BUT the Highest Gift of all Moral Philosophy must ever be allow'd to be that Prudence which has been so accurately describ'd already and which has certainly a marvellous influence as well upon all Intellectual Habits as for the acquiring of True Wisdom And her inseparable Consort is that Philosophical Temperance we have spoken of before Let no Man hope without these two Virtues ever to attain the knowledg of Things Divine which is the onely Sapience or True Wisdom For as Plato has it in his Phaedo What Pretence can the Impure Man have to the things that are Pure And whereas the Philosopher was there contending as if no Man could obtain pure and sincere Virtue that had not first laid by his Body What shall we say of those who think much to shake off but the very Filth and Vices of their Bodies Men that think a little Industry and obstinate perseverance of the Mind will find out Truth without any necessity of parting with their darling Crimes But whether this be not the voice of a Fool or of a mad Man is not hard to determine VII WHOEVER can be Faulty in this kind appears to me as a Bleer-Ey'd Man whom nothing will content but to be gazing at things distant and to see them both clearly and distinctly He refuses all Remedy for his Eyes but resolves by obstinate and peremptory staring to find out the Mark. Thus he goes on till instead of seeing better he every Day grows more blind Whereas if he consulted the Rules of Prudence and of Temperance he would know both the Necessity and the way of first curing his Sight VIII Is there any Man living has Self-sufficiency enough to Contemplate God the Soul's Immortality and Divine Providence Or to consider of these things solidly and sedately without some sort of Separation or Abstraction of the Soul from the Body That is to say in Plato's Style Without such a Meditation of Death as seems to divorce us from Corporeal Affections Or can any Man without some such Translation be as it were rapt up into that State of Divine Love which can onely fit him for Truth and expound the Oracles and Mysteries of things which are otherwise Inscrutable For by how much all Sensual and Corporeal Impressions are extinguish'd in us by the application of that Prudence and of that Philosophical Temperance we have mention'd by so much do we grow Citizens of that Intellectual World and ascend into the Regions of Heavenly Light Wherefore Sapience or the knowledg of Divine Mysteries is the true Off-spring of that Virtue which is entire absolute and consummated IX As to those Blessings which refer to the Body such as Strength Agility Health and Comliness 'T is true that Strength is not so much the Gift of Virtue as of Nature tho 't is as true that the preservation of it is owing to Virtue Nay 't is not improbable but that a Body in declination of Health may by hardships exercise and some Fatigue become more vigorous and robust For Agility This may not onely be as the Pupil but even the Child of Virtue Since Temperance and Diligence do commonly wear down the bulk and excrescence of the Body and rather furnish a Stock of Spirits than of Flesh In which case Agility must succeed of course X. BUT the most high and conspicuous gift of Virtue is that of Bodily Health which as it may be owing in part to every Virtue so more especially to Temperance and Piety I think it was the Chaldean Oracle did thus pronounce Ad Pietatis Opus vegetum si extenderis Ignem Mentis hos fluxos sanabis corporis Artus Would you the best Physician find For a craz'd Body or afflicted Mind Try what the power of Piety can do It heals the Mind and cures the Body too For a purifi'd Mind goes a great way to the purging and purifying of the Body it darts upon it some Rays which have great effect and which corroborate the powers thereof Whereas if the Soul be taken up by consuming Cares and Cupidities If Hatred and Malice make all things ghastly and sour within How can it be but that the Body must also droop the Health wither and the Force decline If therefore such Dilapidations can arise from the remote impressions of the Mind What will not those more immediate strokes accomplish I mean Eating long and Drinking deep and daily and the insolence of an ungovernable Lust XI THE Diseases of the Body are for the most part from the Vices of the Mind and even the Off-spring of sinful Parents do often inherit their Infirmities as well as their Acres But there is no Remedy so powerful for such an Incumbrance as a severe application to Virtue and Piety For as Justice had a Being before all the Vices of the Mind so was Health more ancient than all the Sicknesses of the Body Thus is one brought in by Maximus Tyrius to pray O Health the most Ancient of all the other Goddesses What wou'd I give to enjoy thee but the little remainder of my days Certainly no Man can better pretend to such a Wish than he who is sincerely Vertuous and Devout XII AND as bodily Health is thus gotten and sustained by Virtue so does Virtue confer Comliness and Decorum to all the Parts For Beauty is but as the Fruit or flower of Health nay 't is very Health it self just as Virtue is the very health and beauty of the Soul For where this presides the inward motion of the Spirits throws joy into the Countenance and such sparkling through the Eyes that the Beholders are drawn into love and admiration by it Even the whole Body when actuated by a beautiful Soul is pleasing in all its Gestures Lib. 10. Sect. 15. Antoninus said That a good Man could not conceal himself if he did but open his Eyes For his Benignity and Probity broke out and reveal'd him to all Beholders XIII ON the contrary we may easily observe the Crisis when a Man is falling from his native Innocence or acquir'd Virtue and is warping towards Vice and Immorality He carries a sort of Traytor in his Countenance who reveals all he is about For tho the shape and colour of his Face may look the same to vulgar Eyes yet a sharper sight will find a fading and declination in all the Finer Parts that which once was fresh and florid is now withering that which sparkled is hardly bright the Air it self of the countenance made up of quick and congruous motions resulting from every part and as it were darting Life is now stupid and irregular Alas those inward Spirits that supported all are sick and their activity is but counterfeit So that as now the whole contrivance of the Meen and Gesture is grown Artificial it will in a short time become also Impudent But this is not the Face of Virtue or the Image of that Moral Beauty we have hitherto set forth XIV FOR we also affirm that those
9. § 12. and that they must needs have a Being inasmuch as they are felt Hence by a sense of Virtue ariseth a wonderful Peace and Tranquillity to the Mind a permanent sweetness and complacency which is never to be repented of It surmounts not only all those Pleasures which conclude with Repeâ—…ance and Bitterness of the Soul but excels all Opinions and Philosophical Speculations whatsoever This certainly upon many other accounts is so besides that main one that in those matters a man may almost ever be doubting But in this which is Passion and not Opinion there can be no room for doubt XIII LAST of all besides this Use of the Passions which is almost common to all of them that they strike or rather ingrave the Soul with a more lively Impression of the Object there is another use of them deserving notice as namely the rating of things that are laudable and just according as we find our Passions excited by them or as they are felt and relished by a sort of Connexion with our Souls For passionate affecting is the moâ—… intimate and immediate Fruit of Life anâ— tho we may adorn the best of things with superficial and imaginary approbation yeâ— our-Souls are not able without such Passionâ— to wed the Object and as it were to intermix it with our Sense and Life Nay we know not how by any other ways to discover the Union there is between our Souls and those Objects unless we have an equal antipathy against things vise and ignoble whether in our selve or others For this is the nature of true Virtue to love the best things and hate the worst even to abhorrence in whomsoever they appear Evil in one man is evil in another and is detestable as being such And