France and that which was destined to encounter him when he should have descended the Mountains he came off with such victory as he put Rome into great terror both for that the City was not wont before to hear such bad news from their Captains as also for having so powerful and so victorious an enemy so nigh at hand But what can be added to the victories gotten at the Lake of Thrasymenus and at Cannae places made famous for the calamities which the Româ—ns suffered there to make his glory greater and the good thereof was answerable to the greatness for those of the Empire rebelling every where and flying from the Romans distressed fortune to Hannibals favor and obedience he soon made himself Master of almost all Italy and put the very City of Rome to great danger and confusions So as it was either his noble daring which begot such prosperous effects or else it was thereby accompanied Yet there wanted not other reasons and respects which may make Hannibals advice of leading his Army into Italy appear less useful and less praise worthy and it may be said that if he had passed into Italy with almost all the whole Carthaginian Forces bringing along with him Veteran Soldiers and the greatest strength of the Carthaginian Empire he ought to have considered that undertaking to make War against the Romans a warlike powerful and fortunate Nation the Carthaginian State was not likely to keep unmolested by their Forces Reason not permitting it to be believed that they who formerly not provoked by any injuries but rather excited by a desire of Government had happily waged war with the Commonwealth of Carthage would now stand only spectators of their own misery and repulsers of offence but that they would rather endeavour to carry that fire which was kindled in their own houses either into Africa or Spain to keep the Carthaginian Forces from succouring that part where their own danger was increased And so did the effect ensue for the Romans having
would have been able if not totally to cure such disorders at least so far to have bounded them as they should not have run into so great a precipice And though amongst the Emperors there were some who were endowed with excellent vertues yet could not the affairs of the Empire revert to its beginning because there past sometimes a whole Age betwixt one and another of these good ones And the Empire for a continued series of many Emperors was administred by base men plunged in a multitude of vices Insomuch as it became almost impossible for those who succeeded to reduce the affairs to any good condition which had so long run to the worse Moreover no one mans abilities though never so excellent were able to govern so great a body as was the Roman Empire much less those of such as were so unfit even for Governments of less importance as were many of the Roman Emperors Whence it was that Adrian a wise Emperor thought it fit for the welfare of the Empire to go in his own person and consolidate it with his presence and visit in perpetual progresses sometimes one sometimes another Province for the good Government whereof they being so many and so remote the example of so many rebellous Commanders and Armies shewed how false and unworthy the Ministers had been who had been by the Emperors sent thither But in the Commonwealth there were a great many Citizens who were interessed in the Government and Greatness thereof so as though some valiant man went to the Wars the City remained not without Government or Obedience nor did the appointing a Commander in chief over one Army bereave them of others who might command more Armies if they had need to wage War at one and the same time in several places whereof the Commonwealth of Rome did in all Ages give notable examples Nor can it be affirmed but that the Commanders and Armies of the Common-wealth have made War with people as powerful in Arms as were those Northern Nations whose fury the Roman Empire could not resist For not to mention so many bitter Wars made by those antient Romans the enterprises done by Iulius Caesar in France were they not undertaken against people in whom all the respects met which were considerable in those Northern Nations very numerous Armies for we read that one onely Army amongst many sundry people whereinto France was then divided which was venquish'd and wholly overcome by Caesar consisted of above Three hundred thousand â—ighting men 〈…〉 went over the Mountains to encounter them so as those Barbarians began to be routed and met with a rub to their greatest Forces And afterwards those who had advanced by another way being gotten safe into Italy they sent to desire Marius the General of the Roman Armies that he would assign them some Territories where they might live quietly and they would therewithall rest contented without endeavoring to advance their Fortune any further by their Arms. But they did not then obtain it of the Roman General as did the Goths and other Foreiners afterwards from some of the Emperors who not trusting in themselves nor in their Armies permitted those Barbarous hostile Nations to live peacefully in those Provinces of the Empire whereof they had injuriously possessed themselves Nay though there were not above Fifty thousand Foot in the Roman Army and that they were to fight with six times as many of the Enemy the Roman Commanders did not refuse to join battel with them and did totally overthrow the Enemies Army thereby securing Italy for that time and for many years after from Transalpine incursions But 't is seen that neither the number of the Enemy nor the desperate-mindedness of them with whom they fought nor the discipline nor induration in Armies and military duties all which things were in these barbarous Armies overcome by the Romans were sufficient to discourage the Roman Commanders and Soldiers whilst the Commonwealth did nourish generous thoughts in them and in their Forces And in Augustus his time also because Discipline in War was observed Drusus and Tiberius Nero were able to drive away the Vandals who were then called Borgondi and to frighten other People of the furthermost Northern parts from coming to infest Italy as they were preparing to do No good argument can then be inforced from what hath been said nor can there be any rational judgment given of what would have befaln the Roman Empire if it had still been kept under the antient government of a Commonwealth till the great combustions made by these Northern people by whom it was destroyed Certainly the acquisition or preservation of States does not depend upon the Form of Government whether it be of one alone or of a few or of many for we have examples cleer enough of great Empires which have been won and preserved by a King by the Optimati by a People and by a Commonwealth mixt of divers sorts of Governments But the strength or weakness of every State depends upon particular Orders chiefly in point of the Militia wherewith it is instituted and the force and vertue whereof useth to be such as even Tyrannical Governments which carry with them so much of violence â—â—ve risen to a great height of power and have preserved it long as by woful example to others we may this day discern in the Ottoman Government As then the City of Rome grew great and powerful not for being either formed of an Optimaâ—ical or Popular or mixt Government but for her good Orders and Institutions in military affairs whence it was that when at any time the Romans had â—â—d success in their battels yet all their enterprises did still end in victory So cannot it be alleged for a true and immediate reason of the ruine of that Empire that is fell under the government and obedience of one alone For this Supreme Authority were it either by succession or by election if as it hath been for a long course of time in so many other Countries it had pâ—ssed in a setled and usual manner from one Prince to another whereby the Soldier should have had no occasion to have usurped a very â—â—due and harmful licentiousness in all things and that the antient discipline obedience and military worth had been observed in the Roman 〈◊〉 aâ— it might have been under one only Lord and Master it may be safely said and believed that that the Roman Empire would have suffered no more by the fury of those Northern â—â—undations than it would have done if the State had continued 〈◊〉 a Commonwealth but as the Ciâ—â—bri 〈◊〉 Ambrâ—â—â— all of them people of the same Nations were formerly withstood by the Roman Arms so the violence of Goths Huns Vâ—ndals and all such like might have been stopped It is only so far true that the change of Government afforded occasion to the ruine of the Empire forasmuch as the good orders and Roman discipline were peradventure easilier corrupted when recommended to
and the power of some Citizens to increase too much Who having made themselves so great by the continuation of military Commands and for having many ways whereby to purchase popular favor as the Commonwealth could not keep them within any bounds nor could the Laws curb them did totally subvert that Government insomuch as it was said of Caesar that he would not have any Superior to him in the City and of Pompey that he would have no Equal And Cato had wont to say that Caesars immoderate greatness had enforc'd Pompey likewise to exalt himself above what otherwise became the publick service to the end that the one might counterpoise the other So grant one inconveâ—ience others will easily follow And as too great eminencie in any Citizen although he be not ill-minded towards the Publick ought to be suspected so it is hard to rid ones self thereof when it is once brought in and tolerated where those usual means and institutions are wanting which the Carthaginians had without falling upon violent courses which in stead of Physick proves poison to that State The House of Medici began to lay sound foundations for its greatness in Florence by means of old Cosmo's great wealth it afterwards increased very much by the vertue and wisdom of Lorenzo and so by little and little getting to a great height of power which exceeded the ordinary condition of a Civil State it was no longer able to live under the Laws of the Country but would assume unto it self the superiority of that Government So as when the Florentines were too late aware thereof they could not moderate that too immease greatness for the continued power of that Family wherein there had been excellent men for worth and eminent degrees and dignities purchased by them both in their own Country and elswhere had got them so many to side partially with them as their own Faction was able upon any occasion to sustain them The like happens also in some States wherein there is not so express a form of a Commonwealth but a supreme Prince yet also many particular Lords of great authority In such States the too much greatness of Bâ—rons hath oft-times proved too pernicious For there being in all men naturally a desire of growing greater and they having means to do so where their power is not limited by the Laws and Customs of the State they are easily induced to mount higher then stands with their degree to equal their authority to that of the King himself and to put for innovations prejudicial to the State Amongst many others we have a notable example hereof in the present troubles of France which were occasioned by having suffered some prime Lords to grow too great in power whence civil discords have risen in the Kingdom and the better to foment and sustain their parties and to perfect their designs they had recourse to forein forces and kindled that fire which is not well quenched yet It hath therefore been thought a very wary and well advised course which hath been used by some Prinâ—es to have an eye upon such whose greatness and eminencie above others may render them suspected and to allay thâ—s their greatness by not admitting them into chief imployments by taking away or lessening their Priviledges and Immunities and by lessening their authority and universal favor by other means according as occasions have counselled Consalvâ— a great and famous Commander in the former age had done excellent service to King Ferdinandâ— and when in all other respects he was to have looked for great rewards as having by his own worth gotten and preserved the Kingdom of Naples he was taken off from all imployment and brought back into Spain to spend the remainder of his years in a private condition That prudent Prince was moved thereunto as knowing that such a man who was so generally cried up and who was so followed and applaâ—ded both by the common people and the Nobility could not but be to be suspected So as he knew it was requisite for his own security and the like of his Dominions not to suffer him to grow greater to his Masters prejudice and therefore to take from him all Command and Imployment The Instructions given to this purpose in a figurative way first by Periander to Thrasybalus and after by Tarquiâ— the proud to his Son Sâ—xtâ—â— are very observable to wit to cut off the tops of the highest Poppies oâ— ears of corn whereby they would infer that he who will rule in safety must not suffer men to grow more eminent then others for what concerns any Civil Power which though it appear to be a thing proper to onely tyrannical Siâ—es yet wheâ— it is used with discretion and wisdom hath another aspect for all particular interests ought to give way where the publick good and the preservation of universal Peace and Quiet of the State which is of aâ—much greater concornment is in question But when this may be done by any ordinary way as by Law and Custom as it was among the Athenians and other antient people then this remedie proved the more just and secure There is not any mischief in the City which stands in more need to be cured by the physick of the Law then Ambition for Ambition is such a sickness in the mind of man as where once it takes root it never leaves the mind free and healthful till it be torn out by main force but rather the maladie increasing by length of time it makes men as it were franticâ— so as the ambitious man covets all things and is not satisfied with any thing having neither mean nor bridle Honors Dignities Preferments how great soever they be serve rather for tinder to make this inward fire flame the higher then for water to quench it insomuch as some of these vain-glorious men thought it a small matter to command the whole world when they heard it disputed that there were more worlds then one Now to this almost natural and ordinary defect of humanity and altogether as harmful to the quiet of all States as it is of it self incorrigible 〈◊〉 will prove a wholesome cure and which the Atheniâ—ns in particular 〈◊〉 their Commonwealth stood in need of For as Greece did in that Age abound 〈◊〉 men who were really valiant so ambition seemed to have set up its rest amongst them Wherefore miraculous things are written of that Nation in those times But such as wherein it may be found that true worth was greatly conâ—â—â—isnated by an immoderate desire of glory and haughtinesâ— The Laws of canvassing and all other provisions thereunto tending have alwaies proved fruitless for every little sparkle that remains of this fire though it be covered over with ashes may cause great Combustions It seems therefore that no other remedy is sufficient for those evils which proceed from pride and ambition then totally to rid the City or State of such men as are desirous to exceed all others Plato said that men
and Forces on all sides The City of Rome stands on firm land or Terra firmâ— but so neer the Sea as she may reap the commodity thereof without being thereby endangered she is apt to breed up Armies and to nourish men in the exercise of the Militia not is she inconveniently seated for the transportation of her Forces by Sea into other far off Provinces This diversity of situation hath begot diversity of inclinations in the Inhabitants Thus doth Nature always adapt mens minds to those Arts which they are to exercise themselves in or else Custom doth inform the Habit and turns it into Nature For as the Romans following exercises conformable to the situation of their City were more inclined to Land-war and in Peace to husbandry So the Venetians invited to other things according to the diversity of place applied their studies otherwise to defend their Liberty and to increase their wealth using the Sea Militia for the one and Traffick and Merchandising for the other Which whosoever shall upbraid our Citizens withall seems not to know that without these a City could neither have long preserved it self nor increase in state and wealth as it hath done For not having any particular Territories whereout to extract their livelihood she would have been always poor and weak and wanting other imployments she would have been destroyed if not by forein Forces by her own Idleness as many other Cities have been the Citizens wanting wherein to imploy their thoughts and to exercise themselves in quiet times But if the Citizens of Rome were much commended for their husbandry insomuch as of this day many famous men of that Commonwealth are as much celebrated for having been good Husbandmen as good Commanders as were Curtius Dentâ—tus Quintius Cinciâ—â—tus Attalius Collatsinus Marcâ— Regulus Scipio Africâ—â—ons and others wherefore should the Venetians be upbraided with their Merchandising this being an exercise as fitting and requisite for the situation of Venice as was that of Tillage and Husbandry to the like of Rome If the care of cultivating the Earth did not abase the minds of those antient and reverend Romans who have left so evident examples of worth to all other Cities and Nations why should the industry of Merchandising redound to the opprobry of the Vâ—â—â—tians seeing to the contrary with how much glory and how much publick benefit they have for so long a feries of years govern'd the Commonwealth The studies and actions of the Romans and Venetians have then been different but notwithstanding alike in this that they aimed at the same end though they took several ways there unto to wit aâ— Glory at the Grandeur and Liberty of their Commonwealth Many famous examples of Fortitude of love to their Country and of all other sorts of worthiness have been seen in each of them so as in our men nothing was more to be desired unless 〈◊〉 and more frequent occasions wherein to have imployed themselves that the greatness of their actions might have corresponded to the magnnimity of this minds Yet do not we Venetians want 〈◊〉 of many 〈◊〉 who have been very famous for fortitude of mind and military worth and he who stall examine the life and actions of many Princes of the Commonwealth will find them to be such as deserve praise and celebration Such have Ordelâ—so Fallerâ— Viâ—â—l◠〈◊〉 Micâ—â—li and Hâ—â—â—rico Dandule 〈◊〉 bastione 〈…〉 Cantarem Pietre 〈◊〉 Andrea Gritâ—i Sebastiano Veniero and divers others been whose words might be 〈◊〉 to that of the Fabriâ—â—i Marcelli Fabii 〈◊〉 and others of their so much 〈…〉 then if they had had a larger field to exercise themselves in or had the 〈◊〉 of their Common-wealth afforded them same equal to the merit and valor of those 〈…〉 But let us now come to consider those 〈◊〉 important 〈◊〉 of the condition of Times and their Neighbors qualities The City of Venice 〈◊〉 her beginning when Italy was possest by the wild Northern Nations and when being perplex'd with all other sort of miseries she fell finally into the slavery of Barbâ—â—ians wherein she lived for the space of many years How then could a new City aspire to Empire while the Forces of the Barbarians were so powerful in that Province as the most powerful Roman Empire was not able to withstand them which was shook and destroyed by their fury It rather seems a wonder that a City in her first and weak beginnings was able to manage so great a War and withstand as she did afterwards the violence of two fierce and potent Nations to wit the French and Huns The French when their King Pipin being entred Italy with puissant Forces to drive out the Lombards and being scandalised that the City of Venice had leaned to the friendship of Nicephorus Emperor of Constantinople turn'd his Forces upon her to subjugate and destroy her And the Hâ—ns when parting from Pannonia which took from them the name of Hungary having overcome a very powerful Army of the Germans and kill'd their King Lodovicâ—s they fell to 〈…〉 again their fury was withstood by the 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 a powerful Prince was forced to give way unto But afterwards the Forces of these Western Barbarians being in time weakned by Châ—â—â— the Great the State of Italy fell again in to the Western Emperors who being then very powerfull and masters both of Germany and France the Forces of a weak Commonwealth were not likely to contest with so great Princes with any hope of acquiring 〈◊〉 These difficulties being added unto by the Cities situation withheld the Venetians a long while from thinking how to enlarge their Dominions in Terra sirms in which opinion being for a long time confirmed and having very 〈◊〉 imployed their studies and Forces in Sea enterprises though the 〈◊〉 of times did counsel them to the contrary giving them hopes of noble acquisitions on Land they either despised or knew not how to make use of the occasions which afterwards were offered Thus when the German Emperors troubled with the domestick troubles of that Province did forgo their possessions in Italy the Venetians not minding then that opportunity left the advantage to others which they might easily have reaped whereupon other Cities of Italy purchasing their 〈◊〉 from the Emperors at low raâ—es framed a peculiar Government unto themselves as did Florence and others were possest by others powerful men as 〈…〉 and other Cities of Lombardy when if the Commonwealth of Venice whole power was already much increased had been minded to have 〈◊〉 themselves of any of the Imperial Territories it is not to be doubted but they might in a short time have made notable acquisitions But when they began very late and more provoked by injuries then by ambition of dominion to think upon Territories by Land they found divers other Princes become very powerful both in 〈◊〉 and Authority and confirm'd in the States which they 〈◊〉 under 〈◊〉 a shore lawful 〈◊〉 Wherefore they met with many difficulties and amongst the
ultimate ruine depends â—y this means proceedings march a slower pace and all acquisitions become more difficult so this immoderate desire of having all things for thâ—r own service working a contrary effâ—ct to their intentions keeps the Confines of their Dominions more narrowly bounded and theâ—eby lessens that glory which they seem to aspire so much at If then our Princes and Chieftains will walk in the waies of the Antients they will finde that Justice Clemencie and moderate Empire are stronger and more secure Engins to take strong Holds then those whâ—ch they in these times make use of And if they be not faulty in the truâ—st worth they will find sufficient valor and discipline in their Soldiers to bring to pass whâ—tsoever great Enterprises and to exalt their name to such a height of glory and so illustrate themselves and their Age as they may in all things be deservedly compared to the famousest and most cried up of the Antients The Seventh DISCOURSE What the cause is why Italy hath enjoyed so long Peace and Quiet in these latter Times HE who shall call to mind what troubles Italy for a long time hath suffered under which after the passage of Charls the eight King of France till the Peace made at Bolognia was for the space of thirty five years continually infested with better Wars and subject to all those greater evils which the wickedness of man hath found out to his own undoing may justly think her very happy in this present and the last preceding Age wherein after so long a combustion she hath enjoyed so happy and quiet a Peace For though in this time some little sparkles may have broken forth yet have they not spread much nor lasted long but being confined within some small circuits the greater and more noble parts of Italy have remained safe and untouched by this flame Wherefore those Princes who this mean while have had the government of the several States of Italy are certainly much to be praised and the people of Italy are chiefly to acknowledg so great a benefit from their wisdom and vigilancie Yet because there have divers accidents happened which have opened the way to Princes wherein to walk directly on to this right end of Peace and Concord it may be worth the while particularly to examine from what causes this good hath proceeded for thereby it may likewise be known how the like may be preserved It is a Proposition sufficiently known and indubitably true that Sublata causa tollitur effectus Take away the cause and the effect which proceeds from thence will cease Wherefore by truly examining the causes from whence the Wars and molestations of Italy did proceed we may perceive how these ceasing she hath remain'd in that peace and quiet which may be said to be the true proper and most natural condition of a State all other workings in a good Government and even War it self being ordained for Peace whereby as Ciâ—ies and Kingdoms enjoy Civil felicity so must that State be most perfect wherein the perfectest workings are exercâ—sed to the most pâ—rfect end Peace is of it self introduced into a State by taking away the impediments which do disturb it just as health is introduced into our bodies by taking away those ill humors which keep them from their perfect and natural condition Now if we will take into our consideration whence as from the principal occasions that Hâ—rmony if I may so call it which the Concord of the Italian Princes had so long produced and preserved with such liking and consolation of all men was spoil'd and corrupted we shall find that two affectâ—ons which do usually accompâ—ny Empire and which at this time grew very powerful in some Princes were those roots from which so many mischiefs did afterwards put forth to wit Fear and Ambition Fear of losing ones own State Ambition of possessing what belongs to another The fear of the King of Aragons just indignation made Lodovic Storza think upon Novelties made him have recâ—urse for help to France and made him believe that was best for him which proved his ruine But it wâ—s ambitâ—on of addâ—ng new Territories to that Crown and glory to himself which made Charls the Eight King of France but young both in years and experience think upon nothing but how to effect his desires by acceptâ—ng of Sforzas proffâ—r of passing into Italy which proved the Sepulchre of so many Soldiers and of so many gâ—lant Commanders of that warlike Nation by the so many Wars which arose from that Spring-head and which brought no other advantage to the Authors But let us make a little further enquiry The so famous and as it may justly be termed so pernicious War to all Italy made by the League of so many Christian Princes who had all conspired the ruine of the Commonwealth of Venice whence did it arise but from these two wâ—cked seeds Fear and Ambition Many Princes apprehended the greatness of the Republick which was already much increased by the prosperous success in War wherein she was associated by the French whereby she was become very formidable especially to the Princes of Italy wherefore they all desired her abasement for their own security Nor was the Emperor Maximilian totally free from this fear who had learnt by late experience how powerful the Forces of the Commonwealth were grown which had bereft him of some Towns belonging to him But Lodovick King of France the thirâ—t after Empire being always uâ—quenchable growing still more desirous to possess the whole State of Milan whereof he had already gotten the greatest part and repenting himself that the Cities of Cremona and Giaradada were fallen to the Ventians was egg'd on by this spur of Ambition to join in conspiracie with the other Princes against the Commonwealth which had so lately and so many several ways deserved so very well at his hands After these ensued many long Wars though not equally grievous which had many various and uncertain events and which were fomented and maintain'd by these seeds of all discord fear and ambition When the greatness and power of the Emperor Charls the Fifth was increased and confirm'd in Italy the Commonwealth apprehended that her State in Terra firma would not by reason thereof be very safe she therefore willingly took up Arms accompaâ—ied by the French to secure herself from the danger she conceived she lay under by reason of the continual neighborhood of a greater and more powerful neighbor by having a particular Prince of that State who might be Duke of Milan Francis King of France desired likewise to see the Emperor bereft of that State but out of other respects to wit because his ambition was such as would never suffer him to give way to the fortune of Charls the Emperor and to see Charls so much superior to him especially in Italy where his Predecessors the Kings of France and he himself with no less fervencie though with worse success had labored so long
Holds as now it is she might not peradventure have run so great a misfortune she had not so soon lost so many and so noble Cities as she did but it may be alleadged on the contrary that if in that evil Crisis of affairs wherein she was brought to such adversity she had had so many important Forts as now she hath and that they had faln into the power of the Enemy she would not certainly have so soon recovered her losses and restored herself into her pristine power and greatness as she did We likewise see the State of Milan which fell so often into the power of the French it staid not long under their Dominioâ— for not finding any strong and Royal Forts wherein they could make any safe abode nor having time to erect any by reason of their continual Wars or for want of monies the defenders of that State did often times prevail and every accident either of the change of the peoples minds or of their Enemies increase of Forces were sufficient to drive them out Which would not have happened if they had but once been Masters of any strong Holds from whence they could not have been expel'd without a long and hard siege Guide Ubaldâ— D. of Urbin a Prince but of small Territories but very wise and well experienced in War moved by these respects after he had recovered his State which was formerly taken from him by Duke Valentine he resolved to slight all the strong Holds that were there knowing that they could not at first preserve his State unto him and when hee should lose it they would make the difficultie of regaining it the greater When Charls the Eighth King of France going to win the Kingdom of Naples past through Tuscany the Forts which the Florentines had built for their own securitie were the very things whereby they were most indamaged and these falling into the power of the French whose Forces they thought they were not able to withstand they put the Florentines to vast expence and made them undergo great slavery out of a desire of recovering them Whereas if that State had laâ—n open the King who was bound upon other enterprises passing forward would no waies have troubled the affairs of that Commonwealth The like and almost out of the like respect did afterward befall Duke Cosimo when the Emperor Charls the Fifth would keep some Castles belonging to that State in his own power which should otherwise have been left free to Cosimo and which was the occasion of that saying Chele fortezza sonoi ceppi della Toscana That strong Holds are the fetters of Tuscany These are the greatest mischiefs which strong Holds use to bring with them but there are others not altogether so grievous but more certain and irreparable For who can deny but that the excessive charge which Princes are at not onely in building Fortresses but more in muniting and guarding them doth sufficiently exhaust the publick Exchequer and necessitate the disbursing of such moneys in times of peace as ought to be kept for the more urgent occasions of War And certainly he who could see what vast sums the Commonwealth of Venice hath spent for some late years past in making and muniting so many Forts both by Sea and Land would be very much astonished and would confess that so great a mass of treasure would â—beâ— sufficient to provide for any War how great soever and to withstand for a good while any potent Enemy It may peradventure likewise be said and not untruly that whilst a Prince reposes much confidence in being able to maintain his State by means of these strong Holds and by the assistance of a few Soldiers he is not so careful as he ought to be of other things which belong to the Miliâ—ia which are notwithstanding real and secure foundations of a State The Lacedemonians would not therefore suffer their Cities to be begirt with a wall because they beleeved that by the thoughts of such securitie their Citizens would become more careless and negligent in managing their Arms by sole means whereof they thought that the Forces of an Enemie might and ought to be kept afar off Which that wise man would likewise infer who said That the walls which ought to secure a City should be made of iron not of stone And a Spartan being demanded by an Athenian what he thought of the walls of Athens answered That he thought they were very handsome for a City which was to be inhabited by women inferring that it is not necessarie nor honorable for able valiant men to secure themselves from their Enemies by such means It is likewise usually seen that a Prince who thinks he shall be able to curb his Subjects to govâ—rn them and rule them as he pleaseth by means of Bulwarks and Castles and that therefore he needs not the love of his Subjects is much less mindful of those things which become a good Prince and which purchase affectâ—on Yet we are taught by many evident examples that the peoples love or hatred is that which doth most preserve unto him or bereave him of his State and makes them more ready or backward to render him obedient as is of late seen in Flanders which so many Fortresses and Armies hath not in so long a time been able to reduce to the devotion of its ligitâ—mate Prince And it may generally be observed that such Governments as have lasted longest have been preserved not by the advantage of strong Holds whereof some have not had any but by vertue of a good Militia and of the Subjects love The Romans were accustomed when they had won any new Country to send new Inhabitants thither who being placed either in the antient Cities or in others built by themselves they called Roman Colonies and by these mens valor as People devoted and obliged to the Senate and People of Rome out of remembrance of their desert and in gratitude for the good which they had received they easily kept the new Subjects in loyalty to the Commowealth and the Countries which they had won by their Arms in obedience The which being moved thereunto by the same respects the Venetians did likewise in Candia sending many of their own Gentlemen thither to make Colonies and to defend and maintain that Island But the Turks in a very violent manner but answerable to the custom of their Government do almost totally destroy the antient Inhabitants of their new-gotten Countries chiefly the richest and the most noble from whom they take their lâ—nds and possessions and give the revenues thereof to be made use of by the Soldâ—ery making Timari thereof as they term it which are Pays or Revenues assigned over to the Soldiers upon condition that they are to maintain a certain number of Horse by which means they keep a great number of Warriors continually on foot who seâ—ving for Garrisons for the safety of the new acquired Country are notwithstanding always ready to serve in any other place
were still firm to the French and the other lesser Princes adhered some to the fortune of the French some to that of the Imperialists It was then the most useful safe and requâ—site counsel to join in friendship by particular and reciprocal obligations either with Caesar or with the King of France By doing which to boot with security many good effects might follow to wit that the adverse party being supprest and driven out of Italy that party which should yet remain there as friend and free from the jealousie or rivdship of any forein Prince was likely to afford a long Peace a thing very necessary in respect of the many late afflictions and such accidents might the more probably happen in process of time whereby Italy might more easily free herself from the seâ—vitude of one only Lord and Master then she should have done from the like of two it being unlikely that two Principalities should meet with one and the same fortune at one and the same time But if nothing else of good had happened during this discord and contention between these two Princes their States must be subject to the expences and troubles which do necessarily accompany War so as some revenge would be had upon these forein Nations for the so many calamities which they had brought upon Italy and that saying of the Scripture would be verified To revenge a man upon his Enemies by other Enemies The Emperors of Rome when the Empire began to decline and the antient Italian worth and discipline was almost lost they not having Forces sufficient of their own to withstand the Northern nations made use of the Soldiers of the same Northern nations to drive their Fellow-foreiners out of Italy as particularly of the Goths of whom they had several times great numbers in their Armies But say that one of these forein Princes could not have worsted the other though assisted by the Apostolick Sea even in this condition of affairs hopes would not be wanting whilst War should continue between them For after having long wrestled together especially since the quarrel arose out of hatred and warlike emulation it was not unlikely that they would rather quit the Terititories which they held in Italy to some third persons then to yield one to another so as it might remain in their own power Concerning which surrender particularly of the State of Milan many Treaties had been formerly Leo had likewise a very fresh example of councels taken by the Venetian Senate which in the same case was confirm'd by experience to be very wisely done For that Senate finding that their State was fallen into great misfortunes and reduced to so low an ebb as she was not able to recover of herself they joined with some of their very Enemies against other some of their Enemies whereby they did not only separate them but did revenge themselves much to the prejudice of those that they had excluded from their friendship and did thus recover the State which had been usurped from them But Leo's advice was afterwards the better approved of by the particular issue of this very business For having after many several cogitations of mind join'd in confederacie with Caesar the City of Milan was taken from the French by their joint-forces and the Cities of Paâ—ma and Piacensa were recovered to the Church not without great hopes had it not been for the unexpected and unfortunate death of Pope Leo that the French should have then been totally expulsed out of Italy and Maximilian Sforza reinvested into the State of Milan according to agreements made by the Pope which would have greatly secured the liberty of the Church and of whole Italy Which when it should have so succeeded there was reason enough to hope that the French would join in driving the Imperialists out of the Kingdom of Naples being satisfied without any other reward with having revenged themselves for their received injuries and with seeing the Imperialists reduced to their condition for what concerned the affairs of Italy And it might be hoped that this might the easilier be done by reason of the far distance of Caesars Territories and by reason of many ill humors which began already to grow in several places whereby be might be necessitated to bend his Forces and thoughts elswhere and leave his affairs in Italy but weakly defended Leo then may seem to have grounded his councels well like a wise Prince as he was upon good foundations for as much as may be effected by humane wisdom where so many other accidents do concur Yet were there not wanting some who did greatly blame this resolution of Pope Leo's taxing him with inconsiderateness because being led on by vain hopes he had unnecessarily imbroil'd himself again in War And if we shall look more narrowly into this business we shall find that many Considerations were wanting which may raise at least some rational doubts whether the Pope were more to be praised or to be blamed for this action It is most certain that War in it self is troublesom to Princes grievous to the People and subject to many various and uncertain chances So that as every wise Prince ought alwaies to avoid it where there is no express necessity it appears that this Prince ought to have had it in more horror then any other in respect of the times and of his degree and place which ought rather to have made him endeavor peace and quiet between Christian Princes The Dominion of the Church was by his Predecessors means arrived already to such a largness as it might seem better to become the Succeeder to augment the safety thereof by procuring friendship with other Princes and by a constant neutrality then to expose himself to new troubles and dangers by adding more States thereunto Italy having been much afflicted and brought in almost every of her parts to great misery and calamity for having been the seat of War for the space of thirty years did not onely much desire peace and quiet but did chiefly expect it from the Popes councels and actions by reason of his supreme authoritie and of the zeal he ought to have born to the publick good How could it then deserve praise that when forein Princes seemed to be inclined to suffer Italy to remain quiet he should afford them occasion and means of imbroiling her in new troubles and calamities which were certainly to insue by reassuming Arms where the advantage which might 〈…〉 gotten was very doubtful and questionable But that which in this case 〈◊〉 to be considered is that Leo's intention being to drive the foreiners out of Italy and to vindicate her liberty he should have chosen some good means to have done it Many antient and modern experiences might have taught him how hard a matter it might be to keep the French on the other side of the Mountains The Romans were not more troubled with any other Nation then with the French in freeing Italy from forein invasions for
Hen Do Cary Baro de Leppington Comes Monmouthenâ—is et honble Ord Balniâ— Eques Politick DISCOURSES Written in ITALIAN BY PAOLO PARUTA A Noble VENETIAN Cavalier and Procurator of St. MARK Whereunto is added A short SOLILOQUY In which the AUTHOR briefly examines the whole Course of his Life Rendred into ENGLISH By the Right Honorable HENRY EARL of MONMOVTH LONDON Printed for H. Moseley and are to be sold at the Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Church-yard 1657 THE CONTENTS Of the Several DISCOURSES The First BOOK DISCOURSE I. WHat was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs having Armed people on foot pag. 1. II. What success the Roman affairs would have had if Alexander the Great had turned with his victorious Army into Italy 18 III. Whether was the better and more laudable advice That of the Carthaginians in offering to assist the Romans against King Pyrrhus Or that of the Romans in refusing their offer 23 IV. Which of the two famous Roman Commanders Quintus Fabiâ—s Maximus or P. Scipio Africanus brought more of 〈…〉 the Commonwealth of Rome in managing their War 29 V. Whether war being to be made against the Romans Hannibals counsel was good to carry it into Italy 34 VI. Whether it was well done by the Romans to carry the War against the Carthaginians into Sicily and Spain and into Macedonia and Greece against King Philip whilst Hannibal waged War with them in Italy 39 VII Whether the destruction of Carthage was the rise of the ruine of the Roman Republick 45 VIII Why Rome could not regain her liberty after the death of Julius Caesar as she had formerly done by driving the Tarquinâ— first out and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri 50 IX Which is the safer way to be taken to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth that which was held by Cato or that which was pursued by Caesar. 55 X. To what Age of the City of Rome the greatest praise and merit is to be given for the prosperity and greatness whereto she arrived 59 XI How the Roman Empire though it fell oftentimes into the hands of base and wicked mâ—n was notwithstanding able to maintain it self in the Reign of many Emperors and how it came to be finally destroyed 67 XII Why the Commonwealth of Rome though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels yet did still prove victorious at last 78 XIII Whether the City of Rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her Command if she had preserved her Librty and Form of Commonwealth then she did under the Government of Emperors 85 XIV Why the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their dominion as did the Romans and how Greece came to lose her liberty 93 XV. Whether Ostracism used by the Athenians be a just thing or no and whether it be useful for the preservation of a Commonwealth 104 The Second BOOK DISCOURSE I. WHy the Commonwealth of Venice hath not so for enlarged her Prâ—cincts as did the Roman Commonwealth 111 II. Whether or no the Commonwealth of Venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the City of Pisa when it was appâ—gneâ— by the Florentineâ— 1â—3 III. That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate successes of War after the routing of the Venetian Army in the actioâ— of Giaradada 131 IV. Whether the Princes of Italy did well or no to assault the Army of Charlâ— the Eight King of France when after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples he hasted to pass over the Mountains 140 V. Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises 146 VI. Why modern Princes have not done actions equal to those which were done by the Antients 156 VII What the cause is why Italy hath enjoyed so long peace and quiet in these latter times 164 VIII Whether Citadels and Strong-holds much used by our modern Princes be commodious and of true safety to a State or no. 168 IX Whether the Opinion of Pope Leo the Tenth were good or no and his counsel safe of driving Foreign Nations out of Italy by the help of other Transalpine Forces 179 X. Whether the Counsel taken by the Emperor Charls the Fifth and by his Commanders of not parting from the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come with very great strength from Constantinople to assault it deserve praise or blame 185 A TABLE Of all the more notable Things contained in the present Politick Discourses A. ADrian the Emperor why he resolved to go on progress over all his States and to visit every part thereof Pag. 71-91 Where he set the bounds of his Empire ibid. Agesilaus though he were King in Sparta was obedient to the Laws of the Country 48 Alcibiades by too much desire of glory ruined his Country 10. Had higher thoughts then the rest of the Greek Commanders 95 Alexander the Great the greatness of his enterprises 19. His Militia 20-83 An Indian Gymnosophist shews him how in a large Kingdom insurrections fall out 71. How far he extended his Empire and in how little time 157. and how 159. His artifices and laudable way for opening the way more easily to his great atchievements and greater glory 162 Ambition precipitated Rome into very grievous disorders 15-16-51 When discovered makes men distastefull 58. It and Fear raise in Princes minds a desire of innovation 164. The important mischief of it if once gotten into mens hearts 106. How it is to be cured in States-men ibid. An Army keeping the field how greatly beneficial 169 Armies maintained by the Romans to carry on the war in divers parts taken only out of Italy 64 Arragonian Kings of Naples what they did for fear of the French forces 138 Artillery of what use in warâ—â— 160. That in their stead the Antients had miraculous Engines called Tormenta 173 Assaulting the Enemy in his own State how advantagious 34 Attalaricus King of the Goths descends into Italy 76. is afterwards entertain'd for a Stipendiary to the Empire ibid. Attila content to lose the day so the Roman Commander might be slain in the battel 89 Athens why she soon lost her liberty 5-13-54 Athenians of great power in Greece 94. By what people followed and favour'd ibid. Too hard for the rest in Sea-forces ibid. Hinder'd by the Spartans from taking in Sicily and from assaulting Persia 95. Why they could not enlarge their Dominion 98 Augustus Caesar in many places enlarged the Empire 68. Remained sole Lord of the whole World 71. Reduced it all to Peace though he was troubled with some Insurrections 7â— See Octavianus B. BAttails subject to divers unexpected accidents 31 When they are to be adventured upon 192 Brutus Junius Br. how he stirr'd up the people to Liberty 51. Why he condemned his own sons to death 52 Brutus Marcus Br. why he could not preserve the
