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spirit_n	dangerous_a	form_n	good_a	25	3	2.1572	3	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A94173	Ten lectures on the obligation of humane conscience Read in the divinity school at Oxford, in the year, 1647. By that most learned and reverend father in God, Doctor Robert Sanderson, Bishop of Lincoln. &c. Translated by Robert Codrington, Master of Arts.	Sanderson, Robert, 1587-1663.; Codrington, Robert, 1601-1665.	1660 (1660)	Wing S631; ESTC R227569	227,297	402

intention but unprofitable to the publick nay in some sence obnoxious yet the Subject is bound to obey it provided it be made by just Authority and the matter of the Law or the thing commanded be such that it may be done without Sin The reason is because every man ought to be careful and diligent in the performance of that which belongs to his own part Gal. 6. 5. and not too scrupulous of what concerns another For every man shall bear his own Burthen If a Law-giver shall be wanting in his Duty what is that to you Do you perform your Office howsoever As for his intentions whether they be right or not let himself look to it for he must give to God an account of all his actions and intentions And do you look to your self for if you shall refuse to obey him you shall give to the same God an account of your disobedience XII The fourth Dout of the Changing of Laws if they seem to be unprofitable or obnoxious to the Common-wealth whether and how far the Change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be required and urged by the People The reason of the Doubt in one respect is because in a body Civil as in a body natural every change especially if it be sudden and great is dangerous and on the other side because it concerns the Common-wealth that the Laws be accommodated to the Times and Customes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 4. Phys text 128. and if the one doth change that the other be changed with them For answer to this I say in the first place it is certain that the Laws may be changed yea and sometimes that they ought to be changed for they have heretofore been changed with great profit to the Common-wealth therefore they may now be changed again and may be so in all future times if occasion shall require it shall be found profitable to the Commonwealth And why may not that be lawful to be done again which hath been lawful heretofore There are every day new emergencies new inconveniencies new evils and if there are not new Laws made to redresse them there will be no remedy Arist 2. And all men saith Aristotle seek not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 8. And if heretofore it were expedient that a Law should be made because it was profitable to the Commonwealth it being found afterwards by the change of the conditions of Times and manners to become unprofitable why is it not expedient that it should be taken away again XIII I say in the second place That the change of particular Laws is not without danger and therefore not to be attempted unlesse it be upon some great and urgent necessity Aristotle acutely and briefly as his custom is produceth divers reasons 2. Poli. 8. These three are the chiefest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These often changes do very much derogate from the authority of the Law and the Law-giver As we conceive that person to be of a very slender and weak judgement who for no sound or evident reason is easily enduced to change his Opinion Secondly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It maketh the people wanton and petulant This is true enough we not long since have had the experience of it and apt to fly at any thing if they shall find their Law-giver easy on this account and departing from his own right to humour the Votes and unsatisfied desires of the people Therefore the chief Philosopher most gravely and deservedly doth reprove the Law of Hippodamus a Law-maker of Miletum viz. That whosoever had discovered or found out something profitable to the City should be recompenced for his good service with a publick reward This Law was specious enough at the first sight and plausible to the people but look throughly into it and you will find nothing in it either of prudence or safety or Advantage For what could be found more dangerous to disturb the publick Peace than that factious men and of a turbulent and cunning Spirit under the shaddow of a publick good should not only occasion the subversion of the Laws but also call in question the Form of the whole Civil Government and obtrude unto the State a new Idaea of Government according to the humour of their own Invention Do you hear I beseech you a Philosopher famous in his times or rather a Prophet and a foreteller of the manners and the times in which now we live Grav●ora inserre vulnera dum mino●●bus mede●i defid● amus Ambros 2. O●sic 2. Thirdly the Innovation of Laws being ordained for the removing of some present Inconvenience and being it may come to passe and oftentimes it doth so come to passe that from this suddain Immutation many and more grievous Inconveniencies may arise though not peradventure at the first discovered the most grave Philosopher did judge it to be far safer to tolerate endure some Inconveniencies and those not slight ones neither in a Common wealth which may be avouched of the Church also which is a kind of a Common-wealth than in