no parts if partiri whence they are so called must not and herein he cannot so fool the whole Christian World as to make it concur with him lose its signification to serve a turn Tho' the things be real there partibility is not real If any indeed will call them parts beeause they may be conceived or contemplated apart as parts meerly conceptible are no prejudice to the perfection of the Divine Being so are such conceivable parts acknowledged by this Author himself in express words we cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one Thought and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts God can as little admit to be a part of any thing as to have any thing a part of him And yet 't is no prejudice to the Dignity and Perfection of his Being to conceive of him conjunctly with other things as when we make him a part subject or predicate of a Proposition All his disputation therefore against parts and composition in the Deity is against a figment or no present adversary For my part I am of his mind and I should be obliged to thank him that this once he vouchsafes to let me be on his side when he knows I am if he did not take so vast pains to make others not know it How hard a thing is it for an angry man especially when he knows not why to write with a sincere Mind But hath he in all this fervent bluster a present concern at this time for the Honour of the Divine Being as God forbid I should think he never hath what is that he supposes injurious to it Is it the words parts and compounds or is it the things supposed to be united in the Divine Being The words he knows to be his own and let him dispose of them more ineptly if he can tell how parts that were never put together never parted nor ever shall be the one or other i. e. that never were or will be parts And a compound of such parts But now for the things upon which he would obtrude these words three Essences natures or if you please Infinite minds or spirits signified by the Names of Father Son and Holy Ghost in eternal union but distinct in the Being of God Let us consider his disputation against them united or in union according to its double aspect First upon the Hypothesis or Supposition of them Secondly upon himself First Consider his Disputation as levell'd against the Hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences natures minds spirits in necessary eternal Union in the Divine Being And one of his arguments against it is in those words of his One principal argument against it here put out parts and composition which are his own and we have no more to do with them is that God is eternal and unmade and whatsoever hath parts saies he hath such essences in it must have a maker And here let him prove his consequence and his business is done viz. both ways as will be seen by and by But let him shew the inconsistency between a things having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it as the supposition to be argued against is and before ought to have been justly stated and it 's being eternal and unmade But how that is to be evinced I can not so much as guess confident affirmation against the most obvious Tenour of Gods own Word is of little account who shall ascend into the heavens or fathom the depths or can have that perspection of God's incomprehensible nature as without and visibly against his own revelation to be able without great rashness to pronounce so concerning him But so toyish an Argument as here follows is worse than the Position i. e. when one shall say that for ought we know there may be three distinct Essences by an eternal unmade union united into one in the Being of God any man should say and be so vain as to expect to be regarded that because they are united by an eternal and unmade union therefore they are not united by an eternal and unmade union If there be not a Contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing by it self is to say nothing or is all one with proving a thing by it self He proceeds to what hath no thing in it like an Argument but against his own Conceit of parts and that very trifling too There can be but one eternal nature in God But if there be three there must be three This 't is now come to proving his Point by its self Here he makes sure work to have nothing deny'd but then nothing is prov'd no advance is made if there be three there must be three But if there be three what eternal parts There must be three different Natures or else they would be the same What tho' distinct But this supposes some body said the first And who himself therefore he is disproving himself If I had said so I would have deny'd his consequence for there may be similar parts Whereas by different he seems to mean dissimilar He says not only distinct but different natures Now you have that wonderful thing talk'd of some times but never brought to view before a distinction without a difference 'T is strange how any things should be distinct and no way different What distinguishes them if they differ by nothing This different apply'd to this present Case is his own word coined to introduce a Notion that is not new to Christians only but to all Man-kind If by different Natures he means as he seems of a different kind who thought of such a difference But I trow things that differ in number do as truly differ however essentially cohaering tho' not so widely His next is that though we have a natural notion of an eternal Being we have no notion of three eternal