alter the laws but by degrees one after another and to make other that are more behoovefull for the establishing of the present Government 6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable and well affected so much as may be that they may seem by being conquered to have gotten a protectour rather than a Tyrant For the Common-People if they enjoy peace and be not distracted nor drawn from their businesse nor exacted upon beyond measure are easily contained under obedience Yet notwithstanding they are to be dis-used from the practise of Arms and other Exercises which increase courage and be weakened of Armor that they have neither spirit nor will to rebell 7. If there be any faction in the Countrey to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part and to combine with it as Caesâ—r in Frâ—nce 8. To look well to the Borders and confining Pâ—ovinces and if any rule there of great or equall power to himself to joyn leage with some other Bordeâ—â—â— thoâ—gh of lesse strength to hinder he atâ—empts if any should be by such neighbour Prince For it happeneth often that a Countrey infested by one neighbour Prince calleth in another of as great or greater power to assist and rescue it from the other that invadeth it So the â—â—â—mans were callâ—d into Gâ—â—â— by the AEtâ—â—ians the â—â—â—â—ns by the Britaiâ—s the Danes by the Saxonâ— 9. To leave their Titles and dignities to the Natives but the command and Authority wholly to his own 10. Not to put much trust nor to practise too often the Sâ—pâ—â—sm of Policie especially those that appertain to a Tyrannicall State which are soon detected by men of Iudgement and so being discredit to the Prince and his Policy among the wiser and better sort of his Subjects whereof must needs follow very ill effects The Sâ—â—â—â—â— of Tyrants are rather to be known than practised which are for the supporting of their Tyrannicall States by wise and good Princes and are these and such like as follow Rules Politick of Tyrants Rules practised by Tyrants are of 2. sorts viz. 1. Barbarous and Professed which is proper to those that have got head and have power sufficient of themselves without others help as in the Turkish and Russe Government 2. Sophisticall and Dissembled As in some States that are reputed for good and lawfull Monarchies but inclining to Tyrannies proper to those which are not yet setled nor have power sufficient of themselves but must use the power and help of others and so are forced to be Politick Sophisters I. Sophisms of a Barbarous and professed Tyranny TO expell and banish out of his Countrey all honest means where by his people may attain to learning wisdom valour and other virtues that they might be fit for that estate and servile condition For that these two learning and martiall exercise effect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny viz Wisdom and Valour For that men of spirit and understanding can hardly endure a Servile State To this end to forbid learning of liberall Arts and Martiall exercise As in the Russe Government so Julian the Apostata dealt with the Christians Contrariwise to use his people to base occupations and Mechanicall Arts to keep them from idlenesse and to put away from them all high thoughts and manly conceits and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sorted and so made unfit for great enterprises So the Egyptian Kings dealt with the Hebrews So the Russe Emperour with his Russe people And Charls the fifth with the Netherlanders when he purposed to enclose their priviledges and to bring them under his absolute Government 2. To make sure to him and his State his Military men by reward liberty and other means especially his Guard or Praetorian Band That being partakers of the spoil and benefit they make like that State And continue firm to it as the Turk his Janizarie the Russe his Boyarens c. 3. To unarm his people of weapons money and all means whereby they may resist his power And to that end to have his set and ordinary exactions c. Once in two three or four years and sometimes yearly as the â—â—rk and Russe who is wont to say that his people must 〈…〉 ed as his flock of sheep viz. Their people taken from them least it overlade â— and grow too heavy That they are like to his beard that the more it was shaven the thicker it would grew And if there be any of extraordinary wealth to borrow of them in the mean while till the Tax come about or upon some divised matter to confiscate their goods as the common practise is of the â—ussâ— and Turk 4. To be still in Wars to the end his people may need a Captain and that his Forces may be kept in practise as the Russe doth yearly against the Tartar Pâ—lonian and Sweden c. 5. To cut off such as excell the rest in wealth favour or nobility or be of a pregnant or aspiring wit and so are fearfull to a Tyrant and to suffer none to hold Office or any Honour but onely of him as the Turk his Bâ—shaeâ— and the Russe his Râ—zzes 6. To forbid Guilds Brotherhoods Feastings and other Assemblies among the people that they have no means or opportunity to conspire or confer together of publick matters or to maintain love amongst themselves which is very dangerous to a Tyrant the Russes practice 7. To have their Beagles or lâ—stener in every corner parts of the Realm especially in places that are more suspect to learn what every man saith or thinketh that they may prevent all attempts and take away such â—s mislike their Sâ—â—â— 8. To make Schism and Division among his Subjects viz. To set one Noble man against another and one Richman against another that through Fact on disagreement among themselves they may be weakened and attempt nothing against him and by this means entertaining whispering and complaints he may know the secrets of both parts and have matter against them both when need requireth So The Russe made the Faction of the Zemsky and the 〈◊〉 9. To have strangers for his Guard and to entertain Parasites and other base and â—ervile fellows not too wise and yet subtile that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he commandeth though never so wicked and unjust For that good men can not flatter and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant All these practises and such like may be contracted into one or two viz. To bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt or to alter the present State The use is Caution not Imitation II. Sophisms of the Sophillicall or subtile Tyrant to hold up his State 1. TO make shew of a good King by observing a temper and mediocrity in his Government and whole course of life To which end it is necessary That this subtile Tyrant be a cunning Polititian or a
published that all men might plead it for their advantage but a Charter was left in deposito in the hands of the Archbishop of Canterbury for the time and so to his successours Stephen Langthon who was ever a Traytor to the King produced this Charter and shewed it to the Barons thereby encouraging them to make war against the King Neither was it the old Charter simply the Barons sought to have confirmed but they presented unto the King other articles and orders tending to the alteration of the whole commonwealth which when the King refused to signe the Barons presently put themselves into the field and in rebellious and outragious fashion sent the King word except he confirmed them they would not desist from making war against him till he had satisfied them therein And in conclusion the King being betrayed of all his Nobility in effect was forced to grant the Charter of Magna Charta and Charta de Forestis at such time as he was invironed with an Army in the Meadowes of Staynes which harters being procured by force Pope Innocent afterward disavowed and threatned to curse the Barons if they submitted not themselves as they ought to their Soveraigne Lord which when the Lords refused to obey the King entertained an army of strangers for his own defence wherewith having mastered and beaten the Barons they called in Lewes of France a most unnaturall resolution to be their King Neither was Magna Charta a Law in the 19. of Henry the 2d but simply a Charter which hee confirmed in the 21. of his reigne and made it a Law in the 25. according to Littletons opinion Thus much for the beginning of the Great Cbarter which had first an obscure birth from usurpation and was secondly fostered and shewed to the world by rebellion JUST I cannot deny but that all your Lordship hath said is true but seeing the Charters were afterwards so many times confirmed by Parliament and made Lawes and that there is nothing in them unequall or prejudicial to the King doth not your Honour think it reason they should be observed COUNS. Yes and observed they are in all that the state of a King can permit for no man is destroyed but by the Lawes of the land no man disseized of his inheritance but by the Lawes of the land imprisoned they are by the prerogative where the King hath cause to suspect their loyalty for were it otherwise the King should never come to the knowledge of any conspiracy or Treason against his Person or state and being imprisoned yet doth not any man suffer death but by the Law of the land JUST But may it please your Lordship were not Cornewallis Sharpe and Hoskins imprisoned being no suspition of Treason there COUNS. They were but it cost them nothing JUST And what got the King by it for in the conclusion besides the murmure of the people Cornewallis Sharpe and Hoskins having greatly overshot themselves and repented them a fine of 5 or 600l. was laid on his Majesty for their offences for so much their diet cost his Majesty COUNS. I know who gave the advice sure I am that it was none of mine But thus I say if you consult your memory you shall find that those Kings which did in their own times comfirme the Magna Charta did not onely imprison but they caused of their Nobility and others to be slain without hearing or tryall JUST My good Lord if you will give me leave to speak freely I say that they are not well advised that perswade the King not to admit the Magna Charta with the former reservations For as the King can never lose a farthing by it as I shall prove anon So except England were as Naples is and kept by Garrisons of another Nation it is impossible for a King of England to greaten and inrich himself by any way so assuredly as by the love of his people For by one rebellion the King hath more losse then by a hundred years observance of Magna Charta For therein have our Kings been forced to compound with Roagues and Rebels and to pardon them yea the state of the King the Mouarchie the Nobility have been endangered by them COUNS. Well Sir let that passe why should not our Kings raise mony as the Kings of France do by their letters and Edicts onely for since the time of Lewes the 11. of whom it is said that he freed the French Kings of their wardship the French Kings have seldome assembled the states for any contribution JUST I will tell you why the strength of England doth consist of the people and Yeomanry the Pefants of France have no courage nor armes In France every Village and Burrough hath a castle which the French call Chasteau Villain every good City hath a good Cittadell the King hath the Regiments of his guards and his men at armes alwayes in pay yea the Nobility of France in whom the strength of France consists doe alwayes assist the King in those leavies because themselves being free they made the same leavies upon ther Tennants But my Lord if you marke it France was never free in effect from civill wars and lately it was endangered either to be conquered by the Spaniard or to be cantonized by the rebellious French themselves since that freedome of Wardship But my good Lord to leave this digression that wherein I would willingly satisfie your Lordship is that the Kings of England have never received losse by Parliament or prejudice COUNS. No Sir you shall find that the subjects in Parliament have decreed great things to the disadvantage and dishonour of our Kings in former times JUST My good Lord to avoid confusion I will make a short repitition of them all then your Lordship may object where you see cause And I doubt not but to give your Lordship satisfaction In the sixt year of Henry the 3d there was no dispute the house gave the King two shillings of every plough land within England and in the end of the same year he had escuage payed him to wit for every Knights fee two marks in silver In the fifth year of that King the Lords demaunded the confirmation of the Great Charter which the Kings Councell for that time present excused alleadging that those priviledges were exhorted by force during the Kings Minoritie and yet the King was pleased to send forth his writ to the Sheriffes of every Countrey requiring them to certifie what those liberties were and how used and in exchange of the Lords demaund because they pressed him so violently the King required all the castles and places which the Lords held of his and had held in the time of his Father with those Manors and Lordships which they had heretofore wrested from the Crown which at that time the King being provided of forces they durst not deny in the 14 year he had the 15. peny of all goods given him upon condition to confirme the Great Charter For by reason
