The instance of Solomon is not at all to the purpose unless we asserted three Persons founded upon those different Relations in his individual Nature Who denies that one Person may have different Respects and yet be but one Person subsisting Where doth the Scripture say That the Son of David the Father of Rehoboam and he that proceeded from David and Bathsheba were three Persons distinguished by those relative Properties But here lies the foundation of what we believe as to the Trinity we are assured from Scripture that there are three to whom the divine Nature and Attributes are given and we are assured both from Scripture and Reason that there can be but one divine Essence and therefore every one of these must have the divine Nature and yet that can be but One But it is a most unreasonable thing to charge those with Sabellianism who assert That every Person hath the divine Nature distinctly belonging to him and that the divine Essence is communicated from the Father to the Son Did ever Nâ—etus or Sabellius or any of their Followers speak after this manner Is the divine Essence but a mere Name or a different respect only to Mankind For the asserting such relative Persons as have no Essence at all was the true Sabellian Doctrine as will be made appear in the following Discourse And so much is confess'd by our Unitarians themselves for they say That the Sabellians held that Father Son and Spirit are but only three Names oâ— God given to him in Scripture by occasion of so many several Dispensations towards the Creature and so he is but one subsisting Person and three relative Persons as he sustains the three Names of Father Son and Spirit which being the Relations of God towards things without him he is so many relative Persons or Persons in a Classical Critical Sense i. e. Persons without any Essence belonging to them as such But those who assert a Communication of the divine Essence to each Person can never be guilty of Sabellianism if this be it which themselves affirm And so those called Nominal Trinitarians are very unjustly so called because they do really hold a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead 2. Let us now see what charge they lay upon those whom they call Real Trinitarians and they tell us That the Nominals will seem to be profound Philosophers deep Sages in comparison with them These are very obliging expressions to them in the beginning But how do they make out this gross Stupidity of theirs In short it is That they stand condemned and anathematized as Hereticks by a general Council and by all the Moderns and are every day challenged and impeached of Tritheism and cannot agree among themselves but charge one another with great Absurdities and in plain terms they charge them with Nonsense in the thing whereas the other lay only in words Because these assert three divine subsisting Persons three infinite Spirits Minds or Substances as distinct as so many Angels or Men each of them perfectly God and yet all of them are but one God To understand this matter rightly we must consider that when the Socinian Pamphlets first came abroad some years since a learned and worthy Person of our Church who had appear'd with great vigour and reason against our Adversaries of the Church of Rome in the late Reign which ought not to be forgotten undertook to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity against the History of the Unitarians and the Notes on the Athanasian Creed but in the warmth of disputing and out of a desire to make this matter more intelligible he suffer'd himself to be carried beyond the ancient Methods which the Church hath used to express her Sense by still retaining the same fundamental Article of three Persons in one undivided Essence but explaining it in such a manner as to make each Person to have a peculiar and proper Substance of his own This gave so great an advantage to the Author of those Treatises that in a little time he set forth his Notes with an Appendix in answer to this new Explication Wherein he charges him with Heresie Tritheism and Contradiction The very same charges which have been since improved and carried on by others I wish I could say without any unbecoming Heat or Reflections But I shall now examine how far these charges have any ground so as to affect the Doctrine of the Trinity which is the chief end our Adversaries aimed at in heaping these Reproaches upon one who appear'd so early and with so much zeal to defend it We are therefore to consider these things 1. That a Man may be very right in the Belief of the Article it self and yet may be mistaken in his Explication of it And this one of his keenest Adversaries freely acknowledges For he plainly distinguishes between the fundamental Article and the manner of explaining it and affirms That a Man may quit his Explication without parting with the Article it self And so he may retain the Article with his Explication But suppose a Man to assent to the fundamental Article it self and be mistaken in his Explication of it can he be charged with Heresie about this Article For Heresie must relate to the fundamental Article to which he declares his hearty and unfeigned Assent but here we suppose the mistake to lie only in the Explication As for instance Sabellianism is a condemned and exploded Heresie for it is contrary to the very Doctrine of the Trinity but suppose one who asserts the Doctrine of three Persons should make them to be three Modes must such a one presently be charged with Heresie before we see whether his Explication be consistent with the fundamental Article or not For this is liable to very obvious Objections that the Father begets a Mode instead of a Son that we pray to three Modes instead of three real Persons that Modes are mutable things in their own Nature