each other and saying that we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit as we have of a Body Against this I urged that if it be possible for Matter to think which you assert then from the Idea of Thinking we cannot prove the Certainty of a Spiritual Substance within us where it is plain that a Spiritual Substance is opposed to the Power of Matter It is not whether Matter so modified can think but whether Matter can think and let it be modified how it will Matter is Matter still But the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit say you But doth it cease to be Matter or not If not then it is Matter still endued with a Power of Thinking and so our Idea can be no other than of a Material Thinking Substance But you say further That the Power of Thinking makes it a Spirit without considering what other Modifications it has whether it hath the Modification of Solidity or not That is Although it be really a Material Substance yet the Modification of Thinking makes it a Spiritual Substance for we are to go no farther than that Modification of Thinking and from thence we are to conclude it to be a Spiritual Substance But we are now enquiring not into the bare Modification of Thinking but whether from thence we can prove an Immaterial Substance within us or which is all one a Spiritual Substance as opposed to Corporeal which is your own Distinction And that I may not be thought to do you injury I shall produce your own Words By the simple Ideas we have taken from our own minds we are able to frame the complex Idea of a Spirit And thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking Perceiving Liberty and Power of moving themselves we have as clear a Perception and Notion of Immaterial Substances as well as material So that here we have two things clear 1. That a Spirit and Immaterial Substance are the same 2. That from the Operations of our Minds we have a clear Idea of an Immaterial Substance within us Again you say That the primary Ideas we have of Body as contradistinguished to Spirit are the Cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulse These you think are the Original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body Here Body is contradistinguished to Spirit and as it is so the Cohesion of solid and separable Parts is made one of the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body as distinguished from a Spiritual Substance How then I pray can a Spiritual Substance consist of solid and separable Parts For whatever is solid you grant to be consequently separable This seems to me to confound the Ideas of Body and Spirit which you had taken so much care to distinguish and so must destroy all Certainty of a Spiritual Substance from your Ideas For although the bare simple Idea of Thinking may be said to be distinct from that of a solid Body yet it is impossible from that Idea so explained to prove a Spiritual Substance as distinct from Body Which was the thing I intended to prove But you go on to compare the Complex Idea of Spirit and Body in these Words Let us compare then our Complex Idea of Spirit without our Complex Idea of Body Our Idea of Bodâ— is an extended solid Substance capable of communicating Motion by Impulse and our Idea of our Souls is of a Substance that thinks and has a Power of exciting Motion in Body by Will and Thought These you think are our Complex Ideas of Soul and Body as contradistinguished Here you do not speak of the bare Ideas of Thinking and Solidity but of the different Substances and one is said to be a solid Substance and the other a Substance that thinks I shall add one passage more to the same purpose The Idea we have of Spirit compared with that we have of Body stands thus The Substance of Spirit is unknown to us and so is the Substance of Body equally unknown to us Here we have again the Substance of Spirit and the Substance of Body distinguished from each other and not the bare Modifications So that I need no body to answer you but your self But least such expressions should be thought a mere slip of the Pen you are pleased again to assert the Notion of an Immaterial knowing Substance to imply no more of a Contradiction than an extended divisible Body And yet after all this you confess That you have not proved an Immaterial Substance and that it cannot be proved upon your Principles What is the meaning of this I cannot think you intended to lessen the Authority of your Book in so considerable a part of it And I should much rather have thought the latter Passage a slip of your Pen but that in your Letter you go about to defend it Therefore I must attend your Motions in it You say That all the great ends of Religion and Morality are secured barely by the Immortality of the Soul without a necessary supposition that the Soul is Immaterial I am of opinion that the great ends of Religion and Morality are best secured by the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul from its Nature and Properties and which I think prove it Immaterial I do not question whether God can give Immortality to a Material Substance but I say it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality if it depend wholly upon God's giving that which of its own Nature it is not capable