great Oeconomy the whole System is kept in regular and orderly Motion is firmly established and enabled to exert all those beneficial Powers that are admired in a well composed Body Politic. The Body without the Head being but a Trunk and inanimate Carcase and the Head without the Body as a curious piece of Clock-work without Motion It must be owned to be a noble Enterprise to make researches into the constituent Parts Harmony and Composure of Government which is that benign Supreme Power which influenceth vast Societies of men and combines all tempers constitutions and interests in one noble Machine for the benefit of the whole and every part and makes every Dominion a little World wherein Beauty Order and the Blessings of this Life are inspired into all the Members how minute soever with that calmness when no disturbances are given it that we scarce hear the motions of the (c) Sic orbem Reipubliâ—e esse conversum ut vix sonitum audire vix impressam orbitam viâ—ere possumus Cic. â—â— Attic. Ep. 36. Machine or see the Springs that move it But as in the Body Natural the (*) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Philosopher observes That by the turbulence of depraved Appetites by heady Rashness and seducing Passions in the vitious and ill-affected the Body seems to command the Soul and Reason is dethron'd So in the Commonweal when from mistakes and misguided Zeal Discontent Ambition and other vitious Inclinations People are infected whereby the Malignant Fever of Sedition or the Pest of Rebellion rageth in a State the Sovereign is for a time kept from the Exercise of his Royal Power The Scheme of the whole work and sometimes dethron'd But to leave this pleasing Allegory which I could pursue in comparing all the Members of the Body and Faculties of the Soul with the constituent Parts and Offices of Government I shall instead of that draw a short Scheme of my design in this Work which I had never undertaken if it had not been that I was invited to it by a Great and Wise Minister of State My Lord President whose glorious Service to his Prince and Country will be celebrated in remotest Ages and having liv'd to make some Observations on the Causes and Managery of the Rebellion against King Charles the Martyr and the tendency to another Civil War of later date and revolving with my self that though many wise and judicious Persons both know and have learnedly writ of the secret Springs and Movements of them infinitely beyond what I can pretend to and that both our own Country-men have in Parts writ of all the branches of the English Government and many Foreigners of Politics in general or such as were fitted for the Governments under which they lived yet having met with none that had so particularly writ of the Excellency of the English Monarchy as to illustrate it so as it might be useful to the preventing Seditions and Rebellions and to clear the Commodiousness and Necessity of submitting to it and placing a great Portion of our happiness here in living under it I conceived it might be a profitable Essay to excite those who have not leisure and opportunity to peruse great and numerous Volumes to extract for their use such things as had occurred in my poor Reading to induce them to prize it as they ought and to furnish them with such Arguments as my low Reasoning was able whereby to answer the Objections of our late Republicans against it and discover their Methods of Proceedings towards the overthrowing it and to caution all the well-meaning Subjects against all the Arts of Factious and Seditious People and Principles And though I cannot promise my self the success I wish yet I hope I may excite some more knowing learned and judicious to furnish our little World with a more Copious and Elaborate Piece which may supply my defects and more abundantly satisfy the ingenious and curious Reader to whom I shall now draw the Curtain and expose the Model of the designed Work First Therefore (d) cap. 2. as a Foundation I shall treat of the necessity of Government in General In which Chapter I shall discourse of its Original in Families c. (e) cap. 3. Then that the People are not the original of Government Then (f) cap. 4. of the benefit of Government in instituting Laws In (g) cap. 5. securing Property and other particulars From this I proceed to treat of the (h) cap. 6. inconvenience of Democracy and of the several (i) cap. 7. Forms of Common Wealth Governments before and in Aristotle's time After which (k) cap. 8. of the inconvenience of all kinds of Republick Governments Then of the preference (l) cap. 9. of Monarchical Government before all others In all which Chapters I touch upon the Principles and Practices of our late Republicans which having dispatched I give the Character of a good (m) cap. 10. King in general Then that the care (n) cap. 11. of Religion is incumbent upon Kings Then of the (o) cap. 12. Clemency Prudence (p) cap. 13. Courage (q) cap. 14. and Military Conduct of Kings of the (r) cap. 15. burden and care of Kings (s) cap. 16. The Excellency of Hereditary Monarchy Then I proceed to the King's Authority and (t) cap. 17. Sovereignty in general and more (u) cap. 18. particularly according to our Laws by the Enumeration of many particulars (w) cap. 19. Then as a Corollary that the Sovereign is not accountable to any upon Earth That the King is not to be (x) cap. 20. Resisted or Rebelled against In what cases he may (y) cap. 21. dispence with the Execution of the Laws of his Country Then I treat of the King's Authority (z) cap. 22. in making Laws and of the Laws of the Romans in Britain and of the British and German Polity Next of the Saxons (a) cap. 23. great Councils of whom they consisted and how the Laws were established by the respective Kings Then of the great (b) cap. 24. Councils from the Conquest to the beginning of Hen. 3. Then of the great Councils (c) cap. 25. and Parliaments during the Reign of Hen. 3. to the end of Edw. 3. After which of the Parliaments (d) cap. 26. of England during the Reign of Edw. 2. to the 22. of King Charles the 2d Then of Modern (e) cap. 27. rightly constituted Parliaments and of the Factious (f) cap. 28. Members of Parliaments wherein I discourse at large of the Encroachments of some Parliaments especially of some Houses of Commons Then from the great Council I pass to the (g) cap. 29. Right Honourable the Privy Council their Qualifications to be at the King 's sole appointing Of Ministers (h) cap. 30. of State c. Then of the King's Sovereignty in appointing (i) cap. 31. Magistrates (k) cap. 32.
Magnatibus Proceribus dicti Regni nostri colloquium habere tractatum Tibi praecipimus firmiter injungentes quod facta Proclamatione in proximo Comitatu tuo post receptionem hujus Brevis nostri tenendo die loco praedicto duos Milites gladiis cinctos magis idoneos discretos Comitatus praedicti de qualibet Civitate Comitatus illius duos Cives de quolibet Burgo duos Burgenses de discretioribus magis sufficientibus libere indifferenter per illos qui Proclamationi hujusmodi interfuerint juxta formam Statutorum inde editorum provisorum eligi nomina eorundem Militum Civium Burgensium sic electorum in quibusdam Indenturis inter te illos qui hujusmodi Electioni interfuerint inde conficiendis sive hujusmodi electi praesentes fuerint vel absentes inseri eosque ad dictum diem locum venire facias ita quod iidem Milites plenam sufficientem potestatem pro se Communitate Comitatus praedicti Cives Burgenses pro se Communitate Civitatum Burgorum praedictorum divisim ab ipsis habeant ad faciendum consentiendum his quae tunc ibidem de communi Concilio dicti Regni nostri favente Deo contigerint ordinari super negotiis ante dictis Ita quod pro defectu potestatis hujusmodi seu propter improvidam Electionem Militum Civium aut Burgensium praedictorum dicta negotia infecta non remaneant quovis modo Nolumus autem quod tu nec aliquis alius Vicecomes dicti Regni nostri aliqualiter sit electus Et Electionem illam in pleno Comitatu factam distincte aperte sub Sigillo tuo Sigillis eorum qui Electioni illae interfuerint nobis in Cancellariam nostram ad dictum dâ—em locum certifices indilate remittens nobis alteram partem Indenturarum praedictarum praesentibus consutam una cum hoc Brevi Teste meipso apud Westmonast THE King to the Sheriff Greeting Whereas by the Advice and Consent of our Council Advice of Privy Council for certain difficult and urgent business concerning us and the State and defence of our Kingdom of England and the English Church we have ordained a certain Parliament of ours to be held at our City of c. the day c. next ensuing and there to have conference Conference with Prelates c. and to treat with the Prelates Great Men and Peers of our said Kingdom We command and straitly enjoyn you Proclamation at County-Court that making Proclamation at the next County Court after receipt of this our Writ to be holden the day and place aforesaid Two Knights girt with Swords c. you cause two Knights girt with Swords the most fit and discreet of the County aforesaid and of every City of that County two Citizens Two Citizens and of every Burrough Two Burgesses two Burgesses of the discreeter and most sufficient Indifferently chosen by those present at the Proclamation according to Statutes to be freely and indifferently chosen by them who shall be present at such Proclamation according to the tenure of the Statutes in that case made and provided Their Names inserted in Indentures betwixt the Sheriff and the Electors and the names of the said Knights Citizens and Burgesses so chosen to be inserted in certain Indentures to be then made between you and those that shall be present at such Election whether the parties so elected be present or absent and shall make them to come at the said day and place To cause them to come at the Day and Place The Knights from the County the Citizens and Burgesses from their Cities Burroughs to have full power to do and consent so that the said Knights for themselves and for the County aforesaid and the said Citizens and Burgesses for themselves and the Commonalty of the aforesaid Cities and Burroughs may have severally for them full and sufficient power to perform and to consent to those things which by the favour of God shall there happen to be ordained by the Common Council of our said Kingdom concerning the businesses aforesaid Lest for want of that Power or improvident Election the Business be undonâ— so that the business may not by any means remain undone for want of such power No Sheriff to be chosen or by reason of the improvident Election of the aforesaid Knights Citizens and Burgesses Election to be in full County But we will not in any case you or any other Sheriff of our said Kingdom shall be elected The Indentures to be sealed by the Sheriff and Electors And at the day and the place aforesaid the said Election made in the full County Court A Counterpart tacked to the VVrit returned into the Chancery you shall certify without delay to us in our Chancery under your Seal and the Seals of them which shall be present at that Election sending back unto us the other part of the Indenture aforesaid affiled to these Presents together with this Writ Witness our self at Westminster SECT 7. Concerning the Speaker and the Privileges of the House of Commons IT is not my design to treat of all things relating to the Constitution My Design not to controvert the Privileges of the House of Commons but to shâ—w the gradual Alterations Laws and Customs of the House of Commons there are several useful Books extant which are fit for the Honourable Members of the House to consult What I most aim at is to shew what the Ancient Usage hath been and how from time to time things have been refined to the Mode and State they are now in and I hope those great Spirits that honour their Countries with their Service will pardon one that designs nothing more than to give them a Profile of the whole Model both in the days of our remotest Ancestors and what it was in more Modern times under just and undoubted Soveraigns as also how much it was transformed when the pretended House of Commons being confederated with a successful Army murthered their Soveraign voted away the House of Lords and assumed the Title of the Supream Authority of the Nation of which last I shall treat in the next Chapter The Members being according to the Kings Command come to the place appointed sometimes the Soveraign with the Lords in their Robes have rid in State to the Parliament which is generally yet observed in Scotland and Ireland The Solemnity at the Opening of the Parliament However at the opening of the Parliament the King is seated on his Throne under the Canopy with his Royal Crown on his Head the Chancellor standing something backward on his Right-hand and the great Officers as Lord Treasurer Lord President of the Kings Council Lord Privy Seal Great Chamberlain the Lord Constable Marshal Lord Admiral Lord Steward and Kings Chamberlain attend on either side the State or in their Seats
agreeth with the Act of Parliament 37 E. 3. c. 18. where it is said before the Chancellor Treasurer and Great Council Thirdly The Kings Privy Council which appears to be different from the last Great Council by many Records and particularly by that of (c) Rot. Claus 16 E. 2. m. 5. dorso 16 E. 2. where it is said Hen. de Bellomont Baron of the Kings Great and Private Council was sworn This Council is called Concilium Privatum secretum continuum Regis The Privy Council properly so called Lord President The First Member of this Council is the Lord President who was anciently called Principalis Consiliarius and sometimes Capitalis Consiliarius The first Lord President Sir Edward Coke (d) 4. Instit c. 2. fol. 55. 1. par Pat. num 22. John Bishop of Norwich is mentioned 7 Jo. by Matt. Paris fol. 205. mentions was the Earl of Lancaster 50 E. 3. 1 R. 2. then he reckons these in order the Duke of Bedford 1 H. 6. the Duke of Gloucester 10 H. 6. the Duke of York 11 and 22 H. 6. John Russel Bishop of Rochester and after of Lincoln is called President 13 E. 4. John Fisher Bishop of Rochester 12 H. 7. Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolk from the 25th to the 37th of H. 8. the Lord Pawlet 1 E. 6. the Duke of Northumberland 5 and 7 of E. 6. the Earl of Arundel 1 and 2 Ph. and M. in Q. Elizabeth's time we find none but in this Catalogue Mr. Prynne (e) Animadv p. 45. Pat. 13 E. 4. part 1. m. 3. hath truly noted That the Bishop of Rochester was not made President of the Kings Council but of the Prince's and was his Tutor as appears by the Patent it self there cited dated the 10th of Nov. This Office of Lord President was never granted but by Letters Patents under the Great Seal durante beneplacito In the Statute of 21 H. 8. c. 2. he is said to be attendant on the Kings most Royal Person the reason of which saith Sir Ed. Coke is That of latter times he hath used to report to the King the Passages and the State of the business at the Council Table The Lord Privy Seal is the next Principal Person that hath Precedence in the Kings Council Lord Privy-Seal concerning whose Office my Lord (f) 4. Instit c. 2. fol. 56. Coke hath discoursed at large to whom I must refer the Curious Reader as also to him for the Acts of Parliament Orders of the same and Acts of Council together with Mr. Prynne's (g) P. 45. Animadversions whereby the Privy-Council was to be regulated and concerning the Jurisdiction and Proceedings of the Kings Council Mr. Lambard's (h) P. 108. to 116. fol. 29. Archaion and Mr. Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts may be consulted the several Bundels of Petitions to the King and his Council in the Tower of London and the Answers to them the Placita Parliamentaria coram Rege Concilio in the Tally Office of the Exchequer and in the Parchment Book of them in the Tower under King Edward the First printed by Mr. (i) In Placit Parl. Append. Those summoned to Parliaments as Assistants called the King's Council and in Parliament-time joyned with the King's Council in several Cases Ryley Of this Privy Council there seems to me to be two sorts one constantly attending the King and his Affairs the other in Parliament time only which had their particular Summons as I have before at full discoursed of and these two I find so obscurely distinguished that it is difficult in some places to understand which are meant but I think in time of Parliament these were joyned to the Kings Council for besides that they had a distinct Summons and in them as a specifical distinction the word caeteris was omitted in that part of the Summons which runs dictis die loco personalitor intersitis nobiscum ac cum caeteris Praelatis Magnatibus c. because they were not Parliamentary Barons there was also added in proceedings and judgments upon them these words coram ipso Domino Rege ejus concilio ad Parliamenta sua or ad Parliamentum suum or coram Concilio nostro in praesenti Parliamento For the particular Instances of which being they are very numerous Mr. Prynn's (k) A pag. 363. ad pag. 393. brief Register may be consulted wherein it seems to me upon the perusal of the several Records that these Assistants to the House of Lords were likewise joyned to the rest of the Kings standing Council in Parliament time so it is expressed in the Case of (l) Idem pag. 378. John Salâ—eyn and Margaret his Wife and Isabel her Sister Daughters and Heirs of Robert de Ross de Work thus Habito super praemissis diligenti tractatu per ipsum Dom. Regem totum Concilium and in the same it is thus also worded videtur Dom. Regi Concilio suo concordatum est consideratum per ipsum Dom. Regem Concilium suum So in others per Concilium Archiepiscoporum Episcoporum Comitum Baronum caeterorumque (m) Idem pag. 380. de Concilio suo existentium singulis de Concilio suo totius Concilii Domini Regis So in 21 E. 1. the Archbishop of York's Case videtur Domino Regi in pleno Parliamento praedicto Comitibus Baronibus Justiciariis similiter toti Concilio ipsius Dom. Regis and so it is said Magnates alios de Concilio ipsius Domini Regis rogavit This is further cleared by sundry (n) Idem pag. 383. The Court of Star-chamber was said to be coram Rege Concilio suo See Coke Inst 4. c. 5. Prefaces to and passages in our Printed Statutes as formerly I have noted So the Statute of Bigamy 4 Oct. 4 E. 1. saith In the presence of certain Reverend Fathers Bishops of England and others of the Kings Council the constitutions under written were recited after heard and published before the King and his Council for as much as all the Kings Council Justices and others did agree So the Statute of Quo Warranto 30 E. 1. Cum apud Westminster per nos Concilium nostrum provisum So 33 E. 1. it is agreed and ordained by the King and all his Council So 42 E. 3. c. 3. the Statute made on Petition of the Commons in Parliament begins (o) Plese a nostre Seigneur le Roy son bon Counsel pur droyt Government de son Peuple ordeigner Pleaseth it our Lord the King and his good Council for the better Government of his People to ordain By great store of Records it is apparent that in old times the Kings and their Councils gave Judgment in divers Cases of difficulty and other Common Cases concerning the Law of the Realm (p) See 11 H. 4. num 28. 63. Respectuatur per Dom. Principem Concilium Pryn. Animadv p. 39. 264 265 267 296.