Essences which again I put instead of his parts which necessarily coexist in an eternal union Doth he mean we are to disbelieve every thing of God whereof we have not a natural Notion Then to what purpose is a Divine Revelation Is this Notion of God pretended to be Natural 'T is enough if such a Notion be most favoured by his own Revelation who best understands his own Nature and there be no evident natural Notion against it He forgot that he had said Defence p. 5. If every thing which we have no positive Idea of must be allow'd to contradict Reason we shall find contradictions enow adding We must confess a great many things to be true which we have no Idea of c. He adds once more we have no notion of an eternal and necessary existence but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature but if there be I here again leave out his three parts because I design to consider if there be any thing of strength brought against what was supposed possible by the Enquirer not against his fiction which I trouble not my self any further with three spiritual Beings
simple or that Power Wisdom Goodness in the abstract are the same thing and that our difficulty is great to apprehend them really undistinguishable And let me seriously ask himself doth he in good earnest think it is only through the weakness of our understandings that we distinguish the notions of the Divine Wisdom Power and Goodness certainly it were great weakness of unstanding to define them alike I believe he never met with the writer yet that distinguisht them less than ratione ratiocinatâ in contradistinction to ratocinante which implies somewhat corresponding to our distinct notions of them eminently and not formally in naturâ rei And whereas he further says This prepared his way to make Goodness Wisdom Power a natural Trinity n Unity herein the Defender is mistaken This is not the Trinity which the Enquirers discourse was ever intended to terminate in as he himself hath expresly said and the Defender takes notice of it which makes me wonder how he could think it was so intended citing the very passage p. 37. where the Enquirer professes not to judge that we are under the precise notions of Power Wisdom and Goodness to conceive of the Father Son and Holy Ghost But why then were these three so much discourst of before They are three most celebrated Divine Attributes wherein we have our most immediate and very principal concern And some have thought the Trinity was most fitly to be conceived by them The Enquirer did not think so but he thought first it would be requisite to have our minds disentangled from any apprehended necessity of conceiving them to be in all respects the very same things nor are they the very same if they be so distinguish'd as is expressed in the 16 th of the summary propositions where also they are each of them said to be common to Father Son and Holy Ghost whence therefore it is impossible they shou'd be thought to distinguish Father Son and Holy Ghost But that some distinction being admitted even of them this might facilitate to us our conception of the greater distinction which must be of Father Son and Spirit as is express'd p. 38. Indeed he did not think fit to interrupt his discourse by staying to shew reasons why he did not rest in that account alone of the Trinity tho' it might seem plausible or not absurd but proceeded further to what was more satisfying to himself and might be so to other men And as the intervening Series of his discourse leads thereto this is more directly done p. 47. 48. c. especially where he comes to speak of the necessary coexistence and the as necessary and natural order of the Father Son and Spirit towards each other The second being not by any intervening act of will but by necessary eternal promanation from the first and the third from them both And the true reason why Power Wisdom and Goodness were not thought expressive of the distinction of Father Son and Spirit but common to each of them as is said Summary Prop. 16. was thatt the two latter can not but be necessary emanations most connatural to their Original as is truely suggested by the Defender p. 1â—1 If you object as the Defender brings in the Enquirer saying That this gives us the notion of a compounded Deity c. This i. e. the supposition that absolute omnimodous simplicity belongs not to it is the thing which may be thought to give us this notion And he tells us he the Enquirer answers this difficulty by giving us a new notion of a compositum And what 's that which he calls a new notion that a compositm seems to imply a preexisting component that brings such things together and supposes such and such more simple things to have preexisted apart or separate and to be brought afterwards together into an united State And indeed is this a new notion as new as the Creation Let him shew me an Instance through the whole created universe of Beings And for the uncreated Being the Defender now at this time disputes against any composition there and the Enquirer denies any first where there hath been a compositum without a pre-existing component or next the compounded parts whereof if substantial did not in order of nature pre-exist separate i. e. whether esse simplicitèr do not naturally precede esse tale or which is all one to our present purpose whether they were not capable hereof if the Creator pleased Let any man I say tell me where was there ever a compositum made by substantial union that