of the wars in France and the losse of Rochett he was them enforced to consent to the Lords in all they demanded in the tenth of his reigne he fined the City of London at 50000. marks because they had received Lewis of France in the 11. year in the Parliament at Oxford he revoked the great Charter being granted when he was under age and governed by the Earle of Pembroke and the Bishop of Winchester in this 11. year the Earles of Cornewall and Chester Marshall Edward Earle of Pembroke Gilbert Earle of Gloucester Warren Hereford Ferrars and Warwick and others rebelled against the King and constrained him to yeeld unto them in what they demaunded for their particular interest which rebellion being appeased he sayled into France and in his 15. year he had a 15th of the temporality and a disme and a half of the spirituality and withall escuage of every Knights fee. COUNS. But what say you to the Parliament of Westminster in the 16th of the King where notwithstanding the wars of France and his great charge in repulsing the Welsh rebels he was flatly denyed the Subsidy demanded IUST I confesse my Lord that the house excused themselves by reason of their poverty and the Lords taking of Armes in the next year it was manifest that the house was practised aganst the King And was it not so my good Lord think you in our two last Parliaments for in the first even those whom his Majesty trusted most betrayed him in the union and in the second there were other of the great ones ran counter But your Lordship spake of dangers of Parliaments in this my Lord there was a denyall but there was no danger at all but to returne where I left what got the Lords by practizing the house at that time I say that those that brake this staffe upon the King were overturned with the counterbuffe for he resumed all those lands which he had given in his minority he called all his exacting officers to accompt he found them all faulty he examined the corruption of other Magistrates and from all these he drew sufficient money to satisfie his present necessity whereby he not onely spared his people but highly contented them with an act of so great Iustice Yea Hubert Earle of Kent the chief Iustice whom he had most trusted and most advanced was found as false to the King as any one of the rest And for conclusion in the end of that year at the assembly of the States at Lambeth the King had the fortieth part of every mans goods given him freely toward his debts for the people who the same year had refused to give the King any thing when they saw he had squeased those spunges of the Common-wealth they willingly yeelded to give him satisfaction COUNS. But I pray you what became of this Hubert whom the King had favoured above all men betraying his Majesty as he did IUST There were many that perswaded the King to put him to death but he could not be drawn to consent but the King seized upon his estate which was great yet in the end he left him a sufficient portion and gave him his life because he had done great service in former times For this Majesty though he tooke advantage of his vice yet he forgot not to have consideration of his vertue And upon this occasion it was that the King betrayed by those whom he most trusted entertained strangers and gave them their offices and the charge of his Castles and strong places in England COUNS. But the drawing in of those strangers was the cause that Marshall Earle of Pembroke moved war against the King JUST It is true my good Lord but he was soon after slain in Ireland and his whole masculine race ten yeares extinguished though there were five Sons of them and Marshal being dead who was the mover and ring-leader of that war the King pardoned the rest of the Lords that had assisted Marshall COUNS. What reason had the King so to doe JUST Because he was perswaded that they loved his person and only hated those corrupt Counsellors that then bare the greatest sway under him as also because they were the best men of war he had whom if he destroyed having war with the French he had wanted Commanders to have served him COUNS. But what reason had the Lords to take armes JUST Because the King entertained the Poictovins were not they the Kings vassals also Should the Spaniards rebell because the Spanish King trusts to the Neapolitans Fortagues Millanoies and other Nations his vassals seeing those that are governed by the Vice-royes and deputies are in policy to be well entertained to be employed who would otherwise devise how to free themselves whereas being trusted and imployed by their Prince they entertain themselves with the hopes that other the Kings vassals do if the King had called in the Spaniards or other Nations not his Subjects the Nobilitie of England had reason of grief COUNS. But what people did ever serve the King of England more faithfully then the Gascoynes did even to the last of the conquest of that Duchie IUST Your Lordship sayes well and I am of that opinion that if it had pleased the Queen of Eng. to have drawn some of the chief of the Irish Nobilitie into Eng. and by exchange to have made them good free-holders in Eng. she had saved above 2. millions of pounds which were consumed in times of those Rebellions For what held the great Gascoigne firme to the Crown of England of whom the Duke of Espernon married the Inheritrix but his Earldome of Kendall in England whereof the Duke of Espernon in right of his Wife beares the Title to this day And to the same end I take it hath Iames our Soveraign Lord given Lands to divers of the Nobilitie of Scotland And if I were worthy to advise your Lordship I should think that your Lordship should do the King great service to put him in mind to prohibite all the Scottish Nation to alienate and sell away their inheritance here for they selling they not only give cause to the English to complain that the Treasure of England is transported into Scotland but his Majestie is thereby also frustrated of making both Nations one and of assuring the service and obedience of the Scots in future COUNS. You say well for though those of Scotland that are advanced and enriched by the Kings Majesties will no doubt serve him faithfully yet how their heires and successors having no inheritance to lose in England may be seduced is uncertain But let us go on with our Parliament And what say you to the denyall in the 26th year of his reigne even when the King was invited to come into France by the Earle of March who had married his Mother and who promised to assist the King in the conquest of many places lost IUST It is true my good Lord that a subsidie was then denied and the reasons are
delivered in English Histories and indeed the King not long before had spent much Treasure in aiding the Duke of Britain to no purpose for he drew over the King but to draw on good conditions for himself as the Earle of March his father in law now did As the English Barons did invite Lewes of France not long before as in elder times all the Kings and States had done and in late years the Leaguers of France entertained the Spaniards and the French Protestants and Netherlands Queen Elizabeth not with any purpose to greaten those that aide them but to purchase to themselves an advantageous peace But what say the Histories to this denyall They say with a world of payments there mentioned that the King had drawn the Nobility drie And besides that whereas not long before great summes of money were given and the same appointed to be kept in four Castles and not to be expended but by the advice of the Peeres it was beleeved that the same Treasure was yet unspent COUNS. Good Sir you have said enough judge you whether it were not a dishonour to the King to be so tyed as not to expend his Treasure but by other mens advice as it were by their licence IUST Surely my Lord the King was well advised to take the money upon any condition and they were fooles that propounded the restraint for it doth not appear that the King took any great heed to those overseers Kings are bound by their pietie and by no other obligation In Queen Maries time when it was thought that she was with Child it was propounded in Parliament that the rule of the Realme should be given to King Philip during the minoritie of the hoped Prince or Princesse and the King offered his assurance in great summes of money to relinquish the Government at such time as the Prince or Princesse should be of age At which motion when all else were silent in the House Lord Daâ—res who was none of the wisest asked who shall sue the Kings Bonds which ended the dispute for what other Bond is between a King and his vassals then the Bond of the Kings Faith But my good Lord the King notwithstanding the denyall at that time was with gifts from particular persons and otherwise supplyed for proceeding of his journey for that time into France he took with him 30 Caskes filled with Silver and Coyne which was a great Treasure in those dayes And lastly notwithstanding the first denyall in the Kings absence he had Escuage granted him to wit 20s of every Knights Fee COUNS. What say you then to the 28th year of that King in which when the King demanded reliefe the States would not consent except the the same former order had bin taken for the appointing of 4 overseers for the treasure as also that the Lord chief Iustice and the L. Chancelor should be chosen by the States with some Barons of the Exchequer and other officers JUST My good Lord admit the King had yeelded their demands then whatsoever had been ordained by those Magistrates to the dislike of the Common-wealth the people had been without remedie whereas while the King made them they had their appeal and other remedies But those demands vanished and in the end the King had escuage given him without any of their conditions It is an excellent vertue in a King to have patience and to give way to the furie of mens passions The Whale when he is strucken by the fisherman growes into that furie that he cannot be resisted but will overthrow all the Ships and Barkes that come into his way but when he hath tumbled a while he is drawn to the shore with a twin'd thred COUNS. What say you then to the Parliament in the 29th of that King IUST I say that the Commons being unable to pay the King relieves himself upon the richer sort and so it likewise happened in the 33. of that King in which he was relieved chiefly by the Citie of London But my good Lord in the Parliament in London in the 38th year he had given him the tenth of all the revenues of the Church for 3 years and three marks of every Knights Fee throughout the Kingdome upon his promise and oath upon the observing of Magna Charta but in the end of the same year the King being then in France he was denyed the aides which he required What is this to the danger of a Parliament especially at this time they had reason to refuse they had given so great a summe in the beginning of the same year And again because it was known that the King had but pretended war with the King of Castile with whom he had secretly contracted an alliance and concluded a Marriage betwixt his Son Edward and the Lady Elenor. These false fires do but fright Children and it commonly falls out that when the cause given is known to be false the necessitie pretended is thought to be fained Royall dealing hath evermore Royall successe and as the King was denyed in the eight and thirtieth year so was he denyed in the nine and thirtieth year because the Nobilitie and the people saw it plainely that the K. was abused by the Pope who as well in despite to Manfred bastard Son to the Emperour Frederick the second as to cozen the King and to waste him would needes bestow on the King the Kingdome of Sicily to recover which the King sent all the Treasure he could borrow or scrape to the Pope and withall gave him letters of credence for to take up what he could in Italy the King binding himself for the payment Now my good Lord the wisdome of Princes is seen in nothing more then in their enterprises So how unpleasing it was to the State of England to consume the Treasure of the Land and in the conquest of Sicily so far off and otherwise for that the English had lost Normandie under their noses and so many goodly parts of France of their own proper inheritances the reason of the denyall is as well to be considered as the denyall COUNS. Was not the King also denyed a Subsidie in the fortie first of his reigne IUST No my Lord for although the King required money as before for the impossible conquest of Sicily yet the House offered to give 52000 marks which whether he refused or accepted is uncertain and whilst the King dreamed of Sicily the Welsh invaded and spoyled the borders of England for in the Parliament of London when the King urged the House for the prosecuting the conquest of Sicily the Lords utterly disliking the attempt urged the prosecuting of the Welshmen which Parliament being proroged did again assemble at Oxford and was called the mad Parliament which was no other then an assembly of rebels for the royal assent of the King which gives life to all Lawes form'd by the three estates was not a royall assent when both the King and the Prince were constrained to yeeld to the