c. but must we from hence conclude such a one guilty of Heresie when he declares that he withall supposed them not to be mere Modes but that the divine Essence is to be taken together with the Mode to make a Person Yea suppose some spitefull Adversary should say That it is a Contradiction to say That the same common Nature can make a Person with a Mode superadded to it unless that be individuated for a â—erson doth imply an individual Nature and not a mere relative Mode Is this sufficient to charge such a Person with the Sabellian Heresy which he utterly disowns Is not the like Equity to be shewâ—d in another though different Explication Suppose then a Person solemnly professes to own the fundamental Doctrine of the Trinity as much as any others but he thinks that three Persons must have distinct Substances to make them Persons but so as to make no Division or Separation in the Godhead and that he cannot conceive a Communication of the divine Essence
without this must this presently be run down as Heresie when he asserts at the same time three Persons in the same undivided Essence But this is said to be a Contradiction so it was in the other case and not allow'd then and why should it be otherwise in this I speak not this to justifie such Explications but to shew that there is a difference between the Heresie of denying an Article and a mistake in the Explication of it Even the greatest Heresie-makers in the world distinguish between Heresies and erroneous Explications of Articles of Faith as any one may find that looks into them And even the Inquisitors of Heresie themselves allow the distinction between Heresie and an erroneous Proposition in Faith which amounts to the same with a mistaken Explication of it and they all grant that there may be Propositions that tend to Heresie or savour of it which cannot be condemned for Heretical And even Pegna condemns Melchior Canus for being too cruel in asserting it to be Heresie to contradict the general Sense of Divines because the Schools cannot make Heresies 2. It is frequently and solemnly affirmed by him That the Unity of the Godhead is the most real essential indivisible inseparable Unity that there is but one divine Nature which is originally in the Father and is substantially communicated by the Father to the Son as a distinct subsisting Person by an eternal ineffable Generation and to the Holy Ghost by an eternal and substantial Procession from Father and Son Do the others who maintain a Trinity deny this By no means For we have already seen that they assert the same thing So that they are fully agreed as to the main fundamental Article And even the Unitarians yield that from the beginning he asserted That the three divine Persons are in one undivided Substance Wherein then lies the foundation of this mighty Quarrel and those unreasonable Heats that Men have fallen into about it to the great scandal of our Church and Religion In short it is this that the same Author asserts 1. That it is gross Sabellianism to say That there are not three personal Minds or Spirits or Substances 2. That a distinct substantial Person must have a distinct Substance of his own proper and peculiar to his own Person But he owns that although there are three distinct Persons or Minds each of whom is distinctly and by himself God yet there are not three Gods but one God or one Divinity which he saith is intirely and indivisibly and inseparably in three distinct Persons or Minds That the same one divine Nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the eternal Son and by the Father and Son to the eternal Spirit without any Division or Separation and so it remains one still This is the substance of this new Explication which hath raised such Flames that Injunctions from authority were thought necessary to suppress them But those can reach no farther than the restraint of Mens Tongues and Pens about these matters and unless something be found out to satisfie their Minds and to remove Misapprehensions the present Heat may be only cover'd over and kept in which when there is a vent given may break out into a more dangerous Flame Therefore I shall endeavour to state and clear this matter so as to prevent any future Eruption thereof which will be done by considering how far they are agreed and how far the remaining difference ought to be pursued 1. They are agreed That there are three distinct Persons and but one Godhead 2. That there are no separate and divided Substances in the Trinity but the divine Nature is wholly and entirely one and undivided 3. That the divine Essence is communicated from the Father to the Son and from both to the holy Spirit So that the charge of Sabellianism on those who reject this new Explication is without ground For no Sabellian did or could assert a Communication of the divine Essence Which being agreed on both sides the Dispute turns upon this single point whether a communicated Essence doth imply a distinct Substance or not On the one side it is said That there being but one God there can be but one divine Essence and if more Essences more Gods On the other side that since they own a communicated Essence necessary to make a distinction of Persons in the Son and Holy Ghost if the Essence be not distinct the foundation of distinct Personalities is taken away But how is this clear'd by the other Party They say That it is one peculiar Prerogative of the divine Nature and Substance founded in its infinite and therefore transcendent Perfection whereby it is capable of residing in more Persons than one and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and Holy Ghost So that the Communication of the divine Nature is owned to the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost But how then comes it not to make a distinct Essence