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A62177 Advice given to the Republick of Venice how they ought to govern themselves both at home and abroad, to have perpetual dominion / first written in Italian by that great politician and lover of his countrey, Father Paul the Venetian, author of the Council of Trent ; translated into English by Dr. Aglionby ; dedicated to His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.; Opinione come debba governarsi internamente ed esternamente la Repubblica di Venezia. English. Sarpi, Paolo, 1552-1623.; Aglionby, William, d. 1705. 1693 (1693) Wing S693; ESTC R22760 39,883 142

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no occasion of mending it either by acquisition of new Territory or by receiving Subsidies and Pensions Florence only would hardly be mov'd by that last motive because he is not needy being at this time perhaps the Richest Prince in ready Money that is in Christendom and his Riches always increase because the Princes of that Family do yet retain their Ancestors Inclination to Merchandize and that enriches the Prince without damage to the Subject The Dominions of the great Duke are considerable as well because they are placed as it were in the Navel of Italy with a fertile Territory all united together as also because the States of other Princes are as it were a Wall and Defence to it and it is besides to be valued by the Communication it has with the Sea by Leghorn and some other Maritime Fortresses So that if one were to reckon upon any Italian Prince I know none that deserves so well as being exempted from the temptation of being bought and having yet some of that punctual mercantile Faith If the Republick will have a League with any of the other Italian Princes there will be no difficulty in it provided they pay them but withal one must not forget the witty Reflection of Boccalini when the Italian Princes are willing to be taught manners out of the Galateo provided that it may not look like ill breeding in them to eat with both Jaws as fast as they can With Poland the Republick can have no other Concern than that of defending Christendom and by some diversion from that Crown bear the more easily the weight of the Ottoman Power Therefore it would be well for the Republick to have that King and Kingdom grow more powerful As for any thing else the great distance that is between that State and the Republick takes away all matter of any further Consideration The same thing may be said of the Moscovite England being the greatest of those powers that are separated from the Church of Rome is a Kingdom of great strength particularly since the Union of Scotland and the Kings of England have nothing left to desire as to Territory All that Island is now under the Dominion of one sole Monarch and has the Sea for a Wall So that if England be not disunited within it self there is no power to overcome it We see the Example in the Invasion of Philip the Second of Spain and yet then the Union was not so great as might have been who lost his mighty Armada that he had been so long preparing at such vast Expences Queen Elizabeth who has shew'd the World how far a Woman's ability can go in Government did likewise enlarge her Dominions by Navigations to the Indies and wounded Spain in that tender part She likewise had some Ports of the Low-Countries consign'd to her so that she seem'd to be hardly contain'd in that separate World of hers The Island is fertile and delicious producing all necessaries for Life and though the Natives go abroad and buy the Products of other Countries it is more as Superfluities and out of Luxury than want and amongst the rest they have a Trade for Grapes called Currans which they buy in the Dominions of the Republick Henry the Eighth who was the King that Apostatiz'd from the Church of Rome did use to concern himself in the Affairs of Italy and several times the Popes have had good Protection from the ancient Kings of that Country who were most devoted to the See of Rome to say truth Religion has had a great Loss and the Court of Rome a greater I cannot well say whether out of the great Lust of Henry the Eighth or the little consideration of Clement the Seventh at present that King will not hear of Rome and has but small Curiosity for the Affairs of Italy If this King could grow greater it would be advantageous to the Republick because it might obtain his Alliance and by that means a greater respect from other Crown'd Heads but however even without this consideration 't is a Power to be courted because the Nation having an ancient Antipathy to France and a modern one to Spain it cannot but have a good inclination for the Republick 'T is true that the present King is more enclin'd to Wars with his Pen than with his Sword having a mighty Love for Disputes and valuing himself upon the Character of a Notable Divine so much has the Quarrel with Rome influenc'd that Country that even their Princes study Controversie but however I should not think the Republick ought to mind any of those Circumstances because where there is strength there is always hopes of making use of it that depending only upon raising of Passions The best means would be besides the continuation of those Offices already introduc'd of mutual Embassies strictly to command the Governours in the Levant to shew all good usage to the English Merchants and particularly observe punctually all Treaties and Engagements with them because there is no Nation that puts a greater value upon their Word than the English do and the Kings of that Island have not yet learnt the modern Policy that gives them leave to break their Faith in order to reigning more absolutely With the Seven United Provinces 't will be good to cultivate Friendship and to encrease it by a mutual defensive League particularly at this time that the Truce is but newly concluded with Spain for it will be a Curb upon the Spaniard if he should attempt any thing against the Republick for fear his old Wounds should be set a bleeding again they being but just bound up and not healed 'T is feasable likewise to procure something more of Trade with the Hollanders because they are extremely ingenious and addicted that way and moreover since both the Republicks stand in awe of the same Power it will not be difficult to unite their inclinations and they have made on their side a sufficient Advance by sending an Embassy to the Republick which though of Complement yet it has shew'd great esteem and inclination to an Union Besides the Advantage of a solid diversion of the Forces of Spain there is another Essential consideration which is That from them might be had a considerable Body of well disciplin'd Soldiers and that with admirable celerity besides several Regiments that might be rais'd in a Country so well us'd to War if there were occasion and all the inconveniencies of Transportation are not to be valued for the Republick will always have a greater scarcity of good Soldiers than of good Money With the Princes of Germany of a different Religion there can hardly be any Concerns if there is no room for Quarrels As the World stands now if it be not well they should grow greater at least 't is not amiss they are already great enough because they are a Check upon the Emperour who else would be a most formidable Potentate to all Princes but more particularly to the Italians and
from quartering of Souldiers which is in it self the heaviest of all Tyrannical Oppressions Let the great Crimes be still brought before the Council of Ten that the Veneration for the Power at distance may be greater and likewise because the Ministers of Justice will be less subject to be corrupted when the Criminals are in the Prisons of the State Let the Process against them be tedious that so the slowness of proceedings may be some part of punishment But for the Banditi if they dare to appear in the State let them be Extermined with all Industry for there cannot be a greater Demonstration of Contempt in the Subject and Weakness of the Prince than for a Condemned Man to dare to come into the Dominions out of which he has been banished as if one should frequent another man's House in spight of his Teeth The Bishopricks and other Church-Preferments may be conferr'd upon the Natives first to avoid the Imputation of too much Avarice in the Venetian Nobility if they should take all Preferments to themselves Secondly In order to debase the Spirits of the Natives and turn them off from Arms to an idle Life Besides it will be a kind of a Shadow of Liberty to make them bear their Subjection the better But as much as it may be convenient to let them attain the Degree of Bishops so much would it be dangerous to let them arrive to that of Cardinal for then they will be sure to abhor the Quality of Subjects since those who wear that Purple have usurp'd the Precedency even over Princes Let every City have the making of their own Gentry by their Common-Council for that will make it so much the meaner but still let them be bound to have the Confirmation from the Senate Let all those Families who apply themselves to the Service of Foreign Princes be upon all occasions slighted and not at all countenanced by the Government intimating to them by that silent notice