so much for the clearing of this both in the Preface and the Book it self that I need not to add one Word about it unless he had suggested some new demonstrative Reason to prove it Which he is far enough from All that he saith is That they must be called Fools as well as Sabellius if they asserted Relative Properties or any Properties that were in no Essence But the Author of the Discourse of Real and Nominal Trinitarians to whom he is no Stranger had said That the Sabellians held that the Father Son and Spirit are but only three Names of God given to him in Scripture by occasion of so many several Dispensations towards the Creature and so he is but one subsisting Person and three Relative Persons If this be true here are Relative Properties indeed relating to a Divine Essence but how not as to any Internal Relations of Father Son and Holy Ghost but as to External Dispensations which are another kind of Relative Properties This is all that I can find in this last Effort that relates to my self As to what concerns others they are very able to defend themselves and particularly as to Dr. S. and Dr. Sh. I must still say I think them much his Superiours as to Wit and Learning for of them I spake without the least Respect to my self however he makes it a Complement to my self and them I know not for what Reason unless it be that I speak of those against whom they had written with Insolence and Scorn But I hope they will shew themselves so much his Superiours too in Wisdom and Discretion as not to renew their Quarrels upon his Provocations for he doth what in him lies to inflame them and he thought it and I do not blame him for it the best service he could do to his sinking Cause WORCESTER April 26 1697. E. W. FINIS ERRATA Pag. 3.1 an Answer P. 42. l. 4. for Temerarian r. temerarious P. 63. l. 22. for diceret r. doceret P. 82. l. 17. for Preception r. Perception Books published by the Right Reverend Father in God Edw. L. Bishop of Worcester and sold by H. Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-yard A Rational account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion being a Vindication of the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury's Relation of a Conference c. from the pretended Answer of T. C. 2d Edit Fol. Origines Britannicae or the Antiquities of the British Churches with a Preface concerning some pretended Antiquities relating to Britain in Vindication of the Bishop of St. Asaph Fol. Irenicum A Weapon-Salve for the Churches Wounds 4 to Origines Sacrae or a Rational Account of the Grounds of Christian Faith as to the Truth and Divine Authority of the Scripture and the matters therein contained 4 to A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome and the hazard of Salvation in the Communion of it 8 vo An Answer to several late Treatises occasion'd by a Book entituled A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome and the hazard of Salvation in the Communion of it Part I. 8 vo A Second Discourse in Vindication of the Protestant Grounds of Faith against the pretence of Infallibility in the Roman Church in answer to the Guide in Controversie by R. H. Protestancy without Principles and Reason and Religion or the certain Rule of Faith by E. W. with a particular enquiry into the Miracles of the Roman Church 8 vo An Answer to Mr. Cressy's Epistle apologetical to a Person of Honour touching his Vindication of Dr. Stillingfleet 8 vo A Defence of the Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome in answer to a Book entituled Catholicks no Idolaters 8 vo Several Conferences between a Roman Priest a Fanatick Chaplain and a Divine of the Church of England being a full Answer to the late Dialogues of T. G. 8 vo A Discourse concerning Bonds of Resignation of Benefices in Point of Law and Conscience 8 vo A Discourse concerning the Illegality of the Ecclesiastical Commission in Answer to the Vindication and Defence of it wherein the true notion of the Legal Supremacy is clear'd and an Account is given of the Nature Original and Mischief of the dispensing Power The Unreasonableness of Separation or an Impartial Account of the History Nature and Pleas of the present Separation from the Communion of the Church of England 4 to The Grand Question concerning the Bishops Right to vote in Parliament in Cases Capital stated and argued from the Parliament Rolls and the History of former times with an enquiry into their Peerage and the Three Estates in Parliament 8 vo A Discourse concerning the Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction or the true Reasons of his Sufferings with an Answer to the Socinian Objections To which is added A Sermon concerning the Mysteries of the Christian Faith Preached April 7. 1691. With a Preface concerning the true state of the Controversie about Christ's Satisfaction 8 vo Twelve Sermons preached on several Occasions by the Right Reverend Father in God Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester The first Volume 8 vo A Second Volume will speedily be publish'd The Effigies of the Right Reverend Father in God Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester Engraven on a Copper-plate by Robert White Price 6 d. P. 6. P. 7. P. 8. P. 9. Book 2. Ch. 13. Sect. 19. P. 14. Ch. 23. Sect. 2. P. 11. P. 12 P. 22. P. 35. P. 25. P. 38. P. 28 29. P. 32. Book 2. ch 23. Sect. 6. P. 32. P. 33. P 40. P. 18 23 24 36 37. P. 8. Essay B. 2. ch 8. Sect. 25. Ch. 9. Sect. 8 9 10. P. 7 8 10 30. P. 6. P. 8. B 2. ch 23. Sect. 1. Sect. 2 3 4. P. 22. P. 40. P. 40. B. 2. Ch. 24. Sect. 16. P. 43. P. 44. Voss. Etymol in V. Sto. Thucyd. l. 6. p. 392. Ed. Ox. l. 3. p. 184 Acad. l. 1.8 Cicer. in Lucul c. 6. C. 24. P. 57. P. 226. Book 4. Ch. 6. Sect. 3. Ch. 4. Sect. 18. Christianity not Myst. p. 10. P. 12. P. 13. B. 4. ch 3. Sect. 23. Sect. 24 c. Sect 28. Sect. 30. Book 4. Ch. 17. Sect. 1. Sect. 9. Sect. 10. Sect. 11. Sect. 12. B. 4. ch 17. 