and effective as the first By first and Second Notions I both understand Terms or Words and the Notions signified by them 27. So much for the Object of Apprehension which is Sense and Notion and for the Grounds of that Object which is Sentiment Now for the Affections of Apprehension if a good one and they are two namely Cleerness and Distinctness 28. Cleerness of Apprehension which is in the Minde the same that Cleerness of Seeing is in the Eye is opposed to Obscurity and Darkness and presupposes Light 29. Light is that which manifests and consequently Intellectual Light is that means whereby the Understanding comes to See and Apprehend its Objects or that which manifests them to it and is either Light of Revelation which is also called Light of Faith or Light of Nature which is also called Light of Reason where Reason is Appropriately taken and most strictly 30. The Light of Revelation is that Discovery or Manifestation God himself is pleased to make of things by his Spirit and is chiefly in the Holy Scriptures The Light of Nature is All other Light whatever but that of Revelation whereby we See and Apprehend things and is that we have by Sense and Discourse 31. Some things there are that may be seen in both Lights in that of Nature and that of Revelation though more cleerly in the latter than in the former as that God is Good and that he is the Maker and Conserver and supreme Director of All things Other things are onely to be seen in the Light of Revelation being of a nature not to be discovered but in and by it as the Mysteries of Christian Religion the Doctrine of the Trinity the Incarnation of God c. 32. The Lights of Faith and Nature of Revelation and Reason though they be not the same yet are not contrary I mean that what is shewn or seen to be true in one Light can never be shewn or seen to be false in the other What is Apprehended by Sense rightly circumstanced and condition'd to be This or to be That or else by Reason rightly acting to be so or so it is never contradicted by Revelation Things are nothing to a man but as they stand in his Analogie for him to believe against his Faculties is to believe a Contradiction If in the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper the Elements first and last are Bread and Wine to Sense and to Reason judging according to Sense I cannot hold my self obliged by any Revelation to believe them Flesh and Blood but in a Notion consistent with the judgment Sense and Reason make of them that is not flesh and blood substantially but sacramentally not flesh and blood really but only by signification Else Truth might be Incongruity Inconsistency Transubstantiation is to me a Mystery I am so far from making truth of it that I cannot make any sense of it I might as well believe that two and two make not four or three and three six as that it is not Bread or Wine which to my Eye my Taste my Touch in a word which being an Object of Sense to all Examinations of my Sense is so What is against Sense is against Knowledge 33. An Object onely to be seen by the Light of Faith may be said to be seen by Reason above Reason by Reason assisted with the Light of Revelation above Reason not so assisted but acting onely by the Aids of Nature but still it is Reason sees in both As I can see an Object with a Tube that with my naked and unarmed Eye I cannot or see in the Sun-light an Object that I cannot by Moon-light but still it is the Eye that sees in both the Organ is the same although the Lights be not It is the same Reason and Understanding the same Faculty that sees in the Light of Revelation as it is that sees by the Light of Nature and the same that Argues and Discourses in the one as by the other 34. The great Designe of God in all the Doctrines and even in the highest and most sublime Mysteries of our Religion is to affect the hearts of men and therefore as 1. He represents and reveals them in first Notions so 2. He also doth it in sensible and comparative ones and usually 3. He representeth one thing by many Notions 1. To make it more Affective and withal 2. to signifie that no one Notion he represents the thing in is adequate and just to it Thus he represents the great Mystery of our Union unto Christ and our Communion with him by that between the Vine and Branches between the Husband and Wife between the Head and Members As also the great work of Conversion that passes upon Men in the change he makes on them from their Darkness into his most marvellous Light He compares it to Generation to Adoption to Creation In fine the New Covenant is not only stiled a Covenant but also a Testament and a Promise All which resembling and comparative expressions may and ought to be employed and used for the apprehending of the things they are designed to signifie and the making of them more affective but neither of them so to be insisted on as if it were adequate or just 35. The Light of Faith and Revelation must not be confounded with that of Reason and Nature I mean we ought not to consider points of mere Revelation in the light of mere natural Reason Spiritual things cannot be discern'd but spiritually and therefore must not be compared but with Spirituals In Points of mere Revelation we ought entirely to confine our selves to the Notions Comparisons Similitudes and Representations God himself hath made of them without pretending to be wise above