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A06718 Nicholas Machiavel's Prince· Also, the life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca. And the meanes Duke Valentine us'd to put to death Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto of Fermo, Paul, and the Duke of Gravina. Translated out of Italian into English; by E.D. With some animadversions noting and taxing his errours.; Selections. English Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527.; Dacres, Edward. 1640 (1640) STC 17168; ESTC S111853 98,313 328

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aware how they invade that State insomuch that making his abode there he can very hardly lose it Another remedy which is also a better is to send Colonies into one or two places which may be as it were the keyes of that State for it is necessary either to doe this or to maintaine there many horse and foot In these colonies the Prince makes no great expence and either without his charge or at a very small rate he may both send and maintaine them gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that State and those that he offends remaining dispersed and poore can never hurt him and all the rest on one part have no offence given them and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet on the other side they are wary not to erre for feare it befals not them as it did those that were dispoyld I conclude then ●●at those colonies that are not ●●argeable are the more trusty ●●ve the lesse offence and they that ●re offended being but poor and ●●attered can do but little harme 〈◊〉 I have said for it is to be no●●d that men must either be dalli●● and flatterd withall or else be ●ite crusht for they revenge ●●emselves of small dammages ●t of great ones they are not ●de so that when wrong is done 〈◊〉 any man it ought so to be ●one that it need feare no returne 〈◊〉 revenge againe But in lieu of ●●lonies by maintaining souldi●●s there the expence is great for ●e whole revenues of that State ●e to be spent in the keeping of 〈◊〉 so the conquest proves but a ●sse to him that hath got it and ●dāmmages him rather for it ●urts that whole State to remove ●e army from place to place of ●hich annoyance every one hath 〈◊〉 feeling and so becomes enemie 〈◊〉 thee as they are enemies I wis who are outraged by thee in their own houses whensoever they are able to do thee mischief Every way then is this guard unprofitable a● that of the colonies is profitable Besides he that is in a different Province as it is said should make himself Head and defender of his lesse powerfull neighbours and devise all wayes to weaken those that are more mighty therein and take care that upon no chance there enter not any forreiner as mighty as himselfe for it will alwayes come to passe that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented either upon ambition or feare as th● Etolians brought the Romans int● Greece and they were brough● into every countrey they came by the Natives and the course o● that matter is that so soone as a powerfull Stranger enters a countrey all those that are the lesse powerfull there cleave to him provoked by an envie they bear● him that is more mighty tha● they so that for these of the weaker sort he may easily gaine them without any paines for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that hee hath gotten Hee hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths nor their authorities and so he shall easily be able by his own forces and their assistances to take down those that are mighty and remain himselfe absolute arbitre of that countrey And he that playe● not well this part shall quickly lose what hee hath gotten and while hee holds it shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations The Romans in the Provinces they seiz'd on observed well these points sent colonies thither entertained the weaker sort without augmenting any thing their power abated the forces of those that were mighty and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gaine too much reputation there And I will content my self only with the countrey of Greece for example hereof The Achayans and Etolians were entertained by them the Macedons kingdome was brought low Antiochus was driven thence nor ever did the Achayans or Etolians deserts prevaile so farre for them that they would ever promise to enlarge their State nor the perswasions of Philip induce them ever to bee his friends without bringing him lower nor yet could Antiochus his power make them ever consent that hee should hold any state in that country for the Romans did in these cases that which all judicious Princes ought to doe who are not only to have regard unto all present mischiefes but also to the future and to provide for those with all industry for by taking order for those when they are afarre off it is easie to prevent them but by delaying till they come neare hand to thee the remedy comes too late for this malignity is grown incurable and it befals this as the physicians say of the Hectique feaver that in the beginning it is easily cur'd but hard●y known but in the course of ●ime not having been known in ●he beginning nor cured it be●omes easie to know but hard to ●ure Even so falls it out in mat●ers of State for by knowing it a●●ofe off which is given only to 〈◊〉 wise man to doe the mischiefs ●●at then spring up are quickly ●elped but when for not having ●een perceived they are sufferd 〈◊〉 increase so that every one sees ●hem there is then no cure for ●hem therefore the Romans see●●g these inconvenients afarre off ●lwayes prevented them and ●ever sufferd them to follow ●or to escape a warre because they knew that a warre is not undertaken but deferrd for a●others advantage therfore would they rather make warre with Philip and Antiochus in Greece