as it makes distinct Persons by being communicated The answer we see is That it is a peculiar Prerogative founded on the infinite and therefore transcendent Perfection of the divine Nature But they further add That when the Son and Holy Ghost are said to have the same divine Nature from the Father as the Origin and Fountain of the Divinity not by the Production of a new divine Nature but by a Communication of his own which is one and the same in all three without Separation Difference or Distinction that this is indeed a great Mystery which hath been always look'd upon by the greatest and wisest Men in the Church to be above all Expressions and Description So that the greatest difficulty is at last resolved into the incomprehensible Perfection of the divine Nature and that neither Man nor Angels can give a satisfactory answer to Enquiries about the manner of them And the Author of the Animadversions saith That in the divine Persons of the Trinity the divine Nature and the personal Subsistence coalesce into one by an incomprehensible ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction But do those on the other side think that the asserting three distinct Substances in one and the same individual Substance tends to clear and explain the Notion of the Trinity and make it more easie and intelligible The Divinity they say is whole intire indivisible and inseparable in all three But can one whole entire indivisible Substance be actually divided into three Substances For if every Person must have a peculiar Substance of his own and there be three Persons there must be three peculiar Substances and how can there be three peculiar Substances and yet but one entire and indivisible Substance I do not say there must be three divided Substances in place or separate Substances but they must be divided as three Individuals of the same kind which must introduce a Specifick Divine Nature which I think very
Substance must be divided if there be three Persons That every Person must have a Substance to support his Subsistence is not denied but the question is Whether that Substance must be divided or not We say where the Substance will bear it as in created Beings a Person hath a separate substance i. e. the same Nature diversified by Accidents Qualities and a separate Existence but where these things cannot be there the same Essence must remain undivided but with such relative Properties as cannot be confounded But may not the same undivided Substance be communicated to three divided Persons so as that each Person may have his own proper Substance and yet the divine Essence be in it self undivided This is not the case before us For the question upon the Creed is Whether the Substance can be divided And here it is allow'd to remain undivided Yes in it self but it may be divided in the Persons The Substance we say is uncapable of being divided any way and to say that a Substance wholly undivided in it self is yet divided into as many proper and peculiar Substances as there are Persons doth not at all help our understanding in this matter but if no more be meant as is expresly declared than That the same one divine Nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the eternal Son and by Father and Son to the eternal Spirit without any Division or Separation it is the same which all Trinitarians assert And it is a great pity that any new Phrases or Ways of Expression should cause unreasonable Heats among those who are really of the same Mind For those who oppose the expressions of three distinct Substances as new and dangerous yet grant That it is one peculiar Prerogative of the divine Nature and Substance founded in its infinite and therefore transcendent Perfection whereby it is capable of residing in more Persons than one and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and Holy Ghost but this is done without any Division or Multiplication Now if both Parties mean what they say where lies the difference It is sufficient for my purpose that they are agrred that there can be no Division as to the divine Essence by the distinction of Persons And so this passage of the Athanasian Creed holds good Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance The next Article as it is set down in the Notes on Athanasius his Creed is a contradiction to this For there it runs There is one Substance of the Father another of the Son another of the Holy Ghost They might well charge it with Contradictions at this rate But that is a plain mistake for Person for there is no other variety in the Copies but this that Baysius his Greek Copy hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that of Constantinople 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but all the Latin Copies Persona But what consequence do they draw from hence Then say they the Son is not the Father nor is the Father the Son nor the Holy Ghost either of them If they had put in Person as they ought to have done it is what we do own And what follows If the Father be not the Son and yet is the one true God then the Son is not the one true God because he is not the Father The one true God may be taken two ways 1. The one true God as having the true divine Nature in him and so the Father is the one true God but not exclusive of the Son if he have the same divine Nature 2. The one true God as having the divine Nature so wholly in himself as to make it incommunicable to the Son so we do not say that the Father is the one true God because this must exclude the Son from being God which the Scripture assures us that he is and therefore though the Son be not the Father nor the Father the Son yet the Son may be the one true God as well as the Father because they both partake of the same divine Nature so that there is no contradiction in