1. Sect. 23. B. 4. ch 18. Sect. 2. P. 59. P. 62. P. 65. P. 66. Id. p. 74.82 B. 2. Ch. 23. Sect. 15. Sect. 17. Sect. 22. Sect. 30. Sect. 31. P. 67. P. 68. Leviath ch 34. Leviath ch 38. Vindicat. of Leviath p. 90 91. P. 69 P. 71. P. 72. P. 73. P. 74. P. 75. P. 81. P. 81. Book 4. Ch. 2. Sect. 1. Book 2. ch 23. Sect. 6.14 Sect. 7. Sect. 8. Sect. 12. Book 4. Ch. 4. Sect. 18. B. 3. ch 10. Sect. 15. B 2. ch 23. Sect. 17. B. 2. ch 23. Sect. 15. B. 2 ch 21. Sect. 8. Sect. 13. B. 2. ch 8. Sect. 11. Sect 10. B. 2. ch 27. Sect 9. B. 2. ch 11. Sect. 9. Sect. 10. Letter p. 27. De Immort Animae c. 9. Let. p. 139. P. 73. P. 66. P. 87. P. 88. P. 101. P. 103. P. 106. P. 107. Ib. P. 107. P. 110 P. 113. P. 114. B. 1. Ch. 4 Sect 8. Ch. 4. Sect. 12. P. 119. P. 123. P. 125. P. 121. P. 120 P. 128. P. 127. P. 132. P. 145. P. 136. P. 137. Cum enim duo sint genera rerum quae sciuntur unum earum quae per sensus corporis percipit animus alterum earum quae per scipsum multa illi Philosophi garrierunt contra corporis sensus animi autem quasdam firmissimas per seipsum perceptiones rerum verarum quale est illud Scio me vivere nequaquam in dubium vocare potuerunt De Trin. l. 15. c. 12. P. 139. P. 142 P. 157. P. 165. P. 216. P. 217. â— 2. ch 1. Sect. 5. Ch. 2. Sect. 1. Sect. 2. Ch. 11. Sect. 9 Ch. 12. Sect. 1. Sect. 3. Sect. 6 Ch â—â— Sect. 3. Sect. 6 14 Sect. 33. B 3. ch 3. Sect. 2. Sect. 6. Sect. 9. Sect. 11. Sect. 12. Sect. 14. Sect. 15. Sect. 16. Leviath ch 4. B. 2. ch 17. Sect. 1. P. 169 P. 170. P. 171. B. 2. ch 8. Sect. 10 15 17 23. Sect. 25. P. 174. P. 176. P. 178. P. 181. P. 190. P. 191. P. 193. P. 195. P. 197. P. 198. P. 199. P. 201. P. 20â— P. 203. P. 210. P. 212. Book 4. Ch. 1. Sect. 1. Ch. 3. Sect. 23. Sect. 27. Sect. 24 Sect. 26. Sect. 27. Sect. 25. Sect. 28. B. 4. ch 2. Sect. 2. Sect. 7. Ch. 2. Sect. 14 â—â—â—â— Sect. 1. Sect. 2.
THE Bishop of Worcester's ANSWER TO Mr. Locke's Letter Concerning Some PASSAGES Relating to his ESSAY OF Humane Understanding Mention'd in the late Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity With a POSTSCRIPT in answer to some Reflections made on that Treatise in a late Socinian Pamphlet LONDON Printed by I. H. for Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yard 1697. THE Bishop of Worcester's Answer TO Mr. Locke's Letter c. SIR I Have seriously consider'd the Letter you were pleased to send me and I find it made up of two Parts A Complaint of me and a Vindication of your self To both which I shall return as clear and distinct on Answer and in as few words as the matter will permit 1. As to the Complaint of me it runs quite through the Book and even your Postscript is full of it The substance of it is that in answering Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason I produce several Passages out of your Essay of Humane Vnderstanding as if they were intended by you to that Purpose but you declare to the World p. 150. that it was written by you without any Thought of the Controversie between the Trinitarians and Unitarians and p. 224. That your Notions about Ideas have no Connexion with any Objections that are made by others against the Doctrine of the Trinity or against Mysteries And therefore you complain of it as an Injury done to you in imputing that to you which you have not done p. 95. or at least in leaving it so doubtfull that the Reader cannot distinguish who is meant p. 96. and this you call my peculiar way of Writing in this part of my Treatise Now to give you and others satisfaction as to this matter I shall first give an account of the Occasion of it and then shew what Care I took to prevent Misunderstanding about it The Occasion was this Being to answer the Objections in Point of Reason which had not been answered before the first I mention'd was That it was above Reason and therefore not to be believed in answer to this I proposed two Things to be consider'd 1. What we understand by Reason 2. What Ground in Reason there is to reject any Doctrine above it when it is proposed as a matter of Faith As to the former I observ'd that the Vnitarians in their late Pamphlets talk'd very much of clear and distinct Ideas and Perceptions and that the Mysteries of Faith were repugnant to them but never went about to state the Nature and Bounds of Reason in such a manner as those ought to have done who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe But I added that a late Author in a Book call'd Christianity not Mysterious had taken upon him to clear this Matter whom for that cause I was bound to consider the design of his Discourse related wholly to Matters of Faith and not to Philosophical Speculations so that there can be no Dispute about his Application of those he calls Principles of Reason and Certainty When the Mind makes use of intermediate Ideas to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas received into them this Method of Knowledge he saith is properly called Reason or Demonstration The Mind as he goes on receives Ideas two ways 1. By Intromission of the Senses 2. By considering its own Operations And these simple and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning And so all our Certainty is resolved into two things either immediate Perception which is self-Evidence or the use of intermediate Ideas which discovers the Certainty of any thing dubious which is what he calls Reason Now this I said did suppose That we must have clear and distinct Ideas of what-ever we pretend to any Certainty of in our minds by Reason and that the only way to attain this Certainty is by comparing these Ideas together which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reason where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas From hence I proceeded to shew that we could not have such clear and distinct Ideas as were necessary in the present Debate either by Sensation or