and he shall find them managed much after the same rate Nor hath these differences onely divided these Monarchies where the Succession was never well settled at first but even those that have been better constituted and where one would belieev the Discent of the Crown had been sufficiently settled by a long Discent of Kings for many hundreds of years And of this Scotland hath been a famous Example where after the death of King Alexander III and his Grandaughter Margaret of Norway two or three several Competitors claimed a Right to succeed But omitting others it was agreed that it lay between John Baylliol and Robert Bruce Earl of Carick both of them drawing their Discent from David Earl of Huntingdon Great Uncle to the last King in whom they all agreed the Right to the Crown would have been had he survived Baylliol claimed as eldest Son to Dornagilla Grandaughter to Margaret the eldest Daughter of the said Earl David Robert Bruce claimed as eldest Son of Isabel the second Daughter of the said David So that if Baylliol alledged his Discent from the eldest Daughter Bruce was not behind-hand but pleaded though it was true he was descended but from the second Daughter yet he being a Grandson and a degree neerer ought to succeed whereas Baylliol was but great Grandson to Earl David And though Dornagilla Baylliol's Mother was in the same degree with himself yet he being a man ought to be preferred before a woman in the same Line and that if the Laws of Scotland would have given it to Dornagilla if it had been an ordinary Inheritance yet Discent of the Crown was not to be ruled by the Common Laws of other Inheritances In short this Dispute did so divide the Nobility into Factions and puzzle the Estates of the Kingdom that not being able to decide it they and all the Competitors agreed to refer the Controversie to Edward I. King of England one of the wisest and most powerful Princes of his time who upon long advice and debate with twelve of the learnedest men of both Kingdoms at last adjudged the Crown to Baylliol or as the Scotch Historians relate because he would do him Homage for it which Bruce being of a higher spirit refused Yet this did not put an end to this great Controversie for though Baylliol was thereupon admitted King yet falling out not long after with King Edward to whom he owed all his greatness and having the worst of it the Nobility and States of Scotland revived Bruce's Title and declared him King who after a long War with England enjoy'd the Crown quietly at last and left it to his Issue whose Posterity in our present King enjoy it to this day To this I shall adde one Example more from Portugal within these hundred years King Henry called the Cardinal dying without Issue there was a great Controversie who should succeed for he died suddenly just as the States of the Kingdom were assembled to settle the Succession for he declared himself unable to decide it So that he onely left by his Will twelve Governours of the Kingdom who should govern during the interregnum but that the Crown should descend to him that should appear to them to have the best Title Four eminent Competitors put in their claims 1. Antonio called the Bastard who nevertheless pretended that he was lawful Son to Don Lewis second Brother to Henry the last King So that he had no more to do but to prove himself Legitimate 2. Alexander Duke of Parma who claimed as Grandson to Mary eldest Daughter to Don Duarte youngest Brother to the last King Henry and Son to King Emanuel 3. The Duke of Braganza who claimed as Son to Katherine second Daughter of the said Don Duarte yet alledged his Title to be best because he was the next of the Bloud-Royal who was a Native of Portugal as the Heir of the Crown as he pretended ought to be by a Fundamental Law of that Kingdom yet it seems that Law was not then so well known or otherwise there was no reason why these Governors should not have admitted him King as soon as ever they met 4. Philip the second King of Spain who claimed as Son to Isabella Daughter of Emanuel King of Portugal and so a degree nearer than the rest to Henry the last King The States and Governours differing the States were dissolved and during their recess the Governours not agreeing among themselves the King of Spain raised an Army and entering Portugal seiz'd the City of Lisbon and consequently all the rest of the Kingdom submitted to him and so made himself King by force And yet we have seen in his Grandson's time the Estates of Portugal declare this Title void and the Crown setled in the Posterity of the Duke of Braganza who still enjoy it by vertue of this Fundamental Law And that this Fundamental Law could not be altered but by the consent of the Cortes or States appears by the late Alteration of this Constitution upon the Treaty of Marriage of the present Prince Regents Daughter with the Duke of Savoy And how much even Kings themselves have attributed to the Authority of their Estates appears by the League made between Philip the Long King of France and David King of Scots wherein this Condition was exprest That if there should happen any difference about the Succession in either of these Realms he of the two Kings which remained alive should not suffer any to place himself on the Throne but him who should have the Judgment of the Estates of his side and then he should with all his power oppose him who would after this contest for the Crown So that our Author without cause lays the fault upon the wilful ignorance of the People in not remembring or acknowledging the right Heir of the Crown when the ablest and wisest men of the Age they lived in could not by the meer Laws of Nature and Reason determine which was he And our Author should have done well to have set down some certain Rules how the People might be assured without a positive Law before made that they acknowledge the right Heir and not an Usurper to his prejudice CHAP. II. Observations on the Directions for Obedience in doubtful times and other places of his Patriarcha and other Treatises BUT since this Author rather than the disposal of a Crown shall fall to the decision of the People or States of the Kingdom will give an Usurper a good Right to it against all persons but him that hath the Right we will now examine how much of that is true which he lays down in his Directions for Obedience to Governours in doubtful times and how far men are bound in Conscience to obey an Usurper whilst he that hath Right is kept out by him First he takes it for granted that all those that so eagerly strive for an original Power to be in the People do with one accord acknowledge that originally the Supream Power was
for who hath greater need of Prudence then he who deliberates of such great Affairs Who of more exact Justice then he who is above the Laws Who of a more severe modesty than he to whom all things are Lawful Who of greater Fortitude than he who keeps all things in safety Yet because the Judgment of any one man in discerning that which truly conduces to the publick safety may be easily deceived neither is there in all Men that strength of mind that they may know how in so great a Liberty to govern their Passions and Lusts as Herodian Li. 1. Cap. 4. well observes that it is difficult in the highest Liberty for a Man to restrain himself as it were to bridle his own desires Therefore it seemed most convenient to divers people not to commit so great a power to one mans sole discretion and he no more free from Errors than others but rather more subject to Vices and therefore would rather prescribe the Prince a certain Form or Method of dispatching of publick Affairs after it was at first found out what sort of constitutions or forms of dispatching publick Affairs did best suit with the Genius of the people and the Nature of the Common-wealth to be constituted Neither is there any injury done to the Prince who was at first raised to that Dignity by the free consent of the people upon those conditions For if it seemed grievous to take the supreme Authority because he could not manage it as he pleased he might have refused it if he would so the Conscience of the Oath by which they are obliged upon their taking this Authority ought to restrain them and their Successors from going about to make themselves absolute by secret Machinations and Designs Much less to subvert the Laws of the Kingdom by force Plin. Paneg. Since an Oath is not more Religiously to be observed by any than he whom it most chiefly concerns not to be perjured For that is too weak which some maintain that since Kings are ordained by God who injoyns them a true discharge of their Duty which cannot be performed without the exercise of the most absolute power and therefore God is to be supposed to have conferred such a proportion of power on all Kings as that they ought not to suffer the least part thereof to be diminished or circumscribed and that the People can neither rightly require or oblige their King to it no more than there can honestly be made such a bargain between a Husband and a Wife that he should connive at her stolen pleasures But as we have already sufficiently proved that as all Civil Government is from God yet is so left in Mans disposal at least to those that God did not give any particular Laws to what sort of Government they would set up as Phil. Melancthon in his Epitomy of Moral Philosophy honestly teaches That the forms of Kingdoms are different and in some places there are some degrees of Liberty more than in others For God approves all Forms of Government that are agreeable to Right Nature and Reason and as I think there is no where any Divine precept extant that a free People being about to chuse it self a King should chuse Cajus rather than Titius no more is there any certain form Divinely establish'd under which and no other Authority is to be conferred on Princes Neither are these Men any way helped by that place of 1 Sam. 8. where some will have only the bare unjust practice of Kings that the true right of all Kings is to be there described But Grotius Lib 1. c. 4. § 3. Taking a middle way lays down that there the bare actions of a King is described yet what hath the effect of a right to wit an Obligation of non resistance So that however a King may act against his Duty when he commits such things yet that his Subject sought no more to resist than if he had acted thus by the highest Right and therefore it is added that the People pressed by those vexations should cry to God because there remained no humane remedies So that this was called the Right of the King in that sence as the Roman Praetor was sayed jus reddere to judg right even then when he decreed unjustly however I conceive the true sence of this place may be thus understood there had been hitherto a Democracy among the Hebrews but that which often resembled that sort of Kingdome which Aristotle calls Heroical The Judges incited by a divine instinct did for the most part rescue the oppressed People from their Enemies or else in Peace Judged Causes but in other matters were rather endued with a power of perswading than commanding but yet their Equipage and State being small was not born or encreased by any Publick Taxes yet the People weary of this Government would have a King after the manner of other Nations That is who should appear in great State and Splendour and should maintain a constant Guard or at least should still exercise his Subjects in Arms that they might still be able to meet their Enemies in the Field see Sam. XIII 2. XIV 48 52. Now Samuel that the People might consider of it soberly before hand lays open to them the Prerogatives of such a King and the inconveniencies of that Government You would have a King remarkable by a great deal of Splendour but such a one must be attended with a numerous Train and so will take your Sons and appoint them for himself and to be his Horsemen and to run before his Chariots You would have a King who should maintain an Army but it will be necessary that he appoint him Captains over Hundreds and Captains over Fifties and this must be of your Sons who were used before to look after your own business only the greatness of his affairs and the state of his Office will not permit this King to till his own Land Therefore of your Sons will he set some to Ear his Ground and Reap his Harvest and to make his Instruments of War and since besides he must need a great deal of Attendance and that it will not become the Dignity of his Wives or Daughters to look after the Houshold-affairs Therefore he will take your Daughters to be Confectioners to be Cooks and to be Bakers he will likewise stand in need of many Servants to dispatch the businesses of War and Peace and who all must have Salaries and therefore he will take your Fields and your Vineyards and your Olive-Yards and give them to your Servants and to this purpose he will take the Tenth of your Seed and of your Vineyards and give to his Officers and to his Servants and he will likewise when he hath need take your Men-servants and your Maid-servants and your young Men and your Asses and put them to his work In short he says no more than this If you will have a King he must be maintained like a King and a