Lord rather to be commended as preparing against all danger of Innovation COUNS. It should be so but call your observation to accompt and you shall find it as I say for indeed such a jealousie hath been held ever since the time of the Civill wars over the Military greatness of our Nobles as made them have little will to bend their studies that wayes wherefore let every man provide according as he is rated in the Muster Book you understand me IUST Very well my Lord as what might be replyed in the perceiving so much I have ever to deal plainly and freely with your Lordship more fear'd at home popular violence then all the forreine that can be made for it can never be in the power of any forraigne Prince without a Papisticall party rather to disorder or endanger his Majesties Estate COUNS. By this it seems it is no lesse dangerous for a King to leave the power in the people then in the Nobility IUST My good Lord the wisdome of our own age is the foolishnesse of another the time present ought not to be preferr'd to the policy that was but the policy that was to the time present so that the power of the Nobility being now withered and the power of the people in the flower the care to content them would not be neglected the way to win them often practized or at least to defend them from oppression The motive of all dangers that ever this Monarchy hath undergone should be carefully heeded for this Maxime hath no posterne Potestas humana radicatur in voluntatibus hominum And now my Lord for King Edward it is true though he were not subject to force yet was he subject to necessity which because it was violent he gave way unto it Potestas saith Pithagoras juxta necessitatem habitat And it is true that at the request of the house he discharged and put from him those before named which done he had the greatest gift but one that ever he received in all his dayes to wit from every person man and woman above the age of fourteen years 4d of old mony which made many Millions of Groats worth 61. of our mony This he had in generall besides he had of every benificed Priest 12d And of the Nobility and Gentry I know not how much for it is not set down Now my good Lord what lost the King by satisfying the desires of the Parliament house for assoon as he had the money in purse he recalled the Lords and restored them and who durst call the King to accompt when the Assembly were dissolued Where the word of a King is there is power saith Ecclesiasticus who shall say unto him what doest thou saith the same Author for every purpose there is a time and judgement the King gave way to the time and his judgement perswaded him to yeeld to necessity Consularius nemo melior est quam tempus COUNS. But yet you see the king was forc'd to yeeld to their demaunds JUST Doth your Lordship remember the saying of Monsier de Lange that he that hath the profit of the war hath also the honour of the war whether it be by battaile or retreate the King you see had the profit of the Parliament and therefore the honour also what other end had the King then to supply his wants A wise man hath evermore respect unto his ends and the King also knew that it was the love that the people bare him that they urged the removing of those Lords there was no man among them that sought himself in that desire but they all sought the king as by the successe it appeared My good Lord hath it not been ordinary in England and in France to yeeld to the demaunds of rebels did not King Richard the second graunt pardon to the outragious rogues and murtherers that followed Iack Straw and Wat Tâ—ler after they had murthered his Chancellor his Treasurer Chief Iustice and others brake open his Exchequer and committed all manner of outrages and villanies and why did he do it but to avoid a greater danger I say the Kings have then yeelded to those that hated them and their estates to wit to pernicious rebels And yet without dishonour shall it be called dishonour for the King to yeeld to honest desires of his subjects No my Lord those that tell the King those tales fear their own dishonour and not the Kings for the honour of the King is supreame and being guarded by Iustice and piety it cannot receive neither wound nor stain COUNS. But Sir what cause have any about our King to fear a Parliament IUST The same cause that the Earle of Suffolke had in Richard the seconds time and the Treasurer Fartham with others for these great Officers being generally hated for abusing both the King and the Subject at the request of the States were discharged and others put in their roomes COUN And was not this a dishonour to the King IUST Certainly no for King Richard knew that his Grandfather had done the like and though the King was in his heart utterly against it yet had he the profit of this exchange for Suffolke was fined at 20000 markes and 1000l lands COUNS. Well Sir we will speak of those that fear the Parliament some other time but I pray you go on with that that happened in the troublesome raigne of Richard the second who succeeded the Grandfather being dead IUST That King my good Lord was one of the most unfortunate Princes that ever England had he was cruell extreame prodigall and wholly carryed away with his two Minions Suffolk and the Duke of Ireland by whose ill advice and others he was in danger to have lost his estate which in the end being led by men of the like temper he miserably lost But for his subsedies he had given him in his first year being under age two tenths and two fifteenes In which Parliament Alice Peirce who was removed in King Edwards time with Lancaster Latimer and Sturry were confiscate and banished in his second year at the Parliament at Glocester the King had a marke upon every sack of Wooll and 6d the pound upon wards In his third year at the Parliament at Winchester the Commons were spared and a subsedy given by the better sort the Dukes gave 20 markes and Earles 6 markes Bishoppes and Abbots with myters six markes every marke 35. 4d and every Knight Iustice Esquire Shrieve Person Vicar Chaplaine paid proportionably according to their estates COUNS. This me thinks was no great matter IUST It is true my Lord but a little mony went far in those dayes I my self once moved it in Parliament in the time of Queen Elizabeth who desired much to spare the Common people I did it by her Commandement but when we cast up the subsedy Books we found the summe but small when the 30l men were left out In the beginning of his fourth year a tenth with a fifteen were granted upon
Crown the ornaments thereof And it is an infalliable maxime that he that loves not his Majesties estate loves not his person COUNS. How came it then that the act was not executed IUST Because these against whom it was granted perswaded the King to the contrary as the Duke of Ireland Suffolk the chief Iustice Tresilian and others yea that which was lawfully done by the King and the great Councell of the kingdome was by the mastery which Ireland Suffolk and Tresilian had over the Kings affections broken and disavowed Those that devised to relieve the King not by any private invention but by generall Councell were by a private and partiall assembly adjudged traitors and the most honest Iudges of the land enforced to subscribe to that judgement In so much that Iudge Belknap plainly told the Duke of Ireland and the Earl of Suffolk when he was constrained to set his hand plainly told these Lords that he wanted but a rope that he might therewith receive a reward for his subscription And in this Councell of Nottingham was hatched the ruine of those which governed the King of the Iudges by them constrained of the Lords that loved the King and sought a reformation and of the King himself for though the King found by all the Shrieves of the shires that the people would not fight against the Lords whom they thought to bee most faithfull unto the King when the Citizens of London made the same answer being at that time able to arme 50000. men and told the Major that they would never fight against the Kings friends and defenders of the Realme when the Lord Ralph Passet who was near the King told the King boldly that he would not adventure to have his head broken for the Duke of Irelands pleasure when the Lord of London told the Earle of Suffolk in the Kings presence that he was not worthy to live c. yet would the King in the defence of the destroyers of his estate lay ambushes to intrap the Lords when they came upon his faith yea when all was pacified and that the King by his Proclamation had clear'd the Lords and promised to produce Ireland Suffolk and the Archbishop of Yorke Tresiltan and Bramber to answer at the next Parliament these men confest that they durst not appear and when Suffolk fled to Callice and the Duke of Ireland to Chester the King caused an army to be leavied in Lancashire for the safe conduct of the Duke of Ireland to his presence when as the Duke being encountered by the Lords ranne like a coward from his company and fled into Holland After this was holden a Parliament which was called that wrought wonders In the Eleventh year of this King wherein the fornamed Lords the Duke of Ireland and the rest were condemned and confiscate the Chief Iustice hanged with many others the rest of the Iudges condemned and banisht and a 10. and a 15. given to the King COUNS. But good Sir the King was first besieged in the Tower of London and the Lords came to the Parliament and no man durst contradict them IUST Certainly in raising an army they committed treason and though it appear that they all loved the King for they did him no harm having him in their power yet our law doth construe all leavying of war without the Kings commission and all force raised to be intended for the death and destruction of the King not attending the sequell And it is so judged upon good reason for every unlawfull and ill action is supposed to be accompanied with an ill intent And besides those Lords used too great cruelty in procuring the sentence of death against divers of the Kings servants who were bound to follow and obey their Master and Soveraigne Lord in that he commanded COUNS. It is true and they were also greatly to blame to cause then so many seconds to be put to death seeing the principalls Ireland Suffolk and York had escaped them And what reason had they to seek to enform the State by strong hand was not the Kings estate as dear to himself as to them He that maketh a King know his errour mannerly and private and gives him the best advice he is discharged before God and his own conscience The Lords might have â—â—tired themselves when they saw they could not prevail and have left the King to his own wayes who had more to lose then they had IUST My Lord the taking of Arms cannot be excused in respect of the law but this might be said for the Lords that the King being under yeares and being wholly governed by their enemies and the enemies of the kingdome and because by those evil mens perswasions it was advised how the Lords should have been murthered at a feast in London they were excusable during the kings minority to stand upon their guard against their particular enemies But we will passe it over go on with our parliaments that followed whereof that of Cambridge in the Kings 12th year was the next therein the King had given him a 10th and a 15th after which being 20. yeares of age rechanged saith H. Kinghton his Treasurer his Chancellour the Iustices of either bench the Clerk of the privy seal and others and took the government into his own hands He also took the Admirals place from the Earl of Arundell and in his room he placed the Earl of Huntingdon in the yeare following which was the 13th year of the K. in the Parliament at Westminster there was given to the King upon every sack of wooll 14s and 6d in the gound upon other Merchandise COUNS. But by your leave the King was restrained this parliament that he might not dispose of but a third part of the money gathered IUST No my Lord by your favour But true it is that part of this mony was by the Kings consent assigned towards the wars but yet left in the Lord Treasurers hands and my Lord it would be a great ease and a great saving to his Majesty our Lord and Master if it pleased him to make his assignations upon some part of his revenewes by which he might have 1000l upon every 10000l and save himself a great deale of clamour For seeing of necessity the Navy must be maintained and that those poor men as well Carpenters as ship-keepers must be paid it were better for his Majesty to give an assignation to the Treasurer of his Navy for the receiving of so much as is called ordinary then to discontent those poor men who being made desperate beggars may perchance be corrupted by them that lye in wait to destroy the Kings estate And if his Majesty did the like in all other payements especially where the necessity of such as are to receive cannot possible give dayes his Majesty might then in a little rowle behold his receipts and expences he might quiet his heart when all necessaries were provided for and then dispose the rest at his pleasure And my good Lord