to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in Italy though for that time they were able to avoyd both the one and the other which they thought not good to doe nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouths of the Sages of our dayes to enjoy the benefits of the present time but that rather to take the benefit of their valour and wisdome for time drives forward every thing and may bring with it as well good as evill and evill as good But let us return to France and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them and we will speak of Lewis and not of Charles as of whom by reason of the long possession he held in Italy wee better knew the wayes hee went and you shall see hee did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and conditions King Lewis was brought into Italy by the Venetians ambition who would have gotten for their shares half the State of Lombardy I will not blame his comming or the course hee took because hee had a mind to begin to set a foot in Italy but having not any friends in the country all gates being barrd against him by reason of King Charles his carriage there he was constraind to joyne friendship with those hee could and this consideration
Francis Sforce or a● as members adjoyned to the hereditary State of the Prince tha● gaines it as the kingdome of Naples is to the King of Spain Thes● Dominions so gotten are accustomed either to live under ● Prince or to enjoy their liberty and are made conquest of eithe● with others forces or ones owne either by fortune or by valour CHAP. II. Of Hereditary Principalities I Will not here discourse of Republiques because I have other● where treated of them at large I will apply my selfe only to a Principality and proceed whil● I weave this web by arguing thereupon how these Principalities can be governed and maintained I say then that in State of inheritance and accustomed to the bloud of their Princes there ●re far fewer difficulties to keep ●●em than in the new for it suf●●ces only not to transgresse the ●ourse his Ancestors took and so ●fterwards to temporize with ●hose accidents that can happen ●hat if such a Prince be but of or●inary industry he shall alwayes ●e able to maintain himselfe in ●is State unlesse by some extraordinary or excessive power he be ●eprived thereof and when he hath lost it upon the least sinister chance that befals the usurper he ●●covers it again We have in Ita●● the Duke of Ferrara for example thereof who was of ability to resist the Venetians in the yeer 84 ●nd to withstand Pope Julius in ●he tenth for no other reason than because he had of old continued in that rule for the natu●●ll Prince hath fewer occasions and lesse heed to give offence whereupon of necessity he must ●e more beloved and unlesse it ●e that some extravagant vices of his bring him into hatred it● agreeable to reason that natura●ly he should be well beloved b● his own subjects and in the ant●quity and continuation of th● Dominion the remembranc● and occasions of innovations a● quite extinguished for evermo● one change leaves a kinde o● breach or dent to fasten the building of another CHAP. III. Of mixt Principalities BUt the difficulties consist i● the new Principality an● first if it be not all new but as member so that it may be term● altogether as mixt and the v●riations thereof proceed in th● first place from a naturall diff●culty which we commonly find● in all new Principalities for me● do willingly change their Lor● beleeving to better their condit●on and this beliefe causes the● to take armes against him th●● rules over them whereby they de●●ive themselves because they ●●nde after by experience they ●ave made it worse which de●ends upon another naturall and ●rdinary necessity forcing him ●wayes to offend those whose ●rince he newly becomes as well ●y his souldiers he is put to enter●●in upon them as by many other ●●juries which a new conquest ●aws along with it in such man●er as thou findest all those thine ●●emies whom thou hast endam●aged in the seizing of that Prin●●pality and afterwards canst ●ot keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it for not being able to satisfie them accord●●g to their expectations nor put 〈◊〉 practise strong remedies against ●●em being obliged to them For ●●wever one bee very well pro●●ded with strong armies yet hath 〈◊〉 alwayes need of the favour of ●e inhabitants in the countrey 〈◊〉 enter thereinto For these rea●●ns Lewis the twelth King of France suddenly tooke Milan and as soone lost it and the firs● time Lodwick his owne forces served well enough to wrest it out o● his hands for those people tha● had opened him the gates finding themselves deceived of thei● opinion and of that future goo● which they had promised themselves could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them True it is that countreyes tha● have rebelled again the secon● time being recovered are hard● lost for their Lord taking occasion from their rebellion is less● respective of persons but car● only to secure himselfe by punishing delinquents to clear all suspicions and to provide for himself● where he thinks he is weakest s● that if to make France lose Milan the first time it was enoug● for Duke Lodwick to make som● small stir only upon the confines yet afterwards before they coul● make him lose it the second tim● they had neede of the who●● world together against him and ●●at al his armies should be wasted ●nd driven out of Italy which ●roceeded from the forenamed ●auses however though both ●he first and second time it was ●aken from him The generall ●auses of the first we have treated ●f it remaines now that we see ●hose of the second and set down ●he remedies that he had or any ●ne else can have that should ●hance to be in those tearmes he was whereby he might be able ●o maintaine himselfe better in his conquest than