no light unto it but barely suppose the truthe of it Secondly because you limit it in comparison of the like causes before the flood As if there were no Anakims knowne since the flood Of late yeares in the place where I dwell hathe bene taken up the bone of a mans legge broken in the digging of a well the bare bone was measured to be two and twentie inches about in the calfe and the spurre about the heele was founde allso that of a very vast proportion It seemes the whole body lyethe there If King Iames were alive and heard of it it is like enoughe that out of his curious and Scholasticall Spirite wherby he was caryed to the investigation of strange things he woulde give order that the body might be digged up the parts to be kept as monuments of the great proportion and stature of men in former times As touching the stature of men in these dayes what dothe Capteyne Smith write by his owne experience of the Sasque Sahanocts borderers upon Virginia on the Northe He professethe they seemed like Gyants to the Englishe One of their weroâ—nees that came aboord the Englishe the calfe of his legge was 3. quartars of a yard about and the rest of his limbes answearable to that proportion Sure I am the siege of Troy was since the flood and Homer writinge of the stone that Aeneas tooke up to throwe at his enimies calleth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And he was litle acquainted with Noahs flood that sayde Terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos Thirdly in these dayes some are very lowe some very tall of stature in comparison yet the vigour of causes nutritive and augmentative is the same to each So in all likelihood both before the flood and after such difference was founde The Spyes sent by Iosuah to take a viewe of the land of Canaan having seene the Sonnes of Anak seemed in their owne sight but as grassehoppers in comparison unto them Yet the vigour of foode and nourishment was the same to both Farre better reasons might be alleaged if I mistake not of this difference and withall I see no reason to the contrary but that men might be of a great stature in these dayes as in former times and that by course of nature if it pleased God to have it so But I have no edge to enter upon this discourse it is unseasonable and I desire rather to deale with you in matter of Divinitie and especially to encounter you in your Arminian Tenets The question followinge why vegetables of greatest vigour doe not ingrosse the properties of others lesse vigorous is a senseles question For whether you understande it of vegetables in the same kinde or of a diverse kinde it is ridiculous As for example Woulde any sober man enquire after the cause why that vegetable which is of the greatest heate hathe not the propertie of such a vegetable that is of lesse heate Or why that which is vigourous in heate hathe not the propertie of that which is vigorous in colde or in any other disparate qualitie Nay why shoulde any man expect a reason why different kindes of thinges have different qualities Is it not satisfaction sufficient to consider that they are different kindes of things and therfore no merveyle if they have different properties The cause herof derived from the vigour of that which propagates is very unsound For that which propagates and that which is propagated is of the same kinde and consequently of the same propertie And the question proceedes equally as well of the one as of the other If you shoulde aske how it comes to passe that man is not so intelligent a creature as an Angell it were very absurde to say the reason is because the Father of a man was not so intelligent as an Angell and therfore he coulde not propagate a man as intelligent as an Angell least so he shoulde propagate a more intelligent creature then himselfe I say this manner of answeare woulde give little satisfaction For the question was made of man not of this man in particular but of mankind which comprehendes the Father as wel as the Sonne And agayne the Sonne may be more intelligent then the Father though not after the same manner intelligent as the Angells are The followinge question is as litle worthe the proposinge as the former For what hostilitie is to be feared betweene the ayre and the water But you make choyse to instance in the hostilitie betweene the earthe and the water as a matter of dangerous consequence You demaunde the reason why the restles or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth I had thought the earthe had bene fitter to swallowe up water then water to swallowe up earthe For suppose the Sea shoulde overflowe the Land shoulde it therby be sayde to swallowe it up Then belike the bottome of the Sea is swallowed up by the Sea And by the same reason the Element of the Ayre swalloweth up both Sea and Land because it covereth them and the Element of fire in the same sense swalloweth up the Element of the ayre And the heavens swallowe up all the Elements for as much as they doe encompasse them Every Naturalist conceaves that it is not out of any hostilitie that the Element of water is disposed to cover the earth but out of inclination naturall to be above the earthe beinge not so heavy a body as the massie substance of the earth is And we knowe it is withdrawne into certeyne valleys by his power who jussit subsidere valles as the Poet acknowledgethe who was but a mere naturalist that in commodaâ— habitationem animatium that the earthe might become a convenient habitation for such creatures in whose nostrills is the breathe of life of whome the cheife is man made after the likenes and image of his maker and made Lord over his visible creatures The last question is worst of all and all nothinge to the purpose but mere extravagants What sober man would demaund a cause why the heavens doe not dispossesse the elements of their place might you not as wel demaunde why the fire dothe not dispossesse the ayre and then why it dothe not dispossesse the water lastly why it dothe not dispossesse the earthe of her seate which is as much as to say why is not the heaven where the eartheis and the earthe where the havens are wheras every man knowes that the more spacious place is fitter for the more spacious bodies and the higher places more agreable to lighter bodies like as the lowest place is most fitt for the body of the earthe To say that the nature of the heavens hathe not so much as libertie of egresse into neighbour elements is as if you shoulde say that light thinges have not so much as libertie of mooving downewards nor have heavy thinges libertie of moovinge upwardes Yet there are cases extraordinary when a
yea infinite I know not how neyther doe you once goe about to explicate how Secondly you will not have it called motion but a product of motions Had you sayd you wold not have these revolutions called one motion but many there had bene some sense in the speech though litle reason For you professe these revolutions to be successive and no where have you in the least manner signified them to be interrupt or discont nuall And if you take them as continuall why should they not be stiled one motion But this I thinke is not it you insist upon For you dislike the name of motion it selfe you will rather have it called the product of many motions Now here I am at fault in huâ—inge after the meaninge of your invention But yet as Plutarke makes the hounde to discourse in huntinge after an hare thus he went not that way nor that way therefore he came this way so will not I give over but inquire which way the hare runs Now then this your product of motions is to be understood eyther of a product Physicall or of a product Mathematicall and I explicate my selfe as you loue to involve your selfe thus The product of motion Physicall is the forme that is acquired by motion As for example in alteration a quality is produced in augmentation a certeyne measure of quantity in locall motion a new place or a new site Eyther in respect of the whole as it falls out in all direct motions or only in respect of the parts as in all motions Circular which new site is sayd to be new in respect of that which immediately went before Now in this motion of the Heavens in an