as they foresaw would thwart their designs as Seducers of the King and men of Arbitrary Principles thereby to have them wholly removed from him as we have had Addresses of a later date from an House of Commons against some great wise and Loyal Lords by which severing from him such a body of his faithful Advisers Their Design to remove some Privy-Counsellors that some of their Party might be introduced and dangerously depriving him of the constant means which the Law hath specially ordained him for his support some of them endeavoured to get into their places as was notoriously known to have been proposed that if several of the leading men might have had chief places and honours they would have let the Earl of Strafford live as in another Treatise I hope to make clear and by that meanâ— not only have enriched themselves but have had the guidance of Affairs of State and so by little and little brought about the Promotion of their friends without regard to the Publick If we impartially consider the unreasonableness of this proposal we shall find The Mischiefs that would follow upon the Parliaments nominating Privy-Counsellors that by granting it we must expect to suffer all the evils which Faction can produce This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our bowels which would first break out in our Country Elections and divide the Families by irreconcileable hatred For it cannot be imagined but that Power would bandy against Power and Relations against Relations See Answer to Observations to put a Son or Kinsman into the road to preferment nor could the flames be quenched but burn more vehemently even in the house to which the insolence of some obtaining Offices to which they are not fit the shame and discontent of others repulsed and the ambition of all would be continual fuel and the greatest misery of all would be that were the corruption never so great we could have but slender hopes of redress since the prevailing Party jealous of their honour would constantly maintain their choice and perhaps it would be necessary for them one to wink at another as it was manifestly seen in the long Parliament when the most known Offenders and active Instruments of the Peoples miseries by striking in with the prevailing Party were more safe than innocency could make them It is enacted by King (i) 17 Car. 1. c. 10. The Limitations of the Power of the Privy-Council Charles the First that neither his Majesty nor his Privy-Council have or ought to have any Jurisdiction by English Bill Petition Articles Libel or any other Arbitrary way whatsoever to examine or draw into question determine or dispose of the Lands Tenements Hereditaments Goods or Chattels of any of the Subjects of this Kingdom but that the same ought to be tried and determined in the ordinary Courts of Justice and by the ordinary course of the Law In the Oath of a (k) Rot. Pat. 5. H. 4. num 14. Fleta lib. 1. c. 17. Privy-Counsellor his duty is best manifested First That he shall as far forth as cunning and discretion suffereth First Particular of a Privy-Counsellor's Oath truely justly and evenly counsel and advise the King in all matters to be commoned treated and demanded in the Kings Council or by him as the Kings Counsellor Therefore Henry the Eighth wisht that his Counsellors would commit simulation dissimulation and partiality to the Porters Lodg when they came to sit in Council Secondly Second Branch uprightness That in all things generally which may be to the Kings honour and behoof and to the good of his Realm Lordships and Subjects without particularity or exception of persons not fearing or eschewing so to do for affection love meed doubt or dread of any person or persons that he shall with all his might and power help and strenghthen the Kings said Council in all that shall be thought good to the same Council for the â—niversal good of the King and his Land and for the peace rest and tranquillity of the same Therefore my Lord Cook (l) Instit par 4. fol. 53. saith these Counsellors like good Sentinels and Watchmen consult of and for the publick good and the honour defence safety and profit of the Realm they are his true Treasurers and profitable Instruments of the State Thirdly That he shall keep secret the Kings Counsel Third Branch Secresie and all that shall be commoned by way of Counsel in the same without that he shall not common it publish it or discover it by word writing or in any otherwise to any person out of the same Council or to any of the same Council if it touch him or if he be party thereof So Valerius M. (m) Nihil magis optâ—ndum quam ut rerum ger â—darum consdia qu 〈◊〉 ejus fieri poterit quam maxime 〈…〉 Lib. 4. saith Nothing is more to be desired than that the Counsels of things to be done as much as possible be secreet So Vegetius (n) Nulla sunt meliora consilia quam quae ignoraverit â—dversarius antequam facias Consilia nisi sunt abscondita exitum raro prospiciunt Lib. 3. de Re militari hath of old pronounced That no Counsels are better than those which the Adversary is ignorant of before they be executed for unless Counsel be hidden and secret they rarely attain their end Fourthly That (o) Rot. Pat. 11 H 4. num 28. he shall not for gift meed nor good nor promise of good by him nor by means of any other person receive or admit for any promotion favouring nor fordeclaring letting or hindring of any matter or thing to be treated or done in the Council Therefore the part of a Counsellor is Tu civem patremque geris tu consule cunctis Non tibi nec tua te moveant sed publica vota Fifthly That he shall withstand any person or persons of what condition estate or degree they be of that would by way of feat attempt or intend the contrary to the good of the King peace of the Land c. and generally that he shall observe keep and do all that a good and true Counsellor ought to do to his Soveraign Lord. CHAP. XXXI Of Ministers of State I Joyn to the Privy Council Ministers of State being they differ from them very little some in name others in degrees For there (a) St. Alban's Essays tit Honour and Reputation are several qualifications of Subjects that serve a Prince As first those that are participes curarum upon whom Princes discharge the greatest weight of their Affairs The several Qualifications of Ministers of Princes as Ministers of State and Privy-Counsellors Secondly Duces Belli such as Princes imploy in their Armies and Militia Thirdly Gratiosi Favourites such as are a solace to the Prince and harmless to the People Fourthly Negotii pares such as not only have great places under the Prince and execute them sufficiently but
Representatives using all their industry to make the Subjects believe they were the only Patriots and Liberators They pass Votes conformable to the Petitioners desire animate them to search for more and especially to fix them upon Persons they were mindful to remove out of places of trust Then they begun to impeach several Ministers of State and the Judges that they might weaken the King in his Councils and terrifie others into compliance always taking care to charge the misdeeds upon the Kings evil Counsellors magnifying the Kings Natural Goodness and declaring That if he would consent to redress those Grievances and to punish the Authors they would make him a richer and more glorious King than any of his Predecessors Seditious (t) Address Pamphlets daily came out and the Printing-Press laboured Night and Day to abuse the King and his Ministers and bring the Government Ecclesiastical and Civil into obloquy Their Preachers in the mean time like so many Demagogues plied their business so effectually blowing the Trumpet as they phrased it for the Lord and Gideon that by them the Houses Interest prevailed every where especially in the Populous City which was in a manner wholly at the Houses devotion Having removed the Great and Noble Earl of Strafford by great Industry and Art and the Midwifery of Tumults and got themselves by as strange an Art as oversight perpetuated they set themselves to Remonstrate in which they odiously recount all the miscarriages as they called them in the Blessed Kings Reign charging him though covertly with them and all the very Misfortunes of his Reign They revive the Bill against the Bishops sitting in the House of Lords which had been rejected and in a Parliamentary way ought not again to be set on foot that Session the better to effect which they cause the Rabble and their Confederates to menace and assault them and other Loyal Members of the House they Post up several names of Lords and Commons who opposed their proceedings and having driven the King and his whole Family away by most outragious Tumults they declare their Ordinances to be binding during their sitting and assume the Power of interpreting and declaring what was Law and by all these Arts they brought the People not (u) Culpae vel gloriae socii Tacit. 3. Hist so much to joyn with as to conspire with them Then they pretend a necessity of putting the Kingdom into a posture of defence to secure it against Popery and Arbitrary Government and the Invasion of Foreigners which they pretend were to be brought in to assist these They single out the most confiding and daring in every County to be their Commissioners of the Militia so (w) Quanto quis audacia promptior tanto magis sidus rebusque motis potior babetur Idem 1. Histor much as every one was forwarder in boldness and more hardy by so much the more he was to be confided in and sitter to help forward the turbulent work they were about Having first got the Peoples affections to revere them as their Deliverers they the more easily obtained their Bodies Armour and Moneys and so prosecuted a Rebellious War openly yet with that shameful pretence that they were fighting for the King against his Evil-Counsellors and amongst hands court him with most Dethroning Propositions and success Crowning their arms they wholly destroyed that Monarchy they had all along pretended to establish upon surer foundations for the Honour of the Crown and benefit of the People than former Ages had known Instead of which they made themselves Masters of all their Fellow-Subjects seizing their Estates Imprisoning and Murthering their Persons altering the established Ecclesiastical Government and all the fundamental Laws enriching themselves and over-awing the Kingdom by a standing Army Thus I have drawn that in Miniture which was the Tragedy of many Years and the Subject of numerous Volumes and I shall tack to it something parallel in later Years to let all Posterity see what a Characteristick Mark it is of Turbulent and Factious Inclinations when Petitions against the Will of the Government are violently promoted The great mischief of tumultuous Petitions being considered by the Loyal Parliament The Act against Tumultuous Petitions upon the late Glorious King 's happy Restauration Provision was made that the number of deliverers of Petitions should not exceed ten that three of the Justices of Peace in the County or the major part of a Grand Jury at an Assize or General Sessions or in London the Lord Mayor Aldermen and common-Common-Council have the ordering and consent to such Petitions which shall be for alteration of things established by Law in Church or State by way of Petition Complaint Remonstrances Declaration or other Address to the King or either Houses of Parliament It cannot be forgot in the interval of a later Parliament how zealous and busy multitudes were to get Petitions with Hundreds and Thousands of Hands to the late King for the sitting of a Parliament before the King in his Wisdom thought sit This occasioned the King to issue forth a Proclamation against tumultuous Petitions and other Loyal Persons to express an abhorrence of such Petitions that would press the King to precipitate their Sitting Those that petitioned the King for convening of a Parliament could not but foresee the ungratefulness of such Petitions to the King yet the Designers gave it not over for they had other Ends. As first to engage Men by their Subscriptions to be more fast to them Secondly to try whether the People might be brought to Tumults Thirdly to incense the People more against the Government if their Petitions were denied Fourthly to shew in terroreon the number of their Adherents Fifthly That through every County the confiding and zealous might be known each to other and Lastly that whenever that Parliament should sit they might have their Thanks and by their Numbers the Parliament might be encouraged to proceed in such things as they desired knowing hereby the Strength of the Party When the House of Commons met nothing was so much clamoured against as the Proceedings upon the late Proclamation as if all the Liberties of the Subjects of England had consisted in this Therefore they vote that it ever hath been the undoubted Right of the Subjects of England See the Votes to Petition the King for the Calling and Sitting of Parliaments for redressing of Grievances and to traduce such Petitioning was a violation of Duty and to represent it to his Majesty as tumultuous and Seditious was to betray the Liberty of the Subject and contribute to the design of subverting the Legal ancient Constitution of the Kingdom and introducing Arbitrary Power and so a Committee called of Abhorrence was appointed to enquire of all such Persons as had offended against the Rights of the Subjects This was it that explained their Vote for all the Controversy was Whether a sew private Men might agree upon a Petition then send Emissaries abroad to
Romans Concerning the Roman Ingratitude and onely single two or three of the many Examples of their Ingratitude to their deserving Chiestains to illustrate That Rewards were not bestowed as they ought to have been even to such as were the greatest Preservers of their Country and such as raised the Glory of the Roman Name to the highest pitch of Glory T. Martius Coriolanus called Coriolanus had conquered the Volsci and Aequi yet under pretext that he had advised to sell Corn in time of Dearth at an higher Rate than was convenient he was banished Yet he took not that Revenge he might have done in joyning with the Volsci Furius Camillus subdued the Falisci Furius Camillus but was banished the City upon a Suggestion of some Inequality of dividing the Spoil and retired to ARdaea from whence when the Gauls under Brennus had got all Rome but the Capitol he forgetting the Ingratitude of his Country drew an Army together with which he fell upon the dispersed Gauls and so saved his Country The two Scipio's strangely enlarged the Roman Empire The Two Scipio's by conquering every place where they were employed Publius Scipio the elder Brother overthrew Hannibal and subjected the whole State of Carthage by which he deservedly had the Style of Africanus as his Brother had that of Asiaticus by conquering the Kingdom of Macedon and giving Laws to all Greece and other Territories in Asia Concerning the elder the Senate was unwilling he should carry the War into Africk But the People were earnest for it Concerning Publius Scipio the elder Brother Upon which the Learned (x) Sir Walter Raleigh l. 5. c. 3. sect 18. Historian and Statesman observes That it is often found in Councils of State that the busie and obstinate Heads of a few do carry all the rest and many times Men make a surrender of their own Judgments to the Wisdom that hath gotten it self a Name by giving happy Directions in Troubles by-past therefore he that reposeth himself upon the Advice of many shall often find himself deceived The Counsel of the Many being wholly directed by the Empire of a Few that oversway the rest For here Q. Fabius was accounted the Oracle of his time for his wary Nature suited well with the Business that fell out in the chief of his Imployment therefore others adhered to him that was grown old in following one Course from which they would not shift as the change of Times required But the People who though they could not well advise and deliberate yet could well apprehend embraced the needful Motion of Scipio and furnished him with all Supplies and Furtherance they could From hence I may note the Inconvenience of this Government wherein sometimes the Senators shall be led by one or some few one way and then by others and sometimes the People shall over-rule the Votes of the Senate For though this may be fortunate at some times yet at others it may be as fatal The great Success of Scipio was celebrated with that excess of Joy and deservedly as Rome perhaps never shew'd the like and his Brother L. Scipio's Triumph was not much less than it Yet these two so famous Brothers afterwards were called one after another by two Tribunes of the People to Judgment in probability by the instigation of some of the Faction of the Senate against them The African could not endure that such unworthy Men should question him of purloining from the common Treasure or of being hired by Antiochus to make an ill Bargain for his Country When therefore the Day of Answer came he appeared before the Tribunes not humbled as one accused but followed by a great Train of his Friends and Clients with which he passed through the midst of the Assembly and having