observe a Law Note the Antiquity of of this excellent Law whereby they oblige their Judges by Oath that if the King require an unjust Sentence from them they should refuse him And in the same place it is noted that Antigonus 3. writ to his Cities that if by his Letter he should command anything contrary to his Laws they should not obey it but should think he failed thorough ignorance or misinformation and oftentimes importunate Requests are cluded this way whilst the Prince seems for quietness sake content to grant what he knows will be made void by this Senate or Court of Parliament As it hath been often in France yet when the King is resolved that his Will shall hold good and looks upon the contrary Reasons of this Parliament as not weighty enough to convince him it cannot then any longer contradict the Kings Will for it is not presumed that the King by constituting such a Court would irrevocably abdicate his Right of absolute power So that this Senate or Parliament hath indeed but a Derivative power from the King to be limited as he himself shall please although perhaps he will not exert this power but upon weighty considerations nor does this Court make the power of the King less than absolute since it only gives him occasion to review his own Acts and as it were Appeals from himself when surprised with Passions Prejudices or misinformation to himself in a more indifferent and considerate Temper The like may be said of the Assembly of Estates if they meet only for this purpose that they should be the Kings greatest Council by which the Requests and complaints of his People which often times are concealed in his private Council may come to the Kings ears who is then left free to Enact what he thinks expedient Vid. Gro. Li. 1. c. 3. § 10. But a Kingdom is truely limited when the Subjects at first conferred it on the King on this condition that he should assemble the Estates concerning some Acts without whose consent this Decree should not be valid yet it ought to be in the Kings power to call and dissolve this Assembly and to propose the business to be dispatcht therein unless we should go about to set up an irregular Common-wealth and leave the King no more than an empty Title but if these States being so convocated do of their own accord Propose those things which they conceive conducing to the good and safety of the Kingdom yet the Decrees or Acts constituted concerning them take their force from the Kings passing them Yet such an assembly of Estates do differ from Counsellors properly taken in this that although both of them can only move the King by reason only yet the King may very well reject the Reasons of these latter but not of the former neither ought the King to think himself contemned if these Estates do not consent to some things of his proposing For as he promised at first to have always before his Eyes the good of the Common-wealth of which a great many choice men are supposed to Judg more certainly than one A King may most commonly blame his own imprudence Passions or ill Fortune if the States happen to differ from him from whence it likewise appears that their fear is vain who think that by this means it is at the disposal of the Estates whether the Common-wealth shall be safe or not For it can scarcely be supposed that the King should be so negligent as to omit laying open to his Estates the necessities of the Kingdom or that the Estates being fully satisfied of them will ever go about to betray their own safety But this is certain since those who have conferred the limited power cannot be presumed either to intend to destroy or dissolve the Common-wealth or by their confederacy to order things so that the end of all Common-wealths cannot be obtained in it therefore there ought to be that favourable interpretation made of those Conventions that they really desire the common safety and would by no means do any thing contrary thereunto so likewise in making this compact that whatsoever they have so agreed to they are still to be supposed to have that intention that nothing should be done by reason of those conditions or parts which should prejudice the common safety and publick utility or whereby the Convulsion or Dissolution of the Common-wealth might follow But if such a chance should happen it would be most convenient that if the affair will allow of delay it should be proposed in the Assembly of Estates but where this cannot be done it may be the Kings Duty dexterously to correct those complaints that may break out to the destruction of the Common-wealth which also is of the the same force in respect of publick Laws Pint. in the Life of Agesilaus which the safety of the people and the supream Law commands sometimes to be silent As Agesilaus commanded the Laws of Licurgus to sleep for one day that those might return without ignominy that had fled at the Battel of Levetra However Mr. Hobs will allow no distinction between limited power and absolute but will have all supreme power to be absolute when it is to be observed that in all those assertions which are too rudely laid down by him there is a restriction to be added from the and of all Common-wealths as in what he lays down in his de Cive cap. 5. § 6. that he to whom in a Common-wealth there belongs the right of punishing can by right compel all to all things he pleases or as he expresses this limitation in the same place which are necessary for the common peace and safety and Cap. 6. § 13. when by the right of the supreme Governour he says there is connected so great an obedience of all the Subjects as is requisite for the Government of the Common-wealth so when in the place aforegoing he saith who ever hath so subjected his own will 'to that of the Prince that he may do whatever he pleases without punishment as also make Laws Judg differences punish whom he pleases use the strength power of all men according to his own will perform all these things by the highest right he hath then granted him the greatest power which can be granted But it is now to be considered by what intention or on what grounds men were moved to institute Common-wealths from whence it is clear that no body is understood to have conferred more power by his Will upon the Monarch then a reasonable man can judg necessary to that end and that although the ordering what may conduce to this end in this or that occasion does not remain in those that have transferred their power but in him on whom that power is transferred therefore the supream Ruler can compel the Subjects to all those things which are really condusing to the good of the Common-wealth but he ought not to go about to compel them to
the Second Point proposed and consider what kinde of Right this is and how far it extends Since therefore the Father's greatest interest in his Child proceeds from his having bred it up and taken care of it and that this Duty is founded on that great Law of Nature that every Man ought to endeavour the common good of Mankinde which he performs as far as lies in his power in breeding up and taking care of his Child it follows that this right in the Child or power over it extends no farther than as it conduces to this end that is the good and preservation thereof and when this Rule is transgressed the Right ceases For God hath not delivered one man into the power of another merely to be tyrannized over at his pleasure but that the person who hath this Authority may use it for the good of those he governs And herein lies the difference between the Interest which a Father hath in his Children and that property which he hath in his Horses or Slaves since his right to the former extends only to those things that conduce to their Good and Benefit but in the other he hath no other consideration but the profit he may reap from their labour and service being under no other obligation but that of Humanity and of using them as becomes a good-natur'd and merciful man yet still considering and intending his own advantage as the principal end of his keeping of them Whereas in his Children he is chiefly to design their good and advantage as far as lies in his power without ruining himself and though he justly may make use of their labour and service while they continue as part of his Family yet it is not for the same end alone that he uses his Horses or Slaves but that his Children being bred up in a constant course of Industry may be the better able either to get their own living or else to spend their time as they ought to do without falling into the Vices of Idleness or Debauchery So that it is evident the Father has no more right over the Life of his Child than another man being as much answerable to God if he abuse this Right of a Father in killing his innocent Son as if another had done it Neither hath he from the same Principles any right to maim or castrate his Child as this Author allows him to do in his Directions for Obedience much less sell him for a Slave Therefore it is no part of the Law of Nature unless he cannot otherwise provide for it but of the Roman or Civil-Law that a Father should have power to sell his Son three times For the Father is appointed by God to meliorate the condition of his Child but not to make it worse since it is not himself but God that properly gave him his being So that I hope I have sufficiently proved there is a great difference between a Child and a Slave or a Servant for Life though this Authour will have them in the state of Nature to be all one But for the better clearing of this point how far the power of Parents over their Children extends I think we may very well divide as Grotius does the life of the Child into three periods or ages De J.B. l. 2. c. 5. § 2. The first is the time of imperfect judgment or before the Child comes to be able to exercise his Reason The second is the period of perfect Judgment yet whilst the Child still continues part of his Fathers Family The third is after he hath left his Father's and either enters into another Family or sets up a Family himself In the first Period all the actions of Children are under the absolute dominion of their Parents for since they have not the use of Reason nor are able to judge what is good or bad for themselves they could not grow up nor be preserved unless their Parents judged for them what means conduced to this end yet this power is still to be directed for the principal end the good and preservation of the Child In the second Period when they are of mature Judgment yet continue part of their Fathers Family they are still under their Fathers command and ought to be obedient to it in all actions which tend to the good of their Fathers Family and concerns and in both these Ages the Father hath a power to set his Children to work as well to enable them to get their own Living as to recompence himself for the pains and care he hath taken and the charge he may have bin at in their Education For though he were obliged by the Law of Nature to breed up his Children yet there is no reason but he may make use of their labour as a natural recompence for his trouble And in this Period the Father hath power to correct his Son if he prove negligent or disobedient since this Correction is for his advantage to make him more careful and diligent another time and to subdue the stubbornness of his Will But in other actions the Children have a power of acting freely yet still with respect of gratifying and pleasing their Parents to whom they are obliged for their Being and Education since without their care they could not have attained to that age But since this Duty is not by force of any absolute Subjection but only of Piety Gratitude and Observance it does not make void any act though done contrary to those Duties as Marriage and the like for the gift of a thing is not therefore void though made contrary to the Rule of Prudence and Frugality In the third Period they are in all actions free and at their own dispose yet still under those obligations of Gratitude Piety and Observance toward their Parents as their greatest Benefactors since if that they have well discharged their Duty toward their Children they can never in their whole lives sufficiently recompence so great benefits as they have received from them But it seems the Authour is not satisfied with these distinctions Observations on Grotius de J. B. p. 62. but saies He cannot conceive how in any case Children can ever naturally have any power or moral Faculty of doing what they please without their Parents leave since they are always bound to study to please them And though by the Laws of some Nations Children when they attain to years of discretion have Power and Liberty in many actions yet this Liberty is granted them by positive humane Laws only which are made by the Supreme Fatherly Power of Princes who regulate limit or assume the Authority of Inferiour Fathers for the publick benefit of the Commonwealth So that naturally the Power of Parents over their Children never ceaseth by any separation but only by the permission of the transcendent Fatherly Power of the Supreme Prince Children may be dispensed with or priviledged in some cases from obedience to subordinate Parents For my part I see no