Reflection and consequently we could not attain to any Certainty about it for which I instanced in the Nature of Substance and Person and the Distinction between them And by vertue of these Principles I said That I did not wonder that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning had almost discarded Substance out of the Reasonable Part of the World Which Expression you tell me you do not understand But if you had pleased to have look'd back on the Words just before a Person of your Sagacity could not have missed the Meaning I intended Which are Now this is the case of Substance it is not intromitted by the Senses nor depends upon the Operations of the Mind and cannot be within the compass of our Reason But you say That if I mean that you deny or doubt that there is in the World any such thing as Substance I shall acquit you of it if I look into some Passages in your Book which you refer to But this is not the point before us whether you do own Substance or not but whether by vertue of these Principles you can come to any Certainty of Reason about it And I say the very places you produce do prove the contrary which I shall therefore set down in your own Words both as to Corporeal and Spiritual Substances When we talk or think of any particular sort of Corporeal Substance as Horse Stone c. tho' the Idea we have of either of them be but the Complication or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities which we use to find united in the thing called Horse or Stone yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone or one in another we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject which Support we denote by the name Substance tho' it be certain we have no clear or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support The same happens concerning Operations of the Mind viz. Thinking Reasoning c. which we considering not to subsist of themselves nor apprehending how they can belong to Body or be produced by it we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Substance which we call Spirit whereby yet it is evident that having no other Notion or Idea of Matter but something wherein those many sensible Qualities which affect our Senses do subsist by supposing a Substance wherein Thinking Knowing Doubting and a Power of Moving c. do subsist we have as clear a Notion of the Nature or Substance of Spirit as we have of Body the one being supposed to be without knowing what it is the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without and the other supposed with a like Ignorance of what it is to be the Substratum to those Operations which we experiment in
although we daily see their Effects And that because of the Distance and Remoteness of some and the Minuteness of others and therefore we cannot come to a scientifical Knowledge in Natural Things much less to that of Spiritual Beings of which we have only some few and superficial Ideas 3. Want of a discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have Because the Mechanical Affections of Bodies have no Affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us there being no conceivable Connexion between any Impulse of any sort of Body and any Perception of any Colour or Smell which we find in our Minds And so the Operations of our Minds upon our Bodies are unconceiveable by us And the Coherence and Continuity of Parts of Matter and the original Rules and Communication of Motion are such as we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have 4. Want of finding out such intermediate Ideas which may shew us the Agreement or Disagreement they have one with another And this for want of due Application of Mind in acquiring examining and due comparing those Ideas and by ill use of Words which have so much perplexed and confounded Mens understanding 2. You own the many Failings in our Reason By which you understand two Faculties in our Minds viz. Sagacity and Illation the one finding out and the other ordering the intermediate Ideas so as to discover the Connexion between them But Reason you say fails where our Ideas fail us and because of the Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection of our Ideas both as to Matter and our own Minds and the Divine Operations and for want of intermediate Ideas and by proceeding upon false Principles and dubious Expressions 3. As to Propositions you own these things 1. Those are according to Reason whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable 2. Those are above Reason whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles 3. Those are contrary to Reason which are inconsistent with or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct Ideas 4. As to Faith and Divine Revelation you own 1. That Faith is the Assent to any proposition not thus made out by deductions of Reason but upon the Credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation 2. That things above Reason and not contrary to it are properly Matters of Faith and to be assented to on the Authority of Divine Revelation Thus far I have endeavoured with all possible Brevity and Clearness to lay down your Sense about this matter By which it is sufficiently proved that I had reason to say that your Notions were carried beyond your Intention But you still seem concerned that I quote your Words although I declare that they were used to other purposes than you intended them I do confess to you that the Reason of it was that I found your Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon and that he had nothing which look'd like Reason if that Principle were removed which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold And so I suppose the Reason of my mentioning your words so often is no longer a Riddle to you I now proceed to other particulars of your Vindication Among other Arguments against this Principle of Certainty I instanced