Audience told the People That upon the same day of the Year he fought a great Battel against Hannibal and finished the Punic War by a signal Victory In memory of which he thought it no fit Season to brabble at the Law but intended to visit the Capitol and there give Thanks to Jupiter and the rest of the Gods by whose Grace both on that day and at other times he had well and happily discharged the most weighty Business of the Commonweal and that if from the seventeenth Year of his Life until he now grew old the Honourable Places by them conferred on him had prevented the Capacity of his Age and yet his Deserts had exceeded the Greatness of those Honourable Places that then they would pray That the Princes and Great ones of the City might still be like to him So all followed him except the Tribunes and their Slaves and one of the Cryers by whom ridiculously they cited him to Judgment until for very shame as not knowing what else to do they granted him unrequested a longer Day But after when he perceived that the Tribunes would not let fall the Suit he willingly withdrew from that unthankful Rome that could suffer him to undergo such Indignities and so spent the rest of his time at Linternum Concerning Lucius Scipio the younger Brother The same Tribunes proceeded more sharply with his Brother Lucius Scipio the Asiatick whose wise Conduct and Valour had subjected Greece and Macedonia to the Roman Yoke and extended their Empire over those rich Countries They propounded a Decree unto the People touching Money received of Antiochus not brought into the Common Treasury that the Senate should give Charge unto one of the Praetors to inquire and Judicially determine thereof And Matters were so carried against him that he was condemned in a Sum of Money far greater than his Ability and for non-payment his Body should have been laid up in Prison but he was freed from the Rigour of this by Gracchus the Tribune and his Estate being confiscated when there neither appeared any Sign of his being beholden to Antiochus nor there was found so much as he was condemned to pay then fell his Accusers and all whose Hands had been against him into the Indignation of the People It is observed That Cato the elder who had been his Treasurer was a Promoter of this A Man saith Sir Walter Raleigh of great but not perfect Vertue Temperate Valiant and of singular Industry Frugal of the Publick and of his own who though not to be corrupted with Bribes yet was unmerciful and unconscionable in increasing his own Wealth by such means as the Laws did permit Ambition was his Vice which being joyned with Envy troubled both himself and the whole City And some write That Fabius Maximus out of some private displeasure countenanced these Proceedings From these and other Examples it may well be noted Summary of the Reman Discords how this famous Commonweal was pestered with Faction the want of sufficient Imployment were Sparks that help'd the kindling of the Fire of them which now began to appear and first caught hold of those great Worthies to whose Valour and Conduct Rome
affords us many Examples of Persons selling their Country and putting their great Councils upon ill attempts and labouring with their utmost cunning to frustrate good Designs because their Dependance upon a Foreign State or Kingdom was worth much more unto them than they could hope to gain by honest Service to their Country Supposing both the King and Optimacy be willing to promote the Peoples Happiness yet he is more able to compass that End by reason he hath a more United Power and the Execution of all Designs depends upon a single resolve and therefore may be managed with a certain closeness and all convenient swiftness so that good Councils shall be first discovered in their effects Whereas a great Body move slowly and most times the opportunity of Doing is gone by while they are but half way in their deliberation Besides More Inconveniences under Common-wealths than under Kings cateris paribus as there are many Advantages peculiar to Monarchy as in these three Chapters I hope I have evinced so there is not one Inconvenience to which a People living under Aristocracy are not subject in a much higher Degree than they are under Monarchy For supposing a King cruel yet one Man's Cruelty cannot reach so many as that of Multiplied oppressors when every one takes their peculiar Province to fleece or exercise their Lordliness over according as their Estates or Interests are divided The Covetousness likewise of Senators is more devouring because we may feed one Fire with less Expence of Fewel than five Hundred A Princes profuse Largesses to his Favourites is infinitely over-balanced by so many providing for their poor Kindred and making Friends and purchasing Dependants This very thing must likewise be practised by Senators for underproping their several reputations hiring Advocates to plead for them in their absence purchasing of Votes in their private concerns and obtaining of Offices Places and Estates for themselves and their Relations So that these must require more considerable Supplies from the People who must be squeezed every time any single Grandee wants than are necessary to nourish the Liberality of a Prince who hath a large Patrimony standing Revenue and places of Honour and Profit to gratify his Servants withal The wisest States having made ample allowances to their Princes to enable them to bestow Favours according to Merits or liking Some think that of Ecclesiastes Wo to thee O Land when thy King is a Child a strong Argument against Monarchy Another Objection answered because this Calamity is not incident to a Senate because they are not subject to Nonage But the place rightly understood saith a learned (i) Idem p. 23. Writer whom I have epitomized in the Parallel is a very full Confirmation of the happy Condition we have reason to expect under Monarchy and of the Calamities and Woes which probably attend an Aristocracy For the cause of those Miserie 's foretold is plainly thus A King during his Infancy being not able personally to Rule the Government is managed by the Nobles and thence come Factions and all the Mischiefs that accompany them To close therefore this Chapter we may consider that Kings have no Rivals whom they fear and must keep under as Governours of Commonwealths have which is no small Blessing to a People Kings as Proprietors take all the care possible saith a very (k) Jus Regin◠p. 58. Learned Author to improve their Dominions whereas Republicans are as Tenants mind nothing so much as their private Profit and the very Pretenders to Liberty and Property in this and the last Age have been the great Cheats of the Nation They when raised to govern grew insolent whereas Princes are still the same and their Passions rise not because their Fortunes do not The Prevailing Factions in Commonweals spare none that oppose them having no consideration of them but as Enemies whereas Kings pity even Rebels as considering them still as their Subjects and though I cannot say with my (l) Idem Author of one Year yet I may say of the whole time of the Usurpation That more were murthered and ruined in that Reforming Age than suffered by the Great Mogul and King of France in that space of time and more Severity was exercised by those Reformers than by all the Race of our Kings these Six hundred years And whatever Evil Ministers Kings are said to have yet what that Judicious Author notes of Scotland we may say the like of England That after they had taken from the Blessed King his Prerogative of chusing Judges and Councellors the Parliament did the next year put in I will not say with him the greatest Blockheads and Idiots in the Nation but men of much meaner Parts and more corrupt and unfit either for knowledge or the upright dispensing of the Laws Justice and Equity than any Age had known I have discoursed of this Head before and so shall say no more but that as well as in Antient times the unequal Distribution of Justice hath been noted so the Severity of the State of Venice against their Nobles and the executing Men without Citing or Hearing upon meer Jealousies induced a wise Spaniard who hath collected the Arbitrary Courses practised and allowed in that State to say That there is less of Liberty there than under the worst of Monarchies And for the State of Holland it hath been more than once observed how ingrateful they have been to all their Neighbours who have assisted them in their greatest need and with what a Jealousie they treat the Prince of Orange whose Ancestors setled them in the Possession of what they have as well as to the Crown of England is obvious to common Observation By them their Allies have been unworthily deserted In the matter of Trade no Pact or Faith hath been kept In their Country Mint and Cummin Coleworts and Herbs are excised nothing worn nothing fed upon or necessary for Humane Life but pays something to their Exchequer You pay a Tribute for the Ground you walk on for the Rivulets you pass on only they have not yet found out a Tax upon their Foggy Air. CHAP. X. The Character of a good King in general BEfore I come to treat of the Sovereignty I think it convenient to discourse of the usefullest Qualifications of Monarchs and the benefits that will redound to themselves and their Subjects thereby The (a) Ethic. 8. c. 10. Polit. lib. 3. 5. c. 4. Philosopher in several places compares a King to a Parent and Shepherd but a Tyrant to a Lord over Slaves and a Wolf Difference of a King and a Tyrant The One in his Government having a special Regard to the Peoples Benefit the Other governing without or against Law pro nutu arbitrio reducing all things under their absolute will and Power in such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as is unhappy to their People and in the Conclusion to themselves The ancient Authors Description of a Good
would put them upon that Dilemma will chuse to suffer if they cannot fly rather than rebel Therefore since it pleased his Majesty at his first Step to the Royal Throne which was like that of the rising Sun dispensing innumerable Blessings to his People to express his Royal Favour to the Church of England The King's Commendation of the Principles of the Church of England as to Monarchy with such an Encomium of its Members in that most refreshing Declaration at his first Council which from so just a Prince carries the Force and Energy of an Act of Parliament as well as of State in it it ought to bow the Hearts of all Men that design not to be Rebels as one Man to him Since which by the repeated solemnity of it to his two Houses of Parliament all suspicion of his Majestie 's ever acting to the contrary so long as the Subjects keep their dutiful Station is totally removed His Majesty also hath laid a solid Foundation for true Piety in the discountenancing and discrediting all forts of Vice and Debauchery by which none can doubt but himself as well as his Subjects will in short time reap happy Benefit according to that so the excellent (b) Diutius durant exempla quam mores Tacitus 4. Histor Historian Examples have a more durable force than Laws I shall conclude this particular with the famous Story of the Zealots in (c) Josephus de Bello Judaico lib. 4. c. 5. lib. 7. Judaea Those being told by Vespasian which Messages Josephus himself carried to them that he would change nothing of their Religion but maintain them therein The Evils by Rebelling upon pretence of Religion and in all their Liberties and Franchises yet under colour that they were bound to sacrifice their Lives in the defence of the Temple would never hearken to Peace upon any condition what ever but living upon Forraging Rapines Free-booty and committing most cruel Butcheries Vespasian found himself obliged to arm against them and use them with all Extremity In fine Those who pretended so much the Preservation of their Religion committed a Thousand sort of Impieties and Cruelties and themselves set the Temple of Jerusalem on Fire and at last brought utter Ruin to their Country I shall make no further Application but that from hence we may learn First That it was agreeable to Principles of Government that Vespasian though a Prince of a different Religion to the Jews should not alter their Civil or Religious Government And Secondly That the utter Extermination of a People and their Religion there was the Consequence of the Zelots Rebellion as to the apparent procuring cause for I enquire not here into the Original cause of that Nations Destruction viz. The crucifying of our Lord and Saviour I come now to consider wherein a Sovereign's care of Religion consists Wherein the Sovereign's Care of Religion consists which would carry me into a dangerous Ocean if I should survey all the Rocks Creeks and Quick-sands to be avoided in this matter At the best I shall find an high rolling Sea as that in the Bay of Biscay if I escape the difficult and dangerous passage betwixt Scylla and Charybdis First therefore I shall consider the Obligation the Pagan Romans thought they had not to make any Innovation in matters of their Religion with some Reflections upon it Secondly Consider the Condition of People under Diversity of Religions Thirdly The Roman Heathens not for change of Religion Speak something of the Diversities of Religion sprung up in the time of the late War And Lastly Something concerning Toleration But I must praemonish the Reader that I intend not to treat of these either as Divine or Statesman but only as a Lay-man that loves Order and Peace in transitu as a Parergon First then as to the Heathens we find that remarkable Advice of (*) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dio Cassius lib. 52. Mecaenas to Augustus That he ought to worship the Deity in all Methods and at all times himself according to his Countries Laws and cause others to do so and further adds That he should restrain those that would innovate in Divine things not for the cause only of the Gods but because those that bring in new Deities do drive men to make other dangerous Changes and from thence Conspiracies Sedition Conventicles Cabals c. which are things no ways conducible to the benefit of Government In which we may consider Mecaenas to advise like a Statesman considering that Augustus had but newly extricated himself from a great and dangerous War for no less than the Empire Therefore it behoved him to make no Alterations in Matters that might endanger the Settlement of his present Estate Therefore we find That Augustus laid aside the name of Triumvir contented with the Consulship and for defence of the People with the Tribunitian Authority which were old Offices the People were acquainted with and that he attracted the Soldiers good Will to him by Gifts the Peoples by Provision of Food and all with the sweetness of Peace arising by (d) Paulatim insurgere munia Senatus Magistratuum 〈◊〉 in se trabere aullo adversante Tacit. 1. Annal degrees to draw to himself the Imployment and Authority of the Senate the Magistrates and the Laws none opposing him How far this is to be imitated by Princes in the Circumstances of Augustus I leave to others to determine As to the general Sentiment that the Heathen Roman Religion was not to be changed I shall content my self with two Authorities of the great Orator who in one place (e) Majorum instituta tueri sacris caeremoniisque retinendis sapientis est Patrios ritus migrare aut violare ubique gentium nefarium sir Cic. de Divinatione saith That it is the part of a wise Man to defend the Institutions of their Ancestors in retaining sacred Ceremonies and that in all Nations it is reputed wicked to violate and banish our Countries Rites In another place (f) Omnes Religione moventur deos patrios quos a majoribus acceperunt colendos sibi diligenter retinendos arbitrantur Cic. in Verrem he pronounceth it absolutely That all are moved with Religion and judge their Country Gods which they have received from their Ancestors to be worshipped and retained I am sensible that if this were yielded to Christianity would not have been propagated in the World For if it had not been lawful to alter the so long established Idol Worship and Polytheism the Doctrine of Christianity had been shut out But on the other side when I consider how Christianity was propagated by the working of Miracles and by the Force and Energy of Conviction upon the Minds of such as would admit the Explanation and Dilucidation of the Doctrine and the Christians patient sufferings under the Heathen Persecutions and peaceable awaiting till God Almighty disposed the Emperor Constantine's Heart to embrace the saving Doctrine of