his Parents Commands pretending they are mad or drunk when really they are not he is without doubt doubly guilty both of Hypocrisie and Disobedience But this does not hinder Children in the state of Nature from judging of the reasonableness or lawfulness of their Parents Commands and of the condition they are in when they gave them for otherwise a Child ought to be of his Fathers Religion though it were Idolatry if he commanded it or were obliged to break any of the Laws of Nature if this Obedience were absolute And it is a lesser evil that the Commands of Parents should be disobeyed nay sometimes their persons resisted than that they should make a Right to command or do unreasonable and unlawful things in a fit of madness drunkenness or passion destroy either themselves or others But it may be replied that though Fathers in the state of Nature have no Right to act unjustly or cruelly toward their Children or to command such unlawful or unreasonable things yet however they are onely answerable to God for so doing and there is out of a Commonwealth no superiour power that can question the Fathers actions for since his Children are committed by God to his care he onely is answerable for them and for his actions towards them since no other man hath any interest or concern in them but himself So that if he kill maim abuse or sell his Son there is no man that hath Right to revenge punish or call him to an account for so doing and if no others that are his equals much less his Wife and Children who are so much his Inferiours and who ought in all things to be obedient to his Will Therefore this Power though it be not absolute in respect of God yet is so in respect of his Wife and Children and so in all cases where the Children cannot yield an active Obedience to their Fathers commands they are notwithstanding obliged by the Law of God See Ephes 6.1 Colos 3.20 to a passive one and patiently to submit to whatever evils or punishments he pleases to inflict though it were to the loss of Life itself To which I answer That though it is true a Father in the state of Nature and considered as the head of a separate Family hath no Superiour but God and consequently no other person whatsoever hath any Authority or Right to call him to an account and punish him for this abuse of his paternal Power yet it doth not follow that such absolute submission is therefore due from the Children as does oblige them either to an active or a passive Obedience in all cases to the Fathers Will so that they neither may nor ought to defend themselves in any circumstance whatsoever There is a great deal of difference in the state of Nature between calling a man to an account as a Superiour and defending a mans self as an equal For a man in this state hath a right to this latter against all men that assault him by the principle of Self-preservation But no man hath a right to the former but onely in respect of those over whom he hath an Authority either granted him by God or conferr'd upon him by the consent of other men So that the evils which an Aggressor or Wrong-doer suffers from him he injured though in respect of God the Supreme Lawgiver they may be natural Punishments ordained by him to deter men from violating the Laws of Nature yet they are not so in regard of the Person who inflicts them For God may sometimes appoint those for the Instruments of his Justice who otherwise do injury to the person punished as in the case of Absalom's Rebellion against his Father David So that in this case the evils the wrong-doer suffers are not properly Punishments but necessary Consequences of his Violence and Injustice and in respect of the Inflicter are but necessary means of his preservation So that if a Son have any Right to defend himself in what belongs to him from the unjust violence of his Father he doth not act as his Superiour but in this case as his Equal as he is indeed in all the Rights of Nature considered only as a Man Such as are a Right to live and to preserve himself and to use all lawful means for that end Therefore since as I have already shown that a Father hath no higher Right or Authority from God over the person of his Child but as it tends to his good and preservation or as it conduces to the great end of Nature the common Good and preservation of Mankinde So when the Father transgresses this Authority his Right ceases and when that ceases the Sons Right to preserve himself and in that to pursue that great end begins to take place Therefore out of a Civil state if a Father will endeavour evidently without any just cause to take away his Sons Life I think the Son may in this case if he cannot otherwise escape nor avoid it and that his Father will not be pacified neither with his submission nor entreaty defend himself against his Father not with a design to kill him but purely to preserve his own Life and if in this case the Father happen to be kill'd I think his Blood is upon his own head But if any object to me the Example of Isaac's submission to his Father when he intended to sacrisice him To this I answer that as this act of Abraham's is not to be taken as an Example for other Fathers so neither does the Example of Isaac oblige other Sons For as Abraham had no right to offer up his Son but by God's express Will so it is rational to suppose that Isaac being then as Chronologers make him about nineteen or twenty years of Age and able to carry wood enough upon his back to consume the Sacrifice and of years to ask where the Lamb was for the Offering was also instructed by his Father of the cause of his dealing so with him and then the submission was not paid to his Father's but to God's Will whom he was perswaded would have it so But if any man yet doubts whether resistance in such a case were lawful I leave it to his own Conscience whether if his Father and he were out of any civil estate whose assistance he might implore he would lie still and suffer his Father to cut his throat only because he had a minde to it or pretended revelation for it So likewise if a Father in this state should go about to violate his Sons Wife in his presence or to kill her or his Grandchildren I suppose he may as lawfully use the same means for their preservation if he cannot otherwise obtain it as he might for his own since they are delivered to his charge and that he only is answerable for them For since the Father doth not acquire any property in the Sons person either by begetting or educating him much less ought he to have it over those
Authour is to be Servant to his Eldest Brother or to whomever else his Father pleased to bequeath him Is not the case the same And as for the quiet of the Family which is supposed to be preserved by the Sons absolute submission rather than his resistance in any circumstance I think it would rather increase Dissentions by encouraging of Fathers to use their Power over their Children not as Reason but Drunkenness or Passion may impel them Whereas this Right of Children in defending their Lives and not being obliged to give them up at their Fathers pleasure will rather make Parents act moderately and discreetly towards their Children when they know they are not obliged to stay or bear with them upon other conditions than that they may enjoy their Lives in safety and the ordinary means thereof with some comfort Not that I give Children any Right as I said before to disobey their Parents or resist them upon every slight occasion but rather to bear with their Infirmities as far as it is possible And to suffer divers Hardships and Inconveniencies from them rather than to resist or leave them considering the great obligation they owe them So that I do not allow this Remedy but in case of extreme Necessity yet of which the Sufferer only in the state of Nature can be Judge since in that state where there is no Umpire without both their consents but God only every man is Judge when his Life is in danger And if the Peace of Mankinde were to be procured merely by a mans Sufferance and Submission without any respect to this Right then it would be his duty to give himself up to be robb'd or kill'd by any one who had the wickedness to attempt it because himself being innocent may go to Heaven and the other being guilty of an intent to rob or murder may be damned if he be killed And besides it would more conduce to the preservation of Mankinde that but one man should be lost whereas by resistance they may both perish Yet I suppose no man is so sottish as to hold he ought quit his own preservation in these cases or if he do hold it for discourse sake I am sure he would not be so mad as to observe it For this were such an Argument as to hold Because some men may abuse that Law of Self-preservation to another mans destruction Therefore it were unlawful to defend a mans self at all As for the Examples of those Nations and Common-wealths who have permitted Fathers to exercise a Despotick Power over their Children The Law of Nature or right Reason is not to be gathered from the Municipal Laws or Customs of any particular Nation or Commonwealth which are often different and contrary to each other Therefore as to the Jewish Law though I will not say it was contrary to the Law of Nature yet it was extremely rigorous and severe in all its dispensations and does not now oblige Christian Common-wealths in this particular as in divers others much less in the state of Nature And as for the Romans they saw the inconveniencies of this Absolute Power and retrenched it by degrees until it came to be no more than now with us and in most Countreys of Europe So likewise the Arguments which Bodin brings for the absolute power of Parents over their Children depending upon the Roman and Jewish Law may be easily answered from these grounds Having as I hope clear'd this main point of Paternal Authority and of Natural Obedience without giving an extravagant power to Parents on the one hand to abuse their power or a priviledge to Children on the other side to be stubborn or disobedient to their Parents If then this Paternal Authority extend farther than I have seated it I shall own my self beholding to any Friend of the Authour 's or his Opinions to shew me my errour But if they cannot I desire they would consider whether this natural Right of Kings which the Authour asserts precedent to any compact or civil constitution can extend farther than the natural Authority of Fathers from whom they are supposed to derive it and on which it is founded And if it appears that Princes have such Power as our Fathers then all that the Authour hath writ on this subject signifies just nothing Therefore I shall now proceed to examine the rest of his Principles and shall I hope prove that supposing this Fatherly Power as absolute as the Authour fancies yet that his Divine Absolute Monarchy cannot however be derived from thence The Authour seems to think it a Question very easie to be answered If any one asks what comes of this Right of Fatherhood in case the Crown Fatherly power escheat for want of an Heir whether it fall to the People Patriarch P. 20. or what else becomes of it To which his Answer is That it is but the Negligence or Ignorance of the People to loose the knowledg of the true Heir for an Heir there is always If Adam were still living and now were ready to die it is certain that there is but one Man and but one in the world who is next Heir although the knowledge who should be that one Man be quite lost So that this fine Notion signifies nothing now for Adam being dead and his right Heir not to be known it is all one as if he had none since for ought I know to the contrary the Authors Footman may be the Man But to help this the Author hath found out a couple of Expedients such as they be The first is Directions for Obedience p. 69. That an Vsurper of this Power where the knowledge of the right Heir is lost being in by possession is to be taken and reputed for the true Heir and is to be obeyed by them as their Father And if this will not do he gives us another and tells us Patriarch p. 21. The Government in this case is not devolved upon the multitude but the Kingly power escheats in such cases to the Fathers and independent Heads of Families For every Kingdom is resolved into those parts of which it was first made Each of which we will examine in their turn To begin with the former let us see if it be so easie a thing as the Authour makes it to know who was Adam's or any Monarch's right Heir setting the Municipal Laws of the Country aside so that the People cannot be excused of wilful Ignorance or Negligence if they loose this knowledg Where by the way I observe that as easie a thing as it was to know who was Adam's right Heir and upon whom by the Laws of God and Nature the Crown is to descend upon the Death of the Monarch yet he no where positively answers this important Question For sometimes he is to claim by descent as in this instance of the Heir of Adam sometimes by his Father's last Will as in the case of Noah's Sons according as the Examples out of
in the Fatherhood Vid. Mezeray Abregé Chron. An. 1318. and that the first Kings were Fathers of Families which if granted yet will not prove that this proceeded from that natural perpetual subjection which Children owe their Parents or that because they are Parents they are therefore Lords and Kings over them So that this being the Groundwork of whatever he says in this Discourse p. 67. if this be faulty as I hope I have proved it to be all that he builds upon this foundation signifies nothing Secondly he assumes that this Paternal power cannot be lost it may be transferr'd or usurped but never lost or ceaseth But as the power of the Father may be lawfully transferred or aliened so it may be unjustly usurped and in Vsurpation the Title of the Vsurper is before and better than the Title of any other than him that had a former Right for he hath a possession by the permissive Will of God which permission how long it will last no man ordinarily knows every man is to preserve his own life for the service of God and of his King or Father and is so far to obey an Vsurper as may tend not onely to the preservation of his King and Father but sometimes even of the Vsurper himself when probably he may he thereby preserved to the correction or mercy of his true Superiour And though by humane Law a long Prescription may take away a Right yet divine Right never dies nor can be lost or taken away The same he says p. 70. That in Grants and Gifts that have their original from God or Nature as the power of the Father hath no inferiour power of man can limit nor make any Prescription against them Vpon this ground is built that Maxime That Nullum tempus occurrit Regi no time bars a King Which second assumption is likewise false for I have already proved that all Fatherly power ceases with the life of the Father as Motherly power with the life of the Mother or else in the state of Nature a man must be left like other Cattle to be pickt up and markt by whoever can first seize him And secondly that it is false that this power and authority of a Father can be transferred to or usurped by another or that the Son owes the person to whom his Father transfers or sells him any other duty than as his Assignee performs the Office of a Father towards him Much less that an Usurper acquires any Right over the person of the Son in the state of Nature for otherwise if a Thief should procure strength enough to drive a Master of a separate