did not consist of once separate or of separable parts But note his admirable following supposition that is to say that if a man suppose who consists of body and soul had been from eternity without a maker and his soul and body had never subsisted a part he could not have been said to have been a compounded Creature This is said with design most groundlesly as we shall see to fasten an absurd consequence upon the Enquirer and see how it lucks Did ever any man undertake to reprove an absurdity with greater absurdity a Creature without a Maker what sort of Creature must this be we have a pretty saying quoted in the Defender's Letter He that writes lies down and we are apt enough too when we write to trip and fall down and ought in such Cases to be merciful to one another even tho' he that falls should be in no danger of hurting his fore-head much more if he be What was another man's turn now may be mine next But let the supposition proceed and put we Being instead of Creature which no doubt was the Defender's meaning for Creature he must needs know it could not be that had no Maker And what then why he should not says he have been said to be compounded though he would have had the same parts that he has now We have here a self-confounding supposition which having done that first can't hurt him whom it was designed to confound being taken in season Grant one and you grant a thousand A Being made up of a soul and a body is so imperfect an entity as could not be of it self Nothing is of it self which is not absolutely perfect If he mind to disprove this let him try his faculty when he pleases against it and which I sincerely believe he never intends together with it against all Religion But besides he hath destroy'd his own supposition himself to put us out of that danger by saying in plain words p. 107. We have no Notion of an eternal and necessary Existence but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature Now say I what is so perfect and hath whatever belongs to it necessarily though distinguishable things belong to it hath no parts for what are parts but such things as can be parted such things as never were parted and never can be as 't is nonsence to talk of those things being parted that are united necessarily and of themselves are
other Eyes than his own For then tho' in so gross praevarication he had not preserved his Innocency he might have sav'd in some degree his Reputation Yet also he should have taken some heed that Anger might not so have discoloured his Eye as to make so injudicious a Choice what to confess and what to conceal For had he not himself blab'd that it was said we are not under the precise notions of Power Wisdom and Goodness to conceive of the Father Son and Holy Ghost He might more plausibly have formed his odd Births and father'd them where he doth But wrath indulg'd will show its governing power And all this fury and vengeance upon the Enquirer and the Dean too he reckon'd was due only because it was so presumptuously thought that somewhat in his Hypothesis or which he defends might have been better and that he probably sees it might so much a greater thing in some ill fits is the gratifying a humour than the Christian Cause 2. But let us now see how all this turns upon himself And how directly his ill-polisht not to say envenom'd darts missing their designed Mark strike into that very Breast which he undertakes to defend Whereas there are two things principally to be designed in a Discourse of this subject viz. 1. The explaining the Unity of the Father Son and Holy Ghost so as that tho' they are some way three they may yet be concluded to be in Godhead but one 2. The evincing notwithstanding that unity the possibility of their sufficient distinction to admit the distinct predicates that are severally spoken of them in the Holy Scriptures The Enquirer's discourse chiefly insists upon these two things 1. That necessity of Existence is the most fundamental Attribute of Deity And that therefore the Father as the Fountain being necessarily of himself The Son necessarily of the Father The Holy Ghost necessarily from them both each cannot but be God and the same one God In reference to the former purpose 2. That absolute omnimodous simplicity being never asserted in Scripture of the divine Being nor capable of being otherwise demonstrated of it and it being impossible either from Scripture or rational evidence accurately to assign the limits thereof and determine what simplicity belongs to that ever-blessed Being and what not If it be necessary to our apprehending how such distinct predicates and attributions may severally belong to the Father Son and Holy Ghost that we conceive three distinct essences necessarily coexisting in an eternal vital inseperable union in the Divine Being The thing may be in it self possible for ought we know And this is propounded to serve the latter purpose The Defender of the Dean seems to think otherwise of these two things viz. Of necessity of Existence common to the sacred three which will prove each of them to be God and belonging to them in the mentioned order as Father Son and Spirit will prove them necessarily to be one God And of what is said of simplicity which might admit their sufficient distinction of both these I say he seems to think otherwise by neglecting both lest that Discourse should be thought any way pertinent or useful to its end And disputes vehemently against the latter How strongly