in the Being of Spiritual Substances within our selves from the Operations of our Minds which we do perceive by Reflection as Thinking Doubting Considering c. This Argument I yielded to be very good but that which I urged from thence was that it could not be from those simple Ideas of the Operations of the Mind because you had affirmed that it is impossible for us by the Contemplation of our Ideas to be certain without Revelation that a material Substance cannot think This is a point in my apprehension of great consequence and therefore I must more strictly examine what you say in answer to it Which is That thinking is inconsistent with the Idea of Self Subsistence and therefore hath a necessary Connexion with a Support or Subject of Inhesion i. e. If there be Thinking there must be something that Thinks But the question is Whether that something be a Material or Immaterial Substance But this Thinking Substance is in your Sense a Spirit The question I put is Whether Matter can think or not If not then the Substance which thinks must be Immaterial if it can think then there can be no evidence from the Idea of Thinking to prove the Substance which thinks to be Immaterial This I take to be plain Reasoning which you must allow because it is about the Agreement or Disagreement of two simple Ideas viz. Matter and Thinking But you say That the general Idea of Substance being the same every-where the Modification of Thinking or the Power of Thinking joyned to it makes it a Spirit without considering what other Modification it has as whether it has the Modification of Solidity or not As on the other side Substance which hath the Modification of Solidity is Matter whether it has the Modification of Thinking or not And therefore if I mean by a Spiritual an Immaterial Substance you grant that you have not proved nor upon your Principles can it be demonstratively proved that there is an Immaterial Substance in us that thinks I have thus set down your own Words that you may not complain I have done you Injury But when you put in demonstratively proved I suppose you mean in the way of Certainty by Ideas for concerning that our dispute is And therefore when you add That you expect that I should conclude it demonstrable from Principles of Philosophy you must give me leave to say this is going off from the business before us which is about your Principles of Certainty from Ideas for it was only to that purpose that I brought this argument to prove that we cannot from our Ideas be certain of one of the points of greatest importance viz. that there is a Spiritual Substance within us and yet the operations of our Mind are made one of the Sources of those simple Ideas which are made by you the Foundation of Knowledge and Certainty So that the point before us is whether this Assertion of yours That the Power of Thinking may belong to modified Matter doth not overthrow your Certainty by Ideas No say you that which you are certain of by the Idea is only That there is in us a Spiritual Substance and that you say implies no more than a Thinking Substance i. e. that by Thinking you can prove you have a Power of Thinking which I believe may be demonstratively proved But I pray Sir consider how this question arose it was from your distinguishing Spiritual and Corporeal Substances from
each other and saying that we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit as we have of a Body Against this I urged that if it be possible for Matter to think which you assert then from the Idea of Thinking we cannot prove the Certainty of a Spiritual Substance within us where it is plain that a Spiritual Substance is opposed to the Power of Matter It is not whether Matter so modified can think but whether Matter can think and let it be modified how it will Matter is Matter still But the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit say you But doth it cease to be Matter or not If not then it is Matter still endued with a Power of Thinking and so our Idea can be no other than of a Material Thinking Substance But you say further That the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit without considering what other Modifications it has whether it hath the Modification of Solidity or not That is Although it be really a Material Substance yet the Modification of Thinking makes it a Spiritual Substance for we are to go no farther than that Modification of Thinking and from thence we are to conclude it to be a Spiritual Substance But we are now enquiring not into the bare Modification of Thinking but whether from thence we can prove an Immaterial Substance within us or which is all one a Spiritual Substance as opposed to Corporeal which is your own Distinction And that I may not be thought to do you injury I shall produce your own Words By the simple Ideas we have taken from our own minds we are able to frame the complex Idea of a Spirit And thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking Perceiving Liberty and Power of moving themselves we have as clear a Perception and Notion of Immaterial Substances as well as material So that here we have two things clear 1. That a Spirit and Immaterial Substance are the same 2. That from the Operations of our Minds we have a clear Idea of an Immaterial Substance within us Again you say That the primary Ideas we have of Body as contradistinguished to Spirit are the Cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulse These you think are the Original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body Here Body is contradistinguished to Spirit and as it is so the Cohesion of solid and separable Parts is made one of the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body as distinguished from a Spiritual Substance How then I pray can a Spiritual Substance consist of solid and separable Parts For whatever is solid you grant to be consequently