〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or singly considered but if by negative abstraction you sever any one from the other so as to say the one is God and not the other or any one is all that is signify'd by the Name of God I deny it as before I did for so you would exclude the other two the Godhead which is but what was expresly enough said Sob Enquiry pag. 47. The Father is God but not excluding the Son and the Holy Ghost the Son is God but not excluding c. And if as this Author quotes we are compelled by the Christian Verity so to speak I wonder it should not compel him as it is Christian Verity or at least as it is Verity as well as the rest of Christians or Mankind Why hath he only the privilege of exemption from being compell'd by truth Athanasius his word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we are necessitated and if the Considerator's own Translation grieve him he might relieve himself by considering that all Necessity is not compulsive And because he hath brought me to Athanasius I shall take the occasion to say I cannot apprehend him to have any sentiment contrary to this Hypothesis His business was against the Arians or the Ariomanites as he often called them as symbolizing also with Manes And because with them the Controversy was whether the Son and Spirit were Creatures in opposition hereto he constantly asserts their consubstantiality with the Father never intending for ought that appears that their Being was numerically the same with his but of the same kind uncreated coessential coeternal with his own For so he expresly speaks in his other or additional Questions i. e. asking Quest. 6. How many Essences 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. How many sorts of Essence as the Answer will direct us to understand it do you acknowledg in God The Answer is I say one Essence one Nature one Form 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and adds one Kind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which sufficiently expounds all the rest He acknowledged no different kinds of Essence or Nature in the Godhead but that One only which was eternal and uncreated agreeably to what he elsewhere says against the Followers of Sabellius 'T is impossible things not eternal Beings not partaking Godhead should be ranked or put in the same order with the Godhead Afterwards speaking of the Father and the Son he says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the One is such not the same as the other the other such as he And that the Son was not to be conceived under another Species 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor under a strange and foreign Character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but was God as the Father And I appeal to any Man's Understanding and Conscience If that great Author believ'd a numerical sameness of Essence common to the three Persons what should make him blame the Sabellians for making the Son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when by the latter in that case he must mean the same thing as by the former In the forecited Questions he expresly says we were to acknowledg in the Deity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 three Individuals Answer to Quest. 7. ubi priùs And elsewhere he as distinctly asserts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 three things And what could he mean by three things not three Deities as he often inculcates but he must certainly mean three Entities three Essences for by three things he could not possibly mean three Non-Entities or three Nothings His great care plainly was to assert the true Deity of the Son and Spirit or their Preeternity or that it could never be said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there was a time when they were not which he inculcates in an hundred places still insisting that one Deity one Essence was common to them but still with distinction and as warmly inveighs against Sabellius and P. Samosatensis as against Arius every whit And that which puts his meaning quite out of doubt speaking how the Father Son and Spirit tho of one and the same sort of Essence are three Hypostases he plainly says the Nature wherein they partake is so One as the humane Nature is One in all Men. We Men saith he consisting of a Body and a Soul are all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of one Nature and Substance or Essence but we are many Hypostases And to the same purpose Dial. 2. de Trinitate his Anomoeos comparing the Father Son and Spirit to a Bishop Presbyter and Deacon he brings in the Orthodox saying they have all the same Nature being each of them Man as an Angel a Man and an Horse have different Natures In the mean time because Men are not inseparably and vitally united with one another as the Divine Persons are and cannot but be by reason of the necessary eternal perpetual emanation of the two latter from the first they cannot admit to be called one Man as the three Persons in the Godhead are and cannot but be one God Inasmuch as these three Divine Persons partake real Godhead as existing necessarily each of them they are each truly God but because they partake it in necessary eternal vital Union and so that the first is the radix the second perpetually springing from the first and the third from both the other they are therefore together one God As Branches tho really distinct from each other and the Root are altogether notwithstanding but one Tree and all omoousial or consubstantial to one another which is an illustration familiar with the the Antients And if there be any now a days that will call this Heresy tho as I said I will be no Heretick however