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A19058 A table of humane passions With their causes and effects. Written by ye Reuerend Father in God F.N. Coeffeteau, Bishop of Dardania ... Translated into English by Edw. Grimeston Sergiant at Armes.; Tableau des passions humaines. English Coeffeteau, Nicolas, 1574-1623.; Grimeston, Edward. 1621 (1621) STC 5473; ESTC S108443 165,888 736

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their soules fight for her honor and hold it a punishment to offend her But these are not the effects of Iealousie which contrariwise violates the honour which is due to the party beloued and by a prodigious manner to blind the world will haue her fauour by wronging her treading her merits vnder foote We must then put a difference betwixt a respectiue feare which always doth accompany those that loue perfectly and Iealousie which is neuer found but with an imperfect passion which cannot iudge of the perfections of the party beloued They which know that these things are diuerse and as remote one from another as the earth is from heauen wil easily passe on this side and yeelde that Iealousie is neither competible with Loue nor is any signe thereof Yet if wee shall yeelde any thing to the opinion of the Vulgar we may freely confesse that Iealousie in truth is a signe of Loue but as the feuer is an argument of life It is vnquestionable that a feuer is a signe of life seeing the dead are not susceptible of this bad quality But as a feuer shewing that there are some reliques of life in the patient that is tormented accompanies him to his graue so Iealousie is I know not what signe of Loue seeing they which loue not cannot haue any Iealousie But it is certaine that if wee expell it not it will in the end ruine Loue like vnto a thicke smoake which smothers the brightest flame This is all we can yeelde vnto the Vulgar so as according to this opinion which we haue held the most probable Iealousie is to Loue as thicke mists are to flowers haile to haruest stormes to fruites and poison to our liues Of Hatred or Enmity CHAP. 1. AS the Lawes of Loue and Hatred are directly contrary by that which wee haue spoken of Loue it will be easie to iudge wherein Hatred consists and how farre her effects extends Hatred then is An auersion and horror which man hath of all that seemes contrary to his good or preiudiciall to his contentment Or else Hatred is an horror which the appetite hath of that which seemes pernicious vnto it so as the sheepe hate the wolfe as the enemy and persecuter of his life But wee must heere obserue that as all that is befitting Nature is put in the rancke of good so on the other side whatsoeuer is opposite vnto it must be placed in the rancke of euill Wherfore as the good is the obiect of Loue so the euill is the obiect of Hatred To vnderstand this we must remember that whether it be in the minde or in the body there is a befitting estate and as it were a naturall harmony which makes vs to abhorre that which may dissolue this consort This harmony considered in the body is no other thing then the good constitution by meanes whereof we enioy a perfect health the which being impayred our nature receiues pain as when we indure great hunger and thirst or when as wee receiue any hurt or wound As for the soule this same harmony may bee considered first in the senses as well externall as internall cōsist in the proportiō they haue with their obiects which is such as they hate whatsoeuer puls them away or which diuerts them by any kinde of violence As for example the eyes hate darkenesse and obscurity and our imagination is terrified and troubled by the fearefull apprehensions of dreames which it frameth during our rest This same harmony considered in reason either it regards the simple knowledge of the truth which our vnderstanding conceiues with pleasure or the vse and execution of things which depend on wisedome which wee doe with content In regard of the first our spirit is enemy to lying although at some times it takes delight in the art wherewith they colour a thing to giue it some shewe of truth So as the wisest are delighted in the reading and report of fables when as the intention hath any grace And as for the second there is such diuersity of iudgements in humaine actions which are as it were the Element of prudence as it is a thing in a manner incredible for hardly shall you see two persons which haue the same feeling and apprehension of affaires in regard whereof this life is full of Hatred and factions which grow from these diuerse opinions As for that which concernes the will her harmony consists in the proportion Loue which she beares to the good which makes her detest and abhorre whatsoeuer presents it selfe vnto her vnder the shew of euill as pernicious and hurtfull to her content and rest And therefore the harmony of the sensitiue appetite consisting in the familiarity and concurrence it hath with the good of the sences it doth abhorre and beares an irreconciliable hatred to whatsoeuer shall offend them hence it comes that wee so much abhorre whippes tortures punishmēts hunger thirst wounds such like which tend to the destruction of our being This Passion was ingraft in vs by nature to the end that at the first approach at the first taste and imagination of euill wee may retire our selues and flie it lest wee runne into ruine This kind of hatred then is proper to the concupiscible which is offended at diuerse things yea at small things and many times at those which haue no subiect of offence for you shall see some which cannot suffer the presence of certaine creatures others cannot endure the sight of certaine fruites though otherwise they be exceeding pleasant Finally there is no creature so fantasticke in his Appetite nor so sudden in the motions of Hatred and distastes of things which present themselues vnto his senses as man who not able to endure any thing makes himselfe insupportable in a like manner to all creatures but principally to his like But to giue more light to this discourse we wil obserue that there are diuerse sorts of Hatred and Enmities which may bee referred to foure chiefe heads for there is a natural Hatred and a brutish Hatred a melancholy Hatred and a humaine Hatred The naturall Hatred takes her beginning from a certaine antipathy and contrariety of nature which is found in creatures the which as it were abhorre one another and cannot frequent or conuerse together although the subiect of this Hatred appeare not and that shewes it selfe more in the effect then in the cause whereof wee haue prodigious examples in nature in plants in beasts and in men Brutish Hatred is rather a rage then a Passion for that it seekes a furious destruction of that it hates and to see the last relliques consumed so as it is more fitting for rauening wolues or for monsters then for men Such is the Hatred of those who not satisfied to haue slaine their enemies make their bodies to feele their fury practizing a thousand cruelties vpon their carcasses and making them to suffer after death all the indignities their rage can deuise This detestable Hatred sometimes passeth