what is written and to say or understand just how in themselves the things are abstractly from the Dresses Revelation puts them in 36. He that pretends to understand the Mysteries of Christian Religion or any Point of meer Revelation stript of those Notions Resemblances and Comparisons when they be not revealed or discovered but in them as he looketh not on these things in the Light of Faith and Revelation but in that of Reason or Nature so not looking on them in their own Genuine and Proper Light no wonder if he either erre or trifle about them 37. Justly liable to this Reproof I judge them that are not content to think and speak of God the proper Object as well as Author of Revelation in that manner that he speaks of himself who Reveals himself to us men in Analogous and Comparative Notions not in such as adequate and adjust him but such as do proportion and suit with us as if he had an Understanding Will and Affections and did purpose Ends and elected Means to compass them did consult and decree and were touched with the Affections of Joy Grief Love Hatred Anger Revenge c. 38. They that tell us that he is not angry that Revenge is an Imperfection not to be imputed to him and
Imprimatur November 23 1677. Guil. Jane R. P. D. Hen. Episc. Lond. à sacris domest Organum Vetus Novum OR A DISCOURSE OF REASON AND TRUTH WHERE IN The Natural Logick common to Mankinde is briefly and plainly described By RICHARD BURTHOGGE M. D. In a Letter to the most Honoured Andrew Trevill Esq. of Èthe in the County of Cornwal Marc. Ant. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 7. 1. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 LONDON Printed for Sam. Crouch at the Princes Arms a Corner-shop of Popes-head ally in Cornhil 1678. FOR The most Honoured ANDREW TREVILL Esq AT E the in the County of Cornwall SIR THat of making many Books is no End was truly said by the wisest man that ever was Not in this sense only that multitudes of Books begetting in the mindes of those that read them infinite Distractions deprive them of the Benefits they might receive from fewer but in another that there is a Prolifickness in Books that one produces another and this a third and so on without End and consequently that the labour men are at in making them is not onely Useless but Endless You will have reason to believe this second Sense to be as just and true as the first when you consider that I who lately wrote an Apology for the Deity am obliged by the Reflexions made upon it now to write Another to defend it and no question but the Latter may be as obnoxious to Unjust Exceptions as the Former So that if Occasion given be also taken there will never be an End of writing but by what gives End to the Writer However having received an Invitation to adde something to the former Essay I am at last resolved both in justice to my self and to my Book to comply with it and to enter into thoughts of the Causes that not irrationally may be presumed to have had an Influence on the Objectors and into most of the Objections and then to offer to them by way of Obviation such Considerations as it may be will not prove unuseful to Rectifie Mistakes in other Matters as well as in this And the main Causes I intend to touch on not to mention Envy c. are Three Proud Ignorance Ignorant Zeal and Impertinent Reasoning 1. Proud Ignorance consists in a mans presumption of his own Omniscience for the Sciolist is ever most conceited so that he presently and peremptorily condemneth that for Errour which himself hath never learnt for Truth as if there were no growth in Knowledge or that any Humane Understanding were adequate to Verity Whereas Capacities of the largest size are yet but narrow and they that know most do but the better know how little it is they know and how much they are to seek The most the Wisest know is that their own and others Ignorance is the surest Object of Knowledge True Knowledge is not conceited it is humble and aspireth after more If any man think that he knoweth any thing he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know 2. Ignorant Zeal a cause of very general influence into many Mistakes not onely in matters of Religion but also in points of Philosophy what is it but a Horse of high metal without eyes Indeed nothing is more commendable in Religion or administers a better Argument of Sincerity in its Professors than fervency of Zeal but then it must be Zeal according to Knowledge and managed with discretion or else it is but Rage and Fury not Zeal Zeal regulated by the Holy Scriptures that is Zeal according to Knowledge and governed with Wisdom is Fire from the Altar but then Irregular Zeal Zeal without Knowledge Zeal without Wisdom is Wild-fire which as the corruption of the best is worst hath nothing more pernicious than it self to Church or State Zeal without Knowledge may be stiled Blinde Zeal and is that when men are passionately concerned for or against an Opinion and Practice from a strong but groundless and unwarranted perswasion that what they do and what they are for is highly to the honour and glory of God and what they oppose is against it as if they knew abstractly of themselves and by their own discoursings what is for God's Glory or what is otherwise further than it hath pleased God himself in his Word to reveal it That onely is for God's Glory which is grounded on God's