Family out of doors and so this Rogue could subdue the whole House and set up for Lord and Master of it that then the Wife and Children and Servants were immediately bound to obey him because he hath a possession and is in by the permissive Will of God and so hath a better Right than any body else but the Master himself It is true indeed in this case every Member of this Family is bound to preserve his own life and may yield a passive Obedience to this Rogue for fear of his power and as far as he thinks it will conduce to his preservation but I do not see any obligation he hath from Conscience or Reason to obey this Robber farther than as he cannot help it but may take the first opportunity to drive him out of the House and call in his true Father or Master unless he hath made him any promise to be quiet and not assault him for then he is in the same state with a Prisoner upon parol for all Writers on this subject hold that nothing but a lawful War can give any man a Right over the person of another unless he become his Servant by some voluntary act of his own or otherwise the Slaves taken by the Argter-Pyrates were in a sad case for they were bound in Conscience never to escape without the consent of their Masters Nor upon the Authors principles is there any difference between a Father of a Family in the state of Nature and a Prince since he tells us more than once that a Kingdom is but a large Family And consequently no difference between an Usurper of the Fatherly power and that of a Monarch onely the Rogue that usurped the one could call himself but Master of the Family but the other would stile himself King Emperour o◠Protector Nor will the place of St. Paul Rom. 13. v. 1. oblige any man in this case for though it is said that St. Paul wrote this Epistle Nero an Usurper being Emperour of Rome I deny that Nero was an Usurper for though it is true that Claudius left a Son yet since by the Roman Law a man might make whom he pleased his Son by Adoption which Son so adopted was in all respects looked upon as the true Heir of the adopting Father and Nero was so adopted by Claudius and so being elder than his own Son Germanicus would succeed before him Tacit Annal. 12. c. 25 26. And besides the Adoption being confirmed and passed into a Law by the Senate Nero was as truly Claudius's Son by the Roman Law as Britannicus himself So that an Usurper hath at first no better Right than another For Gods permitting a wicked act to be done as a Banditi or Pyrate to take a man Prisoner does not therefore confer on this Thief or Pyrate any Right over a mans person So that the instance the Author gives p. 73. will not hold That Vsurpers have such a qualified Right to govern as is in Thieves who have stolen Goods and during the time they are possessed of them have a Title in Law against all others but the true Owners and so such Vsurpers to divers intents and purposes may be obeyed For first this is no Law of Nature or Reason but onely a positive Law of England where for the avoiding of perpetual violence and strife and for the better securing of Property they have made possession even in Thieves to confer a Temporary Right against all but the true Proprietor Whereas in the state of Nature a Thief by invading another mans Goods unjustly and taking them away by violence becomes an Enemy to all Mankind and so may lawfully be killed or have what he hath so possessed taken from him by any other Secondly Neither does the parallel between the possession of Goods and that of a Kingdom hold for Goods may be possessed by the first Occupant but Government which is an Authority over the person of a man can never be seized since a man without his own act or consent can never lawfully fall into the power or possession of another as I have already proved So that I know not to what purpose this Treatise of the Authors could serve but to make all men obliged in Conscience to yield not onely a passive but an active Obedience to all the Commands of Cromwel and the
the World If any think that particular Multitudes at their own discretion had power to divide themselves into several Commonwealths those that think so have neither Reason nor Proof for so thinking and thereby a Gap is opened for every petty factious Multitude to make more Commonwealths than there be Families in the world In which Dispute I conceive the Jesuit hath gone too far in asserting an undivided Soveraignty in the whole Multitude collected together before any Civil Government instituted That being onely the Compact or Agreement of those that entred into it and binding none else at first So likewise this is a meer Chimera of the Author's that Adam or Noah were absolute Monarchs and Heirs of the World so that no man could withdraw themselves from the Obedience of their right Heirs without being guilty of Rebellion Whereas I have already proved that all the Sons of Noah and their Descendants were independant Governours of their Families without any subordination to the eldest Son or Heir And if every Brother had a Right to set up an Independant Family or Principality distinct from that of the eldest I would fain know what became of this absolute Right of Adam or Noah and by what authority this undivided Soveraignty which God had conferred on Noah was thus crumbled into parcels If by Gods appointment then it seems God did not countenance this notion of the right Heir of the world If they did it of their own heads then all the ancient Patriarchs or first Peoplers of the world were guilty of Rebellion and Usurpation against their elder Brother and his Descendants But if the Author's Friends think he hath the advantage because I grant that the World was peopled after the Flood under the conduct or government of distinct Heads or Fathers of Families this does not grant any natural Right in those Heads of Families to have an absolute power over their Descendants since perhaps God divided the Language of the World by so many Tribes or Families for the better conservation of the mutual Love and Concord of neer Relations since men would more readily obey their Ancestor or common Father than a meer stranger or for other reasons best known to his infinite Wisdom So that there was a necessity that those of the same Stock should upon the dispersion march off together since none else understood one another Yet the Scripture does not tell us whether in this division and plantation of the World the Headship of these Families was according to eldership of birth or whether they elected the fittest man of their Tribe or Family to be their Leader And if the eldest were the man it was not from any Right over them but either of reverence to his Wisdom or to avoid the Dissentions that might arise by other kind of choice on Eldership though indeed it confers no Right of it self yet is often preferred as a kind of natural Lot So that every one of these Heads of Families being independant from each other they could never agree upon a Ruler over them but by Compact among themselves And if so he was their Leader that all the rest liked and agreed upon So that there needed no Compact of all the People of the world since every Father of a Family being independant upon any man else had a power to confer his Authority of governing himself and his Family upon whom he pleased which Power whether and how far it was from God and what kind of Authority it was we shall examine hereafter So that though I grant all Government might be at first instituted by Fathers of Families yet this does not prove any despotick Power that such Fathers had over their Children or Descendants and so consequently could confer no such Authority over them So that all the rest of the Authors Queries about the distinct power of the Multitude vanish since though there never was any Government where all the promiscuous Rabble of Women and Children had Votes as being not capable of it yet it does not for all that prove all legal Civil Government does not owe his Original to the consent of the People since the Fathers of Families or Freemen at their own dispose were really and indeed all the People that needed to have Votes since Women as being concluded by their Husbands and being commonly unfit for civil business and Children in their Fathers Families being under the notion of Servants and without any Property in Goods or Land had no reason to have Votes in the Institution of the Government So likewise all the Authors Objections and Cavils p. 44. how the greater part of a Multitude could over-rule the rest in the state of Nature signifie nothing since if many men meet to chuse a Governour the first Question must be whether the Votes of the major part shall not conclude the rest and then all that agree that they shall are bound by their own consent and those that will not agree to it are still in the state of Nature toward all the rest and are free to go and set up a Government by themselves that they all can agree to Nemine Contradicente And if they disturb those that have agreed that they will be concluded by the majority they may be lawfully used as Enemies And for Proxies or Representatives though the beginnings of most Kingdoms and Commonwealths like the head of Nilus are hard to be traced up to their Heads or Fountains and no man can positively tell the manner of their beginning yet if they began from some small quantity of men collected into one Army or City there needed no Proxies at all since every man might give his Vote himself But since the Author puts me to name any Commonwealth out of History where the Multitude or so much as the greatest part of it ever consented either by Voice or Proxies to the election of a Prince I will name him two Commonwealths The first was Rome where all the People or Freemen consented to the election of Romulus being formerly proposed See Dionysius Halicarnasseus lib. 3. And the second shall be that of Venice where though it is true the whole promiscuous Rabble did not chuse a Prince yet all the Masters of Families or Freemen at their own dispose had a Vote in the choice of the first Duke and Senate which plainly proves some Governments to have had their beginning by the consent of the People And though some Governments have begun by Conquest yet since those Conquerours could never perform this without men over which they were not always born Monarchs it must necessarily follow that those Souldiers or Volunteers had no obligation to serve them but from their own agreements with their General and for those advantages he proposed to them in the share of those Conquests they should make Read likewise our Historians of the manner of Will. the Conquerors coming over and you will finde those that helped him in that expedition were Volunteers to whom
Nature and constitute one Politick Body all the Members of it are obliged in Conscience to maintain this Government according to its first Institution But if it be to be constituted anew as upon his Escheat of the Crown among the Fathers of Families Who are to chuse one who must take upon him this Fatherly Power over them The inconvenience will be the same upon his own Principles For all Cities Towns and Families consting of so many independant Heads of Families if the major part of an Assembly cannot conclude the minor as this Author supposes then though all the Fathers of Families in a Nation should agree in the choice of a King and but those of one Town or Family dissent these Dissenters if they do not like the Prince the rest have elected may certainly if they are able divide from them and set up a distinct Government of their own since all these Fathers of Families being alike free and independant can in the state of Nature claim no Superiority over each other So that the Author from his own Principles falls into the same inconveniencies which he finds fault with in those of others whereas indeed there is no absurdity in this Supposition I shall now consider in the last place that part of his Hypothesis Patriarch p. 21. where he supposes That all such prime Heads and Fathers of Families have power to consent in the uniting or conferring their Fatherly Right of Soveraign Authority on whom they please and he that is so elected claims not his Power as a Donative from the People but as being substituted properly by God from whom he receives his Royal Charter of an universal Father though testified by the ministry of the Heads of the People I have already pull'd up the foundations of this Notion in the beginning of these Observations by shewing that God hath not ordain'd or conferred any such Power on any particular Father or other Relation and therefore neither on all the Fathers of Nations or Countries taken together they not having any Ownership or Property in their Childrens persons but a Right to govern and direct them for their benefit and preservation which Fatherly Right cannot be transferred to another much less survive his person as I have already proved Yet to render this as clear as may be granting him what he contends for that this Fatherly Power may be transferred to another I should be glad to know though the Monarch so nominated by them may have a supreme Power over all their Children and Servants yet whence does he derive this Right of commanding absolutely over the Persons and Estates of these Fathers of Families themselves Not from succession from Adam for his right Heir cannot now be known nor from their transferring the power of governing their own persons upon him for then this Right commences from their own Act or Election and not from the Fatherly power supposed to be at first conferred on Adam And if they transfer onely their Fatherly or Masterly Authority upon this new Monarch then he hath onely a Right to govern their Children and Servants the Persons and Estates of these Father 's not being included in this Grant And again if this Election in the state of Nature could confer a Right then this Monarch must owe his Power to these Fathers of