will afford us any Conception of it Now suppose That after all these fair Appearances a spiteful Wit could start some difficulties in this Notion as it is not to be expected that in a matter of so high a Nature we should have such a perfect comprehension of it as to leave no difficulties unexplained ought not the Dean to have met with as fair Quarter as other Writers have done in the same cause Has he not given us as intelligible a representation and it is intended for no more of a Trinity in Unity as the Sun its Light and Splendor a Tree and its Branches a Fountain and its Streams or a Mathematical Cube Are not all these Accounts much more chargeable with Tritheism or Sabellianism are not the Sun its Light and Splendor as much Three but not so much One as Three Conscious Minds Can there be a Trinity in Unity unless there be a real and substantial Trinity What work could our Animadverter have made with the Ancient Fathers and some late Writers had he thought fit to have treated them as he has done Dr. Sherlock But it is in vain to expostulate when the Man not his Notions is in Fault and the only Comfort in such cases is That Malice is as blind as Love and so it has happened to the Animadverter as I shall make appear But before I particularly answer the Animadverter's Arguments against Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness and Three eternal Minds it will be necessary to Discourse something in general concerning a Trinity in Unity and the words whereby to express it For a Trinity in Unity is such a distinction and such an Union as is peculiar to the Godhead and though there are some faint resemblances of it in Nature yet Nature has nothing like it and then it is impossible we should have any words that can adaequately express it It may help to allay the heat and virulence of Disputation among those who heartily believe a Trinity in Unity as I hope the Animadverter does to discourse this matter plainly and briefly The Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament every where assure us That there is but One GOD and not to take notice now of the more obscure intimations of a Trinity in the Old Testament Christ in his Gospel and his Apostles after him have ascribed the Name and Character and incommunicable Attributes of GOD to Three Father Son and Holy Ghost we are by the Command of Christ Baptized in the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost and we are blessed in their Name The Grace of our Lord Iesus Christ and the Love of God and the Communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all Amen Christ declares himself to be the Son of GOD and to be One with his Father and St. Iohn tells us That he is that Word which was in the beginning and was with God and was God That by him all things were made and without him was not any thing made that was made And the like Divine Attributes are ascribed to the Holy Spirit and therefore though there be One GOD we must acknowledge if we believe the Gospel that there are Three Father Son and Holy Ghost in the Unity of the Godhead This is the true simplicity of the Christian Faith to believe Father Son and Holy Ghost to be One GOD that the Father is not the Son nor the Holy Ghost that the Son is not the Father nor the Holy Ghost that the Holy Ghost is not the Father nor the Son but that the Father is God the Son God and the Holy Ghost God and all Three but One God Now one would have thought that the Authority of Christ and his Apostles had been a sufficient Foundation for this Faith without any farther enquiries but the Devil very well knew That the whole Oeconomy of our Salvation by Christ and consequently the whole Christian Religion depended on this Faith and that the curiosity of Mankind the weakness of their Understandings and their vain presumption in measuring GOD himself by their narrow Conceits might easily be managed to unsettle these Foundations and therefore here he made some of his earliest Attempts The ancient Christians before this was made a matter of Dispute contented themselves with professing their Faith in One God Father Son and Holy Ghost but when Heresies in several Ages of the Church were broached and some to secure the Unity of the Godhead made Father Son and Holy Ghost no more than Three different Names belonging to Three different Appearances and Manifestations of the same One God others if they were not misunderstood or misrepresented did not only distinguish but separate Father Son and Holy Ghost and made Three absolute independent Gods of them and others denied the Divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost which preserved the Unity of the Godhead by reducing the only begotten Son and the Holy Spirit of God into the rank of Creatures This forced the Orthodox Fathers into a Dispute where they wanted Words adaequately to express their Sence The Doctrine which they constantly affirmed and defended against Hereticks of all sorts was this That Father Son and Holy Ghost were Three as really distinct from one another as Three humane Persons are and that each of them is true and perfect God and has all Divine Perfections in himself and yet that all Three are essentially One and the same eternal and infinite God But when they came to say what these Three are and how they are One by what Name to call this wonderful distinction and Unity here Words failed them as of necessity they must because there is no such Distinction and Unity in Nature and therefore no Name for it For the Names of distinction in ordinary use do not only distinguish but divide and separate their Subjects and the Names of Unity signifie singularity also which admits no number And this has occasioned most of our cavilling Disputes and raised all the noise and clamour about Absurdities and Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity and there is no help for this if Men will ask such Questions as the proper and natural signification of Words cannot reach the Mystery of and not allow such a Theological use of Words as a little alters their natural Signification to accommodate them to represent some divine and supernatural Mysteries Thus for Example A Person signifies a reasonable understanding Being which actually subsists and is distinguished from all other Beings of the same kind but then it signifies more than this not only a distinct but a separate Subsistence for so all created Persons are not only distinct but separate Beings who have a compleat absolute independant Subsistence of their own But when we use this Word Person in a Theological Sense as applied to Father Son and Holy Ghost in the ever-blessed Trinity we only use it in the sense of distinction not of separation to signifie that each of these Holy Three has
