his Majesties particular reasons for I should not be able to finde them out because a Kings heart is not to be sounded and searched by a private head that is not able to conceiue the heigth of their ends but I will discourse of it a hee is our King â—f from a single relation there doe arise as singular respect surely a double portion of respect will follow a double relation Now this Aristocraticall Clergie haue not onely relation to their Prince as hee is a crowned King and they his lawfull subjects but also as hee is the Lords annoynted defender of the faith according to his just title as his Maiestie pleases to speake in his declaration before the Articles For they also are the Lords annoynted deliuering that faith and the Primate of them the immediate instrument of his consecration so that as by the crowning they are by right his subiects so this annoynting of God superinduceth a brotherhood betwixt Kings and Bishops as Sr Francis Bacon in his Booke to King Iames for this relation is onely ancient in our Kings amongst the Princes of Christendome for though as our Soveraigne is crowned by the Archbishop of Canterbury so the Emperours when they were Kings of France began to be annoynted and crowned by the Archbishops of Mentz Collen and Trier as they were Emperours and by the Archbishop of Rhemes as they were Kings of France Yet the Kings of France of the first line at least were not annoynted as one of the freest Historians confesses De la primiere Lignèe oinct ny sacre à Rhemes Girarddu Hallon des affoâ—â—es l. 2. And though the Kings of Spaine are crowned by the Arch-bishop of Tolledo the Kings of Denmarke by the Arch-bishop of Vpsale the Kings of Polonia by the Arch-bishop of Guesire the Kings of Hungarie by the Arch-bishop of Strigon the Kings of Navarre by the Bishop of Pampolune yet none of them were anciently annoynted Now it cannot be denied but as this reall relation doth more peculiar and appropriate the State Ecclesiastick to our King Vid. Legibus saucti Edvardi so it makes him not onely the supreame head and governour but also the chiefe guide and guardian for by it he is more than a meere Lay-man hee is a mixt person having supreame Ecclesiastick as well as Civill government Reges sancto oleo vncti sunt spiritualis iurisdictionis capaces Which sentence was applied to our King in the time of Edward the third 33. Ecâ— Aide lâ— Gryme 12. §. And Guymer in his Comment on the pragmaticall sanction of France is peremptorie quòd Reges inuncti non sunt meri Laici and addes inde Reges Angliae conferunt beneficia So that by this is there some addition granted to the power of Princes over the Church Though the old glosse vpon the Clementines avouch quòd vnctio nil addit ad potestatem Imperatoris which the Gregorian edition of the Common Law did well to dislike Clemeâ— tit 6. Regis but they should haue done better not to haue given a worse And if it adde to their power over the Church then as they haue more right by it so they haue more reason from it to doe what good they please for the Clergie So that doe but consider the quality and qualifications of our Kings person to doe for his Clergie and you will say he hath greatest reason of any Prince Consider againe the reasons on the part of the present State Ecclesiasticall and you shall finde that they deserue more of their Prince than any Clergie these foure hundred yeares § 5. But I must presuppose before that will be granted that our Monarch of great Brittaine hath not any reason to giue or bestow meanes and revenues vpon any forraine State Ecclesiasticall No Prince hath reason to bestow â—is free favours vpon any over whom hee hath for the present no right to rule nor hath heretofore promised it neither by himselfe or by his predecessours and thereby bound himsesfe to farther and favour them So that though the Romane Clergie doth claime and clamour for revenues and priviledges from our King yet as they haue no right to claime them so they haue no reason to expect them for they are so farre from being his deserving domestick subiects that they are his deadly enemies though they be imbred and homebred They haue not then any right for neither our K. nor any of his lawfull predecessours did ever binde themselues to any such performances Later better learned writers of the Romish faction finding by the carefull and curious examination of sundry passages in infinite interpreters how hard a thing it was to proue their vniversall supremacie in temporalibus by direct evidence out of Gods word resolue to proue it by Charter-grant and priviledge from Princes pieties as Augustinus Steucus Librarian to Pope Paul the third sets downe the claime the Pope laid to all the kingdomes in Christendome grounding all from the particular grants from the Kings but especially Boniface the eights letter of Demands As for instance from Constantine the first and the best one Phocas the first and the worst from the vniversall gifts of those vniversall Emperours they ground a generall right in all kingdomes The Bononian Canonists deale cunningly and seeme to deale ingenuously playing the sophisters more than the sycophants in this point discoursing of this donation of Constantine for they lay it downe as a presupposed presumption in the Law That there is such a true deed notwithstanding there be no mention made of it in any part of the sincere Civill Law Sed quae notabiliter fiunt specialiter notanda sunt But they never question it de facto but enquire quo iure and an sit revocabile and since they doe not full affirme that he gaue it vp â— will not so much as shew the falsitie of it but referre all to the most judicious and modestly moderate amongst them But for Phocas his grant Covâ—â—â—u vias 〈◊〉 quest c. 1 mem 9. Decius Consil 130. a faithlesse vsurping tyrant I leaue it to be judged of by those that chuse to measure claimes and titles by the line of equity and not by the Last of ambition Yet thus I will inferre against it that a Charter granted as this was chiefly vpon a ground of cunning with a purpose to maintaine a plot by partie which was vndertaken and begun by fraud might haue beene after revoaked by himselfe or anulled or repealed by his successours And farther I say that though this grant were authentick in all points yet the Popes could haue no right to this kingdome by it because this kingdome was excluded from the care protection and providence of the Romane Empire neere two hundred yeares before Phocas For Aelius L. Lieutenant for Valentimanus in the parts of France Polyâ— cap. 1 sent word to the Brittains that they were to looke for no more ayde from the Empire which was fallen into faction scarce able to
