I was going on to what is obvious and in view to every Man the union between our Soul and Body Nor was I sollicitous to find this an exact Parallel as he fancies I was obliged to do What if there be no exact Parallel Will any Man of a sober Mind or that is Master of his own Thoughts conclude every thing impossible in the uncreated Being whereof there is not an exact parallel in the Creation If any Man will stand upon this come make an Argument of it let us see it in form and try its strength Whatsoever hath not its exact parallel in the Creation is impossible in God c. He will sooner prove himself ridiculous than prove his Point by such a Medium 'T is enough for a sober Man's purpose in such a case as we are now considering if we find such things actually are or might as easily be as what we see actually is among the Creatures that are of as difficult conception and explication as what appears represented in the Enquirers Hypothesis concerning a Trinity 'T is trifling to attempt to give or to ask a parallel exact per omnia It abundantly serves any reasonable purpose if there be a parallel quoad hoc viz. in respect of the facility or difficulty of Conception And tho the vegetative sensitive and intellective Natures be not so many distinct Substances a Trinity is not less conceivable in the Divine Being than three such Natures or natural Powers in the One humane Nature And whoever they be that will not simplify the Divine Being into nothing as the Excellent Author of the 28 Propositions speaks must also acknowledg the most real Perfections in the Divine Being tho not univocal but infinitely transcendent to any thing in us And are they no way distinct Let any sober Understanding judg will the same Notion agree to them all Is his Knowledg throughout the same with his effective Power Then he must make himself For who can doubt he knows himself And is his Will the self-same undistinguishable Perfection in him with his Knowledg Then the Purposes of his Will must be to effect all that he can For doth he not know all that he can do And the Complacencies of his Will must be as much in what is evil as good even in the most odious turpitude of the vilest and most immoral Evils For he knows both alike I know what is commonly said of extrinsecal Denominations But are such Denominations true or false Have they any thing in re correspondent to them or have they not Then some distinction there must be of these Perfections themselves If so how are they distinguisht And there appears great reason from God's own Word to conceive greater distinction of the three Hypostases in his Being than of the Attributes which are common to them as is said Sob Enq. pag. 140. In reference whereto it is not improper or impertinent to mention such Differences as we find in our own Being tho they be not distinct Substances Less distinction in our selves may lead us to conceive the possibility of greater in him in whom we are wont to apprehend nothing but Substance What he adds concerning the Union of Soul and Body in our selves which he cannot deny to be distinct Substances is from a Man of so good sense so surprisingly strange and remote from the Purpose that one would scarce think it from the same Man but that he left this part to some other of the Club and afterwards writ on himself without reading it over or this was with him what we are all liable to some drowsy Interval For when he had himself recited as the Enquirer's words or sense If there is this Union between two so contrary Natures and Substances as the Soul and Body why may there not be a like Union between two or three created Spirits He without shadow of a pretence feigns the Enquirer again to have forgot the Question because Soul and Body are not both intelligent Substances And why Sir doth this argue him to have forgot the Question 'T is as if he expected a Man to be at the top of the Stairs assoon as he toucht the first Step. In a Series of Discourse must the beginning touch the end leaving out what is to come between and connect both parts What then serve Mediums for And so farewel to all reasoning since nothing can be proved by it self He expected it seems I should have proved three intelligent Natures might be united because three intelligent Natures might be united But say I and so he repeats if there be so near Union between things of so contrary Natures as Soul and Body why not between two or three created Spirits The Question is as he now states it himself why may not three intelligent Substances be united And hither he with palpable violence immediately refers the mention of the Union of Soul and Body and says he Why Sir are Body and Soul intelligent Substances And say I but why Sir are not the three supposed created Spirits intelligent Substances And now thinks he will my easy admiring Readers that read me only and not him say What a Baffle hath he given the Enquirer What an ignorant Man is this Mr. to talk of Soul and Body as both intelligent Substances But if any of them happen upon the Enquirer's Book too then must they say how scurvily doth this Matter turn upon himself How inconsiderate a Prevaricator was he that took upon him the present part of a Considerer so to represent him And I my self would say had I the opportunity of free Discourse with him in a Corner which because I have not I say it here Sir is this sincere Writing Is this the way to sift out Truth And I must further say this looks like a Man stung by the pungency of the present Question If Soul and Body things of so contrary Natures that is of an intelligent and unintelligent Nature can be united into one humane Nature why may not three created Spirits all intelligent Natures be as well united into some one thing It appears you knew not what to say to it and would fain seem to say something when you really had nothing to say and therefore so egregiously tergiversate and feign your self not to understand it or that your Antagonist did not understand himself The Enquirer's Scope was manifest Nothing was to be got by so grosly perverting it Is there no Argument but à pari Might you not plainly see he here argued à fortiori If contrary Natures might be so united why not much rather like Natures When you ask me this Question Do not Body and Soul remain two Substances a bodily and a spiritual notwithstanding their concurrence to the Constitution of a Man I answer Yes And I thank you Sir for this kind Look towards my Hypothesis If they were not so the mention of this Union had no way serv'd it You know 't is only Union with continuing distinction