diversorum negotiorum causae in medium duci ex more coeperunt Id. p. 37. num 40. Ann. 1096. vel 1097. Therefore the Festival-days being passed the causes of divers affairs according to custom began to be transacted saith my Author among which that that of Anselm's was one But to draw to a Conclusion of this King's Reign my Author clears who were the Members of the Great Councils and that they were convened at the King's Pleasure in the relating that in the following (k) Mense Augusto cum de statu Regni acturus Rex Episcopos Abbates quosque Regni Proceres in unum praecepti sui sanctione egisset c. Id. p. 38. num 10. Month of August when the King being to transact things concerning the State of the Kingdom by his Summons had convened the Bishops Abbats and all the Noblemen of his Kingdom The affairs for which they were assembled being dispatched and every one prepared to return home Anselm moves again his Petition and in October when the Convention was dissolved he applied himself again to the King at Winchester Here we may observe that it was the King The King solely summons the Great Councils and dismisseth them who being to transact things about the State of the Kingdom by the Authority of his Precept or Summons called together the Members of the Great Council who are expresly mentioned to be the Bishops Abbats and all the Noblemen of the Kingdom Since therefore we find no other kinds of Great Councils in any Authors that write of this King we may conclude the Commons were no ways represented in any of them Most Authors mention this King with no good Character One old Writer saith Omnis jam legum silâ—it Justitia causisque sub justitio positis sola in Principibus imperabat pecunia Florent Wigorn. That all Justice of Laws was in his time hushed in silence and Causes being put in a Vacation without hearing Money alone bore sway among the great ones Polydore Virgil will have the right or duty of First-fruits called Annats which our Kings claimed for vacant Abbies and Bishopricks to have had their Original from King William Rufus However that be it is certainly true that at his Death the Bishopricks of Canterbury Winchester and Salisbury and twelve Monasteries besides being without Prelates and Abbats payed in their Revenues to the Exchequer We may judge likewise of his burthensome Exactions Matt. Paris fol. 74. Edit penult by what we find in his Brother King Henry the First 's Charter Wherein he saith because the Kingdom was oppressed with unjust Exactions he makes the Holy Church free and all evil Customs wherewith the Kingdom of England was unjustly oppressed he doth henceforth take away and they are all in a manner mitigations of the Severity of the feudal Tenor as any one may see in Matthew Paris Mr. Selden and Dr. Brady and is plain by the very first concerning the Laity That if any one of my Barons Counts or others that hold of me shall dye his Heirs shall not redeem his Lands as he was wont to do in the time of my Father c. And in another Praecipio ut homines mei similiter se contineant erga silios silias uxores hominum suorum That according to the relaxation he had made to his Homagers they should regulate themselves towards the Sons Daughters and Wives of their Homagers Of the Great Councils in King Henry the First 's time COncerning the Great Councils in King Henry the First 's time as also till Edward the First 's time I must refer the inquisitive Reader to Dr. Brady's answer to Mr. Petyt in the respective Kings Reigns and to his Appendix in which he hath amassed out of Eadmerus Simeon Dunelmensis Florentius Wigornensis Hoveden Gervasius Dorobernensis Matt. Paris Malmsbury and other Authentick Writers the Emphatical Expressions by which the constituent Parts of the Great Councils are fully proved to be only the Bishops Abbats and Priors for the Clergy or the great Nobility or prime Tenents in Capite such as the King pleased to summon under the names of Magnates Comites Proceres Principes Optimates Barones or Sapientiores Regni expresly used for Barones Where the Populus is used by way of Antithesis as contradistinct from the Clerus and where Regni Communitas or Ingenuitas is used the same Doctor Brady by pregnant Proof puts it beyond dispute that none of the Commons as now we understand them could be meant as Representatives So that though I had collected a considerable number of such Proofs e're I saw the Learned Doctor 's Book I shall now wave them all and only add in every King's Reign some few that he hath omitted or wherein something remarkable relating to the King's Soveraignty or the manner of constituting Laws is found by him noted or as I have met with them in my Reading In the third of Henry the First in the Feast of St. (a) Omnes Principâ—s Regni sui Ecclesiastici Secularis Ordinis Flor. Wigorn. Anno 1102. 3 H. 1. Michael saith the Monk of Worcester the King was at London and with him all the Princes of his Kingdom of the Ecclesiastick and Secular Order and of the same Council Malmsbury saith The King bidding (b) Ipso Rege annuente communi consensu Episcoporum Abbatum Principum totius Regni adunatum est Conciltum De Gest Pontif. Anno 1102. or willing with the common Consent of the Bishops and Abbats and Princes of the whole Kingdom the Council was united and this being mostly about Ecclesiastick affairs it is added that in this Council the Optimates Regni at the Petition of Anselm were present and gives the reason For that whatever might be decreed by Authority of the Council might be maintained firmly by the mutual care of both orders Whereby we may note the Obligation upon Subjects of both Orders to observe the Laws once enacted by the King and Council Anno 1107. 7 H. 1. Matth. Paris saith (c) Factus est conventus Episcoporum Abbatum pariter Magnatum ad Ann. c. there was a convention of the Bishops and Abbats as likewise of the Magnates i. e. Noblemen at London in the King's Palace Archbishop Anselm being President To which the King assented and speaking of what was established he saith Rex statuit To him Hoveden agrees only what the one calls Magnates the other calls Proceres The Manuscript of Croyland (d) Tum Episcoporum Abbatum totius Cleri Angliae by which must be understood the great dignified Clergy Sub Wifrido Abbate p. 104. saith The same Year the King giving manifold thanks to God for the Victory he had given him over his Brother Robert and other Adversaries appointed a famous Council at London as well of the Bishops and Abbats of the whole Clergy of England as of the Earls Barons Optimatum Procerum totius Regni In this Council
the King (e) Remisit libere concessit integre promisiâ— remitted freely granted and fully promised the Investiture by Ring and Staff and freely left the Election of the Prelates to their respective Churches By which we may not only note who made up this Great Council but that the enacting part was solely the King's Grant The Charter (f) Lib. rub Scaccar Twysden LL. Id. 1. p. 175. of Henry the First was made before the Eighteenth of his Reign in which he saith because his Kingdom was oppressed with unjust Exactions in (g) Ego respectu Dei amore quem ergâ— vos habeo Matt. Paris fol. 292. num 10. See the Explanation of this Charter Brady's Argum. fol. 265. and Selden's Epinomis respect of God and the Love which he hath to his Subjects he makes the Holy Church free and so proceeds in the rest of his Laws by way of single Grant and Prohibition Anno 1127. 28 H. 1. (h) Rex auditis Concilii gestis consensum praebuit Authoritate Regia potestate concessit consirmavit statuta Concilii Continuat Florent Wigorn p. 503. W. Archbishop of Canterbury gathered a General Council of all the Bishops Abbats and Religious Persons and at the close of the Acts it is said That the King being at London having heard the Acts of the Council gave his consent to them and by his Kingly Authority and Power granted and confirmed the Statutes of the Council By which we may see that even the Constitutions of Ecclesiastical Councils required the Sovereign's Confirmation Of the Great Councils in King Stephen's time THat he was an Usurper is notoriously known His first great Council is only said by Malmsbury to be gathered at London (a) Coacto magno Episcoporum Procerum Abbatum concilio Fol. 92. b. num 4. consisting of Bishops Nobles and Abbats in which many Ecclesiastical and Secular Matters were ordained Matthew Paris saith That he having gathered at London the Magnates Regni he promised the bettering of the Laws according to the will (b) Juxta voluntatem arbiâ—rium singulorum Fol. 62. num 40. and pleasure of all The reason of which compliance of this King was for that he was set up and Crowned by a Faction there being reckoned by Authors none of Eminence present at his Coronation but the Archbishop of Canterbury the Bishop of Winchester and Roger of Salisbury his Brother no Abbats and but few of the Nobility they having all sworn (c) Malmsb. Hist Novel fol. 101. b. num 16. Fealty to Maud the Empress in Henry the first 's life time though he in the following Charter saith That he was elected King Assensu Cleri Populi But to proceed King Stephen primo Regni at Oxford Anno 1136. grants the Liberties to his Subjects by way of Charter (d) Ego Stephanus Dei gratia assensu Cleri c. omnes exactiones meschenningas injustitias sive per Vicecomites vel per alios quoslibet male inductas funditus extirpo bonas leges antiquas justas consuetudines c. observabo observari praecipio constituo Malmsb. Hist Novel p. 101. b. num 20. that the Church be free and he confirms due Reverence to it and so proceeds to recite many particular Priviledges to it and as to his Lay-Subjects he doth utterly root out all exactions misdeeds and injustices evilly brought in by Sheriffs or any others That he will observe himself and appoints and constitutes to be observed the good Laws and antient and just Customs in Hundreds Pleas or other matters This was by Charter and my Author saith he disdains to set to the names of the Witnesses which were many because he so lightly or foolishly changed all But Richard Prior of Hexham closes the Charter thus (e) Ric. Prior Hâ—gustald col 314. num 6. Anno 1136. 1 Regni The King grants his Charter with a Salvo Haec omnia concedo confirmo salva Regia justa Dignitate mea By which Conclusion it is apparent the King reserved to himself a Latitude to use his Prerogative and some are of opinion Kings cannot by any Concessions divest themselves of that but I want Mittans to handle such noli me tangere's of the Crown What I have further to add concerning this Charter is That the Prior of Hexham makes it granted after the Popes Confirmation (f) Id. 313. num 30. Note That all Authors think strange thâ— Pope should â—â—â—firm and so countenance King Stephen an Usurper of him in which if ever that See consulted its private Interest it was then and in my poor Opinion nothing hath more discovered the Personal failures of Popes than such countenancing of Usurpers my Author I say makes it to be passed at his Parliament at Oxford where he saith he celebrated a general Council Episcopos Proceres sui Regni regali edicto in unum convenire praecepit The Witnesses this Author sets down makes it (g) Id. 315. num 10. appear there were none besides the Clergy and Barons present for after fourteen Bishops named the rest of the Witnesses are Roger the Chancellor Henry Nephew of the King Robert Earl of Gloucester William Earl Warren Ralph Earl of Chester Roger Earl of Warwick Rob. de Vere Miles de Gloucester Rob. de Olli Briano Filio Comitis Constab Robert de Martel Hugh Bigot Humfrid de Bohun Simon de Bellocampo Dapif Rob. de Ferrers William Petrus Simon de Silbanâ—et William de Albania Hugh de Sancto Claro Ilbert de Lecsio All which were very great Barons the last of them being Heir to 150 Knights Fees at least his Grandfather had so many So that we cannot judge the Commons by any Representation were present The other great Councils of this King are to be found in the Authors (h) Flor Wigorn. Anno 1138. fol. 668. cited in the Margent That at Northampton had Turstin Archbishop of York president and the rest enumerated are Episcopi Abbates Comites Barones Nobiles quique per Angliam That of the sixteenth (i) Hen. Hunt Anno 1151. fol. 226. mentions only the Archbishop of Canterbury Eustachius the King's Son Angliae Proceres in the (k) Chron. Norm Anno 1152. Agreement 17 Regni the Conventus was Episcoporum Comitum aliorum Optimatum and the last I find Anno 1154. ultimo Regni e is cum Episcopis Optimatibus (l) Jo. Brompton col 1000. num 50. never any Commons represented being to be met with Of the Great Council in King Henry the Second's Reign THE first considerable Act of State that I find Henry the Second did was Anno 1154. 1 Reg. That he gathered his General Council to London in Lent (a) Spelman Concil Tom. 2. fol. 54. Congregavit Concilium generale renovavit pacem leges consuetudines per Angliam ab antiquis temporibus constitutas he renewed Peace and the Laws and Customs of antient
reason because it passed under his Broad Seal Likewise when the Constitution of Parliament was altered 49 H. 3. whereby in place of the Tenents in Capite which were numerous two Knights were chosen probably by the rest of the Tenents in Capite for the Shires and two Citizens and two Burgesses for Burroughs to represent all those that held in Capite and it is likely all other their Subfeudatary Tenents yet the number was not constantly observed there being sometimes Knights and no Citizens or Burgesses sometimes one Knight one Citizen and one Burgess other times two or three Knights left as it seems to the Sheriffs or the Chusers Election till after it was fixed as it now is for two Knights two Citizens and two Burgesses unless in some places of Wales where to this Day some two or three Burroughs chuse but one or two Burgesses Likewise it is worth the observing how gradually the Advice and Assent hath pass'd from the Advice of the Bishops and Nobles to the Assent likewise and sometimes at their request only the King ordains and then from the Potition of the Commons to their joyning in Advice and after to their Assent and many other material progressive alterations which in this recapitulation I cannot insist upon till it hath come to that constitution so much to be valued by all wise Englishmen as it is the product of the generous condescensions of Gracious Kings and the wise contrivance of our considerate Ancestors Therefore I shall now pass to consider our present Constitution of Parliaments CHAP. XXVIII Of the modern rightly constituted Parliaments SECT 1. Of the General Vse of Parliaments I Have before given an account how the Persian Laws were made by the (a) Daniel cap. 6. v. 7 8. King his Princes Governours Nobles and Captains as in a great Council of several Orders with the Sovereign but we have an older example in Scripture Great Councils in Scripture that seems to be the Pattern of all great Councils such as we call Parliaments under a Monarchy For it is said (b) Legem praecepit nobis Moyses haereditatem multitudinis Jacob. Erit apud rectissâ—â—um Rex congregatis Principibus populi cum Tribubus Israel Deâ—â— cap. 33. v. 4 5. Moses commanded us a Law even the Inheritance of the Congregation of Jacob and he was King in Jesurun when the Heads of the People and Tribes of Israel were gathered together Here is the King Moses commanding a Law and the Heads of the People the Princes or House of Lords and the Tribes that is some to represent the chief of the Tribes like our House of Commons The Roman Senate under the Emperors resembled our ancient Great Councils that consisted of such as the King convened and of the Patrician and Equestrian Order The Comitia bore no resemblance with our Commons and the Amphictyonican (c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Assemblies the Achaian Booâ—â—an and Pan Aetolian were Assemblies of Deputies as the States General of Holland Such Assemblies in all sorts of Governments are necessary Necessary in all Governments for be the Empire never so vast and the Sovereigns Power never so great and uncontroulable yet without Consultation had with the Princes and wise Men for the constituting Laws and modelling the frame and methods of his Government it would soon without such (d) Vis consilii expers mole ruit sua Horat. lib. 3. Od. 4. Buttresses and Undersetters sinking in its Foundation by its own weight with an hideous rush be crushed into an heap of Rubbish In Democracy Great Councils are needful that thereby the (e) Plato de LL. In Democracy Male cuncta ministrat impetus Statius Precipitancy and fury of the Common-People by their gravity may be attempered the common sort being apt to do every thing with a willful Violence which never succeeds well when not directed to a right end If their publick affairs were not committed to a select number of Trustees nothing would be brought to any Issue since none can be heard where all speak nor any good Product be from a jumble of those Atoms Aristocracy it self consists in a select number of the wisest and ablest to govern In Aristocracy who in publick Consultations have no private ends Yet in the great Councils of neither of these forms of Government is there to be found that stayedness orderliness or resolution for the public good as in Monarchy Why such Assemblies are not only convenient In Monarchy but necessary under Monarchy there are many weighty Reasons (f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Xenoph. Cyropaed 8. Satisfactory to the Subject Xenophon observes that a single Person sees or hears but little and Princes must have many Eyes and Ears which in a special manner these Great Councils are from all parts of the Dominions bringing notice of what is amiss and wants redress as well as what is orderly and wants encouragement Besides Princes thereby have the opportunity to give their Subjects satisfaction in their Administration preventing the surmises and jealousies of the Nobility Gentry and common People that he sleights them in not calling them sometimes to consult about affairs of Moment Furthermore the Prince by such congress The Prince thereby knows the Worthy Subjects consults his own Interest in coming to the Knowledg of the most able active and popular Subjects whereby he may single out such as are most fitted for public Imployments to serve him in the several offices of Government and all who thus have a share in the debating and consulting about Laws will not only be witnesses of the Prince's Grace and Favour in granting such as they have desired and assented to but will be so many Heralds of his Wisdom and care of his Peoples good Government and so many vigorous enforcers of the Execution of those Laws they have so lately assisted to prepare Likewise The Prince is skreened from Obloquy as Privy-Counsellors and other Officers are sometime as Skreens to Princes to ward off the Obloquy of the Mobile when something is imposed that may be wholesome though something bitter to their Palates So especially are these great Conventions necessary where useful Laws though severe are to be enacted Money to be raised or other Impositions laid upon the People who do much more chearfully and less repiningly obey when they know (g) Tum caetera parit Turba libens subit propriis quia legibus acta the Nobility and their own Representatives have judged them convenient All Men naturally loving that such Impositions may immediately result from themselves rather than they should be enjoyned by the Princes Arbitrary power according to that of Claudian Observantior aequi Fit Populus nec ferre negat cum viderit ipsum Auctorem parere sibi The General use of good Parliaments is summed up in the (h) MS. Speech An. 1562. The general Benefits of Parliaments Chancellors Speech 2 Eliz. thus That the principal cause of their