of For if the Soul be a material Substance it is really nothing but Life or Matter put into Motion with such Organs and Parts as are necessary to hold them together and when Death comes then this Material Substance so modified is lost God may by his Power grant a new Life but will any man say God can preserve the Life of a Man when he is dead This is a plain Absurdity and I think no such thing tends to preserve Religion or Morality Mr. Hobbes speaks very consonantly to his own Principles although not to those of Religion and Morality For he saith That the universe being the Aggregate of all Bodies there is no real part of it that is not also a Body And so he saith That Substance and Body signifie the same thing and therefore Substance Incorporeal are Words which destroy one another But what then is a Spirit That he saith in the proper signification of it in common Speech is either a subtle fluid invisible Body or a Ghost or other Idol or Phantasm of the Imagination But is there not an Immortal Soul in Man The Promise of Immortality saith he is made to the Man and not to the Soul and Immortal Life doth not begin in Man till the Resurrection From whence it is plain he look'd on the Soul as nothing but the Life and so he saith That Soul and Life in Scripture do usually signifie the same thing And in
the Vindication of his Leviathan he saith That his Doctrine is that the Soul is not a separated Substance but that the Man at his Resurrection shall be revived And he answers that place Fear not them which kill the Body but cannot kill the Soul thus Man cannot kill a Soul for the Man killed shall revive again I think he might as well have said That Man cannot kill the Body for that shall be revived at the Resurrection But what is all this to you I hope nothing at all But it shews that those who have gone about to overthrow the Immortality of the Soul by Nature have not been thought to secure the great ends of Religion and Morality And although we think the separate State of the Soul after Death is sufficiently revealed in Scripture yet it creates a great difficulty in understanding it if the Soul be nothing but Life or a Material Substance which must be dissolved when Life is ended For if the Soul be a Material Substance it must be made up as others are of the Cohesion of solid and separate Parts how minute and invisible soever they be And what is it which should keep them together when Life is gone So that it is no easie matter to give an account how the Soul should be capable of Immortality unless it be an Immaterial Substance and then we know the Solution of the Texture of Bodies cannot reach the Soul being of a different Nature And this is no more than what the wisest and most intelligent Philosophers have asserted merely from the consideration of the Nature and Properties of the Soul as you very well know and I need not for your sake run into such a Digression or as you call it step out of my way any farther then you give occasion for it in what follows For you tell me You have great Authorities to justifie your using a Spiritual Substance without excluding Materiality from it And for this you refer me to two great men indeed among the Romans Cicero and Virgil. I was surprized at what you say out of Cicero having been no stranger to his Writings about these matters and I have consulted the place you refer to where you say that he opposes Corpus to Ignis and Anima i. e. Breath and that the Foundation of his distinction of the Soul from the Body is because it is so subtle as to be out of Sight It is a very easie matter to multiply Citations out of Cicero where Spiritus and Anima are both taken for Breath but any one who will but read the very beginning of his Tusculan Questions may understand his meaning For in the Entrance of that Dispute he takes Animus for the Soul and neither Anima nor Spiritus and he tells us there were two opinions about it at Death Some held a Discessus Animi à Corpore a departure of the Soul from the Body others said that the Soul never departed but was extinguished with Life and the several opinions he sets down at large Ch. 9 10. and then Ch. 11. he summs up the different opinions and saith he If it be the Heart or Blood or Brain because it is a Body it will be extinguished with it If it be Anima the Vital Breath it will be dissipated if it be Fire it will be extinguished It is true he distinguishes here the Vital Breath from the Body and no one questions such a distinction of the Animal and Vital Spirits from the grosser parts of the Body but all this proceeds upon the Supposition of those who held nothing to survive after Death but then he goes on to those who held the Souls when they are gone out of their Bodies to go to Heaven as their proper Habitation And here he plainly supposes the Soul not to be a finer sort of Body but of a different Nature from the Body which it leaves Nam Corpus quidem saith he quasi vas est receptaculum Animi C. 22. and elsewhere he calls the Body the Prison of the Soul C. 30. and saith That every wise Man is glad to be dismissed out of the Bonds and Darkness of it and his business in the Body is secernere Animum à Corpore to draw off the Soul from the Body which the Philosophers called Commentatio mortis