Army 51. Subdued for the Romans above eight hundred Cities 65. The laudable way and art by which he brought people to obey the Romans and facilitated his enterprises 163 The People of Rome of what authority in the Commonwealth 5. How from the beginning it was of great power and increased it more and more 15 Loving liberty how it came to lose it 51. Sought by seditions to obtain from the Senate all things though never so unjust 52 The People That to curb it Severity prevails more then Meekness 16. That out of its natural fickleness it useth to favour a Forein Prince and by seditions and violent attempts to plot against the present Power 170 A Prince shall do well and wisely to have a care that no Subject of his grow to be suspected for his greatness 106. Must not for his own relief make use of Forein aids that he may be too strong for his Native forces 103 Princes what sort of Militia it is best for them to make use of in their expeditions and other matters of War 155. Sage advice to them in points of War and the choice of Commanders 145. Those of Italy have used to imploy foreign Commanders and foreign mercenary Soldiers 122 See more in States R. REpublicks how their divers Forms may be known 6. How their continuance may be known 18. How at last they grow to be Tyrannies 54. That a State deserves not the name of a Commonwealth or Republick where the Decrees of the People and not the Laws carry all the command 6. For the long preservation and quietness of them nothing more necessary then a Parity 104. A poor one cannot enlarge its Dominion 112 Rome was a mixt but imperfect Commonwealth and why 3-11 Was too Popular 3. Why it could not free it self from many disorders 14 How long it held its greatness 68. When and how she might have freed herself from her many bad qualities and defects ibid. How she abounded in Soldiers and Commanders 39-64-74-80 How she made way for Monarchy 39. She scatter'd her corruptions amongst the Nobles and the Communalty 50. That those Citizens proved worst oppressors to her whom for the meer conservation of her Liberty she had too much exalted 51 Her first second and third Age 59. Her first seven Kings of what considerable benefit they were to her 60. At what time she deserved the praise of good Government 61 Romans why they refused the Carthaginians aid against Pyrrhus 26. Refused to have peace with Pyrrhus ibid. For what causes chiefly they had the better of the Carthaginians 39. They regarded not so much present dangers as future 45. Out of one War they still framed another 46 Why they were invincible according to Polybius 78. The two pretences under which they made their most notorious acquisitions 161. How by Colonies they kept their new Subjects in loyalty and obedience 173 Romulus a man fierce ambitious and desirous to enlarge his Estate train'd up the People according to his genius 113 S. SCipio Africanus his worth and actions 29-33 Why he took a course differing from that of Fabius 33. His passage into Sicily of what benefit it was 35 Scipio Nafica when Carthage was taken disswaded the Senate from destroying that City 46. Whether that counsel of his were founded upon good reason ibid. The Senate of Rome what number it consisted of and when first instituted 14 Its authority 4. The generous answer she gave to the Ambassadors of Pyrrhus 26-89 Little esteemed of by Julius Caesar 46. Subject to corruptions 50. Severity in what sort of Commonwealth it doth good 57. Was very great in Cato ibid. Sylla brought into Rome licentious living 51. Increased the Order of the Senators to counterpoise the Communalty Gave honors and riches to his Favorites ibid. Soldan of Caire how and why he lost all his Kingdom in a short time 160 Solyman parallel'd with Charls the Fifth 22. His endowments of mind and fortune 157. His great atchievements 158. Why he made no great progress in Hungary 159. nor at Corfu against the Venetians ibid. Why he made that expedition into Hungary 195. Had under his command four Empires and eighteen Kingdoms 196 Sparta a mixt Republick very excellent 5. Her Laws not written 11 That authority which the Kings had there not prejudicial to it 48. Many worthy men flourished in it by reason of the form of its government 58 For want of money could not enlarge her Empire 82 Spartans when and why of great power in Greece 96. By what people followed and favour'd ibid. Stronger then the rest in Land forces ibid. Why they would not have their Cities begirt with walls 171 States whence their divers changes come 53. How men grow desirous of their change 72. Are augmented and preserved by the same things which gave them their beginning and corrupted by the contrary 73. Where they have been ruin'd by intestine discords the over-great height of some of their own hath been the cause 105. That they have their beginning increase stay declination and ruine 86 Sâ—ilico a Barbarian and by nation a Hun called to the command of the Roman Army betrays the Empire 89 T. THebans much esteemed of for the discipline of their Soldiers called the Sacred Band 94. Pelopidas and Epaminondas famous Commanders of theirs ibid. Themistocles what his advice was and his Naval victory against the Persians 99 Tiberius Gracchus slain by the Nobles of Rome without any revenge from the People 17 Tribuneship in Rome of how great power and its insolence 6. Called Sacrosanctus 52 Triumph in Rome when first instituted and to whom first granted 62 Turks their assistance refused by the Venetians and yet sued for by other Christian Princes 136. Why they cannot so suddenly nor easily do any signal enterprises by Land 161. Are accustomed for their own security to destroy the inhabitants of such places as they take in especially those of the better and richer sort 172. Their chiefest strength consists in their Cavalry 187 Their Law promiseth everlasting reward in heaven to every one that loseth his life in their Soveraigns quarrel 194 V. VAlerius Publicola why in reforming the government of Rome he yielded many things to the People 14-15 That he might have order'd the City better ibid. Venice in time brought her Government to perfection 12. How she hath been able to preserve her Liberty thus long 54. What her Government is ibid. When it began 77-116 Her Founders lovers of Peace and of an intent and end differing from that of the Founders of Rome ibid. Her greatest and most difficult attempts have been either in their own Defence or for Religion or in Assistance of others 115. What wars and efforts of fierce Nations she at her first beginning underwent 117. Why she made use of Foreign Soldiers and Commanders 121. That for having accustomed to imploy Foreign Commanders she hath not been able by reason of their disloyalty to prosecute such Enterprises of hers as had been
well begun ibid. Venetians what course they took to free themselves from the danger they were in of the Genoa-forces 43. That the practice of Merchandising is not to be blamed in them 116. Some of their illustrious and famous Princes ibid. What title their Dukes assumed for the taking in of Constantinople 118 How prejudicial to them the Ottoman Empire hath been ibid. That had it not been for the treachery of their Commanders the State of Milan had been theirs 121. Their weighty and glorious enterprises by Sea and Land against the Saracens for the Emperors of Constantinople and against the Genoeses 129. Why they called Lewis King of France into Italy 130 Why almost all Christian Princes entred into a League against them 132-180 How discreetly they have continued Neutrals in the discords of Princes that thereupon Peace might follow in these latter times 167. Why they sent into Candy new Colonies of their own Gentry 172 Vertue what two vertues are necessary for him that proposeth great matters to himself and aspireth after glory 88 Vertuous To make men vertuous three things are needful 11 W. WAR brought home to the Enemies own doors how advantagious 28 When it ought to be carried on with protracting of time 31. War and not Peace was the cause of Romes ruine 46. It is subject to divers successes and chances more then any other action of ours 31-183-185 Wars made by the Romans after the subduing of Carthage 48. Made and maintained by them in many places at once 65. Particulars most necessary for them 149. The manner of Wars now used is the chiefest cause why the enterprises of modern Princes prove not equal to those of the Antients 148 The end of the second Table ERRATA Pag. lin 4-45 AFter not read only 5-7 Dele not 8-17 For licence read licentiousness 10-27 For temperance read temper 11-38 For them read those 15-25 Before what insert do ib. 48 Dele more 19-19 For of read and for and read of 25-38 Dele only 26 ult After obedience insert iâ— 35-26 After â—ighting read they 37-43 After these insert rather 38-14 After of Insert all this 39-12 Before the insert to 43 pen. After as insert if 53-12 After 〈◊〉 insert the less 55-31 After not insert only 60-3 After not insert only 73-17 Dele and the first Pag. lin 74-27 Before Goths insert great valor of the ibid. 31 For Commanders read Soldiers 82-50 For Rhodosius read Rhodanus 89-30 For Soldiers read Commanders 112-30 For where read were 113-48 Dele then by 116-20 For a read the. 124-7 For them into his read him into thâ—â— 126-34 After mens insert thoughts 152-25 Before Pope insert with Francis King of France 157-5 After if insert we 158-45 For sadly read easily 159-26 For Corâ—â—r read Corfâ— ibid. 29 For Corfee read Corfâ— 176-47 After thereof insert more 199-2 Before not insert it ibid. 3 Dele it 20â— 19 Dele be THE FIRST BOOK The First DISCOURSE What was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs having Armed people on foot THere are many who reflecting upon the Greatness of the Commonwealth of Rome wonder at her so many prosperities by which she flourished a long time and at last obtained the mastery of all other Monarchies And thinking that it is enough to admire her feats of Arms and management in Peace do not care for enquiring into the reason thereof so as ballancing thereby every of her several operations they may know what they were that were truly worth praise and imitation and what blame-worthy and to be avoided But certainly these men seem not to know to how many and how great and various accidents all humane works are subject and what the true rule and measure is whereby the perfection of States is comprehended For that is not simply the greatness of an Empire to which she at the beginning riseth by Fortune and which is increased by Injustice but that may well be said to be the true Form of Government by which people living in peace and union may work righteously and obtain Civil felicity He therefore who will judge aright of the actions of that Commonwealth without suffering his eyes to be dazeled wiâ—h the splendor of the Roman greatness let him consider them nakedly as void of that reputation which Antiquity and the power of Empire purchased them and he will find some things peradventure amongst the many for which she worthily deserved to be cryed up by all men which are more to be observed for the amendment of present Governments by their example then for imitation out of hopes of attaining any true praise or apparent good But as there is nothing of greater importance in a City then the Form of Government by which as by the soul thereof every good act is produced so of all other observations which may be had of the City of Rome there is not any more worthy or of more use then to examine what was the truest Form of her Government that we may afterwards see whether she might have been beâ—ter ordered in Civil affairs then she was without disordering her Militia and whether she could keep together the People armed and obedient to the Laws To know then what the condition of her Government was and thence to comprehend whether that supreme excellencie were in it as hath been thought by some men following the Rule which Philosophy teacheth us which says that every Form of Republick is not convenient for every City but that they must be varied according to the divers natures of the people and according to other accidents we must examine what that State was in it self and then what proportion it held with that City But because it would be too difficult a business to assign any certain condition unto her which may equally correspond to all times she not having so punctually observed one and the same Form continually but varied it somewhat accordingly as it inclined more or less to a Popular State we must have our eys most fixt upon that Age wheâ—ein the glory of that Commonwealth did most flourish not so bearing notwithstanding to touch upon such things in other times as may conduce to our purpose He who would diligently consider all the parts of the Republick will find not only so much diversity but even contrariety in them as he will not be able easily to resolve which was her properest Form of Government For if respect be had to the great Authority of Consuls especially in Armies we may not without reason believe that that City under the name of a Commonwealth was governed with Laws befitting a Kingdom since that Form of Magistracie did use such Authoâ—ity in managing of Arms in concluding Peace and in agreeing differences between potent Kings as one onely Prince could hardly have treated of those thing with more absolute power differing from Monarchy only in this that they kept this Authority but for a
good concord result from the former Therefore care must be had that every Order may keep its own state and be neither too much exalted nor too much abased lest the too 〈◊〉 or too sharp Tone occasion dissâ—nance as it was seen to fall out in Rome where this just proportion was but badly kept people of unequal condition and worth being oft times made equal in Dignity which caused a Government full of confusion and disorder not bounded in any one Form but disposed to receive all Forms But if we will assign any particular State to the mixt body of this City as predominate over the rest there can be none more properly given her then popularity Which though it may be already comprehended yet it will be better known by passing to some other more particular considerations The state of the Commonwealth is known by observing in whom the chief command is found but the majesty thereof appears clearly in the creating of Magistrates in making new Laws or repealing old ones in making War in disposing of Rewards or Punishment All which things being by many examples seen to lie in the power of the People do evidently witness that the State of this Commonwealth was Popular The People were they who gave authority to Magistrates nay even to the Senate it self by authenticating and invigorating the Resolves thereof and as the soul of that Government they did in divers manners move the other parts of the Commonwealth in their operations So as her truest and properest Form can only be taken from them nay it was seen that the resolutions of the Republick did bind the Senate and were of equal force with the Peoples commands prolonging Magistrates in their places and by the authority thereof putting a period to begun Wars Wherefore the corruption of a Popular State may be further seen by the immoderate power of the meanest Citizens Let us next view the ultimate end of that Commonwealth which by a certain ordinary and as it were natural change of condition will shew us what her first Form was For it being changed into Tyranny which usually ariseth from a Popular State it appears that that City was formerly governed by the People and had by corrupt manners opened the way to Tyranny so as this Transition was easily made by the likeness of State For that City where the People commands with licence may be said to be subject to many Tyrants nor admits it of any change saving that one man becomes the master of those disorders which a multitude were masters of There were likewise always many popular Pick-thanks in Rome who like the Flatterers of Tyrants tracing the People in their humors went a birding after favors whereby they won credit and preferment Which as the Philosopher says is a manifest sign that in such a City the People command not the Laws Which is seen by many experiences of which Marius was an evident example who being born of very mean parents and applâ—ing himself from the begining to the Government of the Commonwealth not guided by the glory of his Predecessors or any noble action of his own which might first introduce him thereinto but confiding in a certain greatness of spirit began to think of acquiring great power so as being become Tribune of the People he betook himself wholly to abase the authority of the Nobles as he did in publishing the Law of Suffrages threatening Consul Cotta to imprison him if he forbare not to oppose him By which boldness he won so much favor with the People as he was able to dispose of them afterwards as he listed in any affair how unjust soever or in working revenge upon his Enemies as he did in banishing innocent Metellus or to aggrandise himself insomuch as he contrary to the Laws was created Consul against the Cimbrians being absent and in a contumacious time and lastly in making the Province be assigned unto him which belonged to Sylla By such means the way was opened to the immoderate power of Citizens which in the height of their prosperity brought that Commonwealth to its final ruine For these disorders being long before begun were afterwards by the spaciousness of the City so inâ—â—eased as the People being become powerful by reason of the numerousness of the Citizens and growing more free and bold by their so many prosperities not content to be equal to the Nobility would become greater then the Laws They banish'd many Citizens without hearing the cause they granted places of Magistracie before the usual time they confirm'd the Authority of those that were already out of it and disposed of all things not according to civil equity but as they liked best Which things do sufficiently manifest the imperfections of that Government For the Philosopher says that that State where the People command and not the Laws is so corrupt as it deserves not the name of a Commonwealth no sort of Government being to be thereunto assigned Which easily happens in Cities which are very great and powerful as was that of Rome But iâ— we shall then consider the Conditions of those men into whose hands that Government was put we shall thereby likewise find that amongst the several Forms of Popular States this may be thought the most corrupt as that whereinto even Artificers were admitted which being usually but ill conditioned and frequenting Assemblies only that they may talk together do constitute an imperfect State and subject to alterations And hence it may be deduced that this part being most prevalent in that so corrupt and imperfect Commonwealth the others must partake of the same imperfection For no such union can be framed out of two good Governments and one very bad one as is requisite to give form to a good Government neither could they continue together for never so small a time Whence it may be likewise inferred that those other parts of the Commonwealth which may seem to resemble Monarchy and Aristocracy as the Consuls and Senate came short of such perfection as is proper to those States declining to the contrary party For many things may be observed to have been done by Consuls with more authority and boldness then what became a Commonwealth To pass by many other examples Caesar being confirmed in that power which he had received as Consul usurped the Liberty of the Commonwealth There were likewise many corruptions in the Senate which shew how subject that part was likewise to various disorders For when the Commonwealth was at the very height of her perfection Senators were become so mercenary as Iugurth having corrupted many of them and purchased his own saâ—ety by monies it may well be said that the Citizens of Rome would have sold their City if they could have met with a Chapman for it Another Consideration may be added to wit That that Commonwealth cannot be said to be well ordered even in the very Popular State which she so much affected For it is easie to frame any Government for a
short time in any whatsoever Estate but the sufficiencie of a Law-maker and the excellencie of Laws is found by the long continuance thereof Therefore those Orders by which the Peoples authority was too much increased cannot be said to be truly Popular but such may be so esteemed whereby the State is long preserved Wherefore many things being ordered in Rome without this temperance in favor of the People they of themselves bereft the State of all solidity Thus Licentiousness of living frequent Meetings Appeals to the Tribunes Freedom in accusing and other such things as seemed to be done in favor of the People served for the building up of Tyranny and wrought Romes final ruine Which was formerly seen in Athens which being constituted by Solon in a too Popular condition soon lost her Liberty and was possest by a Citizen of hers named Pisistratus who followed the same way which the Legislator himself had opened unto him by attributing too much to the People So what is intended for good proves often fatal if not well understood But having discoursed sufficiently of the Form of the Government it will not be amiss to examine some other more general Conditions by which the perfection of every State may be the better known In ordering a City respect is to be had to two things to what belongs to War to what belongs to Peace to the end that she may not be governed by Chance in either of them but by certain Laws and may be equally preserved from forein plots and from home discords and to endeavour that as she cannot always enjoy Peace so she should not be continually molested with War But he who will consider the Actions of the Romans and the Institutions of their City will find them so seriously addrâ—st to Military affairs as he may easily judge that they proposed no other things to themselves then how to increase Empire by making one War beget another wherefore many Armies were instituted and many rewards for military valor to make men bold and valiant against the Enemy but not any thing wereby to accustom them to Justice Temperance and to other civil vertues whereby the City might be maintained in peace and unity 'T is therefore no wonder if that Commonwealth won so much Empire and such Glory in times of War and in times of Peace like rusty Iron lost all her lustre So as troubles from Enemies abroad were no sooner ceased but much greater were excited at home by dissentions amongst the Citizens which did not terminate till things were recalled by occasion of War to the same Warlike order and discipline in which the City was excellently well instituted Which might for a while preserve her but when through the want of occasion of War she could not by that means correct her many disorders nor reduce herself to any setled condition for any space of time being still agitated by storms of Civil sedition she must at last be miserably lost when it was time to begin to enjoy her greatness and prosperity For this cause Scipio Nasica a very wise man would not consent to the destruction of Carthage knowing that that Commonwealth which was ordered onely for war could not last long in idleness How can that Government then be termed good which is so ill disposed towards the attainment of a Cities chief end And who can doubt but that the true end of a City is to have her Citizens live vertuously not the inlarging of her Empire Therefore the Philosopher said well That true civil Felicity was not to be expected from astions which relate to things abroad but from those which are used amongst Citizens It argues not then an excellent Government in that Commonwealth that she overcame the whole world since the perfection of Government lies in making a City vertuous not in making her Mistress of many Countries Nay the increasing of Territories as it is commonly coupled with some injustice so is it remote from the true end of good Laws which never part from what is honest Governments which aim at Empire are usually short lived which denotes their imperfection Which happens not onely because they were not better accommodated in times of Peace but that for the great inlarging of Confines it is necessary to nourish ambitious thoughts in Citizens and such as are too desirous to domineer which are easily turned to the prejudice of the Commonwealth its self For it is not to be affirmed that the same thing can be good in respect of the publick and bad in private Affairs For the general felicity of the whole City and the particular good of every Citizen is one and the same thing they onely differ in some certain respects Then taking ones argument from these things the end of this great Commonwealth might easibly be conjectured which as one said well was overthrown by the wait of its own bulk But grant that the lives of such States may be prolonged it cannot certainly be done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers Let Marius his example serve us to see what advantage Citizens got by the immoderate desire of Glory and Dominion who being alwaies bred up in Arms and having wone Credit and Preferment thereby finding that his antient Reputation began to fail by ensuing Peace raised Mithridates King of Pontus against the Commonwealth to the end that being to make use of his Vallor he might recover his former Repute Thus Athens who once inâ—oyed a peaceful condition under Pericles his good Government when she turned her endeavours of Peace and Quiet to Arms and Dominion and would change her manner of life she reaped the like Fruits of Ambition which by such Orders she had sowed in the minds of her Citizens For Alcibiades out of too immense a desire of Glory was he who of himself did incite the Lacedemonians against his Country by whom she was afterwards robbed of her Liberty and Empire For all this you hear me not say that the study of Arms ought to be neglected which are very necessary in what soever State to defend ones self against the Injuries of Neighbors and to preserve Freedom and Liberty Nay Aristotle reprehends Plato for that he thought Cities had no need of Arms at the first but onely when they began to have Dominion But though they may be useful for some other respects Citizens ought not to fix their studies so much upon Military Exercises as not to know nor value any other praise but that of the Militia and to place their greatest and chiefest Good and the welfare of their City therein But they must know that a man must travel further to find out felicity which is derived onely from vertuous actions reserved in Peace as the true fruits of the labours of War Let us then conclude that this part which was very excellent in Rome lost much of that praise which otherwise it might have deserved for the exquisiteness of its Orders because true use was not made thereof as
Commonwealth of Venice hath gotten an excellent Government but was not at first governed by those Laws which she now is But diversity of Occasions have opened the way to the wisdom of many of her Citizens who adding new Orders to the old have brought her to such a height of perfection Which might the easilier be done because that City was free-born and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true Civil end to wit to Peace and Concord and to the Union of her Citizens But on the contrary other modern Republicks the Cities wherein such Governments were formed having been formerly long accustomed to obey Emperors since they got their Liberty by many Accidents they knew not as not being well acquainted therewith how to use it by reason of the Citizens various dispositions of mind So as wheeling often about with an uncertain Form of Government they in process of time return'd under the command of one These Considerations being applied to the City of Rome will prove that the prudence of her Citizens though they were very wise and valiant men was not sufficient to reduce her to a perfect Form of Commonwealth but they might have amended many great disorders in her which did much shorten her life For he who will consider the conditions of the people of Rome will find them to be such as no Form of Government could better agree with them then a Popular State for they were all warlike men bred up even from the very first foundation of the City in the exercise of Arms. And though a Commonwealth may be formed amongst these which may have a certain similitude to an Aristocratical State when the Citizens being governed by certain Laws partake every man more or less of that Government according to their worth For Military discipline hath a certain species of Vertue though it be none of those that do immediately serve to purchase the ultimate end of a City yet this Government is very seldom met with and though it want the true and proper Form is commonly called by the usual name of a Commonwealth So as though at first the City of Rome leaned much thereunto in a short time the People had a great share therein who not knowing how to moderate themselves made it grow licentious But he who will look back even to her first beginning will find that the Peoples authority did thereby ever increase together with the City For the Peoples power and liberty was great not only after the driving out of the Tarquins but even when it was commanded by Kings that City seeming even from that time to be naturally more disposed to the Form of a Commonwealth then of a Kingdom For after the death of Romulus the People being powerful as having the weapons in their hand and as being the first Founders of that City usurped the authority of choosing Kings who on the contrary side that they might the better confirm themselves in their new Kingdom endeavoured to accommodate themselves to the nature of the People and to purchase their love by granting them many considerable things So as even under the Kingly government it had the power of Appeals as appeared in Horatius his case who being condemned by the Magistrates for his Sisters death appealed to the People and was by them freed In favor of them likewise the City was divided into Centuries with a certain Order of a very small Tax according to which the Degrees of the Militia and the Authority of the Publick Courts things which did all of them appertain to a Popular State were to be distributed To boot with these Laws the great number of Citizens which did even then arise to One hundred and thirty thousand made the Peoples party very powerful as also their having been so ready and so successful in engaging themselves in so many enterprises for the Commonwealth without receiving any pay for their pains But the Nobility was a long time very weak and in but little esteem For the first Founders of the City being Shepherds and all of the same condition there was no distinction of degree amongst them save what was soon after brought in 〈◊〉 Romulus who choosing the Senate out of all that former number that they might be assistant to the King in providing for things requisite for the State by this order he divided some of the worthiest of the People in this new City from the rest who gave the rise to the Roman Nobility But even this Order was very weak for it was at first instituted by Romulus but of a small number of men and though others were afterwards added thereunto yet till such time as the City got her liberty 〈◊〉 never exceeded the number of Two hundred Senators nay even these were much lessened by the cruelty of Tarquinius Superbus and their Authority narrowly bounded by the Counterpoise of Regal power So as when the City put herself into Liberty there were not Noblemen enough to form a State of Optimati in this case did Publius Valerius find the City of Rome after the driving out of the Tarquins when he through Brutus his death remaâ—ning sole Consul was to constitute Laws and new mould the Commonwealth Wherefore desirous to introduce a State differing from the former under the name of Liberty it behoved him not to lessen but to encrease the Authority of the People For else they would not have indured it and by fiding with the Tarquins they might easily have confounded that Government and reduced the City again under the power of Kings For which reason also Brutus though he was first created Consul not willing to lose the favor and assistance of the people without which he thought the new Orders of the City could not be well established perswaded his Colleague Tarquinius Collatinus that to give satisfaction to the People to whom the name of Tarquin was become odious and suspitious to lay down his Consulship By these Reasons it appears that Valerius was compelled to ordain many things in favour of the People as were the Appeals from the Consuls The order that upon pain of death no man should enter into any place of Magistracy without the Peoples approbation the petty punishment appointed for them who should not obey the Consuls commands which was no more but to pay five Oxen and two Sheep Moreover he eased the poor of many grievances and made many other very Popular Laws whence he purchased the name of Publicola But which 't is understood that in ordering of the Commonwealth respect was to be had in many things to necessity and to the condition of those times yet if we shall consider other Accidents we shall find them much contrary to such a necessity for the new Legislator was not Prince as was Licurgus but possest a place of Magistracy for a short time the Authority whereof was hardly yet well known and not much valued So as he could not use force to withdraw the people from a Popular
the Magistracie of Consuls which occasioned many disorders which might easily have been corrected by a just fear as is cleerly seen by many examples but chiefly by this that the People being in insurrection and contumacious against the power of Consulship the creating of a Dictator a Magistracie of supreme authority and reverence proved a sure remedy to asswage the Tumult And what more manifest sign could there be given that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by respect unto the Magistrates then that which was given upon the occasion of Appius his Decemvirate For being so ill dealt with by him and by his Colleagues as they wanted not reason to apprehend Tyranny yet the authority of this Magistracie from which there was no Appeal to be made and the severity wherewith it was administred did so bridle the people as they patiently endured all injuries nor durst they go about to shake off that slavery till the Senate interposed it self and that Horatius and Valerius declared themselves Heads of the Insurrection against the Decemviri There ought therefore either greater respect to have been given to the Consulary Authority or else if the more severe and free power of an ordinary Magistrate seemed not to be convenient for the state of that Commonwealth the respect and reverence due to the person of the Magistrate ought to have been transferred to the authority of certain Laws of which the Magistrate should have been chief Guardian inflicting severe punishment upon the not observers thereof For by this means the People would have had no occasion to be offâ—nded with the Nobles when their insolencie should be punished by vertue of the Laws this arising amongst many other beâ—efits from the Laws that he who is punished for his faults cannot complain of any one being condemned by order of Law not by the Judge his will But what hath been noted of Publicola in this first beginning may also be known at all other times and in many other of the chief Roman Citizens who through ambition siding with the People were the cause of their pride and insolencie So the Consuls Valerius and Horatius not being able to obtain Triumph from the Senate sought to have it from the People and the whole Senate not to multiply examples by creating a Dictator to suppress the authority of the Consuls Titus Quintus Cincinnatus and Geneus Iulius Mento who opposed them therein had recourse unto the Tribunes who by threatening imprisonment forc'd them to give way to the resolution And those Noblemen did usually take another course then what is to be held with the People with whom grave and severe proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor But they were so blinded by Ambition as not knowing or not caring for such errors they strove who should most ingratiate themselvs with the the People by Presents Shews and submiss comportment And this instruction might be learn'd by the example of the People of Rome themselves For it was ofttimes seen that greater respect was given to those few who had known how to use severity to the People then to those who carried themselves submissly unto them And certainly amongst other things the Judgment which followed upon the cause between Menimiuâ— and Spurius Servilius was very remarkable who being both of them accused of the same fault by the Tribunes to wit that being Consuls they had opposed the Agrarian Law Menimius who by intreaties and submiss carriage endeavoured absolution was condemned but Spurius Servilius stoutly withstanding the Tribunes fury and speaking severely to the People was acquitted And Furius and Manilius who had both of them been Consuls being not long after accused the Nobles being willing totally to free them from such danger kill'd the Tribune in his own house who had impeached them which did so affright his Colleagues and the People as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reassume the same cause And all the Insurrections which were then in the City being suddenly appeased all of them did willingly subscribe the Militia Appius Claudius was always very severe against the People and amongst other of his actions the punishment which he took upon the Armies insolencie was very observable for he made them be decimated very tenth man be put to death which was submitted unto without any the least tumult by reason of the antient opinion of the Captains severity and for the fear infused into the Soldiers by the sentence of death against some Centurions who were accused for having been Authors of that Insurrection Which was sufficient so far to curb them all as though they were all of them then in Arms every of them stood peacefully spectators of the death of so many Kinsmen and Friends and of their own doubtful chance and which peradventure is a greater wonder and doth the better confirm this truth Appius being accused for this sentence by the Tribunes after he had laid down the Consulship using the same severity in defending himself he was not held less guilty for having been formerly Consul So as the People neither willing to absolve him nor daring to condemn him the cause was put off and he suffered to depart And in the latter times when the Peoples power was greatest Tiberius Gracchus endeavouring to propound the observance of the Licinian Law the Nobles changing their habits and shewing great humility labored to win favor from the People but since they saw they could do no good by this means they resolved for their last refuge to use force and kill'd the Author of those seditions Which action of theirs did so astonish the People as they suffered the Tribunes death whom they had so dearly loved and who had lost his life in defence of their cause to go unrevenged And soon after Caius Gracchus reassuming the cause which his Brother had in vain endeavoured the Nobles using the same cunning sought first by fair means to deprive him of Popular favor making use of another Tribune to this purpose by causing other popular Laws to be propounded by consent of the Senate But humility avail'd no more at this time then it had done formerly so as it behoving them to betake themselves again to Arms they slew Caius Gracchus in the Aventine and after the death of two Brothers annull'd all the Laws made by them nor did the People ever seem to resent it Which if it might have been done by an usual way of a Magistrate as hath been touched upon doubtless these ruder remedies as better suiting with the infirmities of that Commonwealth might have freed her from many mischiefs This is likewise confirmed by many other experiences For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof threatening to create a Dictator it kept the Terentilla Law from being made of creating a Magistracie of five men who were to correct the Consuls power But when it chose to appease the People by giving way to their importunities it did only invite them
to endeavour more novelties so as Humility made them not more quiet but more insolent Wherefore having obtained Appeals they would have a Magistrate of their own endowed with supreme authority and having gotten the power of the Tribunes they could not stop there but would be admitted into the Consulship into the Dictatorship and to all other sort of Dignities and having obtained all sort of Honors they began to aspire to the Estates of the Nobles who being too late aware of their Error to keep themselves from being quite dis-robed of every thing and not being able to remedy themselves by the Laws or by Magistracy they were forced to have recourse to Arms to moderate the Peoples Insolencie Whence it may be concluded that the Romans not having used those means neither at the first making of their Laws nor almost at any other time in any of their Actions which were proper to overcome certain bad qualities which they had contracted even from the birth of the Commonwealth was the reason why remaining alwaies as it were a distempered body wherein ill humours did continually encrease she was alwaies sickly perplext by so many civil Discords and and came to a shorter period of life then she ought to have done for many other of her most noble conditions The example of this powerful and famous Republick if we will well obserserve her civil Orders and what proceeded from thence and if they shall be measured by truer and more general Rules may instruct us excellently well how to discern the perfections and imperfections of Modern States And say it will not serve to correct Errors already too much confirmed by corrupt Customs it will at least be of use to know what value ought to be put upon every Government and what length of daies may in reason be allotted thereunto holding notwithstanding that Disorder for a truer Rule then all Orders which is oft times introduced by various and unthought of Accidenâ—s upon which our civil Actions do depend not onely regulated by humane wisdom but subject for ought that appears to us in many things to a certain casualty though they be indeed directed by assured though hidden causes reserved in the bosom of Divine Providence whereunto our Reason cannot reach Therefore if following the usual manner of speech we shall in these our Discourses make often use of the names of Chance and Fortune let them be understood in this true and pious manner The Second DISCOURSE What Success the Roman Affairs would have had if Alexander the Great had turned with his Victorious Army into Italy THE Republick proved more fortunate then any other State in many things so as he had reason on his side who said That Fortune who was usually an Enemy to vertue had made Truce with her that she might exalt that City to the highest pitch of Greatness But this may chiefly be acknowledged from her being freed from the necessity into which the course of time had brought her of making trial of her Forces against those of Alexander the Great who after having conquered Darius and subjugated Persia together with other Nations did not bethink himself of turning into Europe and chiefly into Italy rather then into the utmost parts of the East Or that from having accomplished so many famous Interprizes in Arabia and in the Indies being as yet but in his youth he lived no longer to carry his Victories over the other parts of the world not as yet concerned in his Forces though invaded by his immense desire of Dominion It will certainly be worth the consideration whether if Alexander had at first had any such thought or that he had had time afterwards to put it in effect to think what influence he would have had upon the Affairs of Rome This doubt was put by Livy who in the Ninth Book of the first Decade of his Histories betook himself to discourse of what might have happened if the Roman Commanders had been to have made War against Alexander But without considering any thing which might make against his opinion he bends all his reasons to prove that the Roman Forces would have proved Victorious if they had chanced to have fought against those of Alexander the Great which he resolves for as great a certainty as if the effect had ensued Yet many Arguments to the contrary may be taken out of divers of those things which Livy relates of his Romans We can take no surer way to know what would have been the success of things not done then to consider what hath been done which may guide us by conjecture to penetrate into what might have happened in other things if occasion should have served Let us then cast an eye upon what Alexanders actions were in those times and what those of the Roman Commonwealth and we shall see what might have been expected from the worth of Force and either of them if trial had been made thereof Alexanders Enterprizes were sufficiently famous and known to all men since the recounting of them hath wearied so many Writers And Plutarch who writ the Lives of the valliantest and most magnanimous men of so many ages In his Preface to that of Alexander excuseth himself with he doth not in relating the lives of any others if he be not able sufficiently to write all his actions by reason of their number and worth But the Romans Enterprizes in that age were not in themselves very great nor very greatly cried up by others Though those which they afterwards performed did for glory out-do what ever was done by any other Potentate So as Reputation and Fame which bear so great a sway in all our operations but chiefly in what belongs to War was without all doubt greater in Alexander then in those Roman Captains who flourished in his time when the greatness of the Roman Commonwealth was but in its rise and first beginning But let us come to some further particular The Commonwealth had not as then inlarged her Confines further then into Latium into some parts of Umbria and into Picenum amongst people who were very near the Volsci and the Aequi. Their Armies were not yet marched out of Italy which they did not till they made War with the Carthaginians Whence it is to be gathered that the Commonwealth was as yet but weak and not accustomed to those more weighty and important Actions of War wherein in after Ages it must be confest she did great and wonderful things But at this time many vertues in the Citizens of Rome and the customs of the City not as yet corrupted were more to be exalted then their Military valour which though their souls might be full of yet they wanted illustrious occasions to exercise it And those so many famous Commanders which as Livy says may be paralelled with Alexander Fabius Maximus Valerius Corvinus Lucius Papyrius Titus Manlius Torquatus and others of that Age what great Fears of Arms did they The War was as yet made as it were