the King of France did I say therefore that these States which by conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their Conquerour are either of the ●●me Province and the same language or otherwise and when ●hey are it is very easie to hold ●hem especially when they are ●ot used to live free and to enjoy ●hem securely it is enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them For in other matters allowing them their ancient conditions and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them men ordinarily live quiet enough as we have seene that Burgundy did Britany Gascony and Normandy which so long time continued with France for however there be some difference of language betweene them yet can they easily comport one with another and whosoever makes the conquest of them meaning to hold them must have two regards the first that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguished the other that he change nothing neither in their lawes nor taxes so that in a very short t●me they become one entire body with their ancient Principality But when any States are gaind in a Province disagreeing in language manners and orders here are the difficulties and here is there need of good fortune and great industry to maintain them and it would be one of the best ●nd liveliest remedies for the Conquerour to goe in person and dwell there this would make the possession hereof more secure and durable as the Turke hath done in Greece who among al the other courses taken by him for to hold that State had he not gone thither himselfe in person to dwell it had never beene possible for him to have kept it for abi●ing there he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings and ●orthwith can remedy them whereas being not there present ●hey are heard of when they are growne to some height and then ●s there no help for them Moreover the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thi●her the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince neere at hand whereupon have they more reason to love him if they meane to be good ●nd intending to doe otherwise ●o feare him and forrein Princes will be well
who writes of him sayes he wanted nothing of reigning but a Kingdome This man extinguish'd all the old souldiery ordein'd the new left the old allyances entertain'd new and as he had friendship and souldiers that were his own upon that ground he was able to build any edifice so that hee indur'd much trouble in gaining and sufferd but little in maintaining CHAP. VII Of new Principalities gotten by fortune and other mens for●es THey who by fortune only become Princes of private men with small paines attain to it but have much adoe to maintain themselves in it and find no difficulty at all in the way because they are carried thither with wings but all the difficulties arise there after they are plac'd in them And of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money by the favour of some one that grants it them as it befell many ●n Greece in the cities of Jonia and Hellespont where divers Princes were made by Darius as well for his own safety as his glory as also them that were made Emperours who from private men by corrupting the souldiers attaind to the Empire These subsist meery upon the will and fortune of those that have advanc'd them which are two volu●ble and unsteady things and the● neither know how nor are abl● to continue in that dignity the● know not how because unlesse i● be a man of great understanding and vertue it is not probable that hee who hath alwayes liv'd i● private life can know how t● command neyther are they able because they have not any force that can be freindly or faythful● to them Moreover those State that suddenly fall into a ma● hands as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly cannot well have taken roote nor have made their correspondencyes so firme but that the fir●● storme that takes them ruine them in case these who as it i● sayd are thus on a suddain clamberd up to be Princes are not o● that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare themselves t● maintain that which Chan●● hath cast into their bosomes an● can afterwards lay those foundations which others have cast before they were Princes For the one and the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a Prince by Vertue or by Fortune I will alleage you two examples which have been in the days of our memory These were Francis Sforza and Caesar Borgia Francis by ●ust meanes and with a great deal of vertue of a private man got to be Duke of Millan and that which with much payns he had gaind he kept with small adoe On the other side Caesar Borgia commonly termd Duke Valentine gott his state by his Fathers fortune and with the same lost it however that for his owne part no paynes was spard nor any thing omitted which by a discreet and valorous man ought to have been done to fasten his roots in those Estates which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him for as it was formerly sayd he that lays not the foundations first yet might be able by means of his extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards however it be with the great trouble of the architect and danger of the aedifice If therfore we consider all the Dukes progresses we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power which I judge a matter not superfluous to runne over because I should not well know what better rules I might give to a new Prince than the patterne of his actions and however the courses he took availd him not yet was it not his fault but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extreame malignity of fortune Pope Alexander the sixt desiring to make the Duke his sonne a great man had a great many difficulties present and future First hee saw no way there was whereby hee