this That there is but one true God and one of the Persons is not the other For that supposes it impossible that there should be three Persons in the same Nature but if the distinction of Nature and Persons be allow'd as it must be by all that understand any thing of these matters then it must be granted that although one Person cannot be another yet they may have the same common Essence As for instance let us take their own Peter Iames and Iohn What pleasant arguing would this be Peter is not Iames nor Iohn nor Iames nor Iohn are Peter but Peter hath the true Essence of a Man in him and the true Essence is but one and indivisible and therefore Iames and Iohn cannot be true Men because Peter hath the One and indivisible Essence of a Man in him But they will say We cannot say that Peter is the One true Man as we say That the Father is the One true God Yes we say the same in other Words for he can be said to be the One true God in no other Respect but as he hath the One true Divine Essence All the difference lies that a finite Nature is capapable of Division but an infinite is not It follows The Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is all one the Glory Equal the Majesty Co-eternal To this they say That this Article doth impugn and destroy it self How so For if the Glory and Majesty be the same in Number then it can be neither Equal nor Co-eternal Not Equal for it is the same which Equals never are nor Co-eternal for that intimates that they are distinct For nothing is Co eternal nor Co temporary with it self There is no appearance of Difficulty or Contradiction in this if the Distinction of Persons is allowed for the three Persons may be well said to be Co-equal and Co-eternal and if we Honour the Son as we Honour the Father we must give equal Glory to him But one great Point of Contradiction remains viz. So that the Father is God the Son is God and the Holy Ghost is God and yet there are not three Gods but one God First they say This is as if a Man should say the Father is a Person the Son a Person and the Holy Ghost a Person yet there are not three Persons but one Person How is this possible if a Person doth suppose some peculiar Property which must distinguish him from all others And how can three Persons be one Person unless three incommunicable Properties may become one communicated Property to three Persons But they are aware of a Distinction in this Case viz. that the term God is used Personally when it is said God the Father God the Son and God the Holy Ghost but when it is said There are not three Gods but one God the term God is used Essentially
thought he could not honestly conceal so fundamental a Point of the Christian Faith and which related to their being entred into the Christian Church For if the Profession of this Faith had not been look'd on as a necessary condition of being a Member of the Church of Christ it is hard to imagine that Iustin Martyr should so much insist upon it not only here but in his other Treatises Of which an Account hath been given by others Athenagoras had been a Philosopher as well as Iustin Martyr before he professed himself a Christian and therefore must be supposed to understand his Religion before he embraced it And in his Defence he asserts That the Christians do believe in Father Son and Holy Ghost in God the Father God the Son and the Holy Ghost And he mentions both the Vnity and Order which is among them Which can signifie nothing unless they be owned to be distinct Persons in the same Divine Nature And in the next Page he looks on it as thing which all Christians aspire after in another Life That they shall then know the Vnion of the Father and the Communication of the Father to the Son what the Holy Ghost is and what the Vnion and Distinction there is between the Holy Ghost the Son and the Father No man who had ever had the name of a Philosopher would have said such things unless he had believed the Doctrine of the Trinity aâ— we do i. e. that there are three distinct Persons in the same Divine Nature but that the manner of the Union and Distinction between them is above our reach and comprehension But our Vnitarians have an Answer ready for these men viz. That they came out of Plato 's School with the Tincture of his three Principles and they sadly complain that Platonism had very early corrupted the Christian Faith as to these matters In answer to which Exception I have only one Postulatum to make which is that these were honest Men and knew their own Minds beâ—t and I shall make it appear that none can more positively declare than they do that they did not take up these Notions from Plato but from the Holy Scriptures Iustin Martyr saith he took the Foundation of his Faith from thence and that he could find no certainty as to God and Religion any where else that he thinks Plato took his three Principles from Moses and in his Dialogue with Trypho he at large proves the Eternity of the Son of God from the Scriptures and said He would use no other Arguments for he pretended to no Skill but in the Scriptures which God had enabled him to understand Athenagoras declares That where the Philosophers agreed with them their Faith did not depend on them but on the Testimony of the Prophets who were inspired by the Holy Ghost To the same purpose speaks Theophilus Bishop of Antioch who asserts the Coeternity of the Son with the Father from the beginning of S. John's Gospel and saith their Faith is built on the Scriptures Clemens Alexandrinus owns not only the Essential Attributes of God to belong to the Son but that there is one Father of all and one Word over all and one Holy Ghost who is every where And he thinks Plato borrowed his three Principles from Moses that his second was the Son and his third the Holy Spirit Even Origen himsâ—lâ— highly