separable This seems to me to confound the Ideas of Body and Spirit which you had taken so much care to distinguish and so must destroy all Certainty of a Spiritual Substance from your Ideas For although the bare simple Idea of Thinking may be said to be distinct from that of a solid Body yet it is impossible from that Idea so explained to prove a Spiritual Substance as distinct from Body Which was the thing I intended to prove But you go on to compare the Complex Idea of Spirit and Body in these Words Let us compare then our Complex Idea of Spirit without our Complex Idea of Body Our Idea of Bodâ— is an extended solid Substance capable of communicating Motion by Impulse and our Idea of our Souls is of a Substance that thinks and has a Power of exciting Motion in Body by Will and Thought These you think are our Complex Ideas of Soul and Body as contradistinguished Here you do not speak of the bare Ideas of Thinking and Solidity but of the different Substances and one is said to be a solid Substance and the other a Substance that thinks I shall add one passage more to the same purpose The Idea we have of Spirit compared with that we have of Body stands thus The Substance of Spirit is unknown to us and so is the Substance of Body equally unknown to us Here we have again the Substance of Spirit and the Substance of Body distinguished from each other and not the bare Modifications So that I need no body to answer you but your self But least such expressions should be thought a mere slip of the Pen you are pleased again to assert the Notion of an Immaterial knowing Substance to imply no more of a Contradiction than an extended divisible Body And yet after all this you confess That you have not proved an Immaterial Substance and that it cannot be proved upon your Principles What is the meaning of this I cannot think you intended to lessen the Authority of your Book in so considerable a part of it And I should much rather have thought the latter Passage a slip of your Pen but that in your Letter you go about to defend it Therefore I must attend your Motions in it You say That all the great ends of Religion and Morality are secured barely by the Immortality of the Soul without a necessary supposition that the Soul is Immaterial I am of opinion that the great ends of Religion and Morality are best secured by the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul from its Nature and Properties and which I think prove it Immaterial I do not question whether God can give Immortality to a Material Substance but I say it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality if it depend wholly upon God's giving that which of its own Nature it is not capable of For if the Soul be a material Substance it is really nothing but Life or Matter put into Motion with such Organs and Parts as are necessary to hold them together and when Death comes then this Material Substance so modified is lost God may by his Power grant a new Life but will any man say God can preserve the Life of a Man when he is dead This is a plain Absurdity and I think no such thing tends to preserve Religion or Morality Mr. Hobbes speaks very consonantly to his own Principles although not to those of Religion and Morality For he saith That the universe being the Aggregate of all Bodies there is no real part of it that is not also a Body And so he saith That Substance and Body signifie the same thing and therefore Substance Incorporeal are Words which destroy one another But what then is a Spirit That he saith in the proper signification of it in common Speech is either a subtle fluid invisible Body or a Ghost or other Idol or Phantasm of the Imagination But is there not an Immortal Soul in Man The Promise of Immortality saith he is made to the Man and not to the Soul and Immortal Life doth not begin in Man till the Resurrection From whence it is plain he look'd on the Soul as nothing but the Life and so he saith That Soul and Life in Scripture do usually signifie the same thing And in
animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis What can express the Soul to be of a different Substance from the Body if these words do it not And presently adds That the Mind is of a divine and Spiritual Nature and above Material Composition as God himself is I hope this may give you satisfaction as to Cicero how far he was from making the Soul a Material Substance And the only place you produce out of him c. 22. proves nothing but that the Soul is Invisible as you may see by looking upon it again As to Virgil you quote that Expression Dum Spiritus hos regit artus where it is taken for the Vital Spirit which sense I know no body questions and so Tully expresses life quae Corpore Spiritu continetur and opposes it to a Life of Immortal Fame which he there speaks of Pro Marcello c. 9. but the only matter in debate is Whether they excluded any other Notion of Spirit which was not done as I have made it appear concerning Cicero and so I shall of Virgil too For soon after Aeneid 4.385 he hath these Words Et cum frigida mors Animae seduxerit Artus Omnibus Vmbra locis adero dabis improbe poenas Which shews that Virgil did believe the Soul to be more than a mere Vital Spirit and that it subsisted and acted in a separate State And it is observed by Servius that Virgil uses Spiritus Mens and Animus for the same In Aeneid 6.726 Spiritus intus alit totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem And he proves that Virgil asserted the Immortality of Souls and answers the arguments against it and as far as he could understand he saith that our Bodies are from the Elements and our Souls from God and the Poets intention was Vt Animos immortales diceret So that neither Cicero nor Virgil do you any kindness in this matter being both Assertors of the Souls Immortality by Nature If these will not do you bring me to Scripture and say that Solomon himself speaks after the same manner about Man and Beast as the one dieth so dieth the other yea they have all one Spirit Eccles. 