pretence of Reformation either Ecclesiastical or Political to cancel old Laws Statutes turn all things upside down Of a far different judgment to those of our times were the wise men of former Ages whose Rules Principles were as are here these folowing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Malum benè positum non est movendum Imperiti medici est pejus malo remedium adhibere an Evil well placed is not to be removed It is the part of an unskilful Physician to apply a Remedy worse than the disease XIV I say in the third place That although the changing of Laws may seem to be necessary by reason of some great and evident Cause yet it is not to be attempted by the people without the consent of the Prince but modestly they are to crave and patiently to expect it of him and this may aptly be collected from the Analogy of the Head and the Members for how like a monster were it and destructive to the whole body if the Arms the Breast or the Feet should assume unto themselves the office of the Head This is abundantly enough demonstrated in those things which not long since we declared to you when we spake of the efficient Cause of Laws viz. That the principal Act of Jurisdiction cannot be exercised but by him only who is the Head and chief of the whole Commonalty Therefore the Constitution the abrogation and any Immutation of Laws whatsoever which are all of them the principal Acts of the chiefest Jurisdiction cannot pertain unto the people unless where the people are Prince as in a State Democratical but to him only who doth exercise a Soveraignty of Dominion over the whole Commonalty in a State Monarchical and who hath the undoubted power of a transcendent Command by himself In a businesse of so great an importance the duties of the people are these

sincerely and openly but with all due reverence to present their just grievances to their Prince and faithfully to lay before him with what present remedies they may cure those evils that oppress them and humbly to beseech him that he would be pleased to condescend to the petions of his Subjects as he shall judge it to be most safe and advantagious to the Commonwealth and confirm the grant of them with his Royal hand And if he being thus petitioned to shall refuse they are to desist for that time from their purposes and to be content with their present affairs and Laws and that without all murmuring or the least sign of force until their Prince being throughly perswaded by his Council and Intreaties of some friends or induced by the arguments of Reasons shall renounce that pertinaciousnesse of his Spirit and give an open Ear to the desires of his Subjects XV. The Fifth Doubt Seeing that the Common good is not only the End of the Laws but of the whole politick Government Is it lawful out of any foresight or pretence of the Common good to change the present form of Government or to attempt the change thereof and how far and to whom is it lawful For Examples sake Is it lawful for the people to change a Monarchical Government into an Aristocratical or into a Democratical or on the contrary A Question of great difficulty concernment especially in these times manners in which we live For my part I will faithfully represent unto you what I think of it and will leave unto every man the liberty to think what he pleaseth I suppose only what is already granted by many and what cannot easily be denye dviz that a Monarchy by Inheritance or a successive Kingdom is absolutely the best amongst all the forms of Common-wealth and highly to be preferred above the other two This being granted I think in the first place that the people if they please may change a Democratical into an Aristocratical or into an Monarchical Government First because it seemeth to be a change for the better moreover in Democracy the chief Command is in the Power of the people so that they may determine of themselves as they themselves please provided that no Injury be done to any man Now it is most certain that by this Change no Injury is done by the people unto any one It cannot be to any other for no Injury can be done to any man in any thing to which he hath no Right neither can any Injury be done herein to themselves who of their own accord do make this Change for no Injury can be ever done to a willing Person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I think in the second place that for all these reasons the Peers of a Land also may turn their Aristocratical Government Arist 5. into a Monarchical one For it is a change into the better Ethic. 〈◊〉 and by so doing no injury is done to any man But I cannot so easily resolve you this doubt whether it be as lawful for them to convert an Aristocracy into a Democracy for although they have power to do it and it may be done by them without any injury yet it seems not to be a Commutation into a better State Thirdly I believe that the Monarchy of an elective Kingdom may be changed peradventure into any form of Government but especially into an hereditary and a successive Kingdom and that for almost the same Reasons above alleged nevertheless this ought not to be done unlesse the Kingdom by the death of him that last Reigned be vacant for otherwise it would be an injury to the present King And Secondly it ought not to be done unlesse by the joynt consent of the Peers of the Kingdom and People and of those persons who have the right of electing I think fourthly that a Monarchy by inheritance cannot lawfully be changed into an Elective Kingdom or into any other form of Government either by the people alone or by the joynt consent of People Peers and King which is the whole people in their greatest latitude unlesse peradventure there shall be such a defect in the Royal Progeny that there is not one of them remaining to challenge the Kingdom due by inheritance to him The Reasons of this opinion are First Because according to our former supposition it were a change from a better to a worse Secondly Because by reason of that exchange an apparent injury would be done to the lawful Heir Thirdly Because that not only the Exchange but because such a desire and indeavour doth seem to be quite contrary to the words of Salomon Prov. 24. 