Assembly was that things there proposed may be orderly and diligently debated deeply considered and thereupon wisely concluded To examine whether any Law already made be too sharp and sore and so over-burthensome to the Subject or over-loose and soft and so over-dangerous to the State For that acriores sunt morsus intermisseae Libertatis quam retentae He further adds The use of them is to consider the want and superfluities of Laws whether Graft Malice or Covetousness hath devised any ways or means to defraud the Benefit and Force of Laws and in matter of Policy for the more perfect upholding and establishing the Soveraigns Royal State and the Preservation of the Common-weal committed to the Princes care Bodin (i) Lib. 3. de Repubâ— p. 350. commends the Constitution of the Government in England and Spain that they have Parliaments once in three Years whereby Princes upon any imminent danger may have recourse to their Council and Assistance to defend their Countries from Hostile Attempts to raise Money for public Necessity cure the Diseases of the Commonweal confirm the State appoint Laws hear the Complaints of the grieved amend Male-Administration by calling ill Mannagers to account understand what the Prince otherwise may be ignorant of and generally to have counsel in all things which in Prudence are necessary for the happy Government of the Commonweal Sir (k) Commonwealth part 1. c. 2. p. 37. Tho. Smith saith As in War where the King himself is in Person with the Nobility Gentry and Yeomanry the Power and Force of England is So in Peace and Consultation where the Prince is to give Life and the last and highest Commandment the Nobility for the higher the Knights Esquires and Gentlemen for the lower part of the Commonwealth and the Bishops for the Clergy be present to advertise and consult and shew what is necessary for the Commonwealth every thing being advised with mature Deliberation every Bill being thrice read and disputed upon in either House apart and after the Prince himself doth consent thereto that is the Prince's and whole Kingdoms Deed whereupon no Man can justly complain but must accommodate himself to find it just See Prynne part 1. Brief Register p. 447. good and obey it and concludes that whatever the People of Rome might do either in Centuriatis or Tribunitiis Comitiis the same may be done by the Parliament of England which representeth and hath the Power of the whole Kingdom Thus far of the general use now to the Constitution Concerning the word Parliament it is concluded by most Of the word Parliament to come from the French word parler to speak therefore before the word was used by our Historians as appliable to this great Convention the Latin word Colloquium was frequently used to signify a Conference betwixt the King and the great Men summoned to consult advise and take Counsel with the King and among themselves Yet before the word was used to signifie these great Assemblies we find it applied to other Meetings in William Rufus's time For Ingulphus Abbat of Croyland speaking of private Consultations in that Abby saith That Semannus de Lek (a) Veniens coram conventu in nostro publico Parliamento c. coming before the Convention in their publick Parliament took his Oath of Fidelity to them as Serjeant of their Church The First that is noted to use this word among all our Historians is (b) Convenit ad Parliamentum Generalissimum totius Regni Angliae c. p. 674. Matthew Paris Anno 1246. 30 H. 3. where he saith There came to the most general Parliament to London the whole Nobility of all the Kingdom of England The first Mention of it on Record is in the (c) Cl. 49 E. 3. d. 11. Writ of Summons to the Cinque Ports summoning them ad instans Parliamentum nostrum and the next is in the Writ of Prorogation of the (d) Cl. 3 E. 1.20 dorso Parliament 3 E. 1. where it is twice mentioned in the Writ generale Parliamentum nostrum eodem Parliamento Having premised thus much concerning the Name and first usage I shall now discourse of it in particular SECT 2. Of the Summons of the Prelates THAT the King is Caput Principium Finis Parliamenti as Sir Edward Coke notes is obvious to all The Summons have been constantly from the King The Summons only from the King or in his Name In the former Chapters I have discoursed out of our Historians that the Great Councils were always convened by the Kings Now I come to prove it by Records and shall note first the Summons to the Prelates then of the Nobles and thirdly of the Knights Citizens and Burgesses only noting some of the remarkablest of them from Mr. Prynn who hath so fully writ of them in his brief Register of Parliamentary Writs in four parts and his Brevia Parliamentaria Rediviva to whose indefatigable pains in transcribing such an infinite of Records all Antiquaries Lawyers and Statesmen will be always beholding though in the use he made of such before the late King's Restauration or at least while he sate in the long Parliament few Loyal Men can follow his Doctrines All the Writs before the Sixth of King John whereby any were summoned to great Councils are utterly lost that runs (e) Claus 6 Joh. m. 3. dorso The Summons in King John's time thus Mandamus vobis rogantes quatenus omni occasione dilatione postposita sicut nos honorem nostrum diligitis sitis ad nos apud London c. nobiscum tractaturi de magnis arduis negotiis nostris communi Regni Vtilitate vestrum habere consilium aliorum Magnatum Terraendstrae Abbates Priores conventuales toti Diuoecesis citari faâ—iatis The second Record is (f) Claus 26 H. 3. m. 13. dorso 26 H. 3. directed to Walter Archbishop of York differing from the former in these particulars Sicut nos honorem nostrum here is added Pariter vestrum diligitis in fide qua nobis tenemini Anno 38 H. 3. the Writ is directed to the Archbishop of Canterbury Paternitatem vestram omni qua possumus affectione rogamus quatenâ—s nos Jura nostra totaliter indeâ—ensa non deserentes cum omni celeritate convocetis coram vobis Capitulum vestrum Cathedrale Archidiaconos Viros Religiosos Clerum vobis subjectum inducentes eos omnibus modis quibus poteritis quod nobis in tanta necessitate liberaliter subveniant I do not bring in this as a Writ of Summons to a Parliament These Summons for Military Aid out only as a special Writ to excite the Clergy to a free voluntary and liberal Contribution for defence of Gascoign and so to show the Customs of Benevolences in that Age out of Parliament The next (g) Claus 49 H. 3. dorso 11. in schedula The first Summons to the Lords when the Commons also were summoned Writ of
and after by himself and his mock-Representatives by Councils of State and Safety and such new Names and Powers as our Laws never heard of and all this under pretence that they Acted by the Peoples Authority and suffrage and all the sad Devastations of that Age resulted from the confiding so much in the pretended Representatives of the People Which (a) England's Universal Distraction p. 4. one some Years before the sad Catastrophe plainly foretold tho' like belief was given to him as of old to Cassandra His Words are That the so much exalting the Power of the Representatives was first to destroy the King by the Parliament and next the Parliament and Kingdom by the People Thus ignorant Politicians that build upon such Quick-sands soon live to see their Insanae Structurae ruinously fall about their Ears Thirdly Whereas the Advocates for the Representatives would gladly have possessed the People that they could rely upon none so securely and safely as upon those they had themselves chosen they being less subject to private ends and affections than any particular man such a Body being not likely to counsel or consent to any thing but what is publickly advantageous It is to be considered that it is a false Postulatum Such a Body being but an Aggregate of particulars may have as many private ends as any other number of Subjects it being well known that Communities themselves are subject to dangerous Inclinations from private Incitements and I the Representatives subject to misleading Factions and Ambitions of private Men and by coalition of Parties when they fall into designs they are most dangerous and fatally violent and tho' it may at first View seem to be repugnant that an Universality should have private ends yet seeing it is not the number of Agents but the capacity in which they act and the quality of the Actors and the coherence or incoherence of what they pursue with the publick end and weal which makes the Actions of men public or private It must needs follow That if without Authority or out of the way of Public Ordinances men pursue any thing though the whole Community concur in the pursuit yet it is all of the nature of a private Action and done to a corrupt and private end Because the Author of some Observations upon some of K. Charles the 1st Messages was reputed the great Champion of the two Houses I shall content my self with culling out some of the daringest assertions Why Reason and Law were not hearkned to by the Advocates of the Long Parliament he and some other of their Triarii used and apply such of those Answers and Reasonings as the Learned and Loyal offered then against them though they could not be heard while the Torrent bore all down the stream The hideous noise of Tumults and after of Drums Trumpets Cannons and Fire-Arms hushed and silenced all the still voice of Law and Reason But now it is to be hoped when Mens Eyes are unsealed the Mask and Vizard dropped or pulled off the fatal Consequences of such pernicious Principles throughly manifested and the loud Thunder of the Two Houses Ordinance allayed mens Spirits will be better fitted to hear them refuted Besides what I have endeavoured to answer before concerning the Authority of the Representative which they would make an Assembly in which the People in underived Majesty are by these Proxies convened to affirm an Imaginary Power supposed to be theirs originally and in such a convention to be put in execution I say besides this which in several places I have refuted That filled all their Declarations Messages and Treatises when they were contriving the setting up the Commons House Topmost to prove That they were a Body that was not easily corrupted byassed tempted or prevailed upon to Act any thing but what was the best for the Peoples advantage Therefore I think fit in many particulars to shew how such Bodies may be warped to sinister ends and especially how that House not only deceived but tyrannized over the whole Nation Private (b) Answer to Observer p. 130 131. How Passions Affections Interests and Factions may sway Representatives Quarrels and the memory of former Sufferings may work upon some discontent and envy at other mens preferment may transport others the fear of the lash and desire to secure themselves have forced some to personate a part great Offices and Honours have been a Pearl in some Mens Eyes to hinder their Fight others have been like Organ Pipes to whom the wind of popular Applause hath only given a sound others who have premeditated their Parts before their design was discovered have upon some pretences or other suppose of an unlawful Election being Monopolists Abhorrers or such like got those excluded by Vote whom they conceived to be likely to oppose their designs The bewitching Power of Oratory prevails upon many In others there is a Speechless Humour of following the Drove The Ambition and Covetousness of Representatives Can we not easily conceive several of this Body may be ambitious which would prompt them to alter the old way of bestowing Offices and collating of Honours so by disservice as well as service in Parliaments some Men have obtained Honours Offices and Estates finding it a good way to get preferment by putting the King upon necessity of granting Good Woodmen say That some have used Deer-stealing as an Introduction to a Keepers place So we have seen a Non-conformist's mouth stopped I might instance in other Professions with a good Benefice whereas before he was satisfied he could gape as wide as his Neighbours Others by more only ways slip into Preferment for Covetousness and Ambition will sail with any Wind. The Covetousness of the Members of the long Parliament by woful experience was found insatiable witness their Voting for one anothers Offices Governments satisfaction for their losses out of Delinquents Estates sharing the Kings Lands and Revenue the Bishops Deans and Chapters Lands and the Estates of the Royal Party hence together with the itch of Arbitrary rule they drew the determination of Causes out of the ordinary Courts of Justice before their Houses and Committees of them and in every County had their Sub-committees to Tyrannize over the People and fleece them Their cruelty appeared in their erecting High Courts of Justice Major Generals and other Arbitrary Courts The Cruelty of the Long Parliament where many a Loyal and brave man for serving his King against such Rebels either lost his Life or his Liberty and Estate and when they were the gentlest yet they could show hatred enough by Imprisoning upon I know not what suspicion and at leasure prosecuting such as they had a pique against The partiality of Members in such Conventions are very frequent The Partiality in shielding their friends from being questioned though their Corruptions were notorious to all the World So in the fatal Parliament of 1641. A Monopolist if a Loyal man was sure to be