That he deserves little of his own Prince who seeks Employment with a Foreign one And if any of these who have serv'd abroad should be so bold as to contend with a Venetian Nobleman if it be at Venice let the Punishment be severe if he be in the wrong but if it is in his own Country let it be gentle that the Opinion of the Publick Justice may be advantageously insinuated to the People and likewise that the Noble Venetians themselves may avoid Contests where they are not more immediately protected Let the Citadels of the Chief Cities be well provided as much against a Foreign Enemy as to chastise a Rebellion at home nothing so much inclining to offend as the hopes of Impunity and it may indeed be said That if Men were certain of a punishment to follow they would never offend at all but a Prince that is sufficiently provided is sufficiently safe Remember that as it is very hard to find either a Wife or a Monk that one time or another have not repented the loss of their Natural Liberty so the same may be said of Subjects who fancy that they have parted with more of that they were born to than was necessary for their well-being And let this suffice for the Second Head Coming now to those several Princes with whom the Venetian Republick may have Concerns we will begin with the Pope as being the first in Dignity if not in Power And here we must have a Two-fold Consideration he being to be look'd upon as a Spiritual and as a Temporal Prince There has been some Advertisements given already about his Spiritual Power We will add here what was then omitted First We must admire the wonderful State of that Monarchy which from a mean and persecuted Condition for the Series of many years in which the very Exercise of Religion was punished with Death is arriv'd to so much Greatness that all Regal Dignities of the same Communion pay Homage to this Spiritual Monarch by the kissing of his Feet God Almighty has been pleased this way to shew the Reward of Christian Religion by raising to the Supreamest Greatness the Institutors and Ministers of it but the Piety of Christian Princes has very much tributed to it and the first was Constantine This Emperor not only embrac'd the Christian Faith but enrich'd the Church extreamly and since his time several other Emperors and Kings have as it were vied with one another who should give most But that which is most inscrutable is how with their Riches they came to give away also their Jurisdiction and Power For six hundred years after the coming of Christ the Popes were always confirmed by the Emperors or in their steads by the Exarcks of Ravenna and in the very Patent of Confirmation there was always written these Words Regnante Tali Domino Nostro In the year 518. the Emperor Justinus sent from Constantinople his Embassadors to Pope Hormisda to confirm the Authority of the Apostolical Sea and to announce Peace to the Church In 684. Constantine the Second gave to Benedictus the Second a Concession by which for the future the Election of Popes should be made by the Clergy and People of Rome and should not need the Confirmation of the Emperour nor of the Exarck not reflecting that the holiness of those times might come to change it self into an Interest of State Bonifacius the Third obtained of the Emperour Phocas that all other Christian Churches might be obedient to the Roman After this in the year 708. Justinus the Second was the first that submitted to kiss the Pope's Feet and that Pope's Name was Constantine But Adrian the first having received great Favours from Charles the first King of France did in a Council of One Hundred and Fifty Three Bishops confer upon him the Authority of chusing the Popes which was about the year 773. a Priviledge which his Son Lewis the Pious knew not how to keep but parted with it for the imaginary Title of Pi●us to which might be added that of Simple Howsoever scandalous the Emperours were in their Lives the Popes did use to bear with them referring to God Almighty the punishment of them But in the year 713. Philip Emperour of Constantinople being fallen into Heresy was Excommunicated by Pope Constantine and had the Reward due for all the Honours and Priviledges given by his Predecessors to the Popes This was the very first time that the Imperial Power was forc'd to stoop to the Papal and yet at the same time the Church of Milan claim'd an Independency from the Roman and maintain'd it for above Two Hundred Years being countenanc'd by the Emperours who often came into Italy and in their absence hy the Exarcks of Ravenna till at last in the year 1057. it yielded up the Contest to Pope Stephen the Ninth In the year 1143. Celestin the Second was the first Pope chosen by Cardinals in Exclusion to the People I have made this Narration that it may appear by what Degrees this
places would not be a Deliberation befitting the Wisdom and Gravity of the Venetian Senate It would be better to watch the occasion of some Extremity or Pinch of an Emperour which often happens and buy these places but then be aware that if it be not a Patrimonial Estate the consent of the Dyet is necessary to the purchase to cut off all claims in time to come 'T is as hard that the Emperour should unite with the Republick to acquire the State of any other Prince in Italy because first for Spain they are the same Family with the Emperour Against the Church he will declare as little professing a great Zeal for it and calling himself The Churches Advocate Modena Mantoua and Mirandola are Fiefs of the Empire Savoy and Florence are remote from him and to come at them he must overcome greater Princes that are between him and them so that this Union would prove difficult If the Emperour should fall out with some of these Dukes his Vassals and depose them it might happen that if Spain were busie elsewhere and the Emperour loth to take the trouble of chastising them himself alone he might then unite with the Republick upon condition to have the best part of the Spoil but if the Emperour should as formerly come to a great Rupture with the Church and employ heartily his power in the Quarrel 't is not impossible but he might be willing to engage the Republick by a promise of some part of the conquest I think in any other way 't is not probable to make any advantage of the Imperial Assistance The last Question is Whether he can unite with others against the Republick And of this there is no doubt For if Maximilian tho infinitely oblig'd to the Republick made no difficulty to unite in a League with Lewis the Twelfth of France his Competitor and Enemy whom for Injuries received he had declared a Rebel to the Sacred Empire tho Lewis laugh'd at that Imaginary Jurisdiction I say if he could submit to joyn with so suspected a power much less would the Emperour now scruple the uniting either with Spain or the Pope or any other Princes of Italy not only for to acquire Territory but even for bare Money if it were offer'd him With France I believe the Union would not be so easie as it was then because now the Emperour being partial for Spain if their Interest did not concur they would hinder him from being drawn away by any hopes or promises But this will appear better when we come to treat of Spain For if Spain will have a League against the Republick the Emperour will never stand out Now let us come to France 'T is not above Fifty years ago that the Republick thought themselves oblig'd not only to desire but to procure the Greatness of France because being under the phrensie of a Civil War it threatned little less than the dissolution of that Monarchy The Succession of Henry the Fourth to the Crown who had his Title from Nature and the Possession from his Sword reviv'd it and at last gave it such vigour that from deserving Compassion it came to move Envy and if a fatal blow of a mean hand had not cut off that Prince's Life and Designs there would have been requisite great Dexterity or great Force to defend the Republick from them The Count de Fuentes Governour of Milan us'd to brag that he had such Musick as should make those dance who had no mind to 't Henry the Fourth might have said so with much more reason and he us'd to affirm That at the pass things were the Neutrality of the Republick was a Coyn that would no longer be current If he had given career to his no ill-founded Designs half a World would not have suffic'd him but we must not be frighted if we see the Raging Sea swell in Billows and look as if it would swallow up the Earth since a little Sand stops all its Fury Death has a Scythe that most commonly cuts off all the Noblest Lives If Henry the Third of France had brought the Siege of Paris to an end if Philip the Second had not had the Winds and Seas against him England would have been in Chains and Paris would have been a Village In conclusion the Fatality of Humane Affairs is such that most great undertakings are disappointed by unexpected causes At present the constitution of France is such that there is little danger from them for during the Minority of their King they will have enough to do not to lose ground there being so many Jealousies and Factions a-foot 'T is true that the common people have open'd their Eyes and begin to be weary of spending their blood for the ambition of the great