the Son though they have the very same Nature yet subsist in a very different manner the Father as Original Mind the Son as the perfect living substantial Image of the Father which is as different as the Subsistence of the Prototype and the Image and every one will grant that a Man and his Image though it were a living substantial Image have a very different Subsistence for the Image has its whole Subsistence in dependance on its Prototype the Man subsists by himself and gives Subsistence to his Image and the same we must conceive of the Subsistence of the Holy Spirit though we have not so apt a Similitude to represent it by And if we must call the Three in the Holy Trinity by any other Name than Father Son and Holy Ghost Three Subsistences is liable to the least Cavil and does most properly express their general Character for they are but One Divinity or One Divine Nature subsisting wholly and entirely Three times without multiplication as a Man is not multiplied but repeated in his Image All other Names in their proper and usual Sence signifie an absolute compleat independent Being such as Nature Essence Substance God And therefore though each Divine Person have a natural essential substantial Subsistence and be true and real God yet we must not say that there are Three Divine Natures Essences Substances or Three Gods because though the whole Divine Nature Essence subsists in Three yet it is but one and the same in all and tho' God be the most absolute compleat independant Being and the Son be God and the Holy Ghost God yet neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost can be said to be an absolute compleat independant God because Father Son and Holy Ghost are but One God neither of which subsist absolutely compleatly independently that is without each other which is all that is meant by an absolute compleat independent Subsistence that they can subsist apart without each other but the Father can no more subsist without the Son than the Son without the Father nor the Holy Spirit without Father and Son nor Father and Son without the Holy Spirit as a natural and necessary Image cannot subsist without its Prototype nor the Prototype without its Image which is essential to it so that they are but One absolute compleat independent Deity though the Three Divine Subsistences in the Godhead subsist in a mutual respect and a relative dependance on each other And this I suppose is what the Schools mean when they call the Three Divine Persons Three Relations or Three Relatives for there must be Three real subsisting Relatives if there be Three Relations for One Subsistence cannot be the Subject of Three Relations no more than one and the same Man can be related to himself as Father and Son But then the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are such Relations as there is no Example of in created Nature for their Relation to each other is not a meer external Respect and Denomination such as absolute independant Beings have to each other but their very Nature and Subsistence as Father Son and Holy Ghost is relative Though the Father be eternal original Mind yet it is essential to this eternal Mind to beget his own living substantial Image and therefore this eternal Mind is naturally and essentially related to his Image And I need not tell you that the very Nature and Subsistence of an Image is wholly relative a natural and essential Image subsists as necessarily as the Prototype but its Nature is wholly relative Thus Father Son and Holy Ghost have the same common Nature not common as a generical or specifick Nature which is only a logical Notion but as One individual Nature really and actually subsisting in each without any other difference than their different manner of Subsistence and their different Relations as a Man and his living Image have the same individual Nature common to both and differ only in their manner of Subsistence and Relations that is as the Prototype and its living Image differ And this I think gives us an intelligible account of a Trinity in Unity in the most Orthodox Language of Fathers and Schools This shews us that the Son and Holy Spirit are not Divine Emanations from the Father as is represented in the Platonick Triad For though the eternal Generation and Procession be such Mysteries as we cannot comprehend nor frame any Idea or Conception of yet we know that an Image is not an Emanation but a Reflextion and therefore is wholly and entirely the same with the Prototype which no Emanation can be for the whole cannot be an Emanation An Emanation indeed is of the same Substance and is specifically the same and in this Sence Homoousios but it multiplies Natures and Substances and is not individually and identically the same as the Prototype and its Image and therefore the Fathers declare That the eternal Generation of the Son is not by Abscission and Passion but think the aptest Representation of it in Nature though that is very different is by Splendor and Brightness or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the out-shining of the Deity and when they call the Holy Spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is not in the Sence of Emanation but of the mysterious Procession This also shews us That this Holy Trinity is not Three Divine Attributes such as Wisdom Power and Goodness for they are all Three the very same with each other the same Wisdom Goodness and Power and therefore not Three Parts or Attributes of the same Deity but each is the whole as a Prototype and its living Image is And this shews That though the Son be true and perfect God as the Father is yet the Son can never be a Father because his Nature and Subsistence as a Son is wholly relative and a Son whose Nature and Subsistence is relative is necessarily and essentially a Son but can never be a Father no more than the Image can beget its Prototype And this gives a plain Account why our Saviour calls God not only his Father but his God and the only true God and acknowledges That he receives all from his Father and That his Father is greater than he is though he have the very same Nature and with respect to his Nature is equal in Power and Glory for this is the true difference between the Prototype and the Image though their Nature be the same Had a Man a living substantial Image perfectly the same with himself as God has the Image must thus speak of his Prototype as the Son of God speaks of his Father He must acknowledge that the Prototype is his Man for he is only the Image of the Man and were there only One Man in the World as there is but One God he must acknowledge the Prototype to be the only true Man for though the living Image would be a true Man also yet he is not originally Man but Man of Man a Man only by
