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A86918 A vindication of the Treatise of monarchy, containing an answer to Dr Fernes reply; also, a more full discovery of three maine points; 1. The ordinance of God in supremacie. 2. The nature and kinds of limitation. 3. The causes and meanes of limitation in governments. Done by the authour of the former treatise. Hunton, Philip, 1604?-1682. 1644 (1644) Wing H3784; Thomason E39_12; ESTC R21631 66,271 81

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I doe not there apparently set it down as a description of our now existent Frame of Government And whether any thing therein is not according to past historie and present experience Yea I challenge the Doctor to except against the least part of it as not so if he cannot he doth wrong so to miscall and deride it After this Excursion he returnes back to the 36. page of my Book and the proper businesse of that Chapt. which was his three Titles by Conquest I looked that after his first he should have made good his second Conquest sc the Danish and made good what he had said that our Kings hold by that too as one of the three But not a word of that for shame He passes p. 26. to the Norman entrance And to prove that William held this Land by conquest he cites out of Mr Cambden that in victorie quasi Tropheum he disposed of the Lands of the Conquered changed their Tenure abrogated what English Lawes and customes he pleased c. Indeed when he had gotten full possession he did what he pleased but sactum non probat jus I have proved and the Doctor hath not gainsaid 1. That his Title by which he claimed was a successive and Legall Title 2. That this Title got the favour of a great party and was a maine Meane facilitating his acquirie 3. That he was inaugurated by virtue of that Title 4. After he had gotten the Kingdome though he did many things arbitrarily yet he setled himselfe and his successours in the state of Legall Monarches as the Doctor confesses p. 27. What then is become of his Triple Tenure by Conquest when here 's not one can be made good when it comes to a due scanning That of Mr Cambden that the Kings of this Land have Potestatem supremam merum imperium is no more then that of the Statute which the Doctor speakes of p. 47. that it is an Empire governed by one supreme head which we acknowledge for that merum imperium must be understood in a moderate sense else it sayes more then the Doctor himselfe professes to own Though Mr Cambdens judgement in this case is not of the authority of a proofe Sect. 2 Then he passes to my Arguments p. 28. But by the way let me tell him My Arguments for Limitation and Mixture vindicated I brought 5. Arguments to prove this Government limited and 3. to prove it mixed and it had been meet he should have brought somewhat beside his bare word to prove it limited only in the exercise that is Absolute in the power but he brings no proofe because he had none Yet perhaps though he had not wherwithall to confirm his own yet he hath to demolish my Assertions Let us see therefore his solutions of my Arguments But before we come to weigh them because he tells us p. 28. it were an Argument fit for a skilfull Lawyer to labour in and slights my endeavour because I bring not History and Antiquity but doe goe about to reason him into a beliefe of those Assertions Let me premise something concerning that course of proving them 1. The work of bringing History and Antiquity doth belong to him who affirmes such a Title of Power in our Kings Let him shew how and when it was conveyed to them He which challenges a right to that which was once undoubtedly mine must prove his right and he can have no more then he can bring evidence for 2. On his defaut if I undertake a needlesse office to prove my Negative there are but two wayes imaginable to doe it one is by records of histories setting out the first constitution of a state and the Termes on which 〈◊〉 people resigned up their liberty to a subjection So in the Antient Romane State the Venetian the late Belgik Vnion and others which have at once visibly and lately been composed it is likely that way might be taken The other is by demonstrative collections drawn from the institution of the present composure of a State Thus alone is it possible to discerne and prove the constitution of a Government which springs not up at once but by unseen degrees and moments whose fundamentall constitutive acts stand upon no record This is the condition of most Governments in the world which have sprung from small rude and unknown beginnings And of this in particular For 1. A limitation of Royall Power was brought hither by the Saxons and Angli our Ancestours hath been proved This was as those times were very rude and unpolished it is likely such as Captaines in Armies have who can doe nothing of moment without the advise and consent of the Counsell of warre 2. This Limitation of Power and Libertie received some more formall and setled bounds afterwards by customes and Lawes before the Conquest as appeares by the Common Lawes which are as it were the basis and foundation of this Government the Statute Lawes being but after superstructives These Common Lawes did not grow up at once but by degrees and were unwritten Customes and Vsages gaining authority by unknowne prescription above all written Lawes and were afterward committed to writing by men skilfull in the Lawes 3. At length and after the Conquest it was perfected to this Parliamentarie Forme and even this being at first but rude grew to this exactnesse by length of Time and infinite Contentions This latter way only being left us that I took and the Doctour hath no cause to despise it For when a thing of present State is made evident by Reason drawne for palpable experience of it's present composure it is madnesse to denie it to be so