commends Moses above Plato in his most undoubted Writings and saith That Numenâ—us went beyond Plato and that he borrowed out of the Scriptures and so he saith Plato did in other places but he adds That the Doctrines were better deliver'd in Scripture than in his Artificial Dialogues Can any one that hath the least reverence for Writers of such Authority and Zâ—al for the Christian Doctrine imagine that they wilfully corrupted it in one of the chief Articles of it and brought in new Speculations against the Sense of those Books which at the same time they professed to be the only Rule of their Faith Even where they speak most favourably of the Platonick Trinity they suppose it to be borrowed from Moses And therefore Numenius said That Moses and Plato did not differ about the first Principles and Theodoret mentions Numenius as one of those who said Plato understood the Hebrew Doctrine in Egypt and during his Thirteen years â—ay there it is hardly possible to suppose he should be ignorant of the Hebrew Doctrine about the first Principles which he was so inquisitive after especially among Nations who pretended to Antiquity And the Platonick Notion of the Divine Essence inlarging it self to three Hypostases is considerable on these Accounts 1. That it is deliver'd with so much assurance by the Opposers of Christianity such as Plotinus Porphyrius Proclus and others were known to be and they speak with no manner of doubt concerning it as may be seen in the passage of Porphyrie preserved by S. Cyril and others 2. That they took it up from no Revelation but as a Notion in it self agreeable enough as appears by the passages in Plato and others concerning it They never suspected it to be liable to the Charge of Non-Sense and Contradictions as our modern Vnitarians charge the Trinity with although their Notion as represented by Porphyrie be as liable to it How came these Men of Wit and Sense to hit upon and be so fond of such absurd Principles which lead to the Belief of Mysterious Non-Sense and Impossibilities if these Men may be trusted 3. That the Nations most renowned for Antiquity and deep Speculations did light upon the same Doctrine about a Trinity of Hypostases in the Divine Essence To prove this I shall not refer to the Trismegistick Books or the Chaldee Oracles or any doubtful Authorities but Plutarch asserts the three Hypostases to have been receivâ—d among the Persians and Porphyry and Iamblicus say the same of the Egyptians 4. That this Hypostasis did maintain its Reputation so long in the World For we find it continued to the time of Macrobius who mentâ—ons it as a reasonable Notion viz. of one supreme Being Father of all and a Mind proceeding from it and soul from Mind Some have thought that the Platonists made two created Beings to be two of the Divine Hypostases but this is contrary to what Plotinus and Porphyry affirm concerning it and it is hard to give an Account how they should then be Essentially different from Creatures and be Hypostases in the Divine Essence But this is no part of my business being concerned no farther than to clear the Sense of the Christian Church as to the Form of Baptism in the Name of the Father Son and Holy Ghost which according to the Sense of the Ante-Nicene Fathers I have proved doth manifest the Doctrine of the Trinity to have been generally receiv'd in the Christian Church 2. Let us now see what our Vnitarians object againâ—t the Proof of the Trinity from these
words 1. They say That there is a Note of distinction and Superiority For Christ owns that his Power was given to him by the Father There is no question but that the Person who suffer'd on the Cross had Power given to him after his Resurrection but the true Question is whether his Sonship were then given to him He was then declared to be the Son of God with Power and had a Name or Authority given him above every Name being exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour to give Repentance and Remission of Sins in order to which he now appointed his Apostles to teach all Nations baptizing them in the Name of the Father the Son and the Holy Ghost He doth not say in the name of Iesus who suffer'd on the Cross nor in the name of Iesus the Christ now exalted but in the name of Father Son and Holy Ghost and although there were a double Gift with respect to the Son and Holy Ghost the one as to his Royal Authority over the Church the other as to his extraordinary Effusion on the Apostles yet neither of these are so much as intimated but the Office of Baptism is required to be performed in the Name of these three as distinct and yet equal without any Relation to any Gift either as to the Son or Holy Ghost But if the ancient Iews were in the Right as we think they were then we have a plain account how these came to be thus mention'd in the Form of Baptism viz. that these three distinct Subsistences in the Divine Essence were not now to be kept up as a secret Mystery from the World but that the Christian Church was to be formed upon the Belief of it 2. They bring several places of Scripture where God and his Creatures are joyned without any Note of distinction or Superiority as The people feared the Lord and Samuel 1 Sam. 12.18 They worshipped the Lord and the King 1 Chron. 