offence was taken away did ratifie the Peace and Amity between those two States So as it was a thing well-beseeming so great a Principality as was that of the Canthaginians not to forgo their friends in time of danger though they were not bound by any particular Obligation to assist them And as the failing in such a duty might have cast some blut upon their City so deserve they no small praise for their reediness in performing it But these things are peradventure of less force and estimation amongst Princes Whence it may be worth consideration Whether the Carthaginians were not perswaded out of other reasons to assist the Romans in this War Great was the Fame of King Pyrrhus his Valor and Forces at this time and no less the report of his Ambition and of his vast Designs of assaulting Sicily and Affrica when he should have overcome the Romans Wherefore the Carthaginians had reason to use all their endeavours not to make trial of their Forces and Fortune with this Prince And nothing was more opportune for them to keep such dangers far from them then to keep Pyrrhus in Italy who finding himself more withstood by the Roman Forces thorough the assistance of the Carthaginians would be necessitated to make the longer abode in Italy and as it falls out in long Enterprises to waste many of his People there and lessen that Reputation and Terror which usually accompanies great Armies in their first and unexpected Assaults To make war in another mans Country is alwaies good Advice but best for those that are farthest off especially when it may be hoped that such a fire may be long fed in another mans Country The Forces of the Romans were sufficiently strong of themselves but much stronger being joyned with those of the Carthaginians and fitter to withstand Pyrrhus his Forces Who on the other side having undertaken this Enterprise with vaste thoughts and being resolved to hazard his whole Fortune out of a desire of new Glory and greater Empire and being himself a valiant Commander of a valiant Army it was not easily to be beleeved that he would quit Italy unless Victorious or else quite over come and destroyd If Pyrrhus should have overcome the Romans when they were abandoned by the Carthaginians and being afterwards big with Reputation of his Victory should have passed into Sicily to molest the Affairs of the Carthaginians as his Design was to do when he left his Country what danger would they have been in or what succour could they have expected from the Romans since they had not been aided by the Carthaginians in their great necessity and must have been much weakened by the Defeat given them by Pyrrhus But if the Romans had been assisted by the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus weary of trying his Fortune in Italy should have turned his Forces upon the Carthaginians how could the Romans have refused to have assisted the Carthaginians in like manner as they had done them Whence it follows that those men which the Carthaginians should have sent into Italy should have fought not onely for the safety of Italy but for the like of Sicily and Affrica and with no less advantage to Carthage then to Rome But though it had been apparent that the Romans might of themselves have resisted Pyrrhus and have got the Victory it had made no less for the Carthaginians to make use of this occasion thereby to oblige the Romans whose Power was then very great and their Worth very much esteemed and their intentions of inlarging their Empire being already known So as it became the Carthaginians for their own safety sake to have an eye to the greatness of this new Potentate and not being able to quell him they had all the reason in the world to keep him their Friend to the end that he might turn his Forces somewhere else and not upon them But what Friendship is more firm then that which is bound with the Tye of great Benefits For the receiver must by an occult force of Nature incline to love his Benefactor and the doer loves this the noble Product of his good turn in another and by so doing makes himself be the better beloved Great was the Romans need at this time who had not as yet met with a more formidable Enemy then Pyrrhus and therefore the occasion was likewise great which offered it self to the Carthaginians to contract a near Friendship and Confederacy with the Romans But to this it may be objected That by succouring the Romans the Carthaginians would draw anothers War upon themselves Nor was it so easie a thing to overcome the Romans as that Pyrrhus could end that War so suddenly or with so entire Forces as the Carthaginians had cause to fear them Nay rather the irritating of Pyrrhus by Injuries might provoke him to revenge and make him forgo the Romans and fall upon the Carthaginians But say that the Affairs of Rome though assisted by the Carthaginians should have succeeded amiss as things of this nature are alwaies subject to variety of Accidents what hopes had the Carthaginians to defend either what they possessed in Sicily or even the African coasts when they should have sent the greatest part of their Shipping and Souldiers to assist the Romans And why should the Carthaginians rather fear Pyrrhus his Greatness then that of the Romans Pyrrhus his Dominions lay further off and more incommodious to molest the Carthaginians then did the Romans he was but one man and though valiant yet his life was subject to various mischances as it proved afterwards he being slain by a stone thrown by a poor old woman But Rome abounded in valiant Commanders and was come to the pass a man may say of preserving herself still the same So as all other Princes ought rather to have had a care to keep the Romans from growing stronger then any other Potentate For Romes power was more stable aud therefore like to cause longer and greater dangers to others Wherefore to keep the Romans long busied in the War against Pyrrhus by which their Forces must have been weakened was the means to preserve other States from that Ambition of Dominion which was already discovered to be in the Romans On the other side To assist the Romans in ridding themselves of the Troubles of War especially if this should have happened by their obtaining any signal Victory what was it but to increase the Reputation and Courage of others so to hasten their own dangers For being freed of such incumbrances and aspiring after greater things a thing which is always occasioned by good success it was not likely the Romans would stand idle but ready to imbrace any Enterpise as it happened afterwards For the first Carthaginian War ensued soon after the War made with Pyrrhus For the Romans meeting with no resistance in Italy after the Honor which they had won in their Victory over Pyrrhus they began to march with their Forces into other Countries they past into Sicily
being invited in by the Mamertini as Pyrrhus was first called ito Italy by the Tarentini And the weakness of Pyrrhus his Forces did not so much occasion the Victories won in the War asdid his inconstancy in prosecuting Enterprises once begun which though it was a natural defect in him yet may it be believed that his sudden departure from Italy might be occasioned by the injury done him by the Carthaginians who unprovoked had taken up Arms against him and were ready to come and find him out in other mens Countries But it may be another greater respect might have moved him to assault the Carthaginian State to wit That he might onely have to do onely with the Carthaginians as he had at first fought onely with the Romans beginning to suspect as having already discovered the Carthaginians good will that if he should tarry longer in Italy and that the Romans danger should encrease that Confederacy might be made between them and the Carthaginians which was first refused So that whatsoever he should afterwards undertake against either of them might afterwards prove more difficult This was then the reason why Pyrrhus whilst the business in Italy was not yet finished nor the danger of the Tarentines not well secured marched to go for Sicily which caused so much trouble and danger to the Carthaginian Affairs as if he had known how to make good use of his Victory the Carthaginians might peradventure have been brought then to those final Extremities which were deferred for another time more for the Romans Glory then for their Welfare and good Fortune Thus what hath been already said may suffice for what concerns the Carthaginians Let us now see what the Romans did and consider whether they did well or no in refusing the help which was voluntarily offered them nay brought home to them by the Carthaginians The War which was made by Pyrrhus against the Romans must be thought to be both great and difficult being made by a Warlike Prince who brought many many men with him well trained up in Arms so as by the very Name and Fame of his Forces he had almost brought many Cities of Italy to his devotion withdrawing them from the obedience of the Romans and though he were a stranger yet having firm footing in Italy whither he was called by the Tarentini he was not likely to undergo those dis-accommodations which Armies use to suffer in another Country but his Forces appeared the more formidable by reason of that terror which things of great Fame and not formerly known use to bring with them And the Elephants were a great cause of fear the Romans not being formerly acquainted with that manner of Militia In so much danger therefore when the whole Rest was at Stake to presume too much upon ones self and upon ones proper Forces and to dream onely of Glory when they were to have been more sollicitous of Safety hath the appearance rather of Rashness then of mature and wise Counsel And why should the Romans promise so much unto themselves against Pyrrhus as to despise the Carthaginians help being as then accustomed to fight with the Tarentini a weak Nation given over to delights of which they were reprehended by Pyrrhus himself and being now to fight with true Souldiers expert in all sort of sufferings and all military Discipline in the recent Wars made by Pyrrhus in Macedonia And when nothing else but even Fortune which in matter of War is so uncertain should have proved averse unto them in any thing to whom could they afterwards have had recourse for succour having despised so great helps readily sent by so great a Power of so great esteem and Authority as was then the Commonwealth of Carthage Yet on the other side it may seem no ways to agree with the Romans Greatness and Generosity to confess themselves so terrified by Pyrrhus his Forces as that they needed Foreign help to defend themselves The Romans might have had Peace from Pyrrhus who when he came into Italy sent his Ambassadors to Rome informing the Senate by them that he was come to compose the Difference between them and the Tarentini with whom if the Romans would have Peace he proffered them the like To which answer was made That the Common-wealth of Rome had not chosen him for their Arbitrator neither did they fear his enmity therefore let him first return to his own Kingdom and then as a Friend to the Commonwealth he might treat of Peace and should be willingly listened unto But the City of Rome did already begin to envy and emulate the Common-wealth of Carthage which she did peradventure more esteem then open enmity with the Kingdom of Epire wherewith she thought she should not so soon have to do neither in matter of Peace nor War though Pyrrhus his ambition had then brought him into Italy Therefore if the Romans would not accept of Peace from Pyrrhus they oughtless to acknowledg their Safety from the Carthaginians They likewise thought they might so much rely upon their own Forces having valiant and well disciplined Souldiers of their own as that there remained no doubt of Victory in that War then what does never part from the uncertainty of Chance in War They considered that the number of Armies or Fleets might be increased by Foreigners and yet the power to resist an Enemy not be made the greater whilst either the differing ends of Princes the little agreement between Commanders or the contrary Custom and Discipline of Souldiers do often occasion many discords in matter of War which are not found where one onely Chieftain commands and disposeth of all things and where better obedience shewn by Souldiers of one and the same Dominion Therefore was it that the Romans did sundry other times refuse foreign aid as particularly in the War against Antiochus when refusing assistance sent unto them by other Kings of Africa they with their own few but valiant Souldiers routed Antiochus his numerous Army made up of many several Nations Such respects as these might have been liable to consideration even when their Faith and Friendship who were to have lent assistance had been for certain to be credited but who could secure the Romans who having already extended their Dominions far into Italy could not grow much greater without injuring Nations further off from being jealous of the Carthaginians who were antient and powerful Lords in Affrica and in Spain and possessed of the greatest part of Sicily and as there were none who could more hinder the increase of their Greatness then the Carthaginians so was it necessary that they being apprehended for such by the Romans should likewise fear them for the preservation of their own quiet and security And what charity is this might those wise and ancient Senators of Rome say which hath moved these Affricans to be so careful of us as without any obligation of Confederacy and not sought unto they should send so prime a Captain as Mago with such a
number of Frigats and Soldiers to assist us and to bereave their own State of such defence to preserve the States of other men The greater the appearances seemed outwardly the more might it be suspected that these things proceeded not from sincerity of heart If the Carthaginians had done this because they held the Romans to be so unworthy as that they were to yeeld to Pyrrhus his first assault and so their States might be exposed to the same danger it was not good to nourish such an opinion in the Carthaginians by which they should no sooner be quit of Pyrrhus but the Carthaginians who were as willing to keep the Romans low as Pyrrhus was might come and set upon them So whilst they should endeavor to secure the War which was on foot and from which if they were the same men which they had always used to be against their Enemies they had great hopes they might defend themselves they might have raised another more dangerous and difficult if the Roman generosity had not suffered that by anothers fraud whereunto they should onely have given consent and some small reward Pyrrhus should have been slain as they were offered by an acquaintance of his he should be though thereby they were freed from all danger but rather to exempt the Commonwealth from such a blemish the Roman Commander chose to acquaint the enemy with what was plotted against him how could they or ought they to tolerate that the Carthaginians who had sent aid not out of any desire of Romes welfare but as those that envied her glory should boast themselves of being the preservers of the Roman Liberty If it should have so faln out by any adverse accident that Pyrrhus who came to assault them should have proved Conqueror nothing had been to be blamed but the Fortune of War since they themselves should have carried themselves gallantly and advisedly in the maintaining of it But if they should have accepted of the Carthaginian succour men might think that the Romans gave themselves for overcome before a blow was given and that they were much inferior to the Enemy not in Forces but in Valor That Pyrrhus had not undertaken that enterprise out of necessity but onely out of a desire of novelty and hopes of glory That therefore if his first assaults should be stoutly sustained he should have enough of it and that being invited by another occasion which he understood was already brewing against him by the Sicilian Discords being naturally of a fickle humour he might readly turn to some other undertaking and that as he had come into Italy slightly and upon no occasion to make War against them so he might easily be perswaded by any adverse Fortune to give over the Affairs of Italy and fall upon something else had he been so strong in Men and Forces as it seems men thought he was he would not have sent his Orator Cineas to seek friendship with the Senate and people of Rome and to endeavour that by words which he might easily have obtained by force which was to grant peace to the Tarentines his Confederates Something like this we may believe was said by that Appius a Senator of experienced wisdom who was imployed in answering Pyrrhus his Ambassador and in readily accepting the intimated War And whosoever shall duly consider these so many and so sprightly reasons which they had to dismiss the Carthaginian assistance must needs be perswaded that it did agree with the Roman wisdom and generosity Yet he who will ground his judgment aright and justly weigh what the Carthaginians did must reflect upon divers respects by which such actions are usually governed If then the advantage of the business be only considered it will appear to consist well with what the Carthaginians did then advise upon For to hazard those few Forces which they sent to assist the Romans tended towards the preservation of their own State from Pyrrhus his incursion and it appeared rational enough that the war made against him by the Roman forces joined with those of the Carthaginians might draw on to a length of time For it was believed by the resolution which Pyrrhus took when he went from his Kingdom that he should not have so soon given over his attempt and the Carthaginians being with a considerable strength in the Roman Armies might at their pleasures and in divers manners have so prolonged the War and spun it out into such a length as they might have so weakened both their Forces as they needed not for a long time to fear either Pyrrhus or the Romans But in the Romans resolutions to refuse the Carthaginian succor the magnanimity of their minds is chiefly to be praised For the War was not slighted by those who refused to make Peace with their Enemies and to accept of assistance from their Friends but full of dangers which if they should be able to overcome they thought it would be an action of great worth but of greater difficulty But this resolution out of the aforesaid reasons made not so much for their advantage for the present as for the future And it was known that Fabritius his generosity in preserving Pyrrhus his life though his Enemy from the Treachery of other men made no less for the overcoming of Pyrrhus then did the military discipline of Valerius Corvinus and the Roman Armies which fought against him Wherefore he sent Cineas to Rome to grant liberty to such prisoners as he had taken and to desire peace with the Romans being moved thereunto rather by that noble act then by any loss he had received in the conflict And it may be believed that it was this which made him resolve to forego Italy the sooner and leave the Roman affairs quiet Yet such a Consideration may appear to be very weak being compared to the advantage which might thereby have been gotten For it had regard to things of uncertainty and to dangers far off whereas the Carthaginians help might have made for the good of present affairs Wherefore the Romans might be herein convinced if it were not to be said that the desire of Glory was so great in them as aiming only and chiefly thereat they put on their resolutions with such fervor as they did not only exceed all others but even themselves They thought they should make their condition the worse by accepting of Forein assistance whatsoever should befall them For if they should overcome Pyrrhus assisted with the Carthaginians the military valor would be much lessened which otherwise did belong to so great an undertaking and to the so great hazard which they ran but if they should be overcome their shame would be increased the Roman Forces though assisted by so great a strength of Foreiners not being able to resist Pyrrhus his Army They might likewise peradventure doubt lest by reposing some part of their hopes upon Forein aid they might make their own Senators less fervent and sollicitous in providing things fitting for the War
Courage but out of abundance of Wisdom he shunned the hazard of giving Battel Wherefore after the discomfeiture at Cannae no man was more constant and ready then he to take a resolution It is therefore said that in the dejection of souls and confusion of all things the Citizens had recourse to his Counsel as to an Oracle And the comparing the actions of others in what concerned the administration of War against Hannibal made Fabius his worth appear the more for before he took upon him the Dictatorship the Consul Flaminius was routed at the Lake Thrasymenus and when he laid down the Dictatorship Terentius taking other courses then did Fabius gave occasion for that famous and grievous overthrow which the Romans received at the Battel of Cannae whereby it may be known that wise Commanders just like understanding Physitians when they meet with weak bodies do oftentimes make use rather to prescribe quiet and good government free from all disorder then Physick when they know the Forces of the Commonwealth to be but weak as were those of the Romans at that time ought also to free the State from great and eminent dangers by temporizing and by proceeding leasurely with all advantage then by using Force of Arms and hazarding a Battel Which made Hannibal say That he feared Fabius his fearfulness more then the daring of the other Roman Captains And finding all his Designs at other times frustrated by Fabius he affirmed that the Romans had also their Hannibal Nor could his cunning be indeed overcome otherwise then by cunning and by knowing how to make use of fitting occasions and how to bereave the Enemy of the like which indeed was peculiar to Fabius It may moreover be said for Fabius and in praise of his advice that as no humane Action is more subject to divers unexpected Accidents then in Battle wherein great Effects are often produced from very small Accidents so cannot a Commander attribute at any time so much praise unto himself in Victories but that good Fortune will challenge a great share therein Wherefore it is numbered amongst the chief qualities which are to be desired in him who would prove a good Commander that he be fortunate Besides no Victory is ever won by meer fighting without much blood and much loss of ones own men so as to overcome an enemy by such means as Fabius knew how to do and without exposing himself to the danger of a set Battle to overthrow an Enemies Army by reduceing it to great hardships is a thing of more rare vertue and which makes the Commander more praise-worthy By these cunnings were Hannibals cunnings deluded by these was his fierceness tamed and the reputation won from him and from his Army which he had won in Battel by having so often worsted and overthrown the Romans So as it may be said that Fabius conquered Hannibal a Conqueror but that Scipio overcame him when he was already conquered For Fabius had to do with him when he was in Italy with a puissant Army and in the height of his greatest prosperity But Scipio made not trial of his Forces against those of Hannibal till he was returned to Africa with his Army beaten and wasted by sufferings and when by the usual change of humane Affairs the state of things between the Carthaginians and Romans was sufficiently altered Wherefore Hannibal who had formerly endeavoured nothing more then to fight his Enemies in a pitch'd field when he was returned to Africa perswaded the Carthaginians to Peace and proposed all conditions of Agreement to Scipio so to shun joyning Battel with him in which as if he had foretold his own misfortunes he lost the remnant of his Army which he had brought from Italy Wherefore should it not then be thought that it was harder for Fabius to stop the course of Hannibals Victories then it was for Scipio to overcome him in Battel when the Carthaginians were at their greatest loss and 〈◊〉 Nay it was objected to Scipio when he endeavoured to lead his Army into Africa that he did it to shun encountring with Hannibal in Italy It is a very common but a very true saying Non minor est virtus quà m querere parta tueri Fabius preserved the Glory Reputation and state of the Commonwealth which his Ancestors had won Scipio increased them So as had it not been for Fabius the Name at least the Fame of Rome had been almost lost But she had onely been less glorious without Scipio On the contrary who will consider Scipio's great actions how can he judge him to come short of any other Roman Commander whatsoever either for glory or dedesert since he may be said to have been the first who opened the way unto the Romans of conquering the whole World as they did in a short time For by his means Africa was conquered and a curb put to the greatest and most powerful Enemies that ever the Romans had so as none ever after durst withstand the Roman greatness by force or did disdain to humble and submit themselves to their worth and fortune whom the most powerful and fortunate of all other Nations did already obey Scipio brought all Spain under the Roman obedience driving away the Carthaginians from thence whom he overcame in four several battels Nor did he make the way easie to greater acquisitions less by his excellent gifts of mind then by force of Arms making those people affectionate and faithful to the Romans And yet as not much valuing these his great deeds being returned to Rome full of glory he endevaoured to return again with his Army into Africa knowing that the Carthaginians could not keep quiet at home but must be troubling and endangering the the Romans Nor had he less difficulty to overcome Fabius his obstinate opinion in the Senate who blamed this advice then in routing the Enemies in the Field But if Fabius be to be esteemed because he in a short time freed the Romans from the danger of the Carthaginians what must we say of Scipio who did for ever secure them from these their Enemies bereaving them of their Land-Forces by taking the Flower of their men away from them in Battel and the like of their Maritime strength having by agreement forced them to burn all their Ships Which won him so great respect from all persons as at his return from Africa people ran from all parts only that they might see him To say truth what can be said of Fabius save that he did not lose But in Scipio's Victories what can be desired to make them greater or more glorious In the space of forty five days he raised a powerful Army and followed by more Voluntiers for the fame of his worth then he carried Soldiers with him by Decree of Senate he marched into Africa He conquered People and Cities that were enemies to the name of Roman he overcame Asdrubal and Hanno two famous Carthaginian Commanders he discomfited Hannibals Army and ending the War with the
the War against the Carthaginians into Sicily and Spain and into Macedonia and Greece against King Philip whist Hannibal waged War with them in Italy AS amongst all the Wars made by the Romans none was more long or troublesom then that which they made with the Carthaginians especially when their Commander Hannibal did flourish so from hence chiefly may noble matter of discourse and useful Instructions for matters of State be gathered Whilst Hannibal was in Italy which was for the space 〈◊〉 Fourteen years the Romans made War notwithstanding in other Countries 〈◊〉 Sicily Spain and Africa against the same Carthaginians and against Philip King of Macedon ïn Greece But as War was made against them in Italy so were they the first Authors of these other Wars which affords occasion of no small wonder to him who considers and doth well weigh this their proceeding One would think that the Romans being set upon at home by so powerful Enemies as it was apparent that their whole Forces were not able to resist should not have resolved by dividing the same Forces to make their defence weaker since the main of all their affairs depended upon the success of their Armies against Hannlbal how can it be thought a good advice to hazard with part of their Forces the whole Fortune of their Commonwealth A thing which when forced by necessity is thought a great misfortune to the State wherein it happens And when Italy should be lost as it was in great danger to be whilst Hannibal was there with a puissant Army to what purpose could any acquisition serve which should be made in Spain or elswhere which must of necessity fall of it self And with what courage could the Romans fight in Forein parts when their own Country was wasted with War their houses wealth and all that they had exposed to utmost danger So as whilst fighting against Hannibal and all their minds being inflamed not only out of a military obligation and out of charity to their Country but out of the natural and powerful love which every man bears to his own affairs one man stood for many So when abroad the unquietness and doubt of mind keeping them afflicted and in jealousie by reason of the dubious case wherein they left whatsoever was most dear unto them would not permit many to stand in fight for one Who can praise the suffering of danger to increase at home out of hopes of purchasing abroad Had the Romans Armies been in another Country and imployed about other affairs reason would have advised them to have sent for them back into Italy when they saw so powerful an Enemy upon their backs For Vis unita fortior Force when united is stronger and better able to keep what is harmful afar off Thus we see it falls out by vertue of mother Nature in our bodies when the Heart is ill at ease all the spirits of the body flock thither to defend it as the most noble part and whereupon life it self depends Hannibal was a powerful Enemy formidable for his excellent worth and military discipline and for the many Forces which he brought with him and moreover Italy was as it wereunarmed at this time and wanted her valiantest Commanders and best Soldiers What could the Carthaginians have more desired for Hannibals prosperity then to see the two Scipio's Gnus and Publius on whom only the welfare of the Commonwealth now so much in danger did rest sent into parts afar off so as they could not in her very greatest extremity return to succor her If Hannibal had had a mind to have lest Italy was not this parting of the Roman Forces and the want of their best Commanders a powerful reason to make him stay And what advice was it to provoke other Princes and People to enmity as must needs be done by sending Forces to molest Spain whilst the Commonwealth was in such trouble and danger as she ought to have made friends on all sides By which they incensed that Nation and drew other African Princes upon their backs who were Friends and Confederates with the Carthaginians And the increasing power of the Romans being formerly apprehended by other People and Princes the condition of those times should have rather advised them to have cloaked such thoughts and not to draw hatred and envy upon them For every one must needs hold that if the Romans being in such calamity and danger would vex other Countries with war no Province would have been free from their Forces when they should have been rid of Hannibal Which made the Romans cause worse and Hannibals better with those in Italy who did not much affect the so much greatness of the Commonwealth and much 〈◊〉 forein Nations Wherefore the French who first opposed Hannibal wheâ—â—â—â—â—nt into Italy did for these respects favor his brother Asdrubal afterwards 〈◊〉 he past with succor through their Country nay many of them joined with his Camp and followe the Carthaginian Colors in Italy to maintain the War with them If the Romans did not know themselves to be sufficiently able to withstand Hannibal in Italy where they had all conveniences and he being a stranger wanted all and could only come by them by force what reason could perswade them to maintain War in Spain at the same time which War must be as incommodious to them as it was advantageous and convenient for their Enemies both for that that Province was at their devotion for the neerness of the City of Carthage and for the accommodation the Sea afforded them in furnishing them with all things necessary to make War which certainly may be done better and more commodiously at home Thus the Cimbâ—ians after having given many defeats to the Romans in Gallia were by them overcome in Italy War is likewise made at home with less danger out of the easiness of recruiting an Army when Battels prove unfortunate Thus the Romans being oft-times worsted by Hannibal did maintain and raise up their abject fortune And the Venetians being assaulted at their own homes by those of Genoa by reason of the commodity they had of assembling all their Forces together did not only wiâ—hstand but did overthrow the Assailants who were gotten even into their Washes and were setled in the City of Chioggia But if we will then consider the particular condition wherein the Romans were at that time we shall find all their affairs in great disorder and such as did advise them rather to lessen then to increase new Expences by undertaking new Wars The publick Treasury was sufficiently decreased by loss of the usual Rents of so many places which Hannibal was possest of in Italy for that what they were masters of in Sardinia was to cease paying usual and great contributions for that the people who were subject to the Romans were so much wearied with continual Wars as they were hardly able to maintain those few Soldiers which they had need of for their own defence not in a case to
if the City which was the beginning of so many Wars had been reserved to be the end thereof These and other such like reasons may be alleadged for the War undertaken against the Carthaginians but that which they made against Philip may be said to be caused rather by necessity then choice For Philip for his part being already resolved to follow Hannibals fortune and expecting large recompence had sent his Ambassadors several times formerly to him to conclude a confederacie with him wherefore the Romans thinking it better to prevent the Enemy then to be by them prevented fell suddenly upon him with their whole Fleet and Army hoping to suppress him though they did not wholly effect their design But they continued their War against him afterwards in Greece incited by the commotions already raised in that Province by the Italians knowing that unless they should interpose themselves Greece must either fall into Philips hands whereby the power of a People that were Enemies to the Romans and already very formidable of themselves would be greatly increased or else they must have recourse to the assistance of King Attalus as the Grecians had already protested to the Romans and so they must suffer the neighborhood of another King who was already powerful in Asia and might at another time trouble the affairs of Rome And the wisdom of the Romans was always such as not being cast down by any adversity they never seemed so much to apprehend present dangers but that they had an eye to those which might ensue and in time grow greater And this peradventure was that which did prove the Romans power and worth more then any thing else since when as they were as yet but masters of a small State and that their affairs were reduced into great difficulties both by their so many bad successes in battel against Hannibal and by the risings of their Friends and Confederates yet they resolved to maintain War at one and the same time in four several Countries to wit in Italy Sicily Spain and Greece and they were able to manage them all And certainly such advice was no less useful then generous For he who should overcome the Romans in any one place could not hope quite to subdue them since they had other Armies and valiant Commanders who might make good their fortune and raise it up again So as things formerly alleadged for arguments to asperse this their resolution may peradventure be allowed of in such States and amongst such Princes where there is not that worth discipline or power as was amongst the Romans but in them or such as they they are of no force and very Experience by the issue of those Wars seems to confirm and approve of the Counsels by which they were undertaken The Seventh DISCOURSE Whether the defâ—ruction of Carthage was the rise of the ruine of the Roman Republick CArthage a glorious and famous City both for the command she had in Africa and Spain and for being long Rival in glory with the Common-wealth of Rome being at last to yield either to the great worth or happy genius of the Romans was not notwithstanding made tribuâ—ary to Rome but was burnt and destroyed even to the ground The Carthaginians were oft times overcome in battel by the Romans and had severe Laws imposed upon them yet were those undaunted fierce minds never well quell'd but beginning to heighten their hopes and augment their Forces after the second Carthaginian war they molested those that were friends to the Romans and contrary to their Articles began to sail upon the Sea with Men of War These things being therefore treated of in the Senate of Rome caused variety of opinions Some were for the total ruining of the City of Carthage since otherwise the Commonwealth of Rome could not be free from their injuries and molestations and Cato was very â—tiff of his opinion who bringing some fresh Figs which were gathered in Carthage shewed what dangers they were always subject unto by reason of their Enemies neigborhood But others endeavoring the contrary sought to prove that totally to extinguish the Carthaginians was no good advice and Scipio Nasâ—ica a man of great authority was greatly averse to this resolution being thereunto moved as he said not through any pitty to the conquered enemy but for the advantage of his own Citizens who when they should be free from the fear of the Carthaginian Forces would suffer many evils through Idleness So as it was the common saying and opinion that the destruction of the Carthaginians would hasten on the ruine of Rome And Salust in the beginning of his History of Catilines Conspiracy describing the abusive customs of the City of Rome at that time seems to be of opinion that the overthrow of Carthage did more harm to the Commonwealth by introducing idleness and pleasure then the keeping of her flourishing and in arms would have done Yet there were other considerations which did thwart this opinion shewing that it was not peace and idleness but the continually being verst in Arms and War which was the true cause of the Civil discords and change of Government in Rome This it was which fomented ambition in the Citizens this it was that did too immensely increase their power Finally it was this that divided the City and through discord brought it to utter ruine And how can it be said that the City of Rome was ruined by Peace since she never tasted thereof Insomuch as for the space of Six hundred eighty five years that famous Temple dedicated to Ianus by Numa Pompillius that it might stand open in time of War and shut in time of Peace was onely twice seen to be shut once in the Consulship of Titus Manlius after the end of the first Carthaginian War and once more in Augustus his time after the Naval Victory over Mark Anthony Thus were the Romans and chiefly the most valiant amongst them great enemies to Peace not so much endeavoring to procure greater strength to the Publick Empire as to encrease their own glory and power Therefore one War was made to beger another no time being ever to be found wherein the City was to injoy honest and civil leasure And Provinces and the authority of administring War was oft times confirmed to those who commanded their Armies who either desired to continue in their command or occasion requiring it to be so that they might put an end the Wars begun As it fell out in the second Carthaginian War where the time of tarrying in that Province and the continuing of his command was prolonged to the Consul Scipio who waged War in Spain to the end that he might finish what he had begun The like was done to Fabus in the Wars which he made against Hannibal in Italy and upon other occasions a thing which being done contrary to the rule of Law though it made somewhat for the Publick advantage at the present yet was it cause of great disorders afterwards Thus Marius
that the last Age which by her particular Acts and labors saw the Commonwealth seated as it were in the Throne of Majesty may with reason challenge the greatest part of this merit and glory because she concurred as the nearest cause to the founding and establishing of the City in that state and condition wherein she was in her greatest excellency and glory amongst all Nations It is true that he who in another respect will more consider the necessity then the dignity of the thing may peradventure be of another mind for it is most certain that had not the City of Rome been first founded by Romulus and maintained by other Kings in her beginning against her insulting enemies if the Capitol had not been saved afterwards from the Gauls if the so many conspiracies made by the people of Italy against her rising greatness had not been repulst there could have been no such thing as the Victories and Triumphs of the Scipio's Marcellus Fabritius Metellus Pompey and Caesar and of so many others who atchieved those things by the strength of the City already happily begun and encreased with much industry and valor But as it usually falls out in natural things that their augmentation changing as it were that first Form proves the corruption thereof so as that subject being reduced to another condition little count is held of precedent affairs so in these things which are formed by mans industry as a more unpolished Form is succeeded by another which renders that subject more excellent and perfect no man values the former or considers it with a thought of praise or imitation So we see it falls out in the more noble Arts as in Painting Sculpture Architecture and the like which daily grow to more perfection those are most commended in them who therein prove the greatest Masters so as their particular praise walks hand in hand with the perfection which by their industry they have brought to that Art wherein they have with much industry and study spent their time Cincinnatus his poverty was praised and the like of some others of those Commanders who were called up from the Plough to be Consuls and Dictators because they bore a certain proportion to the condition of those things and of the City But the magnificence of Crassus and of Lucullus had more coherence with the greatness to which the City of Rome did afterwards arrive It seems then that neither can there be any comparison made between these ages for as they were sufficiently different between themselves so different thoughts studies and exercises did become them which things if they had any thing of conformity between them it was rather by likeness or figure or rather some dispositions of those first weaker operations to the other greater and more noble And as it is seen in every individual man the same things are not proportionate nor proper to all Ages but divers things do accommodate themselves to divers Ages though the one be subordinate to the other so as the exercises may both be the same and different because they are accommodated to the same aim and end but are notwithstanding otherwise put in use in Childhood Youth and Manhood just so in the point we are now upon things suit not with a City in the second Age which were proper to her in the first neither could the second do those things which were reserved to the third and which would not be praised in the third had it not done more then either the first or second So to end this Discourse it may be said That the City of Romes happy genius produced men well adapted to her three conditions and very excellent for what each Age and condition brought forth For if the first would have made too much hast in agrandising and making the City famous they might rather have disordered themselves and by making many enemies have encreased the difficulty of effecting those things which when riper proved afterwards more safe and easie And likewise if the second should have imbraced things disproportionable for her strength and have carried her Forces out of Italy before she had therein setled the Roman power it might have proved rather the corruption then the perfection of the Commonwealth The first therefore and the second are very much to be praised for such things as became that Age and state of the City wherein they were done But by how much more the adoperating cause doth work upon a more noble a perfect subject by so much doth the work prove more perfect and excellent Therefore those of the third Agâ— having occasion to act in greater matters as finding the City already very spacious and powerful the off spring of their industry and labour hath proved more noble and they have won such praise to the Commonwealth as greater is not to be pretended unto The Eleventh DISCOURSE How the Roman Empire though it fell oftentines into the hands of base and wicked men was notwithstanding able to maintain it self in the reign of many Emperors and how it came to be finally destroyed AS amongst all humane actions those Commands and Powers are noblest and of greatest worth by which a man gets to be above other men and doth govern them in a manner as God doth rule and govern the world so of all Dominions and Commands that ever were the Roman Empire was greatly remarkable and held in great esteem and reverence by all Nations and did so far extend her self as it may almost be said with the Poet That her Confines were those of the whole world which was known to antiquity Which may be comprehended by this that Constantine the Great having divided the Empire between his three Sons the elder Constantine to whose third part fell the Provinces of Spain France and the greatest part of Germany together with the Island of Great Britain made War with his Brother Constantine to whose share many other Countries fell to come to a better aggiustment of division wherein he thought his Father had dealt unequally with him But now this so stupendious Fabrick erected in the concourse of many years by the worth and labor of so many gallant men must finally run the fate of all humane things must be dissolved and fall to the ground and by her ruine occasion vast revolution of things Hence it was that so many noble Cities were ruined and the ground-work of some others laid which proved afterwards very noble Structures Hence it was that many intire Regions had their antient Inhabitants driven away and were possest by new Citizens had new Customs new Laws new Tongues and new fashions brought in and hence it was that Italy which had been the Seat of so great an Empire was subject to greater alterations and more heavy calamities then other Provinces It will not then be an unacceptable labor man being so naturally given to the desire of knowledge to seek out how and for what causes chiefly these things happened For that general rule