because I cannot tell when it began to be so Yea when the Question is of present state it is a surer way to find out the Truth then by records of its Originall constitution For in time the Frame of a State may receive reall variations from what it was at first as the Romane State and most others have done for the contracts of men are at pleasure alterable and an argument drawne from Monuments of first coalition would then be fallacious Well be the way never so justifiable which I have taken yet the Doctor dares pronounce my Arguments insufficient to cleare what I have undertaken T is easie to pronounce it let us see how he makes good his sentence I proceeded distinctly first to lay down my Arguments proving Limitation p. 31. Then those which proove Mixture p. 40. He mingles them together And to my first third fourth and fift proving Limitation Answers that They prove only limitation in the exercise of power p. 28. Why so Neither the Denomination of Liege nor any prescription can make us believe that the Limitations of power had any other beginning then voluntary condescent As if a Government by voluntarie condescent might not receive a radicall Limitation But it lies on him to proove it was by such condescent if he can bring no record for it it must
plea of reason was not the act of a reasonable will and therefore I may hold their examples ordinary without impeachment of this Assertion Then he proceeds to Resistance in limited and mixed Rules p. 36. Concerning which I said p. 17. If the exorbitances be of lesse moment they ought to be borne and p. 18. If mortall and destructive neither can be otherwise redressed then prevention by Resistance may be used Here first he challengeth my ingenuity for words spoken in my 49. page He said Sect. 1. of his first booke We may and ought to deny obedience to such commands of the Prince as are unlawfull by the Law of God yea by the established lawes of the Land I censured this speech that it is more then should be said sure a hainous fault in me I say more he hath said more then should be said by all these three bookes in which he sayes that which dissolves all frames of Government into arbitrary overthrowes all effectuall limitation of Power and sure that is more then should be said And for that particular clause Is it not more He speakes without restriction Doth joyne things unlawfull by the law of God and things unlawfull by the lawes of the Land And puts the same may and ought to both if the affirmation must be understood universally of one how can it be understood otherwise of the other It cannot be excused from the censure of a confused and unwary speech He passeth p. 37. to the Question Who shall be the ultime judge of subversive exorbitancies He would know who I have told him my opinion hereof at large in that Tract Here I would faine know his but he would rather carp at mine then give his own When I say there can be no Authoritative judge to determine it He commends my ingenuity p. 37. but I doe not only say it but at large doe prove it there p. 67. as well against him as against those others why doth he not undertake that Question against me if he hath any mind to it He much dislikes when I say p. 18. The fundament all Lawes must judge in every mans conscience This is sayes he a ready way to anarchy and confusion p. 37. I referre not this case to the consciences of men as to an Authoritative Judge but a morall principle of discerning Right And who can deny unto man such a liberty to conceive of right according to the light he hath from the fundamentals of a State Let the judicious reade what I have said here-about p. 67. of that Tract and let him then tell how that Question can be otherwise determined unlesse he overthrow Monarchy by giving a finall judgement to the States or all Liberty if he give it to the Monarch and supposing the Ayme at subversion be evident to mens consciences can we deny them a naturall power of judging according to that evidence or liberty of assisting the wronged So when I say the wronged side must make it evident to every mans conscience also the appeale must be to the Community as if there were no Government and as every man is convinced in conscience he is bound to give assistance p. 29. of my Tract He calls this good stuffe p. 37. Why because I say the people are at liberty as if there were no Government and this appeale is disadvantagious to the Monarch for they will be more ready to believe their representative This would in the consequence be dangerous the high way to confusion p. 38. Answ 1. I say not simply that people are at liberty as if there were no Government but in this particular Question bound still as before in all besides 2. He takes me as if by Community I meant only the Commons when I expresse it by genus humanum especially of that Kingdome 3. He censures the Reason of Man-kind of partiality towards their Representatives Not so for in so great a Question Wise men cannot be blinded Honest men will goe according to their conscience and Reasonoble men according to evidence and will see it concernes them as well to avoid Anarchy by aiding a wronged Monarch as Tyranny by aiding an oppressed State But sith this Replicant is so bitter an enveigher against an Appeale ad conscientiom generis humani in this last case so uncapeable of an Authoritative decision 1. Let him consider on what foundation God hath built Monarchy and all other powers but on the consciences of men Rom. 13. 