ones and amongst these the chiefest are old and at their ease so that they will think chiefly of keeping themselves in those Posts they enjoy The Duke of Maine who is Head of the Catholick Party is very ancient and very rich wherefore if in the time of the great troubles he either could not or would not aspire to make himself King when even he had all but the Name of it 't is not to be imagined he thinks of it now and if he will be content with the State of a Subject he is as great as he can be The Duke of Mercaeur who in his Wife 's right pretended to Erect Britany into a Kingdom is at last dead in Hungary the Duke of Epernon is more studious of good Husbandry than Soldiery the Duke of Montpensier has always been true to the Royal Family the Capricios of the Marchioness of Aumale will hardly have any Followers and it will be well if she can clear her self of the late King's Death On the other side the Prince of Conde the first Prince of the Blood is young and of a mild Nature he has besides before his Eyes the Example of his Father Grandfather and Great Grandfather who all perish'd unfortunately in civil Broils and has in his own person experimented the Spanish Parsimony in his Retreat from Court to Brussels So that if he desires a greater Fortune he may compass it in France from the hands of the Queen her self who is so ill a Politician as to try to put out Fire with pouring Oyl upon it The Hugonots are weary the Duke of Bovillon their Head well pleased with his present Fortune and if he have a mind to be a Hugonot out of Perswasion and not Faction there is no body will hinder him but most of these great men have Religion only for a pretext as 't is reported likewise of the Duke de Lesdiguieres which if it be true they will never be quiet till the King be of Age and by consequence there will be little protection to be hop'd for from that Kingdom Our Speculation therefore may more certainly conclude that the Greatness of France is at a stand and cannot in the space of some years make any progress
ADVICE Given to the Republick of VENICE How they ought to Govern themselves both at home and abroad to have perpetual Dominion First Written in Italian by that Great Politician and Lover of his Countrey Father PAVL the Venetian Author of the Council of Trent Translated into English by Dr. AGLIONBY Dedicated to his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland LONDON Printed for Christopher Nobbes at the Sign of the Olive-Tree in the Inner-Walk above stairs in the New Exchange 1693. TO HIS EXCELLENCY HENRY Viscount Sydney Lord Lieutenant of Ireland Gentleman of the Bed-Chamber to Their Majesties and one of Their Majesties most Honourable Privy-Council My Lord THough your design'd Favours to me might justly claim this offer of my Respects in a Dedication yet I must own That it is not only Gratitude that requires me to make this return but it is my Choice and Judgment that prompts me to take the Liberty of putting this Piece under your Protection And indeed if I regard either the Greatness of your Family or your own Personal Endowments where could I have found a more Illustrious Name or a more generally own'd Desert The Sydneys have fill'd our English History and adorn'd our Nation Great in Employments both at Home and Abroad but more Glorious in asserting constantly their Country's true Interest And your Lordship has not been wanting to follow such Honourable Examples first by a steddy adherence to all the measures that could be entred into by a wise man in times full of dark designs and then as soon as your Countries Good requir'd it by boldly laying aside all dubious Counsels to appear in Arms with our Great and Glorious Deliverer His Present Majesty Amongst the Thanks we owe to all those who have done the like I think no one can more justly be extoll'd by this or recommended to the esteem and admiration of the next Age than your Lordship In your Negotiation in Holland during the close Intrigues of the latter end of King Charles his Reign you strove to keep both him and us happy and quiet by promoting the true Interest of both But when the Ferment of our Affairs forc'd you to more sensible demonstrations of your thoughts you Nobly chose rather to appear an ill Courtier than be thought an ill Man to your Country The Protestant Interest carried it with you while the Roman Faction thought their designs as secure as they were deeply laid 'T is rare to find such Conduct and Courage in a Publick Minister But what could be expected less from one ready to venture his Life in the Field at the Head of our Nation abroad against that unquiet Monarch who was then invading all the Liberty Mankind had left Heaven My Lord has at last bless'd these constant endeavours for England's Prosperity and we see you in the Councils and Privacy of a Prince born for our Felicity The Great Queen of this Monarchy who so lov'd her People and understood their Interest had a Sydney for her Favourite and such a man as she admir'd living and lamented dead and our King who has begun with restoring this Nation to its true Interest and will no question advance its Glory to the highest pitch has your Lordship in his Councils and Arms Guarded by you in the day he sleeps often under your care in the Night safe in your Loyalty and pleas'd in your attendance To whom then could I more properly offer these Arcanums of a Wise Government than to one who must be a good Judge of all Writings of that kind and therefore with repeated Offers of my humble Respects and readiness to obey your Lordship's Commands I take leave and am My Lord Your Lordship 's Most Humble and most Devoted Obedient Servant W. Aglionby THE PREFACE THat Padre Paulo Sarpi of the Order of the Servites is the Author of this Treatise there needs no other proof than the reading of it for whoever is acquainted either with his style or his manner of thinking must of necessity acknowledge that they are both here And indeed we may say that this is not only a true representation of the Government of the Venetian Republick but that the Author also like great Painters who in all their Works give us their own Genius with the mixture of the Representation has likewise drawn the truest Picture of himself He was one of the greatest men of his Age of vast Natural Parts to which he had added all the acquir'd ones that great Study and much Conversation with Men could give him It was he who defended the Republick in the dispute they had with Pope Paul the 5th which he did so solidly and yet so modestly that his Subject never carried him either to Invectives or Railleries unbeseeming the Gravity of the Matter nor the Dignity of the Persons whose Cause he managed that Quarrel being accommodated by the interposition of the Kings of France and Spain in which the Republick had all the advantage possible The Senate very sensible of the Obligation they had to P. Paulo made him Consultor of State and added an Honourable Pension for his Life giving him at the same time Order to view all their secret Records where all their Papers and Instruments of State were laid up all which he reduc'd into such a new order as that they might be recurr'd to with the greatest ease imaginable upon all occasions The Esteem they made of his Abilities was so great that they never had any important debate in which either by publick order or by the private application of some of their Senators they did not take his advice which most commonly was assented to afterwards Towards the latter end of his Life the Inquisitors of State seeing that they could not hope long for the continuation of those Oracles resolv'd that once for all he should impart them his thoughts upon the whole Constitution of their Government and withal add his Opinion touching their Future Conduct both within and without and that is this Piece with which I now present the Publick As it was made for the perusal of those only who were the participants of all the Arcanums of the Empire it is writ with less regard to the Publick Censure to which he suppos'd it would never be subject All other Writers of Politicks may in one thing be justly suspected which is that when they write with a design of publishing their Works to Mankind they must have a regard to many considerations both of the times they write in and Opinions that are then receiv'd by the People as also to the Establish'd Forms both of Government and Religion besides that Self-love too will not let them forget their own Glory for the sake of which they often swerve from the true Rules of writing but here all these considerations ceas'd the Work is directed to those whose Interest it was to conceal it And for the Author himself it may be said it was rather his Legacy than any desire of shewing his Abilities