might be able to make him Lord of any State that was not the Churches and if hee turnd to take that from the Church hee knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would never agree to it for Faenza and Riminum were under the Venetians protection Moreover hee saw that the armes of Italy and those whereof in particular hee might have been able to make some use were in their hands who ought to feare the Popes greatnesse and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them being all in the Orsi●s and Colonnies hands and those of their faction It was necessary then that those matters thus appointed by them should bee disturb'd and the States of Italy disorder'd to bee able safely to master part of them which he then found easie to doe seeing the Venetians upon three considerations had us'd the meanes to bring the French men back again into Italy which hee not only did not withstand but further'd with a resolution of King Lewis his ancient marriage The King then past into Italy with the Venetians ayd and Alexanders consent nor was hee sooner arriv'd in Milan than the Pope had souldiers from him for the service of Romania which was quickly yeelded up to him upon the reputation of the Kings forces The Duke then having made himselfe master of Romania and beaten the Colonnies desiring to hold it and proceed forward two things hinder'd him the one his owne souldiers which hee thought were not true to him the other the French mens good wills that is to say hee fear'd that the Princes souldiers whereof hee had serv'd himselfe would faile him and not only hinder his conquest but take from him what hee had gotten and that the King also would serve him the same turne Hee had experience of the Orsini upon an occasion when after the taking of Faenza hee assaulted Bolonia to which assault he saw them goe very cold And touching the King he discoverd his mind when having taken the Dutchy of Vrbin he ●vaded Tuscany from which ●ction the King made him retire whereupon the Duke resolv'd to ●epend no more upon fortune ●nd other mens armes And the ●irst thing hee did was to wea●en the Orsini and Colonnies ●actions in Rome for hee gain'd ●ll their adherents that were gen●lemen giving then large allow●nces and honouring them ac●ording to their qualities with ●harges and governments so ●hat in a few months the good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguisht and wholly ●ent to the Duke After this ●ee waited an occasion to root ●ut the Orsini having before dispersd those of the family of Co●onna which fell out well to his ●and and he us'd it better For ●he Orsini being too late aware ●hat the Dukes and the Churches greatnesse was their destruction held a Counsell together ●n a dwelling house of theirs in the country adjoyniog to Per●sia From thence grew the r●bellion of Vrbin and the troubl● of Romania and many other dangers befell the Duke which 〈◊〉 overcame all with the help of th● French and having regaind h● reputation trusting neither Franc● nor any forreine forces to th● end hee might
Prince ru●●●g over them with more autho●●●● for in all his country there ●one acknowledg'd for superi●● but himselfe and if they ●d obedience to any one else 〈◊〉 but as to his minister and of●er nor beare they him any par●●●ular good will The examples ●hese two different Goverments ●w in our dayes are the Turk 〈◊〉 the King of France The Turks ●ole Monarchy is govern'd by 〈◊〉 Lord and the rest are all his ●●ssalls and deviding his whole ●●ngdom into divers Sangiacques 〈◊〉 Governments he sends severall ●ther and those hee chops and ●nges as hee pleases But the ●ng of France is seated in the ●●dst of a multitude of Lords ●o of old have been acknow●●●g'd for such by their subjects ●d being belov'd by them injoy ●●eir preheminencies nor can the ●●ng take their States from them without danger Hee then that considers the one and the other of these two States shall find difficulty in the conquest of the Turks State but when once it is subdu'd great facility to hold it The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the Turks Kingdom from him are because the Invader cannot be call'd in by the Princes of that Kingdom nor hope by the rebellion of those which hee hath about him to bee able to facilitate his enterprize which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid for they being all his slaves and oblig'd to him can more hardly bee corrupted and put case they were corrupted little profit could hee get by it they not being able to draw after them any people for the reasons wee have shewed whereupon hee that assailes the Turk must think to find him united and must rather relie upon his own forces than in the others disorders but when once he is overcome and broken in the field so that hee cannot repaire his armies there is nothing else to bee doubted than the Royall blood which being once quite out there is none else left to bee fear'd none of the others having any credit with the people And as the conquerour before the victory could not hope in them so after it ought he not to feare them The contrary falls out in Kingdoms govern'd as is that of France for ●t is easie to be enter'd by the gain●ing of any Baron in the Kingdom for there are alwayes some male-contents to be found and those that are glad of innovation Those for the reasons alleag'd are able ●o open thee a way into that State ●nd to further thy victory which ●fterwards to make good to thee draws with it exceeding many difficulties as well with those ●hat have ayded thee as those ●hou hast supprest Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Princes race for there remaine ●till those Lords who quickly will bee the ring-leaders of new changes and in case thou art not able to content these nor extinguish them thou losest that State whensoever the occasion is offerd