Families and so these being as I have already proved the representative Body of the People he must receive his Authority as a Donative from them which he will by no means admit of But since he will have him properly and immediately substituted by God from whom he receives his Power of an universal Father then these Fathers of Families do not create or constitute the Monarch but onely are Instruments or Ministers to put him in possession and if so it is the possession of the Crown and not their Election that gives him this Right But as the Author words it He receives from God this Charter of an universal Father Upon which Principle see not to what purpose this Nomination or Election â—rves for if any body during this interregnum can by â—rce or fraud slip into the Throne he is more proâ—rly Gods Substitute and to be obeyed accordingly â—an if he had come in by their Nomination or Eleâ—ion since he is in possession by the immediate Will 〈◊〉 God and declared by the success So that these â—athers are in a fine case after all their Priviledge to â—ect since whoever can usurp this Authority over â—…em must immediately be their Father and Master â—hether they ever give their consents or not For â—is Author says Obedience to Government p. 66 67. Paternal Power cannot 〈◊〉 lost it may be either transferred or uâ—rped but never lost But I have sufâ—…ciently exposed the absurdity of this â—otion before in what I have said about Obedience 〈◊〉 Usurpers and shall lay it more open when I come 〈◊〉 shew in what sence Princes owe their Authority to God Therefore since these Fathers of Families had in the â—ate of Nature an absolute Power of governing themselves I shall now enquire in the next place Whether â—…ey may not pass over this Power upon some certain Conditions and reserving some Rights and Priviledges 〈◊〉 themselves and Children upon the making of the Compact with their new Prince Secondly How the perâ—n so elected owes his Authority to them and in what â—ense to God As to the first I see no reason but that â—hese Fathers of Families may if their number be not â—oo great agree to govern all alike together and that whoever is a Master of a distinct Family or a single â—…an at his own dispose and not a Servant shall have 〈◊〉 Vote in the Government and that the major part of â—he Votes shall conclude all the rest and then it will be â—s perfect a Democracy as ever was since as I have granted already there was never such a Governmenâ— where all Women and Children promiscuously haâ— Votes with their Husbands Fathers or Brothers Sâ— that if ever there was any such thing as a Democracâ— in the world this would be one Or lastly if they maâ— all govern themselves they may as well agree to chusâ— a certain number of their own Body to represent them and to meet in a common Council or Assembly anâ— to govern them either for life or yearly as they shaâ—… make the Conditions with them and then this Government will become an Aristocracy where a few oâ— those that are reputed the best do govern though by aâ— Power derived from these Fathers of Families Anâ— if they may bestow this Power upon more than one under certain Conditions I see no reason why they may not do the same if they confer it upon one man after the same manner either by making a Compact with him upon his accepting the Government how much 〈◊〉 this Power he shall exercise and how much they wilâ— reserve to themselves If they agree that he shall have no more but a Presidency
whilst they are well used which if they come to be depraved by those that are in power the same things are counted wicked and unprofitable So likewise p. 73. he makes the Multitude or People of Rome to have elected Nero Heliogabalus Otho and Vitellius for Emperours and to have murdered Pertinax Alexander Severus Gordiun and the rest there named whereas whoever reads the Historians of those times will find it was not the People or Senate but the Army that either elected or murdered Emperours And as for Nero the Senate had never dared to have declared him a publick Enemy had he not become so odious and intolerable that nobody would take Arms for him and that the Army under Galba which had revolted and chosen him Emperour was then marching to Rome So that indeed these Emperours were torn in pieces by the Dogs they themselves fed and kept constantly in pay to prevent the People who had not yet quite forgot their former Liberty from recovering it again And the People of Rome had just as great a hand in the setting up and putting down Emperours as those of Stambola have had in the deposing or setting up those Grand Seigniors which the Janizaries their Guards have strangled of late years setting up their Uncles or Brothers in their rooms or as the People of England had in setting up either Oliver or his Son Richard for Protectors But leaving these lesser Mistakes which I look upon onely as the Transports of the Author's Resentments against Popular Government in which I shall not contradict him in the main onely I would fain lay the Saddle upon the right Horse and not blame them for the faults committed by a standing Army which in those times domineer'd over both Emperour and the People of Rome and imposed upon them what Emperour they pleas'd though never so base and unworthy I shall therefore in the last place come to the second point I before proposed whether the person on whom the Fathers of Families upon this Escheat of the Crown confers their Authority owe the same to them or else immediately to God The Author in the passage before cited will by no means grant That the person so elected claims his Power from the People but as being substituted properly by God from whom he receives his Royal Charter of an universal Father though testified by the Ministry of the Heads of the People Which Assertion is built upon grounds altogether false and precarious as I have already proved For first he here supposes That God hath given by divine grant all Fathers in the state of Nature an absolute despotick power over the persons of their Sons so that they may sell or otherwise transfer this Fatherly power to whom they please And secondly That the Children are as much obliged to obey those to whom the Fathers transfer this Right as they were their Fathers themselves Thirdly That this Power so transferred does not properly derive it self from the Fathers who so pass over their Fatherly power but to God who conferred it on them at first In which Hypothesis every one of the Propositions are false For first I have proved that no Father hath by any divine Grant or Charter an absolute despotick power over the person of his Son Or secondly that God hath given Fathers a power to bequeath or transfer their Authority to another so that the Grantee should by this Assignement succeed to all the Rights of a Father and therefore the two former being false the last of Princes receiving their power immediately from God which is built upon them must be so too And besides it is evident that these Fathers do not onely here pass over a Fatherly power of governing of their Wives and Children but likewise that of governing themselves not as Fathers but as men since they must transfer this power whether they had Wives or Children or not else they might onely pass over to this new Monarch their power over their Wives and Children and reserve the power of governing themselves still So that it is plain there is a power different from that of a Father to be transferred But if it may be replyed They may chuse themselves a Father if they please indeed I have heard of a mans adopting of a Son which still must be by this Son 's own consent yet I never heard of a Son 's adopting himself a Father or that a Father which is a natural Relation can be created at mans pleasure it is true a Lord or Master may but he cannot thereby challenge that natural Reverence and Gratitude due onely to a Father So that if Fathers have a power of governing themselves and their actions in the state of Nature and that they can confer this Right on any other it is evident they do not confer this as a Paternal power on their Monarch which the Author supposes to be granted by God to all Fathers We shall now come to the second Head at first proposed and examine what power a Master of a separate Family hath over his Slaves or Servants in the state of Nature First As for hired Servants though it is true they may submit themselves to the will and disposal of another what Diet they shall eat and what Clothes they shall wear what work they shall do and what hours of rest or sleep they shall have to themselves and that the Master may beat or correct him if he do amiss and through wilfulness or negligence disobey his Masters commands and that these are the Conditions that most hired Servants being part of their Masters Family do serve upon yet is this not so properly an absolute Obedience as a duty of Truth and Honesty in the Servant since as he is bound to perform his part of the Contract so likewise is the Master to perform what he hath promised them since this service is neither absolute nor perpetual so that when his time is out he is free of course And if in the mean time the Master does not allow him sufficient Food Clothes or hours of rest so that he may be able to perform his work this Servant in the state of Nature if he cannot perswade his Master to use him better may without doubt quit his service as soon as he can since he was to yield his Master his Labour upon certain Conditions which not performed on the Masters part the Servant is not obliged any longer to perform his part of the Bargain in living with him or serving him And as for those that have sold or yielded themselves up as absolute perpetual Servants or Slaves to the government of another I see no reason why they may not in this state of Nature make certain Conditions with their Master before they will give themselves up to him since if a man may covenant with another upon what condition he will serve him for seven years why may he not do the same for his whole life So that upon the non-performance of these
Conditions this kind of Servant hath the same remedy against his Lord as an hired Servant may have And of this sort were our ancient English Villains who though they could claim no property against their Lords either in Goods or Lands yet if the Lord killed his Villain the Wife had an Appeal of Murder of the death of her Husband Since no man can be supposed so void of common sense unless an absolute Fool and then he is not capable of making any Bargain to yield himself so absolutely up to anothers disposal as to renounce all hopes of safety or satisfaction in this life or of future happiness in that to come So that I conceive that even a Slave much more a Servant hired upon certain Conditions in the state of Nature where he hath no civil power to whom to appeal for Justice hath as much Right as a Son or Child of the Family to defend his life or what belongs to him against the unjust violence or rage of his Master Nor do I think any places of Scripture if well considered command the contrary For as for the places in St. Paul's Epistles Ephes 6.5 Servants be obedient to them that are your Masters according to the flesh with fear and trembling And Coloss 3.22 Servants obey in all things your Masters c. does not extend to all things that are but only to things lawful for them to do that is that were not against the Principles of Christian Religion And in this it is that St. Peter 1 Pet. 2.18,19 commands Servants or Slaves which there were all one to be subject to their Masters not onely to the good and gentle but also to the froward For this is thank-worthy or grateful if a man for conscience towards God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 endure grief or trouble suffering wrongfully Which words seem to import that Servants ought to bear with a great deal of bad usage from their Masters but does not command them in the state of Nature to give up their Lives or Goods to their Masters without any resistance But if any shall urge the Example of Christ alleadged in the third verse who suffered even to death for us I conceive that does not extend to a suffering or submission unto all things but to such things for which Christ himself suffered viz. for Conscience toward God that is for matters of Religion which is likewise most agreeable to the sence of the words that follow For what glory is it if when you are beaten for your faults you take it patiently but if when you do well and take it patiently c. Now who ever can imagine a Servant to be beaten for doing his duty Therefore doing well here signifies the profession of Christianity which they were not to deny though they had unbelieving Masters Therefore since no interpretation of Scripture ought to be against Reason that can never tell a man that he ought to yield up himself so wholly to anothers disposal as to give his Master an absolute right and power over him to kill or maim him without cause or to be so basely and penuriously used as perpetually to suffer hunger cold and nakedness or the like so that his life should rather become a burden and a punishment than a satisfaction For since we have no notions of happiness but in life nor in that farther than it is accompanied with some contentment of mind no rational man can be supposed to consent to renounce all the pleasures and ends thereof and which onely make life desireable much less the Right of living and preserving himself So that even such a Slave may without doubt in the state of Nature run away from his Master and set himself at liberty if he can since his Master hath not performed his part of that tacite condition of his Service which was that this Master should for his Labour provide him all the necessaries of life and suffer him to enjoy the ordinary satisfactions of it Nor is the worst of Slaves that is one taken in War so absolutely at his Masters dispose as that because he hath him in his