have too much wrong done them for what is more plain then this That the Venetians live more happily under their conditionate Duke then the Turks do under their most absolute Emperours Neverthelesse if we consider the noble Trophees of Rome which it gained under Consuls and conditionaâ—e Commanders we may suppose that no defect at all could be in that popular and mixt government And our neighbours in the Netherlands are a good instance for they being to cope with the most Puissant and free Prince of Christendom being but the torn relique of a small Nation yet for their defence would not put themselves under a Dictatorian power but they prepared themselves for that so terrible encounter under the Conduct of a Generall much limitted Neither have those straitned Commissiâ—ns yeelded any thing but victories to the States and solid honour to the Princes of Orange and what more the mightiest Monarchs of our age have atchieved or enjoy'd besides the filling of a phantasticall humour with imaginary grandour I speak not this in favour of any alteration in England I am as zealously addicted to Monarchy as any man can without dotage but I know there are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such I desire to be most studious of In some things I know t is dangerous to circumscribe Princes but in others there may be great danger in leaving them to their pleasure and scarce any hope at all of benefit and amongst other things the choice of publike Officers if the State have at least some share therein with the King what considerable inconvenience can happen thereby to the State or King is not in me to foresee but if it have no share experience sufficient teacheth us what great disasters may happen And so for the disusing and dissolving of Parliaments if the Parliament divide some part of that power with the King I see great good but no harm at all that can ensue either to weaken the Crown or disturb the subject thereby But it will be said in the next place If this disables not the King from protecting the Subject yet it diminishes his own Right and leaves him but the shadow of Royalty This is grounded upon a great mistake for some men think it a glorious thing to be able to kill as well as to save and to have a kinde of a Creators power over Subjects but the truth is such power procures much danger to ill Princes and little good to any for it begets not so much love as fear in the subiect though it be not abused and the fear of the subject does not give so perfect a Dominion as love Were Hannibal Scipio c. the lesse honoured or beloved because they were not independent surely no they were the lesse feared and for the same cause the more honoured and beloved Or were Alexander Pyrrbus c. the more honoured or beloved because they were independant I believe the contrary and that they had lived more gloriously and died lesse violently if a more moderate power had rendred them lesse insolent in their own thoughts and lesse feared in other mens Was Caesar the private man lesse successefull in his Warres or lesse dear in all his souldiers eyes or lesse powerfull in his Countrey-mens affections then Caesar the perpetuall Dictator No if the Imperiall Throne of the World added any thing to Caesar 't was not excellence nor true glory 't was but the externall complements of pomp and ostentation and that might perhaps blow up his minde with vanity and fill the people with 〈◊〉 it could not make Caesar a nobler gallanter greater Caesar 〈◊〉 he was I expect no lesse then to be laught at at â—ourt and to be hâ—ld the author of a strange paradox by those men which stick not to say That our King is now no more King of Scotland then he is King of France because his meer pleasure there is not so predominant in all cases of good and evill whatsoever but I regard not those fond things which cannot see in humane nature what is depraved in it and what not and what proceeds from vain and what from true glory and wherein the naturall perfection of power and honour differs from the painted rayes of spurious Majesty and Magnificence To me the Policy of Scotland seems more exquisite in poynt of prerogative then any other in Europe except ours And if the splendor and puissance of a Prince consist in commanding religious wise magnanimous warlike subjects I think the King of Scotland is more to be admired then the King of France and that he is so to the meer ingenuity of Government I ascribe it But some will allow That to follow the pattern of Antoninus freely and voluntarily as he did is not dishonourable in a Prince but to be under any Obligation or Law to do so is ignoble And this is as much as to say That Law though good yet quateâ—â—s Law is burthenous to mans nature and though it be so but to corrupted nature in asmuch as it retains from nothing but that which nature in its purity would it self restrain from yet corrupted nature it self is to be soothed and observed I have done with this point 't was spoken in honour of Hen. 7. That he governed his subjects by his Laws his Laws by his Lawyers and it might have been added his subjects Laws and Lawyers by advice of Parliament by the regulation of that Court which gave life and birth to all Laws In this Policy is comprized the whole act of Soveraignty for where the people are subject to the Law of the Land and not to the will of the Prince and where