it is the most perfect state of Life to love good things and to hate the bad at least to bear them with indignation whenever they are obtruded upon us For this gives testimony that the inferior part of the Soul submits and is overawed by the superior and that the whole man is as it were in the firy Chariot of his Affections Elias-like carried up towards God and Heaven XIV BUT if any man shall under a pretended affectation of Peace Prudence or Tranquillity set up for submitting to any lewd usurpation over the common Rights of Mankind and the eternal Laws of Virtue and yet upon every trivial affront to himself she out and even burn with indignation and wrath this were Hypocrisie in such a degree as not barely to deserve Scorn but Detestation XV. PASSIONS therefore are not only good but singularly needful to the perfecting of human life Yet must they be with these two Conditions First that our Desires steer towards a proper Object which may be called The true Impulse For those who offend herein are the worst of sinners such as are the malicious and those that delight in Blood and Tortures and others of that strain The second Rule is That the Desires be adequate to the Object or the End and that according to the thirteenth Noema the best and greatest things be pursued with our chiefest Passion the middle things with less and the lowest with the least But this also in such sort as never to allow any such violence in the Desire as may either eclipse the Light of Reason or obstruct that end to which Nature aspires by the help of those Affections wherewith she has endowed our Souls So that this Rule we may call A moderate Impulse of the Passions XVI BUT if any man should propose the rooting up of all Desires L. 1. c. 12. § 9. in order to free the Soul from Discord and to end all strife and combustion which the Passions maintain against the Soul or among themselves This to me would sound no better than as if one to prevent Discord on the Harp should let down all the Strings or than as if another should with Drugs set all the Humors of his Body in a Ferment for fear of falling sick Wherefore Theages the Pythagorean said very elegantly That it was not the part of Virtue to discharge the Passions of the Soul such as Pleasure and Pain but to temper them aright He also after this extends himself in that double similitude we have mentioned about a due mixture in the Humors of the Body and a right Harmony in the tuning of the Strings which we need not here repeat XVII BUT what is now to be the Rule and Measure by which the Desires are to be temper'd and rectified the two Conditions afore-mentioned do set forth And to one of these that famous Declaration of the Orator may be referred Quaest Tuscul lib. 4. He therefore says Tully whoever it be that by Constancy and Moderation is of a quiet Mind and at peace with himself who is neither wasted with Troubles or distracted with Fears nor burnt up with Thirst of any inordinate Passion or undoing himself with vain and trivial Delights This is the wise man whom we long to behold And he also is the happy Man to whom nothing can arrive in human Affairs so intolerable as to depress his mind or yet so joyful as to transport him But on the other side when we see a Man inflamed with Lust and mad with Ambition catching at all things with insatiable Avarice and that the more his Wealth pours in or his Pleasures abounded the more ravenous he became This saith Tully is he whom a wise Man would not scruple to pronounce the most unhappy and the most perverted of all Men. CHAP. VII Of Passions properly so called according to their kinds I. FORASMUCH as no Man has in my Opinion more accurately summed up or distinctly defined the several kinds or species of Passions than the renowned Philosopher Des Cartes I will tread for the most part in his Footsteps unless upon great Motives to the contrary But it is not amiss in the first place to lay down a larger Definition of Passions and to apply the same to the kinds thereof which follow II. PASSION then is a vehement Senfation of the Soul which refers especially to the Soul it self and is accompanied with an unwonted motion of the Spirits Here I say Passion is rightly called Sensation since in Passion the Soul is sensible that it suffers and with Vehemence because it vehemently suffers That the Soul it self is said in this Sensation especially to suffer is to distinguish it from other Sensations whether of Odors Sounds and Colors c. which refer to external Objects or of Hunger Thirst and Pain c. which regard our Bodies Next I say that this Sensation is accompanied with the Motion of the Spirits rather than to say that it results therefrom inasmuch as the former evermore happens but this not always or very seldom if you but exclude such Motion as results from Eating Drinking or the Change of Air. For in external Objects which agitate the Sense or Imagination it is the Soul
either things dishonest or even the most honest ones if the Means be dishonorable For nothing of this sort can happen but where Passion and Appetite carry all before them IV. EQUAL Determination is very close of kin to Prudence and is as the sentence given upon Pleadings of Right Ethic. Nicom l. 6. c. 11. For who can better be qualified to determine about what is Right and what is Good than he who is not only above Passion but superior to every Impression and to every Custom how inveterate soever that were but capable to misguide him For what concerns Rectitude of Conjecture 't is plain that since Aristotle makes Moral Vertue nothing else but A fit Habit of pointing or aiming at that just Medium which in acting and in suffering Ethic. Nicom 1. l. 2. c. 9. is to be wish'd for Who but the prudent can rightly calculate that Point For he is Lord of his Passions and his Spirits are so pruged and defecated from the Lee Eudem l. 5. c. 9. as he not only gets Presence of Mind thereby but even a sort of Divination 'T is the same Philosopher notes that Right Conjecture is such an Eruption of the Wit and flies so suddenly to the Mark as there is neither Deliberation or Reason imploy'd therein But where any gross Passions happen to intervene they make a perfect Gulph between the Mind and Truth And therefore this Pitch of Sagacity is not attainable but by the prudent Man 'T is likewise as true of those who are imprudent that for what concerns the Sense of Discrimination they have it not V. THE Philosopher speaking about the Rectitude of Conjecture styles it Sense Inasmuch as whatever Judgment we make Ethic. Nicom l. 2. c. 9. 't is collected from Particulars and from Sense As he asserts in the Case of Anger Grief and the rest The same he also repeats in his Great Morals which before was hinted saying L. 1. c. 2. § 9. That if you have not within your self a Sense and Feeling of these Matters all your Labor after them is but in vain Iamblici protrept c. 2. This the Pythagorea◠also called quick and perfect Sensation saying There was a sort of Feeling in our practical Intellect by which it came to pass that we were neither deceived in the sense of what we suffered nor impos'd on by ill reasoning in what we were to act Thus therefore by subjecting of our Passions and the purifying of our Bodies and Souls there springs up to us as it were a new Sensibility in the Mind or Spirit which is only the Portion of the prudent Man For in the Power thereof he finds out and ascertains that Golden Mean which we have hitherto so recommended That which in every Action is so valuable and whereof the indiscreet or the impure Man can never have any Feeling VI. LASTLY the limiting and defining of Right Reason is every where left by Aristotle to the prudent Man's Determination For whenever the Question is started by him what this Right Reason should be he ever refers it thus Prout vir prudens definiverit 'T is even what a prudent Man shall judge fit And surely this is not said in vain if but applied to the Man we speak of For how can there be Right Reason at all if not found within the reach of that Prudence which already we have defin'd And therefore if neither the Pythagoreans the Platonists or Aristotle himself have taken much care in the defining of Right Reason 't is because they finally referr'd it to the