power he hath therefore a Right to use him as he will For first as long as the Conquerour keeps his Slave as a Prisoner and makes him work in Fetters though he hath given him his life for the present yet there does not thence arise any Obligation in the Slave to Obedience so that the Slave may yet run away if he can nay kill his Conquerour unless he will come to other Terms with him and make him promise him his Service and Obedience upon the granting him his Liberty and enjoyment of the ordinary Comforts of Life And if he cannot enjoy these I believe there is no sober Planter in Barbadoes who are most of them the Assignees of Slaves taken in War but will grant such a Slave may lawfully run away if he can Therefore it is not true what Mr. Hobbes says That no injury can be done to a Slave for his reason is not valid that because a Servant hath absolutely subjected his will to that of his Lords therefore whatever he does he does it by his Master's will in which his own is included so that volenti non fit injuria this proves no more than that the Slave hath no just reason of complaint though his Master give him Victuals that does not suit with his palate orprescribe him Work which may not please his humour So on the other side what rational man will affirm that this Slave hath given up the natural Rights of living and being preserved as a man but that injury may be done to this Slave as any other Servant if the Task imposed upon him be beyond his strength to perform or if he be beaten or like to be put to death without cause or that he hath not Food sufficient to enable him to do his work for he may still require at his Masters hands the usage of a man and of a rational Creature So likewise though this property in the person of a Slave taken in War may be assigned over to another yet the Right of commanding a Slave by his own consent cannot be so farther than it was agreed upon in the Bargain between him and his Lord for if he convenanted to be a Slave onely to his Lord and no man else the Lord cannot in justice assigne nor sell him to another without his consent nor leave him to his Heirs since there might be certain peculiar reasons wherefore a man might subject himself to this man and not to another So likewise in absolute Empires which began purely from Conquest though it is taken for granted that they may be aliened at the Will of the Conquerour yet it is otherwise in Subjects who have submitted themselves upon certain Conditions and who have some Liberties remaining to them and much more in those Kingdoms which are limited by their Institution for there not properly the Persons of the men but the
ought to be subject to the Husband in all things tending to the good and preservation of her Children and Family or else the Family would have two Heads as I said before But it does not therefore follow that he hath such a despotick power over her that she may in no case judge when he abuses his Fatherly or Husbandly power For suppose the Father of a Family in the state of Nature should in a mad or drunken fit go about to kill or maim herself or one of his innocent Children can any body think this were Rebellion against the Monarch of the Family for the Wife to rescue her innocent Child or self out of his hands by force if she could not otherwise make him be at quiet Or suppose the Husband in such a fit should command his Wife to deliver him a sum of money which she had in her keeping when she was morally sure that he would presently play it or otherwise squander it away will any rational man affirm that a Wife may not deny to deliver her Husband his own money in such circumstances So that it is evident she never so absolutely submitted her will to his as not to reserve to her self the faculty of a rational woman as not to judge when her Husband would evidently destroy her self or Children or absolutely ruine the Family when he was not in a capacity â—o govern himself So likewise if the Husband command her to do any thing against her Conscience or â—he Laws of Nature she is not obliged to obey him For though the Wife in all matters peculiar to the Marriage-bed and in all other things that relate to the â—ell-ordering the Family is obliged to submit her will â—o that of her Husband yet it does not therefore folâ—ow that she is an absolute Slave to be commanded or â—ompelled in all actions not tending to this end And 〈◊〉 it be objected that as Commonwealths cannot be â—overned without some coactive Empire so Marriage â—annot well subsist by a bare Compact or the power â—f Friendship alone to oblige the Wife to her duty in â—ase she prove disobedient As I do not deny but persaps it may be lawful for the Husband as Head of the â—amily in some cases if the Wife prove palpably obâ—inate and disobedient to his reasonable commands â—nd will not hearken to Reason to compel her by corâ—ection and the rather since Christ hath taken away â—he liberty of Divorce whereby a man might be rid of 〈◊〉 cross Wife as of an ill Servant if she did not â—nend her manners and therefore he hath no way else â—… mend her if she will not do her duty by perswasion â—nd fair means Yet this Power is very rarely to be â—sed since it is onely some women that either need or â—ill endure to be so handled and all discreet and raâ—onal Wives as well as Servants will do their duty â—ithout it Yet this Example of the absolute Obediâ—ce of Subjects in a Commonwealth does not agree with that of a Wife to her Husband as Head of the â—amily since Families especially those who consist â—f a good number of Children and Servants may â—ave a twofold end the one peculiar to it self the oâ—her common with that of Civil Governmments The â—ommon end is considered in that defence and security resulting from the conjunction of many into one Body in which although an absolute Empire be necessary yet since the Wife being but one weak woman can contribute but very little to this end it may very well suffice to the peace and unity of the Family if she be tyed to her Husband onely by a simple Compact by way of Friendship without any despotick power over her But the peculiar ends of Matrimony which are the procreation and breeding up of Children and providing things necessary for the Family may well enough be obtained although the Husband be not invested with this despotick power which supposes that of life and death or other grievous punishments and though the Wife be tyed by her Compact only and the Bonds of Amity of which Compact the Husband being the Principal does imitate that of an unequal League between Civil States in which the Husband being the Head the Wife owes him all due respect and observance and he on the other side owes her maintenance and protection Therefore I am not of the opinion of some who will have the Husband in the state of Nature to be endued with an absolute power of life and death over his Wife and that in this consists the very quintessence of Marital power because forsooth that all Empire when it is in its proper subject and neither is exercised precariously by any man nor circumscribed by any superiour Power does always import jus vitae necis over the Subject But this is not so for a man in the state of Nature may become part of anothers Family and yet make iâ— in his Bargain that the Master of this Family shall not put him to death or misuse unless it be for Crimes that deserve death by the Law of God or Nature or become a publick Enemy And the Supposition is false which first supposes such an absolute Empire to be in the Husband as in the proper Subject neither is there any absolute power of life and death necessary to the ends of Marriage for if the woman commit small faults and will not be amended the Husband may correct her if greater as suppose Adultery he may put her away and likewise chuse whether he will provide for the Children which he hath reason to believe he did not get himself If she murder her Children or commit any other abominable sin against Nature she may justly be cut off from the Family and punisht as a common Enemy to Mankind and so she might be if she had not been his Wife but Servant or other Member of the Family Yet I do not affirm that this despotick Empire or power of life and death is against the Laws of Nature or inconsistent with the state of Matrimony any more than the absolute power of a good Prince should destroy the love of his Subjects towards him or the reverential fear we ought to have of God destroy our love of him Therefore as I have allowed that the woman may confer such a power on her Husband over her self in the state of Nature so I grant this absolute power may likewise be conferred on Husbands by the Civil Laws of particular Common-wealths Thus it is murder for a man in England to kill his Wife taken in the very act of Adultery but it is not so in Spain Italy and most other Countries if he kill his Wife if he find her alone in another mans company though it cannot be proved they have done any thing clse to deserve it Having now gone over the whole power of the Head of a separate Family as a Father Husband and Master and proved that no man is a Slave by Nature or without his
own Consent as a Slave by Compact or without his fault as a Slave taken in a just War and that no Master of a Family hath such Right in the person of one of these but that he may do him injury if he take away his life or punish him without cause and that such even such a Slave may lawfully set himself free if the Master do not perform his part of the Bargain And having in the last place shewn what power a Husband hath over his Wife in the state of Nature and from whence it takes its Original it is now time to answer those Arguments and Objections made by this Author and others That the Prince or Governour so elected by the Fathers of Families or Frcemen at their own dispose which I hold to be equivalent to the whole People hath not onely his Nomination from them but that it is from God alone that he derives his Soveraign Power and Authority with which he is endued upon his first acceptance of the Supreme Power and if he should accept it with any limitation it were to restrain that Power which God hath conferred upon him by his being made the Supreme Magistrate and would hinder him from performing that great Duty as he ought In answer to which I have already proved that no such unlimited Power was conferred by God to any private man in the state of Nature as a Father Husband or Master and therefore could not be given to any Civil Soveraign who is supposed to have no more power than the Father of the Family had before A second Objection is That no particular man hath in the state of Nature any power over his own life and therefore cannot have any over the life of another man and if one man hath not this power neither have the People which is but a universal consisting of singulars any such power and consequently cannot confer it on any other man therefore every Prince must have this Soveraign Power of life and death not from the People but from God In answer to which I shall first of all deny the consequence that because God hath not given a man a power over his own life therefore he can have none over the person of another For God gave man a Right to preserve but not to destroy himself and so cannot dispose of his own life whenever he is weary of it Therefore since the first Law of Nature is Self-preservation it is lawful for a man to use all means conducing to this end that do not prejudice another mans Right in his particular life or happiness so that if any man assault me in the state of Nature I may defend my self and consequently kill the Assailant if I cannot otherwise escape But perhaps it will be replyed that the intention here is not principally to kill the man if it may be otherwise avoided and that this Right is given men onely to preserve their lives from being taken away at another mans pleasure but that no private man hath power to revenge an injury done to another or ones self in the state of Nature with death but God or him to whom God hath committed this power according to St. Paul Rom. 12.19 Dearly beloved avenge not your selves c. I shall prove that this place does not destroy that which I maintain for I grant that all Revenge taken as the satisfaction some men take in the very doing evil or prejudice to another is unlawful even by the light of Nature Secondly Likewise where Magistracy is instituted who is to bear the Sword for the punishment of evil doers I grant all return of like for like to be unlawful since he is appointed as a publick Judge to right those that are injured and maintain the common Peace But no Text forbids men to punish injuries done either to themselves or those they have a concern for in the state of Nature for this is not Revenge but a natural Punishment to deter men from committing violent and unjust actions that disturb the peace of humane Society since the wrong doer declares himself thereby a publick Enemy to all Mankind And on this account Cain feared that not his Father onely hut every one that met him would slay him that is punish him for the death of their Brother or Kinsman And if this were unlawful then all War must be so in the state of Nature and Princes being always in that state in respect of each other could never make any War for the gaining of Rights usurped or to punish for Injuries received So that this power which a man in some cases hath over the life of another is onely given him by God for the common good and preservation of Mankind of which every particular person is a part and so this power conferred upon the supreme Magistrate is no more nor extends higher than that though there are more things requisite to the publick peace and safety of a Civil Government than are to humane Society in the state of Nature And from hence do supreme Powers derive their Right of making positive Laws and ordaining higher Punishments for Offences than the Laws of God or Nature do expresly appoint as for Thest Coining and the like Nor is the Antecedent true that no man in the state of Nature hath a power to dispose of his own life For though it may be true that no man hath a Right to make away himself whenever he dislikes his being here yet it does not therefore follow but that for a greater good to the publick any man nay a Prince himself may lay down his life for his Peoples good And therefore I doubt not but the Example of Codrus the Athenian King was not onely lawful but highly commendable in facrificing his life for the good and safety of his People supposing that all their Estates and Liberties depended upon that one Battel much more for a private man to lay down his life to save some publick person highly useful to humane Society And this much does the Apostle Paul himself seem to admit Rom. 5.7 when he says For scarcely for a righteous man will one die yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die Where by a righteous man Expositors understand one who had sufficiently done his duty in an ordinary private capacity yet contributed little to the publick good whereas by a good man is understood some person highly useful and beneficial to others and for such a one a man may not onely dare to die but actually lay down his life if occasion be A second Objection is That if the supreme Magistrates Authority be derived from the People then this Authority must be either inferiour or superiour to it If inferiour how can the People be commanded or governed by that which is inferiour to its self If superiour how can the Effect be more noble than the Gause since neither any particular Person nor the whole Multitude had Soveraign Authority and therefore