2. Let him weigh whether when he hath said all he can say such an appeale be avoidable For 1. If a controversie arise between the King and a particular person or place the King shall Judge it in his Courts by his Judges and the sentence shall be executed by the force and armes of his other subjects 2. If it be between Him and the Representatives of his whole Kingdome and supreme Court of Judicature in which the Acts and Persons of all other Courts and Judges are to be judged The King cannot judge this in his other Courts and by his Judges nor yet by himselfe for a King out of his Courts cannot judge in a Legall Government especially the acts of his supreme Court But be it so suppose the Doctor and I should agree in this that the King by himselfe is the ultime Judge of Controversies Yet it is very like those States with whom the Contention is will not yeild him so to judge against them in his own cause But suppose they doe not submit to his determination He will say then they sin and rebell against him Well let it be granted yet submit they doe not I demand in this case what course the King hath to make effectuall his sentence It must be by force of armes by the sword but of whom Either the peoples whose representatives they are or other mens but what shall bind them to afford their Force to make good his sentence It must be their conscience of his right Thus when all is done and said To the consciences of Men must his appeall be and to them must he make evident his right in this extreme contention Yea this man in a controversie of the like nature is compelled to acknowledge as much For the Pleaders put the case If a King be distracted I may adde if his Title be dubious c. The Doctors answer is if it be cleare that a King is so c. p. 8. but who shall determine this If must not self-evidence in the consciences of Men This is all the judiciall power the Doctour can referre us to in these cases Lastly He would know what power there is in a Community to make resistance and answers himselfe A Parliamentary and Legall not Military and Forcible p. 38. Thus he speakes of these as contradistinct when they are subordinate Forcible being subservient to Legall to make it valid and effectuall which else were meerely morall and ineffectuall but this is one of his supposals whose vanity I have before
he promises that in this Booke certaine points will appeare to be truth agreeable to Scripture and Reason sc That Government is not the invention of man but the institution of God That Governours have their Power not from the people but from God That Governing Power is one and the same in all supreames and can only be limited in the exercise And that where a Prince stands supreme and next to God above all the people there the Subiects may not take armes and make forceable resistance for any exorbitances These severall Propositions how farre they contain Truth and how far not I shall in the sequell make appear After these great promises he proceeds p. 13. to speake somewhat of the Originall of Governing Power and accuseth me as if I seemed to Sect. 3 affirme it to be from God but in the processe of my booke he finds me deriving it indeed from the people I perceiving two contrary opinions concerning the Originall of Government did in that Treatise endeavour to reconcile them and to shew in what sence both are true To that end as there is manifest p 4. I distinguished 3 things 1 It 's constitution 2 It 's Limitation to one kind 3 It 's determination to one individuall Person and Family The first of these I did affirme to be from God The two latter from Men and then concluded In these things we have Doctour Fernes consent Let us see what exceptions he can take at this peaceable assay of Reconcilement In the processe of my Discourse he findes me deriving it from the people What then Doe I denie it thereby to be from God as if Subordinates did exclude one another God hath ordained that Powers should be People by vertue of that Ordinance give them existence in this or that kind and subiect The Doctor acknowledges all this but not in my sence p. 14. He grants the Designation of the Person and the Limitation of the Power to severall kinds to be from the consent of the People I say no more why doe we not then agree The plaine truth is The Doctor will not have Limitation of Power to be at all from the people what ever he pretends How then the Limitation of the Power to severall kinds is from the people as the Doctor yeelds I cannot tell Is not Limitation of it into kinds Limitation of the Power it selfe But he is possessed that my sound sence is another sence from his what other he doth not shew but it is another which he likes not Why Because sometimes I say the people reserve a Power to oppose or displace the Magistrate Sometime they divest themselves of all superiority 'T is true I say so but withall I say that when they reserve such a Power they constitute no Monarchy Is it not so in the highest Ministers of Power in Aristocracies and Democracies What can he say against so apparent a Truth 2. I call them p. 63. Architectonicall Powers This he derides and saies This is the riddle of this Governing Power originally in the people They are Architectonicall Powers but build upon foundations laid in the aire p. 14 Then he gives his reason For before Government established they have not any politique Power whereby a Command may be laid upon others but only a naturall power of private resistance This is false that they have onely a naturall power of private Resistance They have indeed no formall politique power for we speake of a people free from all government but they have a virtuall radicall power by publike consent and contract to constitute this or that forme of Government and resigne up themselves to a condition of subjection on Termes and after a form of their owne constitution so the Athenians Lacedemonians and Romans of old having expelled their Kings and the Vnited Provinces with others of latter times have done This is that which I called Architectonicall Power and the Replier vainly carpes at the name when he cannot denie the thing But I know what he aimes at in all this sc That Gods Ordinance is an absolute boundlesse Power in all Supremes