Arbitrement of this our Rectified and Prudent Man For they all presum'd that the Mind of Man when effectually purg'd from the Stains of Prejudice and Passion did as naturally discern of things which were just and true as an unblemish'd Eye does rightfully distinguish of Colors So that Aristotle was well advised in pronouncing Right Reason to be that which was conformable to Prudence Ethic. Eudem l. 5. c. 13. taking Prudence in that Latitude we have already set forth VII FROM all that is now said two things deserve Observation First how haughtily and yet very impertinently do some Men carry it who while they are destitute of all Capacity to judge as being unacquainted with this Moral Prudence yet are they so far from subscribing to what the wise and prudent Men of all Ages and of every Nation have established for true and just that they impudently contend there is nothing in its own Nature is either the one or the other nothing right and nothing wrong But surely this is not less absurd than if a blind Man should deny all distinction of Colors when he ought rather to enquire before all other things what were good for his Eyes VIII NEXT we may note that Prudence is not any particular Science of external things but rather somewhat above all Science 'T is a Skill or Sagacity in the Soul whereby she steers so clear from those Rocks which corporeal Passions and Impressions throw commonly in the way as never to fail of making a true and substantial Judgment in all things And this is the Gift and Excellency which is peculiar unto Prudence and which attends her in all her ways But as to the knowledge and sense of things all this and what appertains thereto we derive it from other Fountains as either from Experience or Natural Philosophy or from Skill in War or in the Laws and the like And hereunto Aristotle somewhere refers in saying Ethic. Eudem l. 5. c. 5. Ad Nicom l. 6. c. 5. That the prudent Man had not regard to this or that particular thing but to those which in a more general way appertain'd to the Good of Life So that Prudence is a sort of general Perfection of the rational part of the Soul even as Sincerity is of the Appetitive which from the Pythagorean Fragments we had noted before CHAP. III. Of the other two Primitive Virtues Sincerity and Patience I. SINCERITY is a Virtue of the Soul by which the Will is intirely and sincerely carried on to that which the Mind judgeth to be absolutely and simply the best When I say intirely and sincerely I mean perfectly and adequately For what is done perfectly is according to Antoninus done with the whole Soul Lib. 12. § 29. as well in acting justly as in speaking of truth And the Meaning of Adequate is that no By-consideration whether of Profit or of Fame must ever incline us For the Soul ought so to be temper'd and inflam'd to that which is simply the best as neither from Hurt or Ignominy to be diverted from it For to be oppress'd in a good Cause is better than base Exemption As Tully does assert The Nature of this Virtue is explain'd in Noema the third fourth fifth and so on to the thirteenth But the true Beauty and Perfection thereof can hardly enter into the Imagination of any Man who is not already affected and acquainted with it
and not onely indure Terment on such account but even immediate Death Wherefore there is no Argument that more helps a Man to study Fortitude and how to acquire it than to consider how miserable we are without it 't is else in the power of every insolent Superior either by Threats or by Oppression to make the timorous Man as vile and as obsequious as he pleases And what greater torment or servitude can there happen to an ingenuous Mind than with Guilt and Confusion to own that as soon as the terror of any great mischief looks towards him he shall not onely shrink from Truth and Virtue but even contribute to betray them both VII As for Intemperance the very Discredit of that Pleasure were enough to deter us from it He that considers the Dignity of Man and the great things he is born to must be astonish'd to see at how mean a rate he often sells them all The poor Fly is not more easily taken in the Cobweb or the Fish deluded by the Bait or any other Beast fetter'd in a Toil than is poor Man whom lusts and passions have subdu'd Every Libertine calls him away and every impure Rascal leads him about till at last he grows abject and more contemptible than a Beast For Pleasure which feeds and vitiates the Sense does also by degrees prey upon the Mind It puts out the Light and breaks the force it had Nay when at last nothing but Fortitude is left him that Sentinel or Out-guard without whose vigor and fidelity no virtue can be safe even here Pleasure attacks him and like a raging Strumpet that has had success comes on with Impudence and will not quit her Hold till she drives us into utter destruction So that what Cicero said is no less true than common De Senectute That in the Region of Pleasure it was impossible for Men to hold any Commerce with Virtue VIII NOR does Intemperance onely benumb and bewitch the Mind but the Body also is miserably shaken and obnoxious to many cruel Diseases by it So that Abstinence even on Health's account deserves our highest Care 'T is not that here we should assign the Weights and Measures of Temperance but onely speak of what is relative to Health and to the good state of the Body and the Mind Since we know that in robust Bodies which are over-fed the faculties of the Mind are very often incumbred and opprest IX L. 2. c. 2. §. 3. WHEREFORE Temperance is so to be cultivated as more to intend the plenty and purity of the Animal Spirits than the extension of the Body Thus that Oracle of Zoroaster advis'd Let not the Spirit be defiled nor the superficies be made gross Which refers to that of Hierocles In Aurea Pytagorae Carmina who calls this Spirit by the name of a Thin-Vehicle and a Body Immaterial Adding also this That we take a vigilant Care of our Organ and skilfully fit it to Philosophical purposes X. THIS then is true and Philosophical Temperance if we so far subdue the bulk and powers of the Body as that they may not be able to stifle or extenuate the Sense of excellent Things And above all That the Internal Spirit be not pamper'd and incrassated which is what Hierocles calls the Spiritual Vehicle His Opinion being That our Internal Man is compos'd and made up as well of this Vehicle as of the Soul Wherefore the Pythagoreans made great work about the purifying of the Spirit or Vehicle as by the following words of Hierocles appears In Aurea Pythagorae Carmina We must says he by the exercise of Virtue and the recovery of Truth and Purity take care of those things which appertain to the Luciform Body which is what the Oracles declare to be the Tender or Aerial Vehicle of the Soul But the care of this Purification must extend even to Meats and Drinks and whatever else concerns these our Mortal Bodies For the Luciform Spirit resides therein it was that which gave Life to this when it was inanimate and is the Conservator of its present Frame This indeed is that Immaterial Body which is Life it self and which gives and ingenerates material Life 'T is by this that our Mortal Bodies which consist of Life Irrational and Body Material are made up And thus an Image is compos'd of the Internal Man who is built out of Rational Substance and Body Immaterial XI IN all which High Words he intimates that in our care concerning the External Man which is our Corporeal Frame or Bulk we must be sure to bring no Detriment or Contagion to the Internal But that the regulation and measures of our Diet as to meat and drink and what else concerns this Mortal Body must refer to the health or safety of the Inward Man The End being that this Thin and Lucid covering of the Soul which must surely be some Aerial or Ethereal Vestment be kept free from all servile Commixtures with our polluted Carcase And hereto the same Hierocles adds That forasmuch as to this our Luciform Body there is another Mortal Body congenerate and affix'd We are to preserve the former in all Purity and to discharge it as much as is possible from all Intercommoning or Combinations with the Latter XII THE truth is that all this Doctrine about Cleansing and Purgation