29.20 I charge thee before God the Lord Iesus Christ and his elect Angels 1 Tim. 5.21 The Spirit and the Bride say come Revel 22.17 But can any Man of Sense imagine these places contain a Parallel with a Form of Words wherein men are entred into the Profession of a new Religion and by which they were to be distinguished from all other Religions in the former places the Circumstances were so notorious as to God and the Civil Magistrate that it shews no more than that the same external Acts may be used to both but with such a different Intention as all men understood it What if S. Paul name the elect Angels in a solemn Obtestation to Timothy together with God and the Lord Iesus Christ What can this prove but that we may call God and his Creatures to be Witnesses together of the same thing And so Heaven and Earth are called to bear Witness against obstinate Sinners May men therefore be baptized in the name of God and his Creatures The Spirit and Bride may say come without any Incongruity but it would have been strange indeed if they had said Come be baptized in the Name of the Spirit and the Bride So that these Instances are very remote from the purpose But they say farther That the ancients of the first Four hundred years do not insist on this place to prove the Divinity or Personality of the Son or Spirit As to the first Three hundred years I have given an account already and as to the Fourth Century I could not have thought that they would have mention'd it since there is scarce a Father of the Church in that time who had occasion to do it but makes use of the Argument from this place to prove the Divinity and Personality of the Son and Spirit Athanasius saith That Christ founded his Church on the Doctrine of the Trinity contained in these Words and if the Holy Ghost had been of a different Nature from the Father and Son he would never have been joyned with them in a Form of Baptism no more than an Angel or any other Creature For the Trinity must be Eternal and Indivisible which it could not be if any created Being were in it and therefore he disputes against the Arian Baptism although performed with the same Words because they joyned God and a Creature together in Baptism To the same purpose argue Didymus Gregory Nazianzen S. Basil and others within the Compass of four hundred years whose Testimonies are produced by Petavius to whom I refer the Reader if he hath a mind to be satisfied in so clear a Point that I cannot but think our Vnitarians never intended to take in the Fathers after the Council of Nice who are so expressly against them and therefore I pass it over as a slip 4. They object That the Form of Baptism implies no more than being admitted into that Religion which proceeds from God the Father and deliver'd by his Son and confirmed by the Testimony of the Holy Ghost So much we grant is implied but the Question still remains whether the Son and Holy Ghost are here to be consider'd only in order to their Operations or whether the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost from whom those Effects came are not here chiefly intended For if no more had been meant but these Effects then the right Form of Admission had not been into the Name of Father Son and Holy Ghost but in the Name of the Father alone as Revealing himself by his Son and Confirming it by the miraculous Works of the Holy Ghost For these are only subservient Acts to the design of God the Father as the only subsisting Person 5. They tell us That it is in vain not to say ridiculously pretended that a Person or Thing is God because we are baptized into it for some were baptized into Moses and others into John's Baptism and so Moses and John Baptist would be Gods and to be baptized into a Person or Persons and in the name of such a Person is the same thing Grant this yet there is a great difference between being baptized in the name of a Minister of Baptism and of the Author of a Religion into which they are baptized The Israelites were baptized unto Moses but how The Syriac and Arabic Versions render it per Mosen and so S. Augustin reads it And this seems to be the most natural sense of the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is Act. 7.53 compared with Gal. 3.19 And the force of the Apostle's Argument doth not lie in the Parallel between being baptized into Moses and into Christ but in the Privileges they had under the Ministery of Moses with those which Christians enjoyed The other place implies no more than being enter'd into that Profession which John baptized his Disciples into But doth any one imagine that because Iohn Baptist did enter his Disciples by Baptism therefore they must believe him to be God
this is a very insufficient Distribution of the Ideas necessary to Reason For besides these there must be some general Ideas which the mind doth form not by meer comparing those Ideas it has got from Sense or Reflection but by forming distinct general Notions of things from particular Ideas And among these general Notions or rational Ideas Substance is one of the first because we find that we can have no true Conceptions of any Modes or Accidents no matter which but we must conceive a Substratum or Subject wherein they are Since it is a Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of things that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves and therefore the Rational Idea of Substance is one of the first and most natural Ideas in our minds But we are still told That our Vnderstanding can have no other Ideas but either from Sensation or Reflection And that herein chiefly lies the Excellency of mankind above Brutes that these cannot abstract and inlarge their Ideas as men do But how comes the general Idea of Substance to be framed in our Minds Is this by Abstracting and inlarging simple Ideas No but it is by a Complication of many simple Ideas together because not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves we accustom our selves to suppose some Substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result which therefore we call Substance And is this all indeed that is to be said for the being of Substance that we accustom our selves to suppose a Substratum Is that Custom grounded upon true Reason or not If not then Accidents or Modes must subsist of themselves and these simple