yet if I must make a choice I had rather be an Heretick with the Ante-Nicene and Nicene Fathers and Post-Nicene for ought appears to the contrary through some following Centuries than be reputed Orthodox with P. Lumbard c. whom a German Divine not of meanest account calls one of the four Evangelists of Antichrist But having now done with what he said he would omit but did not tho he might to every whit as good purpose we come to what he overlooks not because he intimates he cannot And let us see whether he looks into it to any better purpose than if he had quite overlook'd it He is indeed the more excusable that he overlooks it not because he says he could not In that case there is no remedy Nor do I see how he well could when the Sober Enquirer had once and again so directly put it in his view and as was said objected it to himself But he thinks however to make an irrefragable Battering Ram of it wherewith to shiver this Doctrine of the Trinity all to pieces and he brings it into play with the two Horns before mentioned The Father he says for instance is either infinite in his Substance his Wisdom his Power his Goodness or he is not With the like pompous apparatus and even in
now speaking to i. e. the Delicious Society the Divine Hypostases are supposed to have with each other give me leave freely to discourse this matter I would fain know what it is wherein he supposes the Enquirer to have overshot his Mark Or of what makes he here so mighty a Wonderment It can be but one of these two things Either that there are three Divine Persons in the Godhead really distinct Or That they have if there be a Delicious Society or Conversation with each other Will he say the former is a singular Opinion Or that 't is Novel Was there never a real Trinitarian in the World before Doth he not in his own express words sort the Enquirer with one whom he will not deny to be a learned Divine p. 43. of these his present Considerations col 1. The Author of the 28 Propositions and Mr. H w as he calls the Enquirer are honest Men and real Trinitarians By which former Character he hath I dare say ten thousand times more gratify'd his Ambition than by calling him learned too And I believe he will as little think this a novel Opinion as a singular one Nor shall I thank him for acknowledging it to have been the Opinion of the Fathers generally not only Ante-Nicene and Nicene but Post-Nicene too for some following Ages unto that of P. Lombard so obvious it is to every one that will but more slightly search For my part I will not except Justin Martyr himself whom I the rather mention both as he was one of the more antient of the Fathers and as I may also call him the Father of the Modalists nor his Notion even about the Homoousian-Trinity as he expresly stiles it For tho it will require more time than I now intend to bestow to give a distinct account of every Passage throughout that Discourse of his yet his Expression of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must not be so taken as if it were to be torn away from its coherence and from it self When therefore he says the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the being unbegotten begotten and having proceeded are not Names of the Essence but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Modes of Subsistence he must mean they are not immediately Names of the Essence but mediately they cannot but be so For what do they modify Not nothing When they are said to be Modes of Subsistence what is it that subsists We cannot pluck away these Modes of Subsistence from that which subsists and whereof they are the Modes And what is that You 'll say the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the one Essence which he had mentioned before and that one Essence is 't is true as perfectly one as 't is possible for what is of it self and what are from that to be with each other i. e. that they are congenerous as the Sun and its Rays according to that Heb. 1. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the effulgency of Glory or as Mind and where there is nothing else but Substance consubstantial Thought or Word Therefore this Oneness of Essence must be taken in so large and extensive a sense as that it may admit of these Differences For so he afterwards plainly speaks if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If the one the Father hath his Existence without being begotten 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another the Son by being begotten 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but that the Holy Ghost by having proceeded here it befals us to behold differences 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the things that import difference There must be a sense therefore wherein he understood this Essence to be most truly One and a sense wherein he also understood it to have its differences and those too not unimportant ones as being unbegotten and being begotten signify no light differences And in what latitude of sense he understood the Oneness of Essence whereof he had before spoken may be seen in his following Explication when what he said he would have be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more manifest he makes Adam's peculiar Mode of Subsistence to be that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not begotten but made by God's own Hand but for them that were from him he intimates theirs to be that they were begotten not made If then you enquire concerning the same Essence that was common to him and them you still find that Man is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Subject whether of formation as to him or of generation as to them And who