even of the Soul it self and so the whole Business and Import of Virtue points but at this that there be Cleanliness in the Inward Man and that the vigor of it be sustain'd For so the same great Interpreter of the Pythagorean Wisdom does a while after explain the Matter saying That the purification of the rational Soul was done with concern and had reference to the Luciform Vehicle Meaning that the Vehicle was thereby to be render'd more Lightsom and Elastic so as it might not afterwards retard the superiou◠flight of the Soul That the said Purification was best effected by divorcing our Thoughts and Meditations from Terrene Objects and lifting them by degrees unto things Immaterial That all Turpitude was to be suppress'd and that we should prohibit all sordid Intercourse of the Body Material for fear the Luciform Body should be Tarnish'd and contaminated by it That if there were a Vigilance in these Particulars then might this Spiritual Vehicle acquire new Life and Vigor it might be endow'd with Celestial Vivacity and at length enter into a Conjugation with the Intellectual Perfections of the Soul All this can Purification do when but steer'd and conducted by Virtue It can Recollect Resuscitate and even inspire with heavenly Energy that subtile and attenuated Chariot of our Mind that inward Organ which will afterwards remain its Habitacle and a Consort inseparable to all Eternity XIII I confess these things sound as lofty Flights and yet they are the Documents of the famous Hierocles by which we are taught that the greatest pitch of Philosophical Temperance is To preserve this Vehicle in a congruous temper to the
Reason IV. FOR as in Numeration the Sum Total is accounted from the last Unite so is it in other matters the last and most perfect essential difference makes a Thing to be what it is and doth distinguish it from all Thiâ— else Wherefore if any man shall make sole good to be that which to himself grateful as insisting wholly on the delectatiâ—… of his animal Appetite he plainly publish himself for a Brute But if he means and â—…tends such grateful thing as to the Intelleâ—… or Right Reason or to the Boniform Facuâ—… is suitable This indeed as Plotinus saith is the Object of a perfect Man I mean of a intellectual Man and for such you may pâ—nounce him V. FOR this is the plain Character of tâ—… intellectual Life that as in the search of Truâ—… it is not inquired what may seem true to aâ—… one Body of Men tho ever so numerous much less to any man in particular but whâ—… is simply and absolutely the Truth so neithâ—… doth it set up that for good which to any oâ— man or to any number of men appears 〈◊〉 such but that which really and absolutely so and which in like Circumstances eveâ— intellectual Creature is bound to elect bâ— the animal Nature never so averse Now 〈◊〉 it happens in specious Arithmetick that everâ— signal Operation stands afterwards for 〈◊〉 Theorem or Conclusion so in Morals leâ—… such preference and election as we havâ— mentioned stand for an eternal President 〈◊〉 guide our actions in all like cases when ciâ—cumstances are the same And let us acquiesâ—… therein and acknowledge the Truth there of tho it prove never so ungrateful to ouâ— Appetites and seem quite contrary to our â—xternal sense VI. WHEREFORE as it is an Error in â—he Intellect to resign it self so far to the â—magination or to the Sense as but to waver â—n the pursuit of Truth So doubtless is it an â—rror in the Will to be so captivated as to â—esign it self to the animal Appetite and to â—orsake what is absolutely good For if the Will may want at some seasons that relish of good which it ought to have this is merely the Will 's neglect in not exciting that divine Faculty by which we not only know what is best but are elevated and even ravished when we enjoy it For it is plain that when we open our Eyes such are the Charms of this Joy that a man would rather venture a thousand deaths than by any base prevarication to hazard his portion in a state of life which is so desirable and so divine VII WHEREFORE as it is now plain that something there is which of its own â—ature and incontestably is true so is there somewhat which of its own nature is simply good Also that as the former is comprehended by the Intellect so the sweetness and delight of the latter is relished by the Boniform Faculty Wherefore as to those who pronounce every thing good so far as at any rate it can be grateful and so establish it for the standard of human Actions this is Madness it self inasmuch as hereby they rank the Wise the Fools and the Mad-men all in the same state Nay perhaps they hereâ— prefer the Fools and Mad men before tâ—… Wise since these are the most likely to pesist against all Sense and Reason and to stiâ—… by that which is grateful let it be never 〈◊〉 destructive vile or ridiculous VIII SOME there are I confess who speaâ— a little more cautiously in this Matter anâ— would have the man they call wise have Selâ— preservation still in his eye how inordinate so ever they allow him in all the rest By whicâ— they shew that if their Fool or Mad-man caâ—… but here be shot-free they little consider 〈◊〉 Immortality or the Fruits of solid Wisdoâ—… However it is plain to every man of Sense that a bare self-preservation is not a desirable thing for such may be the Scorns and Scourge of this Life that none but a stupid Creature would in such Circumstances desire to live But lastly if according to them Life and Conservation be so valuable it must also follow that the more durable these are they are so much the better and that the most durable is best of all Furthermore if such self-conservation of one man be really good it is doubly so to preserve two men Noema 18. and thrice as much to save three and so forward Whence by the Light of Nature it is manifest that every intellectual Creature stands bound to provide both in present and in future for his own and his Neighbor's Preservation so far forth as in him lies and as it may consist without doing prejudice to a third This is what certainly fulfils not â—nly a great part of Justice but of empeâ—ance and indeed of every other Virtue CHAP. VI. Of the Passions in general and of the Helps they afford â— WHAT Virtue is in the general we have already fixed And now before we descend to the several sorts or Species â—hereof it will not be amiss to premise somewhat of the Passions about which such Virtues are conversant so as to explain their Nature â—heir Use or their Disadvantage and thereby prepare the Mind to take in such an Idea of Virtue as may be full and adequate II. BUT by Passions I do not barely understand such as are commonly handled in Moral Philosophy but every other corporeal Impression which hath force enough to blind â—he Mind or abuse the Judgment in discerning what in every case were the best Wherefore I add hereunto all sorts of fantastick Notions and false Impressions that are grown pertinacious and which either by ill custom â—r the Power of Education or by internal Proclivity so seise upon the Mind as to lead us â—nto any apparent Error For Virtue ought to reach 〈◊〉 her Authority to the weeding 〈◊〉 even 〈◊〉 these remote Evils lest the Mind bâ— shaken when it should judge or perverted in the Prosecution of that which is simply the best Yet first we shall treat of those Passions which are properly so called such as are Love Hatred Anger and the rest of that kind Concerning all which we must maintain 〈◊〉 against the Stoicks that of their own Nature they are good and that the Intendments of Divine Providence are not less understood by their Use Vide in this Book L. 1. c. 6. § 2. than by the Structure of those Organs which compose every animal Body III. THE Use and Utility of them may in the general be even illustrated thus that when Passions happen to be joined with a more venement agitation of the Spirits they seem to perform in a Man whom some call the little World what the Winds do in the greater For as these purge and purifie the Air so those cleanse and defecate the Blood and suffer it not by stagnation to corrupt IV. Aâ—S oâ— these Passions play upon the Soul in a thousand shapes and the Scenes of Fancy are so