3.19 I will not dispute about the proper Sense of the Hebrew Word but I must about Solomon's Sense For although he makes Life and Death common to Man and Beast yet he saith v. 21. The Spirit of a Man goeth upward and the Spirit of a Beast goeth down to the Earth But you say If the Notion of a Spirit excludes Materiality then the Spirit of a Beast must be Immaterial as well as that of a Man I answer that although the bare Word doth not prove it yet the design of Solomon's Discourse doth and so the going upward of the Spirit of a Man must be understood in a very different Sense from the going downward of the Spirit of a Beast For he saith concerning Man That the Spirit shall return to God that gave it c. 12.7 To what purpose To be dissipated in the common Air or to be lost in the vast Confusion of Matter no but he concludes his Book thus v. 14. For God shall bring every Work into Iudgment with every secret thing whether it be good or whether it be evil If these be Solomon's Words as no doubt they were and he were a Man of Sense and laid his sayings together as no doubt he did these last Words must interpret the foregoing and his other sayings be made Consonant to this Yes you may say This relates to the general Iudgment and not to the Soul's Subsistence after Death But Solomon speaks of the Spirit of a Man going upward at Death and returning to God that gave it What Sense is there in this if it be a Material Substance which vanishes and is dissolved then And if the Soul be not of it self a free thinking Substance I do not see what Foundation there is in Nature for a Day of Judgment For where there is nothing but Matter there is no Freedom of acting where there is no Liberty there is no Choice where there is no Choice there is no room for Rewards and Punishments and consequently no Day of Iudgment But Solomon positively concludes there will be a Judgment to come as to good and evil Actions in another World and therefore he must be understood in those Expressions to mean a Free and Thinking and consequently an Immaterial Spirit in us But you urge farther That our Saviour himself opposes Spirit to Flesh and Bones Luk. 24.39 i. e. to such a gross Compages as could be seen and felt The question then was whether it were the real Body of Christ or only an Appearance of it and how could this be resolved better than our Saviour doth Handle me and see for a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones as you see me have But he calls this a Spirit What follows Therefore a Spirit is only an Appearance I do not think that is your meaning And no body questions but the name of Spirits is sometimes given to Apparitions But this is far from our case which is whether that real Spiritual Substance we find in our selves be Material or not Doth a Spiritual Substance imply Matter in its Idea or not You cannot say it doth Then it may be Immaterial But how come we to know things but by their distinct Ideas Is the Idea of Matter and Spirit distinct or not If not to what purpose do we talk of Knowledge by Ideas when we cannot so much as know Body and Spirit from each other by them Is it then any Absurdity to call a Spiritual Substance Immaterial No you say You would not be thought to affirm that Spirit never does signifie a purely Immaterial Substance for in that Sense the Scripture attributes the Notion of Spirit to God and you have proved from your Principles that there is a Spiritual Immaterial Substance And this you think proves an Immaterial Substance in your way of Ideas But of that afterwards We are yet upon the proving an Immaterial Substance in our selves from the Ideas we have by Sensation and Reflection Now I say still this is impossible if the Spiritual Substance in us may be material And at last you grant That what I say is true that it cannot upon these Principles be demonstrated Then say I Your grounds of Certainty from Ideas are plainly given up But you say it may be proved probable to the highest Degree But that is not the point for it is not Probability but Certainty that we are promised in this way of Ideas and that the Foundation of our Knowledge and real Certainty lies in them and is it dwindled into a Probability at last The only reason I had to engage in this matter was a bold Assertion that the Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning and that our Certainty lies in perceiving the Agreement or
Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition which last are your own Words How can we then be certain where we have no Ideas from Sensation or Reflection to proceed by As in the present case I have a Mind to be resolved whether the Soul in Man be an Immaterial Substance or not and we are to judge of the Truth of it by our Ideas I ask then What Idea you have of the Soul by Reflection You answer That it is a Thinking Substance But doth this prove it Immaterial You answer That you cannot be certain but that it is very probable Is not this giving up the Cause of Certainty But you say You never offer'd it as a way of Certainty where we cannot reach Certainty But did you not offer to put us into the way of Certainty What is that but to attain Certainty in such things where we could not otherwise do it And what a strange way is this if it fails us in some of the first Foundations of the real Knowledge of our selves But you say If I dislike your way you desire me to shew you a better way of Certainty as to these points I am sensible that you design herein to draw me out of my way to do you a kindness but I will so far gratifie you at this time and to oblige you the more I will make use of no other Principles or Ideas than such as I meet with in your Book and from thence I do not despair of proving that we may be