apprehends not in what latitude of sense the humane Nature is One which is common to Adam and his Posterity Tho the Divine Nature is incomparably more One which is common to the Father Son and Spirit as we have formerly insisted and shall further shew it cannot but be in all necessary and continually-depending Emanations Yet I might if there were need again as to this part quote the Considerator to himself For I suppose he will not disown the Considerations in 1693. in which pag. 15. col 1. are these words Dr. Cudworth by a great number of very pertinent and Home-quotations hath proved that his Explication I mean that part of it which makes the three Persons to be so many distinct Essences or Substances is the Doctrine of the Principal if not of all the Fathers as well as of the Platonists And 't is added and I for my own part do grant it Upon the whole then I reckon that as to this first part we stand clear not only to the rest of the World but with this Author himself that to be a real Trinitarian is not so unheard-of a thing or what no learned Divine of any Perswasion ever dreamt of before the Enquirer But now for the Second Part. The Delicious Society supposed to be between or rather among the three Persons Is this a Dream And so strange a One Why good Sir Can you suppose three Persons i. e. three intellectual Subsistences perfectly Wise Holy and Good co-existing with inexisting in one another to have no Society Or that Society not to be delicious He says How can it be I say how can it but be Herein I am sure the Enquirer hath far more Company than in the former For whether the three Persons have all the same numerical Essence or three distinct all agree they most delightfully converse Will he pretend never to have read any that make Love as it were intercurrent between the two first the Character of the third In short Is it the Thing he quarrels with as singular or the Word At the Thing supposing three Persons he can have no Quarrel without quarreling with the common Sense of Mankind For the Word he hath more wit and knowledg of Language than to pretend to find fault with that For let him but consult Expositors even the known Criticks upon the mentioned place Prov. 8. whom in so plain a case I will not be at the pains to quote and transcribe and take notice whether none read those words fui in
distinction so as to be really and truly One thing If they cannot I would know why i. e. Why they cannot as well or much rather than the Soul and Body so as to be one entire Man If they can such a created Union is acknowledged possible which is all that part of our Discourse contends for And 't is enough for our present purpose for this will be an Union of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. of things of the same nature the Soul and Body are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. things of very different Natures And it sufficiently prepared our way as was intended to advance further and add That if such a created or made Union be possible it cannot be understood why a like uncreated or unmade Union should be thought impossible And if it be possible the noisy Clamour that a Trinity in the Godhead is impossible or that it will infer Tritheism must cease and be husht into everlasting silence Or if it shall still be resolved to be kept up to carry on the begun Humour can only serve to fright Children or unthinking People but can never be made articulate enough to have any signification with Men of sense For when the Father is acknowledg'd on all hands to be the Original or Fountain-Being existing necessarily and eternally of himself the Son existing by eternal Promanation necessarily of and from and in the Father the Holy Ghost of and in them both These because they all exist necessarily cannot but be each of them God and because they exist in necessary natural eternal Union cannot but be one God And he that shall attempt to make Tritheism of this will sooner prove himself not the third part of a wise Man than from hence prove three Gods We may truly and fitly say the Father is God the Son is God the Holy Ghost is God But that form of Speech the Father is a God the Son is a God the Holy Ghost is a God I think unjustifiable The former way of speaking well agrees with the Homoousiotes of the Deity the Substance whereof is congenerous You may fitly say of three drops of the same Water they are each of them Water But if you should say they are each of them a Water one would understand you to mean they were all drops of so many different sorts of Water I do upon the whole judg the Substance or Essence of the three Hypostases to be as perfectly One as can possibly consist with the emanation of some from other of them But now next In his way to his second Topick of Argumentation he is guilty of a strange sort of omission i. e. he twice over says he will omit what he greatly insists upon as a mighty matter that this meaning the Enquirer's Hypothesis is Heresy among those of his own Party whether they be the nominal or the real Trinitarians who all agree That each of the Divine Persons is perfect God in the most adequate and perfect sense and this too as such Person is considered sejunctly or as the Athanasian Creed speaks by himself c. To this I only say in the first place that if this weigh any thing it ought in reason to be as heavy upon him as me for I believe the same People that will call this account of the Trinity Heresy will call his denial of it Heresy much more But if he be not concern'd at that I am the more obliged to him that he hath a kinder concern for me than himself And if he really have let it ease his mind to know that let the Opinion be Heresy never so much I for