Vote to chuse Parliament-men but Freeholders or as in old times none but those who served in the Wars in person had Votes in the Withena Gemote or Great Council And yet this was no standing Army no more than those in Greece So likewise neither are these words fairly rendered in the same page 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that in a Popular State The Soveraign Power is in the Sword and those that are possessed of the Arms but are thus to be rendered In this kind of Government i. e. Popular those govern and have greatest Power who bear Arms and fight for the rest which is but reasonable I shall not trouble my self with the rest of those Contradictions and Faults he find◠with Aristotle since I look upon this Treatise of Politicks as the most confused he hath writ onely it seems this Author did but skim over Aristotle when he so confidently asserts That the natural Right of the People to found or elect their own kind of Government is not once disputed by him which whether he asserts or no let these words judge lib. 5. Pol. cap. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which may be thus Englished But of Kingdoms by discent this may be supposed the cause of their dissolution besides those al◠ready mentioned viz. when it happens to many of them who not being endued with the power of a Tyrant but onely with a Kingly Authority become contemned whilst they will unjustly abuse their Subjects for then there is an easie dissolution of the Government for he is not a true King over those that like not his Government but a Tyrant P. 20 21. He finds fault with Aristotle for making the main distinction between right Forms of Government and those that are imperfect or corrupt to consist solely in this That where the profit of the governed is respected there is a right Government but where the profit of the Governours is onely regarded there is a corruption or transgression of Government By this it is supposed by Aristotle that there may be a Government which he calls a Tyranny onely for the benefit of the Governour That this Supposition is false may be proved from Aristotle himself to instance in the point of Tyranny And therefore the Author endeavours to make him contradict himself thus Tyranny saith Aristotle lib. 3. cap. 7. is a Despotical or Masterly Monarchy Now he confesseth l. 3. c. 6. That in truth the Masterly Government is profitable both to the Servant by nature and the Master by nature And he yields a solid reason for it viz. It is not possible if the Servant be destroyed the Mastership can be saved Whence it may be inferred That if the Masterly Government of Tyrants cannot be safe without the preservation of them whom they govern it will follow That a Tyrant cannot govern for his own profit onely And thus his main definition of Tyranny fails as being grounded on an impossible Supposition By his own confession no Example can be shewn of any such Government that ever was in the world as Aristotle describes Tyranny to be for under the worst of Kings though many particular men have unjustly suffered yet the Multitude or People in general have found benefit and profit by the Government If Aristotle were alive I doubt he would say this Author plaid the Sophister with him and did not onely misquote his words but pervert his meaning For first Aristotle does not say in that place he quotes or in any other that I know of That Tyranny is a Despotical or Masterly Monarchy And therefore all he builds upon this Concession is false It is true indeed Aristotle says That the Government of the Master is profitable both to the Servant by nature and the Master by nature that is upon his supposition that they are either so by nature But the Author omits what immediately follows because it would vindicate Aristotle's true meaning for his next words are Nevertheless it i. e. the Masterly power regards chiefly the profit of the Master and of the Servant but by accident but Oecumenical Government or that of a Master over the Wife Children and Servants is for their sakes whom he governs and for the common good of them all Hence it appears plainly that Aristotle when he says that a Tyranny is for the benefit of the Governour alone he does not mean that the Subjects can have no benefit at all by it since it is the Tyrants interest they should live and get Children or else he would quickly want Subjects Thus the Children of Israel under the Tyranny of Pharaoh had Meat Drink and Cloaths and were not so low kept but they got Children apace and yet we find God thought them opprest and heard their cry But Aristotle clears the point when he distinguishes an absolute Masterly power over a Slave from that of a Father of a Family the Master in the former considering onely his own profit and the preservation of the Slave but by accident and so an ill-natured brutish Master takes care of the life of his Slave that works in the Mines or Sugar-works in the Indies not out of any love to the person of the Slave but because he cannot subsist without him So a Grasier or Butcher takes care of his Cattel that they thrive and do well as they call it yet every body knows that they take this care onely for their Carcasses which yield them so much ready money at the Market So that indeed a Tyrant onely considers his own good in the welfare of his Subjects and looks upon them as no better than brute Beasts in which he hath an absolute property to shear or kill as he thinks it most conduces to his own profit without considering to what end he is set over them As the Grand Seignior makes use of the bodies of his poor Christian-slaves for Subjects I cannot call them to fill up Ditches and to blunt the edge of his Enemies Swords But that all Kings are bound to preserve the Lands Goods and Lives of their Subjects the Author himself confesses Patriarcha p. 94. Though not by any municipal Law so much as the natural Law of a Father which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Forefathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their Subjects So then I hope there is some difference between the Government of a Father over his Children and that of an absolute Lord over his Slaves notwithstanding our Author's Quotation out of Aristotle whereby he would make them all one viz. That a Kingdom will be a Fatherly Government Which is true if you take it in the best sence for that affection that Kings like Fathers should have for their Subjects And so it is plain Aristotle intended it by the words immediately foregoing thus For the Society of a Father with his Sons has an appearance of a Kingdom not that it is so indeed But to make an end with Aristotle I will give you one
Sons reign we find the Procurators of the Nobility and People of England declare in the Council of Lyons quod universitas Regni nunquam i.e. Patres nobilium vel ipsi never consented or would ever consent to the tribute unjustly extorted by the Court of Rome At which protestation his Holyness was so confounded that our Author tells us he never lift up his Eyes or had a word to reply And every Monarch hath as absolute a Propriety in his Kingdom as Noah had in the World as our Author supposes I know no reason why the King may not bequeath his Crown to which of his Sons he pleases no matter whether lawfully begot or not since Princes are above all Terms or positive Laws or he may divide it among them as Noah did the World to his three Sons So that upon these grounds the Testament of Henry VIII whereby he disinherited the Line of Scotland and that of Edward VI. whereby he excluded his Sisters from the Crown should have been valid but the Loyal Subjects of England beleived that neither of those Kings could disinherit the right Heir of the Crown by their Testaments alone but acknowledge them in the persons of Queen Mary and King James notwithstanding those pretended Wills I have been the larger upon this Subject that men that do not much consider nor are versed in these matters may see the absurd wicked consequences of this notion of an absolute Propriety and Dominion to be inseperable from Monarchy So that I doubt not but even those very men who love a smatch of arbitrary Government because it best suits with their tempers or interests cannot away with it unmixt when it comes to exert all its Prerogatives Thus some men think Musk and Ambergreece mixt whith other Ingredients makes an agreeable Perfume which if held to their noses in the Cod or whole Lump they are so far from thinking a good smell that they loath it I shall not affirm with Grotius That the Empire which is exercised by Kings doth not cease to be the Empire of the People For I suppose the People have passed over all their present interest in it to the Prince and his heirs and as long as that line lasts they have nothing to do with it and consequently cannot set up another Family over them and so on the other side the King hath no such absolute Property as that he can alter the succession otherwise than the fundamental laws of the Monarchy did first appoint which were made by consent of all the Estates and without which they cannot be altered nor is there any fear of a contradiction as the Author supposes That the Succession must either hinder the right of Alienation which is in the People or the alienation must destroy the right of succession which must attend upon elected Kings For we own no right of alienation in the People as long as there is a lawful Heir remaining and succeeding in his right to whom the Crown was first legally setled nor yet does therefore the succession diminish the right which the People had at first but that it may arise and take place again if the King should die without known heirs Having done with his observations upon Grotius Chap. VI. I am now come to his Anarchy of a limited or mixt Monarchy in which though I shall not undertake to maintain all which our Author if whom he writes against hath laid down in this treatise since many things in that it treats were written according to Irene's notions during the late Warrs yet I hope I may be able to shew that this Doctrine of a limited Monarchy is not but of Yesterâ—lay as our Author will have it But that all the learned men in the laws and constitutions of these Northern Kingdoms have held it to be no such damnable Doctrine but that the contrary would introduce â—ll Tyranny and Arbitrary Government among them which is at this day practiced in the Eastern parts of the world But it seems the Author allows 260. that there may be a mixt Government but not a mixt Monarchy because the word Monarchy is compounded of two Greek words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one alone and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to Govern or Rule and therefore Monarchy being the Government of one man alone cannot admit of any limitation or mixture But what if one should say that all this is nothing but wrangling about words since why may not he be called a Monarch who hath the Supreme though not the only Power in a Common-wealth if the custom of that Country allow it him though his Power be limited or mixt as well as for the Romanes to call their Monarch but Imperator or General or for the Florentines or Russians to call their Monarch great Duke Since it is not the names but the exercise of the power that creates the difference Nor is it any more a Bull or contradiction than to call that which I now write out of an Inkhorn though perhaps it is made either of Glass or Mettal So the first Monarch being absolute the Title of Monarch may now be by eustom well enough applyed to those that are not absolutely so but to pass by such Grammar niceties I shall endeavour to vindicate the writer of this Treatise of Monarchy whom the Author calls Mr. Hunton from giveing an Idea of a Government which is nothing but meer Anarchy and Fiction and that there hath been and yet is such a kind of Government as a limited Kingship which if the Author is so dogged as he will not allow it the name of a Monarchy we cannot help it let his Friends give it a more proper name if they please As for what he will prove out of that Authors words that every Monarch even his limited Monarch must have the Supreme Power of the state in himself so that his Power must no way be limitted by any power above his For then he were no Monarch but a subordinate Magistrate is true yet I do not see that the Author contradicts himself as the observatour will have him when he tells us in the same Page That in a moderate or limited Monarchy the supreme power must be restrained by some law according to which this power was given and by direction of which this power must act So that he will have his Supreme Power not limited and yet restrained Is not a restraint a limitation and if restrained how is it Supreme and if restrained by some law is not the Power of that law and of them that made it above his Supreme Power and if by the direction of such law only he must Govern where is the Legislative Power which is the cheif of supreme Powers when the law must rule and govern the Monarch and not the Monarch the law he hath then at best but a gubernative or executive Power and so proceeds to quote this Authors own words at large if his Authority transcends his bounds and if it command
