Selected quad for the lemma: state_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
state_n	government_n	king_n	monarchy_n	1,384	5	9.4516	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A88696	Vindiciæ contra tyrannos: a defence of liberty against tyrants. Or, of the lawfull power of the prince over the people, and of the people over the prince. Being a treatise written in Latin and French by Junius Brutus, and translated out of both into English. Questions discussed in this treatise. I. Whether subjects are bound, and ought to obey princes, if they command that which is against the law of God. II. Whether it be lawfull to resist a prince which doth infringe the law of God, or ruine the Church, by whom, how, and how farre it is lawfull. III. Whether it be lawfull to resist a prince which doth oppresse or ruine a publique state, and how farre such resistance may be extended, by whome, how, and by what right, or law it is permitted. IV. Whether neighbour princes or states may be, or are bound by law, to give succours to the subjects of other princes, afflicted to the cause of true religion, or oppressed by manifest tyranny.; Vindiciae contra tyrannos. English	Languet, Hubert, 1518-1581.; Walker, William, 17th cent.	1648 (1648)	Wing L415; Thomason E430_2; ESTC R34504	141,416	156

reverently to serve him He fains also to be exceedingly affected to the publique good not so much for the love of it as for feare of his owne safety Furthermore he desires much to be esteemed just and loyall in some affaires purposely to deceive and betray more easily in matters of greater consequence much like those thieves which maintaine themselves by thefts and robberies cannot yet long subsist in their trade without exercising some parcell of justice in their proceedings Hee also counterfeits the mercifull but it is in pardoning of such malefactors in punishing whereof he might more truly gaine the reputation of a pittifull Prince To speake in a word that which the true King is the Tyrant would seeme to be and knowing that men are wonderfully attracted with and inamoured of vertue hee endeavours with much subtilty to make his vices appeare yet masked with some shadow of vertue but let him counterfeit never so cunningly still the Fox will be known by his taile and although he fawne and flatter like a Spannell yet his snarling and grinning will ever bewray his currish kind Furthermore as a well-ordered Monarchy partakes of the principall Tho. Aquin. in secund secund q. 12. a●t 11. commodities of all other governements So on the contrary where tiranny prevailes there all the discommodities of confusion are frequent A Monarchy hath in this conformity with an Aristocraty that the most able and discreet are called to consultations Tiranny and Oligarchy accord in this that their counsels are composed of the worst and most corrupted And as in the Councell Royall there may in a fort seeme many Kings to have interests in the government so in the other on the contrary a multitude of Tyrants alwayes domineers The Monarchy borrowes of the popular government the assemblies of the Estates whither are sent for Deputies the most sufficient of Cities and Provinces to deliberate of and determine matters of State the tiranny takes this of the Ochlocracie that if shee be not able to hinder the convocation of the Estates yet will she endeavour by factious subtilties and pernicious practices that the greatest enemies of Order and Reformation of the State be sent to those Assemblies the which we have known practised in our times In this manner assumes the Tyrant the countenance of a King and tyranny the semblance of a Kingdome and the continuance succeeds commonly according to the dexterity wherewith it is managed yet as Aristotle says we shal hardly reade of any tyranny that hath out-lasted a hundred yearee briefely the King principally regards the publique utility and a Tyrants chiefest care is for his private commodity But seeing the condition of men is such that a King is with much difficulty to be found that in all his actions only agreeth at the publique good and yet cannot long subsist without expression of some speciall care thereof we will conclude that where the Common-wealths advantage is most preferr'd there is both a lawfull King and Kingdome and where particular designes and private ends prevaile against the publique profit there questionlesse is a Tyrant and tiranny Thus much concerning Tyrants by practise in the examining whereof wee have not altogether fixed our discourse on the loose disorders of their wicked and licentious lives a Bartol in tract de tiranct de regim Civt which some say is the character of a bad man but not alwayes of a bad Prince If therefore the Reader be not satisfied with this description besides the more exact representations of Tyrants which he shall finde in histories he may in these our dayes behold an absolute modell of many living and breathing Tyrants whereof Aristotle in his time did much complaine Now at the last we are come as it were by degrees to the chiefe and principall point of the question We have seene how that Kings b To whom it belongs to resist suppresse Tyrāts without title have beene chosen by God either with relation to their Families or their persons only and after installed by the people In like manner what is the duty of the King and of the Officers of the Kingdome how farre the authority power and duty both of the one the other extends and what and how sacred are the Covenants and contracts which are made at the inauguration of Kings and what conditions are intermixt both tacite and express'd finally who is a Tyrant without title and who by practise seeing it is a thing unquestionable that we are bound to obey a lawfull King which both to God and people carrieth himselfe according to those Covenants whereunto he stands obliged as it were to God himselfe seeing in a fort he represents his divine Majestie It now followes that we treate how and by whom a Tyrant may be lawfully resisted and who are the persons that ought to be chiefely actors therein and what course is to be held that the action may be managed according to right and reason we must first speak of him which is commonly called a Tyrant without title Let us suppose then that some Ninus having neither received outrage nor offence invades a people over whom he hath no colour of pretension that Caesar seekes to oppresse his Countrey c Otto Frising Chron. l. 3. c. 7. and the Roman Common-wealth that Popiclus endeavours by murthers and treasons to make the elective Kingdome of Polonia to become hereditary to him and his posterity or some Brunichilde drawes 〈◊〉 lib. ● c. 1. 〈◊〉 T●u●on lib. 4. c. 51. lib. 5. c. 1● lib. 8. c. 29. to her selfe and her Protadius the absolute government of France or Ebroinus taking advantage of Theodericks weaknesse and idlenesse gaineth the intire administration of the State and oppresseth the people what shall be our lawfull refuge herein First The law of nature teacheth and commandeth us to maintaine and defend our lives and liberties without which life is scant worth the enjoying against all injury and violence Nature hath imprinted this by instinct in Dogs against Wolves in Buls against Lions betwixt Pigeons and Spar hawkes betwixt Pullen and Kites and yet much more in man against man himselfe if man become a beast and therefore he which questions the lawfulnesse of defending ones selfe doth as much as in him lies question the law of nature To this must be added the law of Nations which distinguisheth possessions and Dominions fixes limits and makes our confi●●s which every man is bound to defend against all invaders And therefore it is no lesse lawfull to resist Alexander the great it without any right or being justly provoked he invades a Countrey with a mighty Navy as well as Diomedes the Pirate which scoures the Seas in a small vessell For in this case Alexanders right is no more than Di●medes his but only hee hath more power to doe wrong and not so easily to be compeld to reason as the other Briefely one may as well oppose Alexander in pillaging a Country as a Theefe in