infallible and every Member an Angel But the Observer Objection That if the King have a Negative Voice there will be no need of Parliaments and his Pewfellows urge That if the Houses can do no Act for publick good without the King's consent and if the King may reject their Counsels and Advice it were needless to put the Country to the charge of choosing Members of Parliament And if the King may prefer other opinions before Parliamentary Motives then Parliaments are vain and useless helps Princes are unlimited and the People miserable These Objections are of such an odious nature Answer That no good Subject can take delight in them whose duty is to pray for the like consent among the several Orders of the Kingdom as is supposed to be among the several Orbs of Heaven The King undoubtedly the Primum movens the Great and Privy Council the lower Spheres The usual but not the only form of the Kings Answers to such Bills as they were not willing to pass Le Roy s'avisera proves (e) Answer to Observations p. 56. That after the advice of this his Great Council he is yet at liberty to advise further with persons or occasions as his own Wisdom shall think meet But these Authors will by no means take notice That the use of Council is to perswade not to compel as if a Man in business of great concernment might not very prudently consult with many Friends and yet at last follow the advice perhaps of one if it appear more proportionable to the end he aims at If it were because they are a more numerous body therefore their Counsel is upon that account to be yielded to then the liberty of dissenting may be denied to the House of Peers in comparison of the House of Commons and to that House too in comparison of the People and so both King Lords and Commons are voted out of Parliament Besides Natural Wisdom and Fidelity there is a thing called Experience of high concernment in the managery of Publick Affairs He that will steer one Kingdom aright must know the right Constitution of all others their Strength their Affections their Counsels and Resolutions that upon each different Face of the Skie he may alter his Rudder The best Governments have more Councils than one One for the Publick Interest of the Kingdom another for the Affairs of State a Council for War and a Council for Peace Let them be as wise and faithful Counsellors as the Observer pleaseth only let them be but Counsellors Necesse est us Lancea in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi sic animum perspicuis cedere Let their conlusions have as much credit as the premisses deserve and if they can necessitate the Prince by weight of Reason and convincing Evidence of experience let them do it on Gods name But it is not to be done upon the Authority of a bare Vote as I think all uninterested persons are satisfied in the Votes of the Houses in 1641. about the Militia Church-Government and the voted Nineteen Propositions or the late Votes about the Bill of Seclusion the Repealing of the branch of the Statute of Queen Elizabeth against Protestant Dissenters and the Loans upon the Kings Revenue There are other ends besides Counsel for which Parliaments are called as consenting to new Laws furnishing the Public with Moneys and maintaining the Interest of the Government and liberty of the Subject from the removing one social end to inferr that an Action is superfluous deserves no answer but silence and contempt This should teach the Electors Wisdom not to chuse such as have Factious Bents or are not truly qualified in their Allegiance to their Prince or Malecontents who render such Conventions useless to the Publick Ends of Government and the Peace Tranquillity and Prosperity of both Prince and People Because the Long Parliament Writers would have no Stone unturned nor any specious Argument uninforced Concerning the Coronation-Oaths of the King of England that might bring the King to their Lure to consent to what they proposed they endeavoured to make the World believe that the King was bound by his Coronation Oath to pass all such Bills as they presented or tendered to him grounding as Mr. Prynne and others alledged on a promise of the Kings at his Coronation to grant and keep the Laws and Customs which the Commonalty shall chuse Before I come to give the particular Answer I think it not unfit to take this opportunity to give a full account of the Coronation Oaths of our Kings and how the same from Age to Age were varied by which the Ingenious Reader will find what the respective Kings by their Oaths did promise That I may deduce as high as I have yet found the Original of Soveraign Princes taking Oaths at their Coronations it may be noted that the first Emperor that was Crowned and had any Coronation Oath prescribed was (f) Evagrius Hisâ— Eccles lib. 3. c. 32. Who first took a Coronation-Oath Anastasius the Greek Emperor who being elected by the Senate and Soldiers about Ann. 486. Euphemius Patriarch of Constantinople suspecting him to be addicted to the Heresy of Eutychius and the Manichees would not consent to his Coronation till he should deliver him a Writing under his Hand ratified with his Oath wherein he should plainly declare That if he were Crowned Emperour he would maintain the true Faith and Synod of Chalcedon during his Reign and bring in no Novelty to the Church of God This Writing ratified with his Oath Macedonius the Treasurer was to keep and after he was made Patriarch the Emperor demanded it and said It was a great discredit unto his Subjects that his Hand-writing should be kept to testifie against him or that he should be tied to Pen and Paper There is no mention of any Coronation Oath used from thence to the Year 804. that (g) Eutrop. lib. 24. p. 145 146. Zonar Annal. tom 3. fol. 142 143. Imperatorio Diademate est ornatus postulato prius scripto quo promitteret se nulla Ecclesiae statuta violaturum Stauratius Son to Nicephorus slain in his Wars against the Bulgarians being declared Emperor by some Michael Curopolata was adorned by the Patriarch with the Diadem a Writing before being desired in which he promised to violate none of the Statutes of the Church c. Which is the first Precedent of a Promise not an Oath demanded from or given by any Roman King for confirming the Laws of the Church c. The first Emperor Crowned at Rome by any Pope (h) Onuphr was Charles the Great Anno 800. but without an Oath and Henry the Fifth (i) Dicens Imperatorem nemini jurari debere cum juramentorum sacramenta ab omnibus sint sibi adhibenda Hermold Chron. Scl. l. 1. c. 40. Sim. Dunelm 232 237. refused to take any Corporal Oath saying That an Emperor ought to Swear to none for that Oath i. e. of Fealty
tutissimum rerum administrandarum vinculum Lib. 2. c. 21. 1. Secresie 2. Ability Valerius For he can never atchieve great matters to whom it is irksome to retain Secrets So Aemilius Probus amongst the praises of Epaminondas relates that he was Commissi celans and Albertus King of Poland said he would change his Shirt if he thought it were privy to his Counsels He is a leading eminent Man saith (d) Eum primum esse virum qui ipse consulit quod in rem sit secundum eum qui bene monenti obediat qui nec ipse consulere nec alteri parere scit eum extremi esse ingenii Lib. 2. Livy who is able to give Counsel and Second unto him is he that yields to good Counsel but he is in the lowest form of Wit who neither can give good Counsel nor obey it The true Composition of a Counsellor 3. Skill in a Prince's Affairs saith my Lord St. Albans is rather to be skilled in his Masters Business than his Nature for then he is like to advise him and not to flatter him and find his Humour For knowledg and Prudence in affairs are principally requisite in Counsellors who should be well acquainted with the (e) Ad concilium in Republica dandum caput est nosse Rempublicam Cic. de Orat. Constitution of the Government the Laws Rules and Policy of it both to be able to advise in all things relating to his Princes managment of matters at home and abroad (f) Tacitus vita Agricolae Mores animosque Provinciae quaerere To be curious to dive into the Spirits manners and Dispositions of all those his Prince hath to deal with whereby he may the better suit his Masters occasions by humouring and timing every thing with a quiet Industry and making every matter be adapted to his end without tumultuation and rude Shocks but rather by insensible Screws The noblest design and endeavour any Privy-Counsellor can have 4. Not to aim at Private Profit is to serve his King and Country upon Principles of publick advantage for it is the worst of Poysons to the Judgment and regards to Truth in all Consultations to aim at private Profit according to that Excellent remarque of (g) Pessimum veri affectus judicii venenum sua cuique utilitas 1. Hist Tacitus That private design of Profit is the worst Poyson of Judgment and attaining Truth For when private Prosit holds the Ballance the Princes Standard is little regarded there being no weight so deadly heavy as when a Man's self and his private Interest are cast into one Scale Uprightness and Faithfulness are two Master Ingredients in all Counsellors 5. Uprightness and Faithfulness requisite So Pliny (h) Optimum eum quemque sidelissâ—mum Panaegyr tells Trajan That he is the best Man that is most faithful to his Trust for by the Eyes of Counsellors Princes see by their Ears they hear and if those Organs be depraved the Princes Apprehensions of things must be adulterated and the King passing his Judgment according to their Representation may proceed upon very uncertain or false Grounds Counsellors indeed are the Speculators of Princes they have therefore need of the clearest Sight not to be tainted with false Colours they are to be quick-sighted to pry into the Consequences of Things while in the obscure Shop of the First Causes they are the Pilots that are appointed to steer the Ship of the Commonwealth and so must be skilled in the Chart to know to veer and change with Emergencies to know the rolling Sands and under Sea-Rocks to know the Coast and Creeks the Measure of all things relating to the Government both preceding by-past and to come The (i) Sapiens Non semper in uno gradu sed in una via nec se in aliquibus mutat sed potius aptat 3. Histor most politick Historian notes 6. To pursue the Design of the Prince by several ways That a wise Counsellor though he may pass in several Tracts yet must never be out of that Path which will lead him to the accomplishment of his Designs and in the necessary Traverses he must make not to be found so much to change as to suit himself to the Work he is about It is a great piece of self-denying Wisdom in a Counsellor that desires to keep his Station 7. To leave the Prince the Honour of Counsels to leave to his Master the Honour of the contrivance of those advantagious things he suggests Aliis (k) Guntherus magni reputantibus ipse Negligit modico factum metitur honore So Agrippa admonisheth those that would be safe in Courts to eschew the difficulties of things and leave the glory of the accomplishment of them to those that have the Supremacy It is too hazardous a curiosity in some Princes Counsellors to enquire into the hidden sence of their Masters 8. Not to be too curious in prying into their Master's Secrets or what they reserve in their own dark thoughts It being difficult to attain the meaning of what they leave doubtful according to that of the curious Author (l) Abditos Principis sensus si quid excultius parat exquirere inlicitum anceps Tacit. lib. 6. Annal. c. 2. It is doubtful and unlawful to enquire into the hidden Sence of a Prince or what he more curiously designs But this falls out only under a Tiberius or some Mysterious Prince though it may happen under a Good and Wise Prince who to leave the greater liberty of Debate discovers not his own inclinations and under such an one Counsellors are safe especially when by conjectual Inferences they promote the end though they may differ in the Medium Pliny saith (m) In Consiliario Principis tria maxime requiruntur libertas fides veritas libertas consilii est ejus vita essentia qua erepta consilium evanescit Panaegyr three things are required in a Counsellor 9. Liberty Faith and Truth requisite in a Privy-Counsellor Liberty Faith and Truth Liberty is the Life and Essence of Council which being taken away all Counsel vanisheth for as good Counsel is the Soul of the State so he that hath not a Liberty being bound by private Interest is but a Palsied Member and if Counsellors want Faith and Verity they hide and disguise the Truth which is full of danger both to the King and (n) Malum consilium consultori pessimum themselves Such fear as doth not fall in constantem virum is a great enemy to good Counsel for fear is a betraying of such succours as Reason and Counsel should afford King (o) Coke 4. Instit c. 2. Four Properties of Counsellors Edward the Third would have his Counsellor to have four Properties 1. To be Parcus sui knowing he would never be provident for Him that would not be a good Husband for himself 2ly That he should not be Cupidus rei alienae no covetous or greedy man for
ei nihil turpe cui nihil satis 3ly That he should be Avarus Rei Publicae covetous for the Kings Treasure and Commonwealth 4ly That he super omnia sit expertus that he be expert in what place the King shall imploy him for great Offices are never well managed by a Deputy When quick and when deliberate Counsels are best where the Officer himself is but a Cypher As to Counsels themselves Livy (p) In rebus asperis tenuis spei fortissima quaeque consilia tutissima sunt Lib. 22. excellently notes That in matters that are ground to an edge or drawn to a sharp point and where hope is only left in the bottom the boldest and quickest Counsels are safest yet it must be with great circumspection well considered when and upon what occasions such Counsels must be taken for the same (q) Consilia calida audacia prima specie laeta sunt tractatu dura eventu tristia Idem lib. 31. Author notes elsewhere That subtile and bold Counsels on the first view may be pleasing but are difficult in handling and in the event often Calamitous therefore rashness can never consist with Counsel duo adversissima rectae menti saith (a) Lib. 3. Male cuncta ministrat impetus Statius Thucydides Celeritas Ira Haste and Passion are of all things most opposite to Right Counsel therefore Curtius (b) Novanâ—is quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa ignca speaking of such saith Fiery and furious Spirits are more fit to innovate things and create Factions than to manage Affairs steddily (c) Praepropera consilia sunt raro prospera So hasty Counsels are rarely Prosperous because Resolution should never go before Deliberation nor Execution before Resolution When (d) Prinsquam incipias consuli o ubi consulueris mature fado opus est Sallust upon Debate and Deliberation it is by the Council-Table well resolved the change thereof upon some private information is neither safe nor honourable nor that after timely Resolution timely Execution be delay'd Violent (e) Coke Inst 4. p. 57. courses are like to hot Waters that may do good in an extremity but the use of them doth spoil the Stomach and it will require them stronger and stronger and by little and little they will lessen their own operation To leave this great Theme as too illustrious and sublime a Subject for one to treat of that hath lived in the Shade I shall now proceed to make some other remarks why our Laws give our Kings the sole power of chusing to themselves a Privy-Council and how the designers of 41. would have wrested that Power from the King Besides (f) Review of Observations p. 10. The King's Prerogative to chuse his Privy-Council what is common to all men to have a free liberty to whom they will impart their private Affairs and desire Counsel upon them our Laws being built upon firm foundations of reason considering that in the power of making of Laws the power of two numerous bodies were opposed against the Person of the single Soveraign it foresaw and found that by the Soveraigns consenting to Laws for the ease and benefit of the Subject things might pass to the prejudice and diminution of the Soveraignty If his single Person surcharged with the care of the manifold Affairs of the Kingdom should be left all alone to advise and dispute his right against all the Wisdom and Solicitation of the Representative Body of the Subject See Prynne's Brief Register sect 3. from p. 341. to the end concerning the King's Council in Parliament and out of it Therefore to prevent that it ordered That the King should at his discretion swear to himself a Body of Council sometimes in our Laws called his Grand Council to advise him in matters of State and concernments of his Soveraign Right and safety and a Body of Council at Law to advise him in matters of Justice that he might neither do or suffer contrary to the Rule of Laws especially sitting the two Houses when the wrong might be perpetual and seeing the Government must be continually upon its Guard and Watch without intermission molding and forming all things for its safety and prosperity and consequently of the Peoples this Council must be constantly attending upon the Kings pleasure and daily and hourly considering the best ways and methods of promoting the Kings and Commonweals advantage As to the (g) Pulton 37 56. 72. first particular we find it frequently in several Statutes expressed That the King by himself and by his Council at his Parliament made and ordained The necessity of a Privy-Council That this was not the great Council of Parliament appears by that of Edward the First (b) Idem p. 80. These are the Establishments of the King by his council and by the Assent of the Archbishops Bishops Abbats Priors Earls Barons and the whole Commonalty of the Land thither summoned and Edward the Second saith he caused the Articuli Cleri to be rehearsed before his Council and Answer given c. and much more may be observed in the Acts of the great Councils not fit here to be repeated From hence it is that the Law defines The King can do no wrong Privy-Counsellors responsible for if any evil be committed in matter of State the privy-Privy-Council and if in matters of Law the Justices and Judges must answer for it As to the second particular the Parliament of 1641. cast the odium of most of the management of Affairs of State The Votes of the Long Parliament to traduce the King under the pretence of using Evil Counsellors that were ungrateful to them upon the Kings evil Counsellors as they called them which was a great artifice of the designers of that Rebellion for thereby being then not hardned enough to caluminate the King openly they would make the World believe they paid a just deference to his Majesty yet slily wounded his Reputation through his Counsellors sides leaving the application to the People Tacitly insinuating that the King being mis-led by such Councils was not so Just or Wise as to be wished and when afterwards they had got Power they always made it one of their propositions That the two Houses should have the nominating That the two Houses should have the nominating of Privy-Counsellors So in Henry the Third's time we find Mountfort's Model of Twenty four to redress the Kingdom to chuse Counsellors c. or approving and removing the privy-Privy-Council or great Officers of State pretending they would set such just and righteous Persons in those places as would execute them for the publick good only and upon the same score though on another pretence they were importunate that the Judges should hold their places tam diu quam se bene gesserint rather than be removeable at the Kings pleasure Thus by vote without legal proof of Crimes they blackned as many of the Kings Privy-Council