Word The Word of God is able to make the Man of God perfect The Corinthians had a Zeal for God but not according to Knowledge and so had the Jews who persecuted and murther'd the Christians but thought they did God good service What manner of men they were who among them call'd themselves the Zealous Josephus hath left on Record Yes the Disciples of Christ in Zeal too they would have Fire from Heaven and cite an Example but our meek and blessed Saviour tells them they knew not the Spirit they were of They took it to be a Spirit of Zeal but He knew it to be a Spirit of Passion A persecuting furious Spirit is none of Christ's it is Antichrist's The Wrath of man worketh not the Righteousness of God Zeal without Wisdom may be call'd Imprudent Zeal and is Zeal unseasonably and unsitly shewn in circumstances of time place and persons that will not bear it as when men shall take their Pearls their Reprehensions Counsels Instructions or whatever other instances a Zeal is shewn in and cast them before the Swine and that though they have a Prospect themselves or an Advertisement from others of the probable ill success both that the Pearls shall betrodden under foot and they themselves be rented This is not to employ and use Zeal but to lose it There is a time for every Purpose and every thing is beautiful onely in that time Pearls so cast are cast away 3. Impertinent Reasoning the third Cause I mention'd and a Cause of all others of most general influence into Errours and Mistakes I call not onely that which of the Logicians is named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a passing and arguing from one thing to another when yet there 's no Agreement no Connexion between them but that also which is bottomed on single Mediums and runs on in a long but simple line and train of Consequences from thing to thing or else is founded but on second Notions and inlaid with them which way of Reasoning must be shewed to be Impertinent and that by shewing a better pertinent one Thus Sir I am arriv'd to what I principally design'd and I crave your pardon if for my Readers satisfaction as well as for mine own I now enlarge and take the boldness to let him understand my apprehensions of Reason both as to its nature and the interest it hath in Religion and how I think it must be circumstanced and condition'd to assure us of Truth By which Performance if I gain no more I shall this that as well the persons that approve my former Essay as those that cavil it will know the Rule
Minde but yet seeming to be in the Object He that looks for Notions in Things looks behinde the Gláss for the Image he sees in it 13. Such Cogitable Beings aÅ› have no foundation no ground in Realities that is in things without the Cogitative Faculties but are mere effects of the Faculties are call'd Chimerical Entities and in the Imagination are Fictions in the Understanding mere Notions as in the former a Golden Tree in the latter a Philosophical Romance or Groundless Hypothesis But such as have Foundation in Realities are called Real Real Notions not that in their own nature they are in Realities themselves but that they have their Grounds in those that are they are real as a School-man would express it not formally but fundamentally they are inchoately and occasionally in the things but not consummately and formally but in the Faculties not in the things but as the things relate to our Faculties that is not in the things as they are Things but as they are Objects 14. Those Words or Propositions any one hath a sence of those things to which the Words or Propositions relate he hath a Notion of Sence is Notion onely it is called Sence as it relates to the Words or Propositions and Notion as it relates to the Things but indeed Sence is Notion and to have the sence of a Word or Proposition is to frame a Notion of it or of the thing signified by it 15. 'T is as impossible to apprehend a Word or Proposition one hath no notion no sence of as to see an Object that maketh no impression of Colour on the Eye for what Colour is to the Eye that Sence Meaning or Notion is to the Minde 16. Sence Meaning or Notion arises from a Congruity in the Object to the Faculty so that to enquire why one cannot understand or apprehend a Non-sensical Proposition or Word is to enquire why he cannot see or hear Tastes or taste and smell Sounds or taste hear and smell Colours or see an Object hath none 17. That Congruity in the Object to the Faculty whereby it either actually moves it or is capable to move it to frame a Notion or Sence ought to be distinguished from that Congruity which is in the Object within it self or with other Objects The former for distinction sake I call a Congruity to the Faculty the latter a Congruity in Things The harmony of Objects to their Faculties and that of them within themselves or one to another are distinct Harmonies I can make sence of a Proposition that is not true so that 't is Congruous to the Faculty it moves that when yet it being false the Parts of it are Incongruous one with another 18. To understand and apprehend a Proposition or Discourse it sufficeth not to have a Perception of the sence and meaning of the words those words as in Conjunction and ty'd together ought to make such an impression on the Minde as moveth it to make a Notion of them in that Relation One may have a sence of the words in a Discourse when yet he cannot make any of the Discourse it self because he cannot frame a Conception a Notion of them in the Composition that is given them in it He cannot see how they are joyn'd 19. There are a thousand Instances of Discourses of this kinde in Jacob Behmen but I need not go so far as Germany to seek some I might have many neerer home within the compass of our own time and observation but I decline them as Invidious I will onely point to one in Dr. Fludd a person that could speak as good Sence if he listed as another but I could never make any of many Passages I finde in him and of one particularly namely that in his Mosaick Philosophy Book 3. sect 1. Chap. 4. 