Now although some Citizens say that by decree of Senate the Emperour Augustus was declared to be exempt from obedience to Lawes yet notwithstanding Theodosius and all the other good and reasonable Emperours have professed that they were bound to the Lawes lest what had been extorted by violence might be ●cknowledged and received instead of Law And for Augustus Caesar in so much as the Roman Common wealth was en thralled by his power and violence she could ●ay nothing freely but that she had lost her freedome And because they durst not call Augustus a tyrant the senate said he was exempt from ●ll obedience to the lawes which was in effect as much as if they plainely should have said ●he Emperour was an outl●w The same right ●●●h ever beene of force in all well governed states and Kingd●mes of Chr●st●ndome For neither the Emperour the King of France nor the Kings of Spain England Polander Hungarie and all other lawfull Princes as the Areh Dukes of Austriae Dukes of Brabante Earles of Flanders and Holland nor other Princes are not recreated to the government of their estates before they have promised to the Electours Peeres Pala●ins Lords Barons and Governours that they will render to every one right according to the lawes of the Country yea so strictly that they cannot alter or innovate any thing contrary to the priviledges of the countries without the consent of the ●ownes and provinces If they do it they are no lesse guilty of rebellion against the lawes then ●he people is in their kind if they refuse obedience when they command according to law briefly lawfull princes receive the lawes from the people as well as the crown in lieu of honour and the scepter in liue of power which they are bound to keep and maintain and therein repose their chiefest glory If the Prince may make new lawes What then shall it not be lawfull for a Prince to make new lawes and abrogate the old seeing it belongs to the King not onely to advise that nothing be done neither against nor to defraud the lawes but also that nothing be wan●ing to them or any thing to much in them briefly that neither age nor lapse of time do abolish or entombe them i● there be any thing to abridge added or taken away from them ●t is his duty to assemble the estates and to demand their advise and resolution without presuming to publish any things be●ore the whole have beene first du●y examined and approved by them after the l●w is once ennacted and published there is no more dispute to be made above it all men owe obedience to it and the prince in the first place to teach other men their duty and for that all men are ca●i●ier led by example then by precep●s the prince must necessarily expresse his willingnesse to observe the lawes or else by what equity can he require obedience in his subjects to that which he himselfe con●●mnes For the disterence which is betwixt Kings and subjects ought not to consist in impurity but in equity and justice And there●ore although Augustus was esteemed to be exempt by the d●cree of the S●nate notwithstanding reproving of a young man that had broken the Iulian law concerning adultery he boldly replyed to Augustus that he himself had transgressed the same laws which condemnes adul●eries the Emperour acknowledged his fault and for grief forbore to late So convenient a ●hing it is in nature to practise by example Demoth in oratio con Timocrat that which we would teach by precipt The Lawgicer Solon was wont to compare laws to mony for they m●●n●ain human societies as many preserves traffick neither improperly then if they Kings may not law●ully or at the least heretofore could not mannace or imbase good mony without the consent of the Common wealth much more ●ei●e can he have power to make and Innocen 3. ad regem Fam. in ca. quado d●●ure juando unmake lawes without the which no● Kings nor subjects can coha bite in security bu● must befor●● to live brut●shly in caves and deserts like wild beast wherefore also the Emperour of Germany esteeme it needful to make some law for the good of the empire first he demands the advise of the estates if it be there approved the Princes Barons Deputies of the towns signei● and then the law is ratified for he solemnly swears to keep the laws already made and to introduce no new ones without a generall consent There is a Law in Poloniae which hath beene renewed in the yeere 1454. and also in the yeere 1538. and by those it is decreed that no new Lawes shall be made but by a common consent nor no where else but in the Generall Assembly of the Estates For the Kingdome of France where the Kings are thought to have greater authority then in o●her places anciently all Lawes were onely made in the Assembly of the Estates or in the ambulatory Parliament But since this Parliament hath been Sedentary the Kings ed●cts are not received as authentically before the Parliament hath approved them Whereas on the contrary the decrees of this Parliament where the Law is defective have commonly the power and effect of Law In the Kingdomes of England Spain Hungary and others they yet enjoy in some sort their ancient priviledges For if the welfare of the Kingdom depends of the observation of the Laws and the Lawes are enthralled to the pleasore of one man is it not most certain that there can be no permanent stability in that government Must it not then necessarily come to passe that if the King as some have been be infected with Lunacie either continually or by intervales that the whole State fall inevitably to ruine But if th● Laws be superiour to the King as we have already proved and that the King be tyed in the same respect of obedience to the Lawes as the Servant is to his Master who will be so senslesse that will not rather obey the Law then the King or will not readily yeeld his best assistance against those that seek to violate or infringe them Now seeing that the King is not Lord over the Lawes let us examine how far his power may be justly extended in other things Whether the Prince have power of life and death over his Subjects The Minnions of the Court hold it for an undeniable Maxime That Princes have the same power of life and death over their Subjects as anciently Masters had over their slaves and with these false imaginations have so bewitched Princes that many although they put not in ure with much rigour this imaginary right yet they imagine that they may lawfully do it and in how much they defist from the practise thereof insomuch that they quit and relinquisite of their right and due But we affirme on the contrary that the Prince is but as the Minister and Executor of the Law and may only unsheath the Sword against those whom the Law hath