privatâ— persons deserue and suffer publick punishment not onl for offering private wrongs but also for with-holdiâ— particular rights surely these law-makers and Administrators of justice that will not suffer injuries vnpunished will be so farre from doing wrong though it be but to poore and private men that they will feare though they cannot flie the suspition of it and be as carefull to obserue a just and geometricall proportion in the distribution of dues and duties Now if private and common subjects are not onely secure from injuries but also according to due desert publickly regarded and rewarded for their particular service to the common-wealth though their ayme be but at their owne personall and private profit one may safely conjecture that the publick and politick parts and pillars the distinct and setled societies of that State shall be as strongly secured from detriment by wrongs and as freely and fully favoured by advancement in rights Yea it may be fully presumed where a State is so framed that they are all vnited in one head without dependance and subordination to each other As in a Monarchie which with an equall impartiall proportion giues protection distributes rewards when as if their vnion and communion be continued by a collatorall relation and mutualitie of members their equality of power and desert would breed emulation if not envie and indignation and make them ingratefull to each other if they be not injurious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist lib. 2. c. 12. As it is where the government is Aristocraticall which may be seene in the envious ostracismes of the Athenian Ephesian Venetian States Thucydides historicus in exilium pulsus erat quae fortuna optimo cuique Optimatum Athenis accidere solet as Paulus Iovius saith of the Venetian common-wealth Cicero de Orat. lib. 2. Neminem temerè ex Optimatibus qui vel insigni virtute vel spiritu in gerendis rebus caeteris antecellat potentem clarum fieri patiuntur Iovius Histor lib. 1. Machi vel discâ—r l. 1 c. 29. So that it is but a perverse and peevish paradox in Machivell to hold that a princely Monarch vses to be more vngratefull than free and popular States when as they either returne malice and mischiefe in reward of singular merits or if suspicion which he makes one ground of ingratitude doe not make them at least to suspend them by a relegation yet avarice which is his other ground will make them really ingratefull though formally they pretend a reward For if they giue any thing it will not be worth the taking in statu populari liberis civitatibus praemia liberalitatis plus habent honoris quà m vtilitatis they bestow nothing but vaine vanishing Bodiâ— pubâ— empty and aërie titles which are blowne vp blowne out and blowne away with the breath and voyce of the vulgar that gaue them so that they doe him that is gratifyed no right and reall good Arisâ— 2. ca◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is not gratifying to giue things that are contemptible for no man will confesse that hee hath neede of them but these toyish titles doe men more harme then their ingratitude could For titles without proportionable estates doe not onely fall vnder the miserable succour of other mens pittie but are also a temptation to provoke all men to contemne them But one maine reason of this difference in rewarding is that Aristocracies respect themselues in it when as a Monarch to whom all giue due and loyall respects doth powerfully protect and royally reward with respect to all But as all our moderne Monarchies are distinguished into societies as in some Kingdomes there are fiue States Thesaâ— Apotel as in Denmarke France and in Brittaine three which as they are subordinate and inferiour one to another so the supreame Governour doth regard and respect them with different degrees of favour and care with consideration of what consequence they are to him and so proportions pensions and of what need they stand of him and so affords protection searching into the severall circumstances of their imployments and abilities as of what vse they are in point of necessitie vtilitie and honour Now all these three States are necessary profitable and for honour of the Prince but not equally at any time nor constantly at all times neither in respect of peace or warre domestique or forraine so that as one state doth make it selfe more necessary in relation to an extraordinary time of neede so another may be more profitable in the continuall supplying of ordinary expences and the third may bee more for the honour of a King both in ordinary and extraordinary actions Now a King that preferres his honour before his profit at all times will more respect that state which stands strongest for his honour at all times then that which is more profitable at all times so will hee more esteeme that which certainely supplies his ordinary continuall charges then that which may bee more necessary si coelum ruat vpon an extraordinary vnlooked for occasion because wisedome is not imployed in preventing and providing against what may be in possibility but against what is likely in probabilitie so that in the naturall body though there bee more continuall intercourse and mutuation of needfull supplies reciprocally betwixt the head and the heart especially from the heart yet those externall members that are nearest vnited to the head haue more externall honour as the eyes the eares so in the body politique there is a constant interchange of succours and supplies betweene the state Civill and Ecclesiasticall His Majesties instructions to the Bishops 1626. yet the state of the Nobilitie especially taken for the Councell is of highest assistance which are as it were the eyes and eares of the King in publique providence and intelligence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Zetzes Histor Clibias 1. as Dion Chrysostomus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These principall Peeres that are so closely vnited to the head that they communicate with it in the most secret and serious advisings deservedly enjoy the fairest fortunes and favours for it is great reason that Kings should heape and bestow vpon the watch-towers of the state the greatest and highest honours in the state that as they are nearest so they may be dearest being his right trusty and well beloved Councellours And their imployment is no more immediately eminent then the trust of it troublesome and dangerous § 2 And the next state in high estimation with Christian Protentates and with many the most esteemed in all respects is their Clergie the state Ecclesiasticall vpon which they haue heaped favours to the very exhausting of their treasures Tacâ— lib. 2 Imperium amore religionis semetipsum exhausisse c. I am not able to reach the reason in point of state of that extraordinary extravagant large liberalitie but thus much I am able to compasse and conceiue and shall endeavour to make it plaine that whatsoeuer right and reason any
