Selected quad for the lemma: spirit_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
spirit_n	divine_a	holy_a	son_n	7,564	5	5.7178	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A38076	Remarks upon a book lately published by Dr. Will. Sherlock ... entituled, A modest examination of the Oxford decree, &c.	Edwards, Jonathan, 1629-1712.	1695 (1695)	Wing E221; ESTC R17931	28,355	66

consequently they must be three Gods to all intents and purposes when united as much as if they were separated But 2dly A specifical sameness of the Godhead is by no means to be allowed because it destroys the true and fundamental reason of that unity viz. the infinite perfection of the divine nature which renders it absolutely incapable of any multiplication and places it upon another weak and unstable foundation viz. the operation of the mind and understanding So that the unity of the Godhead according to ths hypothesis doth not result from the nature of God but is owing to and dependent upon the operation of some intellect drawing one common notion from the agreement which it observes in several individuals Which to affirm would certainly be both a monstrous and a Blasphemous assertion ss the Animadverter hath very judiciously observed p. 183. From all these observations I think it is as evident as any truth in nature that to assert three substances in the blessed Trinity is plainly to imply and in other words to affirm that there are three Gods which assertion therefore in the judgment not only of all true Christians but even of Jews and Mahometans and some sober Pagans would be accounted and adjudged false and impious as it is declared to be by the Oxford Censure But against this the Dean will urge in behalf of his three distinct substances the plurality and distinction of persons in the Trinity Are there not three Persons in the Godhead Yes Are not these three Persons three substantial Persons Yes we acknowledge they are Tho by the by this epithet of substantial when added to Person is superfluous and is no better than a plain tautology because the very notion of Person imports the perfection and complement of substance so that it receives no addition to its signification by the word substantial But to pass this by and proceed to his questions Are not three substantial persons three distinct substances I answer no. For these three persons have but one and the same substance or nature that is common to them all which nature hath three different ways of subsisting in the three persons From which different ways of subsisting as I said before do result distinct properties and relations belonging to each of those divine persons and which are incommunicable to the others All these questions so often and so impertinently proposed by the Dean are easily resolved by proposing the like questions in other words but such as are perfectly equipollent Are not the Persons in the Trinity three distinct Divine Persons Yes Is not every divine Person truly and properly God Yes Is it not then as plain that if there be three distinct divine Persons there must consequenty be three Gods I answer no. Because tho each of them distinctly is a divine Person and therefore God yet they have but one and the same Divinity or Godhead in common to them all so that they are distinguished only by their personalities but are united in one divine nature or Godhead And therefore as the Athanasian Creed tells us tho we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord yet we are forbidden by the Catholick Religion to say there are three Gods or three Lords Now of all this I would defire no greater or plainer acknowledgment than what I find in the writings of this examiner and particularly in the papers before us p. 18. he hath these words That there are three Persons and one God is the Catholick Language and therefore three belongs to the Persons and one to the Godhead This is right but in the words immediately succeeding he quite overturns the Catholick Faith and Language by saying That therefore whatever is essential to the notion of each Person may be numbred and distinguished with the Persons From hence he would have it follow as indeed it will if this be allowed that spirit and substance being included in the notion of a Person it must be multiplied with it so that as there are three Persons so there must be three spirits three substances in the Trinity Now this is extremely false for by the same way and for the same reason that there are three substances or three spirits there must be three Godheads He saith no adding that this will not affect the unity of the Godhead for three he saith belongs to the persons which are three not to the Godhead which is but one very right And must it not be said for the same reason that when we affirm that there are three substantial Persons three is to be applied to Persons and not to substance because substance when we speak of God being equipollent to Godhead as was said before is but one and therefore cannot be multiplied But cannot what is essential to the notion of a person be numbred and distinguished with the person No by no means for tho it may and must be so in finite persons it is not so when we speak of the divine infinite persons in the Trinity Because there is something in each of those persons which in common belongs to them all such is the divine nature substance Godhead which is so in each as to be whole and entire in all three and therefore tho residing in and applied to each person yet it may not it cannot be numbred or distinguished with the persons who are distinguished by their properties and relations which arise from three different ways manners of their subsistence but not by their substance and Godhead which is but one and the same in all three without division distinction or multiplication The same orthodox acknowledgment we have p. 21. tho tacked by him according to his usual method to an egregious contradiction There he saith that the divine nature is whole and entire in each divine Person and that infinite and infinite and infinite when applied to the Persons are but one and the same infinite nature Very right but then with the same breath in a manner he puffs all this away by telling us that each of the divine Persons is a distinct infinite mind and yet that these three infinite distinct minds can have but one and the same divine nature Which is a plain contradiction making one to be three and three one in one and the same respect And is no better than if he should say in three Gods there is but one and the same Godhead for infinite mind and spirit is but the same thing in other words with God as he himself elsewhere acknowledges Lastly to mention no more p. 29 30. He repeats the same orthodox expressions The Scripture-notion of the Unity of God is not such an Unity as is only in one Person for then it could not enjoyn the Faith and worship of Father Son and holy Ghost But such an Unity as can be between three when the one same divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the