which ●ive with out a King but we cannot imagine a King without p●ople And those which have bin raised to the Royal dignity were not advanced because they excel●ed other men in beauty come●iness nor in some excellency of nature to govern them as shepheards doe their flocks but rather being made out of the same masse with the rest of the people they should acknowledge that for them they as it were borrow their power authority The ancient custome of the French represents that exceeding wel● for they used to lift up on a buckler sa●ute him King whom they had chosen And wherefore is it said I pray you that kings h●ve an infinite number of eyes a million of ears with extream long hands and feet exceeding swift is it because they are like to Argos Gerion Midas divers others ●o celebrated by the Poets No truly but it is said in regard of all the people whom the busines principal●y concerns who lend to the king for the good of the Common-wealth their eye● their ears their means their facu●ties Let the people forsake the king he presently fals to the ground although befo●e his hearing sight seemed most excellent that he was strong in the best disposition that might be yea that he seemed to triumph in all magnificence yet in an instant he wi●l become mo●t vi●e contemptible to bee brief instead of those divine honours wherewith all men adored him he shal be compe●ed Dionisius for his Ti●a●●ie driven o●t of C●cil●e was fo●s●d to ta●e that course of lif● up●n h●m to become a Pedant whip children in the schoo● at Corinth Take away but the basis to this Giant l●●e the Rodian Colosse he p●esently tumbles on the ground fals into pieces Seeing th●n that the King is estab●ished in this degree by the people for their sake that he cannot subsist without them who can think it strange then for us to conclude that the peop●e are aboue the King Now that which we speak of al● the people universally ought also to be understood as hath been delivered in the 2. question of those which in every Kingdom or town do ●●●wfully represent the body of the people which ordinarily or at lest should be ca●ed the officers of the Kingdom or of the crown not of the King For the officers of the ●ing it is he which placeth displaceth them at his pleasure yea after his death they have no more power are accounted as dead On the contrary the officers of the Kingdom receive their authority from the people in the general Assembly of the states or at the least wer● accustomed so anciently to have done cannot be disauthorised but by them so then the one depends of the King the other of the Kingdom those of t●e soveraign officer of the ●ingdom which is the King himself these of the soveraignty it self that is of the people of which soveraignty both the King all his officers and all his officers of the ●ingdom ought to depend the charge of the one hath proper relation to the care of the ●ings person that of the other to look that the common-wealth receive no damage the first ought to serve and assist the King as all domestique servants are bound to doe to their masters the other to preserve the rights priviledges of the people to carefully hinder the Prince that he neither omit the things that may advantage the state nor commit any thing that may endammage the publique Briefly the one are Servants and domestiques of the Kings and received into their places to obey his person the other on the contrary are as Associates to the King in the administration of justice participating of the Royal power and authority being bound to the utmost of their power to be assisting in the managing of the affairs of State as well as the King who is as it were President amongst them and principall onely in order and degree Therefore as all the whole People is above the King and likewise taken in one entire body are in authority before him yet being considered one by one they are all of them under the King It is easie to know how far the power of the first Kings extended in that Ephron King of the Hittites could not grant Abraham the Sepulchre but in the presence and with the consent of the People neither could Hemor the Hevite Gen. 34. King of Sichem contract an alliance with Iacob without the Peoples assent and confirmation thereof because it was then the custome to refer the most important affairs to be dispensed and resolved in the generall Assemblies of the People This might easily be practised in those kingdomes which were then almost confined within the circuit of one towne But since that Kings began to extend their limits and that it was impossible for the People to assemble together all into one place because of their great numbers which would have occasioned confusion the Officers of the kingdome were established which should ordinarily preserve the rights of the People in such sort notwithstanding as when extraordinary occasion required the People might be assembled or at the least such an abridgement as might by the principallest Members be a Representation of the whole Body We see this order established in the kingdome of Israel which in the judgment of the wisest Politicians was excellently ordered The King had his Cupbearers his Carvers his Chamberlains and Stewards The kingdome had her Officers to wit the 71. Elders and the heads and chief chosen out of all the Tribes which had the care of the Publique Faith in Peace and War Furthermore the kingdome had in every town Magistrates which had the particular government of them as the former were for the whole kingdome At such times as affairs of consequence were to be treated of they assembled together but nothing that concerned the publike state could receive any solid determination David assembled the Officers of 1. Chron. 29. 1 1. Chron. 13. 1. his kingdome when he desired to invest his Son Solomon with the Royal Dignity when he would have examined and approved that manner of policy and managing of affairs that he had revived and restored and when there was question of removing the Ark of the Covenant And because they represented the whole people it is said in the History that all the people assembled These were the same Officers that delivered Ionathan from death condemned by the sentence of the King by which it appeares that there might be an appeale from the King to the People After that the kingdome was divided through the pride of Reoboam ● Sam. ●● 45. the Councel at Ierusalem composed of 71. Ancients seems to have such authority that they might judge the King as well as the King might judge every one of them in particular In this Councel was President the Duke of the house of Iuda to wit ● Chron. 1●

Neh. 11. 9. some principall man chosen out of that Tribe as also in the City of Ierusalem there was a Governour chosen out of the Tribe of Benjamin residing there This will appear more manifest by examples Ieremy sent by God to denounce to the Jewes the destruction of Ierusalem was therefore condemned first by the Priests and Prophets in whose hands was ●or 16. 9 〈◊〉 the Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction afterwards by all the people of the City that is by the ordinary Iudges of Ierusalem to wit the Milleniers and the Centurions Finally the matter being brought before the Princes of Iuda who were the 71. Elders assembled and set neere to the new Gate of the Temple he was by them acquitted In this very Assembly they did discreetly condemn in expresse terms the wicked and cruell act of the King Ichoiakin who a little before had caused the Prophet Vriah to be slain who also fore-told the destruction of Ierusalem We read in another place that Ledechias held in such reverence the authority of this Councel that he was so far from delivering of Ieremy 〈◊〉 37. 