which by other Pieces of his were already sufficiently publish'd to the World But what an Idea must we have of that Man whom a Venetian Senate not only admitted to their Debates but consulted upon the whole Frame of their Government a Senate I say justly deserving the Titles of Wise and Great who have maintain'd their State for 1200 years with little alteration who have been a Bulwark to the Christian World against the most potent Invader that ever was who at the same time have struggled with all the Christian Princes united and headed even by Popes whose spiritual power alone has been able to subvert greater Empires This Senate or at least the wisest of them the Inquisitors of State who have the whole Executive Power in their hands cannot let this Subject of theirs leave the World without having from him a Scheme of their present Affairs and a prospect of the Occurrences to come Nothing certainly can give us a greater Idea of Padre Paulo nor shew us how great Abilities in the most retired and concealed Subjects will break out in all wise Governments and cannot long be conceal'd As to the work it self I shall say little it being improper to forestall the Reader 's Judgment by mine but I think I may venture to give him some cautions against a surprise from some bold Maxims and arbitrary Positions which he will meet with and perhaps not expect from one of our Author's Profession nor in the Methods of a Government which carries the specious and popular Title of Liberty in the Head of it As to the Author tho he were a religious man and a very strict observer of that Life yet being above ordinary methods and having a Mind elevated beyond his sphere he thought that not only he might but that he ought to go to the Extent of his Capacity when he was to advise those whom God Almighty had invested with Soveraign Power This makes him lay down that great Maxim That all is just that contributes to the preservation of the Government and in a natural deduction from this advise in some cases not to stand upon common proceedings I remember the Author of his Life says That he had adapted most of the Aphorisms of Hippocrates about the Diseases and Cure of the Body natural to those of the Body politick and if so he could not forget that of Extremis Morbis extrema Remedia which alone would warrant all uncommon proceedings Most people have an Idea of Commonwealths not unlike that which Poets and young people have of the Golden Age where they fancy that without either labour solicitude or chagrin people past their time in the Innocent Pleasures of Love and Musick and other soft Delights so the World imagines that a Popular Government is all sweetness and liberty precarious and depending upon their Votes free from oppression and slavery and constant to known methods but all this is a very wrong Conception they are invested with Soveraign Power and must and do use it for their own preservation as absolutely as any Soveraign Prince in the World and whoever shall seriously consider the Machine of this Venetian State must own that neither the Governors themselves nor the people governed by them have any such Excellent and Inviting Prerogatives as can justly give them a Superiority to the Government of a wise Prince and well dispos'd People in a limited Monarchy But I have said enough of this the Reader will best judge whether the reading of this Book will enamour him of a Republican Government or not I have no more to say but that this is a very faithful Translation from an Original Manuscript communicated to me in Italy where it begins to creep abroad and if we had in England the conveniency of Workmen that could Print Italian correctly I would have publish'd both the Original and my Translation together The words of Quarantie and Avogadore may puzzle some people but they will easily understand that the first is a kind of Bench of Judges deligated out of the Body of the lesser Nobility for the Trial of Civil and some Criminal Causes and the other is the Name of a great Magistrate in Venice who among oth●r Priviledges has that of carrying the Sentences of the Council of Ten before the great Council THE OPINION OF Padre Paolo Most Illustrious and Excellent Lords the Inquisitors of State I Write by Obedience to your Lordship's Commands without Reflection upon my own small Abilities because the Chief Consideration of a Subject ought to be to obey his Prince Your Excellencies have commanded me to deliver my Opinion how the Venetian Republick ought to regulate it self to hope for a perpetual Duration To obtain a true Notion of this it will be necessary to distinguish and first to regulate the Government of the City in which will be comprehended the manner of keeping the Nobles and the Citizens to their Duty then look abroad to the rest of your Dominions and lastly give some Form to the dealing with Foreign Princes To begin with the First I might in short put you in mind of the Saying of St. Bernardino of Siena to the Doge Moro who said That the Republick should continue so long as they should keep to the Rule of doing Exact Justice but to come nearer to the matter and the Condition of these Times we must reduce under that Head of Justice all that contributes to the Service of the State and to speak yet more succinctly we will lay it down as a Maxim That all is just which is any ways necessary for the maintaining of the Government In the particular Government of the City 't is an excellent Custom to lay the Impositions as well upon the Nobility as the rest of the Citizens First Because the Burden is less when it is general And Secondly Because 't is just when 't is without Partiality There is no doubt but it lessens something of the Splendor of the Nobility to see them tax'd particularly since in many Governments the Nobility and Gentry though they are Subjects and not part of the Government do nevertheless enjoy a Freedom from Taxes and contribute more with their Sword than Purse towards the Publick Charge But since the Ancient Simplicity of our Ancestors has patiently submitted to this Yoak and because the Priviledges of the Sword are dangerous in a Commonwealth I think 't is advisable not to innovate in this Point because such a change would give too much offence to the rest of your People and too much Haughtiness to your own Nobility 'T is true that when the Taxes are upon the Lands so as to be unavoidable it would be convenient to give the Nobility all the advantage of time for payment and at last if they are insolvent it will not be amiss to neglect the rigorous Exaction of the Law that so the Nobility be not ruin'd because Extreams are always dangerous and the Republick may suffer as much from having too many poor
Noblemen as from having too many rich ones besides the Envy and Jealousie that must be in the hearts of those who shall find themselves naked and their Equals cloathed with their Garments and that only for not having been able to pay an Imposition laid upon them by other Peoples Contrivance There are some who not making a right Judgment of things do inveigh extreamly against a Custom of this Republick which is the having so many Offices and Places of so small Revenue that those who enjoy them are almost necessitated to be corrupt and so after they have been Judges and Governours forc'd to come under the lash of the Law or to justifie their Integrity if they can This seems a notorious Abuse and carries with it some appearance But however I should never advise to make these Imployments better because there results from this another greater advantage to the State which is to keep the small Nobility under for they may be compar'd to the Adder which cannot exert its Poyson when 't is numm'd with Cold And if these Nobles who are by inclination discontented should once arrive but to a Mediocrity in Fortune they would presently contest with the great ones and by strength of their Numbers play some ill Trick to the Government whereas now they are kept to their Duty not only by Poverty which clips the Wings of Ambition but also by being subject to the Censure of the great ones for having misbehav'd themselves in their Governments Indead I could think it prudent to proceed against them something coldly unless they are guilty of very great Enormities such as scandalize the generality of your Subjects for then 't is necessary to shew a publick resentment But otherwise I would have them handled gently it being a kind of punishment to lye open to a Prosecution And indeed I would never have any Nobleman though never so guilty be condemned to a Publick Infamous Death because the Damage that results from thence upon the whole Order of the Nobility when they are seen to pass through the Hands of an Hangman is greater than the Good of a Publick Example can avail Neither on the other side would I have these Noblemen thus guilty to walk the Streets and be seen in publick because then your Subjects would conceive a sinister Opinion of your Justice but they should be kept in Prison or if it be necessary be privately dispatch'd If these Criminals fly from Justice then you may use the utmost severity in your banishing of them because then it appears that if nothing more be done nothing more was feasible and let the same Rigour be observ'd in keeping them out for since they are as it were gangreen'd Members cut off from the Body it will not be expedient to unite them again to it with deformity of the whole Here I foresee I shall be censur'd by some as a bad Pilot who endeavouring to shun Scylla runs upon Carybdis that is while I aim at keeping the small Nobility under I forget the danger may arise from the Great and the Rich of that Order I see the Objection but do not value it and my Reason is the long Observation I have made of the Nature of this