this Compound which the Soul is essentially related to not the Body I hope for the Body is no more the Compound than the Soul Is it then the Man and where is this Man that the Soul is essentially related to Does he then mean that it is essential to the Soul to live in an earthly Body Then it cannot live in a State of Separation If it be of the Essence of the Soul to live in the Body it is evident That it can never live out of it and if it be not essential then the Soul may be a whole entire Person when it subsists separate from the Body But the Soul by its original Designation is related to the Body What so that it cannot live without it and never should live without it if not this original Designation does not prove an essential Relation But it has a natural Aptitude to be an Ingredient in the Constitution of a Compound What does he mean by the Soul 's being an Ingredient in a Compound Is the Soul and Body mixed and blended together to make a Man Is it the same thing to be a part of the whole and to be an Ingredient in a Compound Well but the Soul has a natural Aptitude to live in a Body and so it has to live out of the Body and what then then the Soul which is the same Person still is naturally fitted to live in different States and then its Relation to an earthly Body is not essential to it whatever strong Appetite and Inclination as he says it retains to return and be re-united to the Body which whoever says it no Man can know and if it be true of sensual Souls who were wholly immersed in Sense is demonstratively false of all holy and pure Spirits who are in a great measure weaned from this Body while they live in it and rejoyce at their Deliverance when they escape safe out of it who with St. Paul desire to be absent from the Body and to be present with the Lord. Holy Souls indeed in a State of Separation do earnestly desire the Completion of their Happiness in the Resurrection of their Bodies but not to be re-united to these vile earthly corruptible Bodies but to glorified immortal incorruptible Bodies when Christ shall at his Appearance change our vile Bodies and make them like to his own most glorious Body which though they had every individual Atome which belonged to them before are yet in their Nature and Constitution no more the same Bodies than Earth and Heaven are the same But the Spirits of just Men made perfect are in a more perfect State of Life and Happiness out of these Bodies than they enjoyed in them and therefore are more perfect Persons too are more perfectly themselves and enjoy themselves more perfectly and therefore are in a State more agreeable to the Perfection of their Natures and that I take to be a natural State than living in these Bodies The Animadverter will not allow this to be a natural but Supernatural Perfection which relates only to the Consummation of their Graces and not to the manner of their Subsistence But is not the Perfection of our Graces the Perfection of Humane Nature And is not the Perfection of Nature a natural Perfection And if the Soul be more perfect in a State of Separation is not this a more perfect manner of Subsistence This might have shamed the Animadverter had he had a little more Consideration and less Confidence to deny the Personality of the Soul which can subsist and act and be more perfect and happy out of the Body which shews that to be in the Body or out of it does not concern the Personality but the different States wherein the same Person lives To proceed The Dean had upon another occasion said That all the Sufferings and Actions of the Body are attributed to the Man though the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour and Governing Power and constitutes the Person This I should have thought very true and safe but the Animadverter has made very tragical Work with it He says That this proves the quite contrary That the Man himself to whom these personal Acts are ascribed must indeed be the Person and that for the same Reason also the Soul cannot be so But does the Dean any where deny That the Man as consisting of Soul and Body is a Humane Person or when united to a Body affirm that the Soul is the whole Person He says indeed That the Soul is the seat of Personality the only Principle of Reason Sensation and a Conscious life which consequently in a State of Separation is the Person and when united to the Body constitutes the Person and therefore may both be the Person and constitute the Person When a Body is vitally united to a Soul Soul and Body are but One Person because they are but One voluntary Agent and have but One Conscious Life but it is the Soul constitutes the Person as being the Principle of all personal Acts Sensations and Passions which the Body is only the Instrument of but being a vital Instrument is united to the Person and becomes One Person with the Soul for the Person reaches as far as the same Conscious Life does but it is only this vital Union to the Soul which receives the Body into the Unity of the same Person not as part of the Person but as an animated Instrument of Life and Action which as it were cements Soul and Body into One Person A Soul vitally united to a Body is an embodied Person in a State of Separation it is the same Person still but without a Body which makes a great change in its Sensations and manner of acting but no more changes the Person than the Man would be changed cloathed or uncloathed were his Cloths as vitally united to his Body as his Body is to his Soul This is plain Sence and if the Animadverter knows not how to reduce it to Terms of Art I cannot help it The Soul I grant as he wisely observes Cannot constitute the Person efficiently by Creation or Generation nor formally as a constituent part for the Soul is not properly part of the Person but the Soul constitutes an embodied Person by living and acting in the Body which unites Soul and Body into one Life and that makes one embodied Person or Soul and Body one Man And now as for those Questions which with so much Triumph and Scorn he asks the Dean I leave to himself to Answer them and to you to laugh at them The rest of this Chapter is nothing but Ignorance and Raving and has been answered already If you will Pardon this long excursion about the Personality of the Soul which is nothing at all to the present Controversie having given you this one sufficient taste of the Wit and Philosophy of the Animadverter and his great exactness in speaking and reasoning I promise you to let pass an hundred other
were not unius Substantiae of one and the same Substance as St. Austin and all the Fathers assert because they are Two distinct Men and each of them has a distinct Nature of his own Or if he will call this a Difference as if to differ in number and in Substance or Nature were the same thing or as if to differ in number proved a diversity of Nature too It is a tedious thing to dispute with Men who must be taught to construe the Fathers and to understand common Sence But if Authority will not do this he is resolved Reason shall and he has as peculiar a Talent at Reason as he has at Authorities He proves That the Three Persons can't be Three distinct Minds because they are not Three distinct Substances Now the Dean may very safely deny this Consequence and try how the Animadverter will prove it That if Three Minds are Three intelligent Persons and a Mind is a Substance therefore Three distinct Minds or Persons are Three distinct Substances for Three distinct Minds may subsist distinctly and yet inseparably in One Eternal and infinite Substance as Three intelligent Persons do Though the true and short Answer is That the same Substance repeated in Three distinct Subsistences is not Three Substances but One as I have often observed in the Case of the Man and his Image But suppose Three Persons were Three distinct Substances inseparably united in One What then What then It is a