instant supposed by you there is no such product Physicall for looke what site every part of the Heavens hath immediately before this instant the same it hath still And therfore you call it very significantly I confesse a vigorous permanency which is as much as to say no motion at all Neyther doe I thinke that by the product here spoken of you meane a product Physicall Let us come therefore to consider whether it may be verified of a product Mathematicall that is in the Arithmeticall operation of addition for if two numbers be added togeather it will produce a totall and that totall shall be the product Now here you speake of revolutions infinite which beinge added to greater make a product which you call a vigourous permanency which I professe in my judgement seemes to be delivered with admirable significancy and congruitye For if in teachinge my Schollar Arithmaticque I shall exercise him in addition and bid him write seven Cyphars in a rewe thus 0000000 and then bid him subscribe seven Cyphers under them thus 0000000 and then bid him adde one unto the other and tell me what in the product he will tell me that he finds seven Cyphers still which is as much as just nothinge In like sort suppose the Heavens standinge still immediately before this instant and in this instant to be turned round to the place where it was immediately before this deserves to be called a vigourous permanency that is no motion rather then a motion For to be where a body was immediately before is the definition of rest and not competible unto motion Nay take such an other revolution and adde unto the former this allso beinge rather a vigourous permanency and so no motion rather then motion adde no motion unto no motion and what will the product be but a vigorous parmanency and so in infinitum it shall be a vigorous permanency For no motion added to no motion while you will the product shall still be no motion but a vigourous permanency But I see no reason why you should call this vigorous permanency infinitely swifte And yet I confesse by this supposition of yours the Heavens are made to stand still faster then now they goe or run allbeit they run so incredibly swift in the judgement of some that they had rather set the earth goinge and make the Heavens stand still in a vigorous permanency though in a sense much different from the vigorous permanency you discourse of And this calleth to my remembrance one of Bastards Epigrams which he made of himselfe ridinge on Sarisbury plaine For beinge overtaken by a gentelman well mounted who desired to have his company Bastard Spurs his cutt the Gentleman reines his geldinge yet could Bastard keepe no way with him Whereupon he complains thus What shold I doe that was bestrided so His Horse stood still faster then mine could goe So the Heavens by your supposall stand still faster then now they goe I am not a litle sensible of the construction that some may make of this discourse of mine as namely a greate deale too light and vayne for a Divine especially in a matter of so high a nature as of the essence of God and his eternity I professe I am often striken with feare of transgression in this kinde and have often meditated the relinguishinge of it wholy I take so litle pleasure in these Schole quircks Yet another consideration affrights me more then this and that is lest comming to calculate the Divine attributes by discourse of reason in following the course of my weake understanding this way wherof in this case I am much suspicious I shoulde be founde to shape the attributes of God in such a manner as to attribute that unto God which dothe not become his Majestie or deny that unto him which dothe well become him and thus I may fall upon blasphemy before I am awave I had rather submitt unto the acknowledgement of attributes divine by faithe so farre foorthe as they are revealed unto us in Gods word then curiously inquire into the nature of them by reason quaint Scholasticall argumentation But agayne I consider that it may please God to make use of that illumination as well Philosophicall as Theologicall which he hathe given me to cleere some difficult points concerning the nature of God therby to prevent blasphemies each way And as by his grace I feare to enterteyne any indecent conceyte of the Majestie of God so I trust he will not expose me to have my feares brought upon me but rather by exercise perfect those seedes of knowledge of his Divine nature which have bene sowen in me bothe by the light of nature and by the light of grace and assist me allso even in these discourses and make them meanes to keepe others from being led away into erroneous opinions enormous conceytes concerning his nature and divine attributes And as for the censure of lightnes and want of gravitie passable upon this discourse let the Reader consider we are now upon the By and in consideration of a Monstrous supposition and most ridiculous prosecutions therupon and let him judge how such deserve to be enterteyned Agayne when we medle with an obscure perplexe and intricate manner of discourse if matter of refreshing both of mine owne and
of my Readers Spirits be offered especially in that way of an harshe unpleasing discourse shall I balke it and in the affectation of a Stoicall gravitie decline the quickninge of mine owne and of my Readers senses It was wont to be sayde Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci agayne Ridentem dicere verum quis vetap In a word I am at thy judgement Reader to passe what censure upon me thou pleasest neyther am I unwilling thou shouldst knowe mine infirmities as well as my poore sufficiencyes that knowing me to be fleshe and blood as well as others thou mayst receave nothing herein for the Authors sake but only for the evidence it carryethe with it And that evidence is the worke of God thoughe the manner of caryinge it be the worke of Man Now it is highe time to confider the other member of this sentence followinge which is this So should not the duration of one or of all these revolutions be accoumpted as an instant or portion of time but a kinde of duration indivisibly permanent Nowe I finde no proportion betweene this and the former member thoughe they be coupled together with a particle of similitude So. For if the revolution be as it is supposed by you to be in an instant of time why shoulde not the duration of it also be accoumpted in an instant of time So likewise if you conceave diverse revolutions yea infinite revolutions to be in the same instant of time what reason is there why theyr duration should not be accoumpted allso in the same instant of time Fof if these infinite revolutions you speake of have each of them a severall instant why shoulde not the duration of each be accoumpted in each soverall instant and the aggregate duration of them all be reckoned to be in an aggregation of all the severall instants in each wherof one of the former revolutions is founde Secondly you doe not well to joyne an instant and a portion of time together as termes equipollent because no portion of time is an instant nor is an instant any portion of time more then a point is a part of magnitude For every thinge consistethe of its parts but neyther magnitude consists of points nor points of instants Thirdly much lesse reasen is there why the duration of one or of all these revolutions shoulde be coumpted a kinde of Eternitie First because there is no kinde of eternitie indivisibly permanent such as you here speake of but one and that is the eternitie of God Secondly what an absurd thinge is it to say that the duration of a thinge in an instant of time and no longer is fitter to be called eternitie then an instant of time For the revolution you speake of is but for one instant of time For the justifying wherof I appeale to your owne supposall It were no hard supposall to conceyte that a moover of strengthe and vigour infinite shoulde be able to moove a body in a moment This cannot be meant of any other moment then of time For to moove a body in an instant of eternitie requires not a moover of infinite strengthe the meanest motion of the meanest moover is comprehended as you acknowledge within the instant of eternitie Nay all the