King in Europe hath had for this 400 yeares to vphold his Clergie and conferre favours and honours vpon it our present supreame head of our Civill state hath all that right and more reason to bee as royally indulgent to our present state Ecclesiasticall as none can deny but as he that hath chiefty of power over the whole body of the Common-wealth may rightly and justly favour bestow rewards priviledges and power vpon any publique societie or private person in the same so none will affirme that all that haue supreame power haue the same equalitie of right to endow with priviledges or inrich with rewards because that all doe grant that all Kings haue not Dominion in the same equall altitude and latitude and so cannot so highly advance in priviledges least they surmount their petty prerogatiue nor so largely giue them power and revenewes lest their extention shorten their owne And the grounds of this inequalitie are diverse in handling of which I will neither follow Machivell nor Iunius Brutus because I finde them to runne into two extreames the one granting it to all out of the loosenesse of a wanton wit the other denying it to all being carried by the stream of innumerous particular authorities that because as the other wanted conscience so he wanted experience or rather because Machivell lived when all Princes in Italie claimed and vsurped equall and full power and so writ what they did not what they should doe and Brutus might endeavour to diminish the power of all because he would not haue the French King haue so much which he might thinke too much for the present if hee considered it with the times before Lewis the eleventh wherein as the Peeres and Parliaments had too much so the Kings had too little so that their difference of Dominion is not according to that fullnesse Princes can make it when they are once in possession of a Kingdome nor according to that diminution wherewith disloyall subjects impaire it when they threaten and raise a rebellion but it is according to the severall meanes whereby they attaine or obtaine their Kingdome Now all supreame Dominion in a Monarchie is attained by conquest or succession or obtained by election Kings that come to it by the right of conquest may haue as much power as they will take they make their owne Charters those that come to it by succession haue as much power as their ancestours accepting of such lawes as they finde those that haue it by bequest Cujacius observ lib. 7. cap. 7. and are adopted heires for adoption is good by last will and testament haue the same right that a naturall successour hath if the adoption stand good Hottoman illustr quaest 1. As the Kingdome of France was giuen to Edward the third by Charles the sixt but those that are called to it onely by election their power is restrained and curbed with cautionary conditions and stands limited by them Now if all these haue great power in their supreame government by any one of these rights to attaine a Kingdome surely hee that hath it by all these rights conjoyned hath more power then any hath that is intituled to it but by one Brissonius de Regno Persico lib. 1. especially by election But our present gratious Soveraigne hath it by lineall succession from an absolute Conquerour which was confirmed to his father of pious memory by the Nuncupatiue will of his sacred predecessor Anno Iacobi A just recogniâ—on of an vndoubted succession who then adopted him and all was made sure vnto him by the electiue assent of the supreame Nobility without any crosse-course conditions as falls out when the souldiers or people elect And as it is plaine that hee holds by all these so I doe conceiue I could make it appeare that most Kings in Christendome hold primarily and principally but by one of these and that of least power But that I am loath to touch the ticklish and tender titles of forraine Potentates neither will I speake any thing of them as their states now stand but onely in a word shew what anciently they were for in my poore judgement their government may bee as good and lawfull if they haue had the power and opportunity to cast off and free themselues from these bridles and curbes of government for not the most limited power but the best rectified is safest both for Prince and people § 3 To shew then how it was with them heretofore and to begin with the Empire after it was translated to the Almaine Long hath that Empire continued by the election of the high Chamber of the Septem-viri the seaven selected Electors of Germany and some of the best Emperours haue so well liked it that they haue not onely beene willing to take the promissarie oath containing divers strict conditions but haue also granted them new free Charters and large prerogatiues as Charles the 4. in his Bulla aurea and so held so loose and light a hand over them that one of the Electors the Bishop of Ments in the Councell at Franckford said the government was Aristocraticall which might bee well taken if he meant it with reference to the Councell Clap Arca lib. 5 Comâ— 10. 〈◊〉 Graâ— cia l. manâ— Guic hist Iereâ— The Kingdome of France seemes not to haue beene anciently so absolute and vnrestrained as now it is for the twelue Peeres of France qui sunt ut in Germania principes electores had not onely royall priviledges and did not owe simple subjection but respectiue homage and had a regall authority in their severall Provinces and the command of the chiefe forces but also had the power if not to elect their King as Nauclerus saith and as it seemes true because they haue deposed them yet to determine when there is no great doubt who shall succeed and their setting alwayes vpon an heire male which is the course of electiue state shewes it to bee somewhat electiue for the restraining of it to the heire male did not primarily proceed from the Salique law because many of their Kings haue beene Lorraines Hottoman apollogia Catholica §. 6. which Dukes the French Civilians say doe not obserue nor are vnder the Salique law but if it bee not electiue it seemes not to be so cleare a succession because it is a masculine feud entayled vpon the heire male yea the predominant extravigant power of the Parisian Parliament seemes to intimate that the ancient state was not so free and absolute a Monarchie for they called in the Kings edicts sent forth the contrary and no appeale lay from their sentence Contra illud tantum supplicare licet a petition of right onely was permitted Gymerus Comment in prag sanct tit de autoritate Conciliorum so that this state which is most absolute of all others seeemes to haue been anciently not so free and uncontroleable in its government as a free Monarchie ought to be The next is the Kingdome