Terrible then For then Two Substances will concur in and belong to each Person to wit that Substance which is the Divine Essence and so is communicable or common to all the Persons and the Substance which constitutes each Person and thereby is so peculiar to him as to distinguish him from the other and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs I am heartily ashamed and sorry to see such Stuff as must necessarily expose our Holy Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels and that I may not contribute to it all this Nonsence shall escape the lash of my Pen. In short the Dean knows no Divine Substance or Essence distinct from the Three Divine Persons nor knows any distinction between the Divine Essence and a Divine Person but that the Essence makes the Person That the whole Divine Essence or Nature is originally in God the Father that this same whole Divine Nature and Essence was by eternal Generation communicated by the Father to the Son and subsists distinctly in him That this same whole Divine Nature by eternal Procession is communicated by the Father and the Son to the Holy Ghost and subsists distinctly in him and these Three Divine Persons by an inseparable Union dwelling in each other is that Supream and Sovereign Being who is the One God or a Trinity in Unity It is amazing to think what strange Conceits this Man must have of a Trinity of Persons and Unity of Essence or Substance For I am sure no Man has any Idea of an intelligent Nature and Essence distinguished from a Person or of Persons distinguished from a rational Nature of a Divine Essence and Substance which is no Person and of Divine Persons which are no Substances as it seems they cannot be in the Animadverter's way unless he also will compound every Person of Two Substances What is the Divine Essence and Substance but an infinite and eternal Mind And is not an infinite and eternal Mind a Person The Divine Essence then must be acknowledged to be a Person and to be a substantial Person or the Divine Substance so that there is a Person that is a Substance and if there be but One such single and solitary Divine Essence there can be but One such single and solitary Person Will he then make four Persons in the Godhead the Divine Essence which is a substantial Person and Three Persons which are no Substances Or will he own God to be what Pascentius objected to St. Austin and he rejected with Scorn Triformis Persona One Divine Person under Three Forms this or something more Senceless is the Truth of the Case as may appear more hereafter but I will now proceed 3. His third Argument is this If it be truly said that one and the same infinite Mind or Spirit is Father Son and Holy Ghost I mean all Three taken together and it cannot be truly said that one and the same infinite Mind or Spirit is Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits then it follows that Father Son and Holy Ghost are not Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits This Logick is a very troublesome thing when Men want Sence The whole of this Argument is this That One infinite Mind can't be Three infinite Minds nor Three infinite Minds One infinite Mind and that Three Persons who are One infinite Mind can't be Three infinite Minds that is That Three can't be One nor One Three which if it be universally true there is an end of a Trinity in Unity if it be not universally true that is if Three may be One and One Three the meer opposition between Three and One which is the whole force of his Argument is childish Sophistry For if they be Three and One in different Respects this is no Contradiction Every Divine Person is an infinite Mind and as distinctly so as he is a distinct Person and yet by their essential and inseparable Union to each other all Three are but One eternal infinite Mind as they are but One God But when these Three Divine Persons are said to be Three and to be One eternal and infinite Mind they are Three and One Mind upon different Respects every Person by himself as a distinct Person is an eternal infinite Mind that is is a knowing intelligent Being and has all the Perfections of an infinite Understanding distinguished from the other Persons by Self-consciousness and all Three Persons by their inseparable Union to each other are but One eternal infinite Mind as having each other in themselves by Mutual-consciousness and let the Animadverter shew where the Contradiction is That there should be Three Self-conscious infinite Minds as there are Three infinite Persons united into One mutualconscious Mind as Three distinct Persons are united in the Unity of the Godhead especially when this One eternal Mind is entirely and perfectly repeated without the least change in Three eternal intelligent Subsistences each of which is distinctly an eternal Mind but the same One individual eternal Mind 4. His fourth and last Argument is this Whatsoever Attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in the Athanasian Form so belongs to them all in common that it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest But the attribute infinite Mind or Spirit may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in and according to the Athanasian Form And therefore it can belong to none of them under any Term
Existence but in an absolutely perfect and infinite Nature but if there be Three Parts in the Deity Three Spiritual Beings of distinst and different Natures neither of them can be absolutely perfect and infinite though we could suppose their Union to make such a perfect Being because they are not the same and neither of them is the whole and therefore they cannot necessarily Exist and yet a Deity which consists of Parts cannot necessarily Exist unless its Parts necessarily Exist for a Compounded Being can Exist no otherwise than its Parts Exist But there is something in this which seems to have a very ill Aspect upon the Trinity it self as well as on the Unity and Simplicity of the Divine Nature He Professes indeed not to Iudge that we are under the precise Notions of Power Wisdom and Goodness to conceive of the Father Son and Holy Ghost though he has been for several Pages together Vindicating such a representation of the Trinity and teaching us thus to conceive of Father Son and Holy Ghost and thinks That this gives ease to our Minds by their being disentangled from any apprehended necessity of thinking these Power Wisdom and Goodness to be the very same things and if they be not the same thing but Three really distinct Spiritual Beings we must thus conceive of Father Son and Holy Ghost and then the difficulty is in a Compounded Deity by what name to call the Three Parts of the Composition Father Son and Holy Ghost whether as we are taught in the Athanasian Creed we must own each of them by himself to be God and Lord For if all Three by this Composition are but One God neither of them by himself is true and perfect God no more than a Part can be the Whole This might be thought a very invidious consequence had not he himself expresly owned it The Father Son and Spirit being supposed necessarily existent in this united State they