i. e. a Continual Exercise of Dying therefore saith he Disjungamus nos à Corporibus id est consuescamus mori Is it possible now to think so great a Man look'd on the Soul but as a Modification of the Body which must be at an end with Life Instead of it there are several things very remarkable in this very Book concerning the Immortality of Souls by Nature 1. He extremely despises those who made the Soul a mere Mode of Matter which was extinguished with Life and he saith they were Plebeii Philosophi Ch. 23. a mean sort of Philosophers and in another place minuti Philosophi De Senect c. 23. who held there was no Sense after Death But he represents Cato there as weary of the Noise and Filth of this World and longing to go to far better Company O praeclarum diem cum ad illud Divinum Animorum Concilium Coetumque proficiscar atque ex hâc turbâ colluvione discedam Did these men look on the Souls of Men as mere Modifications of Matter 2. He urges the general Consent of Nations for the Permanency of Souls after Death c. 16. and he affirms Nature it self de Immortalitate Animorum tacitè judicare c. 14. And I do not think the general Consent of Mankind in this Matter so uncertain or so slight an argument as some have made it even since the late Discoveries as I think it were no hard Matter to prove but I shall not here go out of my way to do it 3. The most ancient Philosophers of Greece held the same opinion as he shews from Pherecydes Pythagoras Socrates Plato c. c. 16 17 c. and they went upon far better Reasons than the other as he proves at large c. 21 22 23. 4. That the Bodies and Souls of Men have a different Frame and Original Our Bodies he saith c. 19. are made of Terrestrial Principles but the Souls he saith are of a divine Original and if we could give an account how they were made we should likewise how they were dissolved c. 14. as we may of the Parts and Contexture of Bodies but saith he Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest nihil est enim in animis mixtum atque concretum aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur c. 27. So that here he plainly makes a Difference between our Bodily Substance and that of our Souls which have no bodily Texture and Composition because there is no material Substance which can reach to the wonderfull Faculties and Operations of the Soul and therefore he concludes in these words Singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis
animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis What can express the Soul to be of a different Substance from the Body if these words do it not And presently adds That the Mind is of a divine and Spiritual Nature and above Material Composition as God himself is I hope this may give you satisfaction as to Cicero how far he was from making the Soul a Material Substance And the only place you produce out of him c. 22. proves nothing but that the Soul is Invisible as you may see by looking upon it again As to Virgil you quote that Expression Dum Spiritus hos regit artus where it is taken for the Vital Spirit which sense I know no body questions and so Tully expresses life quae Corpore Spiritu continetur and opposes it to a Life of Immortal Fame which he there speaks of Pro Marcello c. 9. but the only matter in debate is Whether they excluded any other Notion of Spirit which was not done as I have made it appear concerning Cicero and so I shall of Virgil too For soon after Aeneid 4.385 he hath these Words Et cum frigida mors Animae seduxerit Artus Omnibus Vmbra locis adero dabis improbe poenas Which shews that Virgil did believe the Soul to be more than a mere Vital Spirit and that it subsisted and acted in a separate State And it is observed by Servius that Virgil uses Spiritus Mens and Animus for the same In Aeneid 6.726 Spiritus intus alit totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem And he proves that Virgil asserted the Immortality of Souls and answers the arguments against it and as far as he could understand he saith that our Bodies are from the Elements and our Souls from God and the Poets intention was Vt Animos immortales diceret So that neither Cicero nor Virgil do you any kindness in this matter being both Assertors of the Souls Immortality by Nature If these will not do you bring me to Scripture and say that Solomon himself speaks after the same manner about Man and Beast as the one dieth so dieth the other yea they have all one Spirit Eccles. 3.19 I will not dispute about the proper Sense of the Hebrew Word but I must about Solomon's Sense For although he makes Life and Death common to Man and Beast yet he saith v. 21. The Spirit of a Man goeth upward and the Spirit of a Beast goeth down to the Earth But you say If the Notion of a Spirit excludes Materiality then the Spirit of a Beast must be Immaterial as well as that of a Man I answer that although the bare Word doth not prove it yet the design of Solomon's Discourse doth and so the going upward of the Spirit of a Man must be understood in a very different Sense from the going downward of the Spirit of a Beast For he saith concerning Man That the Spirit shall return to God that gave it c. 12.7 To what purpose To be dissipated in the common Air or to be lost in the vast