capacities of government in him the one spirituall the other temporall by both these hee hath supremacie and this supremacie is chiefly exercised in the calling presedencie and dissolving of the great assembly of the three States which high Court is not competently correspondent to both those powers in the King vnlesse the Parliament consist collectiue of spirituall and temporall persons which it hath anciently if the Booke De modo tenendi Parliamenti be authenticall for hee makes the vpper House consist of three States the Kings Majestie the Lords spirituall and temporall and lower of the Knights Ridleys view of Ecclesiasticall Lawes Procurators for the Clergie and the Burgesses which both answer the Kings mixt supremacie So that as he is supremus Iustitiarius totius Angliae in relation to the temporalitie so he is supremus or as Constantine truely entitled himselfe in the Councell of Nice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eusebius in vita lib. 3. in respect of the spiritualty But to returne to my present promise and purpose which was to shew how the actes of supremacie haue their effects in the Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction derived to the Clergie And I am now to shew what effect the power of promulgation of lawes hath which is in consenting confirming and publishing the Ecclesiasticall Lawes which are agreed vpon in Convocation not excluding the advice of the Parliament because the State Ecclesiasticall is not an independant societie but a member of the whole hence it is that they are called the Kings Ecclesiasticall Lawes by which the Clergie is ruled in spirituall causes according to which they exercise their jurisdiction in foro exteriori contentioso hence it is that for this last age the Ecclesiasticall Lawes of this Realme haue so well agreed with the Civill because they passe not without the assent of the supreame governour And it were much to be desired that Christian Princes would not onely permit lawes to be made and giue force to them by their authority but also that they would vouchsafe their personall presence to be Presidents in all assemblies for that end for then they would proceed and conclude to better purpose As Isidorus Pelusiota writes to the Emperour Theodosius the younger to be resident and president in the Councell of Ephesus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is that if hee would be pleased to take so much time as to be present there he did not feare that any thing that should passe could be faultie but if he leaue it all to be done by turbulent suffrages 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Isiodoru◠lus lib. 311. Who can free that Synod from scornfull scoffings his counsell was safe and seasonable because the cause of feare was very probable and eminent For in a Councell where there is a Monarchicall authority a supreame power in one there will be more dispatch in deliberations more expedition in executions than where multitudes of equals sit alone for they will be many of them over-wise and most over-wilfull to agree in one poynt when as every singular person will broach his particular project and propose it as a publick law with resolution to be a recusant to all their lawes if they will not be Protestants to his and so it comes to passe too often that they are forced to yeeld to one another or else no law should passe Hence is that multiplicitie vncertainty confusion contrariety of lawes in some diseased States than which nothing discovers a State to be more desperately declining though they are good in their particulars for they shew the multiplication of ill manners which per accidens begot them and they are likely to make them worse because they being appointed to amend them are disappointed and disabled by their owne crosse contrarieties As in a naturall body over-growne and over-flowne with ill humours If a Philosopher that considers onely a body neither sick nor well giues that which is good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Hippocrates calls it and when he hath done an Emperick come that considers it as sick but he knowes not of what nor the temper of the constitution but boldly and blindly giues one medicine to all for all diseases and at last the judicious Physitian come and consider it as it is and know what to doe hee must first vndoe all the other haue done before hee dare administer that which should first haue beene taken and by this time the body is either past cure or desperate conclusions must be tried to recover it Therefore happy is our State Ecclesiasticall in whose Convocation our supream Soveraign is President so that the Lawes passing with his royall consent are certaine and easie to be obeyed by reason of their rarenesse and paucitie which makes them pertinent distinct and free from confusion And therefore I doe not a little marveile at learned Baronius Baronius Annal Anno. 528. that since hee doth not deny Iustinianus the Emperour the power of making Ecclesiasticall Lawes he should so scrupulously and busily inquire what should moue him to meddle with the making of them when as I doe not doubt but the Clergie then might request him to it This last act of supremacie is to receiue appeales and giue determinate decisions and this hath its effect and is exercised in the Ecclesiasticall Courts And they doe not exercise any power that is not derived from this supremacie either immediately or mediately So that as the lawes they execute are the Kings Ecclesiasticall Lawes so these Courts are the Kings and all the processes and courses approved by his Majesties Lawes Therefore now there is no ground for a praemunire in them though the words of the Statute runne to Rome or else-where for by else-where seemes to be meant the Romish power Babylonem◠Gallicam vt Petrarch epist 123. or Court which was not then at Rome because the Popes seat was then at Avignion in France and not our Bishops consistorie For I beleeue that Statute was made to free them as well from the forraine vsurpation as any other of the King Courts as the pragmaticall sanction of France doth which was of the nature and in imitation of it about the same time by Charles the seventh brother-in-law to Edward the third But however it was then meant I am sure it cannot extend to them now vnlesse wee will deny the Kings supremacie over all causes and persons Ecclesiasticall and then they are not the Kings Courts but if we grant the Kings supremacie wee must deny that any of his Courts can incurre a praemunire A prohibition I grant may lawfully lye there because it is safe for the whole State that every jurisdiction should haue its bounds and keep or be kept in them But yet I will not say so in generall but we must admit them with distinction of prohibitions one of Law another of Fact Now that prohibition which is of Law according to the expresse words of the Statute which are commonly large enough