rather devour themselves then destroy enemies Such an army vvhereof the fourth part vvould have conquered all Ireland vvas in respect of Ireland such an army as Xerxes led into Greece in this tvventieth yeare vvherein he had a tenth of the Clergy vvas the great conspiracy of the Kings unkle the Duke of Glocester and of Moubrey Arundell Nottingham and Warvvick the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Abbbot of Westminster and others vvho in the one and tvventieth yeare of the King vvere all redeemed by Parliament and vvhat thinks your Lordship vvas not this assemble of the 3. states for the kings estate vvherein he so prevailed that he not onely overthrevv those popular Lords but besides the English Chronicle saith the king so vvrought and brought things about that he obtained the power of both houses to be granted to certain persons to 15. Noblemen and Gentlemen or to seven of them COUNS. Sir whether the King wrought well or il I cannot judge but our Chronicles say that many things were done in this Parliament to the displeasure of no small number of people to wit for that diverse rightfull heires were disinherited of their lands and livings with which wrongfull doings the people were much offended so that the King with those that were about him and chief in Counsell came into great infamy slander IUST My good Lord if your Lordship will pardon mee I am of opinion that those Parliaments wherein the Kings of this land have satisfied the people as they have been ever prosperous so where the King hath restrained the house the contrary hath happened for the Kings atchievments in this Parliament were the ready preparations to his ruine COV You mean by the generall discontentment that followed and because the King did not proceed legally with Glocester and others Why Sir this was not the first time that the Kings of England have done things without the Counsell of the land yea contrary to the law IUST It is true my Lord in some particulars as even at this time the Duke of Glocester was made away at Callâ—ce by strong hand without any lawfull triall for he was a man so beloved of the people and so allied having the Dukes of Lancaster and York his brethren the Duke of Aumarle and the Duke of Hereford his Nephewes the great Earles of Arundell and Warwicke with diverse other of his part in the conspiracy as the King durst not trie him according to the law for at the triall of Arundell and Warwicke the King was forced to entertaine a petty army about him And though the Duke was greatly lamented yet it cannot be denyed but that he was then a traytor to the King And was it not so my Lord with the Duke of Guise your Lordship doth remember the spur-gald proverb that necessitie hath no law and my good Lord it is the practice of doing wrong and of generall wrongs done that brings danger and not where Kings are prest in this or that particular for there is great difference between naturall cruelty and accidentall And therefore it was Machiavels advice that all that a King did in that kind he shall do at once and by his mercies afterwards make the world know that his cruelty was not affected And my Lord take this for a generall rule that the immortall policy of a state cannot admit any law or priviledge whatsoever but in some particular or other the same is necessarily broken yea in an Aristocratia or popular estate which vaunts so much of equality and common right more outrage hath been committed then in any Christian Monarchy COUNS. But whence came this hatred between the Duke and the King his Nephew IUST My Lord the Dukes constraining the King when he was young stuck in the Kings heart and now the Dukes proud speech to the King when he had rendred Brest formerly engaged to the Duke Brittain kindled again these coales that were not altogether extinguished for he used these words Your grace ought to put your body in great pain to winne a strong hold or town by feats of armes ere you take upon you to sell or deliver any town gotten by the manhood and strong hand and policy of your noble progenitors Whereat saith the story the King changed his countenance c. and to say truth it was a proud and maisterly speech of the Duke besides that inclusively he taxed him of sloath and cowardise as if he had never put himself to the adventure of winning such a place undutifull words of a subject do often take deeper root then the memory of ill deeds do The Duke of Biron found it when the King had him at advantage Yea the late Earle of Essex told Queen Elizabeth that her conditions was as crooked as her carkasse but it cost him his head which his insurrection had not cost him but for that speech who will say unto a King saith Iob thou art wicked Certainly it is the same thing to say unto a Lady thou art crooked and perchance more as to say unto a King that he is wicked and to say that he is a coward or to use any other words of disgrace it is one and the same errour COUNS. But what say you for Arundell a brave and valiant man who had the Kings pardon of his contempt during his minority IUST My good Lord the Parliament which you say disputes the Kings prerogative did quite contrary and destroyed the Kings charter and pardon formerly given to Arundell And my good Lord do you remember that at the Parliament that wrought wonders when these Lords compounded that Parliament as the King did this they were so mercilesse towards all that they thought their enemies as the Earle of Arundell most insolently suffered the Qu to kneel unto him three houres for the saving of one of her servants and that scorne of his manebat alto mente repostum And to say the truth it is more barbarous unpardonable then any act that ever he did to permit the wife of his Soveraign to kneel to him being the Kings vassell For if he had saved the Lords servant freely at her first request as it is like enough that the Qu would also have saved him Miseris succurrens paria obtenibis aliquando For your Lordship sees that the Earle of Warwicke who was as farre in the treason as any of the rest was pardoned It was also at this Parliament that the Duke of Hereford accused Moubray Duke of Norfolke and that the Duke of Hereford Sonne to the Duke of Lancaster was banished to the Kings confusion as your Lordship well knows COUNS. I know it well and God knows that the King had then a silly and weak Councell about him that perswaded him to banish a Prince of the bloud a most valiant man and the best beloved of the people in generall of any man living especially considering that the King gave every day more then other offence to his subjects For besides that he fined the
contrarie 2. Magistrates and Officers which are to be executioners of that which consulted and found to be expedient for the Common-wealth wherein are to be observed the kinds of Magistrate than they be such as fit that kind of Government The time of their continuance and the manner of their election or appointing by whom out tâ— whom and in what manner they be chosen 3. Judges To determine in Civil and Criminal matters where are to be observed out of whom they are to be chosen what kinds are necessary and the manner of Judgement and Judicial proceeding In Magistrates are to be observed 1. Kinds of Magistrates 1. Civil 1. Superiour which are to be such of that kind as agree with the State as Consuls for a year and not perpetual Dictatours in a Senatorie State Praetors Censors that over-see manners orders of the people For a Kingdom Lieutenant of Shires Marshals Masters of Horse Admirals c. Inferiour as conservatours of Peace Constables c. Overseers of youth that take care for their education for civil and warlike exercise Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity and price of victual Edâ—â—es for Buildings Streets Bounds Questours or Treasurers to keep and dispence the publick Treasury Aâ—uâ—â—ies or Recorders which keep the publick Record Goalers to keep prison and Prisoners Surveyours of woods and fields c. 1. As Bishops or Pastours Elders Wardens 2. Time of Magistrates whereof some are perpetual some for a time viz. for more years a year half a year according to the necessity of the Common-wealth and not perpetual or at least not Heredetary in a Kingdom Yearly in an Aristocracie or half yearly in a Free-State 3. Manner of choice by whom and how to be chosen where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage and not by Lot 2. Eclesiastical Causes preserving a State or Common-wealth In preserving of States a things required 1 Mysteries or Sophisms 1. General to all States 2. Particular for every several State 2. Rules or Actions 1. General for all States 2. Particular for every State Mysteries or Sophisms MYsteries or Sophisms of State are certain secret practices either for the avoiding of danger or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the prefent State as it is set or founded State Mysteries are of two sorts 1. Generall That pertain to all States as first to provide by all means that the same degree or part of the Common-wealth do not exceed both in Quantity and Quality In Quantity as that the number of the Nobility or of great persons be not more than the State or Common-wealth can bear In Quality as that none grow in wealth Liberty Honours c. more than it is meet for that degree For as in weights the heavier weights bear down he Scale So in Common-wealths that part of degree that excelleth the rest in Quality and Quantity overswayeth the rest after it whereof follow alterations and conversions of â—tate Secondly to provide by all means that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreams viz. of Nobility and Gentry and the base rascal and beggarly sort For this maketh the State constant and firm when both the Extreams are tied together by a middle sort as it were with a band as for any conspiracie of the rich and beggarly sort together it is not to be feared To these two points the Particular rules in Sophisms of every Common-wealth are to be applied 2. Particular That serve for preservation of every Common wealth in that form of State wherein it is setled as in a Kingdom That the Nobility may be accustomed to bear the Government of the Prince especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the Princes eye it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the Princes Court under presence of doing them honour or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence and to have their children especially their eldest to be attendant upon the Prince as of special favour towards them and theirs that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince and be as Hostages for the good hehaviour and faithfull dealing of their Parents especially if they be of any suspected note To that end serves the Persian practice in having a Band or Train of the Satrapa's children and other Nobles to attend the Court which was well imitated by our Train of Heâ—â—â—â—â—r if they were of the Nobler sort Again sometimes to borrow small sums of his Subjects and to pay them again that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay So in an Oligarchie least it decline to a Popular State they deceive the people with this and the like Sophisms viz. They compel their own sort to wit the rich men by great penalties to frequent their Assemblie for choosing of Magistrates for provision of Armour warlike Exercises making an Execution of Laws By that means seemin to bear a hard hand over the richer but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to be absent and to neglect those Assemblies under pretence that they will not draw them from their business and private earnings Yet withall to cite thither some few of them viz. so many as are casily over-matched by the richer sort to make a shew that they would have the people or poorer sort partakers likewise of those matters yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies with the tendiousnesse of consultations greatnesse of Fines if they should mis-do to the end to make them unwilling to come again or to have to do with those Consultations by which means the richer sort do still govern the State with the peoples liking and good contentment Aixoms Axioms or Rules of preserving the State are 1. General that serve for all Common-wealths 2. Particular that serve for every several State General Rules 1. THe first and principal Rule of Policie to be observed in all States is to profess practise maintain the true worship Religio of Almighty God prescribed unto us in his word which is the chief end of all Government The Axiom That God be obeyed simply without exception though he command that which seemeth unreasonable and absurb to Humane policy as in the Jews Common-wealth That all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship God four times leaving none to defend their coast though being beset with many Enemies Not to sow the seventh year but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine c. 2. To avoid the causes of Conversion whereby States are over thrown that are set down in the Title of conversions For that Common wealth as naturall bodies are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof and are so cured by contrary medicines 3. To take heed that no Magistrate be created or continued contrarie to the Laws and policie of that State As that in a Seâ—atâ— there be not created a perpetual Dictaetor