38. from the dungeon wherein to the 71. had cast him that he durst scant remove him into a lesse rigorous prison They perswading him to give his consent to the putting to death the Prophet Ieremy he answered that he was in their hands and that he might not oppose them in my thing The same King fearing least they might make information against him to bring him to an account for certain Speeches he had used to the Prophet Ieremy was glad to fe●gn an untrue excuse It appeares by this that in the kingdome of Iuda this Councel was above the King in this kingdome I say not fashioned or established by Plato or Arictotle but by the Lord God himself being Author of all their order and supreame Moderator in that Monarchy Such were the seven Magi or Sages in the Persian Empire who had almost a paraleld dignity with the King and were tearmed the ears and eyes of the King who also never dissented from Arist in Pol. lib. ● c. 11. l. 3. c. 7. the judgment of those Sages In the kingdom of Sparta there was the Ephori to whom an appeal lay from the judgment of the King and who as Aristotle sayes had authority also to judge the Kings themselves In Egypt the people were accustomed to chuse and give officers to the King to the end they might hinder and prevent any incroachment or usurpt authority contrary to the Laws Now as Aristotle doth ordinarily tearm those lawfull Kings which have for their Assistants such officers Arist. in pol. l. 5. c. 11. or Councellors so also maketh he no difficulty to say that where they be wanting there can be no true Monarchy but rather a tyranny absolutely barbarous or at the least such a Dominion as doth most neerly approach tyranny In the Romane Common-wealth such were the Senators and the Magistrates created by the people the tribune of those which were called Celerees the Preter or Provost of the City and others insomuch as there lay an appeal from the King to the People as Seneca declares by divers testimonies drawne from Ciceroes bookes of the Common-wealth and the History of Oratius sufficiently shewes who being condemned by the Iudges for killing his sister was acquitted by the people In the times of the Emperours there was the Senate the Consults the Pretors the great Provosts of the Empire the Governours of Provinces attributed to the Senate and the People all which were called the Magistrates and Officers of the people of Rome And therefore when that by the decree of the Senate the Emperour Maximinus was declared enemy Herodi ● 8. of the Common-wealth and that Maximus and Albinus were created Emperours by the Senate the men of war were sworn to be faithfull and obedient to the people of Rome the Senate and the Emperors Now for the Empires and publike States of these times except those of Turquie Muscovie and such like which are rather a rapsody of Robbers and barbarous intruders then any lawfull Empires there is not one which is not or hath not heretofore been governed in the manner wee have described And if through the connivency and sloath of the principall Officers the successors have found the businesse in a worse condition those which have for the present the publike Authority in their hands are notwithstanding bound as much as in them lyeth to reduce things into their primary estate and condition In the Empire of Germany which is conferred by election there is the Electors and the Princes both secular and Ecclesiasticall the Countesse Barons and Deputies of the Imperial Cities and as all these in their proper places are Solicitors for the publike good likewise in the Diets doe they represent the Majesty of the Empire being obliged to advise and carefully fore-see that neither by the Emperours partiality hate nor affection the publike State do suffer or be interressed And for this reason the Empire hath its Chancellour as well as the Emperour his both the one and the other have their peculiar Officers and Treasurers apart And it is a thing so notorious that the Empire is preferred before the Emperour that it is a common saying That the Emperour does homage to the Empire In like manner in the Kingdom of Polonia there is for Officers of the Crown the Bishops the Palatins the Castellains the Nobility the Deputies Speculum saxonicum of Towns and Provinces assembled extraordinarily before whom and with whose consent and no where else they make new Lawes and determinations concerning wars For the ordinary Government there is the Councellours of the kingdom the Chancellour of the State c. although notwithstanding the king have his Stewards Chamberlains Servants and Domestiques Now if any man should demand in Polonia who were the greater the King or all the people of the kingdom represented by the Lords and Magistrates he should do as much as if he asked at Veni●e if the Duke were above the Seigniory But what shall wee say of Kingdoms which are said to go by hereditary succession We may indeed conclude the very same The kingdom of France heretofore preferred before all other both in regard of the excellency of their Lawes and Ai●oni lib. 5. c. 26. in Carolo ●●lv● ma●esty of their Estate may passe with most as a ruling case Now although that those which have the publike commands in their hands doe not discharge their duties as were to be desired it followes not though that they are not bound to do it The King hath his high steward of his Houshold his Chamberlains his Masters of his games Cup-bearers and others whose o●●●ces were wont so to depend on the person of the King that after the death of their Mast●r the ro●●ces were void And indeed at the Funerall of the King the Lord high Steward in the presence of all the officers and servants of the

own bountie presented unto men ought no more to be inhaunsed by sale then either the light the aire or the water as a certaine King called L. magis puto D. de ●ebus corum Lycurgus in the lesser Asia began to lay some impositions upon the Salt pits there nature as it were impatiently bearing such a restraint of her liberality the springs are said to drie up suddenly Inv. Sat 4. Si quid palphurio si credimus Armillato Quicquid conspicuum palchrum q●ex aequo●e to●o est Res fisci est ubicunque natat Now although certain Marm●usets of the Court would perswade us at this day as Juveral complained in his time that the Sea affords nothing of worth or good which falls not within the compasse of the Kings Prerogative He that first brought this taxation into Rome was the Censor Livius who therefore gained the surname of Salter neither was it done but in the Common-wealths extreame necessity And in France King Philip the long for the same reason obtained of the Estates the imposition upon Salt for five years onely what turmoiles and troubles the continuance thereof hath bred every man knowes To be b●eife all Tributes were imposed and continued for the provision of meanes and stipends for the men of war so as to make a Province stipendarie or tributarie was esteemed the same with militarie Behold wherefore Solomon exacted Tributes to wit to fortifie 1 King 9. 15. the Towns and to erect and furnish a publick magazine which being accomplished the people required of Reholoam to be freed Post●l li. 3 de rep Turc from that burden The Turks call the Tribute of the Provinces the Sacred blood of the people and account it a most wicked crime to impl●y it in any thing but the defence of the people Wherefore by the same reason all that which the King conquers in warre belongs to the people and nor to the King because the people bore the charges of the war as that which is gained by a factor accures to the account of his master Yea and what advantage he gaines by marriage if it belongs simplie and absolutely to his wife that is acquired also to the Kingdom for so much as it is to be presumed that he gained not that preferment in marriage in quality of Philip or Charles but as he was King On the contrarie in like manner the Queens have interest of indowment in the estates which their husbands gained and injoyed before they attained the Crown and have no title to that which is gotten after they are created Kings because that is judged as the acquist of the Common purse and hath no proper reference to the Kings private estate which was so determined in France betwixt Philip of Valoys and his wife Jedne of Burgundie But to the end that there be no money drawn from the people to be imployed in private designes and for particular ends and purposes the Emperor swears not to impose any Taxes or Tributes whatsoever but by the authority of the Estates of the Empire As much do the Kings of Polonia Hungarie and Denmarke promise the English in like manner enjoy the same unto this day by