keep a great number of Soldiers in those Garisons to keep the people in obedience which were in pares farthest distant from the Senate of the Empire But the very same thing which was introduced to provide against those dangers was cause of others by reason of the Authority which the Armies had already usurped and out of hopes afforded to the Commanders of attaining this supreme dignity by being by the Soldiers cried up Emperors Wherefore one onely man though of never so much worth not being able to supply all places and provide for so many things as so great an Empire stood in need of and less able to correct the disorders which in so many States as civil humors in members farthest distant from the heart did daily more and more encrease the Empire must needs be continually â—ext both by foreign Nations and by its own Soldiers so as it was hardly ever free from such troubles nor was War sooner ended in one place but it broke forth in another nay for the most part divers Roman Armies fought in several places at one and the same time each of them endeavoring to sustain him whom they had chosen to be their Emperor Therefore Adrian to remedy so many disorders in the Empire which he thought did onely arise by reason of the Emperors being so far off and the largeness of the Confines resolved not to keep his certain abode in Rome but spending his whole time in travelling to visit all the parts of his Dominions to keep his Subjects in their duties and knowing how hard a thing this would be to do and almost impossible in so large Confines he resolved to shorten them in the Eastern parts making the River Euphrates the utmost boundeur of the Emire and restâ—ring all the people of the higher Provinces to their Liberty even to India who being by his successors reduced under the obedience of the Empire and many rebellions ensuing thereupon and much difficulty not onely in the further distâ—nâ— parts bâ—t even in those that were nearest at hand Constantine the Great knowing that these evils could not otherwise be helpâ— but by carrying the seat of the Empire nearer those parts chose the City of Byzantium to be the place which being rebuilt by him took from him the name of Constantinople And hence it is that the Indian Gymnosophist being desirous to shew Alexander the Great that whilâ—t being born away with a desire of Rule in far distant Regions he was gone so far from his own Kingdom as he gave it occasion of rebelling against him made a hard and stiff Oxe-hide be laid upon the ground and walking upon the utmost skirts thereof shewed him that when the part that was trod upon gave way to the foot another part rose up And that so it befell many great Princes who whilst they seek to keep one part of their States low and quiet the rest which they keep far from rise up in rebellion Hence it was that many Emperors not only such as were unfit for Government but even the wisest and most valiant knowing and confessing themselves to be opprest by the weight of so great a mass câ—ose others who in their liâ—e-times were to be their Coadjutors in Government and who should succeed them after their deaths in the Empire which was seldom quietly possest by one alone the Armies of far distant Provinces reâ—â—sing oft-times to obey those who were chosen to succeed in the Empire by other Armies though they were with all solemnity allowed and accepted of by the Senâ—te as befell Galba who being created Emperor by the Spanish Army was not accepted of nor obeyed by the German Army The like befell many others so as sometimes it was not well known who was the true Emperor And certainly tallâ—inâ—es of the greatâ—st height of this Empire it may be known that no one man though of never so great worth was able to govern it in peace and quiet And even Augustus himselâ— made trial of many Insurrections in Spain Germany and in the Eastern pâ—â—ts amongst the â—cythians and Parthians though at lâ—st through his sinâ—ular worth and great good fortune the whole World being reduced to an universal Peace he was able to shut up that famous Temple of Ianus which was kept always open afterward his Successors having always occasion to modest themselvs with war So as the saâ—ing is made true that Suis ipsa Roma viribus ruit But his her ruine was certainly accelerated by the lewd conditions of those into whose hanâ—s tâ—e Empire often fell For through their fault the internal causes of the States corruption were either occasioned or much increased since by their ignorance baseness avarâ—câ— cruelty lust and other enormous vices they drew on contempt and injury the first and chief roots of all change of Government For by contempt the Subjects take occasion to rebel and chiefly the richest and noblest and from injury comes hatred and desire of change of Government And it was the greaâ—er misfortune for this Empire in all other respects more fortunate then all other Empires that in those very times wherein there was greatest need of a continued succession of wise and generous Princes to confirm the State which by vertue of the great Augustus was reduced from War and past disorders into Peace and good Government should after him fall into the hands of three very lewd and base Emperors Tiberius Caligula and Nero from whose enormous vices those chief evils arose to the Provinces of that Empire which we but now mentioned the contempt of that supreme dignity both amongst For in and her own Soldiers The former by rebelling strove to free themselves from their obedience the other through insolence bereâ—t them of Empire and life Haâ—red and desire of change arose likewise in the Senate which was deprived of its authority and particularly in those who were offended or had any thing of generosity in them Hence â—t was that soon after to wit in â—ero's time Caesars linage ended and thaâ— the Soldiers accustomed to much licentiousness under such Princes usurp'd the authoriâ—y of making Emperors as they did in Galba after Nero's death in Otho after Galba and so in many others His worth who commanded in chief and his good fortune who was to succeed in the Empire was sometimes able to make a Successor but not to take this authority totally from the Soldiery through confidence of whose favor many aspired though by bad means to usurp the Empire and amidst these contentions the Empire must needs be divided shatter'd and weakened From this root another disorder arose which was cause of many heinous mischiefs to wit the general corruption of Customs in all the Orders of the City of Rome For Subjects following as usually they do their Princes inclinations and exercises men began to give themselves over to an idle life and Vertue being neither nourished nor at first maintained still languished more and more so as the Art of Commanding failing
good Obedience was also wanting every body made his will his law nor was there any sort of wickedness how infamous soever from which the Commanders or Soldiers were restrained by any respect borne to the Majesty of the Prince All reason was reduced to the sword and every one dared to attempt as much as his power encouraged him to compass Such and so great were the vices which crept daily into men of all degrees and qualities as it would be too laborious a thing to number them up all This one example may suffice to shew to what dissoluâ—eness and licentâ—ousness The affairs of Rome were reduced when Galba having chosen Piso Lasinianus a man very famous for his civil behaviour and military worth his election was neither accepted of by the Army nor by the Senate because it was thought that if he should come to the Empire he would correct the many misdemeanors both of Citizens and Soldiers But both of them being kill'd and in stead of him Otho was made Emperor in Rome and Vitellius at the same time cry'd up Emperor by the Army in Germany the affairs of the Empire were then governed with such confusion and grew so much worse in the succeeding Age the disorders growing to be confirm'd by a bad habit as when any Emperors should go about to correct the immoderate licentiousness of the Soldiers by reducing them to their antient discipline were they never so good and wise Princes they were slain by the Armies as was Alexander Severus Probus and some others So as no certain Form could be given to such a Government wherein the Soldier had so great a stroke in Authority making and unmaking Emperors at their pleasure so as it might seem to resemble a Popular State and yet the Emperors commanding with supreme authority in so ample a Dominion Monarchy might appear to be there formed It is not much to be wondred at then if this monstrous body of the Roman Empire being composed of almost incompatible ill-govern'd and mâ—sproportioned parts should be sick of divers infirmities and must at last suffer dissolution sooner then otherwise her greatness and power promised The negligence and pusillanimity of some Emperors were likewise cause why the City-Soldiers who kept still about the City as it were the Life guard of the Princes person and who were the flower of all the rest both for valor and discipline being long kept idle grew so effeminate and so unaccustomed to labor and military exercise as when some more valiant Prince would make trial of them they found themselves deceived in the hopes they had of their pristâ—ne worth Wherefore the Empire having already received great losses and damages in divers battels things grew to that height as not to mention many almost innumerable particulars which in this case might be produced when the States of the assaulted Empire would defeâ—d themselvs against the Northern nations as you shall shortly hear they were forced to take others of the same Nations to oppose their violence To so great a want both of Power Soldiers and Military discipline was the Empire reduced before it was so rent and so bereft of many Provinces as it was afterwards Then as the Roman Empire was got to that height of power and greatness by the worth of those first antient Romans and by the excellencie of their military discipline so her good Orders being afterwards corrupted she took so clean contrary a way to her first beginning as it behoved her soon to fall to ruine it being a certain and true rule That States do increase and are preserved by the same means by which they had their first beginnings and are corrupted by the contrary And he who shall consider the antient ways and works of those who laid the first foundations of this Empire and shall compare them with those which insued in the time of Emperors will find such difference therein as the necessity of coming to such an end may soon be seen The Roman Armies and their Leaders were once excellent examples of worth and discipline Who does not praise and wonder at what Titus Manlius did who punisht his victorious Son with death because he fought the enemy before the sign of Battel was given Very remarkable were the severe punishments which were oft-times imposed upon the Soldiers disobedience even for slight causes whose tumultuous proceedings were oft-time punished with decimating the whole Army But how different from these examples were those which were afterwards in the following Age shewn by many of those who waged War and commanded the Roman Armies The Commanders indulgence towards the Armies the Soldiers uncurb'd licentiousness the authority and boldness which they assumed unto themselves both over the people and over the very Emperors whom they were to obey are not they monstrous things in a well ordered State Those antient Romans did so study Military Affairs and so frequent were the exercises of the Militia with all Citizens as when the â—â—ity of Rome had not extended her bounds beyond Italy she had so numerous Armies as she was able to maintain at one and the same time but in several parts above One hundred thousand men in Arms and yet when so many calamities and ruines befel her by the Barbarians when she commanded over so many Provinces and Kingdoms her antient Discipline was so lost as for want of Soldiers she was forc'd to make use of mercinary Barbarians who getting at last to be very powerful did joyntly turn their Arms against that Empire for whose defence they were called in and whose pay they took Nor is the vanquishing and beating of the Roman Armies which was for so many years unconquerable by other Nations to be attributed to the Goths or those other Northern people but rather to the corruption of their Customs to the loss of their good Discipline and to the discord and baseness of the Commanders and Soldiers of those times For were not the French a valiant and stout Nation to overcome whom it behoved Caesar to fight so many Battels and to make so often trial of the Romans worth and fortune and that not without much danger Did not the Romans wage War in Spain for the space of almost Two hundred years together before they could well conquer that Nation and get quiet possession thereof How often did the Saxons Bavarians and other people of Germany take up Arms to molest the States of the Empire Yet all their commotions were still supprest And had not the Roman Empire almost continual War by reason of their so many Insurrections with many other Eastern Nations and chiefly with the Persians And though sometimes they tasted of adverse fortune yet their loss was always recovered as also the prejudice of the reputation of the Romans Forces by their own Commanders and Soldiers so as they were always forc'd to keep within their own Confines and under the obedience of the Empire But when they stood in greatest need when the Empire
thought expedient to come to peace with Alaricus King of the Goths leading him and a great number of his men under the Empires pay to make use of them in other undertakings For the Goths being kept in continual pay by some former Emperors amongst other Soldiers which served the Empire and being of themselves conversant in many Wars they were become a valiant People and had learn'd the Roman discipline though not the corruption which overthrew it in the Roman Camp Which though it might be good for the present occasions it did certainly prove very pernicious afterwards For though by this Peace Theodosius was safe from any fear of this Nation whilst he governed together with Gratianus and also afterwards when he held the Empire alone by himself he being a person of singular worth and one who by his industry had somewhat renewed the antient discipline amongst the Soldiers yet after his death the Forces of the Empire beginning again to flag and the Empire falling into the hands of his two sons Arcâ—dius and Honorius who succeeded their Father whilst they were but young and proved not to be of such gallant parts as the condition of those times required many of those who commanded under Theodosius in several parts rebelled who were all of them cryed up Emperors by those Armies wherein they commanded by which occasions being invited the Goths did not only return to rise up in Arms against the Empire but also other Northern Nations who did then inhabit Germany as the Alani Franks and Vandals took up Arms and did at one and the same time assault the States of the Empire in several parts many of them marching more particularly towards Italy and against the very City of Rome which after divers passages remained in prey to these Barbarians the antient Roman worth being so decayed as there was not any one who did so much as provide for the welfare of so stately a City which was the Queen of the World And the Emperor Honorius a thing which is not to be mentioned without much marvel whilst Italy and other Countries were wasted with War and the very City of Rome was reduced to the utmost extremity remained in Ravenna an idle Spectator of his Subjects so great calamity and of the ruine of his State in so base and stupid a manner as being told he might do well to provide for the preservation and safety of so many of the Empires Provinces which being miserably torn in pieces were falling into the power of the Barbarians answered That he could live without them After the ruine of Rome these victorious Barbarians past into France and into Spain where being recruited with other people of their own Nations and the Roman Armies being busied in Civil seditions and in maintaining those Emperors which each of them had chosen they had leisure to fix themselves there and to take possession of those noble Provinces the greatest part of whose antient Inhabitants being extinguished they setled themselves there and did long govern those Dominions and others of them passing into Africa and having won large Territories did with the same Fortune and same thoughts institute their proper Kingdoms But on the other part other People called the Huns fell into Pannonia called now by their names Hungaria and possessing themselves likewise thereof fixt their abode and dominion there So as there was hardly any Western Province of the Empire which was not at this time troubled by this fury of War the Roman Princes and Soldiers not having sufficient worth to withstand them Insomuch that when Attila marched with a furious Army to destroy Italy the Empire not having any Soldiers that they durst confide in to impede his passage the Romans were forced to take King Theodoricus with a good number of his Goths into their pay by whose assistance that cruel Enemy was at that time kept off But the Empires weak Forces being at last tyred and some Commanders being lost in whom there remained yet some worth and discipline the greater and almost fatal ruines of Italy began whereinto when these cruel Barbarians entred they put all to fire and sword bringing total destruction to many noble and populous Cities Which according to the natural order of all things mortal wherein Corruptio unius est generatio alterius gave occasion to the birth of the City of Venice whereunto the remainder of the Italian Nobility had recourse and saved themselves The Twelveth DISCOURSE Why thâ— Commonwealth of Rome though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels yet did still prove Victorious at last HE who shall narrowly consider the great actions of the Romans will still discover new things therein not onely worthy of praise but of admiration Their prosperity was certainly very great but proceeding as it is to be beleeved from their worth and from certain and ordinary causes The People of Rome made more Wars then ever any Potentate hath been known to do but that which occasioneth the greatest wonder is that their success in all of them was prosperous And that though the Roman Armies were in many Battels overcome yet still in the conclusion of every War the Victories sided with them It will then be worth the while to seek out the truest or at least the most truth-like causes thereof by reasoning thereupon The City of Rome waged continual Wars from the first foundation thereof till Augustus his time which was for above Seven hundred years The gates of that famous Temple of Ianus which were never to be shut but in time of Peace stood always open unless it were once in the Consulship of Titus Manlius nor was there almost any Nation known in those daies with whom the City of Rome hath not at some time made trial of her forces and worth That Commonwealth in so many and so long contentions of War was likewise sometimes favored sometimes frowned upon by fortune so as sometimes she was brought into very great danger yet still she prevailed at last and triumphed over her formerly victorious enemies Long and heavy was the dispute which in her very beginning she had with so many people of Italy and chiefly with those that were nearest who singly by themselves and joyntly with others did conspire against the Romans and did by all their best endeavors seek how to keep the powea of the Empire low which was ordained as was afterwards seen to the height of all greatness Nor was the Commonwealth of Rome secure from the efforts of foreign Nations nay many times she was to withstand the fury of the French who assailed her with great Forces that they might totally subdue her and possess themselves of her Territories as they had done of so many other parts of Italy The Commonwealth made trial of her Forces even in the beginning of her greatness with other Kings till beginning with the first Carthaginian Wars to wage War further from her Confines she proved at last a terror even to the most remote foreign
wherewith the City of Rome began to be infected not when she was governed by Emperors but whilst she was ruled by her Citizens in Civil Government And if it be objected that this did not hinder her from giving the greatest testimony of her valor in War since in the last Age of the Commonwealth when these vices and corruptions were rifest among the Citizens Military Discipline did flourish most and greatest actions were done It cannot then be said that neither the corruption of manners in the times of Emperors did destroy the Empire nor that the integrity thereof could have longer preserved the power of the Commonwealth But so much the less for that the Empire did not fall to ruine though it was sufficiently agitated by home-disorders in such sort as that either the Subjects did vindicate their Liberty or the Commanders of Armies divide the Empire amongst them as did Alexanders Commanders after his death but the roman Commonwealth though it was oft-times thrust at by such commotions was still notwithstanding able to subsist and to raise it self up again when it began to fall But barbarous and foreign Forces overthrew it at last with whom the famous Commanders in the time of the Commonwealth not having had any occasion to tâ—y their worth it cannot be said what would have succeeded upon such an occasion if the Government of the Commonwealth had continued till that time It is likely that the disorders and factions increasing much more whereof so many pâ—stiferoâ—s seeds had been sowed in all the Orders of the City the City and Territoâ—ies belonging thereunto being to remain the weaker and the more exposed to the injuries of foreiners would have been the easilier opprest if she had been to have withstood the terrible shock of these fierce and wild Northern Nations which the Emperors Forces did notwithstanding long resist insomuch as the Roman Empire maintained it self for the space of two hundred years after it was molested by these sorts of people nay it maintained it self in dignity and majesty for about siâ—ty years after it was shrewdly shaken till in the time of the Emperor Leo the First Rome and Italy being totally abandoned the name and power of the Western Empire did totally terminate It may therefore be thought a gallant and well-advised action that the Emperors did so long temporise and keep the Arms of these so powerful Nations from the more inward parts of their State of Italy and chiefly of Rome herself like so much venom from their hearts with which if they should have tryed the fortune of War hazarding one Battel or more as upon other occasions those antient Roman Commanders had done they might peradventure have brought the Empire sooner to its ruine since they had to do with a very warlike people and whose condition was such as they must either die or overcome And certainly they had done worse if they had therein trusted and relied upon Fortune since they could have gotten nothing by the victory when they should have won it were it not the saving of themselves for the present against those Armies who might have been succeeded by others of the same Nations and so the War to have been renewed more hotly and direfully then before out of a desire to revenge the death of their friends whereas the loss of a Battel or two on the Romans side might have drawn along with it the ruine of a most noble Empire It was then fortunate for the Common-wealth of Rome that she met not with these people in such necessity and danger for if that had befaln her which hapned in the time of Emperors that Fame might peradventure have been obscured which she was happy in of being glorious and victorious in all Wars and the course of her so many prosperous successes might have been interrupted or broken off by this unfortunate end Yet if we will look on the other side we may peradventure meet with other no less prevalent reasons which peradventure perswade us to the contrary Experience shews us how good the Orders were wherewith the Commonwealth was founded to make great acquisitions But it is a general rule That States are preserved by walking in the same ways wherein they were founded for every thing is preserved and maintained by alike things and are corrupted by the contraries If the Roman Arms governed by her own Citizens with Civil authority were sufficient to reduce so many States and Kingdoms under the power of the Commonwealth what reason have we to believe that they should not still be as able to preserve what they had gotten which is more easily done The baseness and carelesness of many of those Emperors did doubtlesly open the way to the Empires ruine for they oftentimes suffered those Northern people to settle themselves in divers Provinces of the Empire Alaricus was permitted by Honorius to inhabit with his Goths in France and soon after becoming his Colleagues they likewise obtained some Cities in Spain from him Valentinianus granted likewise Servis and Bulgaria to other Goths and before these Gallus had bought peace of the Goths so as becoming more bold and insolent they made themselves masters of Thrace Thessaly and of Macedonia Thus the very Emperors themselves having through their pusillanimity suffered mischief to increase at home and these their fierce Enemies to grow powerful they could not afterwards drive them out of those places which they had possest themselves of nor keep them long out of Italy This would not have been suffered by the generosity of the Roman Commanders and Citizens who when they were in a much worse condition would by no means agree with King Pyrrhus who had assailed Italy unless he would leave them and return to his own Kingdom And that they might draw Hannibal out of Italy they betook themselves to molest the Carthaginians in Spain and in Africa after they had for so many years generously withstood their Forces And whilst that State continued in the form of a Commonwealth as if Liberty had infused noble and generous thoughts into them the City of Rome was an example to all the world of all sorts of vertue chiefly of Magnanimâ—ty in undertaking great enterprises and of Fortitude and Constancie in managing them and in bringing them to a happy end But when the Commonwealth was â—uin'd and a new sort of Government brought in that antient Roman worth went astray by little and little till at last it was quite lost So as the ensuing Ages gave as many examples of ignorance and baseness in the very Emperors themselves and in others who were of greatest degree and authority in that Empire Hence then it was that the good and antient Customs being corrupted both in Civil government and chiefly in the Militia the State being reduced to great faintness and growing old had not strength enough to govern it self when it met with stout opposition The Roman Empire was brought to so miserable a condition when it was set upon by the
the care and diligence of one only Prince who was oft-times unfit for Government then it would have done had it been guarded by many Citizens at once as it was in the Commonwealths time But it is very hard to penetrate into the true causes of so great events and so remote from our memory which are reserved to the deeper judgment of him who is the true and Supreme LORD and who governs and doth dispense States and Empires by ways and ends which are unknown to humane reason The Fourteenth DISCOURSE Why the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their Dominion as did the Romans and how Greece came to lose her Liberty OF all other antient People there are two that have been greatly famous so as their names and the glory of things by them done hath been conveyed over to the memory of Posterity with large acclamations to wit the Romans and Grecians alike for notable examples of all worth and vertue but sufficiently unlike for the greatness and duration of Empire For whereas the Grecians did not extend their Confines beyond the bounds of Greece herself nor did she long flourish in the same splendor of dignity nor greatness of fame and dominion the Romans did command over almost the whole World and their Empire although the Form of Government was changed endured for many Ages for there past above eleven hundred years between the building of Rome and the time wherein she was taken and sackt by the Goths They then who shall consider these things may with reason desire to know why these two Nations did differ so much in fortune since they were equally worthy It was not in any one City alone that choise men for both all civil and military worth did flourish in Greece as in Italy they did in Rome but many Cities did at the same time produce Citizens excellent in all manner of things It would be a tedious thing to number vp the gallant Actions of Miltiades Themistocles Aristides Phocion Alcibiades Ageâ—ilans Cimon Leonida Epaminondas and of so many others whose â—â—me rings loud amongst us And Plutarch when he writes the lives of the most excellent Romans finds as many Grecians almost to parallel to them who are as highly cry'd up for the same vertues Yet did never any of their Cities nor Greâ—â—e herself the Country common to them all ever rise by any of their actions to that high pitch of Fortune and Command as did the City of Rome and whole Italy by the illustrious deeds of the Râ—mans This diversity of success ought not to be attributed to Fortune but their certain and natural causes If Greecâ— should have enlarged the 〈◊〉 of her Empire into the farthest distant Regions as did Italy through the power and gallantry of the 〈◊〉 she must either have been reduced under the power of one only 〈◊〉 or they must all of them have been joined in an uniform 〈…〉 designs But so many difficulties discover themselves in both theâ—e things when they are considered the wonder ceaseth why she could not encrease her Dominions answerable to the Fame Vertue and Glory of things done by that Nation Greece was divided into many several people who were all of them totally or for the most part governed by proper Laws and Civill Institutions in the Form of a Commonwealth though they were of divers States And though they had a general Councel which was called the Aâ—phictyoâ—â—s wherein men met who were sent from all the chief Cities to treat of the most important affairs and such as did concern the common interests of all Greece yet did not this Councel give one onely and certain Government to all Greece but it was such an Assembly as are the Diets which are in these times sometimes call'd in Germany upon some particular Occurrences wherein many Princes and free Cities of that Province meet which do much differ in State Dignity and Form of Government and who have free votes in counselling and in resolving upon such matters as are therein treated But amongst other people of Greece the Spartans and the Athenians antient people of Greece and who for a long time had by their worth purchast much authority were very numerous and eminent when Greece did flourish most both for publick power and for the admirable worth of particular Citizens For though the Corinthians the Argives the Achaeans and some other people were of greater consideration in respect of other lesser Cities yet they for the most part did rather follow the fortune of the Lacedemonians and the Athenians then their own And the Thebans who for a while were in better esteem then the rest by reason of their Soldiers Discipline whom they called by a particular name of the Sacred Cohort yet because of all her Citizens onely two arrived at any celebrated honor to wit Pelopides and Epaminondas and for that her Militia consisted but of Five hundred men their City never arrived at that degree of Dominion and Glory as did Sparta and Athens But as much as these were greater then the others so much did they the more emulate one another both for private worth and glory as for publick Dignity and Reputation To these did the other people of Greece adhere some being by them commanded others by vertue of particular considerations These two Cities were highly esteemed for the orders of the first Founders of such Commonwealths to with Lycurgus in Sparta and in Athens Theseus so as these people who did long before inhabit the same Country began to take name and authority over the rest Those who did inhabit the Terra firma held for the most part with the Spartans and those of the Islands with the Athenians But yet every City was free and hugely intent not to let the power either of the Spartans or Athenians encrease too much but to keep the strength of these two chief Cities so equally ballanced as when the one of them should go about to oppress the other people of Greece the oppressed might have recourse to the other It is therefore to be observed in all the actions of the Grecians that the rest of the people were never firm in their friendships either to the Spartans alone or alone to the Athenians but when the one of them began to exceed the other they sided with the weakest not valuing any tie of friendship or confederacy when they met with any such respect So as for a long time the affairs of Sparta and of Athens marcht hand in hand though each of them both gave and received many routs and partook both of good and bad fortune in War Sparta was strongest by land and Athens by Sea so as they did counterpoise one another and therefore and for that as it hath been said they had each of them many dependants and confederates they kept the forces of whole Greece divided nor was there means afforded to either of them much to exceed the other Wherefore neither of them could busie themselves
they possest themselves of divers parts and Cities of the Empire sparing noâ— friends nor enemies and placing their Regal Seat amongst them they grew soon much more powerful being favored therein by the great dissentions which still continued amongst the Grecian Nobility and other neighboring Lords as those of Servia Bulgaria and Albania interessing themselves therein they together with their own interests drew along with them the destruction of many other States and gave just occasion to postery for ever to blame their ill taken counsels For if the Grecians had been at unity within themselves and as solicitous to keep the Turks from advancing their power as they were to abase that of the Latin Princes they might certainly have hoped to have kept that fire a far off which hath burnt and consumed so many noble parts of Christendom Since it is seen that the Grecian Forces whilst their Lords after being driven from the City of Constantinople by the Latins kept in the parts about Natolia which was for above fifty years although they had already begun to be governed by one alone Prinâ—e under a just form of Empire were yet able to keep them bounded within the mountains of Natolia in barren places not suffering them to make any acquisitions of moment nor to enter into Europe as they did afterwards But it was the particular imperfection of this Province and of that in all other respects most noble Nation that she understood not or knew not how to make use of her many and valiant Forces Since if we will look back upon antient stories when Philip had reduced Greece into his power he put so high an esteem upon the value of those Soldiers as he undertook by them chiefly to effect his antient desire of making the enterprize of Persia whch not being able as hindred by death to effect was after so gloriously ended by his Son Alexander And it is related that being thus minded Philip had already mustered Two hundred thousand Foot and Fifteen thousand Horse in Greece and that Alexander desirous to prosecute his Fathers intentions but by different advice building his chiefest hopes in the body of an Army of but Thirty thousand valiant Soldiers many of which he raised in Greece did by their valor chiefly end so many glorious Enterprises The Fifteenth DISCOURSE Whether Ostracism used by the Athenians be a just thing or no and whether it be useful for the preservation of a Common-wealth IT was instituted by the Laws in some antient Commonwealths that such as were very eminent above the rest either for Riches Glory Friends or for any other Civil power or who did exceed the other Citizens for any particular worth should be banished the City not out of punishment or penalty but for the common good to the end that Equality being the better maintained and as it were a certain Consonancie amongst the several ranks of Citizens observed the Government might be the safer and more durable Which custom was for a long time observed by the Athenians and chiefly then when their Commonwealth did flourish most and ten years was the limited time for this exilement This Law was commonly called Ostracism whereof Aristotle toucheth a little in his Third Book of the Politicks But whether such a Law be just or no and whether it may make for the preservation of a Commonwealth or State for which end it was instituted is a Consideration of no small moment in point of Police there being much to be said on both sides both in praise and dispraise of so strange a Law and Custom In the behalf thereof these things may be had into consideration That nothing is more requisite for the long preservation of a City especially of such a one as is governed in form of a Commonwealth where the Government is in the hands of many then Equality amongst Citizens whereof the more excellent the temper is and the more it is tied fast by strict Laws so as it cannot be exceeded on any side the life of that City or Commonwealth will be so much the longer more quiet and more secure A City may be resembled to a humane Body compounded of divers Elements and consisting of many Members and that as that humane Body is more healthful and more handsom wherein every elementary quality is better distributed and every member better proportioned so that City or Commonwealth wherein every degree of Citizens hath a moderate authority state and fortune and well proportioned to the whole doth preserve it self the longer and keep freer from the contagion of civil seditions Though the Head be the noblest part of the Body and the Eyes the like of the Head yet would they not be of ornament when either that or these were bigger then their ordinary and natural form they would rather take away all Decorum and beauty which is nothing but a due proportion in all things Then though it may seem a gallant thing to shew the greatness and nobleness of a City or Commonwealth that there be many very wealthy men therein and of excellent civil gifts and that the supreme Degrees and Negotiations of the Commonwealth be bestowed upon these yet another reason may perswade the contrary for this eminencie spoils the proportion of the whole and doth not represent a City of Free-men and partakers of the same Government but the form of a Tyrannical Government consisting of Lords and Servants hateful names in good Governments Therefore all the best Legislators have chiefly aimed at the reducing of all things as much as may be to an Equality in that City where they would introduce a Politick Government and a peaceful and durable condition Insomuch as Plato to take away all occasion of civil discord would have all goods to be common in that his Commonwealth which he propounded to himself for the most exact form of Government So as there should be no such name as Rich or Poor but only that of Citizens of the same Country and who live under the same Law So as no man could out-doe another by altering this so necessary and useful Civil Equality which not being to be had where there is a Propriety of Goods the Athenians would provide against those inconveniences which the unequal condition of Citizens produced by driving at a certain time out of the City such as had caused the disorder and who were suspected to be the Authors of Novelties and of trouble to peaceful living And truly he who shall consider what the beginnings of those evils have been which have inwardly vex'd and troubled both Commonwealths and other States as well in antient as in these more modern times shall find that all the confusions and civil disorders which have after a long time brought many States to their ultimate ruine have sprung from this root How was partiality and the corruption of good and antient Orders introduced in the Commonwealth of Rome whence all great things may take example if not from having suffered avarice
Men but amongst bruit Beasts yea even amongst Vegetables Then since this Equality is not to be found amongst Men it is great injustice to distribute things equally in a Government to those whose parts and deserts are unequal For in conferring of honors or pâ—eferments in a City or State a Geometrical not an Arithmetical proportion must be observed It is the vertue and merit of every one that must be weighed He who is richer then another may be serviceable to his Country by great and frequent contributions to the Publick He who hath many Clients and Friends may by his power and authority dispose 〈◊〉 Peoples minds to believe â—ell and act well in the Cities occasions and affairs He who is advanced above others in glory must have deâ—erâ—â—d it well of the Commonwealth by some noble action and 〈◊〉 confirâ—t himself therein by some other like action And he Who is â—â—â—re generally given to any Vertue be it or Warlike or Civil is always 〈◊〉 then others to serve his Country and Prince upon all occasions So as to drive 〈◊〉 men as these out of the City is no better then to cut that member from the body which is loveliest and fitter then the rest to be serviceable thereunto Such an Instiâ—uâ—ion then can have no admittance but in Tyrannical governments And the examples alleadged of Thrasâ—â—alâ—â— and Tarquin are examples of Tyranâ—â— who being resolved to preserve themselves by violence in their usurped dominionr were to be jealous of all the best and most powerful men and endeavor to be quit of thâ—â— for their greater security But a just Prince must not imiteate such examples â—ay even in a Politick Government these Proceedings would be pernicious For he who will thereby preserve himself must change the Form of the whole Government and reduce it to a Despoâ—ical and servile condition with which such Orders holding some proportion and conformity they may for a certain time prove useful for the maintaining of that Tyrannie as it hath done to the Turks in these later times and formerly in some other Nations wherein the whole Government hath related to the sole and peculiar accommodation of the Lord Paramount without any respect to the good of the Subject and more according to will then to Law Nor is it true that the power of Citizens or greatness of Barons in a Kingdom proves alwas harmful it may rather upon many occasions prove the safety of that City or State But this may be ill uâ—ed as many other things are the which notwithstanding whosoever should go about to take totally away from a City would ruine it not bring it to perfection Therefore the Law ought to provide for taking away the abuse of things not the things themselves when they are not simply and in themselves evil And if the Authority which the Roman Commanders held in their Armies had been well regulated and their continuing is their military Commands moderated by a shorter time Caesar could not have made use thereof as he did to the prejudice of the Commonwealth he having continued so many years Commander in chief of the same Army and in the same Province Nor had they needed to have raised Pompey to such a height to oppose Caesars greatness But when when they had let it run on too long to declare him an Enemy to his Country and drive him out of Italy proved a violent remedy and mortal to the Common-wealth Neither can that benefit be expected as is pretended by the banishment of so many Citizens who being become too great are for suspition drives out of their Country of securing themselves from their power rather Injury added to Ambition serves for another incitement to make them endeavor some innovation in the City and makes them the more sollicitous in plotting by the means of such as are their friends and adherents in their own City or State to râ—ise some revolt in it for which they have easie recourse to the favor of other Princes So as the trouble of being offensive to those States from whence such men are expell'd is rather increased then diminished We have infinite examples in all Ages of those who being driven by banishment out of a City or State have been the occasion of notable mischief and ruine thereunto For though it cannot be denied but that the â—o great power of Citizens in a City or of Lords and Barons in a Kingdom begets suspition and is dangerous and doth usually cause no small difficulties to the good and peaceful Government of that State yet some other remedy thâ—◠〈◊〉 may be used to obviate those disorders which such excesses do 〈…〉 For that is only to suffer a â—ore to grow old and to gangrene that they 〈…〉 wards forcâ—d to 〈…〉 or sword to heal it In a well-govern'd State 〈…〉 be had and caâ—â— taken both by the Law it self and by the Prince who rules is chief therein not to suffer any one to grow to too 〈…〉 And if any 〈◊〉 do arrive at such a condition as he begins too far to overtop the reâ—â— the foundation and groundwork of his power must dexterously be taken away and of his ploting thoughts so as he may not thereby be able to work any novelties or disturb the publick peace Which may easily be done by his wisdom who commands in chief the same men ought not to be suffered to continue long in the same imployments and especially not to exercise them too long in the same place such things ought not to be left in their power which may serve for fuel the more to kindle their ambitious thoughâ—â— to the prejudice of the publick good which may be done under a pretence of honor so as the Princes may not be noted for injustice nor can the particular persâ—nages account it as an injury done them If any one do abound in riches let him have expensive imployments that he may lessen that wealth which made him appear more eminent then others If he be of too great authority in the Court or amongst the People as having had the management of important affairs along time send him to some place of Magistracie or other imployment a far off and change him often from place to place If he be great and remarkable for glorious actions done by him give him hard and difficult imployments wherein if he succeed not well his reputation will soon grow less with the people who judge by the events But if such a one appear too much ambitious and be so as many men are seen to be out of a certain vain-glory but without any malice of heart he may be contented and kept quiet by confering honors upon him of glorious appearance but little profit But the remedy will prove peradventure harder in those who boast themselves to be more nobly descended and of better blood then others fâ—r many several respects meet often times in them to make them great and powerful yet even against these remedies may be found without