because they hold not tythes due iure divino and that because they desire still to hold them by the law of the land And that they may more colourably continue it they hold no such sinne as Symonie that the presented may make a symonaicall contract whereby they are confirmed and corroborated in their sacrilegious vsurpations But I will not dispute the poynt whether there be any such sinne as Symonie in relation to a private presentation without respect to orders taken with it But I am sure none will deny but where is a symonaicall contract there is perjurie in the Instituted As for sacriledge I grant it is not easie for men that are guilty of it to be convinced that it is a sinne For sinnes of omission cannot so quickly and sharply touch the conscienee because they are the breach of an affirmatiue law which doth not so strongly check the vice as informe to the dutie especially when pleasure or profit haue bribed the judgement For I feare some hold stolne tythes the sweetest part of their inheritance as it is said by the Epicures Zetzes Chil. 7 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who doting vpon voluptuous sweet delicates called hony the tenth part of the Ambrosia and perhaps that sect set vp the trade of Bee-mongers in Athens as Synesius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Synesiuâ— 136. So I am afraid the tickling sweetnesse of tythes is the cause why the smart and sowrnesse of sacriledge is not felt nor tasted And therefore in my opinion Thom. 〈◊〉 q. 155. Thomas Aquinas doth well to make sacriledge speciem luxuriae so that it may be a sinne and yet they never be convinced of it I am sure not onely the ancient Fathers of the most pure primitiue Church but even the godly Emperours did esteeme it a sinne and that in a high degree that when they granted generall pardons at Easter and other solemne timâ—s they excepted sacrilegious persons As Theodosius the great Theod. tit de Indulg Crim. ob diem Paschae quem intimo corde celebramus quos reatus astringit carcer inclusit solvimus attamen sacrilegus maximè à communione istius munieris separetur So also Gratian and Valentinian Religio anniversariae observationis hortatur vt omnes periculo carceris à metu poenarum eximi iubeamus verùm eos excipimus quos scelera graviora compulerunt Theod. eodem tit vt qui sunt sacrilegi sepulchri violatores So in many of the Novels 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vpon Easter day set all persons free 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Harmenopulus Promp Iur. Civ l. 6. tit 5. but if any be guilty of sacriledge set him be kept still in hold So that you see it was reckoned inter extraordinaria crimina in those dayes and so it would be thought with vs if profit did not blinde the judgement in the payer of tythes and indiscreet covetousnesse leade many Clergy-men to make no distinction betwixt free and friendly compositions with a bountifull Patron and sacriledge In my poore judgement the Canon Law is but just Quicunque c. 6. q. de Iur. Patronatus in decreeing that Si patronus Laicus ad inopiam fuerit redactus hee must haue some competent sustenance from the incumbent especially if he haue not beene sacrilegious and so by Gods judgement brought to it And I doe conceiue that this may be notwithstanding they doe not charge any parsonage with annuitie rents which is prohibited by the statute of Elizab. 3 Eliz. c. 2. Thus it is plaine that the revenues and maintenance of the Clergie are possessed by the Kings Lawes and may be demanded as due by them § 5. The other part of the honour of the Clergie annexed to the power of order is in priviledges immunities by which this power is exercised with more ease delight and respect and as it were with the whole man without distraction Now all the priviledges the Church doth enjoy or desire arise and are raised by the Kings lawes and royall prerogatiue As that ancient-often-confirmed Magna Charta doth fully confirme all former priviledges of the Clergie Magâ— ta cap And that was then favour enough for then they had priviledges to a surfeiting surplussage but now the Clergie stands in more need of them and they humbly expect them onely from the favour of their Prince who hath a plenitude of power to grant more and larger priviledges than ever they will desire For all priviledges are granted in relation to some Law and the power of an absolute Prince is aboue all Lawes as Dion Chrysostome told just Trajane 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cujac vat liâ— or as the same Counsellour to the same Emperour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Cujacius explaines and limits to coactiue correctiue Lawes which Dion saith began in Augustus dayes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dion none of the ancient Romans were freed from lawes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is from the necessity of obeying And I doe beleeue that the Scriptures seeing that they say more for the right of Kings than any booke in the world doe if not fully set downe this power yet permit it with approbation in some cases especially for the publick good of the Church which I am sure is a farre more conscionable and commendable course than to accommodate religion to serue the turne of the State as that judicious Amiratus vpon Tacitus Bisogna accommodar la ragione di stato alla religione nan la religione alla ragione di stato Our King then being a most absolute Monarch hath this prerogatiue and from that wee haue and hold our priviledges not from that written prerogatiue abstracted out of Fitzherberts Abridgement by Sr William Stanford whereby the Kings Exchequer hath many priviledges and peculiar processes as the Civilians call them privilegia fisci fiscus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 habet Cujaciâ— serv l. 2 But from an vnwritten vnrestrained right of dominion whereby he hath plenarie power not onely to make legall propositions of validitie or voyde in their first institution or to interpret them either by declaring them to bee corrected in some poyntes and cases especially if hee correct them by a more particular expresse pressing law as hee may correct the law of nature by the law of nations the law of nations by the law of armes the law of armes by the law of particular Leagues and all by the power of dominion or restraine them in respect of some persons or publick societies but he may dispence also with them since some penall statutes are made with relation to his power of pardon after the act therefore it is not so much to exempt them from being obnoxious to the punishment by pre-interpreting that it was not intended to extend to such persons for so the priviledge is not against law but besides it or aboue it Yea there are statutes dispensatorie as