revolutions you speake of thoughe successively infinite are upon your supposition in one and the same instant which cannot be understood otherwise then of an instant in time Now is it fitt that the duration of such a motion or motions the beginning and ende wherof are both in a instant of time shoulde be stiled eternitie And how can that be called permanent which bothe beginnes and endes in one and the same instant of time Or how can that motion be coumpted indivisible which hathe parts successively infinite as your selfe professe in the sentence immediately before If these be sober conceytes I never knewe what sobrietie in this kinde meaneth But let us proceede to the next The motion of the eighthe spheare supposed to be such as hathe bene sayde that is motion infinitely swift or not divisible by succession the Sunne moovinge successively as now it doth should have locall coexistence to every starre in the eighthe spheare to every point of the eclipticke circle wherin it mooves at one and the selfe same instant or in every least parcell of time The substance of this hathe reasonable good consequence from the former supposition of a thinge utterly impossible and consequently it is not more impossible then the former Yet by your leave you erre in many a circumstance For first as touching the mayne intention of this sentence the Sunne shall not have locall coexistence with every starre or with any starre in the eighthe spheare how can it there beinge the huge distance of three vast bodies of the Spheares of three planets betwixt the firmament and the orbe of the Sunne But that upon your former supposition he shall coexist in the same line drawne from the North to the Southe I graunt in Astronomicall computation and so by the same computation may be sayde to have locall coexistence with it thoughe not in computation physicall Secondly marke I pray you what libertie of speeche you take unto your selfe For that which even now you called a vigorous permanency in this place you terme it a motion infinitely swift as if you should say the motion is so incredidibly swift that the body indeede stands still and mooves not at all As much as to say such a one talkes so fast that he seemes and that in a vigorous manner to holde his peace And indeede I confesse that sometimes it falleth out that the faster we ride the later we come to our journeys ende as in case by fast ridinge our horse playeth the jade and tyreth under us and we can hardly make him goe I had not thought such anomalies and irregularities could have bene devised in the heavens as namely that a motion swift should become a vigorous rest In my judgement if the motion of such like discourses of yours were converted into a vigorous rest it would give farre better satisfaction Thirdly you will not have this supposed motion to be divisible by succession yet you doe impute unto it succession For but erst you affirmed that it had parts successively infinite Now if it hathe succession how is it possible but that it should be divisible into parts succeeding one another For like as magnitude havinge extension of parts must needes be divisible in respect of its extension so motion fluent as it hath succession of parts so it must needes be divisible in respect of this succession Yet you suppose the contrary like unto the Fryar in Chancer who to shewe his contentednes with a litle professed that he desired but of bread a shiver and of a goose the liver and of a pigge the head but that for him nothing must be dead So you will have the motion you speake of to consist of parts succeeding yet not divisible into
and such cautions are very frequent with you which in this place I take to be moste needelesse Now as time and place were as you sayde shadowes of Gods eternitie and immensitie So the power of the creature is a shadowe of Gods infinite power Yet shadowes we all knowe have proportioÌ„s to the substances shadowed by them but betweene finite and infinite we commonly say there is no proportion 2. God you say is more infinite in every kinde then all the united powers of severall natures though they were for number infinite and each infinitly operative in its owne kinde But let us not lye for God as man doth for man to gratify him True and naturall beauty needeth no painting And Gods perfection needeth no Mountebanke like amplifications to sett him forth The powers of the creatures are not formally in God but eminently that is they are sayd to be in God in as much as he can produce them and they re effects allso As for example though he be not hott yet can he produce heate in greater measure then fier dothe But consider I pray you Can God produce a greater heate then that which is infinite or can he produce a greater number then that which is infinite It is apparent that he cannot not by reason of any defecte of power in God but by reason that a greater then that which is infinite to be produced is a thing utterly impossible You are pleased to take notice of a former observation of yours which was this That thinges by nature most imperfecte doe oftentimes best shadowe divine perfection You have allready intreated of Gods immensity and eternity and therein you have tolde us that no positive entity no numerable parte of this vinverse doth so well represent the immensity and eternity of God as the negation of all thinges which we describe by the name of Nothinge I thinke there never dropt a more vile assertion from the penne of any wise man then this yet you desire here agayne to commende it unto the Reader as some quainte observation But what doe you meane to repeate it under such forme as by calling it somethinge though imperfect Is Nothinge or the negation of all thinges to be accoumpted somethinge though imperfect yet the same observation you will have to have place here allso As if this which we call nothinge were the most fitt to represent Gods immensity by yea and his eternity yea and his infinite power allso How neere drawes this to the making of God to consiste of nullities since you say his naturall properties are best resembled unto nullities well we have heard what that is which best representeth his immensity and eternity now we are to expecte what that is which best represents his infinite power And this after a long deduction you expresse to be the center of the earth which you say is matter of nothing And thus you maintaine a just proportion of discourse concerning Gods attributes for still your witt serveth you to resemble them either to Nothinge or to that which you call matter of just nothinge But herein you proceede by degrees And first you seeme to conceave that this center of the earth is in the language of the Holy Ghoste made to be the foundation of the earth as in that speeche of the Lord to Iob chap. 38. 4. 5 6. Where wast thou when I layed the foundation of the earth and whereupon are the foundations therof fastned who hath layde the corner stone therof And first you commende the phrase as surmounting all poeticall decorum and will have the Majesty therof consiste therin sufficiently testifying that it was uttered by God himselfe Now hertofore you have made poeticall witt to stande in opposition unto Metaphysicall truth But of poeticall de corum especially in this place like enough you have a better opinion For my part I am persuaded the Majesty of Gods speeche consists in the power of the Spirite rather then the Wisdome of the wordes Paule allso spake by the Spirite of God and some have observed greate parts in his very language but see what Castellio a freind to your opinions writes of Bezaas judgement concerning this in the defence of his translations upon the 2. Cor. 11. 