Selected quad for the lemma: state_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
state_n	affair_n	great_a	person_n	1,149	5	4.3649	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A81488	An oration of Agrippa to Octavius Cæsar Augustus, against monarchy. Taken out of the LII. book of Dion the philosopher, Cælius, S.C. being the interpreter. Printed at Basil after the end of Nichol. Machiavels Prince, anno M.D.XXC. / And now put into English by A.R.	Cassius Dio Cocceianus.; A. R.; Agrippa, Marcus Vipsanius.	1658 (1658)	Wing D1503B; Thomason E972_3; ESTC R207746	8,407	12

thou seemest no way to repose thy confidence in them Beside in doing this thou errest in thy greatest affairs of State for what can an unexperienced person and a man of an abject fortune do What enemy is there that will not dispise such a person Which of his companions will obey him What true Souldier but will with indignation scorn to be under his command But there is no need for me to enumerate all these evils which thou thy self knowest right-well this onely I must say that if such persons manage not thy affairs well they being more detriment to thee than to the enemy and if they do by reason of their ignorance they are blown up with pride which may afterwards prove terrour to thee But in a Commonwealth none of these things do happen Sect. 7. but the richer and more valiant men are the more are they desirous of honour and therefore by all good ways labour for the prosperity of the State and so profit with joy and cheerfulnesse comes in both upon themselves and upon the whole Unlesse any one amongst them make a step toward Tyranny and then they severely mark his paths and punish him accordingly That these things are so in truth and that the Government of a Commonwealth is to be prefer'd far before that of a single Person is most demonstrable from the examples of Greece For whilest all things were Governed by the will of One they never did any great matter but after that they fell into the form of a Commonwealth they became most famous The same thing is also manifest from the examples of other places of which some living under Tyrants are alwayes slaves and so always treacherous to their Lords Others having often change of their chief Magistrates using their own laws continue in their Liberties But why do I seek examples from abroad when we abound with enough at home For we Romans our selves after we had been broken to pieces and suffered very hard things by our Monarchicall Lords a desire of liberty sprang up in us which when we had attained relying onely upon the good ways of a Common-wealth we are arrived at the greatness which you see For the Senate or grand Council first of all proposeth after that the people decreeth and commande●h then is the Army ready to obey and their Commanders desirous of Honour in the execution of which there hath not been found the like in the Domination of a single person And for these causes our Ancestors so exceedingly hated that kinde of Government that they established it execrable by a law and for ever to be detested But to passe by these things Sect. 8. and speak of what concerns thy own person how canst thou endure the management of these affairs day and night especially if thou enjoyest not thy perfect health And if thou beest deprived thereof what content canst thou receive And wherewithall canst thou be delighted And when art thou like to be without the greatest trouble For it is impossible but he that hath so large an Empire must have both the care and fear of many things but the sense of very few which do delight and always and in every place must both hear and see do and suffer things that are most grievous For which cause I suppose certain both of the Greeks and Barbarians have refused such principalities when they were offered to them These things being foreseen consider well before thou doe attempt for being once entred thou canst not easily go back beware lest the greatness of the Power the largness of thy possessions the multitude of thy guards and the throng of thy servants do deceive thee for they which can doe much have also much businesse to do and they which possesse much have also many expences The troops of guards were invented by reason of the many treacheries Princes are subject too yet these flatterers are oft the causers of their destruction more than of their safety And for these reasons no man that is truly wise can desire to be made a King But if any think it is to be desired because he findes riches there and that he hath power to preserve some and that he may do many good things and some evill too if it seem good unto him this man doubtlesse doth mistake the truth for to be wicked and to hurt other persons how hatefull is it both to God and men and how dangerous it is I need not speak because thou art not such a one neither to effect such things wouldst thou desire to be a Prince Neither is it my purpose at present Sect. 9. to tell how great evills he must doe who covets not most earnestly ●o reigne righteously but rather what things are to be done and suffered also even by such who use their power best And to that which is said that by such power great benefits may be conferred upon poor Mortall Creatures this I confesse is most desirable but sith this thing in a private person is both Honest Commendable Glorious and Secure but in the Government of a single-person that good is not comparable to the other evills that attend and that for this good those evills must be chosen for the fruits of this Bounty shall redound