also Judges and all sorts of Magistrates For as Plutarch well observes As the Master of the Ship chuseth the best Mariners The Prince's Care in chusing his Ministers the Architect the best workmen so a Prince should imploy those that are fit to administer the Affairs of the Commonweal (b) Vt Gubernator optimos quaerit Nautas Architecton doctissimos Ministros ita Principes eos asciscunt qui ad Rempublicam administrandam sunt idonei Generally it is requisite that Princes chuse such as are more sensible of duty than of rising and such as love business rather on Conscience than upon Bravery and it is fit to discern a busie nature from a willing mind for some are impatient of privateness saith my Lord St. Albans even in Age or sickness like old Towns-men that will be still sitting at the street-doors though thereby they offer Age to scorn Therefore as it is necessary that Ministers of State should be subservient to the Soveraign so it is most requisite that a Prince should be careful in his choice of such as may most beneficially serve him and the Publick Some seem fit for Imployment and yet in places disappoint expectation Omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset saith (c) So Tacitus of Galba lib. 1. Hist Alieno Imperio felicior quam suo vetus in familia nobilitas magnae opes ipsi medium ingenium magis extra vitia quam in virtutibus P. 197. Edit 5. Lips Major privato visus dum privatus fuit 1. Hist c. 11. Tacitus of Galba That in the opinion of all he was capable of Empire if he had not discovered his insufficiency when he was Emperor Therefore it is noted as a good Character of Piso (d) Quo nemo validius otia dilexit aut facilius suffecit negotia magisque quae agenda suntegit sine ulla ostentatione agendi Velleius Paterc Actu otioso simillimus That none more vehemently loved recess from business or with more ease underwent imployment or effected those things which were to be done more actively and without any ostentation So (e) Annal. 13. Edit Lips 5. p. 138. Integre sancteque egit procax otii potessati◠temperantior Tacitus saith of Otho when he governed Portugal that he was one loosely given when he had little to do but in Office and Rule more stayed and temperate Such a person is truly qualified for great Managery it being an assured sign of a worthy and generous Spirit whom Honour amends Vertue in the Ambitious being violent and in those in Authority settled and calm For Honour is or should be the place of Vertue power to do good being the true and lawful end of aspiring and Conscience of the same is the accomplishment of Mans rest Men in great places saith one (f) St. Alban's Essays p. 42. How Great Ministers are Servants who made a great figure in his time are thrice Servants First to their Soveraign or the State Secondly Servants of Fame Thirdly Of business So that they have no freedom either in their Persons Actions or Time their rising is laborious their standing slippery their recess either a Downfal or Eclipse so that they had need borrow other mens opinions to think themselves happy for if they judge by their own feeling they cannot find it for though Tacitus saith Sunt plerumque Regum voluntates vehementes inter se contrariae and though they serve a more benign Prince yet they will find many they deal with either vehement in their Wills or irresolved However the fatigue is so much the greater when the Port cannot be gained without doubling and tacking to save the Wind. Therefore it is most necessary The necessary Qualifications of Ministers of State that great Ministers of State have extraordinary Accomplishments both in dexterity of dispatch vast comprehension vertuous resolvedness and prudent cunctation Nam occultat eorum semina Deus plerumque bonorum malorumque causae sub diversa specie latent Panaegyr For as Pliny well notes In most matters the Deity hides the seeds of things and mostwhat the causes of good and bad things lye hid under the contrary appearances So that it requires a great sagacity in a Minister of State to foresee what the effects will be of Causes and Councils when there may intervene so many by-accidents that can neither be foreseen nor prevented Therefore not only great wisdom is required 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist ◠Ethic. c. 8 but great experience and when Ministers of State are endowed with these qualifications whatever the event be yet they are not to be blamed and mostly such grounded resolves succeed well For a wise man (i) Sapiens dominabitur 〈◊〉 over-rules the Stars So a Minister of State who with sufficient ability Diligence Care Fidelity Prudence and Affection Their danger of being supplanted serves his Prince and his Country which are no ways incompatible needs not fear the Detraction of some the mining of others or an inglorious downfal for the Government loseth more by such an ones laying aside than he that hath served his Prince Conscientiously justly and wisely shall lose Those whom either their lucky Stars or conspicuous accomplishments have placed within the Circle of the Court are subject indeed to the greatest danger of inglorious Exits if they be not the most circumspect of Mortals For the envious and ambitious who torment themselves that they are eclipsed by those who interpose betwixt the Sunshine of the Princes favour envy them the Glory of Administration and by cunning and artificial Insinuations of ill Conduct false measures and designs are assiduously heaving them out of their places which if upon false Suggestions they prevail to effect by successive Removals under pretence of reforming matters all things are disjointed the Cement of Government dissolved and greater Errors committed by too frequent fresh Applications 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereby the Malady is made incurable by the multitude of Physicians Amongst other Rules which Princes may find it convenient to observe in chusing ministers of State It is one of no small Moment provided they can be as well sitted that they (k) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be of antient Houses and persons of Fortune For Tacitus (l) Insita mortalibus natura recentem alicrum foelicitatem agris oculis introspicere 2. Hist notes That it is inbred to men to look asquint on the Advancements not so much new as of new Men who coveting too much Power and Honour by that means contract Envies For as he further (m) Nunquam satis fida Potentia ubi nimia est Ibid. observes The Power that is in Excess is not to be confided in being mostwhat Treacherous Therefore (n) Vestra vos non Principis fortur metiamini Panegyr Nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile fluxum est quam potentia non sua vi nixa Tacit. 13. Annal. Pliny adviseth That Ministers of
will have more honourable and contented Thoughts and own not only the Truth but yield to the necessity of that of (g) Fato quodam aut sorte nascendi ut caetera ita Principum inclination in hos ossensio in illos Annal. lib 4. Tacitus That as our Birth s are ascribed to Fate or Chance so the Inclinations of Princes to some and their dislike to others as he instanceth in Lepidus under Tiberius We see in the great Oeconomy of the World which we must believe is disposed by the Universal Monarch some noble Families in every Age are Extinct and other new ones by their Vertues and great Accomplishments are raised and the Cadets of others like some Rivers are hid for some space under Ground till when they appear again they are know by their refined Parts to be of noble Abstract Not to repine at the Prince's Favours bestowed on others The Sun is the same most luminous Body though some Maculae are observed in it by curious Telescopes and if Princes Beams shine not always with the same Serenity upon the district of some Families that it hath done it is no more than the Sun in the great Vortex doth and is no more to be repined at Therefore it becomes those noble Souls to be content with their large allotments and shake off all those Vipers that would sting them with Envy and Discontent It is well worth such Noblemens Consideration how their Interests are interwoven with that of the Crown and if any unhappily have loosened the twine or frozen the Zeal they have for its support let them call to Mind the Vertue and Bravery of their Ancestors and observe what Gemms or Gold-work they were of it and strive to fasten themselves there again and out of the Embers kindle again that Loyalty they have derived ex traduce from their generous Ancestors so that (a) Lucan 1.2 v. 557. Fervidus hac iterum circa praecordia Sanguis Inacleat And as the Crown hath bestowed Honour and Wealth upon their noble Families so let them never be wanting with their utmost Industry to support it in all its splendid Prerogatives and of all the Infamy of Mortals let not ingratitude be laid to their Charge How the Nobility may honourably acquaint their Prince with Grievances The Nobility are Conciliarii nati and as their Birth and places give them easy access to the Princes Privy-Chamber and Cabinet though they be not of his secret Council so they have opportunities to present the State of Affairs and ill managery or grievances of the People when they conceive them concealed from their Prince both better and more effectually than others of a lower Rank But then it should be done like Persons of Honour with all Respect and Duty to their Prince and the ostentation of this sort of Charity should not lessen the usefulness of it much less should they blow a Trumpet when they perform it either to aggrandize the Enterprize or to raise discontent at the denial In every Kings Reign it hath been a flourishing time and happy when the Nobility studied with a refined laudable Contention to aemulate one anothers Vertue striving to out-do one another in the Service of their King and Country uniting in that glorious Testudo to defend their Princes Prerogative and the Laws that adjust their own and the Peoples Priviledges It is never to be forgot how in our late Commonwealth How Common-wealths depress the Nobility the House of Peers was by the very Posteriors of the Commons Voted useless and dangerous No sooner was that sacred Head separated from them but they were degraded to Commoners as to any Legislative Power and though those Noblemen that were content to fit in the lower House were highly caressed and applauded yet a few Years hath changed the note and their Names will be recorded to Posterity in far less Lustre than if they had more strenuously espoused the afflicted Kings Quarrel and it is not to be doubted but the Sence of that will be a most prevalent Antidote against the Defection of any of the Nobility that will consider the naturalness of such a degrading if the Commonwealth-Men should ever appear again without their Vizors and it will be an excellent amulet to keep them from the Infection of such Principles and Practice It is worth noting that William the Conqueror giving to his Nobility great Fees to be held of him in Capite How the Nobility had greater Power anciently than now for some Ages the Nobility had great Interests and numerous dependences and had special Jurisdiction over great Baronies and while they served the Crown according to their Tenures the inferior Gentry and Commoners being one way or other Tenents to them could do little in opposition to the Crown But when in King John and Henry the Third's time their greatness was dangerous to the Crown the Commons were brought in to be a part of the Parliament Yet for some while after they retained their Grandeur till as I have hinted Henry 7. retrenched them and Queen Elizabeth preferring so many new Men makeing less use of the ancient Nobility studied to gain the common Peoples Affections by all Arts and Bounties she could use and in after-Ages the Nobility being less valued by the Freeholders and encreased in Number and some of them adhering to the two Houses against their Sovereign their interests both with the Parliament and People grew less But now under a Prince who sets a true value upon the Nobility if they he not wanting to themselves they may hope to attain the lustre of their noble Ancestors and the Commoners be no ways abridged of their Priviledges For then the Government is in the happiest Condition when the Nobility are great without Ambition rich without Oppression eminent in Vertue as in Character The Gentry so deporting themselves to the Commonalty as they desire the Nobility may to them and the Commonalty with humble Industry peaceably enriching themselves and enjoying that freedom and liberty which may keep them in Heart and Courage to serve their Prince and Country with chearful Alacrity and out-do those of their Rank in all other Dominions which in the English Soldiery is observed in all Wars to be their peculiar Excellency ascribable principally to the Benignity of the Government which dispirits them not and when this liberty is not abused to Licentiousness but restrained within the Bounds of humble Candor and Modesty Reverence to their Superiors and thankfulness to their Prince all is in an happy Frame CHAP. XXXVIII Of the Gentry of England I Shall not detain the inquisitive Reader upon the derivation of the Word Gentilhom or Gentleman but refer him to (a) Titles of Honour P. 861 862. Whence the Name Mr. Selden who at large discusseth the point whether with Velserus and some others it be derived from Gentilis or Heathen as introduced when the Goths Hunns and Vandals having overrun the Roman Provinces were in a
When Princes not to make themselves Parties but only private-Animosities betwixt some of the Nobility wherein the Government is not much concerned there may be some allowance for my Lord Verulam's Opinion That Princes being Common Parents should not lean to one Party because a Boat that is overset by the unequal Weight on one side may carry such Passengers in it as the Prince would not lose Therefore to study ways to piece them and solder up the flaws is better than to side with one to the Ruin of the other and sometimes of themselves also As we may observe in Henry the third of France who entred into the League and it was shortly after turned against himself which may be a document saith that wise Lord to Kings how they make themselves a Party for by that a Prince makes himself unus ex nobis which makes an Obligation Paramount to that of Soveraignty So that a Prince must be very cautelous when he must side with one Party which he espouseth (d) In caducam pariâ—tem ne inclinet lest he lean upon a ruinous Wall But if there be a Party by whose fall the Prince (e) Cujus râ—ina se quoque tradura est Tacitus de Moribus Germ. likewise shall be sure to be ruined as in case of Factions against Government as I mean in this whole Discourse it is necessary for him strenuously to support it When Princes to support one Party Upon this Consideration it seems to me that it ever will be the great Interest of the Kings of England to defend and support the Episcopal Government for that by fatal Experience it was found that the overthrow of it was the Praeludium to the Destruction of the Blessed King and Monarchy For although he was a very great Champion of the Church of England as established by Law yet he too fatally yielded to take away the Bishops Votes in Parliament whereby he lost a considerable Party in the House that would never have deserted his Interest So that in this case I may apply that of Galba (f) Manifestum est neque perire nos neque salvos esse nisi una posse Tacit. 