to them But Edward 1. that great Prince was of another mind who in his Letter to the Pope concerning the Tribure granted by King John Mat. Paris P. 435. Et super hoc nequiverimus ejusdem deliberationem habere cum Prelatis et proceribus ante dictis sine quorum Communicato Concilio Sanctitati vestrae non possumus respondere et jure jurando Coronatione nostra praestito sumus astricti quod Jura Regni servabimus illibita nec aliquid quod Diadema tangat regni ejusdem absque ipsorum re quisito comsilio facimus So likewise that Victorious Prince Edward III. in the preamble to the new Statute of Provisors Anno Regni 25. Which Statute viz. repealing a former Law viz. 35. Edward I. which said this Statute holdeth always his force and was never defeated or annulled in any point and by so much as he is viz. the King bound by his Oath to do the same to be kept as the Law of the Realm But I come now to the last main Objection which the Author makes against limited Monarchy and by which he hopes to prove it an absolute Monarchy I will set down the difference between our Author and Mr. H. upon whom he animadverts in their own words ' First Mr. H. holds that the King himself in a limited Monarchy is not to be resisted or punished any more then in absolute Monarchy and so can doe no wrong in his own person ' Yet if he this limited Monarch transcends his bounds if he commands against Law the subject is not Legally bound to obedience in such cases whereupon our Author asks who shall be Judge whether the Monarch transcend his bounds Mr. H. conceives that in a limited legal Monarchy there can be no stated external Judge of the Monarch's actions if there grow a fundamental variance betwixt him and the Community And in another place confesses that there can be no Judge Legal and constituted within that form of Government whereupon the Author thinks he hath got a great advantage over our Gentleman and therefore is resolved to put the question home and demands of him if there be a variance betwixt the Monarch and any of the meanest persons of the community who shall be judg for instance the King commands or gives Judgment against me I reply his commands are illegal and his Judgments not atcording to Law who must judge if the Monarch himself judge then you destroy the frame of the Government and make it absolute For saith Mr H. to confine a Monarch to a Law and then to make him Judge of his own deviations from that Law is to obsolve him from all Law and on the other side if any or all the People may Judg then you put the Soveraignty in the whole Body or part of it and destroy the Being of Monarchy and thus this Author says Sir R. A. hath caught himself in a plain Dilemma if the King be Judg then he is no limited Monarch if the people Judg then he is no Monarch at all so farewell limited Monarchy nay farewell all Government if there be no Judg. But as sure as this Author thinks he hath his Adversary at an Advantage yet I do not see that he hath given him so much as a Foyl much less a fair Fall for all this terrible Dilemma For first it is for this that if the people be Judg when the Princes commands are unlawful it will therefore destroy the being of Monarchy suppose a King should command all his Subjects to go to Mass which they being Protestants judg Idolatrous If they obey him they must commit Idolatry if they disobey him he is then no Monarch But perhaps it will be replied that it is true the Subjects may judg when the Command is unlawful but if they cannot yield active obedience yet they must yield a passive one and submit patiently to the Penalties he pleases to lay upon them for not going This Answer will not serve turn for the Authors Objection is general if the people judg he does not say resist he is no Monarch at all and refusing to go to Mass is a judging the Princes Command unlawful But Mr. Hobs from whom this Argument is borrowed drives it more home if the Authors friends will admit the Consequence affirms truely upon his own principles that if the Subject do judg in any case whatever of what is lawful or unlawful good or evil it quite destroys the Monarchy For the Monarch is sole Judg of all Actions whether they be Lawsul or not Now when the Monarch hath declared his Will that all his Subjects should go to Mass surely not to go is to disobey the Monarchs Command Since his will was they should absolutely go to Mass nor leave it to their discretion either to go to Mass or undergo the Penalty ordained for not going Lastly neither does the Judgment of the people concerning their own safty in many cases take away the absolute power of a Monarch For a General of an Army hath an absolute Power over the Lives of his Soldiers but does it derogate from his absolute power that he knowes he shall not be obeyed if he command his Men to leap down a Precipice or to kill each other ' But Mr. H. proposes two or three expedients to help this inconvenience of the want of a publick Judg. First He says a Subject is bound to yield to a Magistrate where he cannot de jure challeng obedience if it be in a thing in which he can possibly do it without subversion to the Goverment and in which his Act may not be made a leading Case and so bring on a prescription against public liberty And again he saith If the Act in which the Exorbitance or Transgression of the Monarch is supposed to be be of lesser moment and not striking at the very Being of the Government it ought to be borne by publick patience rather then to endanger the Being of the State But these Salvoes however moderate and sober will not please our Author at all Anarchy 285. ' For he will have them to be but Fig-leaves to cover the nakedness of Mr. H's limited Monarch formed upon weak supposals in cases of lesser moment For if the Monarch be to govern only according to Law no transgression of his can be of no small moment if he break the bounds of Law for it is a subversion of the Government it self and may be a leading case and so bring on a prescription against publick Liberty and strikes at the very being of the Government it self and let the case be never so small yet if there be illegality in the Act it strikes at the very being of limited Monarchy which is to be legal unless the Author will say as in effect he doth that his limited Monarch must govern according to Law in great publick matters only but that in smaller and which concern private Men he may rule according to his own will All which
be upon the hearing of one Party only for it is impossible for a Monarch to make his Defence and Answer and produce his Witnesses in every Mans Conscience in each Mans Cause who will but question the Legality of the Monarchs Government Certainly the Sentence cannot but be unjust where but one Mans Tale is heard The first Sentence of this Paragraph is Answered sufficiently in the Observation upon the last Reason but one As for Written Laws every Body knows they are adumb Letter as they lie in Ink Paper but as they come to be from thence Copied out and fixed in Mens Memories they are not dumb neither always needs a Judg to pronounce Sentence but are able enough to speak oftentimes against the Sentence of an unjust Judg and all the Standers by can easily tell if a Judg should go about to Trie and Condemn a Man without ever Impanelling a Jury nor needs there any Defence for the Judg in this case but that a Man may safely give his Sentence in this Case without hearing the Judges Reason since it is plain there can be none given But as for the Monarch it is supposed that he hath already made his Defence by his Atturney and produced his Witnesses when the Subject Petitioned his Judges to right him in what he conceived to be an Oppression So that the Sentence cannot be unjust where but one Mans Tale is heard But if the Judges in this Case as in that of Ship-Money cannot convince the Plantiff but that he is oppressed contrary to Law It is neither his nor their Judgment that can alter the Case But if he can have no other remedy he must even go home and expect better opportunities of being righted as when there are honester Judges or the calling of a Parliament one of whose ends is to redress grievances of that kind by representing to the King the faults and transgressions of his Ministers who only are punishable and answerable for the injustice since the King in his own Person can do none as I have often affirmed as for Mr. H's conclusion that every man must oppose or not oppose the Monarch acoording to his own Conscience when he can have no other redress I do not approve of it For I will not suppose any time in which this Nation is not oppresed by a standing Army or Men of different Principles in Religion and Goverment but the Subject may find redress if not at one time yet at another But the other part of the dispute between our Author and Mr. H. whether this Power of every Mans judging of the illegal Acts of the Monarch ' argues not a Superiority of those who Judg over him who is Judged because it is not Authorative and Civil but Moral residing in Reasonable Creatures and lawful for them to execute which is not so hard to understand as the Author makes it if we take this Word Moral as it is plain Mr. H. uses it in contradiction to Civil Power which is such a right of acting as every private Man hath though he hath no Civil Authority For a Mans bare judging of the justice and injustice of all Actions that concern him or any other man are inseparable from the Nature of Man whether they are ordered by a Prince or private Man and a Princes commanding this or that to be done or giving his judgment this way or that way cannot alter these settled Rules whereby Men judg of right and wrong So that if this Author or his Friends will make use of Mr. Hobs's Arguments of the necessity of the Judgment of one Man in all Points whatever they must likewise take what follows that there is likewise no good or evil or right or wrong in the state of Nature but what the Monarch judges to be so and when that is done if the Authors Friends have any Religion let them see what they will get by it but the Author supposes he hath sufficient advantage over Mr H. because he hath laid it down in the Page before going ' That resistance ought to be made and every Man must oppose or not oppose according as in Conscience he can acquit or condemn the Acts of the Governour For says the Author if it enable a Man to resist and oppose his Governor without Question 't is Authoritative and Civil As for Mr. Hobs's Assertion I will not take upon me to meddle in so nice a Point though he hath in all his work supposed such resistance lawfull only in limited or mixt Monarchies and not in absolute ones and likewise then only when all other ways and means hvae proved ineffectual and of this opinion likewise the Author of the Excellent Poem called Coopers Hill seems to have been which I rather take notice of because the Author was never look't upon but as a great Friend to Monarchy and this Poem it self speaks him no Presbyterian Both the Verses and Sence are so good that perhaps it may refresh the Reader tired with Reading so much drie Arguments to run them over speaking of the King 's hunting the Stag over Runny-Mead where the great Charter was Seal'd he falls into this reflection This a more innocent and happy Chace Then when of Old but in the self same Place Fair Liberty pursued and meant a Prey To lawless Power here turned and stood at Bay When in that remedy all hope was plac't Which was or should have been at least the last Here was that Charter Seal'd wherein the Crown All marks of Arbitrary Power lays down Tyrant and Slave those Names of hate and fear The happier Style of King and Subject bear Happy when both to the same Center move When Kings give Liberty and Snbjects love Therefore not long in force this Charter stood Wanting that Seal it must be seal'd in Blood The Subjects Armed the more their Princes gave Th' advantage only took the more to crave Till Kings by giving give themselves away And even that Power that should deny betray Who gives constrain'd him his own fear reviles Not thankt but scorn'd nor are they gifts but spoiles Thus Kings by grasping more then they could hold First made their subjects by oppression hold And Popular sway by forcing Kings to give More then was fit for Subjects to receive Ran to the same extreams and one excess Made both by striving to be greater less The mischiefs of which extremes if rightly considered would make all wise Princes and good Subjects contented with their share and endeavour to keep the Ballance even and not to let it incline to either side As to Magna Charta I shall only add that the Defence which the Nobility and People made of their Antient Rights was not condemned or declared Rebellion either by Magna Charta or any other Statute but on the contrary the breakers thereof were declared ipso facto excommunicated the solemn form of which and where the King himself who had so often broke his Oath bore a part see in Mat. Paris