21. My Son fear God and the King and have nothing to do with them who affect new things What before I said I must in this place again repeat viz. I do not urge this as too confidently to affirm it or to cause a disputation with any man in the proof of this particular if he be of another judgment XVI The sixth doubt How may that be understood which so commonly is spoken Salus p●puli est suprema Lex The safety of the People is the supreme Law The reason of the doubt doth proceed from that which we propounded and proved in the beginning viz. That the End of Laws is the publick good From hence on one side it seems to follow that the safety of the Common-wealth doth depend on the strict observance of the Laws and on the other side that all observancy of the Laws ought to give place to the safety of the Commonwealth And from hence some who within these few years have brought a new Divinity and a new policy into the Church and Common-wealth have no lesse confidently than perversely collected and suggested that the Liberty which they call the Right of the Subjects for so they interpret the Safety of the People is to be preferred above the prerogatives of Kings or the enacting or establishing of Laws and therefore all Regal Power and Authority of the Laws is to stoop unto it For the resolution of this doubt you are to know that all the deceit almost on this vulgar Axiom doth arise from the Equivocation which lyeth hid in the Terms especially in that word People For the people being a kind of a Metaphorical Body may be taken two wayes as the word Body may it self Collectively as it signifies the whole Commonalty of the Republick that is both King and Subjects and Discretively as it signifies the Subjects precisely by themselves and severed from the King As when we say the King and the people So in the word Body sometimes the other Members are to be understood with the Head as when we say the Soul and the Body And sometimes the Members only are precisely to be understood the Head to be taken by its self as when we say the Head and the Body XVII First therefore I say that most precisely and by a very evil Counsel that is wrested

Christ The Scripture therefore as supernaturally it is to be believed is the only and Adaequate Rule of our faith and according to our actions and performances so far as they are spiritual and pertain to a spiritual end it is to be the only and Adaequate Rule of our Manners and by consequent the principal and as I may so speak it the Architectonical Rule of all our actions But seeing it doth belong to Conscience to look back on things that are done not only upon this account as they are spiritual that is to say whether they are done out of Charity and directed to a supernatural end but as they are moral that is whether they be good or evil lawfull or unlawful free or necessary that a right judgment may be passed on these things we are not only to seek unto the holy Scriptures but to make our seasonable addresses unto other helps XVI In the third place this is proved again by the Form the Character and the Temperature of the Scripture which seeing it containeth in it very many precepts but not all of one kind some of them pertayning to Manners some to Rites and some indifferently common unto all and some peculiar only to some Nation and some again to some one order or person Some of them induring only for a time and others of a perpetual obligation some by way of Counsel of things expedient according as the exigence of the affairs requireth and some again in the way of mandate or command of things simply or absolutely necessary in themselves if there were not some other rule besides the Scriptures for the discerning of moral from ritual precepts and of things temporary from perpetual and of things peculiar from common the Conscience would oftentimes labour in a Labyrinth of doubts and know not which way to turn especially when precepts of diverse kinds being delivered as it were in one the same breath in the same Phrase and in continued connexion of words do immediately follow and tread on the heels of one another For examples sake Levit. 19. 