passing by a violent and illegal way to the driving them out of the City or State their friends or kindred may be kept low and humble whereby their power is lessened if they commit any excess in case of Justice as such men out of arrogancie often do be severe unto them take their priviledges from them declare them to be for a certain time uncapable of any Publick imployment and do some other such like things which being done upon some just occasion although the parties concerned be therewithall displeased yet not being disliked by the generality their hatching of mischievous plots against the present Government and Weal publick will have less fewel to feed upon But what shall be said of him whose worth and vertue doth exceed that of all others by what pretence can a just Prince or a well-governed Commonwealth humble such a man or keep him low or aloof from partaking of their Councels To this it may be answered that if this supposed personage be endowed with true vertue he will not be subject to any suspition nor will it be imagined that he will do any foul or wicked thing which may be prejudicial to his Prince or Countrie but that all his endeavors shall aim at the common good and it is just and convenient that such a man should alwaies bear sway in every well-ordered Commonwealth But if the vertues which render him so great and eminent tend to policie that is when a man does that which is good and honest having his mind bent upon some other object then meer worth and honesty as most men use to do out of hopes of glory or of bettering themselves which things notwithstanding are so far vertueâ— as they are helpful to the State and have a certain resemblance oâ— true worth it will not be amiss that such a one who may be suspected to misimpâ—y his good endowments be proceeded against in manner aforesaid We may then conclude that the custom of the Athenians concerning Ostracism ought neither to be praised nor practised in relation to the act it self but may admit of commendation and imitation as far as the intention thereof reacheth viz. to provide that the ambition or malice of a few rob not many of their quiet nor do perturb or confound the whole State The end of the First BOOK THE SECOND BOOK The First DISCOURSE Why the Commonwealth of â—enice hath not so far inlarged her Precincts as did the Roman Commonwealth MEN may be allowed to wonder not a little if they take it into their consideration why the Commonwealth of Venice having so excellent Laws and Institutions and having so long preserved her self in power and authority hath not notwithstanding much inlarged the preciâ—cts of her Empire as did the Common-wealth of Rome in a lesser space of time and in a form of Government which was not void of many imperfections The thought thereof hath made me oftentimes desire to search into the true causes of it I find this hath been taken into consideration by some other modern Writers but to bâ—ot that his discourses are already buried in oblivion it may be the things by him alleadged have not been such as may give full satisfaction to one who shall look narrowly into the â—arrtiage of our civil actions He was of opinion that the greatness of the Roman Empires was â—oly to be attributed to the vertue of her Ordinations and Form of Government from which since the Venetian Commonwealth doth differâ—â— he thinks that the cause why she hath not been able to make so great acquisitions And he is so resolute in this opinion as without distinguishing between things things between 〈◊〉 and times he doth so equally extol all the orders and actions of the â—eman Common-wealth as he doth propound some things for example to all 〈◊〉 Princes and Commonwealths as are rather to be blamed then to be imiâ—ated and which were the reasons of the ruine of that Commonwealth as the diâ—â—enâ—ions which was between the Nobility and the Common People and other such things which are rather disorders then orders and more apt to confound then to establish States Insomuch as his opinion is That if there were a City at this day in Italy which had the same â—rom of Government as Rome had of old that City might as the other did make herself Mistress of the World As if the condition of times and the so many variouâ— accidents upon which humane actions and especially the augmenting and change of States do depend were to be held for nothing and that it be in the power of a wise Legislator to give the Empire of the World to that City which he knows how to govern by good Laws But experience teacheth us much otherwise since we have known many antient Commonwealths founded by very wise men and confirm'd with excellent Orders equally for what concerns Peace as War yet not any one amongst so many hath been able I will not say to acquire so much Dominion as did the Commonwealth of Rome but nor hardly able any ways to extend their Precâ—ncts amongst their Neighbors The intâ—insecal Orders of the State are not simply of themselves sufficient to make so great Atchievements though they may peradventure concur very much thereunto Nor ought the State of Venice her not being Mistress of larger Territories be attributed to any defect in this behalf but many other things are to be taken into consideration whereby the truest causes of such effects which amidst the uncertainty of such like affairs can be found out may be discovered by looking into To know then whence such a diversity proceeds we must take the business a little higher and examine First what was the original beginning of these two Cities Rome and Venice what their Founders were and then what their situation what the inclinations studies and vertues of their Citizens and lastly the condition of times and qualities of their neighboring Princes must be examined All which things appertain to this Consideration as well as the Orders of the Commonwealth and their Form of Government He then who shall look upon the first Founders of these two Cities willfind them even in these theâ—r first beginnings not a little differing which occasioned differing intentions and differing ends and therefore peradventure a differing state and differing condition The first Erectors of Venice where men who were peacefully given as those who having been wearied by the so many calamities of Italy occasioned by the inundation of the Barbarians had withdrawn themselves that they might shun the danger of War into that piece of marish ground in the Adriatick Sea which was then greater then now it is and the chiefest of many small Islands which by a common name were called Venetiae So as they lived for a while without any Orders either Military or Civil those first Inhabitants contenting themselves to live in peace and quiet without dreaming of any greater matter For it neither stood with the end
which they propounded unto themselves in this their new abode so to do nor did the condition of those times permit it And they were so fenced from the Arm sof Enemies as then both by the natural condition of their situation as also by the salt waters as they needed not to arm themselves for their own defence Therefore their Citizens being by long custom inured to these thoughts they had no thought of taking up Arms though the City were already much increased both in Forces and Authority unless when they were provoked and more to keep themselves from being injured by others or to assist their Friends and Confederates then out of ambition of Rule and of enlarging their bounds And he who shall consider what their greatest and and most difficult enterprises were in those first times will see they aimed all at this end The Venetians fought first with the French and afterwards against the Huns in defence of their Country and of their Liberties and long after with the Genoeses enforced thereunto by necessity and provoked by many grievous injuries For this very valiant and generous Nation would not rest quiet out of an emulation of glory in Sea-affairs wherein though they were oftentimes worsted by the Venetians yet they still found occasion of new Contests The Commonwealth of Venice hath oft-times taken up Arms likewise in times neerer this our Age with greater preparation for War and with more courage to defend their State in Terta firmâ— which they had already gotten with much ado and whereof they were justly possessed insomuch as they have sometimes valianâ—ly repulsed the fury of most powerful Leagues of Princes who were resolved upon their ruine But it becomes not the moâ—th of a Venetian to say how oft they have taken up Arms in defence of their Friends and Confederates lest he may seem to upbraid others with the services his Countrymen have done them But divers People and Cities assisted and preserved by their Forces do witness this And to speak only of things of more recent memory how great a desire hath this Commonwealth shewn to the common good and to this purpose how careful hath she been of the liberty and glory of Italy in sustaining long and heavy War to preserve the noble Neapolitan Territories in the Italian Princes and the like of Milan But he who will look further back and see what they have done will find that the Venetians have undertaken and finished famous enterprises out of zeal to Religion as they did in the Wars of the Holy Land against the Saracens and divers other times against other Princes to preserve and increase the glory of the holy Church and the Papal dignity which amongst many other actions is cleerly and nobly witnessed by the famous Naval victory won from the Emperor Frederick Barbâ—rossa for the which Venice doth at this day enjoy many great priviledges in witness of her great worth and singular merit But it is needless now to particularize in those things whereof all Histories are full It will suffice to touch upon some things whereby it may be conceived what the first beginnings of the City were and what were the intentions and end of her Citizens Romes ends were far different from these who from her very beginning aimed only at Empire and greatness being built by Romalus a fierce and ambitious man who not content to have recovered his Kingdom to his Grandfather Numiter and opened the way to the Lordship of Alba longa resolved by the assistance of a great many young men who followed him to purchase a better fortune and condition for himself and to build a new City which must have a warlike institution to keep the minds of those stirring youth busied in military exercises and to defend himself from his neighbors who finding that the new City aimed at greater designs thought to keep is low Romulus might with reason promise himself to purchase more Dominion and to enlarge his Confines for he built his City in a Country which was possest by many people who were weak and at odds within themselves so as he needed not fear any potent Prince who might oppose his designs or suppress his Forces before they were somewhat better established This was the first foundation of Romes greatness for the City beginning soon to habituate herself to military discipline and to turn her thoughts upon War and aggrandising her State she grew so confirm'd therein with time and with continual military orders as the Militia and all things thereunto tending did continually flourâ— sh in her For those that came after following as it falls out for the most part the example of their Predecessors her Citizens were always desirous of warlike glory and of Empire proving to be like Romulus and those other valiant men from whom they had their beginning and increase Thus they always made one War beget another not being able to endure the suspected power of their Neighbors nor yet the injuries done unto them by their Friends and Confederates under which two pretences they made first many notable acquisitions in Italy and afterwards passing over the Sea in Africa in Spain and in many other Provinces But to pass on now to another Consideration let us affirm that the situation is of great moment for the Rule and Dominion which one City is to have over another as that which affords security for self defence and opportunity to subjugate others this helps likewise to make a City plentiful and wealthy without which States are hardly acquired For where there is scarcity of livelihood povertie is more to be fought withall then Enemies and want of wealth renders a City alwaies weak and easie to be wasted and opprest Hence it was that Sparta though she had excellent Laws and Institutions yet whilst she observed them she could not much inlarge her Dominions for by them the City was bound for what concerned both the private and publick condition to be kept poor and far from any commerce with others and in our time the Cantons of the Switzers though they be a very valiant Generation yet being poor and seated amongst Mountains and for the most part in barren places their Soldiers being fighting under the pay of other Princes they have not been able to do any thing for themselves or to make any acquisitions but have onely preserved their Liberties If we shall then consider the situation of Venice we shall certainly find it very opportune for most things and miraculously well for some things For if we have respect to safety what City can be compared to this which without any Bulwarks of Walls or Garrisons of Soldiers defended by her natural scituation is of her self safe from all injuries and inexpugnable So as she is the onely example after so many Ages of being untoucht by the Barbarians violence If we respect abundance of plenty and wealth the accommodation that the Sea affords her and the so many Rivers which disgorge themselves either into
test the Wars proved very heavy unto them which they were forc'd to 〈…〉 did not joyn against them because they saw that if that Dukes State fell into the power of the Venetian Commonwealth the way would be laid open to her for much greateâ— matters in Italy whereupon a noble Victorie which was already almost gotten was impeded Hereby it may be then conceived how much the condition of the times was averse to the Commonwealths inlarging her Precincts by Land partly by reason of her self and partly through other various accidents which though they were somewhat more favorable unto her in what concerned the Sea yet met she not with small interruptions therein to her enterprises For the Eastern Emperors being Masters of Greece and of other States and Countries wherein the Commonwealth was to have inlarged the Confines of her command by Sea she could not make any great acquisitions whilst they preserved themselves in such reputation and strength as became their State But afterwards when that Empire began to decline she began to increase and flourish gloriously and her worth was waited upon by much prosperitie as was seen when the Venetians went in companie of the French to the business of the Levant and after many noble warlike actions they took the City and Empire of Constantinople of which acquisition the Commonwealth had so great a share as that their Dukes did then assume the title of Signoridella quarta parte é Mezza di tutto L' Imperio della Romania And soon after with the like prosperous success they did by sundry means reduce many Islands and chief Maritime Towns under their obedience and the Commonwealth marched on apace to greater power and command But this course of glorie and victorie by War was much slackened by the original Customs and Orders of the City as has been said which related more to Peace and Merchant affairs then to War Insomuch as the Venetians seemed for a while to make use of these new acquisitions rather for the better accomodation of their Navigation and Traffick then for any occasion of other enterprises Their business did therefore infinitely increase at this time insomuch as there was not any City famous for merchandizing in the Levant whither the Venetian Ships and Merchants did not flock Nay a great number of men of that Nation did usually remain in those Cities through whose hands the most precious Merchandise of those Countries past to the great advantage of the City and of her private Citizens So as the Genoeses plying the same places at first a certain rivalship and emulation arose amongst them as well for the profit of merchandizing as for the expertness and glory of Sea affairs till at last they came to open and cruel War which kept the Commonwealth so busied and perplexed by disturbing Navigation and even private affairs as for a long while they had no leasure to undertake other enterprises though they had met with opportuity for it and that they had been thereunto disposed For the Venetians having sundry times hazarded their Fleets upon the doubtful event of Battel they tasted both prosperous and adverse fortune insomuch as they were to fight in their own Gulf not more for Empire then for the safety of the City Thus whilst the Commonwealth spent her best years partly in these private affairs and merchandizing business partly in the so long and troublesome Wars against the Genoeses another Power arose in the Levant much greater and more formidable then was the Grecian Empire For the Ottaman Lords beginning by divers accidents but chiefly by reason of the discords among Christians to make notable and successful progress in their rising Empire grew quickly very great and powerful not onely by Land but also by Sea having reduced the City of Constantinople into their hands a very fit place for Sea enterprises whereby the Commonwealth of Venice was not onely bereft of all hopes of further increasing their Dominion by Sea having so great and powerful an â—nemy to near at hand but even what they had already got was exposed to hazard so as being to maintain a bitter and difficult War and to manage it with unequal Forces against this their sore and perpetual adversarie she had more reason to think upon her own defence then by force of Arms to win what belonged to others Let us in the next place consider the conditions of the nearest neighboring people amongst which she was to inlarge her Confines whereby we may also know what difficulties the Commonwealth met with for at the very first she was to overcome the Dalmatians a Nation not onely very valiant but of a quick wit given to sedition and desirous of novelties Whence how great her difficulties were in quelling these may be conceived by this that the Commonwealth of Rome having so many and so far distant Nations yet could she never handsomely put the yoke upon Dalmatia which never was under the Roman Empire until the time of Qctavius Augustus but had still before notably indamaged the Roman Armies It is then no wonder that the state of a Commonwealth should be less which had to contend with such Enemies and who may not know by the actions of this Commonwealth that she rather wanted occasion then worth for the further encreasing her State and fortune Let us now likewise consider the condition of the times wherein the Common-wealth of Rome had her happy beginnings and made the first progress to her Empire Which we shall find to differ much and to be free of the so many difficulties which the Venetians met with Rome had not at her first rise any powerful neighboring Prince for the Assyrians had then the Monarchie whose confines did not extend beyond Asia and after the concourse of many years it was carried by Cyrus amongst the Persians with whom it remained for about Two hundred years till it was destroyed by Alexander of Macedon who though he made greater conquests and made his Forces be felt and dreaded much further off yet dying young in the height of his Victories he could not get into Europe nor afford the Romans occasion of making trial of their Forces with a powerful and valiant Prince And by his death he having left no issue either legitimate or illegitimate behind him that Monarchie was soon destroyed and his Empire was divided between his chief Commanders so as several Kingdoms were thereout framed with which severally the Romans did afterwards much to their advantage make War So as Asia having then been the chiefest Seat of the Empire the Provinces of Europe were not at that time any waies annoied by the power thereof and those that were further from thence as was Italy less then the rest But Greece which was then in high esteem for the excellencie of her Inhabitants genius for what concerned both Civil and Military vertues was divided into many several Peopledoms who contending within themselves for the dignitie both of the soveraigntie of that very
Province it so fell out that aspiring either wholly or chiefly thereat they minded not the annoying of other Nations by their Forces In Africa the Carthaginians were very strong the power of Carthage being almost at the same times as much increased as was the like of Rome in Italy So as she had the Dominion of many provinces of Europe and did possess the greatest part of Spain but this power did not any waies molest the Romans first designs not did it hinder them from making qcquisitions in Italy not from confirming therein those Forces with which she afterwards did subdue the World For the Carthaginians came not near the Romans for little less then Five hundred years till such time as both the Commonwealths inlarging their Confines they grew to be neighbors Whereupon at last they commenced War out of the envy and jealousie that each 〈◊〉 of other This was the condition and 〈◊〉 of times wherein the Commonwealth of Rom◠had 〈◊〉 rise and encrease Whence it may be observed that though there might be some great 〈◊〉 then yet was there none which might compare with the Roman Emperors who had a greater Monarchy then all the rest besides they were so far off as their greatness could not impede Romes increasing though she were as yet but a new-begun City But she met with the like prosperous condition both of affairs and times in relation to her neerest neighbors For Rome had not only not any great contestation with any powerlike Prince in her first and weakest beginning but for the space of three hundred and sixty years till the first French war she had no occasion of making trial of her Forces against any powerful people for then Italy was not only not subject to any one Prince alone who might be greater by other Forces and other States as it happened afterwards in the Venetians times but being divided into many parts as well in respect of dominion as of other separations each Country contained many people of differing government and power So as Latium alone of herself which is now called Campagna di Roma contained four Nations or rather Communalties the Hernici Latini Volsci and Equi with whom the People of Rome did for a long time make war I mention not the Cecinensi the Crustumeni Antinati Sabini Albani and other Nations of less esteem against which in her beginning she exercised her Forces whilst she learned as a man may say the first rudiments of her Militia Tuscany though being taken all together she were very powerful and whose Confines were then much larger yet was she divided into so many Signories or Lordships as the Forces of every People apart by themselves must needs be weak and of small moment which may easily be known by this that bare Three hundred men of the Family of the Fabli were able to wage War with the Veienti who were the chief of that Region with whom they oft times fought with display'd Banners and with dubious event and were at last supprest more by the fraud then force of their Enemies So likewise the other parts of Italy which were neerer Rome were so weakly inhabited as it is not much that a new City but yet well instructed in weapons might get unto herself State and Dominion Nay he who shall consider what the increase of that Commonwealth was from time to time will wonder how that People who got afterwards the dominion of the whole World was so late in enlarging the Confines of her Territories upon her Neighbors when they were to contend in War with those that were weaker then they and that the bounds of their Empire did extend to beyond Italy For for above the space of four hundred years when the City was so much increased in Citizens as she raised Armies of Forty thousand Foot besides Horse the affairs of Rome were notwithstanding in such condition as they made War even under the Walls of Rome with the Equi Volsci and Veientes her first Enemies And this wonder is not a little increased when you shall consider that Military discipline did flourish even from the very first in Rome and was ever afterwards held in great esteem by her Citizens who were bent with all their might to augment the power of their City not being content as were the Venetians to enjoy peace and security Wherefore the Romans gave easily way for friendship to all Foreiners that they might by the multitude of their Citizens render their City more powerful and fitter to worst Adversaries And their first King Romulus set up a Sanctuary where all sorts of men whether free or slaves good or guilty might have receptacle But that Commonwealth had also her imperfections whereby being troubled with perpetual civil discords she found many impediments and much difficulty in effecting her Citizens generous designs But being gotten to a great height of power the Counterpoise of forein Forces ceasing by her own greatness she was able for a time to bear with her so many discorders till at last she was brought to her final ruine We must now be permitted to take some other things into consideration which appertain to particular order of this Commonwealth A City which aspires unto Empire must above all things else be well provided of Arms so as she want not any thing that is requisite for War but she stand◠no less in need of good Laws which are for many respects of great importance in all Governments as also for that when the licentiousness of Arms intrusted in the hands of Citizens is not corrected by the authority of Law that which was destin'd for the good and preservation thereof it turns at last to her ruine Therefore it is requisite that a City be constituted with such Laws as may result both to safety from foreign Enemies and to union between her own Citizens by which civil agreement the strength and reputation of a Commonwealth is much increased Of these two conditions which ought to make a City powerful and so as that power may continue long the Commonwealth of Rome had the first in perfection but was very faulty in the second On the contrary excellent provision was made by the Founders of Venice for the second but much remains to be wish'd for in the former Thus then had Rome a naturally warlike people which she kept continually exercised in Arms observing exactly Military discipline and orders But she was much disorderly and confused in Civil affairs nor knew she how to keep any setled from of Government leaving too much authority in the People and wanting usual means to suppress the immoderate power of Citizens Whereas in Venice the form and order of Civil Government is in every particular well disposed of and excellently well understood so as she is the only example which in so many Ages and so many accidents both of good and bad fortune hath never been troubled with any important domestick discords But then as for Military orders they are
onely to the benefit of the Pisans to the preservation of their liberty as much as might be and to the right of what belonged to their Territories which they were possest of when they put themselves into the Commonwealths protection wherein the Venetians were alwaies very constant though the imminent War with the Turks might have made them forget the dangers and interests of other mens for their own concernments And at last as they would yeeld to nothing which might be prejudicial to the Pisans so to witness to the World that in reality they had no thought in maintaining this controversie to any peculiar design of their own in making themselves Masters of that City they put the determination of these differences into the arbitrement of Hercules Duke of Ferrara which though it had not any effect afterwards the Pisans not consenting thereunto yet it might be discerned that the Pisans averseness thereunto or the constancy wherein they persevered was not fomented by the Venetians but rose either out of the meer election or necessity of the Pisans themselves But let us come to another consideration more proper for this business that is to the reasons of State wherein thâ— many of the same things do concur yet they are clothed with other respects wherewith Princes building either onely or chiefly upon what may most redound to their own advantage do not advise with counsel of equity or do not attribute thereunto what is requisite It is most certain being already reduced to the greatest extremity if they should have been abandoned by the Venetians they must have put themselves either into the power of the Duke of Millan or of the Florentines but reason of State would not permit that in this conjuncture both of times and affairs this City should be joyned to the Dominion of either of these As for Sforza his vast and disordinate drifts were already known and how he would be the sole Arbitrator of Italy so as if he should become more haughty and pâ—ft up by this important acquisition no part of Italy could remain quiet or secure either from his force or craft And as for the Florentines you have heard how resolute they were not to part from the friendship of the King of France by how much greater the danger of whose Army was in recent memory so much the more were his friends and associats to be kept weak and under to the end that they might not increase to the prejudice and apprehension of the rest It was seen in what danger Italy was put by forein Forces how soon the Kings of Aragon were driven out of their Dominion how little resolute the other Princes of Italy were to withstand forein Forces which having once found an open and easie way into Italy it was to be imagined that they would be cause of greater dangers and molestations to her So as the Commonwealth being to be put into a condition of being able to resist the Forces of greater Princes and of not being exposed to their wills she was necessitated to think upon increasing her power and reputation that she might depend upon her own Basis and be well esteemed of by others She knew particularly that 〈…〉 was a State which might accommodate or dis-accommodate the French designs accordingly as it was well or ill affected towards them And the keeping of the City of Pisa dependant upon the Venetians might several waies be helpful â—nto them in their intentions in seeping the French from â—according the â—ingdom of Naples and in securing themselves afterwards from the Florentines as also in winning such strength and reputation to the Commonwealth with friends and 〈◊〉 as she might provide for her own preservation and for the like of 〈◊〉 other Italians who had the like intentions with her to maintain peace in Italy and to keep her safe from foreign Forces It was not their onely useful but necessary for the Venetian in this conjuncture of affairs to have footing in Italy and to have the City of Pisa if not subject to their dominion at least dependent upon the authority of the Commonwealth Now take it for granted that that suspition might be true which they have so much divulged who have endeavored to cast a blur upon the honor and dignity of the Commonwealth to wit that the Venetians intended to make thâ—mselves absolute masters of that City only out of a design of increasing their dominion Certainly the actions of a Philosopher and those of a Prince ought not to be measured by one and the same Rule nor must we fancy the condition of men and of affairs to be what peradventure they ought to be but what they are for the most part Magnanimity is the proper vertue of Princes which makes them always busie themselves about great matters and whereby they make themselves be dreaded and reverenced by others Therefore the desire of Glory and Empire is highly praised in such Princes as have been greatest and most celebrated as Alexander Cyrus Caesar Charls and all the rest of the most famous men in whom a spirit of Grandure and Generosity which did still egg them on to new and glorious enterprises is not only commended but even admired If the Romans whose actions are praised and celebrated by the general consent of all men had been content to contain themselves within the precincts of Latium their worth would have been hidden and obscured nor would their names have been so highly cry'd up to the memory of posterity And had not the Venetians had larger thoughts then to keep within their private merchandising affairs as it became them to do in their weak begining dispising or neglecting such occasions as they sundry times met with of enlarging the bounds of their Dominions the Commonwealth would not only not have gotten such esteem and reputation as it hath got but could not have kept herself so long in liberty amidst so many revolutions of affairs and such movings of Forein Armies It remains now only to see whether the opportunity of the Times and condition of Affairs did counsel them to purchase new glory and greater Empire to their Commonwealth Which though it may be known by what hath been formerly said yet it will more clearly appear by adding some other particular Considerations The Commonwealth was then in a more powerful condition then any Prince in Italy being much stronger then them all both in Land and Sea-Forces the Pisans cause was generally well wish'd unto the Florentines were but little acceptable to the rest of the Princes of Italy by reason of their friendship with the French and for this and other respects were particularly much hated by their neighbors the Genoeses Seneses and Lucheses and all the actions of the Commonwealth seemed to be favored by a certain Genius She had lately gotten the Kingdom of Cyprus she had enlarged her Confines in Friuli by the acquisition of many Towns in the Country of Goâ—itia and she prospered greatly in all that
friendship with Caesar which was offer'd them with so much advantage to themselvs but had taken up Arms to defend and preserve for that King their Friend and Confederate the State of Milan little mindful of such a service as the usual affections of other men are seldom found amongst Princes conspires her ruine and tuâ—ns those Arms against her which through their friendship were grown so powerful in Italy What should move him thereunto Not desire of revenge for there appeared no injury Not any fear of his own affairs for he had found them already very constant unto them No self-interest for he ought to have been jealous of Caesars greatness who had been his perpetual Enemy and to have wished well unto the Venetians who had been his antient Friends But what shall I say of the rest Had not Caesar the like obligations to the Venetians as the King of France had which should have kept him from such a confederacie Nay had he not peculiar respects which counsell'd him to the contrary The injuries which the French had done to the Empire the King of France his particular hatred to him the high aspiring thoughts of that King pernicious to the dignity of the Empire and to the German liberty Wherefore as he could never promise himself safe and firm friendship from the French so be ought rather to have obviated their power then have help'd to advance it But who could have expected that such an action should have proceeded from the admired wisdom of Ferdinand King of Spain so unusual and so harmful to himself by reason of the prejudice and danger which he was to receive in not preserving the State which he had won in the Kingdom of Naples in peace and quiet For which cause the greatness of the French their fidelity and natural desire of novelty ought to have been â—â—spected by him yet he assented to the increase of their power and of his own danger But how did those generous thoughts which Pope Iulius the Second seemed to bear to the greatness and liberty of Italy correspond with his joining in confederacie with the Transaâ—pine Princes who went about to oppress her by the ruine of that Commonwealth which was confest by all men to be at that time the Maintainer of the Glory of Italy and the hope that she might again rise to her antient greatness and reputation What safety could the Apostolick Sea expect by increasing the power of those Princes in Italy who were great of themselves whom he feared and upon whose authority he foresaw the Popes of Rome must depend These certainly were such things as did transcend whatsoever could have faln into the imagination of the Venetian Senators or of any other men how wise soever Nor was the immensity of the danger less nor less able to molest and confound the minds of those who were to prepare for resistance against so great a War The King of France his Forces were of themselves very powerful that Kingdom being then more flourishing then it had been for many years before and become more formidable by the possession which the French had got of the Dukedom of Milan which afforded them mighty conveniencies to assault the Coâ—fines of the Common-wealth And though Caesars Forces were not of themselves greatly considerable yet were they increased by the fame he gave out that he led his Army into Italy to make a certain and noble prey thereof and with a mind to restore the Empire to its almost lost greatness whereby he reconciled the mindes of the German Princes and people and got them to joyn their Forces with his Moreover the King of Spains Naval preparation was in particular to be feared to prevent the which those Sea-Forces of the Commonwealth were to be imployed which should all of them have been imployed in defending the State by Land from so fierce an assault The Pope added no small reputation to the League by his authority and his Spiritual arms being accompanied with Temporal forces became the more dreadful And though the other petty Princes forces were but small yet was their will to offend the Commonwealth great and the Kings of England Poland and Hungary were sought unto and sollicited by all these together to join with them and to declare enmity to the Venetians If then the Venetians had yielded to this so new and great preparation for War which like Thunder made both its noise and harm be heard and felt at once what could have been said unto them Ought not they to have been judged worthy of excuse and their Commonwealth free from the imputation that their Orders were no ways good For as an object of immensurable force does not move but corrupt the sense so the encountring with so weighty a conspiracie was a thing not likely to incite the Commonwealth to shew her vertue but rather to disorder and to confound her Yet it is seen how she behaved herself upon such an occasion and whether it may be inferred from these her first counsels as from a thing that was in her own power that she was not worth much or that she did any thing unworthy of herself of her fame or of the reputation which she held amongst other potent Princes of that Age. What appearance was there in her of any fear or rather what greater sign could be desired in her of generous confidence and most noble daring What did she resolve to yield up of free-will What noise what complaints were heard which shewed that she would terminate that contention with vain words which could not be ended but with Arms The Answer which was given to the French Herald who came to denounce unto them that the King was upon his march in Arms against the Commonwealth was onely that that War was intimated them from the King when they had more reason to expect Amity and Peace from him but that they would not be wanting to their own defence being confident that they should be able to defend themselves by their own Forces and through the right of their cause The effects were answerable to their words for they betook themselves forthwith to provide for so great a War The most expert Commanders were sent for from all parts veteran Soldiers mustered in all places in so great numbers and so qualified as it was agreed upon by the common consent of all that neither that Age nor any other for many years before had seen such an Army of meer Italians in Italy Great and very miraculous was the union and concord both in the Senate and City wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand to assist their Country at so great a need There appeared so great a zeal in every one to the common good such resolution to maintain the state and liberty of the Commonwealth even to the last gasp as those who have appeared to be no very good friends to the Venetians in other things do praise these proceedings being forced so
to do by the power of truth But let us come to those other things which accompany the action it self The Senate upon mature advice resolved wisely how that War was to be managed they knew the enemy was very strong the danger great and that the welâ—are of the Commonwealth depended upon the preservation of that Army which they had now got together But as it would be a great rashness to hazard it upon a Battel so to keep it onely to be a safeguard to the City shewed timorousness in them would discourage their men and increase the courage and reputation of the enemy Whilst they bethought themselves what to do in this great exigencie to evade both these inconveniencies the Senate ordered their Commanders to march with their Army to those Confines of the State of Milan where the Enemy should appear to be likely to make their first assaults to the end that following their Army in near but safe quarters and that keeping them still incommodated and in jealousie and fear of being assaulted they might keep them from advancing further and from falling upon any enterprise The Commonwealths Army was very strong in Horse amounting to the number of Ten thousand and in Foot to boot with a great number of Soldiers of their own Country commanded by their own Orders they had Twelve thousand veteran Soldiers under experienced famous Commanders together with a great train of Artillery and all other instruments for War so as the Senate had reason to beleeve that they might effect their eâ—ds of maintaining the War and of keeping the field and so spinning out time as it becomes those who are upon the defensive part and find themselves to be the weaker secure their own Affairs and keep further dangers from them For it oftentimes falls out through various accidents that the greater Armies be they do so much the more easily moulder away of themselves and the Forces of many several Princes though they be at first great and formidable prove less fit for great enterprises by reason of the Colleagues different ends and interests And as learned Physitians use no strong and violent remedies when the sick party hath but some grudgings of an Ague and when the disease is not yet well known So these wise Senators were of opinion that the Commonwealth being set upon and almost opprest by the sudden violence of so many Enemies it made not for their welfare and safety to come to the violent remedy of a pitcht field with enemies whose strength was not yet very well known Together with these reasons the Venetian Senate had for their example the success of the Commonwealth of Rome which finding her self assailed by powerful Carthaginian Forces and her Affairs being reduced to a great streight preserved themselves from greater danger by drawing out the War at length and by keeping the Enemy incommodated but the Venetians had not a Fabius Maximus for their Commander in chief as the French had an Hannibal for there were many of those vertues in Lodowick King of France which were praised in Hannibal chiefly a mighty thirst after glory to purchase which he valued neither labor nor danger â—ut Alvianâ— a famous and cried up Commâ—nder not more for his own worth then for this misfortune of the Venetians was of a nature much contrary to that of Fabius in knowing how to make advantage of time and though he had many other noble qualities as greatness of spirit in undertakings undaâ—nted courage in executing what he undertook and great experience in matter of War yet were these vertues little advantagious for the present occasion better befitting a Commander who was to assist a puissant Prince desirous of glory and in his most prosperous times then a Commonwealth which not making use so much of force as of occasion was slowly but safely arrived at that greatness and which was now more then formerly to proceed by the like counsels But it may peradventure be said that the Venetian Army wanted not a Fabius having Nicolo Orsino Count of Pitigliano who in his other actions may be truly said to resemble Fabius very much for he alwaies proceeded with the slowest and safest advices but in this he appeared much different and inferior to him since he would not succour Alviano who contrary to his order had given Battel as did Fabius Maximus who readily succoured Quintus Minutius chief Commander of the Cavalry though contrary to his opinion he had rashly exposed himself and part of the Army to the danger of Battel But on the contrary Lodowick King of France was not onely like Hannibal but did much exceed him for Hannibal knew onely how to overcome but knew not how to make use of Victory having spent much time to little purpose after the rout given to the Romans at Cannae but Lodowick pursuing the Victory stopt not till he had regained all that he pretended unto from the State of Venice But the Forces of the Commonwealth did either prove less valiant and less fortunate then formerly they had done or else they were hurried by some occult cause upon this calamity Yet can it not be said that the Senates advice was less good who in their Orders to their Commanders did alwaies lay before them the importance of the business with express and particular command to shun the necessity of joyning Battel with the Enemy Those prudent Senators knew very well that that Army was not to be hazarded upon the dubious event of Battel wherein consisted all the hopes of preserving her State by Land and that the condition of affairs were such on their side that if they came to the trial of a Battel it must be upon too much disadvantage The War was made at their own doors so as if the Enemy should prove victorious the conquer'd party could not have time to rally or recruit themselves for preservation of their own affairs but if the French Army had been overcome the War would not notwithstanding be at an end the Forces of the other Colleagues remaining still intire which were likelier to be ruâ—ned by their own disorders and by the discords which use to happen in Leagues then by force of Arms which could not be made use of without danger The bad advice of some Commanders or else some fatal adversity of the Commonwealth would not permit that this advantage of time should be waited for whereupon they came to the conflict not onely contrary to the so many aforementioned respects but uppon such disadvantage as with but half their Forces they hazarded the whole Fortune of the Commonwealth How valiantly they fought is witnessed by the general consent of all men nor do the victorious Enemies deny but that the victory was a good while doubtful but a few not being able longer to resist a much greater number that notable rout ensued which drew after it so many losses and ruines For the French Forces did not more secure the way to their Army in all places