the Law is left to the interpretation of sworn upright Judges and not violated by power and where Parliaments superintend all and in all extraordinary cases especially betwixt the King and Kingdom do the faithfull Offices of Umpirage all things remain in such a harmony as I shall recommend to all good Princes The Parliament conceives that the King cannot apprehend any just fear from Sir John Hotham or interpret the meer shutting of Hull gates and the sending away of Arms and Ammunition in obedience to both Houses to be any preparation for Warre and Invasion against him at York and therefore they resolve to raise Forces against those Forces which the King raises to secure himself from Sir John Hotham The King hereupon charges the Parliament of levying Warre against Him under pretence of His levying Warre against them This is matter of fact and the World must judge whether the Kings preparations in the North be onely sutable to the danger of Sir John Hotham or no and whether the Parliament be in danger of the Kings strength there or no Or whether is more probable at this time that the King is incensed against the Parliament or the Parliament against the King or that the King is more intentive to assayl the Parliament or the
tenour of Law and if it could there were more reason why the people might justifie force to regaine due libertie then the Prince might to subvert the same And t is a shamefull stupidity in any man to thinke that our Ancestors did not fight more nobly for their free customes and Lawes of which the conqueror and his successors had in part disinherited them by violence and perjury then they which put them to such conflicts for it seemes unnatural to me that any nation should be bound to contribute its owne inherent puissance meerely to abet Tiranny and support slavery and to make that which is more excellent a prey to that which is of lesse worth And questionlesse a native Prince if meere Foree be right may disfranchise his Subjects as well as a stranger if he can frame a sufficient party and yet we see this was the foolish sinne of Rehoboam who having deserted and reiected out of an intollerable insolence the strength of ten tribes ridiculously sought to reduce them againe with the strength of two I come now from the cause which conveyes Royalty and that for which it is conveyed to the nature of the conveyance The word Trust is frequent in the Kings Papers and therefore I conceive the King does admit that his interest in the Crowne is not absolute or by a meere donation of the people but in part conditionate and fiduciary And indeed all good Princes without any expresse contract betwixt them and their Subjects have acknowledged that there did lie a great and high trust upon them nay Heathen Princes that have beene absolute have acknowledged themselves servants to the publike and borne for that service and professed that they would manage the publike weale as being well satisfied populi Rem esse non suam And we cannot imagine in the fury of warre when lawes have the least vigour that any Generalissimo can be so uncircumscribed in power but that if he should turne his Canons upon his owne Souldiers they vvere ipso facto absolved of all obedience and of all oathes and ties of allegiance vvhatsoever for that time and bound by higher dutie to seeke their owne preservation by resistance and defence vvherefore if there bee such tacite trusts and reservations in all publike commands though of the most absolute nature that can be supposed vve cannot but admit that in all well formed monarchies vvhere kingly Prerogative has any limits set this must needs be one necessary condition that the subject shall live both safe and free The Charter of nature intitles all Subjects of all Countries vvhatsoever to safetie by its supreame Law But freedome indeed has divers degrees of latitude and all Countries therein doe not participate alike but positive Lawes must every vvhere assigne those degrees The great Charter of England is not strait in Priviledges to us neither is the Kings oath of small strength to that Charter for that though it bee more precise in the care of Canonicall Priviledges and of Bishops and Clergymen as having beene penned by Popish Bishops then of the Commonalty yet it confirmes all Lawes and rightfull customes amongst vvhich vve most highly esteeme Parliamentary Priviledges and as for the word Eligerit whether it be future or past it skills not much for if by this oaths Law Justice and descretion be executed amongst us in all judgements as vvell in as out of Parliament and if peace and godly agreement be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amongst us all and if the King defend and uphold all our lawes and customes vve need not feare but the King is bound to consent to new Lawes if they be necessary as vvell as defend old for both being of the same necessity the publique trust must needs equally extend to both and vve conceive it one Parliamentary right and custome that nothing necessary ought to be denyed And the vvord Eligerit if it be in the perfect tense yet shewes that the peoples election had beene the ground of ancient Lawes and customes and vvhy the peoples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever I cannot discover That vvhich results then from hence is if our Kings receive all royalty from the people and for