cannot but be God and the Godhead by reason of this necessary Union cannot but be One. Yet so As that when you predicate Godhead or the name of God of any one of them you herein express a true but inadaequate conception of God i. e. The Father is God not excluding the Son and Holy Ghost the Son is God not excluding the Father and the Holy Ghost the Holy Ghost is God not excluding the Father and the Son As our Body is the Man not excluding the Soul our Soul is the Man not excluding the Body This Comparison of the Soul and Body which are the Parts of a Man and whose Union makes a compleat and perfect Man explains what he means by the inadaequate Conception of God when we apply the Name God distinctly to Father Son and Holy Ghost and in what Sence he says the Father is God but not so as to exclude the Son c. All Orthodox Christians own That the Father is God not excluding the Son and the Holy Ghost and that the Son is God not excluding the Father and the Holy Ghost c. but then by this they mean That the Father is true and perfect God has the whole entire Divinity in himself but yet the same whole entire Divinity distinctly and inseparably subsists in the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost that the same whole undivided Divine Nature subsists entirely in Three distinct Persons Father Son and Holy Ghost and therefore each of them by himself in the most proper and adaequate Conception is true and perfect God tho' all Three are but one and the same God But the Inquirers Notion of God as applied to each Person is a very inadaequate Notion for it signifies only a part of the Deity That the Father is God because he is a part of the Godhead and the Son and the Holy Ghost God as parts also of the same One Godhead as the Soul is the Man because part of the Man and the Body also the Man as part of the Man and therefore Father Son and Holy Ghost are each of them God but so as not to exclude each other as no One essential Part can exclude the rest This is such a Notion of the Unity of the Godhead as neither the Scriptures nor the ancient Church knew any thing of and I think there is little need to confute it In short as it makes a compounded Deity so it makes but One compounded Person for if the Godhead be but One by Composition as the Man is by the Union of Soul and Body if God be a Person he can be but One For if you call the Three Parts of the Godhead Three Persons yet neither of them is God but in a very improper and figurative Sence as a Part is called by the Name of the whole so that either there is no Person in the Godhead who is true and perfect God or there must be but One compounded Person as there is One compounded Godhead and there is an end of the Christian Trinity Some late Socinian Writers have been willing to compound this Dispute of a Tinity of Divine Persons for the Three Attributes of Power Wisdom and Goodness and if you have a mind to call these Three Spiritual Beings I believe they will not contend much about it for they are not so much afraid of Three Parts of a Deity as of Three Divine Persons each of which is true and perfect God This also necessarily destroys the Homoousion or Sameness of Nature which the ancient Church asserted in the Persons of the Holy Trinity for Three Spiritual Beings which are the Parts of this compounded Deity cannot be the same no more than Soul and Body are for the Parts of a compound how closely soever they are united cannot be the same for Three Same 's are not Three Parts but Three Wholes As to take his own Representation of it If Power Wisdom and Goodness be Father Son and Holy Ghost it is certain and he owâ—â— that Power is not the same with Wisdom and Goodness nor Wisdom the same with Power and Goodness and therefore the Son is not of the same Nature with his Father Which is another thing to be considered in the Enquirer's Notion that it destroys the Relations of the Ever-blessed Trinity for if Father Son and Holy Ghost be Three Parts of a compounded Deity though we should grant that their Union might make One God yet these Parts could neither beget nor be begotten nor proceed from each other and therefore could not be related to each other as Father and Son and Spirit but only as Three parts of the same Compositum If Power be the Father and Wisdom the Son how comes Wisdom to be the Son of Power and not to be Power as the Father is since a Father begets his own Likeness This destroys the natural Order and Subordination of the Persons in the Trinity if Power Wisdom and Goodness be Three real distinct things and Three Spiritual Beings which compleatly constitute the Godhead let any Man tell me which of these Three in order of Nature is the first second or third why one is the Father the other the Son and the third the Holy Ghost This makes me wonder to hear him talk of Promanations for an Emanative Cause never produces any thing but of its own Nature as Light naturally flows from the Sun But I will not 〈◊〉 this Postscript into another long Letter this is sufficient to my present Design to give you a 〈◊〉 and plain Representation of the 〈…〉 and leave you â—o judge of 〈◊〉 SIR Yours FINIS ADVERTISEMENT A Commentary on the Five Books of Moses With a Dissertation concerning the Author or Writer of the said Books and a general Argument to each of them By the Right Reverend Father in God Richard Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells In Two Volumes Octavo Reason and Religion In some useful Reflections on the most Eminent Hypothesis concerning the first Principles and Nature of things with Advice suitable to the Subject and seasonable for these times Twelves A Defence of the Dean of St. Paul's Apology for writing against the Socinians in answer to the Antapologist Quarto Printed for William Rogers Greg. Naz. Orat. 36. Hil. l. 11. de Trinit Damasc. l. 1. deimaginibus * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Greg. Nyss. contra Eunom Orat. 12. p. 345. Petav. de Trin. p. 342. alibi Ambr. l. 3. de fide c. 7. Facundus pro defensione trium capit c. 1. p 19. Hil. l. de Synod Vindic. of Trin. p. 49. Vindic. p. 130 131 c. P. 122 123 c. P. 81. P. 83. Animad c. 3. Pag. 70. Vindic. p. 48. Page 71. Vindic. p. 268. Anim. p. 73 Anim. p. 74. Animad p. 75. Animad p. 76. Animad p. 48. Pag. 79. Pag. 80. Anim. Chap. 4. p. 90. Pag. 94. Pag. 101. Pag. 104. Pag. 107. Vindic. p. 8. Pag. 100. Anim. Chap. 5. p. 118. Vindic. p. 66. Pag. 119. * Ideo Ipsa mirabilis simplicitas commendatur quia non ibi in Trinitate aliud est esse aliud intelligere vel siquid aliud de dei natura dicitur Anima verò quia est etiam dum non intelligit aliud est quidem esse aliud est quod intelligit Aug. Evod. Ep. 102. Proinde in unum Deum Patrem Filium Spiritum Sanctum credamus ita ut nec filius credatur esse qui pater est nec pater qui filius est nec pater nec filius qui utriusque spiritus est Sed haec tria aequalia esse coaeterna omnino esse una natura Ibid. †Deinde quis audeat dicere patrem non intelligere per semetipsum sed per filium Ibid. Pag. 123. Ep. 176 177. Calm Discourse p. 19 20 21. Pag. 23. Pag. 25. Pag. 40. Pag. 45. Pag. 28 c. Pag. 31. Pag. 34. Pag. 37. Pag. 47.