20. Those Discourses in which nor Words nor Propositions are sensible or wherein the Words are sensible but not the Propositions and yet are taken by those that make them for High Sence may be called Enthusiasm Of the former sort I apprehend the Whims of Basilides of Valentinus and the Gnosticks and of the latter those of the Familists and of others of late 21. Enthusiasm either may proceed from a spirit or from Complexion and a certain temper of Minde the former I call Demoniacal the latter Complexional and not unlikely but in most Enthusiasts it comes from both whereof an Upstart Sect among us in its first appearing afforded strong Evinâ—cments 22. That there are Philosophical Enthusiasts is as certain as that there are Theological Enthusiasts in matters of Philosophy as well as Enthusiasts in matters of Divinity Paracelsus Helmont and many other Chymists are Examples of the first sort as H. Nicolls the Father of the Familists and others are of the second Jacob Behmen and Dr. Fludd may pass for Examples of both 23. When Enthusiasts think they understand one another as they All pretend to do and that seriously and therefore must have some impression to justifie that Pretension whereas yet no sober man can understand Any of them I conceive it not to be by Apprehension but Sympathy not Intellectually by Apprehending that is by framing just steady distinct Notions of what is said but Sympathetically by having excited in their minde on such Expressions Motions conformable to theirs that use them for they all being of the same frame and temper of Minde or of Imagination whatever touches One agreeably also moves the Rest as in Unison-Lutes or other Instruments fitly tuned but to strike One is at once to move All. 24. Notions of the Minde are bottomed on Sentiments of Sense so that as Realities are Grounds to Sentiments so Sentiments are Grounds to Notions the impressions of things without upon the Sensories produce or occasion in them the Cogitations which we call Sentiments as Colours Sounds Sapours c. And Sentiments again impressing of the Fancy and so the Minde and Understanding beget or occasion in it those higher Cogitations which we call Notions Apprehensions of Reason or Ideas Idols or Fantoms are in the Fancy Ideas in the Minde 25. The neerer our Sensories are unto the Objects impressing them if not too neer the clearer and distincter is the Sensation made by them as we more cleerly and distinctly see an Object at a neerer than a remoter distance so the nearer the Minde and Understanding is to Sentiments the more cleer distinct and evident its Perceptions are I mean the more sensible Notions are and the neerer to their Grounds the more effective more impressive and consequently clearer and more evident they be 26. Hence Knowledge and Apprehension of things is better both acquired and conveyed by first Notions which are next to Sentiments than by second which are more remote The Knowledge which is had of things by first Notions is more real evident cleer distinct than that which is by the second First Notions are founded immediately on things Second Notions are Notions concerning Notions These are not so impressive
of Assent that readiness and promptness we many times observe in it is oftner an effect of a Passion bribing of the Understanding than of a pure clear impartial Reason 73. Wherefore others of the Antients as well as of the Moderns abundantly convinced of the insufficiency both of Perception clear and distinct and of Assent free and full to ascertain them of Truth and yet unwilling to have Nature so liberal in other matters exposed to the reproach of Deficiency in One so important as intellectual Judgement They have conceited humane understanding furnish'd by her with certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipations that is with Connatural and Ingrafted Notions Principles designedly implanted in the Minde to be a rule to it to direct it Thus in the speculative Understanding they have set up a habit which they call Intelligence in the Practical another which is called Synteresis in both a Constellation of Principles shining with their own Light and imparting it to others that want it not much unlike to what is affirmed of Dionysius in his Celestial Hierarchy concerning Spirits that those of superiour Orders enlighten all beneath them in the inferiour 74. But were there really such a System of Notions and first Principles ingrafted in the Minde by Nature in whose Light all others were to shine and to be seen it would follow that Contemplation of our own mindes acquainting us with the Chain Concatenation and Sorites of the Principles therein and Propositions deducible therefrom would