certain that a material Substance cannot think And the method I shall proceed in shall be to prove it by such ways and steps as you have directed me to although you might not think to find them so laid together 1. From your general Principles as to Knowledge and Certainty You say That all our Knowledge consists in the view the Mind hath of its own Ideas which is the utmost Light and greatest Certainty we with our Faculties and in our way of Knowledge are capable of Here you resolve our Knowledge and Certainty into the view of the Ideas in our Minds therefore by those Ideas we may come to know the Certainty of things not in the Frame and inward Essence of them as you often tell us but by the Powers and Properties which belong to them Whatever say you be the secret and abstract Nature of Substance in general all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas And you take pains to prove That Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances and their secondary Qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to distinguish Substances one from another which secondary Qualities as has been shewn are nothing but bare Powers So that our Knowledge cannot reach the inward Substance of things and all our Certainty of Knowledge as to them and their Distinction from each other must depend on those Powers and Properties which are known to us One would think sometimes that you would allow Mankind no more Knowledge than suits with the Conveniencies of Life but this would overthrow the great design of your Book which is to put us into a way of real Certainty by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas and where ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas there is certain Knowledge So that here you own we may come to a Certainty of Knowledge which is beyond mere Probability and that by perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas 2. If we can find the Disagreement of any two Ideas upon your own Principles we must do those of Body and Spirit For the Idea of Matter in general you say That in Truth it contains nothing but the Idea of a solid Substance which is every-where the same every-where uniform And that Body stands for a solid extended figured Substance So that Solidity Extension and Figure are the inseparable Properties of Bodies And in another place you have these Words The primary Ideas we have peculiar to Bodies as contradistinguished to Spirit are the Cohesion of solid and consequently separable Parts and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulse These you think are the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body for Figure is but the consequence of finite Extension Here we have the Idea of Body laid down by your self as contradistinguished to Spirit Therefore by your own confession we may perceive the Disagreement of these two Ideas of Body and Spirit and consequently may certainly know their Distinction from each other by their inseparable Properties But if it be possible for Matter to think then these Ideas must be confounded Yet you distinguish the Ideas of a Material and Immaterial Substance in these Words Putting together the Ideas of Thinking and Willing and the Power of Motion or Rest added to Substance we have the Idea of a Spirit and putting together the Ideas of solid coherent Parts a Power of being moved joyned with Substance we have the Idea of Matter The one is as clear and distinct an Idea as the other the Idea of Thinking and Moving a Body being as clear and distinct Ideas as the Ideas of Extension Solidity and being moved Can any thing now be plainer than the Disagreement of these two Ideas by the several Properties which belong to them But if after all this Matter may Think what becomes of these clear and distinct Ideas And yet you have thâ—se Words Thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking Perceiving Liberty and Power of moving themselves and other things we have as clear a Perception and Notion of Immaterial Substances as we have of Material Here it is plain that you make Thinking and Perceiving to be part of the Complex Idea of an Immaterial Substance How is this possible if a Material Substance be capable of Thinking as well as an Immaterial either therefore you must renounce your own Doctrine of Certainty by Ideas or you must conclude that Matter cannot think 3. But I urge this yet further from your Notion of Liberty and Necessity Liberty you say is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any Action according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind whereby either of them is preferred to the other So that Liberty cannot be where there is no Thought no Volition no Wish And again Agents that have no Thought no Volition at all are necessary Agents But you make a Power of Thinking and Liberty to be parts of the Complex Idea of an Immaterial Substance in the Words before cited But what Liberty can you conceive in mere Matter For you grant That Bodies can operate upon one another only by Impulse and Motion that the Primary Qualities of Bodies which are inseparable from it are Extension Solidity Figure and Mobility from any Body Now how can the Idea of Liberty agree with these simple Ideas of Body