and successfully he does it in respect of the Truth of the Thing we have seen But whether weakly or strongly that his disputation tends to wound the Dean's cause all that it can shall now be made appear It is notorious the Dean hath asserted so positively three infinite Minds or Spirits that the benign interpretation wherewith this Defender would salve the matter A new Vocabulary being to be made for him on purpose and the Reason of things quite alter'd will to any man of sense seem rather ludicrous than sufficient without express retractation For which the Enquirer thinks he is upon somewhat better Terms than he if there were occasion for it both by the Tenour of his whole Discourse and by what he hath particularly said in the 28 Sect. But after the Interpretation offer'd See whether such things are not said over and over in the Defence as make the Defender and the Dean if he speak his sense most obnoxious to the whole argumentation in the Postscript So as if a part was acted it was carried so untowardly that it seem'd to be quite forgotten what part it was and all the Blows for it was come now to offending instead of Defending fall directly upon him whom the Actor had undertaken to defend It hath been noted already that the Defender says expresly the Divide Nature is one individual nature and so says the Enquirer but not one single nature then it must be double and triple not absolutely simple as also the Enquirer says to which he viz. the Defender adds one single nature can be but one person whether in God or Man Now let any man judge whether all his Reasonings are not most directly applicable against him if they signify any thing which are contained in his Postscript p. 106 107 108. c. How furiously doth he exagitate that saying When you praedicate Godhead or the Name of God of any one of them viz. Father Son or Holy Ghost you herein express a true but inadequate conception of God c. insisting that the whole undivided Divine Nature no doubt it is everlastingly undivided wherever it is subsists entirely in three distinct Persons This the Enquirer never deny'd tho' he charges it upon him that he makes no one of the Persons to be true and perfect God But how well doth that agree with what he had himself said Defence p. 26. Tho' God be the most absolute compleat independent Being yet neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost can be said to be an absolute compleat independent God He falsly charges it upon the Enquirer that he makes the Persons severally not perfect God and he denies two of them to be compleat God To say not perfect is criminal as indeed it is to say not compleat is innocent But his saying the Son and Holy Ghost are not compleat God How doth it consist with what is said Postscr p. 109. The same whole entire Divinity distinctly and inseparably subsists in the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost What is wanting to make him compleat God in whom the whole entire Divinity subsists No wonder if he quarrel with all the World who so little agrees with him whose Defence he undertakes or with himself In the mean time the Enquirer hath the less reason to complain when he manifestly treats himself as ill as him I only add that for his Discourse concerning the one Divinity or one Divine Nature subsisting wholly and entirely three times whereas I had thought the three Persons had subsisted at all times and all at once Defence p. 26 c. And the Persons of the Son and Holy Spirit not being emanations p. 28. Not the Son because he is the Father's Image And an
Image is not an emanation but a reflection But how should there be a reflected Image without an emanation Nor the Holy Ghost being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not in the sense of emanation but of the mysterious Procession I shall make no guesses about it for it concerns not the Enquirer only I think it very secure against the formidable Objection which he mentions p. 35. of it's being too intelligible Upon the whole matter I see not what service it can do him to put intelligent person instead of mind For I thought every Person had been intelligent Boethius his definition which he alledges plainly implies so much and one would think he must know that it is the usual notion of Person to understand by it suppositum rationale or intelligents Therefore methinks he should not reckon it necessary to distinguish Persons as he doth by this addition of intelligent into such as are Persons and such as are no Persons But since he expresly saies and I think for the most part truly that the three Persons or subsistences in the ever blessed Trinity are three real substantial subsistances each of which hath entirely all the Perfections of the Divine Nature Divine Wisdom Power and Goodness and therefore each of them is eternal Infinite mind as distinct from each other as any other three Persons and this he believes the Dean will no more recant than he will renounce a Trinity for all the wit of man can not find a medium between a substantial Trinity and a Trinity of names or a Trinity of meer modes Respects and Relations in the same single essence which is no Trinity at all As also he had said much to the same purpose before that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract without three that subsist or of one single nature which hath three subsistences when it 's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence c. I believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person