uncapable of any limitation but in the exercise Of which fully afterwards Sect. 4 At length He takes a nearer view of the Formes of Monarchie spoken of by me and makes a few observations upon such particulars at him pleaseth p. 14. Let us follow his steps First for Absolute Monarchie whereas I say it is when Soveraignty is so fully in one that it hath no limitation under God but the Monarches owne will He approoves my description but threatens to remember it below p. 15. Let him doe so and make his best advantage of it only here he cannot forbeare one note that then it is not the deniall of resistance which makes a Monarch absolute but the deniall of a law to bound his Will I doe grant it but with all I say that it is necessariò consequutivum though it be not constitutivum for sith a Monarch which is obsolute hath no Law to bound his Will but his very Will is the Subjects Law then every act of his Will is Gods Ordinance and so by consequence it is unresistible Also p. 15. He allowes it when I say A limited Monarch is he who hath a Law besides his owne Will for the measure of his power But yet he dislikes that I say He must be limited in the Power it selfe and not only in the exercise and I added a reason for an Absolute Monarch may stint himselfe in the exercise of his Power and yet remaine absolute What saies he to this True if such a Monarch limit himself and reserve a Power to vary but if he fix a Law with promise not to varie then in those cases he is limited Note the fraud of this Replier he alters his terms and puts things as opposite which are not so He should say if be limit himselfe and reserve a power to varie then he is absolute but if he limit himselfe and reserve no Power to varie for then the opposition is direct then he is limited But in stead of saying and reserve no power to varie he saies but if he promise not to vary I say that promise not to vary if it be a simple promise of not varying it doth not make him limited in his Power any more then morally and so every Absolute Monarch is limited I affirme still it is Limitation of the Power it selfe not barely of the exercise which constitutes a Limited Monarch for Monarchy is a state of Power and therefore it 's specificative distinction must be from something which distinguisheth Powers and not the exercise of Powers but this is enough proved in the 5 t page of that Treatise Secondly he blames me for that I suppose a Limited Monarch must be radically that is originally invested with such a measure of limited Power and that limited ab externo and not from the free determination of his owne Will Here he adds originally of his owne that so
which are done per immediatam volitionem by a meere expression of the Will A concurrence in consenting and a concurrence in doing is one and the same thing Now Legislation is an imminent Act consisting in a meer expression of an Authoritative Will My third Argument for Mixture was from it's end which was Restraint from excesse 1. He grants such a Restraint but morall and legall not forceable p. 30. I answer He deceitfully confounds morall and legall as I shewed before 2. The End of Mixture in a State is that there may be a power of restreyning more then sufficient as his Majestie expresses it but the Doctors meere morall power is very insufficient It limits not the Power at all nor the Exercise properly no more then an Oath or Promise without it would doe that is makes it sinne to exceed But of this before But here which is very rare He doth not onely denie but give a reason of it If the fundamentall Constitution had intended them such a Power it would not have left a power in the Monarch to call or dissolve them which would make this power of theirs altogether ineffectuall p. 30. This Reason seemes to have some weight in it I will therefore the more seriously consider it 1. Whatever strength it hath had in it now it hath none because that power of dissolving is now by Law suspended for this Parliament and after it a necessity by Law imposed of reducing that Power of Calling Parliaments into Act every Three yeares 2. Neither was it true before these Acts that such a Power was left in the Monarch at pleasure to use or not for it was by ancient Law determined how often they should be convocated 3. But being granted that this Power is simply and fully in the Monarch yet I denie that hence it followes that it would make that Power of the Houses altogether ineffectuall because that de facto though it hath been in the Monarch so long yet it never hath made it voyd but they have exercised a limiting Power as Histories relate enough yea and sometimes too much over the Monarch notwithstanding his Power of calling and dissolving them Thus in the Colledges the Fellowes have an effectuall and more then morall limiting Power though the Governour hath the Power of calling and dissolving their meetings And anciently the prime Patriarch had the power of Calling and dissolving generall Councels yet they had a Power of limiting yea of Censuring him for exorbitances for all that The Reason is because many things fall out oft in a Government inducing such necessities on the Monarch that he for their supply will choose to reduce such power into act of Calling and suspend such power of dissolving although he know those States will use their Limiting Power in reducing such exorbitances and punishing those dearest instruments which have been used in them This the Constitutors of this Frame preconsidering might put in the Monarch this Power and yet intend to the other States a Legall and effectuall power of restraining his exorbitancies by using Force not against him but it's procurers and Instruments Thus we see there is no need of entring on that dispute Whether this Power of calling and dissolving the Houses be placed in the Monarch as all his other are not