Now if thou shalt consider what sort of gouernment that of Darius was thou shalt find it like to the Turks dominions and therefore Alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly and drive him out of the field after which victory Darius being dead that State was left secure to Alexander for the reasons we treated of before and his successors had they continued in amity might have injoy'd it at ease nor ever arose there in that Kingdome other tumults than those they themselves stir'd up But of the States that are order'd and grounded as that of France it is impossible to become master at such ease and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of Spain France and Gree●● against the Romans by reason of the many Principalities those States had whereof while the memory lasted the Romans were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them but the memory of them being quite wip't out by the power and continuance of the Empire at length they injoy'd it securely and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another each one of them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein and that because the blood of their ancient Lord was quite spent they acknowledg'd no other but the Romans By the consideration then of these things no man will marvaile that Alexander had so little trouble to keep together the State of Asia and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest as Pyrrhus and many others which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour but from the difference of the subject CHAP. V. In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd which before they were conquer d liv'd under their own Laws WHen those States that are conquered as it is said have been accustomed to live under their own Laws and in liberty there are three wayes for a man to hold them The first is to demolish all their strong places the other personally to goe and dwell there the third to suffer them to live under their own Laws drawing from them some tribute and creating therein an Oligarchy that may continue it in thy service for that State being created by that Prince knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force who is like to doe all he can to maintain it and with more facility is a City kept by meanes of her own Citizens which hath been us'd before to live free than by any other way of keeping We have for example the Spartans and the Romans the Spartans held Athens and Thebes creating there an Oligarchy yet they lost it The Romans to be sure of Capua Carthage and Numantia dismantell'd them quite and so lost them not they would have kept Greece as the Spartans had held them leaving them free letting them injoy their own Lawes and it prospered not with them so that they were forc'd to deface many Cities of that province to hold it For in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under than by demolishments and whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free and dismantells it not let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge and the ancient orders it had which neither by length of time nor for any favours afforded them are ever forgotten and for any thing that can bee done or order'd unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd that name is never forgotten nor those customes but presently in every chance recourse is thither made as Pisa did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the Florentines But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince and that whole race is quite extirpated on one part being us'd to obey on the the other not having their old Prince they agree not to make one from among themselves they know not how to live in liberty in such manner that they are much slower to take armes and with more facility
the Pope the Venetians the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and the Florentines These potentates took two things principally to their care the one that no forreiner should invade Italy the other that no one of them should inlarge their State They against whom this care was most taken were the Pope and the Venetians and to restraine the Venetians there needed the union of all the rest as it was in the defence of Ferrara and to keep the Pope low they servd themselves of the Barons of Rome who being devided into two factions the Orsini and Colonnesi there was alwayes occasion of offence between them who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope held the Popedome weak and feeble and however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope as was Sextus yet either his fortune or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof for in ten yeers which time one with another the Popes ordinarily liv'd with much adoe could they bring low one of the factions And if as as wee may say one had near put out the Colonnesi there arose another enemy to the Orsini who made them grow againe so that there was never time quite to root them out This then was the cause why the Popes temporall power was of small esteeme in Italy There arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt who of all the Popes that ever were shewd what a Pope was able to doe with money and forces and hee effected by meanes of his instrument Duke Valentins and by the occasion of the French mens passage all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the Church dominions but to make the Duke great yet what hee did turnd to the Churches advantage which after his death when the Duke was taken away was the heire of all his paines Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius and found the Church great having all Romania and all the Barons of Rome being quite rooted out and by Alexanders persecutions all their factions worne down hee found also the way open for the heaping up