not a Person and consequently Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality for as much as it may be in that which is no Person Now indeed had the Dean expresly taught That Self-consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality here had been One supernatural Exception against it which does not alter the Reason of natural Unions and yet is no greater Objection against Self-consoiousness than against the most approved Definition of a Person For if with Boethius you define a Person to be substantia individua naturae rationabilis an individual Substance of a rational Nature the Humane Nature of Christ which is an individual Substance of a rational Nature and yet no Person is an equal Objection against it and let the Animadverter try how according to this Definition he can keep off the Assertion of Nestorius that there are Two distinct Persons in Christ And if Self-consciousness escape as well as any other formal Reason of Personality I believe the Dean desires no more and yet he needs not this for he no where makes Self-consciousness the formal Reason of Personality but only of the Unity and Distinction of a Mind or Spirit and I hope he will grant the Humane Nature of Christ to be One and to be distinct and separated by Self-consciousness from all other particular Humane Natures or Persons The short Answer is this That Self-consciousness makes a Mind or Spirit one with it self and distinguishes or separates it from all other Minds or Spirits and such a distinct and separate Self-conscious Mind is a natural Person unless its own natural Personality be swallowed up in a Personal Union to a Superiour Mind For this is the Account the Dean gives of a personal Union when Two Natures are united into One Person they must be so united that the Superiour Nature have the Government of the whole Person which is necessary to make them One Agent without which there cannot be One Person and that there be One Consciousness in the whole Of which more presently 3. His third Argument is draw out to a great length but may be answered in a few Words becuse it proceeds upon the same Mistake and is nothing to the purpose It is taken from the Soul of Man in a State of Separation from the Body that the Soul in a separate State is conscious to it self of all its own internal Acts or Motions and yet the Soul in such a State is not a Person And therefore Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality But whether the Soul be a Person or no Person in the Body or out of the Body is nothing at all to the present Controversie If the Soul and all other Spirits are naturally One with themselves and separated from all other Souls and Spirits by Self-consciousness this is all the Dean desires and all that his Hypothesis needs And the Animadverter may philosophize as he pleases about Personalities The Truth is to do him right he is a very notable Man if he can draw you into a School-question for he can make a shift to read and transcribe but he hates a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Men at his Heart which is none of his Talent for it requires thinking put him out of his way and he is undone which makes him so angry at the Dean for not speaking the School-Language nor confining himself to known Terms of Art which he has a great deal to say of whether he understands them or not and because the Dean would not do this himself he has done it for him and put his Notions into School-Terms and made Self-consciousness the formal Reason of Personality and on my Word has disputed very notably against it and it is pity Three such dead-doing Arguments should be lost for want of the formal Reason of Personality and yet there is no help for it he must begin all again and try how he can prove that the Unity of a Mind and its distinction from all other Minds does not consist in Self-consciousness and if he can prove this then the Dean is a lost Man for ever and must be contented to follow his Triumphant Chariot But yet whether this Question of the Soul 's being a Person or no Person serve the purpose of the present Dispute or not it abundantly serves the Animadverter's charitable purpose which is the only purpose of his writing this Book to expose the Dean and therefore though the Matter is not worth disputing I shall make some short Reflections on it The Dean has upon another occasion asserted That a Soul without a vital Union to a Humane Body is a Person In opposition to this the Animadverter asserts That the Soul of Man is not a Person neither in its Conjunction with the Body nor its Separation from it The Foundation of his Arguments such as they are is a very unphilosophical and senceless Mistake that because Man consists of Soul and Body which he very undeniably proves from the Athanasian Creed therefore the Personality too must be divided between the Soul and Body that the Soul is but part of the Person as it is part of the Man and then the Soul neither in nor out of the Body can be the Person because a part can't be the whole Quod erat demonstrandum Now I readily grant That the Person of a Man as it is used in common Speech to signifie a Man must include both Soul and Body as the constituent Parts of a Humane Person but when we enquire into the strict Notion of Personality that must be a simple uncompounded thing as indivisible as self is which cannot consist of Parts which may be separated from each other that one part of the Person may live and the other die for though there are Two Natures there is but One Person and the same One Person cannot both live and die at the same time This is a very pleasant Notion if well considered of the two parts of Personality as there are two Parts of a Man Soul and Body for unless there be two Personalities as well as two Natures the two Natures cannot be two Parts of the one Humane Personality as they are the Parts of a Man It is impossible to prove from Two Natures that there are Two Parts of Personality unless each Nature has a Personality of its own the Personality of the Body and the Personality of the Soul united into the One Personality of the Man for nothing can be a part of Personality which has nothing of Personality it self Will the Animadverter then venture to attribute any Personality to the Body as he must do if he makes it part of the Personality This will be a little worse than what he so rares the Dean for calling a Beast a Person tho the Dean gave notice of the impropriety of the Expression and used it only by way of allusion and accommodation the better to represent the Union of Two Natures into