not the very same common nature for the Persons can not be distinguished from each other by that which is common to them all Therefore the Divine Nature which is common to the three must according to him comprehend three single natures and not be absolutely simple Hither must be his resort at last after all his earnest disputation against it And these he will have to be parts which because they are undivided impartible inseparable everlastingly and necessarily united I do reckon the Enquirer did with very sufficient reason and with just decency and doth still continue very peremptorily to deny And whereas he contends that the whole Divine nature is entirely in each subsistence as he does again and again I think the term whole improper where there are no proper parts And I doubt not when he gives place to cooler thoughts he will see cause to qualify that assertion For if he strictly mean that every thing that belongs to the Godhead is in each Person I see not how he will fetch himself from the Socinian consequence that then each Person must have a Trinity subsisting in it and be Father Son and H. Ghost For I doubt not he will acknowledge that the entire Divinity includes in it the Father Son and Holy Ghost And therefore he must be beholden to an inadequate notion in this very case when all is done how much soever he hath contended against it I do however think it safe and free from any other difficulty than we unavoidably have in conceiving Infinites To say that all perfection is in each subsistent which I like better than subsistence as more expressive of the concrete as far as their natural necessary eternal order towards one another as the first is the fountain or radix the second from that and the third from both can possibly admit All must be originally in the Father with whom the other two have that intimate vital eternal union that what is in him the other communicate therein in as full perfection as is inconceivable and more than it is possible for us or for any finite mind to conceive Therefore since that difference which only proceeds from that natural eternal order is conjecturable only but is really unknown unrevealed and inscrutable it is better herein to confess the imperfection of that knowledge which we have than to boast that which we have not or aspire to that which we cannot have FINIS These Books written by the Reverend Mr. John Howe are sold by Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside 1. THE Blessedness of the Righteous The Vanity of this Mortal Life On Psal. 17. ver 15. and Psalm 89.47 2. Of Thoughtfulness for the Morrow With an Appendix concerning the immoderate Desire of fore-knowing things to come 3. The Redeemer's Tears wept over lost Souls in a Treatise on Luke 19.41 42. With an Appendix wherein somewhat is occasionally discoursed concerning the Sin against the Holy Ghost and how God is said to Will the Salvation of them that perish 4. Of Charity in reference to other Mens Sins 5. Self-dedication discoursed in the Anniversary Thansgiving of a Person of Honour for a great Deliverance 6. A Sermon directing what we are to do after a strict Enquiry whether or no we truly love God 7. A Funeral Sermon for that Faithful and Laborious Servant of Christ Mr. Richard Fairclough who deceased July 4. 1682. in the Sixty First year of his Age. 8. A Funeral Sermon for Mrs. Esther Sampson the late Wife of Henry Sampson Dr. of Physick who died Nov. 24. 1689. 9. The Carnality of Religious Contention In two Sermons Preach'd at the Merchant's Lecture in Broadstreet Books lately Printed for Thomas Parkhurst Spira's Despair revived Being a Narration of the Horror and Despair of some late Sinners under the Apprehensions of Death and Judgment Wherein are such Unquestionable Examples produc'd and such Matters laid down and proved as may stop the Mouths of the Atheistical Scoffers and Mockers By Thomas James Minister of the Gospel at Ashford in Kent The Confirming Work of Religion and its great things made plain by their primary Evidences and Demonstrations Whereby the meanest in the Church may soon be made able to render a rational account of their Faith The present Aspect of our Times and of the Extraordinary Conjunction of things therein in a rational View and Prospect of the same as it respects the publick hazard and safety of Brittain in this Day These two last by Rob. Fleming Author of the fulfilling of the Scriptures and Minister at Rotterdam England's Allarm Being an account of Gods most considerable dispensations of Judgment and Mercy towards these Kingdoms for fourteen years last past and also of the several sorts of Sins and Sinners therein Especially the Murmurers against this Present Government With an Earnest call to speedy Humiliation and Reformation and Supplication as the chief means of prospering their Majesties Councils and Preparations Dedicated to the King and Queen A Discourse concerning Old Age tending to the Instruction Caution and Comfort of Aged Persons By Richard Steel A. M. Letter p. 24 25. See his Letter p. 1. Calm Discourse p. 34. Calm Discourse p. 89 90. p. 139. Calm Disc. Calm Disc. p. 140. His Letter p. 105. See Calm Disc. p. 122.123 p. 108.109 110. His Letter p. 5. Calm Disc. 47. His Letter p. 110. Calm Disc. p. 48. Calm Disc. p. 140. Postscr to his Letter p. 111. Calm Disc. p. 48. Calm Disc. p. 73 74. Defence p. 16. p. 18. Calm Disc. p. 50.51 Postscrip p. 108 109. Postscrip p. 108. Defence p. 30.