A DISCOVRS OF THE STATE ECCLESISTICALL OF THI Kingdome in relation to the Civill Considered vnder three CONCLUSION With a DIGRESSION discuss some ordinary Exceptions against Ecclesiasticall Officers By C. D. OXFORD Printed by WILLIAM TVRNER 1632. TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE WILLIAM EALRE Of Salisbury Viscount Cranburne Lord Cecyll of Esendon Knight of the most Illustrous order of the Garter and one of his Majesties most honourable Privie Councell MAY Jt please your honour to accept this present discourse as an acknowledgment of your Lordships favour toward your observant Chaplaine Calybute Downinge ERRATA PAge 8. marg for text read tit p. 15. marg Clayman r. Clapmar p. 17. l. 15. with state r. with the state p. 21. l. 28. sic stantibus r. exstantibus p. 35. l. 18. ordinar r. ordinario p. 39. l. 1. adde à farlo p. ib. Angliterra r. Anghtlterra p. 52. l. ib. 506. r. 56. p. 54. marg Hallandes affaires p. 55. l. 8. Common r. Cannon Law p. 57. l. 18. Conatus r. Canutus p. 59. marg Francum r. aerarium p. 67. l. 24. vacante prudentissimus r. vacante sèd prudentissimus p. 94. l. vlt. dele Othobone vpon CONCLVSION I. That the present State Ecclesiasticall is most convenient and best agreeing with the Civill WIth what care and cost States and Kingdomes which vphold and deriue all happinesse to man as he is a sociable and a feeble creature should be preserved none will deny especially since they are so subiect to decay and the causes of their corruptions so many Senec. 117. For the best tempered common-wealth is not of any constant continuance but full of changes and those at last will after much interchange driue it to a full and fatall period It must therefore be the care of the present age to see that it receiue no detriment while they are in it for they may be so orderly as to worke no distemper but conserue it in health and wealth or at least keepe it from decaying so fast that hauing some space to fall in it may recouer or they haue time to leaue it and not fall with it nor that fall vpon them Now the best and all that the passing present generation can doe is either to keep things in primitiue order or to reforme them to it The first of which is difficult to continue the other dangerous if long discontinued Yet Kingdomes must be conserued by the same meanes they were first established This labour and care then will be to best purpose bestowed vpon those parts which are most necessary and vphold the rest as essentiall and fundamentall being the principles of the intrinsicall Polybius hist lib. 6. originall good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or vpon those that secure these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now that which is the only infallible ground of these must needs be principally respected by those that are vndertakers for the publick good and that ground is true religion For though ill manners are per accidens the cause or rather the occasion of making good lawes yet they are better in the executing best when they are obeyed Now good manners cause obedience and religion naturally begets good manners But religion cannot subsist without publicke exercise and action and so the requisites of it are times places and some persons who ought to be set apart and wholly and only employed in it and they must be in the common-wealth Therefore seeing it is necessary to haue a religion to preserue the common-wealth it is by consequent as needfull to haue preservers of religion that may not overturne the common-wealth by over-ruling religion Wherefore the choyse of them need to be such that seeing they must be in the common-wealth of necessity they may be of the common-wealth for vniversal safety And yet they are to be distinguished by state and order to avoyd confusion nor doth their distinction enforce any such forme after which they must governe as may be inconvenient to the publicke civill state wherby they are to be governed The care then of the wisest must be either to preserue or restore that forme of the Clergie which is most agreeing with the Civill State and that will be the meanes to prolong the age of the state by preserving concord amongst societies which though at last it come to an end yet it may out-last our dayes that we be not vnhappy in the ruine for it is not the infelicitie of States which haue long flourished to decay or be destroyed but the vnhappinesse of those men whose hap it is then to liue and not when they did flourish Now every form of a Clergie will not fit Guic hypor Poli◠but according to divers countries they haue beene severall suiting to the times places and people The first was the originall domesticall discipline in private families before God made choyse and actually seperated a nation to himselfe Then followed the Leviticall Nationall regiment compounded and composed of and according to the ceremoniall and judiciall Lawes Both these formes were not onely by divine permission but also by injunction yet not perpetuall nor vniversall Neither of these then are the government wee must chuse because that manner of exercising religion is antiquated Wee must then consider of a forme which may be conformable to the present practise of true religion in relation to Gods revealed Will which may withall be suitable and sorting with this present state that so they may vphold each other which forme though it be not according to Gods expresse mandate in some particulars yet it is not against it but with his permission of approbation in all points Now in this choyce wee must consider our owne forme of Civill government and whether that were imposed vpon vs by conquest or by our owne consent if by free consent and of long continuance it will with more ease and desire be preserved and with greatest danger altered if by conquest the more Charters of priuiledges are granted to vs vnder it the more it is endeared to vs and esteemed happy but our forme of state is a free Monarchie erected and protected by free consent and of long continuance not imposed but confirmed and reformed to the first freedome by a happy conquest and endeered vnto vs by many Charters of wholsome priviledges Therefore we must seeke or keepe such a forme of state Ecclesiasticall as may best accord with our forme of Civill policie § 2. This present State Ecclesiasticall is the forme that best agrees with the Civill State That it is not against the Law of God I will not goe about to proue because I hope none will question it neither that it was the primitiue and should still be the government of the present visible Church because that is already proved without all contradiction by many most judicious and orthodoxe Divines But my vndertaking is as farre as God shall giue mee vnderstanding to discourse how it is most agreeable with this Kingdome All States haue alwayes endeavoured