of monyes never practis'd before Alexanders time which things Julius not only follow'd but augmented and thought to make himselfe master of Bolonia and extinguish the Venetians and chase the French men out of Italy and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church and in no private regard hee kept also the factions of the Orsini and Colonnesi in the same State hee found them and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration yet two things have held them quiet the one the power of the Church which somewhat affrights them the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them nor shall these parties ever bee at rest while they have Cardinals because they nourish the factions both in Rome and abroad and and the Barons then are forc'd to undertake the defence of them and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons And now hath Pope Leo his Holinesse found the Popedome exceeding puissant of whome it is hop'd that if they amplifi'd it by armes hee by his goodnesse and infinite other vertues will much more advantage and dignifie it CHAP. XII How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercenary souldiers HAving treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being and shewed the wayes whereby many have sought to gaine and hold them it remaines now that I speak in generall of the offences and defences that may chance in each of the forenamed We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid otherwise it must needs bee that hee goe to wrack The principall foundations that all States have as well new as old or mixt are good lawes and good armes and because there cannot bee good lawes where there are not good armes and where there are good armes there must needs be good lawes I will omit to discourse of the lawes and speak of armes I say then that the armes wherewithall a Prince defends his State either are his own or mercenary or auxiliary or mixt Those that are mercenary and auxiliary are unprofitable and dangerous and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary armes hee shall never be quiet nor secure because they are never well united ambitious and without discipline treacherous among their friends stout among their enemies cowardly they have no feare of God nor keep any faith with men and so long only deferre they the doing of mischiefe till the enemy comes to assayle thee and in time of peace thou art dispoyld by them in warre by thy ●lemies the reason hereof is be●ause they have no other love ●or other cause to keep them in ●he feild but only a smal stipend ●hich is not of force to make ●●em willing to hazard their lives ●or thee they are willing indeed ●●be thy souldiers til thou goest to ●●ght but then they flye or run ●way which thing would cost ●ee but small paines to perswade ●r the ruine of Italy hath not had ●ny other cause now adayes than ●or that it hath these many yeers ●ely'd upon mercenary armes ●hich a good while since perhaps ●ay have done some man some ●●rvice and among themselves ●●ey may have been thought va●●ant but so soone as any forrein ●nemy appeard they quickly ●●ewd what they were Where●pon Charles the King of France ●ithout opposition made himself ●aster of all Italy and he that ●●id that the cause thereof were ●ur faults said true but these were not those they beleevd but wha● I have told and because they were the Princes faults they als● have suffered the punishment I will fuller shew the infelicity o● these armes The mercenary Captaines are either very able men or not if they bee thou canst no● repose any trust in them for they will alwayes aspire unto thei● owne proper advancements eitheir by suppressing of thee tha● art their Lord or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose but if the Captaine be● not valourous hee ordinarily ruines thee and in case it be answerd that whoever shall have armes in his hands whether mercenary or not will doe so I woul● reply that armes are to bee imployd either by a Prince or common-wealth The Prince ough● to goe in person and perform● the office of a commander th● Republick is to send forth h● Citizens and when shee send forth one that proves not of abilities shee ought to change him ●hen and when hee does prove ●alourous to bridle him so
army conspird against him Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of Commodus Severus Antonius Caracalla and Maximinus you shall find them exceeding cruell and ravinous who to satisfie their souldiers forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people and all of them except Severus came to evill ends for in Severus there was such extraordinary valour that while hee held the souldiers his friends however the people were much burthend by him he might alwayes reigne happily for his valour rendred him so admirable in the souldiers and peoples sights that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd and those others reverencing and honoring him And because the actions of this man were exceeding great being in a new Prince I will briefly shew how well hee knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts the conditions of which two ● say as before are very necessary for a Prince to imitate Severus having had experience of Iulian the Emperours sloth perswaded his army whereof hee was commander in Sclavonia that they should doe well to goe to Rome to revenge Pertinax his death who was put to death by the Imperiall guard and under this pretence not making any shew that hee aspird unto the Empire set his army in march directly towards Rome and was sooner come into Italy than it was knowne hee had mov'd from his station Being arriv'd at Rome hee was by the Senate chosen Emperour for feare and Julian slaine After this beginning two difficulties yet remaind to Severus before hee could make himselfe Lord of the