moves the Spirits and not the Spirits the Soul III. De Passion animae part 2. Art 69. DES CARTES brings all the Passions of the Soul under six principal and primitive kinds Namely Admiration Love Hatred Cupidity Joy and Grief And that they fall naturally into this Order and Distinction does thus appear For as soon as a new Object or an old one under new Circumstances occurs unto us it stops and entertains our Faculty of Considering it strains up the Attention beyond its wonted pitch and this is called Admiration Now because this may so happen before we comprehend whether such Object will prove grateful or ungrateful to us it may deservedly be called the very first Passion IV. YET after this when the Soul comes to consider the Object as grateful or ungrateful which is the same almost as good or evil then one of them excites Love and the other Hatred But if this Good or Evil be considered by us as remote and future they kindle in us Cupidity namely to join with and enjoy the first and to avoid or repel the latter Both which are by the Schools very properly called Desiderium and Fuga But lastly if this Good and Evil be looked upon as present the first begets Joy and the other Grief V. I WILL not deny but that Des Cartes â—…ad his Reasons thus to enumerate the Passions however I think I have as sufficient Motives to contract them L. 2. c. 1. §. 1. and that into the â—hree first of Admiration Love and Hatred For what is Desire but Love extending it self â—owards future Good And what is Flight but Hatred in turning away from the evil at â—and or at least in fortifying against it What is Joy but Love which triumphs in possessing the thing beloved And what is Grief but Hatred to be involv'd and harassed by the present Evil So that in all these Cases it is manifest that either Love or Hatred lies still at the Root VI. HENCE it is plain that the Scholastick Reduction of the Passions to the two Heads of Irascible and Concupiscible which the very â—est of the old Philosophers made use of deserves not to be so contemptuously exploded if but interpreted aright Yet here I speak â—ut of those Passions which are properly seated in the Heart and not in the Brain where Admiration only as Des Cartes hath it does reside As to the rest they may in my opiâ—nion be justly enough referred to those words of Pythagoras which answer to the Schoolmens Irascible and Concupiscible which in proper Terms are Concupiscence and Indignation And this latter is that Emotion of the Soul by which it testifies wrath against every appearance of what is either evil or ungrateful Now if herein there be no consideration either of present or future then it is simple Hatre if the Evil be impending it is Fight or else a Cupidity either to resist or by any expedient to evade it But if it be actually present then it is Sorrow Grief or Sickness of the Mind which is nothing else but Indignation to suffer and to stoop under the Tyranny of an Evil which cannot be shaken off VII THE Reason of Concupiscence is the same which if it be fairly accompanied with the appearance of what is good or grateful and nothing of Time respected it is called pure and simple Love If the Good be looked on as future it is Cupidity or else Concupiscence properly so called but if it be present then it is Joy or Gladness Yet we must think that it ceaseth to be Concupiscence For unless somewhat that is nauseous and over-cloying supervenes the Love we mention is naturally prone to a continuation in its own Estate so as some Ingredient of Concupiscence will still remain VIII WHEREFORE it is possible there may only be two principal and primitive Passions which have their proper Residence in the Heart They are called by Des Cartes Love and Hatred by the Schools Irascible and Concupiscible and by Pythagoras Lust and Anger which is somewhat remarkable as from the Use thereof we may have cause to note IX HOWEVER at present and for a more extended Notion of the Passions I will follow Des Cartes in his own Order and Distinction as to the six general kinds above-mentioned I will therefore first define them and then subjoin the respective Species unto each Admiration is the first The first Rank of the Passions And it is a Passion of the Soul which is struck with the Novelty of any Object and attentively ingaged in the Contemplaiton thereof Admiration is twofold the one of Esteem the other of Despising Esteem is the admiring of the Magnitude or Value of any Object But Despising is a contrary Admiration at the Littleness or Despicableness of any Object Hence 't is understood what is Esteem or Disesteem of a Man's self Namely when a Man dwells affectedly in the Contemplation of his own Dignity or is fixed with some Resentment on his own Meanness or Disgrace The Reason is the same either as to Disesteem or else Regard for others The first of which is called Scorning and the last Veneration Now Veneration is the Value we set upon a free Agent that can as we believe do us either good or harm and joined with a desire we have of putting our selves in subjection to it But Scorn is a disesteem we put upon a free Agent which tho capable of doing us either good or hurt yet we judge so meanly of such Agent as not to be able to put in execution either the one or the other X. IN the second Rank come Love and Hatred Love is a Passion of the Soul The second Rank of the Passions by which it is excited willingly to join it self unto Objects which seem grateful thereunto Yet here by the words To join it self willingly is not meant to covet its being joined for that appertains to Lust but it is meant with some emotion to acknowledge the thing to be either good or grateful Hatred is a Passion of the Soul whereby it is incited willingly to separate it self from Objects which seem ingrateful or hurtful thereunto When he that loves esteems the Object lesser than himself it is called simple Inclination or good Will where equal to himself then is it Friendship and where greater then Devotion Love which tends singly towards good things is called Love when towards beautiful things then Complacency Also Hatred which refers simply to evil things is called Hatred if to deformed things then Aversion or Horror Nor ought we here to forget that noble and natural sort of Love which the Greeks termed Storge and which we may call natural Affection or that of Hatred called Antipathy XI The third Rank of the Passions THE third Classis is Cupidity with all its Tribe or Off-spring Cupidity is a Passion of the Soul by which it is carried towards good as it is future And therefore as the Absence of Evil and the Presence
is no less harassed by the Evils that lie upon us than from the Want of those Benefits which should advantage us VIII IT is plain that Nature seems more solicitous to drive away Evil than to partake of Pleasure And this appears in those efficacious sorts of Eloquence she has bestowed on so many of the Creatures when they are oppressed for the drawing of Compassion towards them Such is the querulous and lamenting tone of the Voice the dejection of the Eyes and Countenance Groaning Howling Sighs and Tears and the like For all these have Power to incline the Mind to Compassion whether it be to quicken out Help or to retard the Mischiefs we intended IX NOR is Nature wanting altogether in that part which concerns the procuring of Pleasure For every motion of the Eyes and Countenance when we are pleased is much more welcome and agreeable to the Lookers on And even this small Effect of our Joy is by Nature instituted as a Bait or Allurement to draw on mutual Complacency and to create a desire towards the Contentation of each other Just as those former Effects of Sorrow were to dehort us from afflicting any who deserved it not but rather to melt us and push us on to a timely succor of all who are oppress'd But forasmuch as excessive Joy does sometimes bring on what they call Extasie and even swooning away I know not if Nature does not hint hereby that our Souls are capable of greater Pleasure as well as Felicity than our present corporeal and terrestrial State can bear or is able to support Wherefore as to Love and Hatred Grief and Joy the Interpretation of them is this That we do as much as in us lies purchase Good to our selves and others Next that we hurt no Man but on the contrary drive away