6. Paulum sayth he of Beza grandiloquentiâ Platoni vehementia Demostheni Methodo Aristoteli atque Galeno anteponit in quo mihi videtur Pictores imitari qui Christi matrem dum honorare volunt regio vestitu pingunt â—idem tamen ita cogente historia praesepe in quo jaceat Christus infans appingunt nobili sane solaecismo Quid enim mundanis regibus cum praesepibus Mariae gloria est paupertas pictores eam divitiis exornant Sic Pauli gloria gloriatio est Sermonis imperitia But lett the Majesty of the speech passe as nothing pertinent to our present purpose where doe you find the center of the earth to be mentioned or pointed unto in all this doth the corner stone there mentioned signifie so much or by the foundation there expressed muste we necessarily understand the center of the earth The Holy Ghoste seemes rather in this inquisition to have reference to something without the earth that should uphold it or fasten it and withall signifieth that no such supporter can be found Then you proceede to admiration at this that the center shoulde beare up the earth and all thinges theron which center is no body or substance no not so much as a meere Angle or corner nay such as forth with you say is a matter of nothing And so in the issue it comes to this that nothing beares it up which is true in the forme of a negative but not as an affirmative as if there were any power in the center to beare it up And why should we conceave that the center of the earth should beare it up more then the center of a tennis ball beares it up which allso might be the center of all if it lay in the middle of the earth And if any side of the earth were removed from the center to the heavens it would forthwith appeare that the center of the earth beares not up the rest for that which before was the center would now be driven aÌ„ greate deale higher and become the outside of the earth So that the center of the earth will not serve your turne will you then runne to the center of vacuum or of the space imagined to contayne the earth Yet you distinguish not of centrum Physicum and centrum Mathematicum For who doubts but that one side of the earth may be heavier then an other Againe it was woont to be a received Maxime that Terra non gravitat in loco suo and therfore there is no neede of any thing to beare it up For the middle of the world is the naturall place of the earth which when it hath gotten it swayes not nor propendes not nor can be swayed to weighe downewards which indeede were
neither vicious nor virtuous Now where was ever such a disposition to be found Not in man before his fall For hee was created good and holy and inclined onely to delight in that which was truly good and pleasing in the sight of God Some will say then how could he sinne I answer his sinne was the actuating of his naturall indifferency to the doing of any naturall thing As to eate an Apple or not eate it or to eate this or that a thing meerelie indifferent had not God forbidded it and in this case restrayned his libertie which prohibition of Gods he hearkening too much to the tentations of Satan by the ministery of Eve who before had tasted of the forbidden fruit without any dammage discernable and upon her commendation of it inconsiderately transgressed Since the fall of Adam a vitious inclination hath possessed all which even in the regenerate continueth in part though a supernaturall vertuous or religious inclination hath possessed them whereby it comes to passe that both carnall things are pleasing to them as they are flesh and the will of God is pleasing unto them according to the spirit Still the naturall liberty continueth in all to doe any naturall thing whether commanded or forbidden of God For even in the regenerate there is a power to doe any naturall thing though God hath forbidden it and too great a propension to the doing of it and that because God hath forbidden it in respect of the flesh And in the unregenerate a power also to doe any naturall thing which God hath commanded and an affectation to doe it also because God hath commanded it but in the way of hypocrisie to further their owne carnall ends and courses yet have they no religious inclination to honour God How freedome to evill is said by you to spring from the mutability of the creatures freedome I doe not yet understand First what meane you by the creatures freedome Do you meane it of his freedome to good or freedome to evill or such freedome as is neither to good nor evill I thinke your meaning is of the creatures freedom to good Secondly what meane you by the change of this freedome of the creature If you speake of the creatures freedome unto good how is it changed or into what is it changed here is nothing to answer but by saying that his freedome unto good is changed into a freedome unto evill Which if it bee your meaning it was verie absurd to say that his freedome to evill did spring from his change into freedome unto evill For thus the selfe same thing shall bee both before and after it selfe Yet you say not I confesse that this freedome to evill springs from the mutation of the creatures freedome but from the mutability that is from the possibility of change But that is as absurd For change cannot be said to spring from a possibility of change but rather from the agent that changeth Why did you not say plainly it sprang from the will of man disobeying his Creator I see a reason of this First because freedome to evill doth rather goe before disobedience then follow after it Why but then if this state of imperfection came not from the creatures delinquency whence came it The truth is not freedome to doe evill but bondage unto sinn proceeded from the prevarication of the creature against God his Maker And this is a state of great imperfection indeed or rather of great misery as whereby all mankinde are borne children of wrath and such as deserve to be made the generation of Gods curse And are you pleased to mince it thus calling it onely a freedome to doe evill whereas if yet we are onely free to doe evill it must needs follow that wee are free also not to doe it yea and free also to doe good which freedom is now adaies found in none but those whom the Sonne hath freed according to that of our Saviour If the Sonne hath made you free then are you free indeed But let us proceed with you It was I doubt not the will and pleasure of God to make his creatures mutable before they be immutably happy But hence it followeth not that this mutability was necessarily prerequired For how can that be said to bee necessarily which depended meerely upon the free will and pleasure of God without specification of so much as a congruous end intended by God upon supposition whereof this mutability of the creature might be said to be necessarily pre-required before their happinesse Now what kinne this is to the immutability of God or to the reconciling thereof to his freedome let the Reader judge As also of the sobriety of that which followeth God in that he is absolutely perfect is essentially immutable essentially free and immutably happy because infinitely good Then followes the order of immutability and freedome that the ground of this this the perfection of that Yet many creatures are free without any such growne as immutability and where the one is wanting the other cannot be the perfection thereof And if we speake of immutabilitie in respect of second causes is it not in the power of God to make the heavens the Sunne Moone and Starres immutabl◠which notwithstanding should not be any free agents And undoubtedly the immutability of Gods will rather supposeth the freedome thereof then is presupposed by it But these are matters of no great moment that which followeth is of more though you doe but touche and away like the dogge at the River Nilus who feares the Crocodile and it may be herein you feare some bug-beare also Freedome it selfe you say were no absolute perfection unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse Gods freedom then you will have wedded unto goodnesse In what sence is this delivered I am of opinion that whatsoever God doth it is impossible it should be otherwise then good For it is impossible that God should transgresse As who hath no superior to give lawes to him but rather his will gives lawes to all yet in giving lawes to others he gives none to himselfe And if his will were a law unto himselfe it were impossible he should transgresse it in doing ought For as much as whatsoever he doth he doth according to the counsayle of his owne will But you I doubt have some other sence which I will labour to start out if I can You signify his freedome must be wedded to goodnes When a man is wedded to his wife he is restrayned from all others and must keep himselfe only unto her So belike amongst diverse things whereunto Gods power doth extend his freedome must not extend to all but be confined to that which is good As if there were some rules of good and evill prescribed unto God and he were confined to the one and restrayned from the other This is Arminius his language upon which occasion I have bene bold to encounter their 〈◊〉 in two digressions who maintayne that there is a