and facilitate their undertakings then did the reputation of their victory Amidst so great amazement and astonishment nothing was left unattempted by Luigi Gritti and Christofero Moro who were the Provedatori del Campo to uphold the Commonwealths fading fortune They betook themselves to rally the remainder of the Army they comforted the Captains and Soldiers with hope of better success they intreated the Nobility and people of Brescia and of other Cities that being mindful of their Loyalties and of other things done in service to the Commonwealth in former Wars had with Philip Maria Visconte they would be like themselves and with like constancy keep themselves under the moderate command of the Venetians and abhorring the severe Transalpine Dominion they would with one onely inconvenience free themselves from many grievous mischiefs But they were all so possest with a Panick fear as no entreaties nor reason could be listned unto those who had escaped the Battel were unfit either for strength or valor to attempt any thing against the Enemy no disposition to defence was found in the City no not so much as to keep themselves from plunder there were but few Forts at that time in the State and those few of no condition of holding out long What was then to be done to whom was any recourse to be had If all Princes and Countries were become Enemies who were to be trusted If all memory of former benefits were laid aside so as least gratitude was found in those who had been most obliged how could new men be raised and provisions made for a new War The armed Enemy was already at the gates nay even within their houses threatning assured ruine What was to be done in such a general dispait but to give way and suffer the cloud to pass which they saw there was neither wit nor counsel sufficient to withstand And as sometimes it falls out in greatest Tempests that the skill and labor of the Marriners being overcome by the malignity of the weather they take down their sails and suffer the ship to drive up and down whithersoever the Sea carries it So in cases of greatest danger into which States do sometimes fall he that sits at the helm must comply with his fortune be it never so bad till the fury of those tempests being past over the Commonwealth though born down yet not quite sunk may rise again and make way for her pristine greatness The Army being then to retreat and the loss of the City drawing other losses after it as one stone that gives against another it was thought the best course to free the people from their former oathes so to preserve them from sacking and plunder which they must have undergone if they should maintain their loyalties and to free themselves from the tax of rebellion if they should submit to the Enemy Such a resolution might appear willing and therefore less generous but it was really necessary prejudicial to him who doth consider meerly the present condition of things but which might prove useful in the future At first sight it appeared to proceed from rashness and fear and yet it proceeded from wisdom from charity and in respect to the good of the State and of the Subjects The piety nor prudence of the Senate could not admit of the onely hope which was offered in this sad condition of times to be used for withstanding so many enemies wherefore the Venetians did magnanimously refuse those helps and assistances which were offered them by the Turks though but little before as some writers affirm they had been very much sought unto by other Christian Princes as by Frederick of Aragon and Lodovicâ—â— Sforza for the defence of their Dominions and not long after by the Emperor Maximilian to be made use of against the Venetians but neither did the justly conceived anger against so many conspiring Princes nor the desire of recovering what was lost prevail with those most wise and religious men but that it was over-born with the zeal of Religion and with a firm resolution of preserving the glory of their other atchievements against the Infidels immaculate neither would the reason of State if well-understood considered in the example of others suffer them so to do and especially in the unfortunate success of the Emperors of Constantinople who having unadvisedly call'd in to their assistance the Ottoman Princes who were much more powerful then they had drawn a greater ruine upon themselves which proved the occasion of the fall of that Empire But being unwilling notwithstanding to give over all hopes of accommodating the afflicted condition of affairs with some ease the Senate resolved to have recourse to the Pope and to Caesar though they had then appeared their bitter Enemies to treat of some Agreement They were moved much hereunto by the respect and reverence due to that holy See and the pious and religious apprehension they had of Ecclesiastical censures to which they were subject and they trusted more in prevailing with Caesar then with the King of France For what hopes were there to do any good by intreaties with him who being first bound to the Common-wealth by obligation and confederacie had spurn'd at all those respects out of meer desire of novelties To these then they granted all that they pretended unto for being to make them quickly jealous of the King of France his greatness they knew some way would be found out for the Commonwealths better fortune But how is it possible to pass over here in silence another thing not at all differing from this by which such base aspersions have been endeavored to be cast upon the Venetians since by this our present discourse we go about to vindicate them by searching into the truth We read in Guicchiardine a Modern and to give him his due in many things an excellent Historian an Oration published by him in the name of Antonio Iustiniano sent by the Commonwealth to Caesar wherein it is said that the Venetians begging pardon at Caesars hand with much subjection and servility of mind did offer to submit the Commonwealth to be perpetually tributary to the Empire and to acknowledg to hold their liberty lives and livelihood from him with some other base unworthy expressions not only not true but not likely to be so For first it is very certain that Iustinian being sent Ambassador to Maximilian and finding him at Trent was never admitted to have audience peradventure for fear of offending the Confederates and making of them jealous Then it is most certain that the Senate gave no such Commission And let him who will not believe it listen but to reason and then he will be perswaded to the contrary The Commonwealth had then lost all her Territories by Land but at the same time she enjoyed all her State by Sea wherein were not only one or two Cities but divers Provinces and noble Kingdoms their Naval accoutrements were very great and equal if not superior to those of whatsoever
man thought of making any defence but sought how to save himself and the best things he had in the Capitol their houses and walls were abandoned and the very gates left open to the Enemy by the Roman Soldiers who fled into the City to save themselves and had not the good genius of that Commonwealth which was preserved for greater things sent Carius Camillus to succour it the rising glory of the Romans had even then been exstâ—â—ct But what shall we say of things that happened afterwards when their Fame grew greater Did not the Romans lose possession of all Italy after the rout given them by Hannibal at Cannae Did not the Cities belonging to their friends and confederates rebel every where And did not they themselves give over all hopes of defending them the resolutions taken by the Souldiers shewed what the â—â—ight what the fear of the conquered was For some whilst they were yet in their own houses rendred themselves prisoners to the Conquerors others withdrew to the Sea side intending if they could have the benefit of shipping to go to some other Prince and seek out a new Country But with what despair the Citizens of Rome were possest when they heard the news of this misfortune in how great confusion all their Orders were may be conceived by what Livy relates who undertook not onely to write the History of the Commonwealth but to celebrate with perpetual praise the fame and merit of her Citizens And it was credibly belâ—eved for as much as we hear that those valiant men unaccustomed to know what fear was were strucken with such amazement as if Hannibal had known as well how to make use of victory as he did to overcome the so great and so long continued fortune of Rome had not onely been hereby interrupted but totally supprest And these very selfâ—same Carthaginians who had so long and so stoâ—â—â—y conteâ—â—ed for glory with their rival the Commonwealth of Rome when they tasted of adverse fortune went astray from their former generosity and suffered themselves to be born down by extremity of despair for after the defeat which they had received by Sea by the Romans they inclined to yeeld up unto them the Islands of Sicily and Sardiâ—ia and to make themselves 〈◊〉 for ever to the Senate and people of Rome and afterward being overcome in Battel by Scipio Affricanus they fell to find 〈◊〉 But why do I instance in so many examples Are not these sufficient to prove that the valiantest and wisest men are strangely teâ—â—ified at great and unexpected misfortunes and that when Armies are lost which are the instruments whereby States preserve themselves from the evils of War good Counsels must cease as not able to keep off other greater evils which do usually follow after that a Battel is lost Therefore out of the above-mentioned reasons and by what hath been done by others upon like accidents every one may be cleerly satisfied that the misfortune which the State of Venice underwent by reason of the ill-fought Battel of Giaradada ought not to detract any thing from her other praises For her subsequent actions by which with singular constancie and generosity she recovered what she had lost render her by the joint consent of all men truly glorious The Fourth DISCOURSE Whether the Princes of Italy did well or no to assault the Army of Charls the Eight King of France when after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples he hasted to pass over the Mountains AMongst those things of sad remembrance to Italy the passage of Charls the Eight King of France to the Conquest of the Kingdom of Naples may be numbred amongst the saddest and most recent For ever since that time the Transalpine Nations have had a power in Italy and the greatness of the Italian name which began at that time to be raised up again with hopes of greater glory all the parts of Italy being under the command of our Italian Princes return'd to such a declination by this blow as it could never since recover its pristine majesty But that which most afflicts the minds of those who are any ways generous is to think that this most noble Country fell into such misfortunes through the fault of her own men and that the Italian Princes to satisfie their own disordinate desires and immoderate ambition did call in Forein Nations to the prejudice of Italy and little valuing the truer and greater dangers they stood basely looking on and suffer'd this their common Country to be rent in peeces by Foreiners The French Forces did at this time pass into Italy by which she had not for a long time been molested being called in by Lodovick Sforza and maintained by other Italians But ere long they were all aware of their ill-taken counsel being touched by the danger more at hand by rearon of the French-mens great felicity which as it might have been foreseen further off so was it not now so easily to be remedied They therefore joined all of them together afterwards in confederacie for the safety of Italy and to oppose King Charls his designs So as after the acquisition of Naples as he would return into France by the same way which he had come in with his Army which was notwithstanding much less numerous in men he was opposed by the Army of the confederate Princes as he came to the banks of Tarus who meant to hinder his passage and to fight his Army For a little before the Pope the King of the Romans the King of Spain the Commonwealth of Venice and the Duke of Milan had joined in confederacie to this purpose the Venetians havâ—ng been the first moâ—ioners thereof and express Ambassadors from all the aforesaid Princes had met in Venice where the League was concluded and published This resolution was at those times generally commended as being geâ—erous and suiting with the honor of Italy But notwithstanding there wanted not those then who desired they had been more moderate nor will it be now from the purpose to examine this business so to draw some secure document for times to come by a diligent examination of the things done and to know whether they were really such as deserve praise and imitation or whether there was any thing more to be desired therein For they appear to be attended with that wisdom without which no action though perchance it may have good success deserves either to be praised or imitated by wise men The taking up of Arms to drive the French out of Italy was doubtless a resolution as much to be commenped in the Italian Princes as some of them were blamed for calling of them in and others for assisting them to the common shame and prejudice But how these Arms were to be made use of against them and whether it was well done to hinder them when they were marching away and to stop their passage and force both the French and themselvâ—s to come to a Battel is somwhat a difficult case
have sent at that time more men into Italy and Monsieur d'Orleans would not have had any occasion to have possest himself of Nevara which did afterwards redound to the great prejudice of the Colleagues and particularly to the business of Naples For part of those Forces which were promised and intended to assist Ferdinand in the recovery of the Kingdom marched to the recovery of Novara out of desire whereof Lodowick Sforza did at last draw himself out of the league Whence it appears that it was rather revenge or vain-glory then any just reason which the Princes proposed unto themselves in this their confederacy that moved them to resolve upon fighting the French Army But let us now consider more particularly what of advantage what of good the Colleagues might have got if they had had the better of that Battel The best which they could hope for for all these their pains and dangers could be nothing else but the routing of those Forces which were not likely to make War any more in Italy and the Italians had as then no reason to think of any Transalpine Affairs It may be the person of the King who was then in the Army might peradventure be considerable if he had faln into the power of the Colleagues But both his life in that hurly burly was exposed to great danger and say he had been taken prisoner he might have found many waies how to eseape And say althings had faln out according to the wish of the Colleagues what would the Italians have gotten by having so great a Prisoner but the drawing upon themselves an inundation of Foreiners which would still have put them into greater troubles and dangers That warlike Nation which was at this time more then at any other devoted to their King would not have sat down by such an indignity such an injury without revenging it with their own Forces and by drawing other Transalpine Nations who wished not well to the glory of Italy especially in Military Affairs to joyn with them Let us see an example of this in what followed the next Age after where we shall find that the imprisonment of King Francis though taken by so great a Prince as was Charls the Fifth to whom none of the Princes of the League no not the whole League it self was to be compared produced nothing but longer and more heavy Wars which ended not till the conquerors had yeelded many things to the conquered But on the contrary let us imagine into what ruine Italy would have faln if the Army of the League had been routed and defeated the Enemy being in the State of Milan wherein are so many and so noble Cities for defence whereof there were no other Forces on foot then those which were to hazard themselves in that Battel and to raise another Army which might be able to make head against so powerful enemies and so victorious would be a business of some time and very hard to do if not impossible And if the very name of the French and the fame of their Forces had made the way to so great a victory easie to them and so easie the conquest of so noble a Kingdom what mischief had they not reason to expect if by the discomfeiture of that Army the Forces not onely as formerly of the Kings of Aragon should have been beaten of whole Italy and also such forein Forces as could be ready to afford any succor for in that Army were all the Soldiers that the King of Spain had in Italy So as there was not any State which upon such an accident could promise it self security Affairs then standing upon this foot who can praise the advice taken by the confederates of fighting the French But on the other side there want not other reasons to plead for the honor wisdom and maturity of the Italians in this action to boot with that noble daring which can by no means be denied them it is very likely that the flourishing condition and prosperity of Charls King of France began at that time to make him be hated and suspected not onely by all the Italian Princes but also not very acceptable to the King of 〈◊〉 insomuch as he who had called him into Italy did already repent his rash advice and he who did not withstand him blamed himself for his slackness and irresolution so as they agreed all together to abate the so great power of that King and to curb his prosperity and his thoughts of further achievements If then the King had been suffered to return without any let safe and triumphant into his Kingdom was it not to be feared that the French not content with their having got the Kingdom of Naples would pass over the Mountains the next year again with greater Forces to what danger would the Dukedom of Milan and Tuscany have been exposed upon which States it was known that the French had set their minds neither would they have spared the rest if they had had any opportunity offered them of advancing further And if the Italians should have seemed but to doubt their beating those Soldiers who were but the remainder of an Army which had first past the Mountains and â—ad left a good part of their Forces in several Garrisons in the Kingdom of Naples many whereof were likewise dissipated through several accidents what hopes had they to withstand their entire and much greater Forces with which they were to return the next year on this side the Mountains to new enterprises Nor had they any reason to despair of victory since the Colleagues had an Army for number of men much greaâ—er then the Enemy commanded by experienced and valiant Officers well provided both of Curasiers and Light horse well disposed to all actions and which were to fight with people opprest with fear and who may be said to have almost run away already of themselves especially the advantage considered which the assaiâ—aâ—ts for the most part have It was further considered that the French Army had done nothing whereby to be dreaded or to cool the courage of other men since the French had not onely not met with any occasion of fighting but had not so much as seen the face of an Enemy since the Enemy was the rather to apprehend this encounter for that it was unexpected they being accustomed to find all passages open not needing to make their way by the sword Nor was the advantage small which they might promise unto themselves by beating a victorious Army and a warlike Nation the person of so great a King being also in that Army wherefore in such a case the French-mens courage was rather to fail then to avial them And it was to be beleeved that the Enemies to that Crown would the sonner appear against them as the Emperor Maximilian Henry King of England and that Ferdinand King of Spain would continue the more firm to the Italian confederacie Then what courage or what hope of succour would those
French-men have who were left behind for the defence of the Kingdom of Naples and the City of Novara which though it were back'd with the Kings men who to this purpose kept his Army a long time together after the Battel was reduced to so great streights by the Colleagues as the King was compelled to yeed it up upon Articles to Sforza would it not soon have been taken by the sole reputation of the victoâ—y Neither would this have been an occasion of dissention as afterwards it was amongst the Colleagues and which bereft them of the chiefest advantage which that confederacie could hope for These are the Considerations which we may conceive did move those Princes to resolve upon following the French Army and to join battel with it But that which amongst such diversity of reasons seems more answerable to reason is that the Battel was not occasioned out of an absolute resolution and resolute advice but happened party out of necessity both Armies being already drawn very near and partly upon a resolution taken by the Commanders upon the very place But the Princes of the Leagues truest intention was to necessitate the King of France when he should see so great a preparation for War to be made against him to hasten his departure the more and to enforce him to draw so many more of his men from the Kâ—ngdom of Naples that so he might make his passage the surer And that the Kingdom not having sufficient Garisons to defend it might the more easily fall into the power of the Aragoneses for whom the same Colleagues were preparing a Fleet by Sea to assault it Nor was it judged by the example of things formerly past that the States of Italy were free from the insolencies of the French unless the Prâ—nces of Italy should either put themselves into a posture of War or if they should keep their Forces far distant from the way whereby the King was to return for France since in his former passage to the enterprise of Naples though he was more necessitated to make hast and haâ— greater need of making himself Friends more by favor then by force he had notwithstanding used strange novelties in Tuscany which the Florentines did much â—esent And who could have ascertained that he would not do the lâ—ke in his return in all other parts where meeting with no obstacle he might meet with opportunity of pleasing himself or procuring any thing of advantage The Colleagues seeking to provide for these mischiefs rather to shun new inconveniencies then endeavor to repair their past losses they thought it the best course that their Army should follow that of the Kings so to keep him in perpetual jealousie and suspition and hinder him if he should make any attempt hoping likewise as they had like to have done that this was the way to make the King come to some good agreement with them which had been often endeavored and not without hopes of good success even when the Camps were very near together But the Colleagues incited either by the Armies being so near together by the desire of glory or hope of victory or perchance being inforc'd so to do as it usually falls out when the Enemies Army is reduced to straight passages they fought the French the Commanders of the Leaguâ—s Army were then to have considered that they had more reason to hope for victorie then to fear loss in that daies fight as the effect did in part prove it being the common opinion that had not their own men been put into great disorder by their own light-horse who fell too soon to pillage the Enemies Camp they would have had a full and glorious victory But though the business should have succeeded otherwise they knew the state of affairs to be such as the victory oâ— the Kings behalf could not occasion them those great mischiefs which upon such an occasion have been considered the Kings Forces not being so great when most entire much less being much weakened by the conflict as could prove very formidable Such like events may teach us not to attempt such things in which it is hard to resolve and wherein the profit which may accrue is very doubtful nor to bring our selves to such a condition as the necessity of putting on another resolve bereaves us of choice Nor will it be a less useful precept for Princes to have a great care and to be very well advised in chusing their Commanders which are to have the chief imployment in great enterprises for if their nature and customs be not conformable to the thoughts and intentions of the Prince it is in vain to give them any Instructions or Commissions for oft-times a resolution is to be put on upon the main concern wherein a mans natural inclinations may prevail over whatsoever strict command which the Commonwealth of Venice had experience of particularly in this daies fight in the Marquis of Mantua and some years after with much more danger and damage in Bartholomiâ— d' Alviano at the Battel of Giaradada in both which personages natural ardor and too vehement a desire of glory prevailed over the Senates wise and moderate counsels The Fifth DISCOURSE Whether or no the Forces of Leagues be fit for great Enterprises AMongst those things which fall into discourse when people talk of weighty State Affairs and of War enterprises one and a chief one is that of Leagues and Confederacies in which divers Potentates do joyn either out of some particular design of their own or for their better securitie or to abate the power of others And the weakness of Potentates who are wanting in the antient military worth and discipline hath been the occasion why we read of more examples of such unions in these latter times then we have heard of formerly So as now adaies as also in some later times past when any great enterprise is debated upon recourse is forthwith had to Leagues by means and vertue whereof it is usually thought that greater ends may be compassed then can be hoped for from the peculiar power and vertue of any one onely State and chiefly to curb and keep under those Forces which do threaten whole Christendom with most danger and damage Those who speak in the behalf of these Leagues and who heighten the hopes thereof use these or the like reasons First because reason natures self doth teach us that the multiplication of the force and vertue of the movers makes the motion the greater and more powerful and that power and perfection which in humane affairs is denied to one alone is easily found amongst many There is hardâ—y any one so weak or so little befriended by the gifts of nature or fortune who may not be some help to another by adding that little which he hath to the much more of the others This is the cause why in humane actions and especially in such as are of the nobler sort the perfectest are those which are most compounded The best
harmonie is composed of differing â—ones of Vâ—yces The perfectest State Governments alwaies provided that they be essential and not meer Idea's are those which being composed of the Three best do comprehend the perfections of all the Three and it is easie to observe the like in many other things And Aristotle when he would shew the perfection which proceeds in every thing from this concourse and union of many doth instance in the example well known in those times of publick banquets and entertainments where those wherein many were imployed some in one thing some in another proved more noble and sumptuous then those which were made by any one onely though never so wealthy Citizen Let us then gather by this that such Forces likewise wherein several Potentates do concur for some noble and important action where every one lends his assistance and advice will be fitter to atchieve any great enterprise then those of one onely though never so great a Prince In War there are several Offices and several imployments whereunto we see that one Nâ—tion is not so proper be it either by reason of the several influences of the Heavens or through custom which is a second nature as is another So in this mistery of War several people prove proper for several imployments In pitcht Battels the Dutch and Switzers have exceeded others and have purchast most fame The Italians have been alwaies esteemed for making assaults and storming of Cities and the Spainards are held better then others at defending a strong hold by reason of their undergoing labor and disquiet and for their dexteritie in military actions Others are better at Horse-service then on foot as the French others are good at Seafaring and at Maritiâ—e Discipline as the Genâ—â—ses Pâ—â—tugeses and Venetians and others have been pâ—â—ticularly addicted to other exercises So as those who are able to imploy several people and several Forces as Leagues may do especially if they be made between puissant Princes may have great designs for they shall have wherewith to offend and defend both by Land and Sea and numbers enough of Soldiers â—it to undertake and accomplish whatsoever Enterprise But besides this many things are requisite for the maintaining a long War Arms Ammunition Victuals Money and other things the which no one State can sufficiently furnish at least not without much incommodity for any long time but where many joyâ— together and every one furnisheth somewhat which they most aboâ—nd in the enterprise is sâ—â—e not to be impeded nor retarded for want of any thing nor for the difficulties which are occasioned thereby Moreover for great enterprises as they cannot be so soon effected so are they subject to the hazard of ill success when they depend upon one onely Commander who when he is lost there is never another of equal authority valor and experience left to succeed him for there are but few of those that are fit for much pains-taking and for management of great affairs Insomuch as that State is very happy which in more then one Age meets with a generous and warlike Prince and that Prince is very fortunate who when he will not follow the Wars in his own person hath a Subject of his so qualified as becomes him to be who is to command an Army when the War is difficult and of importance which is the cause why we often-times see great enterprises which are weâ—â— begun precipitate into great disorders and ruines The death of Alexander the Great without any legitimate Heirs fit to undertake the Government of such an Empire and of so weighty affairs kept the Macedonians and Grecians of which two Nations his valiant and unconquered Army did consist from following his prosperous course and from conquering the Well as he had done the East and which whilst he was alive he had proposed to himself to do The Carthaginians chiefest ruine arose from the want of Commanders for having placed their hopes in one onely Hannibal they were forced to send for him back out of Italy to defend themselves in Africa against Scipio and his fortune forgoing him when he was beaten they knew not whom to betake themselves unto to uphold their tottering Commonwealth But in Leagues there is no such hazard run since the best Commanders that are in any of the Confederate Princes States may be imploied and the Princes themselves may serve upon an urgent occasion so as one Commander being lost another may be found to succeed him of as great excellency and worth For every State hath usually in all Ages had some one man more eminent then the rest unto whom is greatest extremities they have recourse So as a League if we suppose it to be like a well Fabrickt humane body may since it hath the strength of many Dominions united in it be resembled to Briarâ—â—â— for strength for as he had a hundred hands to make use of as he pleased in several actions so many do lend help to such a League and make it stronger and fitter for any undertaking Moreover when we have to do with a very powerful Prince as it falls out in great Enterprises if we will weaken his strength we may endeavor chiefly to keep his forces divided and imploied in several parts for so they are lessened and become less apt to make resistance but as this will be hard for a single Prince to do though a great one for he who will drive another man from his own home must be much stronger then be so is it more easily done when many are confedrates together and this not onely because several â—orces joyned together prove the greater as hath been said and several Armies abounding with all things necessary may be thereout framed but for the commoâ—iousness which several confederate States have of assaulting the Enemies Country at one and the same time in several parts Wherefore when any great and difficult enterprise was to be undertaken not to speak of antient times but of more modren ones against the Saracens and the Turks two Nations which have governed and domineered in these latter times with great fame and force recourse was had to Leagues to Câ—â—sadas and to the unions of Christian Princes by means whereof notable things have been done against those cruel Barbarians How many Princes how many several Nations join'd together in the time of Pope Urban the Second for the recovery of the Holy Land About Fifty thousand fighting men were raised commanded in chief by Godfrey of Bullen who gained so many and so famous Victories and so worthy of eternal glory this holy League having regained more then a hundred Cities in Asia which were possest by the Saracens And in the tâ—me of Baldwin the Third King of Ierusalem when the Emperor Conradus and Lodowick King of France joining together with other lesser Princes went themselves in person against the said Saracens did not they do excellent exploâ—ts though couzened and be rayed by some Lords of Asia they could not continue
on their enterprise with like success as at the first And hath not this last Age seen one of the most signal and illustrious Naval victories that was ever heard of which was the fight at Lepanto which was won from the Turks by the League of the Christian Princes But let us add somewhat more in pursuit of our former considerations Greatest enterprises though happily begun are oft-times left imperfect when they depend upon the Forces of one only Prince for the rest of his neighboring Princes either out of envy or fear of his greater prosperity take up Arms against him to make him give over the hopes of further acquisitions and bethink himself of defending his home-affairs and to keep the scales more equal between him and his neighbors and to take away the jealousies of State which are of all other things most dangerous and whereof we have infinite examples But when a weighty War is to be undertaken by the Forces of many Joint-Potentates this suspiâ—ion ceases for Leagues are usually made with other Princes and neighboring States or with such as are concern'd in common interest And this Amity or Confederacie doth not only secure those States with whom the Confederacie is contracted so as the one fears not the other but it preserves each of them from the injuries that any may go about to do to any of the Confederates For one State supporting another by reason of their convention things are so well and stoutly govern'd as People not being able to worst them keep from molesting them knowing that by offending any one Confederate they shall draw upon them the Forces of all the rest and hasten their own ruine Every one of these Princes may then by reason of their strait conjunction and confederacie with others more boldly and more resolutely undertake and accomplish any whatsoever enterprise without danger of being diverted by any particular interest of his own And all these Considerations are better confirm'd by many notable examples Greece was assaulted by Xerxes that powerful Prince of Persia with an infinite number of men both by Sea and Land almost all the several People of that Province united and confederâ—ted together against this so great a warlike power And such was the efficacie of this unâ—on as that though one only Greece was to withstand the Forces of almost all the Eastern Nations who were flock'd together to that enterprise but still under the Imperial command and conduct of one and the same King Xerxes they did not only make their part good but repulsed so puissant an Enemy much to his own prejudice The associate War which happâ—ned in the time of Marius and Sylla wherein many Associates and Confederates of the Romans did conspiâ—e together against the Commonwealth of Rome though the Confederates were all of them but weak people as the Maruceni Vestini Samnites Lucans and other of their neighbors yet was this War held one of the most dangerous that the people of Rome did ever sustain For these people had join'd themselves together with much fervor to revenge themselves of the Roman Nobility who had first promised them and then denied them the liberty of being Citizens of Rome And in these later Ages whole Germany having confederated together against the Emperor Charls the Fifth was able to raise so numerous an Army though all the German Princes did not concur therein as did much perplex and endanger Charls Which examples prove what many Forces though weaker being taken apart can do when join'd together against one potent Prince These then may seem sufficient reasons and examples to ground a favorable conclusion in the behalf of Leagues and to make them be held a strong and powerful means to order great enterprises by and to bring them to a good end Yet there be many good Considerations which may be alleadged on the contrary part so as he who shall mind realities and not what the magnificencie of name or preparations do promise will doubt much whether these Leagues and Confederacies do really prove what they appear to be It is most certain that as the truest perfection consists in union and that whatsoever will partake of that must be reduced to this so may all our humane actions prove the more successful and perfect the more reducible they are to this unity and if it happen to some sometimes otherwise it is because those some are not capable thereof either of themselves or because their corrupted customs will not suffer them so to be But it is not to be denied but that in all humane actions chiefly such wherein great affairs are concern'd and more chiefly in matters of War after mature advice taken sudden execution is requisite and that it is necessary to reduce all things as much as may be to this unity So as the soveraign authority consist in one only and not in many for the multiplicity of those that concur especially by way of pâ—rity in the same action doth not help but rather disorder and confound Then look how much harder it is to reduce things to an unity in a League the less gallant do they prove and less fit for prosecution of great affairs For they contain and almost naturally such contrarieties as must occasion the sudden corruption thereof Several are the thoughts of several men the customs of Nations different and which in this case is of most importance the counsels and resolutions by which confederate Princes govern themselves do not only differ but are for the most part contrary according as State-jealousies are apt to breed occasion of falling out The powerful desire after Rule never suffers right to be known nor people to be there with contented It is therefore to be observed that in all Ages the greatest and most signal actions in War have been done and accomplish'd by the worth and prosperity of one only Prince or at least of one sole Potentate with a series of divers Princes and Captains who have commanded therein Alexander the Great the Commonwealth of Rome Charls the Great and in these latter time the Ottoman Empire not to mention many others who have been great and potent though not altogether so highly cry'd up did all of them arise to that height of glory and power by the power and worth of one only Command with the true and proper military discipline of each of them and under the conduct of one and the same Principality On the contrary Leagues shew their weakness at the very first sight For company and multiplâ—city denotes always imperfection and in this particular makes it be known that those things which a Prince or a Commonwealth cannot by reason of their weakness do of themselves and by their own Forces they seek to effect it by the company and help of others Wherefore as it hath been said in this respect Leagues have been more frequently used in these latter Ages then of old â—or many Princes and States are failing in military worth and courage and
endeavors as that all the Colleagues may have the same intentions in preserving it What greater reason can one Prince have to promise unto himself the continuance of friendship and fidelity from another then had the Commonwealth of Venice to expect first from Lewis the Twelfth and then from Francis the First both of them Kings of France Since to keep from any waies violating the friendship and conjunction which she held with the former she drew upon her the Forces of Maximilian the Emperor and exposed her State to so much labor and danger and did so long maintain a great part of the expence of a weighty War first to free the Seconds own person from Prison and then his Sons yet as usually affection prevails more in the minds of Princes then common reason or justice by which private persons govern themselves Lewis breaking off his antient Capitulation which he held with the Commonwealth was a great means to make all the Princes of Europe conspire against her and France as soon as he had made what advantage he could by the agreement laying aside all other respects made peace for himself alone with the Emperor leaving the Common-wealth exposed to great toil and danger of War So as when any stedfastness is found in any Colleague all that is to be said is That as he that doth observe 〈◊〉 deserves to be praised for his fidelitie so â—e that doth rely too much thereupon is not to be much commended for câ—vil wisdom But it may be moreover considered that many times the Colleagues began to square but badly in the very beginning of their agreement which tends much to the prejudice of the common interest Whilst the last League against Selinus the Turkish Emperor was in treaty and when it was so high time to relieve Cyprus it was long and importunately argued in Rome where they were first to imploy the Forces of the League and some of the Spanish Ministers were so blinded with their particular interest as they propounded and stifly maintain'd it to the very great prejudice and loss of time that as soon as the League should be fully agreed upon the Forces thereof should march to the Sea-coasts of Africa to take in such places as they thought might make most for the advantage of Spain not weighing that whilst they should leave their Enemies powerful with the Fleet safe and entire in the Levant it was very vainly done to think of getâ—ing such things which though they should succeed well must be to no purpose and must quâ—ckly prove unfortunate as experience shewed afterwards and which reason could not perswade before But if these peculiar respects be at first concealed they break forth in the process of time and work sometime worser effects in such of the Colleagues as are either weakest or do confide most in the Confederacie Ferdinand King of Spain though falling off from the other Colleagues he joined with great offers and protâ—stations with the Commonwealth of Venice yet when the City of Brescia was recovered he would keep it for himself and appropriate the first fruit of victory to himself which by the former and by renewed capitulations was destin'd to others Pope Clement the Sevenâ—h the Commonwealth of Venice and the Duke of Milan join'd together in League against Caesar but their ends were if not apparently contrary at least intrinsecally different The King of France desired by all means to free the Crown of France from some prejudice which he had done it by the former agreement with Caesar and to set his Sons at liberty who were left with him in nature of Hostages But on the contrary the other Confederates chief endeavour was to take the Dukedom of Milan from Caesar and to secure Italy from his power The enterprise was begun with prosperous success the Italian Princes doing readily what became them but the King of France when he knew how to obtain his ends by another way and began to suspect the Colleagues constancie did neither make War on the other side the Mountains nor did he send his Forces into Italy as he was bound to do Whereupon the League which was made with great preparation with good beginning and better hopes ended in an agreement which was voluntary and advantagious on the Kings behalf by the recovery of his Children but inforced and not over-secure on the behalf of the other Colleagues who fell short of thâ—ir conceived hopes being abandoned by their Friend and Confederate the King To know then the truth amidst this diversity of reasons and examples we must distinguish and consider apart for what occasions and with what respects every League is made what the end therein proposed is and upon what terms and conditions it is concluded for by these particulars we may the better know what good or bad may be expected by joyning together in League and whether the League be likely to be of short or of long duration Sometimes Leagues are made by Princes or Popularities out of necessary defence and to provide opportunely for their own safeties the Confederates obliging themselves by particular and stated obligations to defend each others State when they shall be assaulted by any others from without And such Leagues as these have proved profitable as having respect to the preservation of Peace and to a certain and honest end and whilst nothing but the common interest is treated of so as they have all the same object as well in maintaining as in making the Confederacie The Confederacie made between the Pope the King of Naples the Commonwealth of Florence the Duke of Milan and other lesser Italian Princes did long preserve the Peace of Italy and was for a while very advantagious for the Colleagues for the only drift thereof was to constitute some assured bounds to every of their powers and to settle them in a just temperature making the Confederates thereby the stronger and more able to withstand any one that should attempt any thing against them Sometimes again Leagues are made for more necessary self-defence and which must suddenly be actuated to wit when a State is assaulted by one more powerful and that the neighboring Princes lest themselves might suffer if they should permit a neighboring power to grow too great by the ruine of that State do take up Arms jointly for the defence thereof in whose defence they know their own safeties are concerned since they might soon incur the like danger if they should not keep him at a further distance from the others home And such a League may also at first do gallant and memorable things if it so fall out that the condition of affairs being altered in the same League and the Colleagues interests becoming different they will advance further with those Forces and with more full intentions to ruine that Foe-Potentate and take occasion by joining in League to increase in State and power When these respects and their contraries already hanâ—led are considered these Leagues do usually lose