18. An example is there given to love thy neigbour as thy self And in the verse immediately following there is a command that two Beasts of a several kind might not be suffered to mingle in generation with one another and that one Field be not sowen with diverse sorts of seeds nor any garment made of Linnen thread interwoven with Woollen The first command herein is moral and universal the other but Ceremonial and judicial and peculiar only to the Nation of the Jews But when these things are read in the Churches it cannot by the Text appear what so great a difference there is betwixt them And in the 30th verse of the same Chapter the Sanctification of the Sabbath the reverence of the Sanctuary are equally commanded and in a continued course of words and even in the very same solemn sanction of the Law given Ego Jehovah I the Jehovah yet I doubt not but that most men are of opinion that in one of the Precepts the Consciences of men are at this day obliged to the performance of it and that in the other they are not Now what the reason is that their opinion is such the precepts in the Text being all alike and no distinction nor the least apparence of so great a difference there can certainly no other reason be given but that it proceedeth from the judgment of reason and prudence which being excluded obligatory precepts cannot so be known from those which are not obligatory but that the Conscience will be oftentimes in a suspence and not able to know or judge what is commanded to be done or what to be left undone XVII It is proved in the fourth place by an argument drawn from the inconvenicies which do arise from the contrary opinion that is from the most grievous calamities which have a long time afflicted the church of Christ by reason of the misunderstanding of the perfection of the holy Scriptures from whence a most dangerous error hath possessed some men of great estimation that they have declared that nothing can be lawfuly done or commanded which is not authorized by God in the Scripture or at least there approved by some laudable example This foundation being once laid not a few men of a hot spirit being transported to judge charitably of them with a zeale to God but not according to knowledge did begin to raise unnecessary strifes and disputation concerning the Ceremonies of the Church they did declare that all Ceremonies not expressly mentioned in the word of God were to be thrust out and for ever to be banished from the Church of Christ that Laws ordained by men concerning things Indifferent were to be cancelled that all the Churches throughout Europe were to be reformed all things to be reduced to the Evangelical purity and Simplicity The unruly rage of these men did hete for a while make a stand but it did not stand here long but as commonly it commeth to passe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one absurdity being granted a thousand will insue their boldnesse derived from his fountain did flow at last into an open rage and brake forth into an Anabaptistical fury And although the growing mischief hath gon so far that it can scarce rise higher yet every day it swels and more and more doth inlarge it self by bringing into the world new monsters of opinions that were we not assured by the word of God that the foundation of God doth continue firm and that the Gates of Hell shall never be able to prevail altogether against the Church it were much to be feared lest the universal Church of Christ overwhelmed with a Deluge of Atheism should utterly be swallowed up by it throughout the world XVIII And let no man think that in vain Rhetorick I do complain of this with more enuy than truth for I am most confident that he whosoever he is that is strongly prepossessed and infected with this errour shall never be able in his daily controversies any ways to satisfie the importunate arguments of the Anabaptists Socinians and other Sectaries whose names I am ashamed to mention For to passe by the established form of Ecclesiastical Government which now adays our Political Divines would either referr to the Civil Magistrate or quite take them away upon no other account but this only that they think it is no where expressed in the word of God they must take away with it the observation of the Lords day the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel the Baptism of Infants the Sprinkling of water in Baptism for the dipping of the whole body the Sacramental reverence and many other things with all Ecclesiastical Rites and Laws or else having reformed their judgements they must confesse they may all of them be retained without or sin or scandal XIX But this you will say is to derogate from the perfection of the Scriptures which all the Divines of the reformed

said to be unjust either as it is unfit or grievous to be born or unlawful to be done In the first Interpretation if it be unjust what by the Law is commanded that is if it be unequitable and not dishonest yet if it be done it is the fault only of him who doth command it He that obeyeth the Command is so far from fault that he should be a great Transgressor if he did not obey it But in the latter sense if any thing what is commanded be unjust that is not only grievous to be born but also shamefull to be done and notwithstanding it is done the Sin lyes heavy on both First on the Magistrate who commanded an unjust thing Secondly on the Subject who acted an unlawful one The sense of the Conclusion is this Wheresoever the Law by its Command doth forbid any thing to be done which is so necessary that it cannot be omitted by the Subject without Sin or wheresoever the Law doth Command any thing to be done which is so unlawful that i● cannot be put in execution without Sin that Law doth not oblige in Conscience IX My first reason is De jura praelec 2. Because as elsewhere I have fully explaned there is no obligation for an unlawful Act. Sect. 13. Secondly because as there also I have expressed the first Obligation