Evil most industriously and affectionately from others as well as our selves X. ALL Diligence is animated by Cupidity which is the most Mercurial and awakened Passion and which agitates the Heart with more violence than any other Affection It sends up a greater quantity of Spirits to the Brain which diffusing themselves again into the Members of the Body not only render it more active and more vigorous but the Soul also is hereby drawn in and concurs in a grateful and chearful Vivacity For the Soul if it want suitable Entertainment or Objects that are worthy of it is but too apt to rust and grow Lethargick even as the Lord Bacon has somewhere truly admonished That the Life of Man without a proposed End is altogether loose or languishing However if we would rightly govern and make use of this Cupidity to good purpose let us beware that it fly not to Objects that are without our reach or more impetuously to those within it than our Health and the Frailty of our Condition can bear For to make more hast after things within our Power than will consist with our Strength or Ability is but attempting things that are plainly impossible So that such unadvised Cupidity would end rather in Sorrow and Vexation than in Contentment Lastly since 't is so manifest what the end of Cupidity is Namely to excite Vigor in the Execution of our Purposes this Passion must wholly be laid by till we are just on the Borders of acting what by Counsel we have resolved For else this Ardor and especially in weak Constitutions would not only be useless but by inflaming the Spirits would exhaust our strength dry the whole Body and overthrow our Health CHAP. IX The Vse and Interpretation of Love and Hatred which are in the Second Classis I. AMONG the Sorts or Species of Love there is principally to be considered not only Devotion and Complacency but what the Greeks call Storge which is that strong Intercourse of Filial Parental Sympathy that is founded in the Bowels of Nature So likewise in the sorts of Hatred there is to be observed Horror and Antipathy By Devotion we are taught as by a loâ— Exhortation of Nature to believe that therâ— is something which ought to be more dear 〈◊〉 us than our selves and for which we should not scruple to lay down our Lives The Usâ— therefore of this Passion refers chiefly to Pâ— lity and Religion neither of which can bâ— without Virtue So that for the true Use oâ— this Passion we are accountable to our Prince our Country and to our Religion That iâ— to say unto God and true Virtue Whence it follows that those who place the higheâ—… Wisdom in Self preservation and as preferable at all times to all other things do sin against the Light of Nature II. BY Complacency and by Horror we are admonished that there are some things Beaâ—tiful and some Deformed much contrary to the sordid Opinion of those who laugh at all Distinctions Nay their Raillery extends to the placing of this Indifferency even in Vice and Virtue Whereas Virtue for the most part is but a mere Symmetry of the Passions in reference to their Degrees and Objects Just as Beauty it self is made up from a due proportion in the external Parts and then animated by a Decorum in the Motion and Direction of the whole Which in a manner is the same thing that Tully noted in the Fourth Book of his Tusculane Questions Lib. 4. For as in the Body says he there is a certain apt Figuration of the Members with a sweetness of Color All which we call Beauty so in the Mind an equability and constancy in our Opinions and Judgments joyned to such a firmity and settledness in them as we make to be the consequence of or even the substance of Virtue this also is declared beautiful Wherefore this Natural Complacency and Natural Horror ought to spur us on to the Love of Virtue and an Aversation to Vice For one is the most charming as the othe the most deformed thing in the World III. BUT the more peculiar Intent of that Complacency which is commonly called Love refers to the Propagation of Children Which Passion if it be more importunate than the rest it shews the Care and Anxiety of Nature to preserve and continue the Race of Mankind And Nature is herein so solicitous so artificial and useth such clandestine Feats of Negromancy and Prearication as if she would rather pass for an Inchantress or even a Mountebank than want sufficient Allurements to that end But forasmuch as the Intention of this Ardor is made so conspicuous as before we are thereby admonished how far to restrain it and with what Circumspection to put all due Boundaries thereunto IV. WHEREFORE as this Love has reference to Propagation so Storge or Natural Tendirness referreth chiefly to Children that are begot And if more of the Storge appear in Parents than what is reciprocal it shews this Passion is implanted by Nature a others to a greater Degree or a less suitable to the Use or Want there may be thereoâ— For there is greater Utility and Need of thâ— Parents Affection
as they appear to our external Senses As if a man finding somewhat that was grateful to his own Taste should streight conclude that the same Pleasure and Sweetness were in the thing it self and therefore that it must equally gratifie the Taste of all other Creatures We see the same Fallacy obtruded in the Objects of Sight when a Man shall conclude that the Light and Colors which are taken in by the Eye are also in the things themselves which is no more true than that Stones feel pain which wound the bare Feet of those that run over them or that when a Man's Hand is burnt by a Coal that the Coal also should have sense of such Burning For 't is plain that Heat is no more in the Coal or in any such Subject than us the very Pain but both arise from the Agitation and Concussion of Particles So as if this be very moderate we feel Heat without any Pain whereas if our Senses are immoderately struck then follows Perception both of Heat and Pain together Wherefore Heat and Pain are things which differ only in degree and we our selves are the Subject in which they meet and wherein their Force and Vigor is exerted And the like we may pronounce of other the Objects of our external Senses III. IMAGINATION is a corporeal Impression which inclines the Soul to believe that such things are or else may be which yet never are nor can ever be As Sensation is apt to misguide the Soul touching the Nature of Things unless care be taken so Imagination does the like as to their Existence whether present or to come Fâ—… as the vigor of our Sense throws us 〈◊〉 Security as to the real presence and existence of any thing so the torrent of Imagination which seems to equal or at least to imitate Sense it self does easily impose a false Affâ—rance on the Soul that such thing is true oâ— may be true tho there be no other Foundation for it but that it has been vehemently 〈◊〉 imagined How these insolent Phantasâ—… and such idle Dreams of Men who sleep not may be detected and dispelled we have taught at large in our Book of Enthusiasm Sect. 51 52 53 c. to which the Reader is referr'd IV. AS to the peculiar Temperament and Constitution we define it to be A corporeal Impression that results from the whole natural Mass by which the Soul is obstructed and perverted from the Contemplation of some peculiar Things Of this corporeal Frailty there might be many Instances given We have seen how happy and even famous some have been at the Mathematicks who when you turn them to thing Theological or into the Metaphysicks they are quite lame and stumble at every step They will avow they perfectly comprehend whatever concerns the Nature of a Body but as to that of a Spirit they cannot figure to themselves the least Notion or Signification of it On the other side you have others who are so full of their Notion about Spirits that they believe not a corner of the World to be void or destitute of them They think they are present at every Thunder and every Rain and they have mustered and regimented them into such Brigades that it would make a Man sweat to comprehend the Government and Intrigues that they impute unto this invisible Race V. I KNOW not well how otherwise to judge of this Disease in the Art of Thinking than that it grows from a particular Texture of Parts or a prevalent Byass in the