as Caesar in Rome In a Kingdom that there be no Senate or Convention of equall power with the Prince in State matters as in Poland 4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is setled and take heed of the contrarie practise as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdom or Aristocracie And secondly to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve and what hurreth or altereth the present State 5. To that end to have certain Officers to pay abroad and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort agreeable to the present State but desire rather to bee under some other form or kind of Government 6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money nor bribe in their Offices which especially to be observed in that Common wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his Common Fees the common sort and such as want honour take in good part that they be not preferred and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters the common people are doubly grieved both because they are debat'd of those preferments and of that gain they see to grow by them which is the cause that the German Oligarchies continue to firm for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth and the richer sort are by that means freed and secured from being under the poor 7. To take heed that the State as it is setled and maintained be not over-strict nor exceed in his kind viz. That a Kingdom be not too Monarchicall nor a Pâ—â—ulâ— State too Pâ—â—uâ—ar For which cause it is good that the Magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour and bahave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts though inferiour for place and office And sometimes popularly with the common people which is the cause that some Common wealths though they be very simply and un kilfully set yet continue firm because the Magistrates behave themselves wisely and with due respect toward the rest that are without honour and therefore some kind of Moderate Popularity is to be used in every Common-wealth 8. To take heed of small beginnings and to meet with them even at the first as well touching the breaking and altering of Laws as of other rules which concern the continuance of every severall State For the desease and a teration of a Common-wealth doth not happen all at once but grows by degrees which every common wit cannot discern but men expert in POLICIE 9. To provide that that part be ever the greater in number and power which favours the State as now it stands This is to be observed as a very Oracle in all Common-wealths 10. To observe a mean in all the degrees and to suffer no part to exceed or decay overmuch As first for preferments to provide that they be rather small and short than great and long and if any be grown to overmuch greatness to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour Where these Sophisms are to be practised viz. to do it by parts and degrees to do it by occasion or colour of law and not all at once And it that way serve not to advance some other of whose virtue and faithfulness we are fully assined to as high a degree or to a greater honour and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth above that which is meet As touching wealth to provide that those of the middle sort as before was said be more in number and if any grow high and over charged with wealth to use the Sophisms of a Popular State viz to send him on Embassages and Forreign Negotiations or imploy him in some Office that hath great charges and little honour c. To which end the Fâ—â—â—â—ful served in some Common-wealths 11 To Suppress the Factions and quarrels of the Nobles and to keep other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and Factions 12. To increase or remit the Common Taxes and Contributions according to the wealth or want of the People and Commonwealth If the people be increased in Wealth the Taxes and Subsidies may be increased If they be poor and their Wealth diminish specially by dearth want of Traffick c. to forbear Taxes and Impositions or to take little Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow The Sophisms that serve for impositions are these and other of like sort To pretend business of great charge as War building of Ships making of Havens Castles Fortifications c. for the common defence sometimes by Lotteries and like devises wherein some part may be bestowed the rest reserved for other expences but Princely dealings needs no pretences 13. To Provide that the Discipline Training of youth of the better sort to such as agreeth with that Common-wealth As that in a Kingdom the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince In the Senatory State that the sons oâ— the Senatours be not idly nor over daintily brought up but well instructed and trained up in Learning Langues and nartiall exercise that they may be able to bear that place in the Common-wealth which their Father held and câ—nt any wise in a Popular State 14. To take heed least their Sophisms or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that State be not discovered least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves but wisely used and be with great secrecie Particular Rules Rules and Axioms for preserving of a Kingdom Hereditary Conquered Kingdoms Hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering 1. HImself viz. By the tempering and moderation of the Princes Answer and Prerogative For the less and more Temperate their Power and State is the more firm and stable is their Kingdom and Government because they seem to be further off from a Master like and Tyrannte all Empire and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree to wit the Nobility and so lesse subject to grudge and envy 2. Nobility c. By keeping that degree and due proportion that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm or State can bear as the Scottish Kingdom and sometime the English when the Realm was overcharged with the number of Dukes Earls and other Noble whereby the Authority of the Prince was eclipsed and the Realm troubled with their Factions and Ambitions Nor that any one excel in Honour power or wealth as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom as the house of Lancaster within this Realm To that end not to load any with too much Honour or preferment because it is hard even for the best and worthiest men to bear their greatnesse and high Fortune temperately as appeareth by infinit examples in all States The Sophisms for preventing or reforming this inconvenience are to be
used with great caution and wisdom If any great person be to be abated not do real with him by calumniation or forged â—atter and so to cut him off without desert especially if he be gratious among the people after the â—â—chiavâ—an Place which besides the injustice an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince Not to withdraw their Honour all at once which maketh a desperate 〈◊〉 in the party and a commiseration in the people and so greater love he be gracious for his virtue and publick service Not to banish him into Forreign Countries where he may have opportunity of practising with Forreign States whereof great danger may â—nâ—e as in the example of â—ortulanus Henry the fourth and such like But to use these and the like Sophisms viz. To abate their greatnesse by degrees as David Joabs faâ—â—â—â—a Bellisarius c. To advance some other men to as great or greater Honour to shadow â—â— over-mate the greatnesse of the other To draw from him by degrees his friends and followers by â—â—veferâ—â—â— rewards and other good and lawfull means especially to be provided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the Common wealth whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the State 3. People viz. So to order and behave himself that he be loved and reverenced of the People For that the Prince need not greatly fear home conspiracâ—es or forreign Invation she be firmly loved of this own people That reason for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise not any refuge being discovered put to flight â—t the multitude affect their Prince But the common people being once offended hath cause to fear every moving both at home and abroad This may be affected by the Prince the use means and art of getting the favour of the people and avoid those things that breed have and contempt viz. if he seem as Tutor or a Father to love the people and to protect them if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom For that nothing is more popular nor more pleasing to the people than is peace 4. If he shew himself oftentime graciously yet with State and Majestie to his people and receive complaint of his suppliants and such like 5. If he sit himself sometimes in Open Courts and place of â—ustice that he may seem to have a care of Iâ—â—stice among his people If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that Citie which he maketh the seat of his Lâ—â—â—â— and to make it sure and faithfull unto him which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom as the heart in the middle of the body or the Sun in the middle of Heaven both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions and least the furthest parts at one end move whilest the Prince is in the other If he go in progress many times to see his Provinces especially those that are remite 6 If he gratifie his Couâ—tiers and â—â—â—â—ians in that sort and by such means as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt injury of his people as with Mâ—nâ—â—olâ—es and such like 7 If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy or seem grievous to his Ministers but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himself as the French Kings who for that purpose as may seem have erected their Court at Paris which acquitteth the Prince from grudge and envy both with the Nobles and the scope 8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people though he have no need and pay the same justly without defalcation of any part by his Exchequer or other Officer 9. If he avoid all such things as may breed hâ—treâ— or contempt of his person which may be done if he shew himself not too light unconstant hard cruel esteminate fearfull and â—asterdly c. But contrariwise Religious Grave Just Valiant c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian Policie with far the better means to keep the people in obedience than love and reverence of the people towards the Prince 10. If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision which is to be rumoured and made known abroad if it be known that he is reverenced and obeyed by his peoples at home 11. If he provide so much as lieth in him that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominior which if it happen he is to joyn speedily with other Princes which are in like danger to abate that greatness and to strengthen himself and the rest against it An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain 12 If he get him Intelligencers by reward or other means to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince with whom he hath differences if any thing be intended against his State Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad about that Princes Court under colour of Embassage or some other pretence which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn 13. To observe the Laws of his Country and not to encounter them with his Prerogate nor to use it at all where there is a Law for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts especially if it tender to take from them their commâ—dâ—tâ—es and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Ministers 14. To provide especially That that part which favoureth the State as it standeth be more potent than the other which favoureth it not or desireth a change 15. To make speciall choise of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates especially of such as assist the Prâ—â—â—â—â— on Couâ—sels and Policieâ— and not to lean overmuch to his own advise contrarie to the rule of Maâ—liâ—â— who teacheth That a Prince can have no good â—â—â—â—sul except it be in himself his reason â—â— use if he use the 〈…〉 is in dangâ—r to be over w 〈…〉 d by him and if he counsel with more then he shall be 〈…〉 in opiâ—iâ—â—s As if a Prince of great or mean wisdom could not take the Judgement of all his câ—ncâ—llours in any point of Poâ—â—â—â— or of so many as he himself thinke he good and to take it either by word or in writing and himself then in private peruse them all and so after good and mature deliberation make choise of the best without any distraction of binding himself to the direction of one For the Proverb is true that two eyes see more than one and therefore the advises and Consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a Feast or dinner where many contribute towards the â—â—â—t by which means they have more variety of dishes and so better fare and yet every mean may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his 〈…〉 e. 16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publick justice and to give an experiment