most of all to others but the greif of all the Evill must return upon himself Besides it is not so easy a matter as some think that one person should suffice to supply the necessities of so many for those that account themselves worthy to receive a Benefit are in a manner all sorts of men although they have deserved nothing from him for even every man by nature is apt to be well conceited of himself and is willing to receive a benefit from him who is able to bestow it But now those things that can be given viz Honours Preferments and sometime Monie's also are but a very few being compared to so great a multitude of men which thing since it is most true more hatred will arise from such who cannot obtaine the things which they desire than good will from those which do receive them For these reckon themselve● to have received but their due and so believe they are not much engaged to him that hath conferred the Benefit having nothing given but what they did expect beside they are slow in rendering thanks lest hereby they may seem unworthy of that which is bestowed upon ●hem but now in those who shall not obtain the things which they desired are troubled upon two accounts first because they are deprived of that which is their own for all men reckon that to be theirs which they have deserved and then if they bear patiently the repulse they seem to him to acknowledge themselves unworthy of such a benefit Again he who justly distributes those favours appeares to have diligently considered the merrits of each person and to have rewarded some and disregarded others whereupon pride springs up in the Conscience of the one but greife and vexation in the other And if any fearing this would therefore distribute his favours without choise he would not mend the matter at all because wicked men and undeserving being honored doe become the worse thinking themselves either praisworthy because they are good or flattered because formidable but now the good men being no more valued than the worst and seeing these to be made equall with them would rather grieve for this under-valuing than rejoyce in the benefits received whereupon they would leave off the prosecution of better things and by degrees become as bad as they Therefore that which is most desirable in King-ship you see is the hardest to be put in practice These things and what else I have here mentioned consider well Sect. 10. whilest there is yet an opportunity and being wise Restore again to the People their Militia their Territories their Government and their Monys which if thou shalt now willingly and of thine own accord perform thou wilt excell all mortall men in fame and honour and wilt be in thy Person most secure but if thou shalt Deferre till some power shall compell thou wilt doubtlesse with disgrace and shame sustain some evill Thou mayest take examples from Marius and Sylla Metellus and Pompey who when they might would not King it amongst the People by which they did receive no damage But Cinna and Strabo the other Marius Sertorius and Pompey himself after they were once inflamed with a desire of Reigning did perish basely It will be difficult to make this people who have so many years been free and ruled over others subject to the will of One Camillus who triumphed gloriously was banished by our Ancestors And they spoiled Scipio when they perceived him to grow too big And remember thy own Father who but for suspition to affect the Kingdome was miserably destroyed by them And there were never any that were better than these men Yet do I not perswade thee so speedily to lay aside the Government that thou shouldst not provide for the blessings of the people and after the example of Sylla take care for what shall be convenient by good constitutions for although many of them were afterwards abbrogated yet a great and the better part of them remain Neither would I have thee object and say that new troubles and tumuls will arise for I must answer that the people opprest with Tyranny will much sooner attempt new matters and if we will rightly consider things the fears of discords which we think are wont to arise from a Popular Government rather than from the government of a single Person are without any shew of reason at all of the greatnes of which troubles I shall not speak at all lest I should seem to be desirous to make that appear evill which is so evill in it self And that this Government by One is such this one thing is sufficient to convince that the very nature of it is to turn honest men into Knaves FINIS

and cheerfully doth exercise the same and if he perceive the same to appear in any other he undauntedly doth encourage it studies to encrease it and speaks honourably thereof But if any be wicked and dishonest he is hated by all good men but he that is afflicted by sufferings all men do pitty and the injury and reproach which is suffered is held to be in common This is the nature of a Popular State But now in Tyrany all things are found contrary Sect. 3. but what need we speak more in a word there is none that is willing to have any excellent thing appeare in him because all the great ones are his enemies upon that account All men do make the Princes manners the rule of their own life and what they think they can effect without danger that they labour in whereby almost all do study nothing but their own particular advantages All other men they hate reckoning the happiness of such to be their misery and the calamity of such to be their gain And sith things are so why thou should'st be moved to desire the