the sinne of Angels may be sinely phrasified and called an excentrical motion thus in catching after a phrase you obscure the sense of a sentence which when all is well scanned is but this the root of the Angels fall was this that he might commit an irregular motion which might have beene done although the capacity of his desire had not beene infinite that is though he had not affected the greatnesse of the divine Majesty for this I take to be the meaning and yet this meaning is little congruous For this infinite capacity you compare to a sphere too wide and the finite motion you compare to a starre fixed in this sphere and to it you ascribe the irregular motion not to the sphere and that very incongruously too for the finite motion of Angels you speake of was their very sinne but the starre sixed in his sphere is not his irregular motion If ever Divinity and Philosophy have beene frayed out of their wits by any mans discourse it is your discourse that hath done this deed You suppose the sinne of Angels consisted in affecting Majestie infinite whereof you say he was more uncapable then a whirrie of an Arposies saile But how I pray you could such a thing be affected without errour of judgement And was it possible that errour and so Foule an errour of judgement could be in an Angell before his fall Should not so poena be prior culpa Hereupon it is that Scotus maintaines there could be no affecting of any such thing but onely complacentia simplex therein not that he did affect it well knowing it to bee a thing impossible For my part I doe as little like that simplex complacentia he speakes of No wise man in this state of our corruption will please himselfe in conceiting himselfe to be a King much lesse to be a God but reckons of such fancies as most vaine and frivolous let us leave unto Clownes such conceits O if I were a King I would live like a Lord I would eate fat beese and glorry porridge and have a whip should cry slash Dic mihi si sieres tu Leo qualis eris And what devise you should move all the rest of the mutineers to concurre with him in so unreasonable an affectation Doe you thinke the chiefe called in Scripture the Devill did sinne in one thing to wit in affecting majestie insinite and the rest called his Angels in another thing to wit in standing with him and standing for him I should rather thinke their sin was one and the same And I make no doubt but their sinne was pride Sure I am they were not subject to concupiscence of the flesh or concupiscence of the eye but to pride spirits may bee subject as well as men But wherein this pride manifested it selfe that is a great mystery but if they did affect divine Majestie I should thinke it was in a way whereby they were capable of it and this is now revealed to be by hypostatizing And there is no question but that God could hypostatize an Angell and as many as he would as well as man But I doe not say that they did affect it I have no ground to conceive that any such thing entred into their thoughts But as God tooke a course to put Adam and Eve to the triall of their obedience so it is very likely God had a course to put the Angels to the trial of their obedience which became a scandall to many of them through pride and disdaine to be in subjection not that they disdained to be in subjection unto God but more likely to some inferiour nature which was to be advanced to the throne of God For as God made this visible world for the service of man so God might withal reveale unto them what his purpose was namely to advance the nature of man unto his owne throne so that all the Angels of God must worship him Thâ—s I say might bee the rocke of offence to them of any more fit then this I cannot conceive As touching the roofe of mans unconstancy you are nothing so curious as about the Angels But that curiosity of yours tended not to the discovering of any depth of truth but meerly to the involving of a plaine truth by most wilde expressions The bitter fruit of Adams prevarication we all feele in a generall impotency unto that which is truly good or to resist temptation unto sinne in a gracious manner But yet I see no reason but a man may resist many a temptation without grace but not in a gracious manner For what thinke you is it necessary that as often as the Devill tempts a man to incontinency to murther to theft he should as often yeeld to the committing of any of these It is apparent that many naturall considerations may restraine us but in a gracious manner that is in such a manner as is acceptable unto God no man can resist any temptation unto sinne without grace That maxime Mora facilius moventur hath no proportion in the case whereto you apply it for it proceeds of the same individuals such as Adam and his children are not yet by Adams yeelding unto sinne through Satans temptation all his posterity are made more prone to sinne then any man in particular is made by the committing of any sinfull act For a sinfull or vicious act in ordinary course hath no more power to habituate a mans inclination unto evill then a vertuous action hath unto good but farre greater is mans pronenesse unto sinne since and through the fall of Adam then by any vertuous action is our pronenesse unto good Touching your close I say to seeke our owne welfare with anothers harme is not to seeke that which is good and right yet in some cases another mans harme may be sought without any transgression For undoubtedly the Iudge sinneth not in pronouncing the just sentence of condemnation upon a malefactor no nor the Israelites neither in robbing the Aegyptians nor Abraham in going about to cut the throat of his owne innocent childe Isaac 6. In the next place you discourse of the improvement of the force of temptations which you say is wrought by inequality partly of our naturall propensions partly of the meanes which minister their severall contentments or annoyances Herein you propose a distinction but I doe not finde you very carefull to follow it and make it appeare how you accommodate your selfe thereto Great meanes of annoyances are apt to breed great feares and feare is a strong passion hindering the course of reason and of morall duty according unto reason Peters confession of Christ at the very time when and in the place where Christ was in his enemies hands that sought his death might have hazarded his life and the consideration hereof being suddenly put unto it either to confesse him or deny him surprized him with feare this feare exposed him to deny his master Sir Gervas Elvas moved to give way to the poysoning of Sir Thomas