City by the strength of which I dare boldly affirm that the Republick of Venice will never come to its end by that which has ruin'd all other Republicks to wit when the power has been reduc'd first into a few hands and then their Authority devolv'd upon one who has erected a Monarchy The strange Emulation that reigns here among the great ones even among those of the same Family nay that is between Brothers themselves does secure the Government from this danger and if by a Supposition almost impossible all the Brothers of one Family had the power given them of making a Dictator I am confident they would never agree to chuse one among themselves but would rather chuse to be a part of the Government divided among a Thousand Gentlemen than to be Princes of the Blood and Subjects The Great Governments called Governments of Expence and so contriv'd on purpose by our prudent Ancestors to give an occasion to those who are too rich to lessen their Riches ought to be dispos'd of according to the Intention of their first Institution That is to say not to those who have no means to sustain such a Burden and must be forc'd by consequence to compass them per fas nefas and if they are Honest must do it foolishly because they are not wicked enough to do it knavishly and so either acquire the Hatred of those they govern or be laugh'd at and contemned by them This is a Point of great Importance and he who goes through such an Imployment meanly and without Expence demerits extreamly of his Countrey because he renders the Person that represents the State contemptible and all Rebellions of Subjects have had their first Original Rise from the Contempt of the Prince The Contests that happen between Nobleman and Nobleman of equal Fortunes and are follow'd by Attempts upon one another may be conniv'd at when they are reconcil'd but if the thing be between a Nobleman of the Better sort and one of the Lesser let it be chastis'd with some appearance of Severity at least for fear the Humours of the small Nobility should be stirr'd But if one of these shall attack a Nobleman of the First Rate let him be punish'd with a heavy hand lest the Party injur'd being potent in Friends go about to do himself Justice to the great detriment of the Publick Authority But if a Nobleman do commit an Enormity towards a Subject first let there be all the endeavour possible used to justifie him and if that cannot be let the punishment be with more Noise than Harm But if a Subject insults a Nobleman let the Revenge be sharp and publick that the Subjects may not accustom themselves to lay hands upon the Nobility but rather think them Venerable and Sacred In Civil Judicatures it would be requisite to act without Passion to take away that ill Opinion that Men have of the Partiality of Justice in favour of the Great This Belief must be destroyed for a Subject that once thinks himself prejudg'd by the Quality of his Adversary will never be capable of seeing whether his Cause has been decided according to the merit of it or no Therefore there can never be too much diligence used in the Administration of Civil Judicatures which are one of the greatest Foundations of Government for when a Subject can say to himself That he shall have Justice if his Case deserves it he submits to a great many other Grievances without repining And on the contrary though after an unjust Sentence he should be indulg'd in some Criminal Matter he will never have a Love for the Government because the Injury receiv'd will stick in his Memory and the Indulgence will vanish out of it The Quarrels between the Plebeians may
be judged according to the common course of Justice which may there appear in its Natural Being there arising no Politick Grounds to disturb the Course of it nay rather their little Animosities are to be fomented as Cato us'd to do in his Family and for this Reason wise Antiquity permitted the Encounters and Battles that are still practis'd in this City between several Parties of the People But all Assemblies of numerous Bodies are to be avoided as the Plague because nothing can sooner overturn the Commonwealth than the Facility the People may meet with in getting together to confer or debate about their Grievances Nay this thing is so dangerous that it is to be detested and abhorr'd even in the Nobility because that there being in all Bodies some ill Humours if they are not united either they do not work at all or do not work ill But if they once are in a Mass and take their course one way they not only are hard to cure but often prove mortal to the Body Let there be a careful watch upon all Seditious Discourses nay upon all Speculative ones that seem any way to censure the Government and set before your Eyes the Example of Heresies which have never so much wasted the Church as when they have had their Beginnings from Curiosity and Jests Let the City Arsenal be kept up though there be not present occasion for it because things that depend upon Time must be anticipated by time Let the Masters and Tradesmen of the place be kept satisfied and upon any Fault committed let the Punishment be Paternal that is with seeming Rigour but not such as to make them run away for if possible they are to believe the Fable of the Mouse who thought its hole to be all the World Let the Publick Secretaries and all other Officers that must be inform'd of the Publick Concerns be chosen with care as like to be faithful and diligent but when once admitted though they should prove otherwise let them be born withal because there is need of but a few to do well But every single Officer can do hurt and it 's much easier to defend ones self from a Potent Foreign Enemy than from an ill-meaning Servant Let the Manufactures which are peculiar to Venice be preserv'd and to that end let them not be loaded with many Impositions because that Profit and Gain which has made Men venture through a Thousand Difficulties to discover New Worlds will still carry the Merchant if he cannot have it at home to seek it abroad though he go to the Antipodes for it Preserve the Artists therefore remembring that most Arts are a kind of Phantastick Being The Marriages between Noblemen and Women of the City may be tolerated if the Women are very rich because it often happens that the Industry of many Years of the Plebeians serves only to enrich the House of a Nobleman and it is a gentle Imperceptible sort of Usurpation 't is true 't is something abating of the Lustre of the Noble Families but that is only in abstract and in general but in reality it advantages the Nobility and there need be no fear that the Children be degenerate and base because nothing so debases a Nobleman as Poverty Besides there results from this another great advantage which is to make the Plebeians concern'd by Affection for the Nobility and bound to study their advantage by a much sweeter tye than that of Obedience Let the Considerable Honours of the Commonwealth be disposed of to those who may naturally pretend to them for having gone through the many Employments which are steps to the highest Dignities making always an allowance for extraordinary Merit in which the State can never be too prodigal For otherwise to prefer those who cannot reckon themselves among the Lawful Pretenders gives just Offence to the others his Equals and likewise strengthens the pretensions of the unworthy who not seeing any thing in that Fortunate Man that exceeds their ordinary Talent cannot imagine why he should be preferr'd and they excluded from the like Dignities The Subject on the other hand is hardly brought to pay Excessive Reverence where they never us'd to give but ordinary Respect and from this argues That the Dignity it self is not of so much value since it is bestowed upon so inconsiderable a Person And because it is in the Nature of all sublunary things to have a mixture of Imperfection I must own that the Republick of Venice has likewise its Defects and the Chief one is That the Body of the Nobility is too numerous to be Aristocratical therefore it will always be expedient to contrive by all Arts imaginable that the Great Council do delegate the greatest Authority that may be to the Senate and the Council of Ten But this must be done by secret imperceptible ways such as shall not be discover'd till after 't is done because when they have once for all parted with their power it will be a happy settlement of the deliberating part and if the same can be composed in the Judiciary and distributive Power it may be hop'd that the Constitution of the State will be more vigorous It cannot be denied but the Great Council does relish very much of the Mobile and by consequent subject to impetuous Deliberations not always weigh'd in the Ballance of Prudence and Experience And truly I admire that wise Antiquity did not gain this Point it being easie for them to take advantage of the simplicity of their times or at least to have prolong'd the time of the great Magistratures further than from Year to Year at the end of which they now must have a new Confirmation from the Senate For this being design'd to prevent the falling into the Tyranny of the great ones does unawares run the State into that of the meaner sort so much the more odious by how much 't is more numerous and unexperienc'd We should see more vigorous Resolutions in the Senators if they were not continually obliged to court the Favour of the Piazza The Office of Avogadore is to be disposed of with extream Circumspection and that to Persons of Eminency such as have no need of fawning upon the Multitude of the Great Council and then the Senate and Council of Ten might make some steps beyond their Natural Authority which would be born with patience and Time would give them Prescription Whereas if an Avogadore to make himself Popular shall carry these Deliberations to the Great Councils Censure immediately out of Jealousie they are annull'd though never so expedient Therefore if that Office of Avogadore cannot be placed in the hands of one who inclines more to the Patritian than to the Popular side it would be well to give it to one of mean Spirit and a quiet Temper or if it be disposed of to an unquiet bold man let him be one who lies under some infamous imputation of Corruption or other Enormity to the end that the first may not