the behoofe of the people and that by a speciall trust of safety and libertie expressely by the people limited and by their owne grants and oathes ratified then our Kings cannot be sayd to have so unconditionate and high a proprietie in all our lives liberties and possessions or in any thing else to the Crowne appertayning as vve have in their dignity or in our selves and indeed if they had they vvere not borne for the people but merely for themselves neither were it lawfull or naturall for them to expose their lives and fortunes for their Country as they have beene hitherto bound to doe according to that of our Saviour Bonus Pastor ponit vitam pro ovibus But now of Parliaments Parliaments have the same efficient cause as monarchies if not higher for in the truth the vvhole Kingdome is not so properly the Author as the essence it selfe of Parliaments and by the former rule t is magic tale because vve see ipsum quid quod efficit tale And it is I thinke beyond all controversie that God and the Law operate as the same causes both in Kings and Parliaments for God favours both and the Law establishes both and the act of men still concurres in the sustentation of both And not to stay longer upon this Parliaments have also the same finall cause as Monarchies if not greater for indeed publike safety and liberty could not be so effectually provided for by Monarchs till Parliaments were constituted for the supplying of all defects in that Government Two things especially are aymed at in Parliaments not to be attayned to by other meanes First that the interest of the people might be satisfied secondly that Kings might be the better counsailed In the summons of Edw. the first Claus. 7. 111. 3. Dors. we see the first end of Parliaments expressed for he inserts in the writ that whatsoever affayre is of publike concernment ought to receive publike approbation quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbari debet or tructari And in the same writ he saith this is lâ—x ne tissima provida circumspectione stabilita there is not a word here but it is observeable publique approbation consent or treatie is necessary in all publike expedients and this is not a meere usage in England but a Law and this Law is not subject to any doubt or dispute there is nothing more knowne neither is this knowne Law extorted from Kings by the violence and injustice of the people it is duely and formally establisht and that upon a great deale of reason not without the providence and circumspection of all the states Were there no further Antiquity but the raigne of Edward the first to recommend this to us certainly so there ought no reverence to be withheld from it
all men which neither Kingdom Parliament King nor all the Royallists can oppose What a strange unlathomable machination and work of darknesse is this But this is said to be done by cunning force absence or accident If it be by cunning Then we must suppose that the Kings party in Parliament has lost all their Law policy and subtilty And that all the Parliament except some few are luld-a-sleep by Mercuries Minstrelsie or that some diabolicall charme has closed up all their various eyes If it be by force Then we must suppose that our Aristocraticall heads carry about them great store of that Serpents teeth which yeilded heretofore so sudden and plentifull a harvest of armed men being but cast into the furrows of the earth Though their armies have been hitherto invisible yet we must suppose That they are in a readinesse to rise upon the first Alarum beaten If it be by absence then we must suppose That this Aristocraticall machination is easily yet to be prevented for t is not a hard matter to draw a full apparence together and that we see has been done lately by the order of the House it self Nay we see t is not the House but the opposite part that desires to scatter and divide and draw away and as much as in them lyes to hinder a full assembly And therefore This is not the way If it be by accident Then we must be contented to expect and have a little patience Fortune is not alwayes constant to one certain posture nor do the Celestiall bodies confine themselves to one unaltered motion The Parliament requests of the King That all great Officers of State by whom publike affaires shall be transacted may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Councell The King takes this as a thing maliciously plotted against him as a proposition made in mockery of him as a request which He cannot yeeld to without shewing Himself unworthy of that trust which Law reposes in Him and of His descent from so many great and famous Ancestors He conceives He cannot perform the Oath of protecting His people if He abandon this power and assume others into it He conceives it such a Flowre of the Crown as is worth all the rest of the Garland not to be parted with all upon any extremity of conquest or imprisonment nor for any low sordid considerations of wealth and gain whatsoever He conceives That if He should passe this He should retain nothing but the Ceremonious Ensignes of Royalty or the meer sight of a Crown and Scepter nay the Stock being dead the Twigs would not long flourish but as to true and reall power He should remain but the outside the picture the signe of a King Could this be If all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty the substance of the request seems to be no more but this That it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments rather then His own meer understanding or any inferiour Councellors in those things which concern the liberties and lifes of the whole people And how could this request seem equall to a demanding of the Crown to a dethroning of the King and to a leaving of the Kingdom destitute of protection if Parliaments were not supposed mortall enemies to Princes and Princes not supposed but openly declared enemies to Parliaments if the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his own good liking only or upon recommendation of such a Courtier here he is devested of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himself of Majesty and devesting himself of Power Ordinary reason cannot suggest otherwise hereupon but either Parliaments affect not Kings nor their own good nor would make good elections or else Kings affect not Parliaments nor the Kingdoms good and therefore they oppose such elections meerly because they are good but let us observe the Kings reasons against Parliamentary elections For first He conceives them prejudiciall for the people Secondly Dishonourable to himself Man is by nature of restlesse ambition as the meanest vassall thinks himself worthy of some greatnesse so the most absolute Monarch aspires to something above his greatnesse Power being over obtained by haughty mindes quickly discovers that it was not first aimed at meerly to effect Noble actions but in part to insult over others and ambitious men thirst after that power which may do harm as well as good nay though they are not resolved to do harm yet they would be masters of it Qui nolunt occidere quenquam Posse volunt And yet let this power be added the minde still remains unfilled still some further Terrestriall omnipotence a sharing with God and surmounting above mortall condition is affected Our Law has a wholesome Maxime That the King may onely do that which is just but Courtiers invert the sense of it and tell him That all is just which he may do or which he is not restrained from doing by Law Such and such things Princes ought not to do though no Law limited them from doing thereof but now those things which by nature they abhorre to do yet they abhorre as much to be limited from That disposition which makes us averse from cruelty and injury we account a noble and vertuous disposition but that Law which shall restrain us from the same is stomacked at and resisted as a harsh bit to put into our mouths or bonds upon our arms Antoninus Pius is greatly renowned for communicating all weighty affairs and following publike advice a dapprobation in all great expedients of high concernment and he was not more honourable then prosperous therein Had he been a meer servant to the State he coulâ— not have condescended further and yet if he had done necessarily what he did voluntarily the same thing had been in the same manner effectuall for t is not the meer putting or not putting of â—aw that does after the nature of good or evill Power then to do such an evill or not to do such a good is in truth no reall power nor desired out of any noblenesse but rather windy arrogance and as it is uselesse to men truely noble so to men that love evill for evill ends t is very dangerous What will Nero more despise then to condescend as Antoninus did yet 't were more necessary that Nero were limited then Antoninus for excessive power added to Nero's cruelty serves but as Oyl poured upon flame When Princes are as potent as vicious we know what Ministers swarm about them and the end is That as vast power corrupts and inclines them to iâ—l Councells so they perish at last by Councellors worst of all T is pretended that Princes cannot be limitted from evill but they may be disabled from doing good thereby which is not alwayes true and yet if it were the people had better want some right then
are fallen Calumny and Envie herselfe would never have attempted to obtrude upon us such impossible charges of Treason and Rebellion against our most sacred Councell from the mouthes of Popish Prelaticall and Military Courtiers The King sayes 'T is impâ—obable and impossible that His Cabinet Counsellours or his Bishops or seuldiers who must have so great a share in the misery should take such paines in the procuring thereof and spend so much time and run so many hazards to make themselves slaves and to ruine the freedome of this Nation how strange is this wee have had almost 40 yeeres experience that the Court way of preferment has beene by doing publicke ill Offices and we can nominate what Dukes what Earles what Lords what Knights have been made great and rich by base disservices to the State and except Master Hollis his rich Widow I never heard that promotion came to any man by serving in Parliament but I have heard of trouble and imprisonment but now see the traverse of fortune The Court is now turned honest my Lord of Straffords death has wrought a sudden conversion amongst them and there is no other feare now but that a few Hypocrites in Parliament will beguile the major part there and so usurpe over King Kingdome and Parliament for ever sure this is next to a prodigy if it be not one but let us consider the Lords and Commons as meere Counsellors without any power or right of Counselling or consenting yet