Overbury saw manifestly that his refusall would have beene an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower which he had bought with a great summe of money This temptation prevailed with him wee commonly say The greater is the temptation the lesse is the sin So where small meanes of contentments are the greater is the temptation to discontent and to tast of the bitter fruits thereof But I doe not finde that the particular instances following doe any way savour of this member of your distinction You seeme to keepe your selfe wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of naturall propensions yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit Wit is a naturall faculty I confesse I never heard it called a naturall propension till now But as for wealth it is neither propension nor faculty naturall nor at all naturall It is true I confesse that some mens wealth gets the start of wit as he observed that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors When I behold your wealth I wonder at your wit againe when I behold your wit I wonder at your wealth I confesse willingly that to abound in wealth is to abound in temptations unto sinne that fulnesse of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodome that when Jeshurun waxed fat he spurned with the heele But the temptations herehence arising prevaile onely on them that want wit is an observation I have not beene acquainted with before neither am prone to beleeve it I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians or of Xerxes who as I remember it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure nor to Heliogabalus among the Romane Emperours Nero was luxurious enough I never heard it proceeded from want of wit for the first quinquennium of his reigne hee manifested himselfe to bee no foole Hercules servivit Omphale was it for want of wit That the Merchants sonne of whom it is reported that in one night at Venice he spent sive hundred pounds upon his five senses had his honesty beene answerable to his wit he had kept his reputation with the best And the Gentleman of the house of the Vaineys that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turke I never heard defamed for want of wit Yet we commonly say many men have good wits but they are in fooles keeping And indeed a foole in Solomons computation doth usually stand for a knave And it is most true that such are most unwise as appeares by the issue for by such courses they shorten their dayes and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves there to grow greene before their heads bee gray and after they are gone their remembrance rots and they leave a very ill savour behinde them But I should thinke that dull fellowes are neither so inventious of mad courses nor of so active spirits to prosecute them as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding I grant men of great wits have not alwaies revenues answerable But I should thinke it is their pride rather then their wit that instigates them to injurious courses For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labour to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their mindes this must needs expose them to lewd courses Yet a good wit I confesse to maintaine a bad cause may animate some more to molest and vexe and it is not the greatnes of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses Though mens bodies overgrow their soules yet if they have not a spirit answerable they will prove but lubbers though great lubbers as great as Gog-Magog whom Corineus met withall at Dover when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsie turvie over and over And it is a common saying that a short man needs not a stoole to give a great lubber a box in the eare though he that is weake had neede to be witty yet it is not alwaies true or for the most part that weake persons are wily and where wilinesse is found it is a temptation strong enough without weaknesse to move men to practise unlawfull policy where grace is wanting But to say that wilinesse shelters it selfe with craft is as much as to say it shelters it selfe with it selfe and if the distinction be put betweene the disposition of wilinesse that is within and wily crafty courses without well something else to wit mens private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltred hereby yet wilines cannot For like as wisdome is not sheltered but rather discovered laid open by wise courses folly by foolish courses so also wilines craftines by wily and crafty courses I see no reason to justifie that saying men love their wits more strongly when they perceive them set upon that which in it selfe is good And I give a reason for my negation though you give none for your affirmation for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite the more strongly doth the appetite affect it and the more convenient things are unto us the more wee love our selves for affecting them Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite then objects temperate and avaritious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person then courses of liberality and generally to all men in the state of corruption the pleasures of sinne are more gratefull then the pleasure of righteous courses Nay a man regenerate may for good reason seeme not to be so strongly caried in his affections unto good as the wicked are in their affections unto evill my reason is because in the regenerate there dwels a flesh lusting against the spirit which remits and qualifies the fervour of his affection unto good whereas on the contrary in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh to remit or qualifie the fervour or fury rather of their affection unto evill especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them Againe to doe good to the poore is not good in it selfe as you suppose we were wont to say in the Vniversity that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias and as I remember it was a saying of Bernard that vaine-glory clotheth the poore as well as charity And how can that bee a good will to the poore that practiseth to coosen others for the gratifying of the poore â—o may hee be said to beare a good will to Paul that robbeth Peter to pay Paul yet that which hee will leth is good to Paul I confesse but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfie Paul it may well proceed from other intentions No man is bound in conscience to hinder any mans welfare or his owne either no
exhortations whereunto some yeeld and some resist And I pray who deserves to be accounted the author of my faith the author of my repentance he that exhorteth me hereunto or rather I my selfe that doe beleeve and doe repent though upon anothers exhortations For exhortation may thus farre bee performed by a reprobate for such plead at the day of judgement Have we not prophesied in thy name and S. Paul observed that some preached Christ not chastly but upon pretence and that with foule intentions even to adde affliction to Pauls bonds yet howsoever he rejoyced in this that Christ was preached which hee would never have done if by their preaching none were likely to be brought over to Christ by faith and repentance Againe to inspire them with good desires and with conformity to Gods will this is no other in your language then to exhort them hereunto And thus it is that God workes in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure Now this speech bewrayeth you as much as ever Peters speech bewrayed him but with this difference Peters speech bewrayed him to be a follower of Christ but your speech bewrayeth you to be a follower of Pelagius and as like him as if you were spit out of his mouth for thus did Pelagius discourse Operatur Deus in nobis velle quod bonum est velle quod sanctum est dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos futurae gloriae magnitudine premiorum pollicitatione succendit dum revelatione sapientiae in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitat voluntatem dum nobis suadet omnem quod bonum est Now see to what acknowledgement of grace Austin putteth him if so be he will be a true Christian. Nos eam gratiam volumus isti aliquando fateantur qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur verumetiam creditur speratnr nec solum reveletur sapientia verumetiam amatur nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est verumetiam persuadetur Hanc debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri si vult non modâ— videri sed esse Christianus Now what followeth upon this your doctrine touching the nature of election namely that it must bee upon the foresight of mens obedience to Gods exhortations and perswasions which here you call placid inspirations Now because God exhorts us to faith repentance and all manner of good workes the foresight of our obedience hereunto must bee it whereupon our election must depend and so you are ready to shake hands with the Apostle not of fellowship but to bid him adieu as who plainly professeth that Election is not of workes but of God that calleth us and he proves it by this that before they had done either good or evill Iacob was elected and Esau reprobated which must exclude not only the pre-existence of works but the pre-consideration of them otherwise hee could not therehence conclude that election is not of workes and the