Four State-Ministers though bound by excessive Rewards to Secresy And what a wonderful thing was the deposition of the Doge Foscari conceal'd by his own Brother Certainly one cannot without Tears observe that in our Times so great a Quality which seem'd to be proper to the Venetian Commonwealth is something altered by the inconsideration of the young Nobility who not out of Disloyalty but too much Freedom do let things slip from them which ought to be conceal'd I think every Venetian Nobleman ought to teach his Children the use of Secresie with their Catechism but the better way were to forbid all talking of Public Concerns out of the place where they are properly to be deliberated on and much less among those who are partakers of the Secret Let the Honours and Dignities of the Commonwealth be dispensed regularly and by degrees avoiding all sudden Flights because they are dangerous To see a Cloud enlighten'd of a sudden is most commonly a sign of a Thunderbolt to come out of it and he that from a private man leaps in an instant to the Port of a Prince has something of the Player Honours given by degrees keep the young Nobility from attaining them before they are ripe for them and we may observe that as in Physick a man moderately Learned but well Experienc'd is safer for the health of the Body Natural So in the Government of the Commonwealth a man often employed though perhaps of less acuteness succeeds best All Matters of Benefices are very properly under the Cognizance of the Great Council but it would be as proper to take away all Appeals to the Quaranties and place them in the Senate because it often happens that these Causes are to be decided according to reason of State and those Quarantia Judges put little value upon those Politick Reasons And besides it seems a great incongruity that a Sentence where the Person of the Doge and the whole Signoria both intervene should afterwards be lyable to the Censure of Forty Persons of lesser value I believe if it were observed to chastise rigorously but secretly all those Lawyers and their Clients who carry these Appeals to the Quarantias the use of them would be less frequent and in time they would be forborn as if they were forbidden If it should fall out that any of your Subjects should procure a Decree in the Rota or Court of Rome you must rigorously command from him a Renunciation ab Impetratis else all beneficiary Causes will be devolv'd to Rome where they are look'd upon as Sacred and so a fourth part of all Civil Causes would be lost for your own Courts Auditors of the Rota are to be with the Commonwealth like Bishops in partibus Infidelium a thing of Title but without Subjects Let the Bishops of the Venetian State be always praecogniz'd in the Consistory by a Venetian Cardinal without the Circumstance of creating him Special Procurator but as Protector which he really ought to be as other Cardinals brag they are so for other States For the Court of Rome to avoid these procurations to Venetian Cardinals would perhaps desist making any of that Nation that so they might oblige the State to have recourse to Strangers which in time would also prejudice the pretence of being treated as Crown'd Heads If the preconisation be made otherwise let the State seize the Temporalities of the Bishoprick and stop all Pensions laid upon it 'T is true that if the Cardinal Nipote should make the Preconisation and enjoy at the same time the priviledge of a Venetian Nobleman it could not well be rejected If it should ever happen that there should be a Pope I won't say a Venetian for that would be of more danger than advantage to the Government but a Foreigner well inclin'd to the Venetian Republick then would be the time to obtain once for all the Grant of the Tenths upon the Clergy as once it was got under Clement the Sixth whose Bull is unfortunately lost for 't is troublesome to get it renew'd every Five Year or Seven Year and it would be a Point gain'd which still would more and more equal the Republick with Crown'd Heads as also if in the Titles given by the Pope to the Doge there could be gain'd the Superlative as Carissimo or Dilectissimo as is usual to Crown'd Heads it would be a new lustre to the Republick which for want of these things and also because that never any Venetian Nuncio was promoted to be Cardinal is look'd upon at Rome as a kind of Third Power between Crown'd Heads and the Ducal State If I say all this could be gain'd by the State from a Pope there might be some return made by making a Law That Church-men in Criminals should not be judged by any Tribunal but the Council of Ten or Delegates from that Council And now I am speaking of that Council I cannot but inculcate That all means possible should be used to hinder an Avogadore from daring to carry the Decrees of the Council of Ten to be re-view'd or censur'd by any other Council but rather if there ought to be any Change made in them let it be by the same Power that made them otherwise the Consequence will be a constant annihilation of their Decrees and a manifest depression of the great Nobility with an Exaltation of the lesser Touching the Authority of this Council I have this more to say That I could wish that the Delegations of its Power were less frequent with great regard to the Dignity of the Persons as well as to the Splendor of the Government which is always more reverenced when it is least communicated like the Sun-beams which in that glorious Body are of Gold but communicated to the Moon are but of Silver Indeed our Ancestors would have deserved well of us if they had lengthened the time of this Magistracy but because that which was not done in those Old Times can hardly be hop'd in these Modern ones the only Remedy would be to obtain a Continuation of the same persons for another year under pretext of avoiding so many various Elections in so short a time as must be made by a Scrutiny in the Pregadi 'T is true that would exempt the persons continued from the Governments of Expence but as long as that Exemption did not extend beyond a year there would be little Inconvenience in it And if it be objected That this would too much strengthen the Authority of the great ones I answer That it lasting but a few months could not be of ill Consequence and on the other side those hands are as it were tied up which ought to be at liberty to do Justice while every week they may be canvass'd and teas'd by a Party of mean Persons both for the Conditions of their Mind and Fortune I have often admired how the Council of Ten having already all the Criminal Power and a good part of the Judiciary in Civil Causes as well as
Spiritual Monarchy has increased and in it the Goodness of Christian Princes is not more to be admired than the Dexterity of the Popes in not omitting any occasion to gain ground At present the Emperour is chosen by a Pontifical Bull where the Power of Election is committed to the Three Ecclesiastical and Four Secular Electors with an Obligation nevertheless in the Emperour chosen to receive his Confirmation and Coronation from the Pope so that the Subject is at last become Prince over his own Prince not without some reflection of Weakness upon Otho the Fourth Emperour of Germany who in the year 994. agreed with Pope Gregory to settle the Election in this manner for the Honour as he thought of the German Nation but with great Diminution of the Imperial Dignity To this Grandeur of the Papacy if we add that of having subjected to its power all the other Bishops of Christendom and obtain'd to be own'd the first of all the Patriarchs who long contested its Primacy I say so high a Power ought to make all other well-govern'd States very wary in their proceedings with it and to have a careful Eye upon all those occasions wherein the pontifical Authority may be still enlarged because 't is observed that all Courtesies and Favours of Princes are in that Court turn'd to Debts and Claims in the space of a few years and to obtain the possession they do not spare for Exorcisms and Anathema's There is one Custom or rather Abuse introduc'd in that Court which deserves great consideration from Princes which is the power the Pope has assum'd of deposing Princes and Soveraigns and giving their