Master-piece of profound Reason and Judgment If Three distinct Self-consciousnesses formally constitute Three distinct Personalities then Three distinct Self-complacencies will constitute Three distinct Personalities too He might as well have added Self-Love and Self-Displeasure and Self-Condemnation and as many Selfs as he could think of only the Danger then was That the Personality should alter with the Judgment or Passion that the Person should not be the same when he is pleased and displeased when he applauds and acquits or condemns himself Had he added Self-conscious to all this as a Self-conscious complacency for then it is the same thing whether Self or any other Being be the object of the complacency a Self-conscious Love or Fear or Hatred or Desire every one of these Acts would prove a distinct Person because they are the Acts of Self-consciousness which distinguish one Person from another as every Act of Reason proves a reasonable Creature because it is the exercise of Rationality but yet no Man will say that it is every Act but the principle of Reason which makes a reasonable Creature and no more does any particular Act but the principle of Self-consciousness distinguish between Self-conscious Persons much less such Acts as may be separated from the Person as I doubt Self-complacency is from Damned Spirits or if he will not allow Souls to be Persons as it will be from Damned Men. He has drawn this Argument out to such a length and has so many pretty Remarks that I have much ado to keep my word with you but let him go like a wrangling Wit as he is and I 'll go on As Self-consciousness makes a Person one with it self and distinguishes it from all other Persons so the Dean apprehends That a natural Mutual-consciousness makes Three Persons as naturally One as it is possible for Three to be One and that is the Unity of the Godhead not the Unity of One Person but the Unity of Three or a Trinity in Unity And this is his next Attempt to prove That the Unity of Three Divine Persons in the Godhead can't consist in Mutual-consciousness He proceeds upon the same mistake and therefore the same Answer will serve By Self-consciousness he understood as you have seen the acts of Self-consciousness and then the act Supposing a Person could not be the formal Reason of Personality and thus by Mutual-consciousness he understands the Acts of Mutual-consciousness which supposes the Unity of Nature and therefore cannot be the cause or reason of it now though I know not of what use that Dispute is about the Priority of Being and the first Modes and Affections of it to any Act of Knowledge or any other Acts especially when we speak of the Divine Nature which we know has no Modes and Affections no Priority so much as in Conception if we conceive aright of him between his Being and a pure and simple Act yet I will not put the Animadverter out of his way when there is no need of it an easie obvious distinction between the Principle and the Act answers all A Self-conscious Principle without which we can't conceive a Mind makes a Mind one with it self and distinguishes it from all other Minds and by the Acts of Self-consciousness which suppose the Principle every Mind feels it self to be One and distinguished from all others And thus the natural Principle of Mutual-consciousness between Three Persons unites them inseparably in One Nature and the Acts of Mutual-consciousness are the Acts of Unity whereby they know and feel themselves to be essentially in each other and therefore to be essentially One Just as we consider Reason either as the Principle or as the Act the first constitutes a reasonable Nature the second is the actual exercise of Reason and thus all his Arguments vanish like Smoak rise in a dark Cloud but immediately disperse and are seen no more till they return as such Vapours use to do in Thunder and Lightning or some threatning Storm 1. His first Argument is this No Act of Knowledge can be the formal Reason of an Unity of Nature in the Persons of the blessed Trinity But an Act of Mutual-consciousness is an Act of Knowledge Ergo. Nothing will satisfie the Animadverter but formal Reasons whereas the Dean no where asserts That Mutual-consciousness is the formal Reason of this Unity but that Three Persons who are thus Mutually-conscious to each other must be essentially One nor does the Dean place this Unity in an Act of Mutual-consciousness which signifies the Principle as well as the Act and then Mutual-consciousness if it were no more than Knowledge of which presently must not be considered as an Act of Knowledge Arg. 2. If Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons be the Cause Reason or Principle of Mutual-consciousness in the said Persons then their Mutual-consciousness is not the Cause or Reason of the Unity of their Nature but the former is true and therefore the latter is so too If by this he means That these Divine Persons could not be thus Mutually conscious except they were essentially One it is true but nothing to the purpose for they may be thus essentially One by Mutual-consciousness or Mutual-consciousness may be essential to this Unity though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other unless they were thus united as to have and to feel each other in themselves If by the Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons he means the Sameness and Homoousiotes of Nature this I grant is a necessary Foundation for Mutual-consciousness without which they could not be One nor mutually conscious to each other but I deny that it is the immediate Cause Reason or Principle of Mutual-consciousness The ancient Fathers were very sensible That when the same Nature subsisted distinctly in Three distinct Persons the meer Sameness and Homoousiotes of Nature could not make this essential Unity and therefore they added their Perichoresis or the mutual In-being of these Divine Persons in each other which the Dean calls Mutual-consciousness which is the only natural Union and In-being of Minds He proves That Unity of Nature is the Cause and Principle of Mutual-consciousness because Mutual-consciousness is an essential Property equally belonging to all the Three Persons and therefore as all Properties and internal Attributes do must issue and result from the Essence and Nature and therefore can have no antecedent causal influx upon the same Nature so as to constitute either the Being or the Unity of it Now I grant That Mutual-consciousness does equally belong to all Three Persons for they are all mutually-conscious to each other and I grant that it is essential to the Divine Nature as to subsist in Three distinct Persons so in Three mutually-conscious Persons but yet Mutual-consciousness belongs not immediately to Nature but to Persons and is that intimate Union of Persons which consists in feeling each other in themselves The Dean will leave the Animadverter to Philosophize by himself concerning