circumstance of not being as yet borne doth evidently exclude as well faith as good workes For a man unborne is as unable to beleeve as to performe any other worke And notwithstanding this foule injury you offer unto God in robbing him so shamefully of the glory of his grace and absolute prerogative to dispose of his creatures as he thinkes good in making whom he will vessels of mercy and whom hee will vessels of wrath yet you thinke to pacifie him with an hungry base and meere verball amplification of the streames of his goodnesse the issue whereof is to injurie him afresh in like manner by robbing him and adorning man with the spoiles of his glory For increase of joy and happinesse shall be you say unto a man from the streames of life proceeding from God as a fountaine of life provided that man gives free passage to their current And what is this current but Gods spirations formerly mentioned whereby he exhorts us to profit by the examples of his judgements on others and also to patience when we are injuried by others Now if we doe yeâ—ld to this and doe profit by the consideration of Gods judgements upon others and doe patiently beare the wrongs that are done us by others then increase of joy and happinesse shall be unto us from the fountaine of goodnesse who as he hath some streames of life whereby hee exhorts us unto that which is good so he hath other streames of life and happinesse wherewith he rewards us for our obedience so that whatsoever shew you make of honouring God the issue is to bestow all the honour upon the obedience of man So that the amends you make herein for former injuries is as if a man having given his neighbour a box in the eare should make shew of making him amends by kinde stroaking of him and in stead of stroaking him give him another box in the eare Thus Ioab tooke Amaza by the beard as though hee would have kissed him but indeed stabd him to the heart You are willing to make God the author of glory but by no means can you be brought to acknowledge him the author but onely the orator of grace like to the Panims who were wont to say Det vitam det opes animum mihi ipse parabo You are given so much to painting that it is a hard matter to discerne the native countenance of your discourse the proper face of your meaning What meane you by the current of life Is it a gracious current or a glorious current if gracious that is the same with spirations before spoken of and these are exhortations and perswasions But how I pray doâ— these when they are refused by some the more overflow to others They that heare the same Sermon have never a whit the more for others resisting it they that heare it not have no part of it though all resist it As for the currrent of glory how hath any man the more for that others are wholly deprived of it yet it is true that even the reprobation and damnation of some tends to the increase of glory to the elect in contemplation of the mercy of God towards them in comparison of others and of the sorrowes from which God hath freed them as both the Apostle signifies Rom. 9. 22. And is maintained both by Didacus Alvares and Alphonsus Mendosa But I doe not finde you have any such meaning But when you have taken up a metaphor by the end you play upon it and make as good musicke with it as pigges doe in playing upon Organs What are the miseries which wicked spirits suffer are unknowne to us we reade that they beleeve and tremble Iam. 2. that they are kept in chaines to the judgement of the great day They aske our Saviour whether he be come to torment them before their time they pray him not to send them into the deepe And therefore a man may very well be ignorant of any good which their miseries work upon us seeing that
or angles in the circle but farre more eminently Vpon this I looke for an enumeration of the conditions and properties of a measure and the application of them unto God and particularly that that a measure must be that which is better knowne then the thing measured And it is of use to bring us acquainted with the things measurable Now God is not better knowne to us then any other thing To himselfe I confesse he is as well knowne as ought els But he hath no neede of any measure whereby he should arise to the knowledge of any thing though in knowing himselfe he knoweth all other things nor lookes out of himselfe to be acquainted with ought But you I perceave are willing to ease your selfe of this burthen you tell us what a measure he is not as when you say the Divine essence is a measure not applyable to measurables for kind or quantity much different according to diversities of parts as who hath no parts but insteede of telling us what measure it is you say that the nature essence quality and quantity of all things are applyed to it in that they have actuall being So that for God to measure all things belike is as much as to say God hath created all things Now if to be created is to be applyed to God then to create is to apply And so Gods creating and application active in order of nature was before theire creation and application passive You say it is impossible the Creator should be fitted to any thing created And is it not I pray alike impossible that the thing created should be fitted to the Creator Yet before you sayd that God is a measure not applyed to things created but wherunto things created are applyed in as much as they have theire actuall beings God is immutable and eminently conteyneth all things in his indivisible essence but to say that hee eternally and immutably site all the possible varieties whereof contingency it selfe is capable I doubt will proove non sense in every particular For first contingency is not capable of such variety you speake of The things contingent themselves are various indeede but not the contingency of them Things are very various but the modi rerum are not There are but two modi rerum the one we call contingency the other necessity You may say necessity is capable of variety as well as contingency And indeede there is farre greater variety of agents necessary then of agents voluntary Agayne what is it to fit varieties other then to produce them For if you meant of fitting them after they were produced it is like you would have told us wherunto God doth fit them Thirdly it is absurd in a Philosophers phrase to say God doth produce varieties for variety is no fit object of production it being a relation which indeede results upon the producing of the foundation rather then is produced But suppose you understand it of the things produced in all possible variety Yet this is directly untrue For it is possible for God undoubtedly to produce things in greater variety then he doth Neyther is this production eternally wrought or the things you speake of fitted by God for surely this fitting of varieties as you speake beganne not till the world beganne And what you meane in saying that God doth immutablely fit them I well understand not God I doubt not is immutable but the things he fits are not especially contingency which includes mutability you say God is fitnesse it selfe but eyther you consider not that fitnesse is a word of relation or if you did you were to blame in not telling us in what respect this fitnesse is With greate pompe of words filling up eleven lines you tell us that God fitteth all things better by eternall immutable and incomparable fitnesse then it could be by any other measure fitted And doe you thinke any man doubts whether that fitnesse which is measured by incomparable fitnesse should be better then that which is measured and ordered by any inferiour measure of fitnesse And what is all this if we speake plainly but to say that rewards of obedience and punishment of disobedience are so well fitted as they cannot be amended And this plain and vulgar truth is expressed in termes as obscure as those Paracelsus was wont to discourse in Not only rewards and punishments which are cheifly reserved for another world but every thing in this world we beleive to be so ordered that the wits of men and Angells were not able to mende it But yet whether the infinite wisedom of God might not exceede this the Schoolemen in theire disputation herupon as I remember doe generally deny He is eminently all in as much as he produceth all but you may be pleased to except relations such as contrariety and equality For they are not termini producibiles but such as doe usually result upon position of theire foundation When you say As of his other attributes one truly and really is an other so in respect of man his measure is his judgement c. You seeme to reckon amongst the attributes of God a strange one which you call his measure and this you say is not only the rule wherby he rewards or punisheth but the reward and punishment it selfe Rewarding and punishing are kindes of Gods working Now if we would know by what rule God works the Apostle plainly informes us herin when he sayth God worketh all things according to the counsaile of his owne will Ephes. 