my part am however resolv'd to be no Heretick as he and they may well enough see by the whole tenour of that Discourse But yet I humbly crave leave to differ from him in this as well as in greater Matters I am apt enough indeed to think that the Nominal Trinitarians will judg the Opinion of the Real Trinitarians to want Truth and the Real will perhaps more truly judg theirs to want Sense But neither the one nor the other will say that each of the Divine Persons is perfect God in the most adequate and perfect sense For both cannot but agree that God in the most adequate and perfect sense includes Father Son and Holy Ghost but they will none of them say that each or any of the Persons is Father Son and Holy Ghost And I am very confident he that shall so represent them will betray them by it into such inconveniencies and so much against their mind and intent that if ever they did trust him as I believe they never did this Considerator to express their sense for them they never will do it more As for Athanasius himself whose Creed he mentions tho he often speaks of an equality of the Persons in point of Godhead yet he also often Tom. 2. p. 576. most expresly excepts the Differences which I take to be very important of being unbegotten begotten and proceeding And which is a Difference with a Witness in his Questions and Answers He asks how many Causes are there in God Q. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and answers One only and that is the Father And then asks Q. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How many effects or things caused And answers two the Son and the Spirit And adds The Father is call'd a Cause because he begets the Son and sends out the Spirit The Son and Spirit are said to be caused because the Son is begotten and doth not beget the Spirit is sent forth and doth not send Now can he be thought all this while to mean an absolute equality And whereas he uses the Term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which our Author renders sejunctly or by himself that he may make it seem opposite to what is said by the Enquirer pag. 50. I for my part say as Athanasius doth that each of these Persons is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 singly God and Lord but I say not as he doth not and he denies what the Sober Enquiry denies in the mentioned place That any one of the Persons sejunctly is all that is signify'd by the Name of God which words this Author slily leaves out for what purpose he best knows But his purpose be it what it will can no longer be served by it than till the Reader shall take the pains to cast back his Eye upon pag. 50. of the Sober Enquiry And I must here put the Considerator in mind of what I will not suppose him ignorant but inadvertent only at this time That one may be sejoin'd or abstracted from another two ways or by a twofold abstraction precisive or negative That we may truly say of the Father Son or Holy Ghost that the One of them is or is not God abstracting from both the other according as you differently abstract If you abstract any one of the Persons from both the other by precisive abstraction and each of them is God or Lord
A VIEW Of that Part of the late Considerations Addrest to H. H. about the TRINITY Which concerns the Sober Enquiry On that Subject In a Letter to the former Friend LONDON Printed for Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and three Crowns at the lower-end of Cheapside 1695. A View of the late CONSIDERATIONS addrest to H. H. about the TRINITY YOU see Sir I make no haste to tell you my Thoughts of what hath been publish'd since my last to you against my Sentiments touching the H. Trinity I saw the Matter less required my Time and Thoughts than my other Affairs And so little that I was almost indifferent whether I took any notice thereof or no. There is really nothing of Argument in what I have seen but what I had suggested before and objected to my self in those very Discourses of mine now animadverted on which not having prevented with me the Opinion I am of can as little alter it and should as little any Man 's else But a little leasure as it can without extortion be gained from other occasions I do not much grudg to bestow on this I find my self concern'd in the late Considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity in a Letter to H. H. The Author is pleas'd to give me the honour of a Name a lank unvocal one It is so contrived that one may easily guess whom he means but the reason of his doing so I cannot guess Is it because he knew himself what he would have others believe But I suppose he as well knew his own Name If he knew not the former he ran the hazard of injuring either the supposed Author or the true or both I could I believe make as shrewd a guess at his Name and express it as plainly But I think it not civil to do so because I apprehend he hath some reason to conceal it whereof I think he hath a Right to be the Judg. But I will not prescribe to him Rules of Civility of which that he is a great Judg I will not allow my self to doubt Yet I will not suppose him to have so very diminishing Thoughts of our Saviour as not to acknowledg and reverence the Authority of that great Rule of his which he knows gain'd Reverence with some who called not themselves Christians Whatsoever you would that Men should do to you c. Nor can divine what greater reason he should have to hide his own Name than to expose mine or make the Person he indigitates be thought the Author of the Discourse he intended to expose Since no Man can imagine how as the Christian World is constituted any one can be more obnoxious for denying three Persons than for asserting three Gods