and silenced all his Adversaries then that he heard no more of that till the Animadverter revived the Quarrel who could have given you the Dean's Answers to his own Objections if he had so pleased for they are not new but borrowed from such Wits as Mr. Alsop without any new strength given to them Where the Animadverter charges the Dean with Absurdities and Contradictions turn to the place and read it with it s context and tell me what you can't Answer and I will But if you or any body else can be perswaded by the Animadverter That the Dean understands neither English Latin nor Greek neither Logicks Metaphysicks or Common Sence I need wish you no other Punishment than when ever you Write to fall into the hands of such an Adversary for I believe there are very few Writers but might be exposed in the same manner by a spiteful Critick not the Animadverter himself excepted who begins his Animadversions with a notorious Blunder in deriving a Mystery from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereas a Mystery does not signifie in English the word Mystery but the thing signified by that word and therefore though the word Mystery may be derived a Mystery is derived from no Word and to Talk of deriving a Mystery is neither English nor Sence But though it were Justice to return some of his Complements to the Dean upon himself yet his Example is too scandalous to be imitated and there is no need to expose him more than his own Pen has done I am SIR Your very Faithful Friend A POST-SCRIPT Concerning the Calm-Discourse of the Trinity in the Godhead SIR SInce my writing this Letter I have met with a Book Entituled A Calm and Sober Enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead Written as is said by a Man of great Reputation among the Dissenters I do not intend to examine the Book nor to approve or disapprove it though there seem to be very obnoxious Passages in it should he fall into such hands as our Animadverter He has taken great care That no Man should suspect that he favours the Dean in his Notions and I believe the Dean will thank him for that for if I understand him he would never have said and would be as unwilling that any Man should think he has said what the Enquirer has But all I design by this Post-script is only this to let you see that though the Enquirer does not in every particular say what the Dean says yet he says what will justifie the Dean against the heaviest Charge the Animadverter himself could frame against his Hypothesis and that is Tritheism The pretence of this is what the Dean says concerning Three distinct eternal infinite Minds and the Objections and Answers you have already heard and if I can understand the Enquirer he says this as plainly and in more obnoxious Terms than the Dean has done To prove the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead he argues from the possibility of God's uniting two Spirits by as close an Union as he has united Spirit and Body which make One Man and if it were possible to him God to unite Two would it not be as possible to unite Three So that he represents the Trinity in Unity by the Union of Three Spirits which are distinguished by their own individual Essences and remain distinct by their singular Essences so as to be everlastingly united but not Identified and by Vertue of that Union be some one thing as much and as truly as our Soul and Body united do constitute One Man Now from the possibility of such an Union with such a distinction in created Spirits he concludes the possibility of such an Union unmade or that is original and eternal in an unmade or uncreated Being that is That Three eternal unmade uncreated Spirits may be thus united in One Godhead that is That there are or may be for whatever he thinks which may be easily guessed at he will not positively assert it Three eternal uncreated Minds in the Unity of the Godhead This he proves from the Incarnation That the Union of the Two Natures the Humane made up of an Humane Body and Humane Soul which are Two exceedingly different Natures with the Divine which is a Third and infinitely more different from both the other in One Person viz. of the Son of God cannot certainly appear to any considering Person more conceivable or possible than that which we now suppose but assert not of Three distinct Essences united in the One Godhead And that Father Son and Holy Ghost have their distinct Essences he proves also from the Doctrine of the Incarnation since the Man Christ is confessed to be in Hypostatical Union with the uncreated Spiritual Being of God not as that Being is in the Person of the Father nor as in the Person of the Holy Ghost for then they should have become Man too but as it was in the Person of the Son only why should it be thought less possible That Three uncreated Spiritual Beings which the Animadverter will no more allow of them of Three eternal Minds may be in so near an Union with each other as to be One God as that a created Spirit and Body too should be in so near an Union with One of the Persons in the Godhead only as therewith to be One Person Will it not hereby be much more apprehensible how One of the Persons as the common way of speaking is should be Incarnate and not the other Two Will not the Notion of Person it self be much more unexceptionable when it shall be supposed to have its own individual Nature Will it be Tritheism and inconsistent with the acknowledged invioluble Unity of the Godhead A great deal more to this purpose you may find in his first Letter to Dr. Wallis p. 100 c. and whether this be Tritheism or not he had best ask the Animadverter who charged the Dean's Hypothesis with Tritheism with much less Reason And I confess I am amazed that after all this he should so industriously Vindicate himself from Dr. Sherlock's Notion of Three infinite Minds or Spirits for Three distinct Substances the Dean does not assert and if the Enquirer has not all this while been proving Three Spirits Three distinct Essences Three individual Natures in the Godhead no Man living can guess what he means for my part I cannot tell where the difference is unless it be in the Term of infinite for his Three Spirits and Essences and individual Natures which make up his Unity of the Godhead as he has represented it do not seem to be infinite But he shelters himself from the Animadverter whom he seems to be terribly afraid of in Academick uncertainty and thinks he may safely dispute as he pleases and all on one side so long as he asserts nothing though I cannot see how the Dean was more dogmatical than the Enquirer who proposed his