the Lawes of Henry the third and Edward the first The French Kings in former times imposed no Taxes but in the Assemblies and with the consent of the three Estates from thence sprung the Law of Philip of Valoys that the people should not have any Tribute layd on them but in urgent necessity and with the consent of the Estates Yea and anciently after these monies were collected they were locked in coffers through every Diocesse and recommended to the speciall care of selected men who are the same which at this day are called Esleus to the end that they should pay the souldiers enroled within the Towns of their Diocesses the which was in use in other Countries as namely in Flanders and other neighbouring Provinces At this day though many corruptions be crept in yet without the consent and confirmation of the Parliament no exactions may be collected notwithstanding there be some Provinces which are not bound to any thing without the approbation of the Estates of the Countrey as Languedoke Brittannie Province Daulphinie and some others All the Provinces of the Low Countries have the same priviledges finally lest the Exchequer devour all like the spleen which exhales the spirits from the other members of the body In all places they have confined the Exchequer within its proper bounds and limits Seeing then it is most certaine that what hath been ordinarily and extraordinarily assigned to Kings to wit Tributes Taxes and all the demeanes which comprehe●d all customes both for importations and exportations forfeitures amercements royall escheates confiscations and other dews of the same nature were configned into their hands for the maintainance and defence of the people and the State of the Kingdom insomuch as if these sinewes be cut the people must n●eds fall to decay and in demolishing these foundations the Kingdome will come to utter ruine It necessarily follows that he which layes impositions on the people onely to o●presse them and by the publick detriment seeks private profit and with their own swords kills his subject he truely is unworthy the name of a King Whereas concrarily a true King as he is a carefull mannager of the publick affairs so is he a ready protector of the Common wellfare and not a Lord in propriety of the Common-wealth having as little authority to alienate or dissipate the demeans or publick Revenue as the Kingdom it self And if he mis-govern the State seeing it imports the Common-wealth that every one make use of his own talent it is much more requisite for the publick good that he which hath the mannaging of it carrie himself as he ought And therefore if a prodigall Lord by the authority of justice be committed to the tuition of his kinsmen and friends and compelled to suffer his revenues and means to be ordered and disposed of by others by much more reason may those which have interest in the affairs of State whose duty obligeth them thereto take all the Administration and government of the State out of the hands of him which either negligently executes his place ruines the Common-wealth if after admonition he indeavours not to performe his duty And for so much as it is easily to be proved that in all lawfull Dominions the King cannot be held Lord in propriety of the demeane without searching into those elder times whereof we have an apt representation in the Gen. 23. person of Ephron King of the Hittites who durst not sell the Field to Abraham without the consent of the people This right is at this day practised in publick States the Emp of Germany before his Sleyd l. 1. bulla aurea Coronation doth solemly swear that he will neither alienate dismember nor ingage any of the rights or members of the Empire And if he

of the State neither can those be justly excused whose base feare hindred the happie successe of Pompey and his partakers noble designer Augustus himselfe is said to have reproved one who rayled on Cato affirming that he carried himselfe worthily and exceedingly affected to the greatnesse of his Countrey in couragiously opposing the alteration which his contraries sought to introduce in the Government of the State seeing all innovations of that nature are ever Authors of much trouble and confusion Furthermore no man can justly reprehend Brutus Cassius and the rest who killed Caesar before his tyrannicall authoritie had taken any firme rooting And so were there Statues of brasse erected in honour of them by publick decree at Athens and placed by those of Harmodius and Aristogiton then when after the dispatching of Caesar they retired from Rome to avoyde Mar Antonie and Augustus their revenge But Cinna was certainly guiltie of sedition who after a legall transferring of the peoples power into the hands of Augustus is said to conspire against him Likewise when the Pepins sought to take the Crowne of France from the Merovingians as also when those of the line of Capet endeavoured to supplant the Pepins any might lawfully resist them without incurring the crime of sedition but when by publick counsell and the authoritie of the Estates the kingdome was transferred from one familie to another it was then unlawfull to oppose it The same may be said if a Woman possesse her selfe of the Kingdome which the Salick Law absolutely prohibites or if one seeke to make a Kingdome meerly elective hereditary to his off-spring while those Lawes stand in force and are unr●pealed by the authoritie of the generall Estates which represent the body of the people Neither is it necessary in this respect to have regard whether faction is the greater more powerfull or more illustrious Alwayes those are the greater number who are led by passion than those that are ruled by reason and therefore tyranny hath more servants than the Common-wealth But Rome is there according to the saying of Pompey where the Senate is and the Senate is where there is obedience to the Lawes love of libertie and studious carefulnesse for the Countries preservation And therefore though Brennus may seeme to be master of Rome yet notwithstanding is Rome at veies with Camillus who prepares to deliver Rome from bondage It behoves therefore all true Romans to repaire to Camillus and assist his Enterprise with the utmost of their power and endeavours Although Themistocles and all his Plutarch in vita Themist able and worthiest companions leave Athens and put to Sea with a navie of two hundred Gallies notwithstanding it cannot be said that any of these men are banished Athens But rather as Themist●cles answered These two hundred Gallies are more usefull for us than the greatest Citie of all Greece for that they are armed and prepared for the defence of those which endeavour to maintaine and uphold the publick State But to come to other examples it follows not that the Church of God must needs be alwayes in that place where the Arke of the Covenant is for the Philistines may carry the Arke into the Temples of their Idols It is no good argument that because wee see the Roman Eagles waving in Ensignes and heare their Legions named that therefore presently wee conclude that the Armie of the Romane Common-wealth is there present for there is onely and properly the power of the State where they are assembled to maintaine the libertie of the Countrey against the ravenous oppression of Tyrants to infranchise the people from servitude and to suppresse the impudency of insulting flatterers who abuse the Princes weaknesse by oppressing his Subjects for the advantaging of their own fortunes and containe ambitious minds from enlarging their desires beyond the limits of equitie and moderation Thus much concerning Tyrants without title What may lawfully be done against Tyrants by practise But for Tyrants by practise whether they at first gained their authoritie by the sword or were legally invested