Frame and Constitution of the Body In some the Spirits are more stiff gross and tenacious in others more volatile unequal and even turbulent So that if a Man had it in his Power in the Language of the Chymists to fix the volatile and to volatilize the fix'd by which they promise themselves Golden Mountains I mean if he could bring his Spirits to a just proportion of Delicacy and Agility and could then so totally control their Motion as to fix and settle them in the Contemplation of any particular Object he were then certainly Master of the greatest Secret in the World towards the Knowledge and Contemplation of all Things VI. CUSTOM is a corpercal Impression by which the Soul is extremely bent to judge of things as true good or amiable for no other Motive but because it has been accustomed so to judge and so to act There is an Instance of this Depravity in the Cannibals who eat Man's Flesh without any Ceremony or sort of Qualm whatever And the Power of Custom is so very strong as Tully observes it from Aristotle that it becomes a second Natural Hence it is that some inveterate Opinions usurp among Mankind the Name of Principles or common Notions and a very 〈◊〉 Custom of the Country passes for a Law of Nature How pernicious a Fate therefore is it when young Men happen to be that handled How cautious ought all to be of any false or immoral Custom And how much does it import us to fly the Society of those who are over run with any Habit either of ill Notions or ill Manners 'T is not to be imagined how a little Familiarity and Conversation with an ingenious Libertine will insensibly steal away that Sense of Honâ—… and of Virtue which one first brought with iâ— when we fell into his acquantance VII EDUCATION a Custom with some remarkable Affections annex'd For commonly Teachers do instil their own Notions also into the Esteem of their Disciples as if it highly imported them to the perfecting of their Education And so it comes often to pass that the Scholars will not afterwards endure the Correction of some Insufferable Errors but persist and die in them Happy had it been for such had they never had any other Tutor than bare Nature for then the Sparks of Virtue and of Truth which were in their tender Minds had not been as now by the Perfidy of an ill Master extinguish'd Tully takes occasion in his Tusculan Questions highly to exclaim hereat affirming Tuscul Quaest l. 3. That we are been with such Elements of Vertue as if they were not depress'd even Nature is self would instigate us to a happy life Whereas now we are perverted as soon as born and our Minds so scribled over with crooked Sentiments as â—f they had been even mingled with our Milk But this Misfortune is so little rectified in riper time by Instructors and Teachers that Truth â—s laugh'd out of Countenance vulgar Errors take place and even Nature is subdu'd by Opinion VIII AS Education has Reference unto Custom so a peculiar Genius or Inclination hath reference to a particular temperament of the Body and is a corporcal Impression by which a Man is so endowed and so appropriated to certain ends that he conceives all human Happiness and Perfection to consist therein and that all are either miserable or â—mith to be pityed who are defective in that particular Thus it comes to pass that whether in
up a Man's self in Sacrifice â—o Reason and to God which is the Heighth of Sincerity Next he requires That we never â—ield to corporeal Affections and this takes in Patience Lastly Not to precipitate our selves â—n any thing lest Error ensue which is the Dictate of Prudence Lib. 8. § 26. The same Philosopher has much more up and down to the like effect VII BUT particularly in his tenth Book he recommends three things which much concern the Virtues in hand As namely Intention of Mind which answers Prudence Sect. 8. Conâ—entment and Extension of the Mind which refer to Sincerity and Patience For to say the Mind is intent is to say it dwells sedately on its Object and accurately sifts into every part thereof which is the Business of Prudence And for Sincerity and Patience how can they better be set off than by placing the Mind in a state of Content For this testifies a thankful humble Acceptance of what Nature in her common Distribution hath given whatever the Portion be And thus to acquiesce in Nature's common Law is in the Judgment of that wisest Philosopher To obey the common Reason that is in God nay which is little less than God himself For he is the living Law Marcus Anton. lib. 10. § 25. in whose Administration the whole Universe remains and he who bestows on every Man what he in his Wisdom thinks fit and competent for him VIII So then he that chearfully accâ— and values not what to his Sense or Faâ—… might be more complacent but what Predence thinks fit to order and impose as 〈◊〉 deed some things are sent which altho 〈◊〉 altogether unwholsom yet unto Flesh 〈◊〉 Blood their Taste is extreme bitter this 〈◊〉 is L. 8. § 52. by Antoninus cry'd up As one that 〈◊〉 cerely cooperates with that intellectual Powâ— which guides and comprebends all things 〈◊〉 adds L. 7. § 9. That the World is one and the same 〈◊〉 every part that God is every where the same 〈◊〉 that there is but one Essence and one Law 〈◊〉 is the common standard and measure of all 〈◊〉 lectual Beings that there is one Truth as 〈◊〉 one Perfection of all Animals of the same 〈◊〉 and but one and the same Reason among all 〈◊〉 Creatures that partake thereof IX THUS it is plainly his Sense that 〈◊〉 common Rule and Constitution runs throuâ— every intellectual Substance and that ranâ— nal Creatures are in this way made a sâ—of Fellow-Citizens with God L. 2. c. 4. § 4. and that nothing can degrade them but a perverse Will against that Bond and Sanction by which they hoâ— this State Whereas if they resign to every thing which the Divine Law and immâ—table Reasons lays on them and do not 〈◊〉 much as covet that things should be otherwise than as they are Such says he are not 〈◊〉 reputed as bare Conformers Marcus Antonin l. 12. § 23 who submit and 〈◊〉 content but as Men who are drawn if 〈◊〉 caught up by God himself For they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he would have them and they have no other Will but the Will of their Creator This therefore is the supremest Degree of Sincerity For this is not only the pursuit of what is eminently the best but a thirsting â—nd panting after it for it's own sake and for it's intrinsick worth X. LASTLY he advises L. 10. § 8. 10. That we corroborate 〈◊〉 Minds to such a degree as to repel not only the charming but the rugged Assaults â—f the Flesh also to be above Vain-Glory and even Death it self This surely is enough whereby to know what Patience is and 't is by this Virtue of Patience that we surmount the Temptations of either Hand whether they be soft or harsh Now if it come to this that neither Infamy nor Death can otherwise be â—hun'd than in submitting to what is vile and contrary to the Laws of Reason we must stand our ground and with Patience congraâ—ulate them both Upon the whole matter we did not inconsiderately set down Prudence Sincerity and Patience to be the first Fountains of all other Virtues And this will be further manifest when we shall with a little more Accuracy consider and define the Nature of each CHAP. II. Of Prudence the first Primitive Virtue I. PRUDENCE therefore is a Virtue by which the Soul has such Dominion over the Pissions properly so called as well as over all sorts of corporeal Impressions that the mind can receivâ— no Impediment thereby in rightly observing and successfully judging of what is absolutely 〈◊〉 simply the best The Demonstration of this Virtue is maâ—e out by Noema the Twelfth Hence therefore it is that Prudence is attended and furrounded by Knowledge Diligence good Counsel 〈◊〉 Determination judicious Conjecture Presence 〈◊〉 Mind Sense and the Limits of Right Reasâ—… Of which in particular For II. KNOWLEDGE or Intelligence is thâ— Companion of Prudence because knowing is nothing else but a right comprehension 〈◊〉 those things whereof we are by others 〈◊〉 monished Eudem l. 5. c. 10. So Aristotle observes That 't is 〈◊〉 Prudence we apprehend but by Knowledge that 〈◊〉 judge and determine so Men are call'd intelâ—… gent