10. Hist P. 195. Edit Lips 5. to his Soldiers It is manifest that undivided or alone they can neither be Saved or Perish in times when they are attacqued But to return to the Prognosticks of dangerous Seditions I shall mention some that Tacitus hath noted and described Speaking of the Revolt of the Legions in Germany under Germanicus at the Beginning of Tiberius's Reign Unanimity a dangerous Sign he saith Those that looked deeply into the Disposition of the Soldiers judged it a strong Argument of an unappeasable Revolt (g) Id militares animos altius conjâ—â—â—antibus praecipuum indicium magni atque implacabilis motus quod neque disjecti nil paucorum instinctu sed pariter ardescerent pariter silerent tanta aequalitate constantia ut regi crederes 1. Annal. that they were not scattered or divided nor any attempt given by a few but grew insolent together were quiet at once with such moderation and constancy that one would have thought they had been governed by one Head For when any Sedition is carried on with such Unanimity it is a certain Sign that the Poyson hath a large spread and there are few sound Parts left The Progress (h) Ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio Juâ—e â—tentum militem doâ—is populum Annena cunâ—los dulcedine oâ—ii pellexit Insurgere paâ—tatim munia Senaâ—us Magistratuum Legum in se trahere nullo adversante lbid Augustus made to establish the Sovereignty in himself The Methods of Designers is the usual Method by which such as intend subverting of Government may proceed which according to the same Author was That to ingratiate himself with the People he contented himself with Tribunitian Authority to defend the Common People that he wound himself into the Favour of the Soldiers by Gifts of the People by Provision of Sustenance and of all in general with the sweetness of Ease and Repose by little and little taking upon him the affairs of the Senate the Duty of the Magistrates and Laws and so without the Contradiction of any he obtained the Empire This in Augustus was commendable and Politically done being to alter a Commonweal into a Monarchy and Wisemen by his method might have foretold his Design So in Seditious enterprises against Monarchy the way is to court the People and insensibly cajole them with the sweetness of Liberty under a Commonwealth and the heaviness of the Yoak of Monarchy and having possessed them with this they have no more to do but to await some critical time or revolution that may suit their Design as some new Imposition laid some publick Calamity the displacing some great Officer or Death of some great Man or their Prince such (i) Opportunos magnis conatibus transitus rerum 1. Histor Revolutions being the sittest times for great Attempts as Tacitus speaks of Otho's Conspiracy by Galba's Covetousness to the Soldiery c. Concerning Sejanus the same Judicious (k) Primas dominandi spes in arduo ubi sis ingressus adesse studia ministros Lib. 4. Annal. Author gives us the Saying of Drusus That the first hopes of attaining Command or working themselves into Power by Sedition is difficult but after the Entrance there will not want aids of Council and assisting Hands Therefore it is most necessary Speedy Suppression most necessary that Princes diligently watch the motions of all kind of Seditious aspiring Persons to prevent their first Entrance upon their Designs lest they prove afterwards too Powerful In such a State of affairs the Council of (l) Nibil in civilibus discordiis festinatione tutius ubi facto magis quam consilio opus 1. Hist Tacitus is to be followed That nothing is safer in Seditions and Civil Discords than quickness of dispatch when there is more need of Action than Consultation The misfortune is great which happens to the Subjects by Faction and Sedition The Mischiefs of Faction for such things once begun are not in a short time hushed but the Animosities are durable and when one (m) Inter victores victosque nunquam solida sides coalescit Idem 2. Hist Party overcomes yet the Conquered retains his old grudge and is always catching at opportunities to promote his Interest and there is rarely in that Generation at least a sincere amnesty and union of Affections Therefore as Princes by Acts of Pardon endeavour to put all into a State of Unpunishableness though they cannot into a State of Innocence so those that have assisted the Seditious Party ought with a generous Repentance and Fidelity to their Prince endeavour all their Lives to be rubbing out those Stains by their Loyalty For he that (n) Quem paenitet peccasse pene est innocens repents he hath offended is in the next degree to the Innocent It
setting on work and relieving the Poor by the labour of their own hands and forcing sturdy Beggars and idle Vagabonds to work or be confined to their own Parishes were strictly put in Execution we should have less reason to complain of them It is true it is not from the poor and lazy that the Government is so much in danger for those are not fitted for Souldiers It is the spirited poor that have spirits above their fortunes or by living above their income have wasted their Estates that are Instruments fit to be made use of by the Factious yet their numbers are not so great but vigilant Magistrates may have an eye upon them and the Government may imploy the ablest of them in collecting the Revenue Others may be made inferior Officers in the Militia and the rest must be left to better hushand what they have remaining and kept in hopes that if they pay due respect to the Government at one time or other they may be provided for and the Loyal Gentry may find ways to oblige them in their Services so that every one that is fit to be made good use of may by one way or other be set to gain a better livelyhood than they are like to get by santring and flandring the Government which if they do some severe Animadversion may amend them or deter others It is not possible that the Government can provide for all the Indigent without strict execution of the Laws But the care of the Justices of Peace injoyned by the Soveraign may do much good however they may keep such from molesting the Government Since therefore that of Tacitus is so true Lâ—vissimus quisque fauri improvidus spâ— vana tumet That the least provident to prevent future want build Castles in the air and are big with vain hopes and expectations their hopes and desires are to be so directed that they may hope for more advantage from their Prince than from Factious Oppressors Fourthly 4. The Ambitious Ambition is so near a kin to Nobleness that it seems a Nobility and unvulgarness it self being an Inmate only of Souls elevated above the level of the common sort of mankind Ambitious men are the Field-Officers and Brigadeers of Faction and by so much as they are commonly persons of Birth and Parts they the more require a Prince's regard above all other Factious persons If they find saith my Lord St. Albans the way open to their rising they are rather busy than dangerous but if they be checked and stopped like ill humours they grow Malignant These faith (f) St. Alban's Eâ— says c. 36. the Chancellor become first secretly discontented looking upon men and matters with an evil eye and are best pleased when things go backward and so are the worst Servants of Princes or States Therefore it is good for Princes if they use ambitious men so to handle the matter as they be still progressive which because it cannot be without inconvenience it is good not to use such natures at all for if they rise not with their Masters service they will take care to make their service fall with them There is less danger caeteris paribus of ambitious men if they be of mean Birth than if Noble and if they be new raised rather than grown cunning and fortified in their greatness It is less danger saith the same great Chancellor (g) Idem whose wise observations on this head I cannot omit to have an ambitious man stirring in business than great in dependance He that seeks to be eminent amongst able men hath a great task but such as is ever good for the Publick but he that plots to be the only figure amongst Cyphers is the decay of a whole Age. Princes may make use of Ambitious men in pulling down the greatness of any Subject that over-tops as Tiberius used Macro in pulling down Sejanus Also they make use of them as Screens in matters of danger and envy But no man will take that office unless he be a seeled Dove that mounts and mounts because he cannot see about him Commanders in Wars though Ambitious are useful for their Service dispenseth with the rest and to take a Souldier without it is to pull off his Plumes and his spurs Favourites are remedies against ambitious great ones and they are well corrected also by ballancing them by others as proud as themselves but then there must be some middle Counsellors to keep them steddy for without that Ballast the Ship will roll too much These and such like may be the cures of Ambitious Men while they are of the Council of Princes on Ministers of State But when they want Imployment and are tainted in their Principles or entertain designs of altering the State or by the unboundedness of their aspirings aim at the sole direction of Affairs and care not what mischiefs befall their Prince or Country in the pursuit of their Designs a Prince should look upon them as in the next degree of most dangerous Traitors In this case a Prince hath but two ways either to set wise men to work who cambring them to their Service and make them sensible that their advantage will be greater by studying the Service of their Prince in consort with other experienced Statesmen than by heading of any Faction against the Government and letting them see by the many examples in History how unprosperous it hath been to all that have striven to wrest Honours and Employments from their Prince without proportionable Service That they are not to presume to be wiser than the Government That Kings have long Hands can reach Malefactors at a great distance and unprovided how unable they are to vie with Majesty and make them sensible that never any durable Renown or Wealth was got by courting the People in opposition to the Prince and demonstrate the Justness of the Government in such Particulars as they most quarrel at And if this will not bring them to their right Senses then either send them abroad or give them some ticklish Employment at home wherein if their Ambition tempt them to outdo their Commission they may be run into a Praemunire whereby they may be crushed at once Still a Prince hath a difficult task how to comport himself to cast off Ministers of State who having been accustomed to be very leading and much credited in Councils have been imployed in great and weighty Affairs got themselves great Estates and Dependences If such upon some Reasons the Prince best knows to himself be softly to be laid aside whereby his Partisans may be induced to believe it was for no Guilt but to make room for others advancement a Prince is in danger to have his Affairs much obstructed by them For these upon every ill succeeding Affair of State after their removal will suggest to the People the evil tendency of it and they shall be sure to have their repute for Judgment and forecast much valued by the People because
Land and the other the demean of the Fee So it is in an Estate of Power and Authority If the King granteth an Estate of Power Authority and Jurisdiction in Fee-simple or in Fee-tail for term longer or shorter the King hath the demean of Power and the other the demean of Use the King hath Dominium directum the other Dominium utile which he applies to the two Houses but it must be likewise considered that this distinct Authority they have is wholly derivative and so much the more depending on the Sovereign as he can at his Pleasure totally deprive them of the Exercise of it by Prorogation or totally annihilate it by Dissolution Another Objection they made Objection The Three Estates to restrain the Excess of each other was from the Answer the King authorized a Gentleman to make to the Observer That the three Estates are constituted to the End that the Power of the one should moderate and restrain the excess of the Power in the other From which he infers That this is an Allay and mixture in the Root and essence of the Constitution To this it may be answered Answer to it That there is no such Power in the two Houses they are called to consult and to consent All they can do is that they have the opportunity of having grievances redressed because they may otherwise deny the King the assistance he desires But they have no Authority of themselves to redress them or to restrain and moderate his Excesses by Force nor can they moderate the Excesses of one another by any Act of their own singly further than the exorbitant Estate shall be willing to be moderated It is a most absurd thing to imagine that when the Law hath placed the Sovereign Power in the King it should again for a space of time during the Session of Parliament unsovereign Him and place in the two Houses the same Sovereign Trust and with a second absurdity leave in the King's Hands the summoning and dissolving the Power by which himself should be constrained and to make up all should by Authority of that Power constrain all the Heads of the People and even the Representative Body of that Power by Solemn Oath to declare that the King is not only supreme Governour but that he is only supreme Governour Besides the Arguments they sued upon this Head of a debased Monarch that was not only to admit some of his Subjects into the Participation of his Burthen but of his Soveraignty whereby they pleaded for both the Houses being joynt-Sovereigns for the time they used other Arguments singly for the House of Commons which they endeavoured to aggrandize and raise to a strange over-towring heighth above both King and Lords and they grounded all their Arguments upon the immense Power of their being the Peoples Representatives The Observer saith Objection concerning the Power of Representatives That the vertue of Representation is the great Privilege of Privileges that unalterable Basis of all Honour and Power whereby the House of Commons claims the entire Right of all the Gentry and People and that there can be nothing under Heaven next to renouncing of God which can be more perfidious and more pernicious to the People than the withdrawing from them and doth acknowledge that the Arbitrary Rule was once most safe for the World But now since most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable Order for publick Assemblies he means by Representatives whereby the People may assume its own Power and do it self Right without the disturbance of it self or injury to Princes he is very unjust that will oppose this Art and Order In answer to which it ought to be considered That the Representative Body deserves the highest Honour and Observance that can be given to the Body Represented Answer What Honour is due to Representatives of the Subjects but this Honour will depend upon two things First the quality and condition of the Body represented and Secondly on the quality of the Representative it self If therefore the Body at large were an absolute Sovereign as in Republicks the true Representative of that Body were to be observed with all Sovereign Honour and due Subjection But when the Body at large it self is but a Subject as it is in Monarchy the Honour and Authority of the Representative cannot exceed the Honour and Authority of a Subject for none can make the Image more than the Original or without Adulterating Arts appear so Therefore however abhorrent a Crime he makes it in such as concurr not in their Judgment with their Representatives that exceed their Authority and Commission yet all sober and just Persons ought to consider that the Subjects by giving Authority to some of their own Order to represent them and advise and consent for them gave them no such Power above that of Subjects yea so much above the condition of their Sovereigns that neither breach of Faith nor the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy which they never took to them or any other Duty to their King was comparable to the withdrawing from the Vote or Act of their Representators as if the Rights of the Crown and Kingdom and the Laws made by the King with the assent of the three Estates in Parliament did not so much concern the Commons of the Land but that against all these they stood solely bound to the Representatives as the only Sovereign of their Obedience I shall now offer some Reasons against this dangerous Opinion First It is to be considered Reasons against the Power of Representatives That in our Kingdom the Representors are not equally chosen as in the united Provinces and other Commonwealths but it lies in the Power of the Sovereign here to make a Town equal in number of Burgesses to a County which doth vehemently demonstrate That the first Institution and end of such Representatives was rather to minister Information of the State and Condition of that particular place and advise and assist the Sovereign and to consent with him and not to determine Sovereignly Secondly The cockering the People in that Opinion that the Soveraignty lies in Materia prima in them and by their Representatives that they may exert it is the certain way to ruin not only Monarchy but all government as was evident in the case of the Rebellious House of Commons in King Charles the First 's time who prided themselves so much with the Title of Representatives and by pretext of that and the Assistance of their Army having unyoked themselves from all Subjection to their Lawful King and disengaged themselves from their dangerous and useless Collegues the Lords as they then voted them after some while they lost their Honour and Reverence with their own Army who then would be the People and pulled them out of their House justly charging them with a design to perpetuate themselves And so the Tyrannical Supremacy was exercised by Cromwell and his Council of Officers a while