of charity razed the foundations of our Churches confounded divisions of parishes changed the right and custome of paying tythes with many such miserable inconveniences which were so in the Apostles times of miseries in persecution So that the State then would not venture to trie conclusions vpon it selfe by this new receipt but chose rather to feele the supposed paine than to take the pill and yet it hath subsisted though not in that heigth of health which that forme of government promised yet in such a good competent continuance of reasonable well that the present state also had rather indure the worst of the disease than make the best vse of the remedie And if it must haue made such a change in the entrance what would it haue done in the continuance how would it haue agreed with this Monarchie that must haue entred with such oppositions so that I neede not to say much to discard it for it hath enough in it at the first sight to keepe it out And I confesse that if I would I cannot say much of it with any confident certainty because indeed I doe not know neither doe I thinke that any of them doe or at least ever haue set downe in positiue and plaine termes the whole frame and face of this platforme as they would haue it received in this Kingdome But as much as I conceiue of it and at the best and purest it is a mixt Democraticall discipline and it is not likely that a dissolute Democracie should long agree with this Monarchie It is not my intent here to discourse of the nature of a Democracie Clayn Arc. that I should shew the manifold consequent coincident inconveniences that doe naturally flow in with it and follow it notwithstanding that Machivell in many of his discourses vpon Livie doth preferre a Democracie before any other forme but rather wittily out of a Paradoxicall contradicting humour than wisely out of the weight and worth of sincere sage and serious arguments And Plato saith thus much for it in his Idaea of a Common-wealth Plat◠lib. 5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inter iniquas formas optima inter legitimas deterrima For if it begin to degenerate into an Ochlocratie as I cannot conceiue it possible but it must considering that liberty is the end and excellencie of it then it turnes to a most head-strong intollerable tyrannie For I am not of their opinion that hold it a contradiction that where a Democracy prevayles there can be a tyranny For the Ephori of Sparta were as the Tribunes of the people of Rome chosen by the people and out of the common people and the conservators of their liberty Yet I thinke there are but few that discourse of these Ephori but they conclude and condemne their government of tyranny They cast Pausanias into prison and Thucidides saith that they vsurped that power over and against their Kings for they put Agis junior to death Plato de leg lib. 4. as Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and they were set vp to restraine their Kings It is a hard matter to keepe that liberty within its limits in any common-wealth where it hath the supreme government and therefore with much difficulty will it submit to be governed by a free Monarchy especially a Democracie of that new nature which makes the same persons civill subjects and ecclesiasticall superious those lay Elders that are neither Ministers nor Magistrates and yet must be governours in the Church whose jurisdiction doth destroy the nature of a Monarchie For all publick government in the Church derived from Christ the fulnesse of it is either Propheticall Sacerdotall or Regall and they assume not any of these but the Regall which is given in charge to supreme Christian Magistrates in a Monarchie and therefore if they deriue not this power from him they establish a regiment against him So that if his power doth not include theirs they exclude his and he having no supereminent power over them as they impeach his right so they will enlarge their owne liberty till it be dissolved into a loose licentious libertinisme Polybius hist lib. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Polibius well expresses it And if they did not thus it were the greater vertue seeing they must haue such power limited by lawes left to discretion And they would finde it a hard peeece of patience to abstaine and containe themselues within such bounds of obedience as this State necessarily requires Can men that professe themselues popular passe plausiblie and please the vulgar if they doe not to their vtmost vphold them in their highest insolencies Tull◠2. co◠Agra Tullie found this impossible when as hee withstood the people in Lege Agraria for they cast him off and clave to Rullus who would be popularis though it were but in populatione and as it cannot stand with the power of our government so it withstands the honour of our governour debasing the majestie of a Monarchie into a popular paritie without respect of His most sacred person In this it is truly Democritall for as it was received for libertie so it must bee vpheld by equality 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be fully free without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Poly◠lib. 6 and I cannot then conceiue how any could apprehend it as a forme likely to agree with state so that this government at the best would bee like the spleene in the body which is the subject of the dregs and settlings of the humours as a Democracie is la feccia della plebe Gui◠Hist and as the spleene being not able to mooue it selfe is not troublesome so long as it is not pressed vpon by the heart but permitted full and equall liberty nor disturbed by a Flatus hypocondriacus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but once mooved 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 affectes the head and heart with turbulent distempers Hipp notio so in a Democracie as long as they haue all at their loose list and are not compelled to keepe within compasse but apprehend themselves equall to the highest in all respects and are not mooved by some sedicious spirit they are quiet enough Nam multitudo sicut mare per se immobilis est Livi Psal 〈…〉 Ide◠but if once they perceive that any goe about to oppresse or crosse them in their false and fugitive liberty as they are very suspicious vpon the least cause they presently are ready but tentare magis quà m tueri libertatem and if any one dare but begin to blow a Trumpet of sedition as they doe not easily statim ferox erit si non ad bellandum saltem ad rebellandum I doe confesse that this forme of government may bee of good use in some states at some times as in a popular state where these Lay Elders may be both Church and Citie Burgesses as the Democraticall Helvetians approved it so also as for the enlarging of a Monarchie Machivellus l. 1. cap. 5.