Machiavilian at the least and that he be taken so to be for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded and is thought thereby not unworthy for to Govern others 2. To make shew not of severity but of gravity by seeming reverent and not terrible in his speech and gesture and habit and other demeanour 3. To pretend care of the Common-wealth And to that end to seem loath to exact Tributes and other charges and yet to make necessity of it where none is To that end to procure such War as can bring no danger toward his State and that might easily be compounded or some other chargeable business and to continue it on that he may continue his exaction and contribution so long as he list And thereof to imploy some in his publick service the rest to hoord upon his Treasury which is sometimes practised even by lawfull Princes as Edward the fourth in his Wars against France when have levied a great sum of money throughout his Realm especially of the Londoners he went over Seas and returned without any thing doing 4. Sometimes to give an account by open speech and publick writing of the expence of such Taxes and Impositions as he hath received of his subjects that he may seem to be a good husband and frugal and not a robbe of the Common-wealth 5. To that end to bestow some cost upon publick buildings or some other work for the Common good especially upon the Ports Forts and chief Cities of his Realm that so he may seem a benefactour have a delight in the adorning of his Country or doing some good for it 6. To forbid feastings and other meetings which increase love and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters under pretence of sparing cost for better uses To that end the Curficu Bell was first ordained by William the Conquerour to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour 7. To take heed that no one grow to be over-great but rather many equally great that they may envy and contend one with another and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort to do it warily and by degrees If quite to wreck him and to have his life yet to give him a lawfull tryal after the manner of his Country And if he proceed so far with any or great power and estimation as to do him contumely or disgrace not to suffer him to escape because contumely and disgrace are things contrarie unto Houour which great spirits do most desire and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace than to any thankfulnesse or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dismission True in Athâ—ists but not in true Christian Nobility 8. To unarm his people and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe and having them ready when service requireth and then to arm with them such and so many as he shall think meet and to commit them to such as are sure men 9. To make schism or division under hand among his Nobility and betwixt the Nobility and the people and to set one Rich man against another that they combine not together and that himself by hearing the griefs and complaints may know the secrets of both parts and so have matter against them both when it listeth him to call them to an account 10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong specially about womens matters by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters which hath been the ruin of many Tyrants and conversion of their States As of Tarquinius by Brutus Appius by Virginius Pisistratus by Harmodius Alexander Medices Duke of Florence Aloisus of Placenâ—â—a Rodericus King of Spain c. 11. To that end to be moderate in his pleasures or to use them closely that he be not seen For that men sober or watchfull or such as seem so are not lightly subject to contempt or conspiracies of their own 12. To reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize or do any speciall action for the Common-wealth in that manner as it may seem they could not be better regarded in case they lived in a free-Free-State 13. All rewards and things gratefull to come from himself but all punishments exactions and things ungratefull to come from his Officers and publick Ministers And when he hath effected what he would by them if he see his people discontented withall to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects 14. To pretend great care of Religion and of serving God which hath been the manner of the wickedest Tyrants for that people do less fear any hurt from those whom they do think Virtuous and Religious nor attempt likely to do them hurt for that they think that God protects them 15. To have a strong and sure Guard of forreign Souldiers and to bind them by good turns that they having at least profit may depend upon him and the present State As Caeligula the German Guard where the Nobility are many and mighty The like is practised by Lawfull Kings as by the French King 16. To procure that other great persons be in the same fault or case with them that for that cause they be forced to defend the TYRANT for their own safetie 17. To take part and to joyn himself with the stronger part if the Common people and mean degree be the stronger to joyn with them if the Rich and Noble to joyn with them For so that part with his own strengh will be ever able to overmatch the other 18. So to frame his manners and whole behaviour as that he may seem if not perfectly good yet tolerably evil or somewhat good somewhat bad These Rules of Hypocriticall Tyrants are to be known that they may be avoided and met withall and not drawn into imitation Preservation of an Aristocracie RUles to preserve a Senatory State are partly taken from the common Axioms and partly from those that preserve a Kingdom Preservation of an Oligarchie by Sophisms Rules 1. IN Consultations and Assemblies about publick affairs to order the matter that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies and Councels But to impose a Fine upon the richer sort if they omit that duty On the other side to pardon the people if they absent themselves and to bear with them under pretence that they may the better intend their Occupations and not be hindered in their trades and earnings 2. In election of Magistrates and Officers To suffer the poorer sort to vow and abjure the bearing of Office under colour of sparing them or to enjoyn some great charge as incident to the Office which the poor cannot bear But to impose some great Fine upon those that be rich if they refuse to bear Office being Elect unto it 3. In judiciall matters In like manner to order that the people may be absent from publick Trials under pretence of following their businesse But the Richer to be present and to compel them by Fines to frequent
the Court. 4. In Warlike exercise and Arms That the poor be not forced to have Armor Horse c. under pretence of sparing their cost nor to be drawn from their trades by Martiall exercises but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of Armor Horse c. by excessive Fines and to exercise themselves in War-like matters c. 5. To have special care of instructing their children in liberal Arts Policy and warlike exercise and to observe good order and discipline For as Popular States are preserved by the frequency and Liberty of the people so this Government of the Richer is preserved by discipline and good order of Governours 6. To provide good store of warlike furniture especially of Horse Horsemen and of Armed men viz. Pike c. which are proper to the Gentry as shot and light furniture are for a Popular Company 7. To put in practise some points of a Popular State viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment To make yearly or half years Magistrates c. For that the people are pleased with such things and they are better secured by this means from the rule of one And if any grow to too much greatness to abate him by the Sophisms fit for this State 8. To comit the Offices and Magistracies to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters which both rendeth to the conservation of this State and pleaseth the people for that they reap some relief and benefit by it 9. To the same end To contract marriages among themselves the rich with the rich c. 10 In some things which concern not the Pâ—iâ—ts and matters of State as Electing Magistrates Making Laws c. to give an equality or sometimes a preferment to the Common People and not to do as in some Oligarchies they were wont viz. To swear against the People to suppresse and bridle them but rather contrary To minister an Oath at their admission That they shall do no wrong to any of the People and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons to shew some example of severe punishment For other Atioms that preserve this State they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a Popular and Tyrannicall State for the strict kind of Oligarchie is kin to a Tyranny Preservation of a popular State Sophisms Rules or Axiom 1. IN publick Assemblies and Consultations about matters of State creating of Magistrates publick Iustice Exercise of Arms to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government to wit an Oligarchie For in Popular States the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies Magistrates Offices Warlike Exercise c. By mulcts and rewards and the richer sort are to be spared and not to be forced by fine or otherwise to frequent these Exercises 2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men and not to swear against them as the manner hath been in some Popular State but rather to prefer them in all other matters that concern not the State and publick Government 3. To elect Magistrates from among the Commons by Lot or Ballating and not to choose any for their wealths sake 4. To take heed that no man bear office twice except it be Military where the pay salary c. is to be reserved in their own hands to be disposed of by a Common Councel c. And to see that no man be too highly preferred 5. That no Magistracy be perpetual but as short as may be to wit for a year half a year c. 6. To compel Magistrates when their time expireth to give an accompt of their behaviour and government and that publickly before the Commons 7. To have publick Salaries and allowance of their Magistrates Judges c. And yearly dividents for the common people and such as have most need among them 8. To make Judges of all matters out of all sorts so they have some aptness to perform that duty 9. To provide that publick Iudgements and Trials be not frequent and to that end to inflict great Fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and Dilators as the law of requital c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler and not the Commons are indited and accused in this Common-wealth which causeth the rich to conspire against the State whereby many times the popular State is turned into an Oligarchie or some other Government Hereto tendeth that Art of Civil Law made against Accusers and Calumniatours Ad Senatus-consultum Tarpthanum l. 1. de Calumniatoribus 10. In such free States as are popular and have no revenue to provide that publick Assemblies be not after because they want salary for Pleaders and Oratours And if they be rich yet to be wary that all the revenue be not divided amongst the Commons For that this distributions of the Common revenue among the multitude is like a purse or barrel without a bottom But to provide that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs 11. If the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of State to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Countrey places and to provide above all that none do live idely but be set to their trades To this end to provide that the richer men place in their Farms and Coppie holds such decayed Citizens 12. To be well advised what is good for this State and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular State that seemeth most popular but that which is be for the continuance thereof And to that end not to lay into the Exchequer or Common Treasury such goods as are confiscate but to store them up as holy and consecrate things which except it be practised confiscations fines of the Common people would be frequent and so this State would decay by weakening the people Conversion of States in general COnversation of a State is the declining of the Common wealth either to some other form of Government or to his full and last period appointed by God Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts General and Particular GEneral viz. 1. Want of Religion viz. of the true knowledge and worship of God prescribed in his word and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people as in the examples of Sâ—uâ— â—lizzâ—ah the Iewish State the four Monarchies and all other 2. Want of wisdom and good Councel to keep the State the Prince Nobles and people in good temper and due proportion according to their several order and degrees 3. Want of Iustice either in administration as ill Laws or ill Magistrates or in the execution as rewards not given where they should be or there bestowed where they should not be or punishments not inflicted where they should be 4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self viz. Of provision as Armor Money