absolutely but with limitation of necessary reducing it into act on the last exigencies of the Kingdome After this he returns to my other Arguments for limitation One of which drawne from radicall Mixture he fully omits but now having shewed the invalidity of his exceptions against my arguments for it I have given force to this argument for Limitation drawne therefrom That which he sets on last is my first for Limitation in the very Power sc the Kings owne expresse confession That the Law is the measure of his power That the Powers which he hath are vested in him by Law p. 31. of my Tract And as if this were not more then he could answer the Doctor addes a third for us in which he ascribes to the Houses a power more then sufficient to restraine his Excesses p. 30. Here are Authorities as punctuall and expresse as can be imagined Yet the Doctor resolving not to be reasoned into a beliefe of these things out faces all this evidence and to that end frames three Answers such as they are 1. He sayes His Majestie had few of his learned Counsell about him 2. His gracious expressions ought not to be drawne out to his disadvantage 3. All that can be gathered from them doth not come up to these Conclusions p. 31. In the two first he openly enough taxeth his Majestie of unadvised expressions excusing it from absence of his learned Counsellours you may soone imagine whom he meanes Thus disparaging the Kings judgement and all then about him and tels us we must not be unjust to set those sayings on the racke that is we must not take them in their plaine meaning but on this mans wrested and sencelesse interpretation What doe not these men dare doe and say Before we heard him correcting the expressions of all Moderne Parliaments teaching us to reforme them by the old Here the King and his Counsell setting out in such a time Declarations to all his Subjects to informe them about the nature and extent of his Royall Power He compares those serious expresses to Trajans sudden and excessive speech He will correct Kings Counsels Parliaments and all but he will have his way To him they must come to learne how to speake and what powers they have But let us heare his Doctorall Exposition of his Majesties expresses Hee sayes The Law is the measure of his Power Wee must understand his meaning to be that his power is bounded by Law but it doth not follow that his power wherein it is not limited by Law is not absolute and full p. 31. Here is profound interpreting If his Power be limited by Law is there any part of it not limited by Law If the Law be the measure of it sure it is even with it for the measure is equall in extent with the thing measured Thus he papally interprets against the direct meaning of the Text But he doth not show us how that can be understood when he saith His powers are vested in him by Law if the Law be a limitation only of exercise Nor how their Restraining power is more then sufficient if it be only morall which how unsufficient a restraint for exorbitance it is every ones experience can enough testifie I admire a man who pretends to conscience and judgement should take such liberty of interpreting Certaine if those Reasons and Testimonies doe not clearly proove a radically limited and mixed Constitution of this Monarchy I shall despair of ever proving any thing by way of Argument any more I had an intent to have subnexed other Arguments to make good Sect. 3 those Assertions but I see it is to no purpose 7 Queries concerning this
Governement for he is resolved not to be reasoned into them He can denie all as failing either in the Antecedent or Consequent p. 32. The Power of this Kingdome he must have unlimited He will give no Reason for it nor heare no Reason against it Yet sith he professeth himselfe a Resolver of Conscience Let me therfore be so bold as to propose certaine Cases to him 1. Why in the late Oath proposed to be taken by all his Majesties Subjects the Power of enacting Statutes is sworne to be joyntly in the Kings Maiestie Lords and Commons in Parliament Certes the Doctor writ this Reply before that Oath was printed in Oxford or else he did not consider of it He cannot say I hope there were but few of his counsell about him when that was framed if the Doctor hath taken it He hath forsworne this passage of his Reply and sworne them a joynt enacting power 2. Why we are enjoyned to sweare that we doe beleeve that the Subiects of England are not obliged by any Act made either by the Kings Maiestie solely or the Houses solely c. Sure the Doctor hath abjured his other Assertion of the unlimited Power of the King if he hath taken this Oath for if Power be solely his then an Act made by him solely is obliging If they be not obligatorie they are not Authoritative and so the mixture and limitation is in the Authority it self Here is no place left for his distinction of Active and Passion subiection For 1. Will any thinke that the intent is to sweare men to be bound not to doe but to suffer 2. The Beliefe of a non-Obligation proceeds indifferently and as fully concerning the sole Acts of the King us the Houses but I beleeve the Doctour will not say we are obliged to passive subiection to the sole Acts of the Houses 3. I would know if the States doe limit onely morally what they doe which is not done without them A Promise and Oath do limit morally without them He will say they may admonish him and denie their consent and so iudge his Acts invalid He meanes still morally invalid and so would they be without them 4. Suppose the Monarch minded to establish a Law which he judges needfull and the States being averse he enacts it without them Is it not a Law It hath all the Legislative authoritie in it He will say it is not duly made 1. I grant it but yet it is a Law for it hath all the Power of a Law 2. But is it not duly made Why the power of last