Ideas need no Tortoise to support them For Figures and Colours c. would do well enough of themselves but for some Fancies men have accustomed themselves to If it be grounded on plain and evident Reason then we must allow an Idea of Substance which comes not in by Sensation or Reflection and so we may be certain of some things which we have not by those Ideas The Idea of Substance we are told again is nothing but the supposed but unknown support of those Qualities we find existing which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante which according to the true import of the word is in plain English standing under or upholding But very little weight is to be laid upon a bare Grammatical Etymology when the word is used in another sense by the best Authors such as Cicero and Quintilian who take Substance for the same with Essence as Valla hath proved and so the Greek word imports but Boethius in translating Aristotle's Predicaments rather chose the word Substance as more proper to â—xpress a Compound Being and reserved Essence for what was more simple and immaterial And in this Sense Substance was not applied to God but only Essence as S. Augustine observes but afterwards the names of Substance and Essence were promiscuously used with respect to God and his Creatures And do imply that which makes the Real Being as distinguished from Modes and Properties And so the Substance and Essence of a Man are the same not being taken for the individual Substance which cannot be understood without particular Modes and Properties but the general Substance or Nature of Man abstractly from all the Circumâ—â—ances of Persons And I desire to know whether according to true Reason that be not a clear Idea of a Man not of Peter Iames or Iohn but of a Man as such This is not a meer universal Name or Mark or Sign but there is as clear and distinct a Conception of this in our Minds as we can have from any such simple Ideas as are convey'd by our Senses I do not deny that the Distinction of particular Substances is by the several Modes and Properties of them which they may call a Complication of simple Ideas if they please but I do assert that the general Idea which relates to the Essence without these is so just and true an Idea that without it the Complication of simple Ideas will never give us a right Notion of it I must do that Right to the ingenious Author of the Essay of humane Vnderstanding from whence these Notions are borrowed to serve other Purposes than he intended them that he makes the Case of Spiritual and Corporeal Substances to be alike as to their Idea's and that we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit as we have of a Body the one being supposed to be the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without and the other of those Operations we find within our selves And that it is as rational to affirm there is no Body because we cannot know its Essence as 't is called or have no Idea of the Substance of Matter as to say there is no Spirit because we know not its Essence or have no Idea of a Spiritual Substance From hence it follows That we may be certain that there are both Spiritual and Bodily Substances although we can have no clear and distinct Ideas of them But if our Reason depend upon our clear and distinct Idea's how is this possible We cannot reason without clear Ideas and yet we may be certain without them Can we be certain without Reason Or doth our Reason give us true Notions of things without these Idea's If it be so this new Hypothesis about Reason must appear to be very unreasonable Let us suppose this Principle to be true That the simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning I ask then how we come to be certain that there are Spiritual Substances in the World since we can have no clear and distinct Ideas concerning them Can we be certain without any Foundation of Reason This is a new sort of Certainty for which we do not envy these Pretenders to Reason But methinks they should not at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these Ideas to our knowledge and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them If there be any other method they overthrow their own Principle if there be none how come they to any Certainty that there are both Bodily and Spiritual Substances As to these latter which is my business I must enquire farther how they come to know that there are such The Answer is by Self-Reflection on those Powers we find in our selves which cannot come from a mere Bodily Substance I allow he Reason to be very good but the Question I ask is whether this Argument be from the clear and distinct Idea or not We have Ideas in our selves of the several Operations of our Minds of Knowing Willing Considering c. which cannot come from a Bodily Substance Very true but is all this contained in the simple Idea of these Operations How can that be when the same Persons say that notwithstanding their Ideas it is possible for Matter to Think For it is said That