Captains Souldiers c. Execution when the means or provision is not used of all used 5. Particular To be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules that are prescribed for the preservation of the Common-wealth Particular causes of Conversion of States are of two sorts 1. FOrreign By the over greatness of invasion of some forreign Kingdom or other State of meaner power having a part within our own which are to be prevented by the providence of the chief and rules of policy for the preserving of every State This falleth out very seldom for the great difficulty to overthrow a forreign State 2. Domestick Sedition or open violence by the stronger part Alteration without violence Sedition SEdition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of Armes against the superiour power Quasi ditio secedens Causes of Sedition are of two sorts 1. General Liberty Riches WHen they that are of equal qualitie in a Common-wealth or do take themselves so to be are not regarded equally in all or in any of the these three or when they are so unequal in quality or take themselves so to be are regarded but equally or with less respect than those that be of less defect in these three things or in any of them Honour 1. IN the Chief Couetousness or oppression by the Magistrate or higher Power viz. when the Magistrates especially the Chief encreaseth his substace revenue beyond measure either with the publick or private calamitie whereby the Governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in Oligarchie or the other degrees conspite together and make quarrel against the Chief as in Kingdoms The examples of â—at Tylâ—r Jack Straw c. 2. In the â—â—â—â—f Injury when great Spirits and of great power are greatly wronged dishonoured or take themselves to be as Coriolanus Cyrus minor Earl of Warwick In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong 3. Preferment or want of preferment wherein some have over-much and so wax proud and aspire higher or have more or lesse than they deserve as they suppose and so in envy and disdain seck Innovation on by open faction so Caesar c. 4. Some great necessity or calamity So Xerxes after the foil of his great Army And Senacherib after the losse of 185. in one night 2. Particular 1. ENvy when the chief exceed the mediocrity before mentioned and so provoketh the Nobility and other degrees to conspire against him as Brutus Cassius c. against Caesar. 2. Fear viz. Of danger when one or more dispatch the Prince by secret practice or force to prevent his own danger as Artabanus did Xerxes 2. Lust or Lechery as Tarquinius Superbus by Brutus Pisistratiâ—â—ae by Armoaius Appiuâ— by Virginiuâ— 4. Contempt For vile quality base behaviour as Sardanaâ—alus by â—â—aces Dionysius the younger by Dion 5. Contumely when some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit who standeth upon his honour and reputation as Caligula by Chaereas 6. Hope of Advancement or some great profit as Mithridates Anobarâ—anes Alteration without violence CAuses of alteration without violence are 1. Excess of the State when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was or should have been setled and exceedeth in power riches and absoluteness in his kind by the ambition covetousness of the chiefe immoderate taxes and impositions c applying all to his own benefit without respect of other degrees so in the end changeth it self into another State or form of Government as a Kingdom into a Tyrannie an Oligarchy into an Aristocracy 2. Excess of some one or more in the Common-wealth viz. When some one or more in a Common-wealth grow to an excellency or excesse above the rest either in honour wealth or virtue and so by permission and popular favour are advanced to the Sovereignty By which means popular States grow into Oligarchies and Oligarchies and Aristocracies into Monarchies For which cause the Athenians and some other free States made their Laws of Ostroâ—ismos to banish any for a time that should excell though it were in virtue to prevent the alteration of their State Which because it is an unjust Law 't is better to take heed as the beginning to prevent the means that none should grow to that heigth and excellency than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy FINIS A METHOD How to make use of the Book before in the reading of the Storie DAVID being seventy years of age was of wisdome Memory c. sufficient to govern his Kingdom 1. Reg. Cap. 1. Old age is not ever unfit for publick Government DAVID being of great years and so having a cold dry and impotent body married with Abishag a fair maid of the best complexion through the whole Realm to revive his body and prolong his life 1. Reg. Chap. 1. vers 3. Example of the like practise in Charles the Fifth DAvid being old and impotent of bodie by the advise of his Nobles and Phisitians married a young maid called Abishag to warm and preserve his old bodie Observation WHether David did well in marrying a maid and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marrie a young woman or on the other side for an old worn and decrepite woman to marrie a young and lustie man For the Affirmative ARG. The end of marriage is Society and mutual comfort but there may be Societie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old and young partie Ergo 'tis Lawful Answ. Societie and comfort is a cause effect of marriage but none of the principal ends of marriage which are 1. Procreation of children and so the continuance of mankind 2. The avoiding of Fornication As for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man woman and woman where no marriage is and therefore no proper ends of marriage The Negative ARG 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends for which marriage was ordained by God is no lawfull marriage But the conjunction betwixt an old impotent and young partie hath no respect to the right end for which marriage was ordained by God Therefore it is no lawful marriage 2. No contract wherein the partie contracting bindeth himself to an impossible condition or to do that which he cannot do is good or lawfull But the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young partie bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot do viz. to perform the duties of Marriage Therefore it is unlawfull For the same cause the civil Law determineth a nullity in these marriages except the woman know before the infirmitie of the man in which case she can have no wrong being a thing done with her own knowledge and consent because Volenti non fit injuria In legem Julian de adulteriis leg Si Uxor c. It provideth further for the more certainty of the infirmatie That three
years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage because that men that have been infirm at the first by reason of sicknesse or some other accident afterwards proved to be sufficient De repudiis leg in causis Defence for David in marrying Abishag IT was rather a Medicine than a marriage without any evil or disordered affection 2. It was by the perswasion of his Nobles and Physitians 3. It was for the publick good to prolong the life of a worthy Prince 4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid who was made acquainted with the Kings infirmity and to what end she was married unto him who if she diâ— it for the common good and for â—â—â—â—tes sake having withall the gift of continency she is to be commended if for ambition or some vain respect it is her own and not Davids fault Politicall Nobilitie Adonijah aspiring to the Kingdom FIrst took the advantage of Davids affection and kindnesse towards him and make him secure of any ill dealing Secondly of his age and infirmities disabling his Father as unfit for Government Thirdly blazed his title and Right to the Crown Fourthly got him Chariots Hors-men and Foot men and a guard to make shew of State Fifthly being a comly and goodly Person made a popular shew of himself and his qualities Sixtly joyned to himself in Faction Joab the Generall of the Army who was in displeasure for murthering of Abner and Amaza and feared that David would supply Bâ—najah in his place and so was discontented And Abiather the high Priest that was likewise discontented with David for the preferment of Zadok Seventhly bad meetings with them and other his confederates under pretence of a vow and offering at the Fountain of Raguel in the confines of Judea Eigthly made a shew of Religion by Sacrificing c. Ninthly made himself familiar with the Nobles and people and entertained them with feasting Tenthly drew into his part the chief Officers of the Court and Servants to the King by rewards Familiarity c. Eleventhly disgraced and abased the Competitour and such as he knew would take part with him and concealeth his ambition and purpose from them Twelfthly had Ionathan a Favourite of the Court and near about the King to give him intelligent if any thing were discovered and moved at the Court whilest himself was in hand about his practise OBSERVATIONS Ways of such as aspire to the Kingdom and marks to discern them FIrst they wind into the Princes favour by service officiousnesse flatterie c. to â—lant him in a good oâ—â—â—â—on of that loyaltie and faithfulnesse hereby to make him him secure of their practises 2. They take advantage of the Princes infirmities age impotencie negligence sex c. And work upon that be disabling the Prince and secret detracting of his State and Government 3. They blaz their Title and claim to the Crown if they have any with their friends and favourites 4. They provide them in secret of extraordinarie forces and furniture for the wars make much of god Souldiers and have a pretence if it be espied of some other end as for the Kings honour or service and to be in readinesse against forreign enemies c. 5 They make open shew of their best qualities and comlinesse of their persons which though it be vain as a dumb shew it is very effectuall to win the liking of the popular sort which according to the rule of the election of Kings in the Bâ—es Common wealth think that Forma est digna imperare Activitie Nobilaie Ancestrie c. 6 To have their blazers abroad to see out their virtues and to prepare their friends in every Province 7. To draw into their part and make sure unto them of the chief Peers and men of best quality such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers and the Militarie men and most subtile and politick especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the State 8. To have meetings for conference under some pretence of some ordinarie matter in some convenient place not too near nor too far off but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition 9. To take up a shew and pretence of Religion more than before and beyond the practise of their former life 10 They use popular courtesie which in a great person is very effectuall feasting liberality gaming c. 11. To be over liberal win to them by gifts familiaritie c. the chief Officers of the Court and Governours of State 12. To have some near about the Prince to keep them in credit and common suspition if any arise 13. To disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the Prince present State or to the competitour and to bring them into contempt by slander detraction and all means they can and to conceal the designs from them left they be discovered before they be too ripe 14. To have some spie near about the Prince to advertise them if any inckling suspition arise whilest themselves are practising Note the practises of Absolom 2 Sam. 16. And of Cyrus minor in Xenophon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cap. 1. Politicall Prince David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdom valour religion and justice and so highly deserving of the Common-wealth yet grown into age grew withall into contempt had many both of his Nobles common people that fell from him first with Absolom then with Adoniiab who affected the Kingdom and rebelled against him For remedie whereof he stirred up himself to publick actions which might shew his vigour sufficiencie to manage the affairs of his Kingdom 1. AFter the victorie against Absolom he forced himself to forbes mourning and shewed himself to his discontented Army when all were like to fall from him for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his Son 2. After the victorie he caused a general convention to be assembled of the whole Nation to bring him home with honour to Jerusalem which was a renowing and re-establishing of him 2 Sam. 19. 12. 3. He gave an experiment of his power and authoritie by deposing a person of great author 〈…〉 estimation to wit Ioab General Captain of the Armie and advancing Amasa to his place 4 He sent kind pssages to Ierusalem and to other chief and head towns and special men of Iudea his contributes puting them of their alliance with him with these word That they were of his own flesh and bloud with protestarian of his special love and affection towards them 〈…〉 them with the like kindness 〈…〉 towards him 5. He â—â—mbled a Parliament of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and took occasion upon the â—â—â—â—gâ—â—ing of his successour to commend into them he succession of his house into the conâ—inuance and maintenance of Gods â—â—â—mor in and â—â—â— good the established and gave a grâ—ve and publick charge to his Suâ—cessour nâ—w designed â—ucâ—ing the manner of his government and maintaining of religion 1. Chron.