decision is in the King alone Suppose he define that the Intent of his Predecessours in granting this consenting power to the Houses had no intent to hinder but further themselves in establishing good lawes and therefore now they not concurring by assent to this needfull Act He ought not to be hindred but may lawfully doe it without them He is the last Judge in this case and it must be held ever lawfully enacted So that in the result here is left to these States by the Doctors grounds neither Civill nor Morall Limitation but at pleasure 5. If Limitation in our Government exempt Subjects from a necessity of active Subjection but not from passive How is it that our Lawes doe not only determine what the Monarch shall command but also what he shall inflict what shall be accounted Rebellion what Felonie c. and what not also what he shall inflict for this crime and that crime and what not Sith the Lawes limiting what he shall command doe limit our necessity of active Subiection it will follow that the Lawes limiting what he shall inflict doe limit our necessity of passive Subiection Here 's no evasion by saying the Laws do limit him morally what he shall inflict and if he inflict beyond Law he sinnes in it but we must suffer for the Doctor acknowledges that the Lawes defining what he shall command doe so limit our active subjection that we have a simple exemption from any necessity of Doing and therefore also the Laws defining what he shall inflict doe so limit our passive subjection that we have a simple exemption from any necessity of suffering beyond those Limitations for also if they did not free us from passive subjection it were unlawfull not only to resist but also to avoid suffering even by flight 6. When the liberties of magna Charta and other grants have been gotten and preserved and recovered at the rate of so much trouble sute expence and bloud whither by all that adoe was intended only a morall liberty definement in the Monarch and not also of the power it selfe only that he might not lawfully exorbitate from established Lawes and not also that he might have no Authority or Power to exorbitate at all Sure this was their aime for the former he could not doe before 7. The Law granting a writ of Rebellion against him who refuseth to obey the sentence of the Judge though he have an expresse Act of the Kings will to warrant him doth it not suppose those exceeding and extrajudiciall Acts of the Kings will to be unauthoritative and unable to priviledge a man from Resistance If the Doctor by his faculty can resolve these Cases He will doe much in way of satisfaction of my conscience but if he cannot they will prove so many convincing arguments that the Power of the Monarch in this Frame is not unlimited Now having made good my Assertions I expected another worke sc an Examination of his Reasons for unlimitednesse and simplicity of Monarchicall Power but he is not guilty of my fault he doth not goe so much as to reason us into a beliefe of it He doth in vaine expresse a desire hee hath that some skilfull Lawyers or Divines would helpe him at this dead lift yet he is like to goe alone in this wild untroden path of defending an unresistiblenesse on such supposals shall we think any Divine will second him in justifying his unwritten fancie about Gods Ordinance necessarily investing all the acts of his will who is supreme Or any sound Lawyer will overthrow the grounds of his Profession that the Royall Right Authority and Government of this Realme is both founded on and measured by the Laws thereof Yea it is very remarkeable that his Majestie in all the Declarations and Expresses which I have seen doth not once touch upon this way sc a challenge of such a latitude of Authority as can preserve destructive instruments from force but condemnes the now Resistance by solemne protestations of innocency and intention of governing by the known Laws CHAP. VI. An Answer to his 5. Sect. of Resistance in Relation to severall kinds of Monarchy THE residue of his Book is spent about the Question of Resistance Sect. 1 I might well spare the labour of any farther Answer for now having so apparently made good these two Assertions 1. That soveraignty may be limited in the very power 2. That de
facto it is so in this Government every one may discerne the necessary truth of these inferences 1. That in this Government the exceeding Acts of the Princes will being out of the compasse of his Authority can not authorize their Instruments 2. That hereon Resistance of them is no other then of private men not of Authority or Gods Ordinance But because the Doctors chiefe confidence is in this part of his discourse and he is large in it I will therefore goe on in my work and will briefly make appeare that his Reasons are infirme and his Authorities impertinent and his Answers very insufficient for having been so large in making good my supposals and overthrowing his I may the more contract my selfe in this remaining businesse In this Section he proposeth two things 1. To consider how I state the point of Resistance in the kinds of Governments 2. To prove that Limitation and Mixture in government doe not imply a forceable constraining Power in subjects p. 39. I will follow him in both My stating the Question vindicated He begins with a charitable censure of my stating the Question and sayes he finds it to be in a way that lies very open to Rebellion p. 33. Let the Reader judge I am sure his Resolves and Determinations are not in a way to destroy all liberty and make all Governments Arbitrary but directly doe it Then for my maintaining the Person of the Monarch in all Formes to be above the reach of Force he approves it yet sayes I allow subjects to raise Armies to give battle to those that are about him as his guard He wrongs me I say not his guard but subversive seducers and