therewith by a generall consent It behooves us to examine this point with much wary circumspection In the first place we must rememher that all Princes are born men and therefore reason and passion are as hardly to be separated in them as the soule is from the body whilest the man liveth We must not then expect Princes absolute in perfection but rath●r repute our selves happy if those that govern us be indifferently good And therefore although the prince observe not exact mediocrity in State-affaires if sometimes passion over-rule his reason if some carelesse omission make him neglect the publick utility or if he doe not alwayes carefully execute justice with equality or repulse not with ready valour an invading enemy he must not therefore be presently declared a tyrant And certainly seeing he rules not as a God over men nor as men over beasts but is a man composed of the same matter and of the same nature with the rest as we would questionlesse judge that prince unreasonably insolent that should insult over and abuse his subjects as if they were bruit beasts so those people are doubtlesse as much void of reason which imagine a prince should be compleat in perfection or expect divine abilities in a nature so frail and subject to imperfection Put if a prince purposely ruine the Common-weale if he presumptuously pervert and resist legall proceedings or lawfull rights if he make no reckoning of faith covenants justice nor piety if he prosecute his subjects as enemies briefly if he expresse all or the chiefest of those wicked pr●ctsces we have so merly spoken of then we may certainly declare him a tyrant which is as much as an enemy both to God and men We doe not therefore speak of a prince lesse good but of one absolute bad not of one lesse wise but of one malicious and treacherous not of one lesse able judiciously to discusse legall differences but as one perversly bent to pervert justice and equity not of an unwarlick but of one furiously disposed to ruine the people and ransack the State For the wisdome of a S●nate the integrity of a Judge the valour of a Captain may peradventure inable a weak prince to govern well But a tyrans could be content that all the Nobility the Councellors of State and Commanders for the warres had but one head that he might rake it off at one blow those being the proper objects of his distrust and feare and by consequence the principall subjects on whom he desires to execute his malice and cruelty A foolish prince although to speak according to right and equity he ought to be deposed yet may he perhaps in some sort be born withall But a tyrant the more he is tollerated the more he becomes intollerable Furthermore as the Princes pleasure is not alwayes law so many times it is not expedient that the people doe all that which may lawfully be done

people in the generall Assembly of the States he grew insolent and relying on the counsell of his Minions arrogantly threatens to lay beavier burthens on them hereafter No man can doubt but that according to the tenour of the contract first passed betweene the King and the people the prime and principall Officers of the Kingdome had authority to represse such insolence They were only blameable in this that they did that by faction and division which should more properly have beene done in the generall Assembly of the States in like manner in that they transferred the Scepter from Juda which was by God onely confin'd to that Tribe into another linage and also as it chances in other affaires for that they did ill and disorderly manage a just and lawfull cause Prophane histories are full of such examples in other Kingdomes Brutus Generall of the Souldiers and Lueretius Governour of the Citie of Rome assemble the people against Tarquinius Superbus Titus Livi. lib. 1. and by their authority thrust him from the royall Throne Nay which is more his goods are confiscated whereby it appeares that if Tarquinius had beene apprehended undoubtedly hee should have beene according to the publique lawes corporally punished The true causes why Tarquinius was deposed were because he altered the custome whereby the King was obliged to advise with the Sena●e on all weighty affaires that he made Warre and Peace according to his owne fancie that he treated confederacles without demanding counsell or consent from the people or Senate that he violated the Lawes whereof he was made Guardian briefly that he made no reckoning to observe the contracts agreed between the former Kings and the Nobility and people of Rome For the Roman Emperours I am sure you remember the sentence pronounced by the Senate against Nero wherein he was judged enemie to the Common-wealth and his body condemned to be ignominiously cast on the dung-hill and that other pronounced against Vitellius which adjudge him to be shamefully dis-membred and in that miserable estate trayled through the Citie and at last put to death another against Maximinius who was dispoild of the Empire and Maximus and Albinus established in his place by the Senace There might also be added many others drawne from unquestionable Historians The Emperour Trajan held not himselfe exempt from lawes neither desired he to be spared if he became a Tyrant for in delivering the Sword unto the great Provost of the Empire he sayes unto him If I command as I should use this sword for mee but if I doe otherwayes unsheath it against me In like manner the French by the authority of the States and solicited thereunto by the Officers of the Kingdome deposed Childerick the first Sigisbert Theodoricke and Childericke the third for their tyrannies and chose others of another Family to sit on the Royall Throne Yea they deposed some because of their idlenesse and want of judgment who exposed the State in prey to Panders Curtesans Flatterers and such other unworthy mushromes of the Court who governed all things at their pleasure taking from such rash Phaetous the bridle of government left the whole body of the State and people should be consumed through their unadvised folly Amongst others Theodoret was degraded because of Ebroinus Dagobert for Plectude and Thiband his Pander with some others the Estates esteeming the command of an effeminate Prince as insupportable as that of a woman and as unwillingly supporting the yoke of tyrannous Ministers managing affaires in the name of a loose and unworthy Prince as the burden of a tyrant alone To be briefe no more suffering themselves to be governed by one possessed by a Devill than they would by the Devill himselfe It is not very long since the Estates compeld Lewis the eleventh a Prince as subtile and it may be as wilfull as any to receive thirtie six Overseers by whose advise he was bound to governe the affaires of State The descendants from Charlemaine substituted in the place of the Merovingiens for the government of the kingdome or those of Capet supplanting the Charlemains by order of the Estates and raigning at this day have no other nor better right to the Crowne than what wee have formerly described and it hath ever been according to Law permitted the whole body of the people represented by the counsell of the Kingdome which are commonly called the Assembly of the States to depose and establish Princes according to the necessities of the Common-wealth According to the same rule wee reade that Adolph was removed from the Empire of Germany Anno 1296. because for covetousnesse without Anno 1296. any just occasion he invaded the Kingdome of France in favour of the English and Wenceslaus was also deposed in the yeare of our Lord 1400. Yet were not these Princes exceeding bad ones 1400. but of the number of those which are accounted lesse ill Elizabeth the wife of Edward the second King of England assembled the Parliament Froisard li. 1. cap. 