Which latter his impotent attempt aims to make that Author do For his Censures of that Author's stile and difficulty to be understood they offend me not But so I have known some pretend Deafness to what they were unwilling to hear There is indeed one place Sob Enq. p. 24. in the end of Sect. 8. where must should have been left out upon the adding afterwards of can that might give one some trouble In which yet the supposal of a not unusual Asyndeton would without the help of Magick have reliev'd a considering Reader And for his Complements as they do me no real good so I thank God they hurt me not I dwell at Home and better know my own Furniture than another can For himself I discern and readily acknowledg in him those excellent Accomplishments for which I most heartily wish him an Advocate in a better Cause without Despair he will yet prove so when I take notice of some Passages which look like Indications of a serious temper of Mind as of choosing God and the honour of his Name for our Portion and Design and that he lives in vain who knows not his Maker and his God with the like But on the other hand I was as heartily sorry to meet with an expression of so different a strain on so awful a Subject of making a Coat for the Moon That Precept which Josephus inserts among those given the Jews doth for the reason it hath in it abstracting from its Authority deserve to be considered It seems to import a decency to the rest of Mankind whose notions of a Deity did not argue them sunk into the lowest degrees of Sottishness and Stupidity Good Sir what needed think you so adventurous Boldness in so lubricous a Case It gains nothing to a Man's Cause either of Strength or Reputation with wise and good Men. A sound Argument will be as sound without it Nor should I much value having them on my side whom I can hope to make laugh at so hazardous a Jest. I can never indeed have any great Veneration for a morose Sourness whatsoever affected appearance it may have with it of a simulated Sanctimony or Religiousness but I should think it no hardship upon me to repress that Levity as to attempt dancing upon the brink of so tremendous a Precipice And would always express my self with suspicion and a supposed possibility of being mistaken in a case wherein I find many of noted Judgment and Integrity in the succession of several Ages differing from me But go we on to the Cause it self where he pretends 1. First to give a View of the Sober Enquirer's Hypothesis 2. And then to argue against it As to the former He doth it I am loth to say with less fairness than from a Person of his otherwise appearing Ingenuity one would expect For he really makes me to have said more than I ever did in divers Instances and much less than I have expresly said and that he cannot have so little understanding as not to know was most material to the Cause in hand He represents me p. 40. col 1. saying the Persons are distinct Essences numerical Natures Beings Substances and col 2. That I hold them to be three Spirits when in the close of one of those Paragraphs viz. Calm Discourse p. 112 113. I recite the Words of W. J. In the Unity of the Godhead there must be no plurality or multiplicity of Substances allowed And do add nor do I say that there must And p. 39 40. I do not positively say there are three distinct Substances Minds or Spirits I would ask this my learned Antagonist have saying and not saying the same signification And again when Calm Discourse p. 123. my words are I will not use the Expressions as signifying my formed Judgment That there are three Things Substances or Spirits in the Godhead how could he say I hold the three Persons to be three Spirits Is any Man according to the ordinary way of speaking said to hold what is not his formed Judgment If he only propose things whereof he doubts to be considered and discust by others in order to the forming of it and by gentle ventilation to sift out Truth it the rather argues him not to
I was going on to what is obvious and in view to every Man the union between our Soul and Body Nor was I sollicitous to find this an exact Parallel as he fancies I was obliged to do What if there be no exact Parallel Will any Man of a sober Mind or that is Master of his own Thoughts conclude every thing impossible in the uncreated Being whereof there is not an exact parallel in the Creation If any Man will stand upon this come make an Argument of it let us see it in form and try its strength Whatsoever hath not its exact parallel in the Creation is impossible in God c. He will sooner prove himself ridiculous than prove his Point by such a Medium 'T is enough for a sober Man's purpose in such a case as we are now considering if we find such things actually are or might as easily be as what we see actually is among the Creatures that are of as difficult conception and explication as what appears represented in the Enquirers Hypothesis concerning a Trinity 'T is trifling to attempt to give or to ask a parallel exact per omnia It abundantly serves any reasonable purpose if there be a parallel quoad hoc viz. in respect of the facility or difficulty of Conception And tho the vegetative sensitive and intellective Natures be not so many distinct Substances a Trinity is not less conceivable in the Divine Being than three such Natures or natural Powers in the One humane Nature And whoever they be that will not simplify the Divine Being into nothing as the Excellent Author of the 28 Propositions speaks must also acknowledg the most real Perfections in the Divine Being tho not univocal but infinitely transcendent to any thing in us And are they no way distinct Let any sober Understanding judg will the same Notion