instruments Those which he called cut-throates in his first booke now he repents he gave that hard name to his clients whom he pleades so hard to save harmelesse and makes them amends with the stile of a Guard A guard which bring him into greater danger then all his enemies who bring him into battell to save themselves where Ordnance and Musket can put no difference No They use him as their guard If harme befall him which God avert the guilt and punishment will fall on them who are so prodigall of hazarding his sacred Person not on those who could desire nothing more then his security by absence from a multitude who by undertaking the subversion of Religion and Lawes for that is the Doctors supposition bring themselves in danger of condigne destruction Then he proceeds to Resistance in an Absolute State Where I affirme If such a Monarch should seeke the destruction of the whole Community his instruments of such inhumanity may be resisted He dares not deny it but would know what I doe meane by the whole community I meane the whole simely or the whole interpretatively that is the greater part and therefore his exception of the Jewes in the Kingdome of Ahasuerus or the Templers in the Westerne Kingdomes is not to the purpose but the instance which I bring of the Law-Countries comes home for they were the whole community but the Replier corrupts it when he saith the Spanish King intended the extirpation of the Protestants only p. 34. For he intended not only theirs but of all Papists and else which would not admit the introduction of an Arbitrary Government and the subversion of their liberties as the histories thereof make plaine Here in this 34. page the Doctor shewes a bad mind Taking occasion to excuse the Rebels in Ireland as if they might justifie themselves on these grounds and intimating a falshood as if the Parliament did intend their extirpation hereby declaring how ill he likes any effectuall course for the rooting out of Popery out of the Kingdomes Indeed he sayes he pleads not for them but yet he doth it He finds out arguments for them and shews them a way both how to excuse themselves and accuse the Parliament and to call a resolution of cleansing that Iland from Popery an extirpation of their Nation He sayes the example of David proves not this being but a particular Man I say it proves it the more strongly as shall appeare Then if a particular mans life be invaded without any plea of reason I suppose it hard to deny him the liberty of positive resistance of agents and prove it by the instance of the peoples rescue of Jonathan and Davids of himselfe where the peoples Oath and Davids Army with his enquiry at Keilah doe prove a serious and reall purpose of Resistance let the Doctor say what he please to the contrary so that these examples come home to justifie resistance in such case even in an Absolute Monarchy for here are particular men in an absolute Monarchy assaulted without plea of reason for that Jonathan who had wrought such a deliverance should die for tasting in his ignorance a little honey there was no colour of reason the Kings rash oath was none And that David should be put to death whom Saul himselfe oft with his own mouth professed innocent and absolved was as much without plea of reason so that here I need not flie to the Doctors shift of an extraordinary case as he tells me I must p. 35. I acknowledge no extraordinary case in these examples Take them in their due extent and they justifie no more then I have asserted and so much they doe In my 5. Assertion p. 11. Of submitting States Liberties and Persons to the will of an Absolute Monarch carrying any plea of reason He faults my Order and tells me it should have been first It seems this mans eye can spie small faults but why first he doth not say I think in stating of the question of resistance I may as well begin with the Affirmative and shew first when it may be used and then when it ought not as on the contrary but he will make a fault where he finds none But what sayes he to the Assertion He grants it but dislikes the limitation so it carry plea or shew of reason and sayes here the way is open enough to rebellion p. 36. No opener then himselfe makes it p. 10. This is usuall with him when he dislikes a thing He can speak no lesse words then Rebellion But why sayes he so Every man will be ready to think there is no reason nor equity in the will of the Monarch when he is oppressed by him He may well enough if hee be oppressed but yet there may be a plea and colour of equity even for an Act of Oppression and in an Absolute Monarchy it will little availe a man though he think there is no reason for it for he must not be his own judge nor hath he any outward judge to appeale to but the Reasonable will of the Monarch himselfe if he submit to its determination there is no feare of Rebellion if not I have done with him in such a Government Of Saules censure of Jonathan and David I have spoken already and made it appeare it had no