Throne I know not for beside that that its trouble some to the People it is like to prove much more troublesome to thy self Dost thou not see the nation and the affaires thereof yet troubled and unquiet and how difficult it will be to reduce our people who have so long tasted liberty and no lesse difficult to bring into bondage our fellows and companions of which some use their own laws and others have been made free by us especially sith we have so many enemies round about us And that I may begin with that which is to be accounted the first and chiefest Sect. 4. much money is upon every occasion to be found out by thee for which thy present estate as well for other things but especially to maintain the Armies is never able to suffice which difficulty although it arise in a popular State also because no commonwealth can be without expence yet in that State most men do willing contribute much because they do it ayming to arise at greater honours and do receive from thence worthy rewards And if by Pole necessary Tributes be required they do it not unwillingly satisfying themselves herein that they do it for their own benefit and advantage But in Monarchy all hold it equall that the Prince abounding in wealth should undergo the charge inquiring diligently into his Incomes but not so readily into the occasions of his expences And therefore particular persons do by private wayes contribute against their wills and do not readily assent unto the common Taxes for the first no man would do lest he should betray himself to be rich nor would it be profitable to the Prince if he should because by this means he might get a popular opinion and being so heightned might attempt some new commotions And for the second to wit to pay a common Tax is very grievous and burdensome unto many especially since they receive the detriment and others the profit thereof For in a popular State they which pay the Tax for the most part have to do with the Campe by which their money some way or other returns back again into their hands But in the Government of One there are one sort of persons which Till the Land Trade and play the Merchants from whom the greatest part of the money is extorted and another sort who follow the Wars and do receive Sallaries And this is one of those things which is like to breed thee trouble There is a second thing which I shall open Sect. 5. who ever commits any wickedness it behoveth that he be punished now a great part of men can neither be chastized by chidings nor examples but are altogether to be punished by disgrace banishment or death which thing in so great an Empire and so great a multitude of men and especiall in the change of a Commonwealth are wont to happen Now these guilty ones if thou commit their judgment unto others shal be absolved if they be such as are reputed to be thy enemies for then the Judges think themselves mighty when they give judgement against the opinion of the Prince And if at any time they be condemned they will seem to bear their punishment at thy instigation But if thy self be Judge thou must needs punish many that are thy equals which thing will make thy life unhappy and thou wilt seem altogether to inflict thy punishments in wrath rather than in equity For such in whose power it is to offer violence are thought by no man to decree righteous judgement For all men think them only to hold forth the colour and shadow of a Commonwealth and by the pretence of legal judgments to satisfie their unlawfull lusts Those things fall out in the Dominion of a single-Person but in a Popular administration if any do transgresse Judges are proposed of persons like unto himself by which it comes to passe that what ever happens it is more easily born because men think themselves not forc't to suffer any thing from the Judge either by power or favour Again beside such who offer injury to others very many being heightned either by blood or riches Sect. 6. or some other way who although they live inoffensive towards others yet are they against the power of a single Person who if he suffers such to thrive cannot live safe and if he would suppresse them he cannot justly do it Now which way wilt thou handle these men how wilt thou behave thy self towards them For if thou wilt cut off their stock if thou wilt diminish their riches or depress their growth thou wilt get no reputation amongst thy People For how canst thou be beloved when it is not lawfull for any man to be nobly descended or to get riches to become valiant magnanimous or wise And if thou suffer such to increase thou must not easily afterward put them upon service Now if thou couldst Govern the Commonwealth and do all that pertains unto the Wars alone and hadst no need of any Colleague or helper in any thing the matter would be otherwise But since thou hast altogether need of many Associates in Administration of thy affairs especially in such a portion of the World and it is altogether reason that they should be wise and valiant Therefore if thou shalt put the Government and Army into such hands dost thou not cast thy self and People into extream hazard for it cannot be that any man should be excellent and great but that he also should be bold nor can any man of a base and low condition scarce become magnanimous and if at any time such a one become bold by and by springs up in him a true love to liberty and an hatred of Kingship But if now thou shalt have no confidence in such as these but wilt rather make use of common men thou presently incurrest the hatred of those gallant men because