only from their Facility of being taught Wherefore we may agree that prudent 〈◊〉 are also the most intellegent For as they 〈◊〉 keep an open Ear to good Counsel and 〈◊〉 not given up to the Prejudice of any Passion of corporeal Impression so are they qualified by this Temperament still to embrace Truth where ever they find it III. Ethic. Nicom l. 6. c. 13. DILIGENCE as is noted by Aristotle shines most in the finding out of fit Mediums and of applying them to the Mark But if the Design be ill then is a Man not termed diligent but shrewd or busie Wherefore it seems there is some Sagacity and Subtilty of the Wit required in Diligence which the prudent Man can scarce ever want For having both Mind and Body purified as he hath from the stains of Passion or Impression he has also a stock of subtil and lively Spirits always attending him Where this Diligence presides there happy Counsel can never be wanting Ethic. Eudem l. 5. c. 9. ad Nicom l. 6. c. 10. For as the Philosopher places Rectitude of Counsel in advising that which is good so the Essentials herein are that the Ends be honest that the Means be lawful and that the Consultation be neither slow nor precipitate And all these things meet in a prudent Man as by the Definition of Prudence is manifest So also Antoninus observes That the prudent Man being Master of his Affections will never rashly break out That being assisted by a Purity in his Blood and Spirits he has no Motions that are either sluggish or violent for 't is observ'd that the Fluency and Purification of the Spiâ—its does not a little conduce both to their Gentleness and Moderation Much less says he will such a prudent Man attempt
L. 1. c. 2. § 9. And 't is to a Soul thus rectified that we may apply that of Aristotle That neither the Evening or the Morning Star is half so charming There can be no exterior Light half so bright or so desirable as this of the Soul which is puâ—e and perfect and even Divine II. To this State of Simplicity or Sincerity in the Soul is referable that of Antoninus where he thus expostulates with himself O my beloved Soul when wilt thou be naked simple L. 10. § 1. and entirely one And again he gives himself the Rule Do not discompose thy Mind or excite the Dregs L. 4. § 26. but purifie thy self to the utmost that is possible For this Sincerity is a Fountain that runs clear and is perennial it pours in Consolation and fills the Life with internal Joy This is the state of that Peace which is so constant and ineffable that no Cares no Crosses or so much as Jealousies can distract it For in that which is single and but one there can be no. Diversity 't is all Union profound Love and perfect Rest Wherefore it was not without cause that the Pythagorean call'd those blessed who could by this happy Analysis Jamblicus Protrept c. 4. resolve all things into one and the same Principle which they plainly meanâ— to be the Unity of God and did accordingly bind themselves both to follow and to obey him III. BUT to follow God constantly and sincerely is to follow that which is eminently the best tho not that which is most grateful to our Appetites For who as a mere Creature can sincerely and constantly prosecute that which is best This must be the Gift of God and the Effect of a Divine Sense or Spirit That Perfection does not originally appertain to any created Being but to God the Creator He who is the common Father of us all and the Legislator of the whole World He whom Zeno in Laertius styles Right Reason penetrating all things even the same Reason which is in Jove himself the Captain and chief Pilot in the Administration of the Universe IV. L. 8. § 54. HERETO refers that Exhortation of Antoninus That we should not any longer perplex our selves barely about the circumambient Air but rather join and combine with that intellectual Power which comprehends the Universe Which saying amounts to this That we ought to be drawn into one and the same mind with God This is the Passion that can only make a Man Divine Tusculan Quaest l. 5. For such the Man is as his Affections and Inclinations make him 'T is not here enough to have simple Intellection no it rather calls up and summons the Boniform Faculty which is replenish'd with that Divine Sense and Relish which affords the highest Pleasure the chiefest Beauty and the utmost Perfection to the Soul 'T is by this supreme Faculty that we pant after God that we adhere unto him and that as far as our Nature does admit we are even like unto him he who is Goodness it self perfect Purity and the most exalted Simplicity he is that pattern whom in these Attributes we are to imitate and this is that state of Sincerity we are to aspire to as far as Humanity will permit And as in doing hereof the highest Perfection of Man's Will is best express'd so in the state of Patience is there exercised that great Faculty which the Pythagoreans have styled The Strength and Bulwark of the Soul V. PATIENCE is a Vertue of the Soul whereby 't is enabled for the sake of that which is simply and absolutely the best to undergo all things even that which to the animal Nature is totally harsh and ungrateful We do not by Patience understand a bare passive and stupid Indolence but a vigorous and positive Firmity of the Mind such as was before noted from Metopus the Pythagorean And such as shrinks not from rugged and dangerous occasions but bears up boldly and invincibly against all so as 't is not in the power of any Mortification whatever to turn the Will from the pursuit of that which is best VI. OF Patience there are two Parts or Species which are Continence and Long-suffering We mean hereby not those Demi Virtues which are spoken of in the Schools of Pythagoras and Aristotle but Virtues that are complete Continence therefore is that part or species of Patience whereby the Soul does on account of that which is simply the best both easily and constantly endure whatever Grief or Molestation can arise by denying the sensual Appetite those things which would otherwise be grateful to it Suffering is that species or part of Patience whereby the Soul does in like manner for the sake of that which is simply and absolutely the best both easily and constantly endure whatever is harsh and vexatious unto our natural Life VII THE Demonstration of these Virtues will be found in the Noemas fifth sixth seventh eighth ninth tenth and eleventh But the use of them is of such extent as to reach to almost all Virtues Wherefore Aristotle every where speaks to the same effect saying Ethic. Nicom l. 1. c. 2. Magn. Moral l. 1. c. 6. That all Moral Virtue has reference either to pleasure or to pain that 't is for pleasure we commit what is vile and for fear of pain withdraw our selves from things that are honest So that Epictetus thought all Moral Philosophy was summ'd up in this short Precept Sustine abstine As one part thereof referr'd to Suffering the other to Continence VIII HENCE it appears that Continence and Suffering are not barely Virtues but such as are of a high account For they both in their Derivation have reference to that Force and Power which is in the Soul either to excite motion or procure its rest And to this Faculty refers what Antoninus adviseth That we cleanse the Imagination L. 7. § 29. and stop all Motions of the Sense Which takes in both the Duty of Continence and of Suffering IX BUT altho we have here said enough of the Primitive Virtues yet we may further inculcate that they are so much the true Parents or Patriarchs of all the rest that in them alone all the Force and Essence of every other Virtue seems to be comprehended Nor can any Man that is possessed of these find difficulty in acquiring the rest This we chuse to notifie lest the Mind should be distracted after many things when these very few Objects are sufficient not only for its Exercise but to satisfie the most zealous search and anxiety after Virtue and for attaining that Felicity which alone can attend it X. WE only add that 't is impossible if a Man wants these he should have any Real Virtue whatever he may shew of what is counterfeit or casual For Virtue must not be incumbred with Error nor can it live but under the Regency of that Prudence we have already described Yet if a Man shall by adventure and