discovered And p. 51. of my Treatise in a full dispute have I proved the Parliaments power in resisting destructive instruments which I doubt not will appeare cleare notwithstanding any thing said in this Reply But that is very strange which he affirmes p. 39. That if they use a Legall restraining power the Monarch cannot alter the established frame Sure by cannot he understands fallaciously as he useth to doe a morall cannot that is not without sin which is a poor small cannot now adays if he mean indeed cannot that is is not able it is against reason by his grounds for what is not he able to doe whose lowest most desperate instrument of pleasure is unresistible Let him remember where he said p. 19. A forcible consent cannot be wanting to a Conquerour and a Conquerours power is no more then unresistible Nay I am senselesse on the Doctors grounds if he cannot lawfully for suppose he be pleased to make it a Question whether he were not better governe by the Civill-Law as more conducent to Gods glory and the end of Government He is by Law the last judge of this Question if he determine it best then he may lawfully doe it Now we are come to the second part of this Section in which he Sect. 2 undertakes the proofe of this Assertion His Arguments against power of resistance reserved answered that Limitations and Mixtures in Monarchy doe not imply a forcible constraining power in subjects for the preventing of dissolution but only a Legall p. 39. Answ He failes in the very proposall of his Assertion in three points 1. He proposeth it of Limitation in generall whereas I grant it of that which is only in exercise affirming it only of that which is of the power it selfe 2. He sayes Forcible constraining power in subjects when he should have specified against subversive instruments for I grant it of the Monarch himselfe 3. He opposeth forcible to Legall when it should be opposed only to meere Morall not to Legall as before Now let us weigh his Arguments First Such a power must be in them by reservation and then it must be expresse in the constitution of the Government and Covenant or else by implication I will answer distinctly concerning this Reservation of power of forcible Resistance 1. There is a Reservation of liberty or power of not being subject neither actively nor passively to the exceeding Acts of the Monarchs will This is by implication for what they did not resigne up they did reserve 2. A power of Authoritative judging and resisting the Monarch thus exceeding This neither expressely nor implicitly is reserved not because it is unlawfull as the Doctor imagins but contradictory to the very institution of a Monarchy and so under that intention impossible 3. A power of forcible resistance of subversive instruments This by the Authority of the Law is not reserved but expressely commited not only to the Houses of Parliament but all inferiour Courts for the Law whose execution the King committeth unto them commands them not only to resist but punish its violaters much more its subverters without exceptions of Persons or respect of their number or ground and reason why they doe it whether with or against the Kings private and absolute will or Warrant supposing such men to be without warrant And this power of judging all violators and subverters of Laws being committed to them includes a power of imploying the force or Armes of the County or whole Kingdome if need be to make good the sentence of the Law against them This power being a necessary attendant to the former And they who have the power of judging by Commission have the power of force by implication To his five Arguments therefore by which he proves this power not reserved by implication I briefly Answer 1. Limitation cannot infer it c. Answer Limitation in exercise only doth not but in the power it selfe doth infer it as I have often shewed 2. The inconveniencies of exorbitancie cannot infer it Answer They doe not infer it of themselves for they are the same in absolute Rule but supposing a people mind in their Frame effectually to prevent those inconveniencies that doth infer it 3. The consent and intention of the people choosing a Monarch cannot infer it because it is not the measure of the power it selfe Answer I have before proved the contrary and made the Doctors supposall appeare a groundlesse falshood concerning unlimited power by Gods ordinance 4. The intention of the people in procuring Limitations of power cannot infer it Answer If the peoples intention in it be a greater security from oppression then in an absolute Government they can have or a meere morall limitation can give them then it doth inferre it 5. If the Architects did intend such a forceable power to these States they would not have best it in his power to dissolve them p. 42. This hath had its full satisfaction before These are poore infirme arguments as the reader cannot but see yet he ends in a triumph Therefore I conclude here as I promised in the second Section where the Prince stands supreme c. there Subjects may not by force of armes resist though he be exorbitant c. p. 43. 'T is true he concludes as he promised but he hath not proved as he promised nor as we expected for here is nothing but that which fals to the ground with his supposals on which they are built and which I have demolished in the 4th Chapter CHAP. VII An Answer to the 7th Section of his Replie of places of Scripture out of the old Testament HIs sixt Section doth wholly concerne the Authour of the fuller Sect. 1 Answer which I passe over because I am chargeable for no more then is my owne And come to his seventh which containes an Examination of places alledged in this Question out of the old Testament Where he begins confidently that there is no warrant for Resistance p. 56. and he yeelds two Reasons why 1. Because the Institution of that Kingdom was such as doth plainly exclude Resistance 2. Because the Prophets never call for it Ans I grant it doth exclude it as farre as in an absolute Monarchie it may be excluded and therefore there is no need of answering his Arguments But yet let us consider them sith he is so large in them To shew us the Institution of that Kingdome he brings 1 Sam. 8.11 Where he sayes we have it For Samuel is commanded v. 9. To tell the people Jus Regis Now this jus Regis he makes a great matter of and tels us it implies not a Right of doing such unjust Acts but a securitie from Resistance and force if he does them p. 56. Ans 1. It is no prejudice to the cause I defend if I should grant all he would worke out of this Text for it prooves no farther then of that particular Kingdome inducing no necessitie that all others must have the same Institution Also