1. against her husband who was there deposed both because he tyrannized in generall over his Subjects as also for that he cut Reade the manner of the deposing of Richard the second off the heads of many noble men without any just or legall proceeding It is not long since Christierne lost the Crowne of Denmarke Henry that of Sweden Mary Steward that of Scotland for the same or neere resembling occasions and the most worthy Histories relate divers alterations and changes which have hapned in like manner in the Kingdomes of Polonia Hungarie Spaine Portugall Bohemia and others But what shall we say of the Pope himselfe It is generally held Ant de But. confil quod positum est inter consil Paul de Castro vel antiq nu 412. incip viso puncto that the Cardinalls because they doe elect him or if they fayle in their dutie the Patriarkas which are next in ranke to them may upon certaine occasions maugre the Pope call a Councell yea and in it judge him As when by some notorious offence he scandalizeth the universall Church if he be incorrigible if reformation be as necessary in the head as the members if contrary to his oath he refuse to call a generall Councell And we reade for certaine that Mar. Laud●ns in tract de Card. 1. l. 2. q. 35. Ph●lip Deci●s in quodan co ●i●o cujus verbs suerunt Andr. B●●h in d. con●● 1. lib. 1. 〈◊〉 6. 〈…〉 de major obed divers Popes have been deposed by generall Councells But if they obstinately abuse their authoritie there must saith Baldus first be used verball admonitions secondly herball medicament● or remedies thirdly stones or compulsion for where vertue and faire meanes have not power to perswade there force and terror must be put in ure to compell Now if according to the opinions of most of the learned by decrees of Councels and by custome in like occasions it plainly appeares that the Councell may depose the P●pe

for an ornament and desence of the publick State They have also the example of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ who though he were King of Kings notwithstanding because he conversed in this world in another quality to wit o a private and particular man paid willingly tribute If the Magistrates themselves manifestly favour the tyranny or at the least doe not formally oppose it let private men remember the saying of Job That for the sinnes of the people God permits bypocrites Iob. 34. to reigne whom it is impossible either to convert or subvert if men repent not of their wayes to walk in obedience to Gods commandments so that there is no other weapons to be used but bended knees and humble hearts Briefly let them bear with bad princes and pray for better perswading themselves that an outragious tyranny is to be supported as patiently as some exceeding dammage done by the violence of tempests or some excessive over-flowing waters or some such naturall accidents unto the fruits of the earth if they like not better to change their habitations by retiring themselves into some other countries So David fled into the mountaines and attempted nothing against the Tyrant Saul because the people had not declared him any publick Magistrate of the Kingdome Jesus Christ whose kingdome was not of this world fled into Egypt and so freed himselfe from the pawes of the Tyrant Saint Paul teaching of the duty of particular Christian men and not Rom. 13. of Magistrates teacheth that Nero must be obeyed But if all the principall Officers of State or divers of them or but one endeavour to suppresse a manifest tyranny or if a Magistrate seek to free that province or portion of the kingdome from oppression which is committed to his care and custody provided under colour of freedome he bring not in a new tyranny then must all men with joynt courage and alacrity run to Armes and take part with him or them and assist with body and goods as if God himselfe from heaven had proclaimed warres and meant to joyn battell against tyrants and by all wayes and means endevour to deliver their Coun●rey and Common-wealth from their tyrannous oppression For as God doth oftentimes chastise a people by the cruelty of tyrants so also doth he many times punish tyrants by the hands of the people It being a most true saying Ecclus 10. verified in all ages For the iniquities violences and wickednesses of Princes Kingdomes are translated from one Nation to another but tyranny was never of any durable continuance The Centurians and men at armes did freely and couragiously execute the commandments of the High Priest Jehoiada in suppressing the tyranny of Athalia In like manner all the faithfull and generous Israelites tooke part and joyned with the Machabites as well to re-establish the true service of God as also to free and deliver the State from the wicked and unjust oppression of Antiochus and God blessed with happy successe their just and commendable enterprize What then cannot God when he pleaseth stirre up particular and private persons to ruine a mighty and powerfull tyranny Hee that gives power and ability to some even out of the dust without any title or colourable pretext of lawfull authority to rise to the height of rule and dominion and in it tyrannize and afflict the people for their transgressions cannot he also even from the meanest multitude raise a liberator Hee which enthral'd and subjected the people of Israel to Jabin and to Eglon did hee not deliver enfranchise them by the hand of Ebud Barac and Debora whilst the Magistrates Officers were dead in a dul negligent extasie of security What then shall hinder you may say the same God who in these dayes sends us Tyrants to correct us that he may not also extraordinarily send correctors of tyrants to deliver us What if Adab cut off good men if Jezabel subborn false witnesses against Naboth may not a Jehu be rais'd to exterminate the whole line of Arab to revenge the death of Naboth and to cast the body of Jezabel to be torne and devoured of dogs Certainly as I have formerly answered the Almighty is ever mindfull of his justice and maintains it as inviolably as his mercy But for as much as in these latter times those miraculous testimonies by which God was wont to confirme the extraordinary vocation of those famous Worthies are now wanting for the most part let the people be advis'd that in seeking to crosse the Sea dry foote they take not some Impostor for their guide that may lead them head-long to destruction as we may read happened to the Jewes and that in seeking freedome from tyranny he that was the principall instrument to dis-inthrall them became not himselfe a more insupportable Tyrant than the former briefly lest endeavouring to advantage the Common-wealth they introduce not a common misery upon all the undertakers participating therein with divers States of Italy who seeking to suppresse the present evill added an accession of greater and more intollerable servitude Finally that we may come to some period of this third question Princes are chosen by God and establisht by the people As all particulars considered one by one are inferiour to the Prince so the whole body of the people and Officers of State which represent that body are the Princes superiours In the receiving and inauguration of a Prince there are Covenants and contracts passed between him and the people which are tacite and expressed naturall or civill to wit to obey him faithfully whilst he commands justly that he serving the Common-wealth all men shal serve him that whilst he governs according to law all shall be submitted to his government c. The Officers of the Kingdome are the Guardians and Protectors of these Covenants and contracts He that maliciously or wilfully violates these conditions is questionlesse a Tyrant by practice And therefore the Officers of State may judge him according to the lawes and if he support his tyranny by strong hands their duty bindes them when by no other meanes it can be effected by force of armes to suppresse him Of these Officers there be two kindes those which have generally undertaken the protection of the Kingdome as the Constable Marshalls Peers Palatines and the rest every one of which although all the rest doe either connive or consort with the tyranny are bound to oppose and represse the Tyrant and those which have undertaken the government of any Province Citie or part of the Kingdome as Dukes Marquesses Earles Consuls Mayors Sheriffes c. they may according to right expell and drive tyranny and Tyrants from their Cities Confines and governments But particular and private persons may not unsheath the sword against Tyrants by practise because they were not establisht by particulars but by the whole body of the people But for Tyrants which without title intrude themselves for so much as there is no contract or agreement