Kingdoms and States to others under pretext of ill Government The Prodigal Son in the Gospel did not lose his Right to his portion though he was resolv'd to dissipate and consume it viciously because that Title which we receive from Nature can never be lost in our whole Life The Kings of Navar were fain to go Vagabonds about the World for the sake of a Bit of Parchment which Pope Julius the Second put out against them whereby King John the Second lost his Kingdom which was given to Ferdinand● of Arragon and had not providence brought them to the Crown of France there would have been no mention in the World of the Kings of Navar From this Liberty of taking away Kingdoms the Popes assume that of Erecting them Pope Paul the Fourth made Ireland a Kingdom and Pius the Fifth Erected Tuscany into a great Dutchy Queen Elizabeth of England was deposed by Paul the Third and according to the usual custom her Kingdom given to Philip the Second of Spain who was to execute the Papal Sentence but he met with the Winds and Seas and the English Ships which quite defeated his Armada In France by a priviledge of the Gallican Church they admit of no Bulls that contain Deprivation of Kings but keep to the Right of Succession and indeed to depose an actual King and give away his Kingdom is not only to destroy a suppos'd Delinquent but to punish an Innocent Successour and likewise to prejudice the Right of Election in those who have it On the other hand England has often thought fit to make it self Tributary to the See of Rome by the Peter-Pence the first time under Pope Leo the Fourth and more remarkably under King John in 1214. to avoid the Invasion from France but Henry the Eighth delivered himself once for all and not only refused the Tribute but made himself amends by seizing the Church-Lands The fresh Example of Paul the Fifth towards this Republick is never to be forgot who charitably would have govern'd another bodies House under pretext that the Master did not understand how to do it himself And the constancy of the Venetian Republick will have given fair warning to the Court of Rome how they undertake such Quarrels since they were forced to come to an agreement with very little satisfaction or Honour on their side having been obliged tacitely to give up their claim for to demand peremptorily and then relinquish the Demand is a sign it was not well founded in Justice and the Absolution refus'd was proof enough that the Excommunication was void in it self So that the advantage that has accrew'd to the Venetian Government from the Contest has been much greater than the damage sustain'd in it If ever for the future which I scarce believe there should happen an occasion of an Interdict from the Court of Rome to the Republick I should advise presently to post up in Rome an Appellation to the future Council which is a cruel blow to them For first it insinuates the Superiority of the Council over the Pope and secondly it revives the memory of Councils and lets them see they are not things quite forgot all the World over If there be care taken to examine well all Bulls that come from Rome and the Observation of what has been hitherto practis'd be strictly continued it may be hop'd that the Republick shall not undergo any greater Subjection than other Princes but rather shall have some Liberty above them particularly more than the Spaniards who find their account in complying with the Tyranny of Rome because they receive at the same time great Favours from it and are proud of maintaining its Authority To say truth the Popes hitherto have shew'd little kindness to the Republick and except the Priviledges granted by Alexander the Third which serve more to register to the World the Action of the Republick in restoring and protecting him than for any thing else For the Doge might of himself without the Papal Concession have assum'd those other little Ornaments of the Ombrella the Standard and the Sword So that bating the Concessions of the Decimes upon the Clergy and the Nominations to the Bishopricks this Country of ours feels but slender Effects of the Pontifical Kindness which may be an advantage upon all Occurrences of Interest of State to stick the closer to that because there needs no Complements where every one desires but his own In considering the Secular Power of the Pope we will do it upon Five Heads which may serve to examine all other Princes Interests with the Republick First If it be advantageous to the Republick to have the Church grow greater Secondly What Title Inclination or Facility the Popes may have to acquire any part of the State of the Republick Thirdly What Inclination Title or Facility the Republick may have to acquire any part of the State of the Church Fourthly If the Church may unite with the Republick to acquire the State of any other Princes Fifthly If the Church can unite with other Princes to hinder the progress of the Arme of the Republick To begin with the First we will answer with a General Rule which is That it never is advantageous to a Prince who desires to remain free and powerful to let another grow great except it be to lessen a Third who is greater
than them both and if he that is thus agrandiz'd be a Neighbour his advancement is so much more to be feared These Alterations indeed may not be so dangerous to a little Prince who does not fear depending upon a great one to avoid being molested by one who is already too strong for him But to come closer to the Case of the Republick we will say That if the Church could make it self Master of any part of the King of Spain's Dominions in Italy where he is the greatest Prince they might hope for the consent of the Republick which is the Second Great Italian Potentate because by that means the Republick might become the First and however the strength of the Church will always give less jealousie to the Republick than the Spanish Power in Italy for the Nature of the Pontifical Principality is Elective and Temporary and the Aims and Designs of that Court vary according to the Genius of the several Popes and sometimes it is subject to long Vacancies whereas the Monarchy of Spain is successive and as one may say Eternal and govern'd by standing lasting Maxims But if the Church be to grow great by the Spoils of any other Italian Prince it would be the Interest of the Republick to oppose it because the Damage thence resulting is evident and the Advantage dangerous It ought to be well consider'd how the State of the Church is increased in this last Century The custom that was in the Church before to give Infeodations upon slight Acknowledgments had brought that power to be more of show than real strength but Julius the Second succeeding Alexander the Sixth made Borgia Duke of Volentine Nephew to Alexander who had seiz'd upon all those Infeodations in Romania refund them to the Church and added to them the conquest of Bologna and got also from the Republick the Cities of Cervia Rimini Ravenna Faenza Imola and others to which under Clement the Eighth was added the whole Dutchy of Ferrara and lately that of Vrbin So that these Acquisitions alone would make up a great Principality and the Church seems to want nothing towards the making of it the most considerable power of Italy than the addition of Parma and Piacenza and some little Independent Castles in the Territories about Rome Besides it can never more be lessen'd by Infeodations that being quite left off by that Court So that to let the Church grow any greater in Italy generally speaking cannot be for the Interest of the Venetian Republick To the Second Point What Title Inclination or Facility the Church may have to acquire any portion of the State of the Republick we shall say That since the Court makes profession of the Extreamest Justice and that likewise they are loth to begin the Example of Princes usurping upon one another I think they can hardly set up any Title but upon the Polesine of Rovigo which they say was formerly annex'd to the Dutchy of Ferrara and in the times that the Dispute was between the Dukes of Ferrara and the Republick the Popes always shewed themselves smart Defenders of the Dukes Of Four Interdicts published by the Church against the Venetians Two of them were for this very cause the first in the year 1305. the Second in the year 1483. under Sixtus the Fourth at which time indeed the Republick had taken the whole Dutchy of Ferrara by the Instigation of the Pope himself but he being Friends with the Duke commanded them to restore what they had taken which they refusing to do he fulminated his Excommunication and Interdict but a Peace following the Republick kept by agreement the Polesine of Rovigo The Third Interdict was in 1505. under Julius the Second because the Republick had several Cities of Romania in their possessions and the last of all was now lately under Paul the Fifth So that if the Popes shewed such a concern for the thing when it was only belonging to the Dukes of Ferrara much more would they do it now when the profit would be their own So that we may believe that as to this they do own a Title and have likewise inclination enough to regain this bit of Territory that is lopp'd off from them We are therefore to consider what Facility they have to do it and I do not