Pope and if the King get any good sum or subsidie out of them it is either la cruzada or tenths called el excusado granted to him by the Popes indulgence or if he cannot procure a Bull of facultie he must get all they giue by striving and force as Cardinall de Ossat in his letter to Henry 4. Ossatns epist 274. of France speakes of Philip the thirds sacriledge Rex Hispaniae omnem argenteam supellectilem Ecclesiarum Ecclesiasticorum sacrilega manu vsurpare tentat when as our Clergie which haue not the tyth of the tenth part of that meanes is not only now and then profitable in small matters And if Francis 1. beleeved that for a great kindnes from Pope Leo the tenth in their conference at the interview to haue the tenths of Ecclesiasticall livings in France for one yeare Guicc hist lib. 12. as Guicciardine in a judicious sleighting of the favour Promes se il Pontifice al re dargli faculta di riscuotere per vn anno la decima delle cheise del Reame de Francia that the King tooke the proposall into consideration and communicated it to his Councell who thought it a great benefit if he might haue them non secundum antiquum valorem beneficiorum Concord◠liae tit d libus but as they are improved surely a farre greater benefit it is to haue the tenth every yeare Subsides most yeares and first fruites the first yeare and that not according to the present value which is much fallen from the ancient revenewes but according to the Popes bookes in most when as Ecclesiasticall preferments are abated halfe in halfe So that as all other states are more charged so their revenewes are improved accordingly but the meanes of the Clergie is much impaired and yet their charges increased in many things in all things keepe the old rate so that notwithstanding the poverty as S Nicholas Bacon at the Councell table we haue no reason to exact or expect any subsidie from the spiritualtie who are so exhausted yet it is constantly the most beneficiall state of this Realme to the Crowne both in ordinary and extraordinary revenewes In these two considerations amongst many wee see they deserue much and there is one thing that makes it more safe for our King to bestow greater honour and priviledges vpon them then any other Prince which is because he hath not the reason to suspect them of ambitions aspiring to a Monarchie since they haue cast off their Church Monarchies as the Romans never suspected any of a tyrannicall vsurpation after they had by one consent cast out the Kings so that though the Pope seeme to favour the Clergy vpon good reason yet our King hath as much and this reason more then the Pope hath for he hath not onely all the power of jurisdiction the Pope had over them 1. Eliz. but also the revenewes also the Pope had from them and yet is without feare and danger of being rebelled against by them or dis-throned But in one thing it is more capable of a royall Potentates bounty and protection then any forraine Clergie is in respect of its owne Civill supreame head or any state in our owne Kingdome is of our King and that is that it is so poore and obvious to injuries that it will make the ordinary bounty of a Prince magnificent and make his power long and delight to protect such an innocent state being neither able to resist nor strong to endure and suffer wrongs thus from the power of Dominion passeth the influence of protection THE THIRD CONCLVSION That all the rights and respects that the state Ecclesiasticall enjoyes or desires are originally derived from their relation and dependance on the Civill HE that hath publique power and an opportunitie to doe a great good turne for endearing a private friend that depends vpon him will haue much adoe to forbeare to doe it though the weale publique suffer some detriment by it Yet if his friend doe so much tender the publique good that he will not desire any thing to the prejudice of it surely then the publique person out of his engagements and respects to the publique good will leaue off his present purpose and pleasure his favorite in some things that may doe him good and the Common-wealth no harme Even so our supreame Regent of great Brittaine hath great and transcendent power and never wants an opportunitie to doe good bestow favours vpon the well deserving state of the Clergie and it were impossible for him to hold his royall bountifull hand if this Clergie should not in all its petitions consider the publique good apprehending it selfe as a member of the Civill state And hence it is that though the King hath more power then I beleeue was ever tried or can be defined to doe his Clergie good yet they haue not any thing conferred vpon them which is not according to the lawes customes and liberties of this Common-wealth All that the state Ecclesiasticall enjoyes belongs to it as to a principall member of the body politique and is derived to it from the supreame Civill head on which it doth depend and in whom it is vnited to the Civill state It is no debasing or derogation to a spiritualitie to bee thus subject to the Dominion of a sacred Soveraigne for though servitude according to the Civilians proceed not from the law of nature but of Nations or at lest from nature corrupted as the Schooles yet orderly subjection and superioritie proceed from the instinct of pure nature for in Heaven there is order amongst the blessed Angels and in the state of innocency there was superiority not onely betwixt man and all other creatures but also betwixt man and woman and had they lived in Paradise till there had beene father and sonne there should haue beene Patria potestas or else the fifth Commandement is not morall and when there had beene many families there must necessarily haue beene Regiae potestas or else the best and most happy life must haue beene without the greatest happinesse of life which is order Now the superiority of our Prince over his Clergie is not an enslaving tyranny but a sweet and a lawfull Soveraigntie which government as it is due so it is our duty to obey it for government and obedience are relatiues of equall extent And as it is no disparagement to the state Ecclesiasticall to bee subject to our supreame Magistrate so it is great benefit to the Clergie and a satisfaction to the Laytie that all the rights and respects that they enjoy or desire are deriued from that Prince whom both so willingly obey § 2 All that the state Ecclesiasticall doth enjoy or claime may bee reduced to these two heads of power and of honour and they deriue these from one sole supreame governour who is fully qualified by his personall eminent authority to transferre and conferre these rights and respects to them and vpon them for as these two