whole State the one in Asia where Niger the Generall of those armies had gotten the title of Emperour the other in the West with Albinus who also aspird to the Empire and because hee thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both he purposd to set upon Niger and cozen Albinus to whom hee writ that being elected Emperour by the Senate hee would willingly communicate it with him and thereupon sent him the title of Caesar and by resolution of the Senate tooke him to him for his Collegue which things were taken by Albinus in true meaning But afterwards when Severus had overcome and slaine Niger and pacified the affaires in the East being returnd to Rome hee complaind in the Senate of Albinus how little weighing the benefits received from him hee had sought to slay him by treason and therefore was hee forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude afterwards hee went into France where hee bereft him both of his State and life Whoever then shall in particular examine his actions shall finde hee was a very cruell Lion and as crafty a Foxe and shall see that hee was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one and by the armies not hated and shall nothing marvell that hee being a new man was able to hold t●gether such a great Empire for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him But Antonius his sonne was also an exceeding brave man and endued with most excellent qualities which causd him to be admird by the people and acceptable to the souldiers because hee was a warrlike man enduring all kind of travell and paines despising all delicate food and all kinde of effeminacy which gaind him the love of all the armies neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such and so hideous having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria that hee grew odious to the world and began to bee feard by those also that were neare about him so that hee was slaine by a Centurion in the very midst of his army Where it is to be noted that these kinde of deaths which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde cannot by a Prince be avoyded for every one that feares not to dye is able to doe it but a Prince ought to be lesse afraid of it because it very seldome falls out Only should hee beware not to doe any extreame injury to any of those of whom he serves himselfe or that hee hath near about him in any imployment of his Principality as Antonius did who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that Centurion also threatned him every day and neverthelesse entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body which was a rash course taken and the way to destruction as befell him But let us come to Commodus for whom it was very easie to hold the Empire by reason it descended upon him by inheritance being Marcus his sonn● and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps and then had hee contented both the people and the souldiers but being of a cruell and savage disposition whereby to excercise his actions upon the people hee gave himselfe to entertaine armies and those in all licentiousnesse On the other part not maintaining his dignity but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers and doing such other like base things little worthy of the Imperiall majesty hee became contemptible in the souldiers sight and being hated of one part and dispisd of the other he was conspird against and slaine It remaines now that wee declare Maximinus his conditions who was a very warrlike man and the armies loathing Alexanders effeminacy whereof I spake before when they had slain him chose this man Emperour who not long continu'd so because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt the one because hee was very base having kept cattell in Thrace which was well knowne to every one and made them to scorne him the other because in the beginning of his Principality having delayd to goe to Rome and enter into possession of the Imperiall throne he had gaind the infamy of being thought exceding cruell having by his Prefects in Rome and in every place of the Empire exercisd many cruelties insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his blood on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his cruelty first Affrica afterwards the Senate with all the people of Rome and all Italy conspird against him with whom his own army took part which incamping before Aquileya and finding some difficulty to take the town being weary of his cruelties because they saw he had so many enemies fearing him the lesse slew him I purpose not to say any thing either of Heliogabalus Macrinus or Julian who because they were throughly base were suudenly extinguishd but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse and I say that the Princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the Souldiers extraordinarily in their governments for notwithstanding that there be some consideration to bee had of them yet presently are those armies dissolv'd because none of these Princes do use to maintaine any armies together which are annex'd and inveterated