ioy then that which had succeeded if it had bin obtained without any difficulty considering that the enioying makes him forget all the precedent paines But from the beginning and breeding of desire or during the whole continuance thereof bee it with hope or without expecttance of the enioying of the obiect if it appeares to bee a thing absolutely impossible to enioy then not to suffer desire to consume it selfe in a vaine pursuite the Irascible stirres vp despaire to the end the Concupiscible power may not spend it selfe in a designe which cannot succeed And in like manner if an obiect presents it selfe vnto the appetiue power vnder the forme of euill as for example a powerfull enemy prepares himselfe to wrong vs then first of all hatred riseth in vs and makes vs apprehend the euill which doth threaten vs apparantly and then inclines vs to seeke the meanes to auoyd it bee it in putting our selues in defence or in retiring our selues and seeking some shelter for this storme or else in auoyding it by some other meanes the which breeds in vs the Passion of flight by the which wee vnderstand no other thing here then our striuing to flie the euill But in case that in this seeking of meanes to auoyde it there appeare not any difficulty then the irascible power doth not trouble it selfe to assist the concupiscible And for that to escape a danger and to auoyd a mischiefe is a kind of good this happening it begets ioy As on the other side if we fall into a misfortune which threatens vs although there appeare not any difficulty in the auoyding it will cause griefe But if whilst I seeke meanes to auoyd the storme which threatens me I finde that I cannot doe it without paine and difficulty then for that the least obstacles amaze and hinder the concupiscible power which neuer striues to surmount them the irascible excites courage which goes to succour it and supports the motion of this Passion which wee terme flight or auersion from the thing vntill the euill bee wholy auoyded and dispersed and then ariseth the same ioy which had happened if it had not incountered any of these difficulties And if amidst this resistance and striuing of courage the euill doth notwithstanding ariue then griefe is framed after the same manner as if this accident had happened without any incounter or difficulty But if whilest wee seeke the meanes to auoyde the euill wee discouer much difficulty to preserue our selues and that there approcheth an eminent danger to our persons then the irascible doth succour vs with feare which makes man discreet and aduised to the end that his too great hardines may not precipitate him into the danger which hee would auoyd Besides al this when as the obiect which presents it selfe vnder the forme of good seemes at the same instant impossible to be attained vnto then not onely hope dies but euen desire is banisht so as the first Passion which then springs vp in vs is despaire which the irascible stirres vp to the end there should grow no vaine desire for that naturally no man desires things which are impossible and vaine and vnprofitable actions are enemies to nature As for the contrariety which may bee found betwixt some of these Passions we must vnderstand that this contrariety may be considered after two manners that is to say either by reason of the diuers motions of the appetite which is inflamed as for example wee say that hope and despaire are contrary Passions not in respect of their obiects seeing they both regard the apparant good vnder the condition of difficult obtaining but by reason of the diuers motions they excite by their nature in the appetite for that hope striues to seeke and enioy the obiect and despaire to flie from it and auoid it Whence it growes that if we compare hope and cour●ge we shall find them contrary Passions not in regard of the motion of the app●tite seeing that both agitate and stirre vp the spirit and serue it as a spurre to make it more ready in the pursuit of th●ir obiect but in respect of the obiect for that hope lookes to the apparent good and courage to the euill In like manner fe are and despaire are contraries by reason of their obiects and not in regard of their motions for that both serue rather to retire and stay the striuing of the appetite then to excite and stirre it vp Next desire and flight are contrary Passions by both reasons together considering that the one hath the good for obiect and the other the euill And moreouer desire stirres vp the appetite to seeke the obiect whereas flight makes it retire to auoyd it We may make the same comparisons of the rest of the Passions But this will appeare more plainely when wee shall treat of them in particular Of the quality of Passions whether they be good or bad CHAP. 3. AMongst the questions which haue beene seriously disputed in the Schooles of ancien● Philosophers there is not any one hath bene more famous nor whose subiect hath been● argued with greater contention then that which concernes the quality of the Passions of the Soule that is to say whether they be good or bad and if they bee compatible with any eminent vertu● or can subsist with it The Stoicks seuere Phil●soph●rs dissenting from the common opinions of the world haue maintained that a Soul● in which vertue hath taken deepe roote and which enioyes all the ornaments of true wisedome should haue gotten such a power ouer all her motions as it should neuer be transported with any perturbations The reason which moued them to this opinion was for that they held it an vnworthy thing for a wise and vertuous man to see himselfe subiect to the infirmities of the soule which is the name they giue to Passions But the Peripatitians haue held the contrary opinion and did beleeue that it could not bee denied but that the greatest Spirits and most accomplished in vertue and wisedome had sometimes a feeling of these Passions the heate whereof wisemen knew how to bridle and restraine And they ground their reason for that they rise not in vs by our election but are as it were siences of Nature which spring out of themselues This controuersie hath seemed to many great Personages to be more verbal then materiall But whatsoeuer it bee it is certaine that the wisest cannot exempt themselues from the motions of naturall Passions and yet their vertue is nothing diminished or made lesse perfect We must then remēber that these kinds of Passions may be considered in two manners first in their particular extent that is to say as motions of the sensitiue appetite which of it selfe is not indowed with any reason and which is common to vs with beasts and in this consideration they are neither commendable nor blame worthy seeing that the weight and merit of that which parts from our soule depends of reason secondly they may be considered in