all their efficacie since they fail in their chiefest and surest ground-work when the truest conjunction fails which is that of Princes minds thoughts and designs whence conformable actions and such as are of great efficacie and worth do arise Almost all the People of Greece join'd together to defend themselves against Xerxes his Forces a mighty King of Persia who came to assault them with an innumerable Army and they got that famous Victory by Sea at Salamis which furnish'd them at the same time with prosperous successes at Land where they put the same King to flight And Greece was preserved at that time by vertue of that League from so great a danger against which it appeared almost impossible that she could defend herself So likewise in these latter times the Pope and Philip King of Spain join'd with the Commonwealth of Venice in defence of the Kingdom of Cyprus to whom that Kingdom as part of her Territories did chiefly belong when it was assaulted by powerful Turkish Forces and having put together a powerful and numerous Navy they bore away that famous and singular Victory which will be celebrated in all Ages the Turkish Forces were routed and shattered at Sea and their honor and courage lessened But when all this was done what other thing did the victorious Grecians answerable to the hopâ—s which were expected from that their so greaâ— Victory the whole fruit whereof at their reurn home ended in the dividing of the booty So also the Christian League by Sea did not only spend the rest of that Autumn a fit time for any enterprise which they could have undertaken after the honor they had won in the aforesaid Victory in dividing the prey and in other matters of small moment but also spent all the next enâ—uing Spring and Summer idly without being able so much as to keep together so to keep the Enemy from recruiting to the great notable and woful example of what we are now in treaty of and to shew that the Forces of Leagues are weak though made between potent Princes The purchase which is got or which is hoped for cannot be so equally divided and agreed upon but that some of the Confederate Princes will happen to have a greater share then the rest and every increase bâ— it â—â—'r so little doth easily cause jealousie or at least envy in the rest Almost all the Potentates of Europe convened together in the famous League of Cambray against the Commonwealth of Venice allured by the hopes of being able to divide her noble rich and flourishing State which was so much a more prevailing object in the minds of the confederate Princes to make them endeavor by their joynt Forces to suppress the Commonwealth and bereave her of all her riches But as soon as the Colleagues first design began to discover themselves and begot jealousies and suspition amongst them insomuch as the very same Princes who had conspired together to ruine the Commonwealth did soon assist and succor her being become bitterer Enemies one to another and amongst themselves each others greatness becoming formidable and hateful to their companions then they had been before out of the same reason to the Venetians against whom they had joyntly taken up Arms. It was not hard though not very reasonable for Lodowick King of France and Ferdinand King of Spain being blinded with the same desire of enlarging their Territories to joyn together in driving the Aragonians from out the Kingdom of Naples but afterwards they did as easily disagree touching the dividing of what they had got So as the League might help to bereave others of that Kingdom but other Forces were requisite for the appropriation of it to ones self and thereunto the proper and peculiar vertue of the Militia and of good counsel was likewise required Leagues use likewise to prove advantageous when many Potentates take up Arms against one new Prince who is yet but weak and not well setled in his State as was seen by the example of the League made by the Princes of Italy against the Scalligers and certain other petty Lords or Tyrants for Leagues being of some validity in their beginning and not meeting with any stout resistance may at the very first effort have ruined the Enemy against whom such Legues were made but when they have to do with a Potentate of esteem though he be inferior of himself to the power of the Colleagues they have not produced any great effects as may be known by divers confederacies made by the Princes of Italy against the Commonwealth of Venice against which as being become formidable to them all though all Italy hath more then once taken up Arms yet she hath been able to defend herself against such forces for the first Efforts being withstood the rest proved less difficult by reason of the usual weakness which Leagues are soon reduced unto And it might have succeeded so with her likewise in the times of greater danger in the Leagues of Cambray had not Alviano with his unseasonable resolution of immaturely hastning on the the Battel drawn that ruin upon the Commonwealth which she might easily have escaped by temporising and the League have been dissolved thereupon as it was not long after Now by reassuming all these considerations these general and true Conclusions may be thereout asserted that Leagues may prove beneficial either when they aim simply at defence and at the maintaining of Peace by the reputation of such an union or when one that is not able to defend himself by his own particular Forces is actually assaulted by one that is more powerful then he and whom he is not able to resist of himself For if no other good be got by such unions yet the business is spun out the longer and there may be a way sound out to deviate imminent ruine by diversion But he who will conside too much upon such Unions or be less diligent in negotiating those Affairs which of himself he is not able to do will soon finde he is deceived nay if he be not the more cautious and circumspect he may become a prey as well to him who appears to be his friend as to his formally declared enemies Whence it is inferr'd that to make Leagues out of a meer and voluntary election of increasing Territories is very uncertain and falacious yet may prove good if many who be strong and powerful joyn against one that is weak but at last the fire is greater which breaks out amongst the Colleagues themselves then that which they carried home to another mans house But that a State which is already grown great and powerful may be opprest by the strength of Leagues unless it begin first to totter by reason of its internal disorders from what the experience of so many past passages teacheth and from reason which is corroborated by custom is a thing which no man ought to promise to himself unless he delight in flattering himself with vain and prejudical
easiness wherewith they were done can walk hand in hand with those of the Antients amongst whom we see one only Alexander one Pompey one Caesar to have subjugated many entire Provinces and conquered many Nations And not to go further in search of the like examples since one Age alone very neer this of ours can easily furnish us with them Were not the Emperor Charls the Fifth Francis the First King of France and if will pass by the errors of Religion Sultan Solyman Emperor of the Turks Princes great and valiant in all acceptations in whom so many endowments both of Nature and Fortune did concur as hardly any thing remained to be desired in any of them to make and constitute a potent Prince and an excellent Commander fit to undertake any action how great or difficult soever What was it that Charls with his undaunted and dreadless spirit did not undertake Who was ever known to be more ambitious of praise and military honor then Francis never weary nor satisfied with toiling in Arms and in leading Armies Solyman was so fervently bent upon purchasing glory in the Waâ—s as his age though very great was not able to asswage it for he dyed in the Field amongst Soldiers when he was eighty four years old These great Princes were so puissant and so remarkable for the number to Soldiers which they led to Battel for military Discipline and for all that belonged to War as their Age had no cause to wonder at nor to envy any preceding times which were famousest for such affairs Yet he who shall particularly examine their actions will find they come far short of the famous acts of the Antients and that they correspond not with the fame and opinion of such Princes and of such Forces For if we we shall consider the deeds of those few aforesaid not to mention so many others what and how many were the things done by Alexander the Great who having in so short time vanquish'd the powerful Persian Empire victoriously overran the whole East and made the terror of his wâ—apons known to People almost unknown till then and yet died whilst he was very young How many Cities and Provinces did Pompey and Caesar bring under the Roman Empire The first conquered and subjugated Pontus Armenia Cappadocia Media Hiberia Syria Cylicia Mesopotamia Arabia and Iudaea things which though done seem incredible And the other though he did not overrun so great a space of Land did no less admired things if we will regard the condition of the conquered He quell'd the warlike Switzers French and Dutch and made so many and so fortunate expeditions as by his means only above eight hundred Cities were brought under the Government of Rome What can be alleadged on the behalf of these modern Princes which may compare with these for military glory Charls the Emperor led sundry times puissant Armies upon several undertakings but what was the fruit that he reaped by his most famous Expeditions The greatest and most victorious Army which he ever put together was that wherewith he withstood Solyman when he came to assault â—ustria yet he never departed with it from before the walls of Vienna so as all the Trophy of Victory which he got there for so much expence and labor was only not being overcome for his Army never saw the Enemies face The Wars of Germany were very difficult in this behalf yet therein he contended not with any Prince whose Forces were of themselves equal to his nor were they made out of election or hope of glory by new acquirements but out of necessity and for the defence as well of his own person as of the Empire and all the good he got thereby was only the restoring the affairs of the Crown to the former condition so as the Empires authority might not be lessened The Wars made so long between Charls the Emperor and Francis King of France with no less hatred then force did oftentimes weary both their Armies but though Caesar had several times the better yet at last the power of France was not diminished nor the greatness of Charls his command made any whit the larger so as he was master of so many and so ample States rather by his right of inheritance then by means of War thâ— enterprises of Tunis and Algier in Africa might have some greater appearance of generosity the business being very difficult and attempted with great courage and much danger and wherein the glory appeared to be more then the advantage yet the unhappy success of the one did much lessen the honor and praise won by the other and these undertakings did finally produce no greater effects then the acquisition of one or two Cities and those none of the chiefest of Africa whereas one onely Scipio subdued Carthage the Head of so great an Empire and brought all those Regions under the Roman Eagles The Acts done by Solyman were somewhat greater then these but not to be compared to those of old nor peradventure will they appear to be very famous if we shall consider his power and the long time that he lived Emperor He consumed much time and many men in Hungaria making many expeditions against it and yet got but one part thereof which was none of the greatest Provinces neither He wan the Island of Rhodes but what glory could redound to so mighty a Prince by overcoming a few Knights who were weak of themselves and who were not succoured by others And yet he was therein assisted more by fraud then by force He past with his Army into Persia but though he might say with Caesar venâ— vidi yet could he not add vici for as he with great celerity over ran a great part of the Persian Empire and came to the City of Taâ—ris so not being able to fix in any place or establish any conquest he retreated to within his own Confines having lest the greatest part and the best of his men in the Enemies Country routed and defeated by divers accidents These things then and many other the like give just occasion of wonder and incite curious wits to search out the truest causes of such diversity of successes Amongst which nay in the primary place the different means of warfaring in those times and in these may come into consideration wherein if we come to more particulars we shall meet with the use of Forts and Strong Holds which are become more frequent in these our Ages then they were in former times the art of building being doubtlesly in greater perfection with us then it was with them There is hardly any State or Country now adaies wherein there are not many Towns and Cities either assisted by natural situation or else by art reduced to much safety by many inventions found out by modern Professors of Fortification so as almost every place is so fortified as it is able to hold out with a few men against many and he who will in these times enter into another
with such expence and with the loss of so many men only to retain and keep some Territories This was the tree from which the boughs or sprouts could not be so fast cut off but that one War soon succeeded another wherewith Italy was long perplex'd till in the year 1529. the Princes being tyred and the People ruin'd agreement was made in that famous Meeting at Bolognia in which so sound foundations of the peace and quiet of Italy were laid as they may almost be said to have continued till now with fair hopes of longer continuance For though fâ—r thus many years there have been some commotiens in Italy made both by her own Inhabitants and by Foreiners yet in respect of the calamities she underwent in those former Ages they may rather be termed uprores then wars This condition of affairs and of affectionâ— being changed and the materials being removed by which the fire of war was fed Italy remained in great tranquility Soon after this introduction of Peace the Statâ— of Milan by the immaâ—ure death of Francisco Sfâ—rza who left no issue behind â—im fell into the power of Charls the Emperor and afterwards into his son Philip's in which Princes no such respect concurr'd as lately have been mentioned whereby the peace of Italy might be troubled as it had been before For these Princes by reason of their other great possessions being peacefully Masters of so fair and noble a part of Italy as is the Kingdom of Naples and Dukedom of Milan they had no reason to trouble the peaceful condition of affairs either out of any apprehension of their own businesses or out of a desire to enjoy what appertained to others They were treed from fear not onely by the friendship solemnly established and ratified by the other Portentâ—tes of Italy but much more by their own power and greatness and thâ— knowledge that to intreach upon one might easily move all the rest and afford occasion of bringing â—orein Forces into Italy whereby to disturb â—heir own setled possession of so large and nobe a share â—hereof kept thâ—m from dreaming upon the possessing of other mens estates So likewise the Commonwealth of Venice was at this time in such a condition as being only to covet peace she might hope to injoy it safely because she was neither so great nor powerful as to hope after new acquisitions being counterpoised by greater Forces in Italy who upon the least discovery in her of taking up Arms would oppose her and not suffer hâ—r to increase to their prejudice neither was she yet so weak as she might dread being easiâ—y opprest by others so as to secure herself from such a danger she might be constrained to think upon novelties or to procure new friends The Câ—uâ—ch Territories being secured no less by the reverence due to religion then by force of Arms remained safe and quiet nor had the Popes any reason either to fear their own affairs not yet to desire a greater temporal â—â—state for having recovered many Cities which the Church had formerly lost discords being ceased and the faction wherewâ—th she had been troubled beâ—ng almost eâ—â—inguished and the authority of the Barons of Rome being moderated that holy See was in a condition of as great dignitie and safety as she had been at any time before and Duke Cosâ—o de Medici Duke of Florence being allied to the favor and friendship of a potent Prince wherein he was very fortunate was safe enough and being likewise a new Prince in â—uscany he was to think as he wisely did rather how to setle himself well in his noble Dominon then to dream of becoming the Author of new Wars and of increasing his State Hence it was that the Forces of these greater Potenrates being ballanced and theit thoughts tempered all occasions of making any great change or alteration of States in her was taken away such as had hapned in the former Ages through the commotions of the very Princes of Italy As for such dangers as might happen from abroad Italy was at this time secured by various accidents If wâ— shall first consider the Empire from whence her greatest troubles had often tâ—mies come those Emperors knew very well by what had succeeded to Charls in the Imperial dignity that they had not Forces sufficient wherewith to betake themselves to forein enterprises out of any particular interest or ambition without the help of Germany which was but little inclined to increase their power and authority But though the moderate minds of those Princes which was alwaâ—es inclined to Justice and Equity must be greatly praised the eminent danger their States lay in by reason of the Turks Forces was above all other things able to keep them from thinking of molesting other mens States which Turks being so near and so powerful neighbors have kept them busied and molested and in a condition of thinking rather how to secure their own affairs then to increase their fortune by new acquisiâ—ons not onely when they were forced to take up Arms for the defence of Hungary and Austria but even in time of peace and greatest security The French I must confess have been more intent to trouble the peace of Italy on which they had a long time set their minds out of a desire to get some footing there But though the Forces of that flourishing and powerful Kingdom were very formidable before these Civil Discords yet experience hath shewed that their attempts when they have had none to receive and to uphold them in Italy have caused more dread then damage for their Armies being to be furnished with all necessaries from a far off they have been overcome by weaker â—orces and oft-times by their own wants Therefore because in these later times when they past over the Mountains they were not conâ—ederate as formerly they had been with any great Potentate in Italy therefore have they been able to â—arry there but a while nor have they made the noise of their Trumpets be heard a far off though they havenever let 〈◊〉 any occasion out of a desire of Novelty and glory so as all those who have at any time been ill satisfied by the Imperiâ—lists and then by the Spainards have been easily received into friendship with them This was the defence of Sieâ—na imbraced a City opprest by the severe Government of Caesars Officers Thus were the Ferneâ—s taken into protection to keep them in their possession of Parma and Piacenza out of which the Emperor would have driven them Thus was the Prince of Salerno listned unto who by his favor and the insurrection of the people furthered the hopes of great acquisitions in the Kingdom of Naples Thus Paul the Fourth met with good correspondencie in Henry King of France as soon as he discovered himself to be ill affected towards Caesar and that he would take up Arms against him for he hoped to attain those things by the friendship and conjunction of a powerful Prince and one who according
to his desire was apt to commotions wherein he had had but ill success at the same time in Italy by reason of the weak assistance of the Senesi but all this while and upon all these ocasions it may be truly affirmed that these were rather Tumults then Wars which as hath been said was occasioned chiefly for that such a disposition of mind and of affairs was found in the Princes of Italy as they did not much â—or all at a time interess themselves in these Wars And though some of the Popes did busie themselves therein yet since these Wars were not treated of as any thing belonging to the Church or immediately appertaining to the Apostolick See they were neither favored by the other Princes of Italy nor yet imbraced by the succeeding Popes with the same thoughts because their ends nor interests were not the same nay they did rather endeavor to appease then to foment them And those who were the raisers and furtherers of these novelties and of the coming of forein Forces being weak of themselves and not being seconded by any they could not long make good the War not having sufficient Forces of themselves nor being able to make such use of the Transaâ—â—â—ne Forces but that they were exceeded by those who opposed them and who were of greater force and friendship in Italy as was particularly seen in the Wars of Sienna which lasted longest and were the forest that happened in these latter times For the â—rench having no other receptacle in Italy then what was given them by the Senest who had called them in and being stoutly opposed by Charls the Emperor who was stronger by reason of the many opportune aids which he received from the Duke of Florence they could not long continue not fiâ— their abode in Italy In which occurrences the State of Venice may justly challenge no smal share of commendation For that notwithstanding the so many offers and pressures made unto her to take up Arms and to make use of such occasions as presented themselves to augment her fortune she notwithstanding with less aspiring thoughts but certainly with very wise and safe advice continuing in her newtrality did rather endeavor by her many good offices to withdraw fewel from the fire which had already burst forth in Italy then to make it flame the higher by intereâ—â—ing herself therein and by joyning with either party Whereby she did not undoubtedly advantage herself onely but whole Italy where she being one of the chief Potentates by keeping quiet and newrer not inclining to either party was the reason why the Imperial and French Forces counterpoising each other could not effect any of their designs which might have proved prejudicial to the liberty and peace of Italy Hence then it ensues that the best advice for the preservation of this peace and quiet of Italy is to keep affairs so equally ballanced as that the Princes who have Dominions there may neither have reason of fear nor of ambition which as hath been said have in former times been cause of her perturbances In which happy condition she will still continue if the Princes of Italy shall know so to moderate their desires and keep themselves so closely annexed together by an union of mind and by good intelligence that the one may not fear the other for any desire of novelty which may be found in them nor discover themselves to be so weak by their divisions as out of the easiness of the prey ambition may move others to aspire after their States The Eâ—ghth DISCOURSE Whether Citadelâ— and Strong Holds much used by our modern Princes be commodious and of true safety to a State or no FOrts and strong Holds are of late grown into so great esteem as Princes seem now adaies to mind nothing more then these for the security of their States Yet this business may admit of such various considerations as it is not peradventure easie to be discerned whether a Prince that is thus advised be in the right way to effect that which he propounds unto himself which is the securing of his affairs To know then what ought truly to be thought in this case we must first consider what this art of Fortification is of it self on which so much study and expence is bestowed and whether it be grounded upon such undeniable principles and reasons as by means thereof the benefit at which it aims of preserving Cities and States in safety may be expected from it Certainly this first consideration admits of no â— smal doubt or difficultie for we are taught by modern experâ—ence that all the waies whereby a strong Hold may be assaulted and takeâ— are not yet so well known as being reduced under general terms as that it may be asserted that thereby an art is found out which contains all sorts of possible offence and whâ—ch is governed by a certâ—in and true rule to effect the intent thereof and to come to the perfection thereof Nay rather we find to the contrary that the professors of this Art do not agree well in their principles and that time makes it subject to such alterations by reason of the new waies which the wit of man finds out as well for offence as defence as it seems it must be confest that this is not in reality a true art or at least that it is so imperfectly known and used as that strong holds are but a weak foundation for the safety of a State though they be never so many and be in esteem by military men For say nothing else does it the experience of more then one Age doth evidently prove that is a short time they become vain and useless since a Fort which was formerly greatly esteemed and held to be almost impregnable hath now by the invention of new engins and waâ—es of opugnâ—ng it lost that reputation and is thought little less then ridiculous and it may be beleeved that the same may befal any strong holds which are in these daies built by reason of the new waies of offending which many do daily with much study and industry labour to finde out Whence it is that Princes find they have often spent much time workmanship and moneys in a business which in time of need can but little avail them and â— they wiâ—l reap any benefit thereby they must continually be at new expence both of monies and men keeping them continually busied in new works and Fabricks adding alwaies or altering many things about their Forts to fit them to the use of the present times and Militia But give it for granted that such strong Holds may be brought to rather an imaginable then a possible perfection and security certainly they are no way serviceable of themselves but are like dead and useless things which have need to be as it were inanimated and be made useful by good Garisons who may keep and defend them And if otherwise they serve for the conveniencie and service of the Enemy which makes
it yet more questionable whether strong Holds be a greater safety or weakening to a State and where there are many and very great ones the doubt is made the greater since so many Soldiers must be imployed in their defence as if the Prince be not very powerful he shall hardly find Forces sufficient to keep several Armies as they may be termed on foot some within the Forts and some in the Campagnia Nor can it be made good that strong Holds are of themselves sufficient to secure the whole State for though they may entertain the Enemy for a while and stop the first brunt of an impetuous assault yet at last unless they be back'd with Forces from without and timely succored and relieved being overcome either by power length of time or necessity they must yield and fall into the power of the Enemy which cannot be denied no not by the very Professors and Favorers of Fortification And yet it cannot be denied but if a Prince have sufficient Forces to keep the Field in his own Country he may thereby keep himself from being injured for men do not easily put things to hazard where they think to meet with stout opposition and the only opinion and reputation of such Forces is able to keep off the greatest dangers For the Enemy who did design to assault such a State becomes jealous and doubtful nor is he bold enough to enter far into such a State as is guarded by a good Army and chiefly in situations such as are almost in all Countries as are naturally fortified by Hills Vallies or Rivers where it is hard to enter and harder to retreat And if any well experienced Captain command over such Forces he will be likely enough to defeat the Enemy without endangering himself by keeping him from victuals and so imployed and busied in sunâ—ry ways as he shall neither be able to keep long in the Country nor much less imploy himself in the taking or sacking of any Cities since he knows he is hourly subject to surprisals and to be ruâ—n'd and strong Holds securing nothing but those quarters where they are situated they do not secure the State if they be but a few and if many they require all the Forces for their own defence and leave the Enemy master of the Field to the Prince his prejudice and the Peoples despair So also if they be but little ones and incapable of such Works and so many men as are requisite to make them hold out long they and the Soldiers which defend them are lost and if they be great and contain large plots of ground as is most in fashion in these days they may be more perfect in themselves but they need so many men to defend them as those Forces which ought to be imployed for the safeguard of the whole Country or a great part thereof are bounded within a little compass in defence of some City or Ciâ—adel And yet these very Soldiers when drawn out into the Field may do much better service for being fashioned into the body of an Army they become as it were a moveable Fort which secures at once many Cities and a great Tract of Country nay by these the Enemy is much â—â—damaged and the troubles and danger of War are kept far from a mans own home For as hath been said diversions and preventions may be made by these Forces they may be carried into another mans State and set another mans hoâ—se on fire before it take head in ones own house but he who placeth his safety in strong Holds puts himself into a condition of being at his Enemies disposal in whose will it lies to choose what shall make most for his advantage with great prejudice to the opposing party For he may either pass by the Forâ—s over-ruâ— the Country enrich his Soldiers by booty impoverish the Subjects of that Country which is assaulted and cannot be releived by reason that the Forces thereof are disperst and imploid in the defence of the strong Holds or if he will make any certain archievement he may sit down before any Fort and without indangering his own men whilst he shall live upon the Enemies Territories he may in time take it by siege and effect his own desires for as hath been said no strong Hold can promise it self long safety where no succour is ready at hand But let us come a little closer to the business and let us suppose that these strong Holds may be brought to such a condition as they may be assuredly able to resist any open force which shall come against them and not be deceived in that their beleef as often times they are How can they secure themselves from treacherie and from such dangers as they may be subject unto by the negligence of Soldiers or falsehood of the Commanders that have the custodie thereof in which case the Princes danger is so much the greater and more irreparable for that his Enemy is in the Dominions in a well munited seat from whence he cannot hope to drive him without much labor and difficultie But in greater Cities wherein are a multitude of people and where these cautions and suspitions are not to be found others no whit inferior to these do arise for such quantities of victuals is requisite to feed the many men that are therein inclosed as no Prince is able to provide for so as may serve them for a long time and if this fail to what end serves Walls Weapons or Soldiers To this may be added that the safety of such strong Holds does in a great part depend upon the pleasure of the people who being of themselves naturally fickle do often favor forein Princes out of very slight reasons and sometimes out of a meer desire of noveltie and plot by sedition and by open force against the present State and deliver themselves and the City into another mans power And though they may afterwards repent themselves of their folly they know not how to mend it when a powerful Army is within the City Walls nor can this be done by him who defends the State because he cannot keep so many Forces together as are able to defend several places at â—nce and because loving his Subjects as a legitimate Prince ought to do he is loath to destroy a City of his own though whole Armies be therein But if the State be open and not pestred with Fortifications though it may the more easily be lost by sudden assaults or by ill affected Subjects it will be the more easily regained and as soon as the Prince who is deprived thereof shall have means to rallie his Forces which by misfortune may have been beaten he soon makes head again and recovers what he had lost the Enemy not having any safe hold wherein to abide And of this there are many apparent examples If the Commonwealth of Venice in the times of her greatest calamitie had had her State in Terra firma so well provided of strong
and upon all occasions as they shall be commanded to the greater benefit and safety of the State then Forts and strong Holds can do to those other Nations which make most use of them But other Princes who have had greater abundance of Territories if you will respect their Inhabitants did use to leave great store of Land upon their Confines desert and unmanured as at these times the Persians did upon their Confines towards the Turks to render it more difficult for a numerous Army to pass through them to their prejudice or in case they do to make any long abode there which hath often been of great use to them as hath been seen when very mighty Armies have been led on by the Ottoman Emperors against the Persians they have most commonly been wasted and destroyed by their own sufferings and wants From these things it appears it may be inferr'd that there are other Arts and ways which may much better do that for which Fortifications were first found out and for which they are now a-daies so much used especially amongst Christian Princes And yet if we will face about some other and those no contemptible arguments will be found which will plead for the very great advantage which Princes and States receive from Fortifications It is most assuredly certain that to secure a mans self by all means possible from offence is a precept not only taught by Reason but dictated by Nature which as it were by some occult and miraculous counsel hath pleased to divide those Nations by a long series of high tow'ring Mountains and to secure them from the injuries which the diversity of Climate hath produced in their several affections and customs and consequently a certaâ—n natural enmity and hath likewise provided in all parts more eminent seats amongst Mountains and more inclosed ones amidst Vallies wherein the Inhabitants may preserve themselves safe from the force and violence which the stronger use to exercise upon the weaker So as Fortification may be said to be an Art which doth imitate and help Nature because her operations are like those of the others and do sometimes reduce the workmanship of Nature to more perfection and use And though this be not grounded upon so certain principles as those of the Sciences yet doth she govern herself by a kind of Reason in such things wherein she is versed And thus much may serve to prove that she deserves the name of Art neither ought she to be ever a whit undervalued because new things and new rules are daily found out by the industrie of those that study her since it is proper to natural and eternal things to keep themselves always in such a condition as that they suffer not any alteration But say what thing it is which of all humane operations wherein such certainty and constancie is to be found No man will notwithstanding say that men are to live idly or totally to betake themselves to Contemplation and despise so many Arts which are the ornaments of Civil life because we cannot proceed therein by way of demonstration to one only and certain truth Nor can it be said that this Arts of Fortification is of late invention for it is very antient and hath been known almost in all Ages and by all Nations but sometimes in lesser sometimes in greater perfection according to a certain variety and vicissitude which Time causeth as well in Arts as in all other things The Antients had their Forts and Engines of War to take them which by a general name they called Tormenta Amongst other Engines which served to batter down Forts the Rams were much known and used and we find mention made of many other sorts of Instruments belonging to the offence and defence of Cities and of these some so miraculous as their force may be said to cause no less wonder then do our Guns now-a-daies To this purpose we read that when Scipio would vanquish a certain City in Spain the Defenders thereof threw certain Irons over the walls so artificially ordered as they therewith drew up such of the Enemies Soldiers as came neer the walls to the top thereof And it is related of that famous Archimedes that he invented an Engine which was used in defence of his Country Syracusa by which an armed Gally might be raised by force out of the water and drawn up on the Town-walls How can it be then said that such Art of Fabricking was unknown to the Antients if they used such study and industry in defending and in oppugning Forts Nay many of their most cry'd up Commanders have been praised particularly for this and the Romans who were very excellent at all things belonging to the Militia were very good at this also and did thereby preserve their State which they had almost lost by fighting For Hannibal in his prosperous course of victory was forced to keep so long and spend so much time before some small but strong and well-walled Castles and Colonies of the Romans as the safety of the City of Rome was in a great part attributed thereunto But to speak no more of these antient proceedings do we not see that many Forts and Castles have been built in not many Ages ago in many places and chiefly in Italy Which though the use of Cannon renders now of no use yet compare such Fortresses with the manner of warfaring in those days and they may be held almost equal to ours or at least they shew that men did study as much then to secure themselves from being injured by the Enemy and the better to maintain their States and Territories by that art as they do now The so many Sieges and beleaguering of Cities whereof mention is made in all Ages do cleerly prove that the use of Fortification is of very antient use and hath been continued in all Ages though it be now reduced to much greater perfection Now if we shall consider what advantage is made by Fortificaâ—ions we shall find them to be many and of great importance For it is sufficiently manifest that a Country wherein are no strong Holds is alwaies in apparent danger and left almost at the discretion of the Enemy who whilst they may safely at unawares enter thereinto not meeting with any obstacle have it alwaies in their power if not to prejudice the main affairs of that State at least to vex the people by fire and rapine of whose safety and preservation the Prince ought alwais to be careful We may find sad example of this by the late and well known passages of the Country of Friuli in the late Wars which the State of Venice had in Terra firma being totally destitute of strong Holds it became a prey to whosoever would assault it insomuch as it was not onely ruined and destroyd by regular Armies but by such as passed tumultuously over the mountains the Inhabitants thereof being only so long secure as the Venetian Army was permitted to remain amongst those Confines but
as soon as being summoned from thence upon other occasions it behoved to be gone from thence the Enemies returned again to fresh and secure depredations which will likewise befal any Region which is not defended and maintained by Fortresses And where the members of a State are far asunder if it must be defended onely by the Soldiers sword many Armies will scarcely be able to secure it whereas by means of strong Holds the same people who are able to defend them will likewise serve in a great part to preserve the Country as well because many of the Inhabitants may there finde safe refuge as likewise for that is no good advice nor usually imbraced by good Commanders to advance forward and to leave the Forts of the Enemy placed in fitting parts upon the Frontiers behinde them the State is preserved from greater dangers As on the contrary the State wherein there are no strong Holds though it be provided of a good and valiant Militia yet must it depend upon the various chance of War and hazard all upon the uncertain event of Battel and if any thing of misfortune befal the whole Country is left to the discretion of the Enemy and the Armies not having any safe place whereunto to retreat are totally defeated by one rout as it happened in the last Age in the Soldan of Cairo's most famost Empire which Soldan being overcome in several Battels by Selymus Ottoman and wanting time to rally his Army and strong Holds whereunto to have refuge did in a short time lose his whole Kingdom and the Empire of the Mammalucchi was overthrown which was before very famous for military discipline and esteemed very secure by reposing its safety in the valor of strong and able men To this may be added That strong Holds do not onely secure States from these utmost hazards of adverse Fortune but make very much for the keeping it away and often-times they reap the intention of true securitie without any hazard for when he who intends to assault a State shall consider that his attempts are likely to prove tedious and difficult and that it is doubtful whether he shall be therein victorious or on he does not so easily fall upon the business but when the War is once begun Fortresses do assuredly sufficiently keep from comming to join Battel for the assailant will not easily hazard himself upon the danger of a pitch'd Field because he sees he shall be debarr'd the chief fruits of Victorie which is the getting of some City or place of importance by strong Holds And so also he who is assaulted the more he sees his affairs in a good posture by the means of strong Holds the more he endeavors to prolong the time to the end that he may defeat him by his own incommodities without much use of weapons Whence ◠is that in these times wherein the perfection of fortifying is much increased field Battels are seldom fought for to fight makes not for the advantage of either of the parties out of the above said considerations Since the wit and industry of the Commanders seems to prevail over Fortifications and do in a great part take that uncertainty from War which useth to be found therein In the condition of the present affairs and times it is also seen that as much time is spent in the taking of one onely Fort as in former Ages and when another manner of Militia was in use was spent in taking in whole Provinces Which peradventure is likewise the cause why the Princes of these later Ages though some of them have been very powerful and valiant have not made any great progress in all the Wars which they have made Wherefore it seems it may be affirmed that Fortification is a very noble and excellent Art because it helps to compass the ultimate and true end which ought to be the aim of War in a well regulated State to wit peace and securitie What is then to be resolved upon in this diversitie of allegations It is a true and general rule that all things cannot suit with all things nor ought we in the actions belonging to civil life to seek for that which is simply and of it self good for it would be in vain to do so divers things prove useful to divers ends and to divers persons and they ought to be accommodated to the condition of times quality of customs and to other particular accidents Therefore the same manner of proceeding in the Government and preservation of their States becomes not several Princes but several waies Such Princes as have large Dominions and powerful Forces may securely repose 〈◊〉 safety in their Militia and Soldiery they have no great need of Castles or strong Holds and if they will have any it may suffice them to have them placed upon their utmost Confines to secure their Country from sudden incursions and for the opportunitie and securitie of such Garisons as such Princes use to keep in their provinces which are furthest remote and at a great distance from their Imperial Seate as the Roman Emperors did in former times and as the Ottoman Lords do now who trusting in their own power do endeavor much more the taking of Forts which do appertain to other men then the making of new ones themselves which they stand not so much in need of for that their greatness keeps them free from being injured by others But lesser Princes ought to govern themselves by another rule and stand more in need of strong Holds for not having any large Territories nor much money to keep a great many Soldiers continually in pay what they cannot do by force or reputation they do by the advantage of Fortifications for they keep what belongs unto them so well guarded by a few Soldiers as sometimes the Forces of any whatsoever powerful Prince are not able to pluck them out of their nest nor yet to bereave them of any part of their State Whereof we have had many examples in these later times and amongst the rest the defence of Malta is very remarkable which being assaulted by the Forces of so great a Prince as was Solyman the few Knights of Malta were so able to defend it as the Turks were forced not without some shame and much to their prejudice to quit it after having spent much time and lost many men before that Fort. And the Turks having learned by the experience of others the good of strong Holds being now to have a better esteem of them then formerly they have had especially in places furthest off from the Seat of the Empire where all things necessaie cannot be provided for but in a long time and with much inconveniencie They have to this purpose built many Forts in the parts which they have lately gotten in Persia and have therein done very wisely for whereas the former Ottoman Emperors reaped no good by their enterprises upon Persia but as soon as their Armies were withdrawn the Country which they had