agree to them all Is his Knowledg throughout the same with his effective Power Then he must make himself For who can doubt he knows himself And is his Will the self-same undistinguishable Perfection in him with his Knowledg Then the Purposes of his Will must be to effect all that he can For doth he not know all that he can do And the Complacencies of his Will must be as much in what is evil as good even in the most odious turpitude of the vilest and most immoral Evils For he knows both alike I know what is commonly said of extrinsecal Denominations But are such Denominations true or false Have they any thing in re correspondent to them or have they not Then some distinction there must be of these Perfections themselves If so how are they distinguisht And there appears great reason from God's own Word to conceive greater distinction of the three Hypostases in his Being than of the Attributes which are common to them as is said Sob Enq. pag. 140. In reference whereto it is not improper or impertinent to mention such Differences as we find in our own Being tho they be not distinct Substances Less distinction in our selves may lead us to conceive the possibility of greater in him in whom we are wont to apprehend nothing but Substance What he adds concerning the Union of Soul and Body in our selves which he cannot deny to be distinct Substances is from a Man of so good sense so surprisingly strange and remote from the Purpose that one would scarce think it from the same Man but that he left this part to some other of the Club and afterwards writ on himself without reading it over or this was with him what we are all liable to some drowsy Interval For when he had himself recited as the Enquirer's words or sense If there is this Union between two so contrary Natures and Substances as the Soul and Body why may there not be a like Union between two or three created Spirits He without shadow of a pretence feigns the Enquirer again to have forgot the Question because Soul and Body are not both intelligent Substances And why Sir doth this argue him to have forgot the Question 'T is as if he expected a Man to be at the top of the Stairs assoon as he toucht the first Step. In a Series of Discourse must the beginning touch the end leaving out what is to come between and connect both parts What then serve Mediums for And so farewel to all reasoning since nothing can be proved by it self He expected it seems I should have proved three intelligent Natures might be united because three intelligent Natures might be united But say I and so he repeats if there be so near Union between things of so contrary Natures as Soul and Body why not between two or three created Spirits The Question is as he now states it himself why may not three intelligent Substances be united And hither he with palpable violence immediately refers the mention of the Union of Soul and Body and says he Why Sir are Body and Soul intelligent Substances And say I but why Sir are not the three supposed created Spirits intelligent Substances And now thinks he will my easy admiring Readers that read me only and not him say What a Baffle hath he given the Enquirer What an ignorant Man is this Mr. to talk of Soul and Body as both intelligent Substances But if any of them happen upon the Enquirer's Book too then must they say how scurvily doth this Matter turn upon himself How inconsiderate a Prevaricator was he that took upon him the present part of a Considerer so to represent him And I my self would say had I the opportunity of free Discourse with him in a Corner which because I have not I say it here Sir is this sincere Writing Is this the way to sift out Truth And I must further say this looks like a Man stung by the pungency of the present Question If Soul and Body things of so contrary Natures that is of an intelligent and unintelligent Nature can be united into one humane Nature why may not three created Spirits all intelligent Natures be as well united into some one thing It appears you knew not what to say to it and would fain seem to say something when you really had nothing to say and therefore so egregiously tergiversate and feign your self not to understand it or that your Antagonist did not understand himself The Enquirer's Scope was manifest Nothing was to be got by so grosly perverting it Is there no Argument but à pari Might you not plainly see he here argued à fortiori If contrary Natures might be so united why not much rather like Natures When you ask me this Question Do not Body and Soul remain two Substances a bodily and a spiritual notwithstanding their concurrence to the Constitution of a Man I answer Yes And I thank you Sir for this kind Look towards my Hypothesis If they were not so the mention of this Union had no way serv'd it You know 't is only Union with continuing distinction
can be added thereto or be without its compass much less can there be another Infinite added to the former I only now say you talk confidently in the dark you know not what And so as to involve your self in Contradictions do what you can 1. In saying nothing can be added to what is infinite 2. In pretending to know if any thing can be added how much or how little can 1. In saying nothing can be added to or be without the compass of what is infinite For then there could be no Creation which I cannot doubt him to grant Before there was any was there not an infinitude of Being in the eternal Godhead And hath the Creation nothing in it of real Being Or will you say the Being of the Creature is the Being of God I know what may be said and is elsewhere said to this and 't will better serve my purpose than his 2. In pretending to know what can or cannot be