more import to the rendring us Philosophers not to say Divines also than observation of the World and Experience and so the greatest School-men those Metaphysical Alchymists that insisted much on this Method and spun out all their notions of their own Bowels should have been the wisest and most fruitful of men Whereas we know the men and the manner of their Communication all their Discourses are indeed subtle and acute but also empty and barren and no more agreeing with Realities and in our Analogy than Light with Darkness Again the Soul in its state of Union and Conjunction with the Body is so dependent on it in all its Operations that it exercises none without the Aids of it Ratiocination it self it is an Animal act not an abstract Action of the Soul but a Concrete act of the Animal it is the Man reasons And in the ordinary method of Nature we receive into our Mindes no Impressions no Images but what are handed to them by our Senses I am apt to think that person who should never have seen nor heard nor tasted nor smelt nor felt any thing would have his minde as little furnish'd with Idea's or Notions as his Memory with Images and would understand as little as he had sensed Besides those very Principles themselves we call First ones or Anticipations shining with their own lustre and light Propositions which we cannot but assent to assoon as we hear them or minde them It will appear if we reflect warily on what doth pass in our Mindes that even these are not assented to but on the Evidence they bring I mean not assented to naturally but as other Propositions are judicially For instance that the whole is greater than the part we assented not unto it on the first hearing but first considering what was meant by Whole what by Part what by Greater what by Lesser and then having sensibly either by Eye-sight or by Imagination compared one unto the other we evidently saw it to be so that the Notion of Greater even to Sense ever agreed to the whole and that of Less to the Parts The like that Two and Two make Four This is the way we first admitted to belief the Propositions which are called Principles and it is no other than that wherein we admit all others Onely the Propositions which are call'd Anticipations or first Principles are Propositions of so easie sensible and plain an evidence and so obvious that we early admitted them so early that we cannot well remember when we first did so and therefore they are stiled Anticipations or proleptick Notions for being of so early an admission and existence in our Mindes they preceded all our after knowledges whose acquirement we well remember Further Beings are not to be multiplied without Necessity and there is none of faigning such Anticipations and Habits of Principles to direct the Minde in inquisitions after Truth since all acknowledge there are no such principles in the Eye the Ear the Nose the Tongue to direct them and why then in the Minde Besides Reflection on our ordinary reasonings evinces that in them we seldom attend to such Principles but to the Object discoursed of nor need we to do otherwise if it can be evidenced that there is a certain Notion Form Ground of Truth that runs through all things true which Form or Notion of Truth assoon as the Understanding rightly circumstanced and conditioned apprehends in an Object it cannot but acknowledge it to be true as it would another to be white or black wherein it is assured by the Eye rightly circumstanced and conditioned that there is the Form of Whiteness or Blackness As for Anticipations they are too particular and not of a nature so large and comprehensive as to be the Rules and Measures of Truth which is infinite Let those Anticipations be reckoned and then Experiment be made upon comparison with the immense Latitude of Questions and of Truth relating to them 75. Thus I have shewn the Indications Marks and Notions of Truth that in my judgement are not proper adequate or useful it now remaineth that I shew one that is And Truth as it is the Ground Motive and Reason of Assent is objective Harmony or the Harmony Congruity Even-lying Answerableness Consistence Proportion and Coherence of things each with other in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes Truth is universal and exact Agreement or Harmony 76. On the other hand Falsity as the ground motive and reason of Dissent is Objective Disharmony or the disharmony incongruity inequality unanswerableness inconsistence disproportion and incoherence of things in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes Any Disagreement or Disharmony is Falsity 77. Probability or Likelihood of Truth is an appearance of Congruity A thing is probable when it hath some consistence and agreement it Quadrates and lies even with what we do know but in regard there are particulars relating to the same Systemes and Frames of Thoughts which yet we do not know therefore we know not if it will lie even and square with them Improbability is apparent Incongruity 78. That Truth is Harmony and Proportion and consequently that Probability is apparent Harmony apparent Proportion and Falsity Disharmony Disproportion cannot be but very evident to him that shall consult with Nature and common sense 79. In Nature it is plain For Harmony it is the Reason of the World the World was made by it cannot be known but by it The rule of Proportion is