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or singly considered but if by negative abstraction you sever any one from the other so as to say the one is God and not the other or any one is all that is signify'd by the Name of God I deny it as before I did for so you would exclude the other two the Godhead which is but what was expresly enough said Sob Enquiry pag. 47. The Father is God but not excluding the Son and the Holy Ghost the Son is God but not excluding c. And if as this Author quotes we are compelled by the Christian Verity so to speak I wonder it should not compel him as it is Christian Verity or at least as it is Verity as well as the rest of Christians or Mankind Why hath he only the privilege of exemption from being compell'd by truth Athanasius his word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we are necessitated and if the Considerator's own Translation grieve him he might relieve himself by considering that all Necessity is not compulsive And because he hath brought me to Athanasius I shall take the occasion to say I cannot apprehend him to have any sentiment contrary to this Hypothesis His business was against the Arians or the Ariomanites as he often called them as symbolizing also with Manes And because with them the Controversy was whether the Son and Spirit were Creatures in opposition hereto he constantly asserts their consubstantiality with the Father never intending for ought that appears that their Being was numerically the same with his but of the same kind uncreated coessential coeternal with his own For so he expresly speaks in his other or additional Questions i. e. asking Quest. 6. How many Essences 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. How many sorts of Essence as the Answer will direct us to understand it do you acknowledg in God The Answer is I say one Essence one Nature one Form 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and adds one Kind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which sufficiently expounds all the rest He acknowledged no different kinds of Essence or Nature in the Godhead but that One only which was eternal and uncreated agreeably to what he elsewhere says against the Followers of Sabellius 'T is impossible things not eternal Beings not partaking Godhead should be ranked or put in the same order with the Godhead Afterwards speaking of the Father and the Son he says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the One is such not the same as the other the other such as he And that the Son was not to be conceived under another Species 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor under a strange and foreign Character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but was God as the Father And I appeal to any Man's Understanding and Conscience If that great Author believ'd a numerical sameness of Essence common to the three Persons what should make him blame the Sabellians for making the Son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when by the latter in that case he must mean the same thing as by the former In the forecited Questions he expresly says we were to acknowledg in the Deity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 three Individuals Answer to Quest. 7. ubi priùs And elsewhere he as distinctly asserts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 three things And what could he mean by three things not three Deities as he often inculcates but he must certainly mean three Entities three Essences for by three things he could not possibly mean three Non-Entities or three Nothings His great care plainly was to assert the true Deity of the Son and Spirit or their Preeternity or that it could never be said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there was a time when they were not which he inculcates in an hundred places still insisting that one Deity one Essence was common to them but still with distinction and as warmly inveighs against Sabellius and P. Samosatensis as against Arius every whit And that which puts his meaning quite out of doubt speaking how the Father Son and Spirit tho of one and the same sort of Essence are three Hypostases he plainly says the Nature wherein they partake is so One as the humane Nature is One in all Men. We Men saith he consisting of a Body and a Soul are all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of one Nature and Substance or Essence but we are many Hypostases And to the same purpose Dial. 2. de Trinitate his Anomoeos comparing the Father Son and Spirit to a Bishop Presbyter and Deacon he brings in the Orthodox saying they have all the same Nature being each of them Man as an Angel a Man and an Horse have different Natures In the mean time because Men are not inseparably and vitally united with one another as the Divine Persons are and cannot but be by reason of the necessary eternal perpetual emanation of the two latter from the first they cannot admit to be called one Man as the three Persons in the Godhead are and cannot but be one God Inasmuch as these three Divine Persons partake real Godhead as existing necessarily each of them they are each truly God but because they partake it in necessary eternal vital Union and so that the first is the radix the second perpetually springing from the first and the third from both the other they are therefore together one God As Branches tho really distinct from each other and the Root are altogether notwithstanding but one Tree and all omoousial or consubstantial to one another which is an illustration familiar with the the Antients And if there be any now a days that will call this Heresy tho as I said I will be no Heretick however yet if I must make a choice I had rather be an Heretick with the Ante-Nicene and Nicene Fathers and Post-Nicene for ought appears to the contrary through some following Centuries than be reputed Orthodox with P. Lumbard c. whom a German Divine not of meanest account calls one of the four Evangelists of Antichrist But having now done with what he said he would omit but did not tho he might to every whit as good purpose we come to what he overlooks not because he intimates he cannot And let us see whether he looks into it to any better purpose than if he had quite overlook'd it He is indeed the more excusable that he overlooks it not because he says he could not In that case there is no remedy Nor do I see how he well could when the Sober Enquirer had once and again so directly put it in his view and as was said objected it to himself But he thinks however to make an irrefragable Battering Ram of it wherewith to shiver this Doctrine of the Trinity all to pieces and he brings it into play with the two Horns before mentioned The Father he says for instance is either infinite in his Substance his Wisdom his Power his Goodness or he is not With the like pompous apparatus and even in