we have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material Being thinks or not it being impossible for us by the Contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation to discover whether Omnipotency hath not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed a Power to perceive or think If this be true then for all that we can know by our Ideas of Matter and Thinking Matter may have a Power of Thinking and if this hold then it is impossible to prove a Spiritual Substance in us from the Idea of Thinking For how can we be assured by our Ideas that God hath not given such a Power of Thinking to Matter so disposed as our Bodies are Especially since it is said That in respect of our Notions it is not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases super-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking than that he should super-add to it another Substance with a Faculty of Thinking Whoever asserts this can never prove a Spiritual Substance in us from a Faculty of Thinking because he cannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking that Matter so disposed cannot Think And he cannot be certain that God hath not framed the matter of our Bodies so as to be capable of it It is said indeed elsewhere That it is repugnant to the Idea of Sensless Matter that it should put into it self Sense Perception and Knowledge But this doth not reach the present Case which is not what Matter can do of it self but what Matter prepared by an Omnipotent hand can do And what certainty can we have that he hath not done it We can have none from the Ideas for those are given up in this Case and consequently we can have no certainty upon these Principles whether we have any Spiritual Substance within us or not But we are told That from the Operations of our Minds we are able to frame the Complex Idea of a Spirit How can that be when we cannot from those Ideas be assured but that those Operations may come from a material Substance If we frame an Idea on such Grounds it is at most but a possible Idea for it may be otherwise and we can have no Assurance from our Ideas that it is not So that the most men may come to in this way of Idea's is That it is possible it may be so and it is possible it may not but that it is impossible for us from our Ideas to determine either way And is not this an admirable Way to bring us to a certainty of Reason I am very glad to find the Idea of a Spiritual Substance made as consistent and intelligible as that of a Corporeal for as the one consists of a Cohesion of solid Parts and the Power of communicating Motion by impulse so the other consists in a Power of Thinking and Willing and moving the Body and that the Cohesion of solid Parts is as hard to be conceived as Thinking and we are as much in the dark about the Power of communicating Motion by impulse as in the Power of exciting Motion by thought We have by daily experience clear Evidence of Motion produced both by Impulse and by Thought but the manner how hardly comes within our Comprehension we are equally at a loss in both From whence if follows That we may be certain of the Being of a Spiritual Substance although we have no clear and distinct Idea of it nor are able to comprehend the manner of its Operations And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend that all our Reason and Certainty is founded on clear and distinct Ideas and that they have Reason to reject any Doctrine which relates to Spiritual Substances because they cannot comprehend the manner of it For the same thing is confessed by the most inquisitive Men about the manner of Operation both in material and immaterial Substances It is affirmed That the very Notion of Body implies something very hard if not impossible to be explained or understood by us and that the natural Consequence of it viz. Divisibility involves us in Difficulties impossible to be explicated or made consistent That we have but some few Superficial Ideas of things that we are destitute of Faculties to attain to the true Nature of them and that when we do that we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity and can discover nothing farther but our own Blindness and Ignorance These are very fair and ingenuous Confessions of the shortness of humane Understanding with respect to the Nature and Manner of such things which we are most certain of the Being of by constant and undoubted Experience I appeal now to the Reason of mankind whether it can be any reasonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine proposed to us as of Divine Revelation because we cannot comprehend the manner of it especially when it relates to the Divine Essence For as the same Author observes Our Idea of God is framed from the Complex Ideas of those Perfections we find in our selves but inlarging them so as to make them suitable to an infinite Being as Knowledge Power Duration c. And the Degrees or Extent of these which we ascribe to the Soveraign Being are all boundless and infinite For it is infinity which joyned to our Ideas of Existence Power Knowledge c. makes that Complex Idea whereby we represent to our selves the best we can the Supreme Being Now when our Knowledge of gross material Substances is so dark when the Notion of Spiritual Substances is above all Ideas of Sensation when the higher any Substance is the more remote from our Knowledge but especially when the very Idea of a Supreme Being implies its being Infinite and Incomprehensible I know not whether it argues more Stupidity or Arrogance to expose a Doctrine relating to the Divine Essence because they cannot comprehend the manner of it But of this more afterwards I am yet upon the Certainty of our Reason from clear and distinct Ideas and if we can attain to Certainty without them and where it is confessed we cannot have them as about Substances then these cannot be the sole Matter and Foundation of our Reasoning which is so peremptorily asserted by this late Author But I go yet farther and as I have already shew'd we can have no certainty of an Immaterial Substance within us from these simple Ideas so I shall now shew that there can be no sufficient Evidence brought from them by their own Confession concerning the Existence of the most Spiritual and infinite Substance even God himself We are told That the Evidence of it is equal to Mathematical Certainty and very good Arguments are brought to prove it in a Chapter on purpose but that which I take notice of is that the Argument from the clear and distinct Idea of God is passed over How can this be consistent