over-run but not gotten returned to the obedience of its former Lords now by degrees from time to time they have by their Forts so confirmed themselves in the possession of such places as they have once taken as the Persians being a people little verst in the expugning of strong Holds have but small hopes of ever driving them out from such spacious Territories first gotten by force of Arms and afterwards by such means maintained by them by a safe possession secured unto them So as the use of Fortresses are sometime according as place and occasion shall serve of no smal service not only to peâ—tie Princes but even to the greatest But as for the number of these strong Holds for the time form and other accident which ought to be observed in the building of them no such certain rule can be given as can serve all men at all times Only this may be said that a wise Prince ought to consider herein not only what he designs to do but what his Estate and what his Forces are otherwise that which was intended for a cure and sustenance may prove poison and ruin to the State As when a Prince will make such and so many Forresses as that by reason of too great and inconsiderate expence in time of Peace in maintaining them he must of himself consume then that will prove true which hath formerly been considered that a Prince of no great fortune not being able to garrisonise or furnish so many Fortresses with things necessary not to draw forth the body of a well-adjusted Army into the field in greatest danger of War will find he hath not secured but increased his own dangers and hath put the total of his affairs in great disorder and confusion Fortresses then as all other things in a well ordered Government ought to be disposed of with good judgment and a well regulated temper 〈◊〉 as their number and greatness may be proportionable to the condition of the State and of the Prince his Forces They must not be placed idly in all places but only upon the Frontiers and in places fit for that purpose and so as the natural situation of the place may assist Art as much as may be and be also thereby assisted for such Fortresses may be maintained in greater security and with fewer Soldiers But above all things all possible care must be had that in time of greatest need they may be succor'd for no Fort can hold out long against a great force unless it be supplied by new Garrisons Munitions and with all other necessaries It is also very advantagious for Fortresses that there be good store of good Earth or Mould within them whereby they may several ways accommodate themselves for defence according as the approaches to take them are made and also to have ready opportunity to use the benefit of many retrears and to gain time which is the proper and grearest conveniencie for Fortresses So as if fitting provisions and respects be had Fortresses so built will prove advantagious for a Prince or State not only in the opinion of Soldiers but even of Statesmen But when they are made without judgment or art it is not the â—ault of the Work but of him who knows not how to use it if such good effects do not ensue thereupon as are desired Which happens not only in strong Holds but in all other things which being ill used lose their efficacie Thus then those arguments are easily answered by these distinctions and by what hath been alleadged in the behalf of strong Holds which might at first occasion any doubt For the Art of Fortification ought not to be despised because it hath not alwaies been the same rather it ought to be so much the more esteemed because we see it grows every day to greater perfection by new inventions and by experiences Thus it fares also with the Art of building of Ships and Houses with that of Sculpture Physick Painting and of all other excellent Disciplines which Experience being the best Introductress did not arrive at such excellencie and estimation suddenly but in process of time And notwithstanding this Art of Fortification hath in this our Age gotten some more setled Rules and as a man may say more certain Principles since the use of Batteries and of other manner of Attaques introduced by modern men whereby she doth govern herself in the whole and in every one of her particular members in form distance proportion of parts and in other things which are alwaies the same where the seat will permit it Variety of noble Wits have added so much of ornament and of perfection of late to this noble Profession as all doubts which may be put whether there be a true Art thereof or no are evidently cleered And though sometimes she may vary by reason of the diversity of situations or by any other accidents which cannot be comprised within one and the same Rule this ought not to detract from the dignity of the Artificers thereof then it doth from the Polititian who certainly is the chiefest Archiâ—ector in all our Civil operations to proceed by probable arguments and oftentimes alter his advice that he may fit his actions to the circumstances which do accompany them Nor doth it follow that such an Art should be the worse thought of because it doth not alwaies compass its end which is the preservation of such a City or such a Country where such Fortifications are erected since that likewise depends upon various accidents which no humane art or wisdom is able to foresee nor when foreseen to provide alwaies by any industry a due remedy against them It may as well be said men ought to forbear building of Ships and deprive themselves thereby of the Traffick and Commerce which is held with far distant Countries because many Ships perish in the Seas The Physitians care doth not alwaies cure the sick party the Orator doth not alwaies compass his ends by his perswasive oratory Ought men therefore to forbear Navigation Physick or Perswasion If a wicked and persidious man betray a Fort unto the Enemy which was recommended to his trust ought this to be attributed to the evil and imperfection of Forts What thing is there so good as may not be abused by wicked men 't is only Vertue which hath this priviledg all other adorments of Humanitie would be exâ—inct and expell'd the World If a Fort be lost for being badly garrisoned ill defended or by some other sinister accident ought the fault which is committed by the Prince his negligence the Commanders ignorance or by the Soldiers cowardise be laid upon the defect of the Fort which is of it self well made But say I beseech you are such disorders and dangers as may arise in a State by want of care in a Prince by the perâ—idiousness of Commanders or cowardise of Soldiers become so peculiar to Forts and Citadels as the same by the same occasion may not happen in Armies and
of Thirty years when in the time of the Popedom of Leo the Tenth she seemed to have some hopes of quiet and of enjoying some better condition after her so many and so grievous vexations and ruines which had called to mind the unhappy memorie of the former calamities which she had undergone by the invasion of the Northern Armies But the wounds of the late evils remained yet uncured for two noble members of this Province were faln into the hands of forein Princes the State of Milan being at the devotion of Francis King of France and the Emperor Charls the Fifth being possest of the Kingdom of Naples which Princes being now weakned and weary with so many Wars so as the one could not exceed the other and having at that time their thoughts elsewhere bent being governed more by necessitie peradventure then by their own wills they seemed to rest satisfied with what they did already posses in Italy and that they would suffer her to enjoy at least some rest after her past molestations In this posture of Affairs Pope Leo who had often negotiated with several Princes about the business of Arms and had endeavored as he said the liberty of Italy and chiefly the preservation of the Dukedom of Milan in the Government of the Sforza's was much displeased to have the power of strangers any longer continued and particularly that the Church should be berest of two noble Cities Parma and Piacenza which were become members of the State of Milan Therefore with a haughty and generous mind he resolved not to prefer an unsecure quiet before some present troubles so to shun other molestations and dangers which he thought might grow the greater by such a peace in future if not to himself at least to the Church And knowing that he should not be able either of himself nor by joining with other Italians to drive forein Potentates out of Italy he resolved to join with some foreiners against some other foremers with design as he said that when some of them should be forced to forgo Italy it might be the easier to expel the rest Leo having thus put on this noble and generous resolution it may seem to merit praise by all men as to the intention but as for the means he took to compass it it is not so easily to be agreed upon for many and weighty respects do concur thereunto for some of which this action may seem to be as wise as glorious and if we will reflect upon other some there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein then of security and hopes That all Transalpinâ—rs might be driven out of Italy was a thing desired and not without cause by all Italians and which ought to be his chiâ—fest care and endeavor who had such Territories degree and authority in that Province as Leo had The antient dignity of the Italian honor seemed to appear in the Popâ—s majesty and in the splendor of the Court of Rome â—ut as for the effecting of this business it did planly appear that all the power of the Italian Potâ—ntates was too weak since two great Princes and warlike Nations had foâ— many past years though with various fortune got footing there and still kept their possession so as their power could suffer no disturbance but must be confirmed and consolidated and must become more formidable to the Church and to all the Italian Princes unless it were by some of the same forein Nations If the sole Forces of the Italian Princes when Italy by reason of a long Peace did flourish most were not sufficient to stop the French Forces which were then but new in those parts and but meanly assisted what reason was there to believe that this Province should ever be raised up again of herself and should by means of her own Forces return to her pristine fortune and digniâ—y after having been so long vexed by cruel Wars and having lost two of her noblest Members Wherefore though to administer fresh fuel as it were to this fire of War as would be done by the authority and Forces of the Apostolick Sea if they should joâ—n with Caesar or with the King of France might be troublesom and dangerous yet might it be beneficial or at least hopeful since it might so fall out that the fortune of War being various and subject to unexpected chances some good effect might ensuâ— thereupon for the liberty of Italy the Forces of those Princes who did oppose her growing much the weaker or else by their growing weary of the work and by their tuâ—ning themselves to some other undertaking Whereas on the contrary to suffer them to settle there and to get in time greater authority over the people and more love to the States which they had gotten was a certain and irreparable ruine and an utter abolishing of all hopes of ever restoring the States which were postest by strangers into the hands of the Italian Princes But the fear lest both these Princes who were grown so powerful in Italy might join together against the Territories of the Church or those of other Italian Princes to divide them amongst themselves as had happened not many years before when the Emperor Maximilian and Lewis the Twelfth King of France who had been formerly at such great enmity one with another grew good friends by dividing the Lands between them which belonged to the Venetians might chiefly perswade the Pope to quit neutrality and to side with the one or the other of these Princes Leo knew that upon many past occasions he had done things not only of but little satisfaction but of much disgust to both these Princes and Nations more particularly to the French who were alwaies jealous of his cunning so as great emulation growing in them both and a desire of commanding over all Italy and finding that affairs were so equally poised between them in this Province as the one could not much exceed the other nor make any new acquisition it was with reason to be feared that being void of all hopes of having the Pope to side with either of them from whose friendship they might for many reasons expect very considerable assistance they might at last convene together to the total oppression of the Liberty of Italy Nor was Leo's Neutrality in this conjuncture of time and affairs able to secure him from such a danger since he had formerly openly declared himself and taken up Arms in company with others and chiefly since the French knew that he was no waies pleased with their Dominion in Italy as well for the common affairs as for his own particular dislike that they had possessed themselves of the Cities of Parma and Piacensa which were returned to the obedience of the Apostolick Sea by his Predecessor Iulius So as the Churches State and that of the Florentines which was under the same Popes protection and government grew to be those alone which were exposed to the injuries of all men for the Venetians
she was oft-times assaulted by them and many of her parts possest by them and the Empire it self was endangered by their Forces And of late years since the passage of Charls the Eighth though they had proved variety of fortune yet kept they still the same resolution of waging war in Italy and of keeping footing in this Province not being frighted from this resolution by any misfortune how great soever but being once beaten back they returned with great fury to seek out novelties and at this very time that we now speak of they were possest of the Dutchy of Milan Therefore to secure himself from the French it was not sufficient to drive them once out of Italy for the Forces of that large Kingdom being still very powerful and they being alwaies prepared for novelty their desire bore them chiefly thereunto where it had done formerly so as Italy remained still exposed to new incursions and subject to the miseries of War Therefore this intention of Pope Leo's of keeping the French long out of Italy could not peradventure have been compassed but in a long process of time and with much variety of success no not though Italy had been all of a peece and in greater power and prosperitie then she then was Whereas at this time the Commonwealth of Venice being now returned to great power was joined in confederacie with the King of France by vertue of antient Capitulations nor was it to be hoped for that out of any uncertain hopes and of long expectation she should easily forgo such a friendship And as for other Princes they were but weak and their ends not constant nor conformable And on the other side Caesar was very bare of monies and had many other irons in the fire so as the greatest weight and care of managing this War was likely to fall unto the Popes share wherein if he should slacken never so little all that had been done would have been to no effect and those places which by reason of this confederacie with the Church were taken from the French would quickly and easily have faln into their hands again But say that Charls had been able to have imploted all his Forces about this business the greater they had been the greater share would he have pretended in the business and the less able had the Pope or any others been to oppose his Forces Charls the Great a Prince of excellent worth freed Italy from the slavish yoke of the Northern Barbarians driving the Lombards from thence who had had the chief command there for Three hundred years but he would therefore make the greatest advantage thereof unto himself creating his Son Pipin King of Italy nor ought any of Charls his promises to be thought sufficient to shun such a danger to which it was known he was much more moved out of a fervent desire to draw the Pope into this confederacie of excluding the King of France then that he had any waies quitied his desire to the Dukedom of Milan What reason was there then to beleeve that when Caesar should be become more powerful in Italy and should have driven out the French he should likewise be expell'd from thence when his Territories and Authority should be there the greater It is rather to be beleeved that by his increase of power Italy should be in a worse condition and the danger thereof the more for whilst these two Princes stood upon equal terms and with an invererate mind did counterpoise one another the other States were the more secure it being unlikely that any one of the parties would permit that the others should increase or be heightned by the ruine of any of the Princes of Italy but he that should be assaulted by one was sure to be assisted by the other so as Leo ought chiefly to have endeavored in this conjuncture of affairs to have kept these scales even by his neutrality for whilst the business stood thus it behoved the very Enemies of the Italians to value their Friendship for their own good and for the preservation of their States It is not easie to decide whether it did really conduce more to the good of Italy that the Pope should continue in his neutrality or by his joining with some one of these forein Princes who at that time had so great an influence upon Italy the success being to depend upon many very much differing accidents for since humane wisdom is not able to provide against them all she cannot find any secure way which leads to that destin'd end Let us say then still keeping our selves within some general rules in the first place that to join in friendship and confederacie with a more powerful Pâ—ince and one who is a near neighbor when the increase of power is intended by this conjunction is never to be done without danger nor ought such a resoluâ—ion ever be taken but out of great necessity especially not by such Princes who are not so weak as they need a leaning stock not to depend in all things upon the event of anothers fortune Now Leo had no such reason to forgo the little quiet which he had then purchast by plunging into a Sea of Leagues and Confederacies which are very hard to be laid fast hold of with Princes of great powerl desirous of glory who pretend the same things and between whom War is not so easily ended as it is reassumed The Churches Patrimonie was sufficiently secured by the majesty of Religion by Pontifical power by the moneys which by many waies she may be supplied with and by her Dominions being at this time much inlarged by Iulius the second So as Leo's intention is to be praised for having his thoughts so carefully bent upon the Libertie of Italy It is likewise to be desired that he had had either more judgement or temper to know and chuse an opportune time and a sitting occasion and yet it is likewise a general rule that to wait for the advantage of Time when Affairs are upon great strieghts do usually bring notable advantages and sometimes by new and unexpected waies Italy was long under the obedience of the Western Emperors If at that time when their power and authority was so great the Popes would have call'd in forein Forces and made use of them to reduce the Government of Italy under the Churches power or else into the hands of some other Italian Princes Italy would in the first place have certainly been given in prey to the insolencie of foreign Soldiers and at last she would peradventure have been brought to a worse condition But by temporising such occasions arose as the Church increased her Dominions by certain lawful Donations without the shedding of blood and all Italy remained subject to her own proper and particular Lords and the Western Emperors being long vex'd and troubled by the Wars of Germany were forced to forgo the affairs of Italy Moreover though Caesar's fortune and power was then very great yet was it
subject to great alterations by reason that he was a new Prince in his Dominions because that they were far divided one from another and for that many were apprehensive of so fast increasing greatness So as many more opportune and better grounded occasions might peradventure arise of compassing such an intent and the War made against him by the Germans which tended so much to his danger might prove such a one By making fit use of which accidents Caesar's power might receive a rebuke as concerning the affairs of Italy if the French forces had been any ways received or that the Italians had been of the same mind as formerly they had been more unseasonably Therefore to separate the friendship of the French totally from the Italians as Leo did for as much as in him lay discovering a double injury to them since the King of France might think that fraud was join'd to ill will could not be but an ill-taken advice He had done better to have somewhat allaied their power as to the affairs of Italy then to have quite extinguish'd it till the Italians might get some better light how to recover their liberty The Venetian Senate took another course though they had therein the same intent For whilst the affairs of these two Princes Charls the Emperor and Francis King of France were in the greatest heat of War in Italy they would apply themselves to each of their fortunes and according to the condition of time and affairs they often changed friendship being still constant in their aim which was to keep their Forces as equally ballanced as they could and that they should both be weakened by their contention one with another But when occasion was offered of falling upon one without too much advantage to the other as it did in the last Wars made by the Venetians in Italy after King Francis was let out of Prison they stood firm and resolute not being easily perswaded upon any conditions to lay down Arms. For on the one side Caesars power did decline by reason of many adverse chances and the affairs of Naples were in great confusion and danger And on the other side the affairs of France were not much bettered as to the prejudice of the liberty of Italy for a chief Article in this Confederacie was That the State of Milan should be restored to Francisco Sforza as at last it was But Leo in this conjuncture of affairs did precipitate himself into friendship with the Imperlalists and drew the enmity of the French upon him so as his danger became almost equally the same whatever event the War should have and the sequel did more demonstrate this by the imprisonment of Clement and by the slavery which Caesars greatness threatened to all Italy So as it appears to reason and by the sequel that a noble and magnificent fabrick as Leo's proposition touching the freeing of Italy from the subjection of Foreiners was really to be esteemed was not built upon of true and solid a foundation as was able to support so great a weight But for the present after many various accidents the condition of affairs may be esteemed either good or at least less bad forasmuch as Italy through Philip the King of Spains great wisdom and moderation of mind hath enjoyed a long and peaceful condition and flourisheth no was much as she hath done in many preceding Ages to the Peoples great comfort and to the singular praise of the late Princes The Tenth DISCOURSE Whether the Counsel taken by the Emperor Charls the Fifth and by his Commanders of not parting from the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come with very great strength from Constantinople to assault it deserve praise or blame AS two great and famous Princes not only for the largeness of their Dominions but for their particular warlike valor the Emperor Charls the Fifth and Solyman Ottoman the Grand Signior of the Turks did both of them flourish in one and the same Age so amongst the most memorable things of those times the stupendious preparations for War made by the above-named Princes in the year 1532. was most remarkable and variously thought of All possible means was used by both of them and the whole World put into Arms so as the fortune of these two Empires was judged to depend upon the worth and prowess of these two Armies But the success did no ways answer the fame of so great Princes and the noise of the preparation for neither did the Imperial Army stir at any time from the walls of Vienna nor did the Turkish Army come within many miles of them Now since more recent businesses have recalled this to memory it may prove no unuseful Consideration to represent what of praise or of blame may be given to this resolution put on by the Emperor Charls and his Commanders Many were of opinion then and the same may now be thought that in this case or in the like the managing of War in this manner standing only upon defence and expecting to be assaulted by the Enemy did much withdraw from the reputation of the Christian Militia which was already much in the wane and was sufficient to awaken fresh spirits and boldness in the Turks to undertake any thing the more easily against them in the future since the flower of all the Soldiery of all the strongest and most esteemed Nations of Christendom being assembled under the conduct and auspice of a mighty Prince the Head of all Christendom and in a business of such weight which had drawn the eyes of the whole World upon it not any the least thing was put forth against these Enemies no Army brought to face them nor put in a posture of seeming really to desire battel none of their Forts were assaulted no Country of theirs prejudiced Why were so many valiant men brought from their own homes into far distant Regions why such expence why such preparation for War Was it that so strong and flourishing an Army should rot and moulder away about the walls of Vienna What could have better decided the question which till then was disputable in behalf of the Ottoman Princes and of the Turkish Militia and against the true honor of War which our Princes and Soldiers have long laid claim unto and sometimes atchieved then after so great a preparation of Arms after so cried up an enterprise with intention to quell the Turkish forces to halt so long and to so little purpose not knowing what resolution to take but that that Camp then which no former Age had for a long time seen a greater nor a more noble one should stand still like an unmoveable Fort Being overcome by truth we must confess that the hopes of Victory for Christian Princes was lost or at least brought to this pass as not to lose must be termed Conquest but neither could this be done by taking this course No Christian Prince had usually so great and so setled a Militia as could continually maintain such an
that Kingdom as he did being more encouraged thereunto by the weakness and backwardness of the Imperialists who if when they had done their utmost had done nothing at all and the Turks knowing that Charls the Emperor being imploâ—ed in other very considerable Wars would not be alwaies able to afford his Brother so great assistance was not this a great incitement to them quickly to renew the War to the greater prejudice and danger not onely of Hungary which Ferdinand laid claim unto but even to the like of Ferdinands own Territories and not long after the fact it self shewed what might have been foreseen by reason for Solyman could not onely not be perswaded to quit the protection which he had taken of his Pupil King Steven but before he should come to any accord with Ferdinand demanded tribute from Austria and the conditions both of the War and Peace growing daily worse and worse the greatest part of Hungary being lost after the notable discomfitures of the German Armies at Essechlo and Buda and the other part continuing still in great danger the certain loss was known which did redound unto them by not hazarding a Battel at this time when the fears and hopes were at least alike on both sides But say that this had been too rash or too difficult a thing to have been effected what hindred them or disswaded them from passing through their own Countries and marching with their Army to between Dava and Sava a Country which had not at all been prejudiced by the late Wars and therefore fit to furnish their Army with victuals and where there are many mountainous seats which were advantagious for the Imperialists and incommodious for the Turks in respect of their Cavalry whereby they might have preserved two Provinces which were Patrimonâ—al States of the House of Austria and therefore ought to have been the more carefully kept Carinthia and Stiria which being abandoned were left a secure prey unto the â—urks who utterly destroyed them by fire and sword endangering likewise the loss of some of their chief Cities for the way would have been block'd up and kept Solyman from coming thither if it had been first possessed by the Imperialists and Solymans reputation would have been much lessened if he had tarried behind leaving that Country untouched which he was come to assault with so great an Army But to do as the Imperialists did to keep so many men with so great a Train of Artâ—llery and all necessaries for War barely to defend one City which lay not open but was begiâ—t with walls which was held to be a strong Forâ—ress and which being but meanly provided of men had formerly repulsed great Turkish forces what was it but by this new and prejudicial example to confirm the Turks and even our own men in the opinion that the Christian Militia was inferior to that of the Turks and that our Princes being intent upon their own defence and not without some fear to imploy their utmost endeavors therein were for their parts to suffer the Turks to enjoy their large Empire in peace and safety Which the Ottoman Princes have brought to so vast a greatness not by letting their Forces lie idle and by being content to defend that Title which they had gotten at first but by going every where to find out the Enemy fighting him upon all occasions and by making their way by their swords into other mens Countries How oft have the Turks entred into the Consinus of Persia nay wrought themselves in even to her inmost parts chiefly intending to come to a day of fight with the Persians Armies which they have often enected though the Persians were rather to be feared then to be despised for their antient honor in War and for the manner of their Militia and yet at last they have in these last Wars got safe possession of the chiefest part of this most noble Kingdom What then is more to be said but that if this way of proceeding have proved prosperous to those that have walked therein he who takes another way walks on towards destruct on and either through ignorance or too great a thirst after quiet and secuâ—ity involves himself into greater troubles and difficulties And though the loss be made by peece-meal which may peradventure make it appear the less yet at last the whole falls into more certain though a later ruine And to speak of more modern affairs how had not only the Commonwealth of Venice but several other States of Christian Princes been preserved from the Turkish power and insolencie if the Leagues Fleet shunning all occasion of fight had retreated without that famous Victory of Lepaâ—â—â— But it was afterwards more cleerly seen that Charls his intent on in this War was far from joining battel with the Turks either that he would not hazard his glory and honor or manifestly confess himself interior to Solyman in Forces when Hungary and Austria being assaulted at another time by the same Solyman in stead of succoring of assisting his Brother who was in emient danger he went to try new adventures in Africa of a much more inconsiderable nature If a day of Battel be ever to be had what else was there to be done to keep off the ruine which doth threaten Christendom every day more and more He who hazards may lose but he may also win And he who stands idly and does nothing whilst he endeavors security by useless means does by degrees daily fall into new dangers and doth as it were voluntarily but for certain basely submit himself to the yoke of a grievous and unworthy slavery If Germany and Italy had been so forward to furnish men and monies for this enterprise the authority of so great a Prince who was the chief Author and Head thereof being considered as upon other occasions which did happen not long after these assistances might have been sooner hoped for When were the whole Forces of Germany seen so united as they were at this time Nay it was rather to be doubted that many seeds of discord were to grow which were already spread abroad throughout this Province by reason of Religion and State-policie whereby Germany might be weakned and divided From whence then was there any good to be hoped for against this so formidable Enemy if so great a preparation for war proved altogether vain and useless The condition of present Times and of long Custom will not suffer us now to hope that we may see what formerly fell out in that famous Councel of Clerement that at the words of an Hermite at the bare exhortations of a Pope Christian Princes and people should readily take up Arms against the Infidels being content for bond of firm union to be all of them signed with the sign of the Cross. But now when any such thing is treated of such disputes are made upon every point every one looks so much to their own particular ends not measuring things aright nor minding the common
interest in comparison of their own as Leagues and Unions being contentiously handled slowly concluded and untimely dissolved there comes no good of them Wherefore it cannot be said that they thought by delay to reserve occasions prepared for Victory to which the Cause which was then in hand ought not a little to have excited them to wit the maintaining of King Ferdinand in his just pretences to the Kingdom of Hungary from whom without any right and unprovoked by any injury it was attempted to be taken Very shame should likewise have been able to have made them not suffer so miserable a spectacle of such devastations and ruines as were made by the Barbarians in Carinthia and Stiria whilst they stood looking on with so great an Army at which the Imperial Commanders being at last moved they went about though late to revenge these injuries and their boldness being assisted by fortune the Freebooters were routed and almost quite discomâ—â—ted in all places where they were assaulted So as it appears it may be pleaded by this late example that they might have done greater things if they had attempted it Moreover so many military men might very well have known what advantage might have been gotten by giving Battel since in this posture of affairs great rewards were to be expected from the Victory and but small loss had they been beaten For the Christian Army if victorious might have penetrated into the Turks Dominions where there are no strong Holds save some few upon the Frontiers and not meeting with any obstacles might have marched even to before Constantinople planting their Trophies in sundry places by one sole Victory Whereas on the contrary the Imperialists upon any adverse fortune had many strong Holds whereunto to have retreated and by maintaining them might have retarded the course of the Turks victories and have recruited their broken Forces But say I pray you who could assure the Imperialists that they should avoid the hazard of a Battel Was it not rather to be believed especially if we will consider the boldness of the Turks who are wont to meet but with weak resistances that answerable to what they gave out they would advance and force the Christians to give Battel as the Voyage taken by Solyman did promise who kept not within his Consines but was entred into the Imperialists Country so far as some of his Horse Troops made inrodes even to Newstat a Town standing in the same Champaine Country and not far from Vienna And say that being assaulted by the Enemy they had been forced to fight who can deny but that both before and after the conflict the business would have proved hazardous to the Imperialists since they were to fight at their own homes and in their own defence For great is that astonishment which is caused by the bold coming on of an Enemy and men are alwaies readier to run away there where they have best means of saving themselves and in case of adverse Fortune the danger is greater when the Enemy is in the bowels of the State and if the inhabitants overcome the less good redounds by the victory because the enemy hath time to rally and to defend himself These were therefore notable disadvantages which were unaviodable whilst the Imperialists Camp remained fixt before the walls of Vienna and thereby made themselves to depend upon the Enemies resolution Notwithstanding all this he who shall duely consider the present condition of the Affairs of the Empire of the Militia and of all other things which belongs to such a business may peradventure be of a different opinion and judge otherwise and if not commend at least excuse the resolution taken by the Imperialists of not parting with their Army from before the walls of Vienna and from the River Danubius That the Turkish Empire is very great and potent is a thing too well known by us to our cost but the care how to prevent the maladie and weakness into which Christendom is fallen by the greatness of such an enemy hath been so long in cogitatâ—on as to use violent means might bring ruine upon her rather then procure her safety Christian Princes have not in this age a setled well disciplined well ordered Militia and kept in perpetual pay as the Turks have and as the Romans and some other Empires have formerly had Whence it is that numerous Armes cannot be raised without length of time and much difficulty and for want of continual exercise by which the Soldiers of one and the same Nation have been known to be able to supply every military Office recourse must be had to several Nations for men fit for several actions in War so as it is thought that either by natural inclination or by antient Custom or by meer opinion every Nation is best some for one thing some for another as also because there are but very few in any place who are well instructed in Military affairs For no Militia is entertained except it be in time of need or some few who are kept in Garrisons with little or no exercise The charge also of assembling Soldiers from several and far distant Countries as also all things which belong to War is much the greater and whereof not any one State of our Princes is compleatly furnished So as put all these together it is from hence that when any enterprise hath been to be taken against the Turks in these times with numerous and powerful Forces they have not been able to be got together in any reasonable time nor well ordered which delay arising from necessity hath hindred our preventing the Enemy and our assaulting them at their own doors But particularly is it not very well known that at this time whereof we now speak Caesar was to assemble Soldiers from so many Nations subject to other Dominions and to joyn together the Auxiliary Forces of Germany and Italy as in doing thereof so much labor and time was spent as before the Imperial Army was mastered at Vienna Solyman was already come to Belgrade so as to have resolved upon preventing the Enemy and of assaulting his Confines before the arrival of his Army was impossible though it had been thought expedient to have done so nor ought reason to prevail over experience and this so much the less for that there wants not other reasons to prove that the Turks are readier at their counsel and speedier at their executions then we can be But let us suppose that all prolixity and difficulties therein might have been helped and that it had depended upon the free will of the Imperial Commanders to assault the Turks within their Consines say I beseech you what design could the Imperialists have had to euer into the Enemies Country Should they perhaps have stood idly expecting the shock of the Turkish Army if it should advance towards them or if Solyman should not have advanced but have shunned the encounter should they have marched on and forced him to fight Or should
though in great parties to pillage the Enemâ—es Country the business not being any thing alike the Turks had the disadvantage of the Countries situation of being loaded with prey of being in disorder as commonly befals those who go to plunder not to fight and of other accidents But besides all this he who relates this business mentions not any baseness in the Turks but saies That notwithstanding these disadvantages they defended themselves generously to the utmost of their power But what did the same Solyman who cannot be denied to have been very valiant and greatly experienced in matter of War though he had all the advantages that have been mentioned he did not advance with his Army as near as as he might have done nor did endeavor to enforce others nor to be enforced himself to fight but rather went out of his direct way which he had taken to come to Vienna and kept for the most part in strong and commodious seats as between the two Rivers of Sava and Drava and iâ— a powerful and van glorious Prince who professed that he had undertaken that War meerly out of a desire of glory would make use of haesitatious counsels where the consequences were so great and so heavie how would it have becomed Charls a Prince no less wise then valiant and who was necessituted by many other important affairs of some other States of his to leave Germany suddenly as he did to have put himself upon the dubious events of Battel whereby to indanger almost his whole Fortune When Marius was sent against the Cymbrians who were faln down into Italy which was thought to be as considerable a War as any that the Romans had made the same circumstances concurring thereunto whereby to infuse terror as do now to make the Turkish Forces so formidable as crueltie barbarism the great number of the Enemy and the fame of the victories which they had won the wise Commander would not though many occasions had offered themselves and that he was taxed by the unexperienced of timerousness come to a pitch'd field with such an Enemy till for many moneths space he had kept the Army accustomed to the performance of duties and to Military actions and chiefly till he had acquainted them with the aspect of the Enemy and how to have the bettâ—r of them in light skirmishes which were not notwithstanding attempted but upon great advantage And if Caear used to prevent the Enemy and to be the first that should assault it is to be considered that he commanded a veteran Army of whom he had by long Wars had much experience So as the same example is not to be made use of in a new and tumultuous Army and of so different conditions But let us likewise consider what were the reasons which made these two Princes take up Arms for by the first rise of Wars the reason of their administration and the good means whereby to conduce them to a good end is best known The War was offensive on the Turks behalf undertaken with great surquedrie and with great hopes of victory and glory Solyman having propounded unto himself to revenge the injuries done by Ferdinand then King of Bohemia to Iohn King of Hungary who reigned under his Guardianship and protection But whether this was his true intention or no or but pretended that he might possess himself of the Kingdom of Hungary as afterwards he did it was most certain that he could not compass his end of beating the Forces of these two Austrian Brothers Charls and Ferdinand Caesar on the other side being usually distracted and busied as now in particular in other Wars had betaken himself to this to defend the assaults which were threatned his Brothers Territories as also the honor of his family or rather that of all Germany or to confine ones self to narrower bounds it may be said that this contention of War did paâ—ticularly concern the oppugning and the defence of the City of Vienna Soâ—yman who had formerly little to his honor been driven from before the walls of that City professed to return thither with greater Forces being firmly resolved to reduce it to his power and to challenge the Emperor to a pitch'd Battel Charls on the contrary having brought his Forces about that City had propounded unto himself the keeping of it and to frustrate this so great furie and boasting of Solymans Now then whilst Vienna was preserved and that she was kept free from all dangers and that Solyman was so curbed and frightned by the Imperialists Forces as that he duâ—st not advance or make good his word which he had publickly professed did not the Imperialists effect the business they had taken in hand without the effusion of blood Did they not preserve their own honor and do service to all Christendom If this Army as the success of Bittel is more uncertain and dubious then any whatsoever other humane action had received any noâ—able defeat when would this wound have ever been cured The afflicted body of Christendom must have its wounds long kept open and have still ulâ—â—cerated more and more How would Caesars particular Enemies have been encouraged to fall upon his Territories and to have endangered and molested his own particular affairs whilst he should have shewed courage enough but little good counsel in defending another mans right which did not immediately concern himself Had the Tâ—rks in former times been made retreat to their own Confines as now they were without having made any acquâ—sition they had not been masters of so many Christian Kingdoms as now they are And had their Forces proved still vain their Militia would have been imbased and they would have been discouraged from troubling others without any good to themselves which peradventure would have been the safest and securest way of weakning so great a power as that by temporizing affording them thereby occasion of growing idle and of falling into domestick disorders so as they might the more easily have received a blow and have been overcome both by cuning and force Nor will it avail to affirm the contrary as if the future dangers and troubles had been certainly to have happened or that they might have been made greater by a new commotion of War for it was more answerable to reason that when Solyman should have done his utmost with his whole Forces assisted by his own presence he would have suffered the Estates of Austria and of Germany to have remained quiet if King Ferdinand had rested content with his own Patrimonie and with the Kingdom of Bohemia together with the hopes of succeeding in the Empire without intricating himself in new troubles by obstinately maintaining his pretences to the Kingdom of Hungary drawing thereby the fury of the Turkish Forces upon him as he often did So as King Ferdinando and his Councellors are more to be blamed for those many mischiefs which ensued afterwards and for those which we are still threatned with by the so near neighborhood of