believe that ever of themselves they will kindle the fire but make advantage of one ready kindled by some other as it happened under Julius the Second Nay if they reflect upon the great Rule of preserving the Liberty of Italy they will not for so small a matter enter into a League against the Republick for it is of greater concern to them not to break the Ballance of Dominion in Italy lest the Tramontani should take advantage of it and subdue all But this very Reason was strong in Pope Julius the Second's time and yet was without Effect in a Mind bent all upon particular Interest wherefore I conclude that we are not to expect greater Temper in the Modern Popes but ought to rest satisfied that if a powerful Foreign Prince should promise them the acquisition of the State of the Republick they would embrace the motion without delay To the Third Question I say That the Republick might have just Reason to make themselves amends for the Country they lost in Romagna it not being a thing they had usurp'd from the Church but a voluntary Dedition of those Cities who were tyranniz'd over by little Tyrants that had taken occasion from the Negligence of Popes to make themselves Masters of those places They were yielded up by the Republick to take off Julius the Second who was the great Fomentour of the Fire which was kindled against the Venetians in the League of Cambray where the Forces of all the Princes of Christendom were united against them and without doubt upon good circumstances the Republick might justifie the re-taking of these Towns and I believe there is Inclination enough to do it all Princes being willing to extend their Territories but the point is the Facility of doing it which I think altogether remote for all other Italian Princes if not out of conscience yet out of Ostentation of Religion would be backward to fall upon the Church and except it should happen that some one of them should grow too powerful for all the others united and so be able to right himself I think the State of the Church need not fear being lessen'd To the Fourth Question I answer in the Negative and do not believe that the Church would joyn with the Republick to acquire the State of any other Prince except it were such a one as the Church had a pretence upon and then they would keep all which would not please the Republick Besides we ought to reflect upon the Genius of the Popedom which being Elective most commonly the Popes have no other aim than to keep all quiet and preserve the general Respect of Princes towards them that in that decrepit Age they may
Milan So that we need not doubt but the Spaniard looks upon these Cities with an Amorous Eye and with great Desire to enjoy them there remains only the Facility of doing it which is always the most important of the Three Points Upon this Subject we must distinguish whether they will make the Attempt by themselves or in Conjunction with others If alone and that the Republick have any Great Prince either Italian or Foreigner on their side they will meet with little Facility in their Designs because the Republick's Money joyn'd to the Forces of another Prince can give check to almost any great Power and particularly to that of Spain whose States and Possessions are large but disunited and they cannot but be afraid that while they are busied in Lombardy others would try to attack them in a more sensible part If Spain should therefore unite with any other Prince provided the Republick had France on their side they would not much hurt it because the Inundation of the French into Lombardy uses to be both powerful and sudden provided they be called in by an Italian Prince of some Figure and by that means the Spaniard being attack'd on Two sides would go near to lose his Dutchy of Milan But if we consider the Republick united only with some Italian Prince and the French to stand Spectator as might happen in the Minority of a French King particularly if the Spaniard had the Pope and Emperour of his side I doubt the Republick would be hard set for that other Prince in League with them cannot be of any great Force the most useful would be Savoy but besides that he would be bought very dear he would be always wavering if the Spaniards tempted him strongly The Richest would be Florence but his Territories not joyning upon those of the Republick there is little good to be expected from his assistance Lastly If Spain will fall upon the Republick alone and the Republick be likewise alone I say That as to the State of Terra Firma it would go near to be lost but by Sea the Republick would make a stout Resistance But if it be ask'd whether the Republick have either Title Inclination or Facility to acquire any part of the Spanish Dominions in Italy I answer the Title would be upon Cremona in Lombardy and upon Travi and other Ports of La Puglia in the Kingdom of Naples the Republick having been in Possession of all these places before ever Spain had footing in Italy So that there wants nothing but Facility and there is but one Case that I know in which the Republick might hope to get Possession again and that is in case the Republick were in League with France and the Emperour busied by the Protestants of Germany then some of these Expectations might be fulfilled but still with the same Jealousie that your Friends should at last joyn with your Enemies to fall upon the Republick as it happened in the League of Cambray And this answers the other Question to wit Whether Spain can unite with any other Power against the Republick 'T is very true that I can hardly believe that the Spaniards would without any precedent broil attempt a League with France against the Republick because the Damage of one City's remaining in the French Hands would be greater to them than the profit of taking all the Republick has in Terra Firma would amount to Whether the Spaniard may unite with the Republick to acquire conjoyntly in Italy I say That if it be against an Italian Prince they will not because it is not their Interest that the Republick should be greater and already almost all the lesser Princes are Dependants of that Monarchy and as for the Pope they would certainly help him rather than joyn against him being us'd to make a great shew of their protecting the Church The only case that would make them bear patiently any new Acquisitions of the Republick would be if France should make any progress in Italy After all amidst so many well-grounded suspicions it must be confessed that the Neighbourhood of Spain has prov'd of less disturbance to the Republick than that of any other Prince who had those Countries before them for the Dukes of Milan were perpetually either quarrelling or finding themselves too weak were inciting of other Powers under-hand against the Republick There may be an Union likewise of the Republick and Spain by Sea against the Turk and by Land against the Grisons or any other Hereticks And this is enough for Spain Now by reason of Vicinity we will speak of the other Italian Princes It would be the Interest of the Republick to see them greater if it could be done at the Expence of Spain and by their Spoils as also by getting from the Church But both those Cases are next to impossible if first the World be not turn'd topsy turvy which can never be but by a League with France and then if any part of the Spaniards Dominions could be shar'd amongst them it would not injure the Republick at all but for any of these Princes to grow great by spoiling one another I should not like it for the advantage would be inconsiderable and in the mean time the fire would be kindled in Italy the property of which is to go not where you would have it but often where you are most afraid of it Whether any of these Princes have Title Inclination or Facility to acquire from the Republick the consideration will be short because Facility will be wanting Mantoua has some pretences upon Valesa and Peschiera Modena upon the Town of Este from whence the Family comes But all these little Princes united without the Pope and Spain could hardly give a disturbance to the Republick because the Two powerfullest of them to wit Savoy and Florence are not immediate Borderers Whether the Republick have either Title Inclination or Facility to acquire from them in the State they now are in I answer That the House of Este not having Ferrara the Republick has no Title to either Modena or Reggio There would indeed be a good Inclination against Mantoua because he lies as it were in the Bowels of the Republick but there would be but an ill Title except the Republick should bear the Charges of his Education while they were his Guardians and then the Facility would be small for no sooner would the Republick have begun the Dance but others would come in and perhaps it would not end as it begun Of the other Princes I have little to say the Republick having had no disputes with them for the Genoueses who formerly set the Republick so hard have done as the Horse in the Fable lost their own Liberty in hopes of being victorious of their Enemies and are by that means out of power to hurt the Republick As for Leagues these Princes will be ready to make them either with or against the Republick because their Fortune as Princes being but small they will let slip