added Or that in the way of necessary eternal Emanation there cannot be an infinite addition tho not in the way of voluntary or arbitrary and temporary production The reason of the difference is too obvious to need elucidation to them that can consider But for your part I must tell my Antagonist you have concluded your self even as to that which carries the greatest appearance of impossibility come off as you can You say a Body of an Inch square is not only not infinite in extension but is a very small Body yet it hath this infinite power to be divisible to infinity So I suppose you must say of half that Inch or a quarter or the thousandth part of it much more of two or twenty or a thousand Inches You say indeed this Body it self is not infinite Nor will I insist upon the trite and common Objection against you How can any thing be divisible into parts which it hath not in it Which yet Men have not talkt away by talking it often over Still haeret lateri Nor of an infinite Power 's being lodged in a finite and so minute a Subject But in the mean time here are Infinites upon Infinites an infinite Power upon an infinite Power multiplyed infinitely and still these infinite Powers greater and less than other as either the Inch is augmented or diminished And he saith the Mind of Man hath the Property of infinite or eternal duration Therefore so many Minds so many Infinites And he must suppose the infinite duration of some Minds to be greater than of others unless he think his own Mind to be as old as Adam's or do not only hold their preexistence but that they were all created in the same moment Which if he do I am sure he can never prove And so for ought he knows there may not only be many Infinites but one greater than another What therefore exceeds all limits that are assignable or any way conceivable by us as we are sure the Divine Being doth it is impossible for us to know what differences that vast Infinitude contains And we shall therefore but talk at random and with much more presumption than knowledg when we take upon us to pronounce it impossible there should be three infinite Hypostases in the Godhead Especially considering that most intimate vital Union that they are supposed to have each with other in respect whereof the Son is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inexisting in the Father as Athanasius's Phrase is agreeably to the Language of Scripture Joh. 14. 11. and elsewhere And which by parity of Reason is to be conceiv'd of the Holy Ghost too who is also said to search all things even the deep things of God 1 Cor. 2. 10. In respect of which Union and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which may thence be collected whatever of real Perfection Wisdom Power Goodness c. is in any one is each ones as truly as any ones all being originally in the Father as the first and everliving fountain of all As was said Sober Enquiry p. 31 32. But whereas the Considerator urges If the Father be infinite in his Substance in his Wisdom his Power his Goodness he is God in the most adequate and perfect sense of the Word I say well and what then If therefore he mean the Son and the Holy Ghost must be excluded the Godhead let him prove his consequence if he can And he may find the answer to it Sob Enquiry pag. 53. I shall not transcribe nor love when I have writ a Book to write it over again His Notion may fit Pagans well enough or those who are not otherwise taught Christians are directed to understand that the Deity includes Father Son and Holy Ghost Their equality I acknowledg with the mentioned Athanasian Exception notwithstanding which that they equally communicate in the most Characteristick difference of the Deity from all Creatures viz. Necessity of Existence is conceivable enough To sum up all the Considerator I understand even by the whole management of his Discourse and specially by the conclusion of that part wherein the Enquirer is concern'd to have most entirely given up this Cause as ever did any Man The Enquirer's only Undertaking was to maintain the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in opposition to his former daring Assertion of its being impossible and nonsense He now in conclusion says the Enquirer saw there must be a Nexus intimating if there can that he hath gain'd his point but 't is added he durst not venture to say what it was To which I must say That this is most uncautiously said I will not say deceitfully tho I know 't is said untruly and he might have known or remembred too that he the Enquirer often spoke of it as a necessary natural eternal vital and most intimate Union He further says he only explains it by the Union of Soul and Body Which again 1. Is so great a Misrepresentation that I wonder he would say it here when he himself but two or three Pages off recites as the Enquirer's words If God could unite into one two such contrary Natures let any Man give me a reason why he might not much more first make and then unite two and if two why not three Spirits c. Is this only to explain it by the Union of Soul and Body But by the way that first make and then unite was none of the Enquirer's but appears thrust in to make what was manifestly possible seem impossible Sic notus Let two Substances be created entire with no natural Propension to each other they are capable of no natural Union without change of their Natures Who sees not it were a Contradiction to suppose them the same still and not the same But suppose them created with mutual aptitudes to Union and united what should hinder but they may continue united without being confounded 2. And 't is said impertinently as well as untruly for what if he had not explain'd it at all