wee shall see if they be not lesse knowing and faithfull than other men they ought not to be deserted unlesse we will allow that the King may cause whither he will admit of any counsell at all or no in the disposing of our lives lands and liberties But the King sayes that he is not bound to renounce his owne understanding or to contradict his owne conscience for any Counsellors sake whatsoever 'T is granted in things visible and certaine that judge which is a sole judge and has competent power to see his owne judgement executed ought not to determine against the light of nature or evidence of fact The sinne of Pilate was that when he might have saved our Saviour from an unjust death yet upon accusations contradictory in themselves contrary to strange Revelations from Heaven he would suffer Innocence to fall and passe sentence of death meerly to satisfie a bloud-thirsty multitude But otherwise it was in my Lord of Straffords case for there the King was not sole Judge nay he was uncapeable of sitting as judge at all and the delinquent was legally condemned and such heynous matters had beene proved against him that his greatest friends were ashamed to justifie them and all impartiall men of three whole Kingdomes conceived them mortall and therefore the King might therin with a clear conscience have signed a warrant for his death though he had dissented from the judgement So if one judge on the same bench dissent from three or one juror at the barre from a eleven they may submit to the major number though perhaps lesse skilfull then themselves without imputation of guilt and if it be thus in matters of Law a fortiori 't is so in matters of State where the very satisfying of a multitude sometimes in things not otherwise expedient may proove not onely expedient but necessary for the setling of peace and ceasing of strife For example It was the request of the whole Kingdome in the Parliament to the King to intrust the Militiae and the Magazine of Hull c. into such hands as were in the peoples good esteeme Conscience and understanding could plead nothing against this and if it could have beene averred as it could not for the contrary was true that this would have bred disturbance and have beene the occasion of greater danger yet Where the people by publique authority will seeke any inconvenience to themselves and the King is not so much intressed in it as themselves 't is more inconvenience and injustice to deny then grant it what blame is it then in Princes when they will pretend reluctance of conscience and reason in things behoofull for the people and will use their fiduciarie power in denying just things as if they might lawfully do whatsoever they have power to do when the contrary is the truth and they have no power to do but what is lawfull and fit to be done So much for the ends of Parliamentary power I come now to the true nature of it publike consent we see consent as well as counsell is requisite and due in Parliament and that being the proper foundation of all power for omnis Potestas fundata est in voluntate we cannot imagine that publique consent should be anywhere more vigorous or more orderly than it is in Parliament Man being depraved by the fall of Adam grew so untame and uncivill a creature that the Law of God written in his brest was not sufficient to restrayne him from mischiefe or to make him sociable and therefore without some magistracy to provide new orders and to judge of old and to execute according to justice no society could be upheld without society men could not live and without lawes men could not be sociable and without authority somewhere invested to judge according to Law and execute according to judgement Law was a vaine and void thing it was soon therefore provided that lawes agreeable to the dictates of reason should be ratified by common consent and that the execution and interpretation of those Lawes should be intrusted to some magistrate for the preventing of common injuries betwixt Subject and Subject but when it after appeared that man was yet subject to unnaturall destruction by the Tyranny of intrusted magistrates a mischiefe almost as fatall as to be without all magistracie how to provide a wholsome remedy therefore was not so easie to be prevented 'T was not difficult to invent Lawes for the limitting of supreme governors but to invent how those Lawes should be executed or by whom interpreted was almost impossible nam quis custodiat ipsos custodes To place a superiour above a supreme was held unnaturall yet what a livelesse fond thing would Law be without any judge to determine it or power to enforce it and how could humaine consociation be preserved without some such Law besides if it be agreed upon that limits should be prefixed to Princes and judges appointed to decree according to those limits yet an other great inconvenience will presently affront us for we cannot restraine Princes too far but we shall disable them from some good as well as inhibit them from some evill and to be disabled from doing good in some things may be as mischievous as to be inabled for all evils at meere discretion Long it was ere the world could extricate it selfe out of all these extremities or finde out an orderly meanes whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded prerogative on this hand and to excessive liberty on the other and