To be moved only by Impulse from another Body and from the free Determination of our own Thoughts are two Ideas as disagreeing with each other as we can well imagine But if Matter may Think it may have Liberty too because you join these together but if it be uncapable of Liberty which goes along with Thinking how can you imagine it should be capable of Thinking I argue from your Notion of Personal Indentity which you place in self Consciousness For you tell us That a Person is a thinking intelligent Being that has Reason and Reflection and can consider it self as it self the same thinking thing in different times and places which it does only by that Consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and seems to you essential to it From whence it follows that if there can be no Self-consciousness in Matter then it cannot think because it wants that which you say is Essential to it It being impossible for any one to perceive but he must perceive that he doth perceive But what is there like Self-consciousness in Matter Or how is it possible to apprehend that meer Body should perceive that it doth perceive For Bodies you say operate only by Impulse and Motion i. e. one Body upon another But how can a Body operate upon it self without Motion Those you call the Secondary Qualities of Bodies are only you say the effect of the Powers in some Bodies upon others endued with Sense and Perception So that the effects of these Powers in Bodies or of the Primary Qualities of Bulk Site Figure Motion c. is not upon themselves but upon other Bodies either by changing those Primary Qualities in them by different Site Figure Motion c. or producing those Effects in us or which we call Sensible Qualities But either of these ways there is no possibility for Matter to operate upon it self in a way of Self-consciousness If then every intelligent thinking Being have this so inseparably belonging to it that you say It is impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he doth perceive and it be impossible from the Idea of Matter to make out that a meer Body can perceive that it doth perceive I think it is more than probable in the way of Ideas that Matter cannot think 5. I argue from the power of Abstracting which you make proper to a thinking Substance This is done say you by considering Ideas in the Mind as separate from the Circumstances of Time and Place And this power of abstracting you add puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to You tell me That you did not say the chief Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly or any ways in this that Brutes cannot abstract for Brutes not being able to do any thing cannot be any Excellency of Mankind But I hope it is the Excellency of Mankind that they are able to do what the Brutes cannot And you say This puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes and I had thought in comparing Man and Brutes that which put a perfect Distinction was the chief Excellency with respect to them But let that be as it will the thing I insist upon is the power of Abstracting following that of Thinking so closely that you utterly deny it to Brutes but if it may be in the power of Matter to think how comes it to be so impossible for such Organized Bodies as the Brutes have to inlarge their Ideas by Abstraction Pomponatius thinks to avoid the Argument from Abstraction to prove the Souls Imateriality by saying That in the most abstract Speculation the Mind rests upon Particulars Vniversale in singulari speculatur But this doth not reach the force of the Argument which is not whether the Mind hath not an Eye to Particulars when it forms Universal Notions but whether the power of forming such Abstract Ideas from Particulars do not argue a Power which meer Matter can never attain to And all that Philosopher hath said doth not amount to the least Proof of it 6. Lastly I argue from the Reason you give why God must be an Immaterial Substance For these are the words in your Letter And the Idea of an Eternal actual knowing Being is perceived to have a Connection with the Idea of Immateriality by the Intervention of the Idea of Matter and of its actual Division Divisibility and Want of Perception c. Here the want of Perception is owned to be so essential to Matter that God is therefore concluded to be Immaterial and this is drawn from the Idea and Essential Properties of Matter and if it be so Essential to it that from thence you concluded God must be an Immaterial Substance I think the same Reason will hold as to any thinking Substance Because the Argument is not drawn from any thing peculiar to the Divine Perfections but from the general Idea of Matter But after all you tell me That God being Omnipotent may give to a System of very subtil matter Sense and Motion Your words before were a Power to perceive or think and about that all our debate runs and here again you say That the Power of Thinking joined to Matter makes it a Spiritual Substance But as to your Argument from God s Omnipotency I answer That this comes to the same Debate we had with the Papists about the Possibility of Transubstantiation For they never imagin'd that a Body could be present after the manner of a Spirit in an ordinary way but that by God's Omnipotent Power it might be made so but our Answer to them was That God doth not change the Essential Properties of things while the things themselves remain in their own Nature And that it was as repugnant for a Body to be after the manner of a Spirit as for a Body and Spirit to be the same The same we say in this Case We do not set bounds to God's Omnipotency For he may if he please change a Body into an Immaterial Substance but we say that while he continues the Essential Properties of Things it is as impossible for Matter to think as for a Body by Transubstantiation to be present after the manner of a Spirit and we are as certain of one as we are of the other These things I thought necessary on this occasion to be cleared because I look on a mistake herein to be of dangerous Consequence as to the great Ends of Religion and Morality which you think may be secured although the Soul be allowed to be a Material Substance but I am of a very different Opinion For if God doth not change the Essential Properties of things their Nature remaining then either it is impossible for a Material Substance to think or it must be asserted that a Power of thinking is within the Essential Properties of Matter and so thinking will be such a Mode of Matter as Spinoza hath made