eternal Son and by the Father and the Son to the eternal Spirit without any division or separation And that which is communicated whole and entire without division or separation makes no number for it is but one still Here he is as sound and orthodox as Athanasius but when he comes to explain himself and therein to give us his true sentiments for all the former expressions are but an artificial disguise of his errors then he uses such a shuffing ambiguous deceitful way of speaking that you would think that Ursacius or Valens or Eusebius of Nicomedia were risen from the dead I confess I have bin beyond measure astonished when I have perused his writings on this subject to find such plain and gross contradictions so often and so boldly uttered by him Sometimes he will make a good and laudable confession of the Faith and by and by he spoils all by a very fraudulent and treacherous explication And indeed hereby he hath laid the foundations of such a sophistical and deceitful way of writing that if it should be countenanced in him and thereupon imitated by others it would render it almost impossible either to vindicate the truth or to confute any Heresy This charge will be made good by considering these following particulars Such as are 1st his manifest and manifold contradictions with which his books written upon the subject which is now before us do every where abound Whereby he affirms and denys the same thing almost in a breath and what he erects in one place he presently kicks down in another To make out this I shall confine my self to one instance of it relating to the Unity of the divine nature p. 21. He saith the Divine nature is whole and entire in each divine person and the three divine persons whom he very falsly and very dangerously there calls three divine minds have the same one divine nature and are but one and the same infinite nature p. 29. There is but one and the same divinity or Godhead in them all speaking of the three persons The same one divinity or Godhead is entirely and indivisibly in three distinct persons p. 30. The same one divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated from the Father to the Son c. See p. 45. where you have the like expressions by which he affirms that there is but one and the same nature one Divinity one Godhead in the three Persons And yet in other places he is as confident that there is not only one singular nature and substance in God p. 16. To say that there is one singular substance in the Deity is the fundamental Article of the Sabellian Creed p. 17. If there be but one singular divine nature and substance in the Deity tho men could find a Trinity of Persons in this one divine nature which yet p. 16. he represents as a ridiculous imagination yet from thence he saith it must follow that the whole Trinity must be incarnate p. 23. Now to affirm that there is but one Godhead one and the same divine nature in the three Persons and yet to deny that there is one singular divine nature and substance in those persons I think amounts to a very plain contradiction I know it will be said that he affirms and denies the Unity of the divine nature but it is not in the same respect when he saith it is one he means that the same specifical nature is whole and entire in the three Persons but when he denies it to be one he means that there is not one only singular or numerical divine nature for this were by so saying to revive the Heresy of Sabellius I Answer this will not save him from a contradiction For let him make choice of which of these terms he pleases to express the Unity and sameness of the divine nature by it is certain that what he affirms in one place he denies in another When he saith it is one one and the same doth he mean one singular numerical nature if he means so then this he doth at other times in plain downright terms deny not only as a thing that is false but as Heretical impossible contradictory as was seen before Well when he asserts the Unity of the Godhead and saith that one and the same divine nature is in the three Persons wholly and entirely communicated from the Father to the Son as he expressed himself p. 30. doth he mean a specifical Identity I suppose he doth for p. 10. he tells us that to assert three substances in the Arian notion that is three distinct minds and species of substance or three natures and essences specifically different this is false impious and Heretical Therefore to affirm three natures of the same kind must be a true religious orthodox acknowledgment This he must mean if he means any thing Otherwise if he shall say that when he affirms there are three natures or substances he means that there are three but yet which are neither of the same kind nor of a different kind that is neither numerically nor specifically different Then I say that he advances an absurd and an inexplicable position which neither he nor any man else can possibly understand But on the other hand if he affirms or means a specifical Unity in the Godhead then I am sure he doth as plainly as words can make it in other places contradict his meaning For p. 19. He hath these words Tho the Ancient Fathers frequenty make mention of a specifick Unity of nature in the Godhead yet they did not confine the Unity of the divine nature to this And p. 33. This specifick sameness doth not answer the complete notion of the divine Unity Nay he doth not only say this but gives a very good reason for it p. 19. The divine nature is no species for it is but one If there be any force in this consequence it must be this viz. That the divine nature is but one singular individual nature which is incapable of plurality or multiplication and therefore it cannot be a species because a species can be multiplied and therefore is capable of being affirmed and predicated de pluribus of more things of the same kind He proceeds The Unity of the Godhead is the most real essential indivisible unity Very right Therefore say I it is not a specifical Unity the former assertion being a clear an unanswerable proof that it is not so For 1st The Unity of the Godhead is a real Unity but a specifick Unity is only a Logical and Notional one 2dly The unity of the Godhead is an essential unity the unity of one nature and essence the specifick is only an unity of several natures which are really and essentially à parte rei distinct from each other and are only united in the understanding Lastly The unity of the Godhead is the most real and therefore the most perfect unity but a specifick unity is not the most real but of a lesser sort