you may bear patiently the death of your valiant son This 22. of March from the Isle of Christophers yours Walter Raleigh Yours Walter Raleigh Post-script I Protest before the Majestie of God That as Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins died heart broken when they failed of their enterprise I could willingly do the like did I not contend against sorrow for your sake in hope to provide somewhat for you and to comfort and relieve you If I live to return resolve your self that it is the care for you that hath strengthened my heart It is true that Kemish might have gone directly to the Myne and meant it but after my sons death he made them believe he knew not the way and excused himself upon want of water in the River and counter feiting many impediments left it unfound When he came back I told him he had undone me and that my credit was lost for ever he answered That when any son was lost and that he left me so weak that he resolved not to find me alive he had no reason to enrich a companie of Rascals who after my sons death made no account of him He further told me that the English sent up into Guiana could hardly defend the Spanish town of S. Thome which they had taken and therefore for them to passe through thick woods it was impossible and more impossible to have victuall brought them into the Mountains And it is true that the Governour Diego Poloâ—eqe and other four Captains being slain whereof Wat flew one Plessington Waâ—s servant and John of Morocâ—urs one of his men slew other two I say five of them slain in the enterance of the Town the rest went off in a whole bodie and took more care to defend the passages to their Mynes of which they had three within a League of the Town besides a Myne that was about five miles off than they did of the Town it self Yet Kemish at the first was resolved to go to the Myne but when he came to the banck-side to Land and had two of his men slain outright from the bank and six other hurt and Captain Thornix shot in the head of which wound and the accident thereof he hath pined away those twelve weeks Now when Kemish came back and gave me the former Reasons which moved him not to open the Myne the one the death of my son a second the weaknesse of the English and their impossibilities to work and to be victualled a third that it were a folly to discover it for the Spaniards and lastly my weaknesse and being unpardoned and that I rejected all these his Arguments and told him that I must leave him to himself to resolve it to the King and State he shut up himself into his Cabbin and shot himself with a pocket Pistol which broke one of his ribs and finding that he had not prevailed he thrust a long Knife under his short ribs up to the handle and died Thus much I have written to Mr Secretarie to whose Letters I refer you to know the truth I did after the sealing break open the Letter again to let you know in brief the state of that business which I pray you impart to my Lord of Northumberland and Silvanus Scoâ—y For the rest there was never poor man so exposed to slaughter as I was for being commanded upon mine Alleagiance to set down not onely the CouÌ„-trey but the very River by which I was to enter it to name my Ships number men and my Artillerie This now was sent by the Spanish Ambassador to his Master the King of Spain the King wrote his Letters to all parts of the Indies especially to the Governour Palamago of Guiana Elderado and Trinidado of which the first Letter bore date 19 of March 16â—7 at Maâ—rill when I had not yet left the Thames which Letter I have sent ot Mr Secretarie I have also other Letters of the Kings which I reserve and one of the Councels The King also sent a Commission to leave three hundred souldiers out of his Garrisons of â—nie Regno de Granado è Portricho with ten pieces of brasle Ordinance to entertain us he also prepared an Army by sea to set upon us If were too long to tell you how we were preserved if I live I shall make it known my brains are broken and I cannot write much I live yet and I told you why Witney for whom I sold all my Plate at Plymouth and to whom I gave more credit and countenance than to all the Captains of my Fleet ran from me at the Granadoes and Wolleston with him so as I have now but five Ships and out of those I have sent some into my Fly boat a sabble of idle Rascals which I know will not spare to wound me but I care not I am sure there is never a base slave in all the Fleet hath taken the pain and care that I have done that have slept so little and travelled so much my friends will not believe them and for the rest I care not God in heaven blesse you and strengthen your heart Sir Raleigh's Letter to Mr Secretary Winwood SIR SInce the death of Kemish it is contessed by the Serjeant Major and others of his inward friends that he told them that he could have brought them unto the Myne within two hours March from the Riverside but because my son was slain my self unpardoned and not like to live he had no reason to open the Myne either for the Spaniard or for the King they answered that the King though I were not pardoned had granted my heart under the Great Sea He replyed that the grant to me was to no man non Ens in the Law and therefore of no force this discourse they had which I knew not of till after his death but when I was resolved to write unto your Honour he prayed me to joyn with him in excusing his not going to the Myne I answered him I would not do it but if my self could satisfie the King and State that he had reason not to open it I should be glad of it but for my part I must avow that he knew it and that he might with loss have done it other excuses I would not frame he told me that he would wait on me presently and give me better satisfaction but I was no sooner come from him into my Cabbin but I heard a Pistol go over my head and sending to know who shot it word was brought me that Kemish shot it out of his Cabbin window to cleanse it his boy going into his Cabbin found him lying upon his bed with much bloud by him and looking in his face saw him dead the Pistol being but little did but crack his rib but turning him over found a long Knife in his bodie all but the handle Sir I have sent into England with my cosin Harbert a very valiant honest Gentleman divers unworthy persons good for nothing neither by sea
the North the fift penny In the two and thirtyeth year he had a subsedy freely granted In the three and thirtyeth year he confirmed the great Charter of his own Royall disposition and the states to shew their thankfulnesse gave the King for one year the fift part of all the revenues of the land and of the Citizens the sixt part of their goods And in the same year the King used the inquisition called Trai le Baston By which all Justices and other Magistrates were grievously fined that had used extortion or bribery or had otherwise misdemeaned themselves to the great contentation of the people This Commission likewise did enquire of entruders barators and all other the like vermine whereby the King gathered a great masse of treasure with a great deal of love Now for the whole raigne of this King who governed England 35 years there was not any Parliament to his prejudice COUNS. But there was taking of armes by Marshall and Hereford JUST That 's true but why was that because the King notwithstanding all that was given him by Parliament did lay the greatest taxes that ever King did without their consent But what lost the King by those Lords one of them gave the King all his lands the other dyed in disgrace COUNS. But what say you to the Parliament in Edward the Seconds time his successor did not the house of Parliament banish Peirce Gaveston whom the King favoured JUST But what was this Gaveston but an Esquier of Gascoine formerly banisht the Realme by King Edward the first for corrupting the Prince Edward now raigning And the whole Kingdome fearing and detesting his venemous disposition they besought his Majestie to cast him off which the King performed by an act of his own and not by act of Parliament yea Gavestones own father in Law the Earle of Glocester was one of the chiefest of the Lords that procured it And yet finding the Kings affection to folow him so strongly they all consented to have him recalled After which when his credit so encreased that he dispised and set at naught all the ancient Nobility and not onely perswaded the King to all manner of outrages and riots but withall transported what he lifted of the Kings Treasure and Iewels the Lords urged his banishment the second time but neither was the first nor second banishment forced by Act of Parliament but by the forceable Lords his Enemies Lastly he being recalled by the King the Earle of Lancaster caused his head to be stricken off when those of his party had taken him prisoner By which presumptuous Act the Earle and the rest of his company committed Treason and murder Treason by raising an Army without warrant murder by taking away the life of the Kings Subject After which Gaveston being dead the Spencers got possession of the Kings favour though the younger of them was placed about the King by the Lords themselves COUNS. What say you then to the Parliament held at London about the sixt year of that King JUST I say that King was not bound to performe the acts of this Parliament because the Lords being too strong for the King inforced his consent for these be the words of our own History They wrested to much beyond the bounds of reason COUNS. What say you to the Parliaments of the White wands in the 13th of the King JUST I say the Lords that were so moved came with an Army and by strong hand surprized the King they constrained saith the story the rest of the Lords and compelled many of the Bishops to consent unto them yea it saith further that the King durst not but grant to all that they required to wit for the banishment of the Spencers Yea they were so insolent that they refused to lodge the Queen comming through Kent in the Castle of Leedes and sent her to provide her lodging where she could get it so late in the night for which notwithstanding some that kept her out were soon after taken and hang'd and therefore your Lordship cannot call this a Parliament for the reasons before alleadged But my Lord what became of these Lawgivers to the King even when they were greatest a Knight of the North called Andrew Herkeley assembled the Forces of the Countrey overthrew them and their Army slew the Earle of Hereford and other Barons took their generall Thomas Earle of Lancaster the Kings cozen germane at that time possessed of five Earledomes the Lords Clifford Talbort Moubray Maudiut Willington Warren Lord Darcy Withers Knevill Leybourne Bekes Lovell Fitz williams Watervild and divers other Barons Knights and Esquiers and soon after the Lord Percy and the Lord Warren took the Lords Baldsemere and the Lord Audley the Lord Teis Gifford Tucoet and many others that fled from the battaile the most of which past under the hands of the hangman for constraining the King under colour and name of a Parliament But this your good Lordship may judge to whom those tumultuous assemblies which our Histories falsely call Parliaments have been dangerous the King in the end ever prevailed and the Lords lost their lives and estates After which the Spencers in their banishment at York in the 15th of the King were restored to the honors and estates and therein the King had a subsedy given him the sixt penny of goods throughout England Ireland and Wales COUNS. Yet you see the Spencers were soon after dissolved IUST It is true my Lord but that is nothing to our subject of Parliament they may thank their own insolencie for they branded and dispised the Queen whom they ought to have honored as the Kings wife they were also exceeding greedy and built themselves upon other mens ruines they were ambitious and exceeding malicious whereupon that came that when Chamberlain Spencer was hang'd in Hereford a part of the 24th Psalm was written over his head Quid gloriaris in malitia potens COUNS. Well Sir you have all this while excused your self upon the strength and rebellions of the Lords but what say you now to King Edward the third in whose time and during the time of this victorious King no man durst take Armes or rebell the three estates did him the greatest affront that ever King received or endured therefore I conclude where I began that these Parliaments are dangerous for a King JUST To answer your Lordship in order may it please you first to call to mind what was given this great King by his subjects before the dispute betwixt him and the house happened which was in his latter dayes from his first year to his fift year there was nothing given the king by his Subjects in his eight year at the Parliament at London a tenth and a fifteenth was granted in his tenth year he ceased upon the Italians goods here in England to his own use with all the goods of the Monkes Cluniackes and others of the order of the Cistertians In the eleaventh year he had given him by Parliament a notable