doth prejudge the following insomuch that a new obligation contrary to the former cannot be superinduced Now any Law commanding a thing unlawful as homicide Perjury Sacrilege or forbidding a necessary duty as the worship of the true God or the performance of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents c. doth exact that of us which is contrary to our former obligation by the vertue of which divine Precept we were before obliged therefore that humane Law cannot induce any obligation on us The third Reason is Because that no man can at the same time be obliged to Contradictories but if that Law were obligatory it would oblige to the performance of that thing which the Law of God at the same time doth oblige to the not performance of it Now to do and not to do are Contradictories The fourth Reason is deduced from the examples of godly men who have been always so instructed by the principles of their Faith that with a cheerfull spirit they have undertaken and performed the grievous but not dishonest Commands of the Emperours But if any thing though by the authority of Law was required of them which was against Faith or good manners or any ways repugnant to common honesty they openly and couragiously did deny the Command and for the fear of God despised all humane Laws and institutions The Decree being made at Babylon that the concent of musick being heard they all should worship the great golden Image which the most mighty monarch had set up and a most severe punishment threatned to those who should do otherwise the three young men of the Hebrews would not suffer themselves to be obliged by that Law Dan. 3. Because an unlawful thing the worshiping of an Idol was commanded In the Law again of the Persians it being commanded that no man for certain days should make a Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the King of Persians only Daniel did not obey that Law but as his Custom was at his set houres he prayed unto God Dan. 16. And Peter and John being forbidden to speak any more in the Name of Jesus they not only disobeyed the Command but confidently answered Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God judge yee Acts. 4. The Reason indeed was because the things that were forbidden were necessary viz. The worship of the true God and the preaching of the Gospel committed to their Chatge X. The second Conclusion The Law of man prohibiting a thing simply evil as Theft Adultery Sacrilege or commanding a thing good and necessary as the worship of God the discharge of Debts the Honour of Parents doth induce a new obligation in the Conscience My first reason is because the proper Cause being given the necessary effect of it will follow unless it be hindred by some other means But an obligation is so necessary an effect of the Law that some have thought that the very Name of the Law hath received its derivation from it as already I have men●ioned And nothing seems to be here assigned which may hinder the consecution of its effect The second reason is a Minori ad majus from the Less to the Greater By the confession of all men a Law prohibiting a thing otherwise Lawful or commanding a thing otherwise free doth oblige therefore much more prohibiting a thing unlawful or commanding a thing free But something there appears that may be objected to both these reasons viz. Non esse multiplicanda Entia sine necessitate Beings are not to be multipled without necessity For every man by the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the performance of what is necessary and the eschewing of what is unlawful the same obligation doth exclude that which we think to obtain by humane Laws as superfluous as water praeexistent in a full vessel doth hinder the infusion of new moysture And it seemes that two obligations to the same thing can no more be admitted in one Conscience than can two Accidents of the same Species in one Subject To this I answer that it is usu●ly spoken and indeed truly enough Obligationem priorem praejudicare posteriori The former obligation doth prejudice and take place of the posterior which Argument we our selves have even now made use of for the confirmation of the former Conclusion But this Saying hath place only amongst those obligations which are Destructive to one another and whose effects have so great a Contrariety and Repugnancy amongst themselves that one being admitted the other of necessity must be taken away Notwithstanding this doth not hinder but that another and a new obligation may come unto the former provided it be of the same reference and can be consistent with it Neither in this consideration is that of any moment as is alleged of water in a full vessel for the impediment why the full vessel admits of no more liquor doth not consist in the part of the liquor but proceeds from the incapacity of the vessel and the nature of the place which cannot at once receive more bodies And nothing hindreth but there may be many Accidents of the same Species in one and the same Subject provided they be Relative and not Absolute as suppose that Socrates had ten Sons there must be in Socrates ten Paternities for relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of their Terms And we said but even now that the Law did oblige according to the manner of the Term. Therefore seeing that every Law according to the nature of it and as it is a Law is an Inductive to an obligation there will be so