1. 11. But when you say that his retribution of rewards and punishments is his measure I pray of what for measure is a terme of respect but you speake in a dialect of your owne making and if we had a dictionary too of your owne making for the opening of your owne dialect perhaps we might understand you better then we doe There is no composition in God such as is betweene the subject and the accident which founds the destinction of abstract and concrete We admit God to be bounty it selfe love it selfe mercy and compassion it selfe but to whom say you only to those who are touched with the sense of theire owne misery or only in solliciting men to repentance As you would faine steale up your Arminian Tenets and cunningly obtrude them upon the faith of a credulous reader of a weake reader We say his mercy and love and bounty cheifly appeares in causing man to be touched with the sense of his owne misery as also in giveing repentance and not only in solliciting thereunto not only in being gracious unto them that repent A greate deale of froth of words you spende in amplifying the goodnesse of God in rewarding our repentance when in the meane time you endeavour to drowne all consideration of Gods goodnesse unto sinners while they lye weltering in theire sins as in theire blood and draw away the minds of your readers from taking notice therof as if humility and repentance were a worke of nature not of
grace a worke of flesh and blood and not of the spirit of God And all the way no touch of faith your discourse savoring of the humour of a naturalist throughout rather then of a Christian. To them that are sanctified he is you say felicity and salvation but what is he to them that are not sanctified belike to them damnation Yet the holy Apostle hath taught us that God hath made Christ to be unto us wisedom righteousnesse sanctification and redemption 1 Cor. 1. 30. And that God is he that justifieth the ungodly Rom. 4. Alas how often hath the best despised his bounty love mercy grace and salvation yet is not he justice indignation and severity unto them but bounty still love still mercy and grace and salvation still and at length overcomes them and bringes them from the power of Satan unto God When for theire wicked covetousnesse he was angry with them and hath smitten them he hid himselfe and was angry yet they went away turned after the way of theire owne heartes Yet after all this He hath seene theire wayes and hath healed them Es. 57. 17. 18. Yea he rules them with a mighty hand and outstretched arme and makes them passe under the rod and brings them under the band of the covenant Ezech. 20. 37. He takes away their stony hearts and gives them an heart of flesh and putteth his owne spirit within them and causeth them to walke in his statuts and keepe his judgements and doe them I am sory to find so litle evidence throughout your discourse that your selfe have neede of this What did the heathens understand by theire Nemesis God or a creature If God surely he is not more powerfull then himselfe If a creature is it strange that the power of a creature should be inferior to the power the Creator VVhen the Apostle sayth God shall be all in all he speakes only of his elect to fill them with the joyes of Heaven and with God himselfe VVill you take boldnesse to apply this presence of God to the very divills and reprobates It is true we looke for the comming of the mighty God who shall be glorified in his Saints even then shall he shew himselfe from Heaven with his mighty Angells in slaming fire rendring vengeance to them that doe not know God as also unto them which obey not the Gospell of the Lord Iesus Christ which shall be punished with everlasting perdition from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power When he shall come to be glorified in his Saints and to be made marveylous in all them that beleive and because his servants testimony towards us was beleived in that day Then shall the Heaven depart away like a scrolle when it is rolled and every mountayne and yle be mooved out of theire place And the Kings of the earth and the greate men and the rich men and the cheife Captaines and the mighty men and every bond man and every free man hide themselves in dennes and among the rockes of the Mountaines and say to the Mountaines and to the rockes fall on us and hide us from the presence of him that sitteth on the throne from the wrath of the Lamb. For the greate day of his wrath is come and who can stande Anno Dom. 1629. Aprilis 30. FINIS The Errata IN the Epistle to the Reader pag 7. lin 24. for pag 1. read page 642. In the Praeface pag 4 lin 30. for which 〈◊〉 with p 6. l. 13. r necessitie contingencie lin 31 for your sweet r. the sweete p 10 l 32 for si antea read sint ea 1. Sect. p. 1. 2. l. 14 for good r. Godâ— p. 20 l. 7. for Salumy r. Salmuth p. 23. lâ— 22. for kight shâ—s r. kickshewes p. 25. l. 25. r. of things that doe appeare l. 29. r. omnis causa est principium omnis causatum est principlarum p. 30. l. 24. r. to be some 12 or 13 inches p. 31. l. 4. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 50. l. 3. r. and as we all confesse l. 32. r. finite or infinite p. 63. l. 17. r. If you say a true being p. 74. l. 18. r. are life and power 2. Sect. p. 92. l. 27. for is not only r. it is not only p. 99. l. 16. for motis r. molis p. 102. l. 29. for most unlike r. most like p 104 l 1. for motis r. molis p. 1 18. l. 21 for quia et r. quia est p. 119. l. 24. for so they are r. so they are p. 123. l. 28. for the paradoxes r. your paradoxes p. 125. l. 2. for diaculetion r. ejaculation p. 126. l. 7. competi r. competeret l. 23. dare r. dari p. 127 l. 8. for returne to r returne from p 128 l. 4. for numerably r numerable l. 5. for notting r. nothing p 130 l 15. for Sincet r Snicet p 131 l. 31 for mutili read iuhtili p 133. l. 30 for properby r properly l 32 for motis r molis p 135. l 29 for persitum rea per situm p 141 l 23 for maxime r matter p 142 l 4 for tertium r tantum pag 143 l 12 for liberall r litterall p 144 l 26 blot out so l 28 they draw it from leaue out it and in the place thereof interline their existence continuance of being from that which did every way exist before them I know not how much lesse how they draw it p 145 l 33 for sect r section l 36 for spere r sphere p 146 l 15 for what such moue r what should move l 21 blot out the first word of the Greeks there and read insteed thereof earum p 147 l 18 for what I ever r what ever p 148 l 15 for cortune r continue p 149 l 8 r entertaine time that wasted p 150 l 9 r some things move more or lesse p 152 l 31 r move any way p 153 l 5 for and shall be r it shall be p 155 l 7 r and the miserablest p. 156 l. 17. for Dorphiry r. Porphiry pag 157. l. 1 r. or of being what it is l. 10. for hactens r. hastens l 16. for Times r. Time is p. 158 l 8. for be not stored r. be not scored p 161. l 3. r. severall branches of time l 9. r. is impossible p 162. l 7. r. is diversified l 8. r. one is sicke l 11. for crosse r crasse p 163. l 11. r then that being p 164. l 3. for even r aevum l 34 r. in that hope p. 169 l 4. r. with out begining l 28. r. but eminently p 172. l 2. r. I know not the l 31. r. diminution in quantitie p 177. l 35. r. to his power p 182. l 9. for forme r. formes p 148. l 13. r. world doth truely p 191. l 9. 10 11. to all things that haue been is and shal be coexistent to all that shal be is most