him for the Citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the Magistrates are not like in those fractions to obey his and in doubtfull times hee shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom hee may trust for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times when the Citizens have need of the State for then every one runs and every one promises and every one will venture his life for him when there is no danger neare but in times of hazzard when the State hath need of Citizens there are but few of them then and so much the more is this experience dangerours in that it can be but once made Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise a way whereby his Citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government and they shall alwaies after proove faithfull to him CHAP. X. In what maner the forces of al Principalities ought to be measured IT is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities to have another consideration of them that is if a Prince have such dominions that hee is able in case of necessity to subsist of himselfe or else whether hee hath alwaies need of another to defend him And to cleer this point the better I judge them able to stand of themselves who are of power either for their multitudes of men or quantity of money to bring into the feild a compleat armie and joyne battell with whoever comes to assaile them and so I think those alwayes to stand in need of others help who are not able to appear in the feild against the enemy but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them Touching the first case wee have treated already and shall adde somewhat thereto as occasion shall require In the second case wee cannot say other save only to incourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capitall city and of the countrey about not to hold much account and whoever shall have well fortifi'd that towne and touching other matters of governments shall have behav'd himselfe towards his subjects as hath been formerly said and hereafter shall bee shall never be assaild but with great regard for men willingly undertake not enterprises where they see difficulty to work them through nor can much facility bee there found where one assailes him who hath his towne strong and well guarded and is not hated of his people The cities of Germany are very free they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them and they obey the Emperour when they please and they stand not in fear neither of him nor any other potentate about them for they are in such a manner fortifi'd that every one thinks the siege of any of them would proove hard and tedious for all of them have ditches and rampires and good store of Artillery and alwayes have their publick sellers well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeere besides this whereby to feed the common people and without any losse to the publick they have alwayes in common whereby they are able for a yeere to imploy them in the labour of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves they hold up also the military exercises in repute and hereupon have they many orders to maintaine them A Prince then that is master of a good strong city and causeth not himselfe to be hated cannot bee assaulted and in case hee were he that should assaile him would be faine to quitt him with shame for the affayres of the world are so various that it is almost impossible that an army can lye incampt before a towne for the space of a whole yeere and if any should reply that the people having their possessions abroad in case they should see them afire would not have patience and the tedious siege and their love to themselves would make them forget their Prince I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious will easily master those difficulties now giving his subjects hope that the mischiefe will not bee of durance sometimes affrighting them with the cruelty of their enemies and otherwhiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to runne to the enemy Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their country upon his arrivall and at those times while mens minds are yet warme and resolute in their defence and therefore so much the lesse ought a Prince doubt for after some few dayes that their courages grow coole the dammages are all done and mischiefes receivd and there is no help for it and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince thinking hee is now more bound to them their houses having for his defence been fir'd and their possessions wasted and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they doe as for those they receive whereupon if all bee well weigh'd a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizens ●earts at the beginning and ●atter end of the siege when ●ee hath no want of provision ●or food and munition CHAP. XI Concerning Ecclesiasticall Principalities THere remaines now only that wee treat of the Eccle●iasticall Principalities about which all the difficulties are be●ore they are gotten for they are ●ttain'd to either by Vertue or ●ortune and without the one or ●he other they are held for they ●re maintaind by orders inve●erated in the religion all which ●re so powerfull and of such na●ure that they maintaine their ●rinces in their dominions in ●hat manner soever they proceed ●nd live These only have an Estate and defend it not have ●ubjects and governe them not ●nd yet their States because un●efended are not taken from them nor their subjects though not govern'd care not think not neither are able to aliene themselves from them These Principalities then are only happy and secure but they being sustained by superiour causes whereunto humane understanding reaches not I will not meddle with them for being set up and maintaind by God it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them Yet if any man should aske mee whence it proceeds that the Church in temporall power hath attaind to such greatnesse seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixt the Italian potentates and not only they who are entitled potentates but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition in regard of the temporality made but small account of it and now a King of France trembles at the power thereof and it hath been able to drive him out of Italy and ruine the Venetians and however this bee well known me thinks it is not superfluous in some part to recall it to memory Before that Charles King of France past into Italy this countrey was under the rule of