is it therefore impossible which it belonged to him to prove or he did nothing and he hath done nothing towards it I have askt him before and now I put it again seriously to him whether he do in his Conscience believe this a good Argument Such an Union i. e. natural necessary c. hath no pattern or parallel in the Creation therefore it is impossible in the Nature of God For what he adds That the Soul and Body in a Man are not united into one Substance or Essence nor possibly can be The Cause indeed depends not on it but lies remote from it Methinks however it is very feat and shews him pinch't that he can be brought to this Hath a Man no Substance Is he a shadow Or hath he no Essence Is he a Non-entity Or is his Essence a Body Then a Body is a Man Or is his Essence a Spirit Then a Spirit is a Man If he say either of these I wish he would tell us the quantity of those Propositions that we may know whether he means that every Body is a Man or every Spirit is a Man I am sure where the Essence is there must be the Essentiatum Or whether Soul and Body united make nothing different from either or both disunited Or whether a Man be only such a thing as a Pye Or why might not a Pudding serve as well if made up of several Ingredients He hath greatly indeed oblig'd Mankind for such an Honour done them If indeed the Cause depended on it he would have good store of Philosophers to confute and all that have any concern for their own kind before he could disprove the possibility of the supposed Union in the Deity and you have nothing for it but his bare word Which at least without the addition of his Name will not do the business Nor if he could also bring us a demonstration against the Union of Soul and Body can he thereby prove such an Union as we suppose in the Godhead impossible The case is quite another The Union of the Soul and Body was never by me called essential for I well know if they were essentially united in the strict sense they could never be disunited But 't is commonly call'd a substantial Union and I called it natural in respect of the Principle Nature in contradistinction to Art As for the supposed Union we speak of in the Deity that being necessary original eternal it must be essential or none but with such distinction as before was supposed For it was Union not Identity that was meant which Union with such distinction till they be proved impossible the Enquirer's Cause is untoucht And is certainly to any such purpose not in the least touch'd by the Considerator Whether there be any such Union that may admit to be called essential among the Creatures doth neither make nor marr We have never said there was nor doth the stress of the Cause lie upon it I find indeed an ingenious merry Gentleman animadverts upon a Postscript writ against the Sober Enquiry and upon a Letter in answer to it who at a venture calls all essential Union essential Contradiction and substantial Nonsense Who this is I will not pretend to guess only I guess him not to be the same with the Considerator for this besides other Reasons that he calls the Author of the Considerations a great Man and I scarce think he would call himself so His Wit and sportful Humour I should have liked better in a less serious Affair For this heboldly pronounces in immediate reference to the Trinity it self that the World might know he hath a Confidence at least equal to his Wit I can easily abstain from asserting that any created Unions are to be called strictly essential because then they must be simply indissoluble And I see not but whatsoever things the Creator hath united he may disunite if he be so pleased Yet one might have expected this Author to have been a little more civil to him whom he stiles the late famous Dr. More who hath publisht to the World his express Sentiments in this matter that created Spirits have real amplitude made up of indiscerpible parts essentially united so as not to be separable without annihilation of the whole One would think he should not have treated him so as to make his essential Union substantial Nonsense But there are those left in the World who have that Veneration for the Doctor as to think it no indecent rudeness to this Gentleman not to put his judgment in the ballance against the Doctor 's or to distinguish between his calling it Nonsense and proving it so But if any wonder that they who think there is no such thing as an essential Union among Creatures do yet think there may be in the uncreated Being they will shew themselves mighty wise in their wonder i. e. in wondering that the Creatures are not God And if they further hereupon enquire why we will then make use of Unions not essential among Creatures to illustrate that which is supposed essential in the uncreated Being and expect very particular distinct accounts of every thing so represented they will shew themselves as wise in their Expectations i. e. that they think nothing can serve to illustrate unless it be like in all respects That Question still returns Is every thing to be judg'd by any Man of sense impossible in God whereof he hath not given distinct and explicit accounts and illustrations from somewhat in the Creatures And another will be added Is there any thing originally in God not essential to him But when the World is so full of instances of substantial Unions without Confusion or Identification that he cannot so much as name me a created Substance that he can be sure exists absolutely simple I am sure it can be no contradiction to suppose that there may be uncreated necessary eternal Union without Confusion or Identification and that it would be as he phrases it essential Contradiction or substantial Nonsense to say that things united necessarily tho distinct can possibly ever admit of Separation And if our modern Anti-Trinitarians for I will not call them by the inept Name of Unitarians which as rightfully belongs to them whose Adversaries they are pleas'd to be as to themselves and therefore cannot distinguish the one from the other would allow it to be their Method to understand the Doctrine of the Orthodox Antients before they decry and hoot at it they would find that as they allow sufficient distinction of the sacred Hypostases so the Union they assert is not such as identifies them but only signifies them to be inseparable So speaks Athanasius himself We think not as the Sabellians that the Son is of one and the same Essence with the Father but consubstantial Nor do we assert three Hypostases separated as with Men bodily lest with the Gentiles we should admit Polytheism c. So do Liberius and he agree in Sentiment The