purloining a cloake as well him when he seekes to batter downe the walls of a Citie as a robber that offers to break into a private house There is besides this the civill law or municipial laws of severall Countreyes which governs the societies of men by certaine rules some in one manner some in another some submit themselves to the government of one man some to more others are ruled by a whole Communalty some absolutely exclude women from the Royall Throne others admit them these here chuse their King descended of such a family those there make election of whom they please besides other customes practised amongst severall Nations If therefore any offer either by fraud or force to violate this law wee are all bound to resist him because he wrongs that society to which wee owe all that we have and would runne our Countrey to the preservation whereof all men by nature by law and by solemne oath are strictly obliged insomuch that feare or negligence or bad purposes make us omit this dutie wee may justly be accounted breakers of the Lawes betrayers of our Countrey and contemners of Religion Now as the Law of Nature of Nations and the civill commands us to take Armes against such Tyrants so is there not any manner of reason that should perswade us to the contrary neither is there any oath covenant or obligation publike or private of power justly to restraine us therefore the meanest private man may resist and lawfully L. ult D. ad leg Jul. Majestatis oppose such an intruding tyrant The Law Julia which condemnes to death those that raise rebellion against their Countrey or Prince hath here no place for he is no Prince which without any lawfull title invadeth the Common-wealth or Confines of an other nor he a rebell which by armes defends his Countrey but rather to this had relation the Oath which all the youth of Athens were accustomed to take in the Temple of Aglaura I will fight for Religion for the Lawes for the Altars and for our possessions either alone or with others and will doe the utmost of my endeavour to leave to posteritie our Countrey at the least in as good estate as I found it To as little purpose can the Bartol in trac de Guelph Gibellin Lawes made against seditious persons be alledged here for he is seditious which undertakes to defend the people in opposition of order and publick Discipline But he is no raiser but a suppressor of sedition which restraineth within the limits of reason the subvertor of his Countries welfare and publicke Discipline On the contrary to this hath proper relation the Law of Tyranacides Plin. lib. 4. Alexand. ab Alex. lib. 6. cap. 4. which honours the living with great and memorable recompences and the dead with worthy Epitaphes and glorious Statues that have been their Countries Liberators from Tyrants as Harmodius and Aristogiton at Athens Brutus and Cassius in Greece and Aratus of Sycione To these by a publike Decree were Ziphilm in vita August erected Statues because they delivered their Countries from the tyrannies of Pisistratus of Caesar and of Nicocles The which was Plutarch in Arato of such respect amongst the Ancients that Zerxes having made himselfe Master of the Citie of Athens caused to be transported into Persia the Statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton afterwards Valer. Maxim lib. 2 c. ultim Selcucus caused them to be returned into their former place and as in their passage they came by Roades those famous Citizens entertained them with publick and stupendious solemnities and during their abode there they placed them in the choicest sacresties of their gods But the Law made against forsakers and traytors takes absolutely hold on those which are negligent and carelesse to deliver their Countrey oppressed with tyrannie and condemnes them to the same punishment as those cowardly Souldiers which when they should fight either counterfeit sicknesse or cast off their Armes and run away Every one therefore both in generall and particular ought to yeeld their best assistance unto this as in a publicke fire to bring both hookes and buckets and L. 3. l. Omne delictum §. ult D. de remilit water wee must not ceremoniously expect that the Captaine of the Watch be first called nor till the Governour of the Towne be come into the streets but let every man draw water and climb to the house-top it is necessary for all men that the fire be quenched For if whilest the Gaules with much silence and vigilancie seeke to scale and surprise the Capitoll the Souldiers be drowsie with their former paines the Watch buried in sleepe the dogges fayle to barke then must the geese play the Sentinells and with their gagling noyse give an alarum And the Souldiers and Watch shall be degraded yea and put to death the geese for perpetuall remembrance of this deliverance shall be alwayes sed in the Capitoll and much esteemed This of which wee have spoken is to be understood of a tyranny not yet firmely rooted to wit whilst a tyrant conspires machinates and layes his plots and practises But if he be once so possessed of the State and that the people being subdued promise and sweare obedience the Common-wealth being oppressed resigne their authoritie into his hands and that the Kingdome in some formall manner consent to the changing of their Lawes for so much certainly as then he hath gained a title which before he wanted and seemes to be as well a legall as actuall possessor thereof although this yoke were laid on the peoples necke by compulsion yet must they quietly and peaceably rest in the will of the Almightie who at his pleasure transferres Kingdomes from one Nation to another Otherways there should be no Kingdome whose juridiction might not be disputed and it may well chance that he which before was a tyrant without title having obtained the title of a King may free himselfe from any tyrannous imputation by governing those under him with equitie and moderation Therefore then as the people of Jurie under the authoritie 2 Kings 24. and 25. Ierem. 37. of King Ezechias did lawfully resist the invasion of Senacherib the Assyrian So on the contrary was Zadechias and all his subjects worthily punished because that without any just occasion after they had done homage and sworne fealtie to Nebuchadnezzar they rise in rebellion against him For after promise of performance it is too late to repent and as in battles every one ought to give testimony of his valour but being taken prisoner must faithfully observe Covenants so it is requisite that the people maintaine their rights by all possible meanes but if it chance that they be brought into the subjection of anothers will they must then patiently support the dominion of the Victor So did Pompey Cato and Cicero and others performe the parts of good Patriots then when they tooke armes against Caesar seeking to alter the government