Confusion of Matter no but he concludes his Book thus v. 14. For God shall bring every Work into Iudgment with every secret thing whether it be good or whether it be evil If these be Solomon's Words as no doubt they were and he were a Man of Sense and laid his sayings together as no doubt he did these last Words must interpret the foregoing and his other sayings be made Consonant to this Yes you may say This relates to the general Iudgment and not to the Soul's Subsistence after Death But Solomon speaks of the Spirit of a Man going upward at Death and returning to God that gave it What Sense is there in this if it be a Material Substance which vanishes and is dissolved then And if the Soul be not of it self a free thinking Substance I do not see what Foundation there is in Nature for a Day of Judgment For where there is nothing but Matter there is no Freedom of acting where there is no Liberty there is no Choice where there is no Choice there is no room for Rewards and Punishments and consequently no Day of Iudgment But Solomon positively concludes there will be a Judgment to come as to good and evil Actions in another World and therefore he must be understood in those Expressions to mean a Free and Thinking and consequently an Immaterial Spirit in us But you urge farther That our Saviour himself opposes Spirit to Flesh and Bones Luk. 24.39 i. e. to such a gross Compages as could be seen and felt The question then was whether it were the real Body of Christ or only an Appearance of it and how could this be resolved better than our Saviour doth Handle me and see for a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones as you see me have But he calls this a Spirit What follows Therefore a Spirit is only an Appearance I do not think that is your meaning And no body questions but the name of Spirits is sometimes given to Apparitions But this is far from our case which is whether that real Spiritual Substance we find in our selves be Material or not Doth a Spiritual Substance imply Matter in its Idea or not You cannot say it doth Then it may be Immaterial But how come we to know things but by their distinct Ideas Is the Idea of Matter and Spirit distinct or not If not to what purpose do we talk of Knowledge by Ideas when we cannot so much as know Body and Spirit from each other by them Is it then any Absurdity to call a Spiritual Substance Immaterial No you say You would not be thought to affirm that Spirit never does signifie a purely Immaterial Substance for in that Sense the Scripture attributes the Notion of Spirit to God and you have proved from your Principles that there is a Spiritual Immaterial Substance And this you think proves an Immaterial Substance in your way of Ideas But of that afterwards We are yet upon the proving an Immaterial Substance in our selves from the Ideas we have by Sensation and Reflection Now I say still this is impossible if the Spiritual Substance in us may be material And at last you grant That what I say is true that it cannot upon these Principles be demonstrated Then say I Your grounds of Certainty from Ideas are plainly given up But you say it may be proved probable to the highest Degree But that is not the point for it is not Probability but Certainty that we are promised in this way of Ideas and that the Foundation of our Knowledge and real Certainty lies in them and is it dwindled into a Probability at last The only reason I had to engage in this matter was a bold Assertion that the Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning and that our Certainty lies in perceiving the Agreement or
Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition which last are your own Words How can we then be certain where we have no Ideas from Sensation or Reflection to proceed by As in the present case I have a Mind to be resolved whether the Soul in Man be an Immaterial Substance or not and we are to judge of the Truth of it by our Ideas I ask then What Idea you have of the Soul by Reflection You answer That it is a Thinking Substance But doth this prove it Immaterial You answer That you cannot be certain but that it is very probable Is not this giving up the Cause of Certainty But you say You never offer'd it as a way of Certainty where we cannot reach Certainty But did you not offer to put us into the way of Certainty What is that but to attain Certainty in such things where we could not otherwise do it And what a strange way is this if it fails us in some of the first Foundations of the real Knowledge of our selves But you say If I dislike your way you desire me to shew you a better way of Certainty as to these points I am sensible that you design herein to draw me out of my way to do you a kindness but I will so far gratifie you at this time and to oblige you the more I will make use of no other Principles or Ideas than such as I meet with in your Book and from thence I do not despair of proving that we may be certain that a material Substance cannot think And the method I shall proceed in shall be to prove it by such ways and steps as you have directed me to although you might not think to find them so laid together 1. From your general Principles as to Knowledge and Certainty You say That all our Knowledge consists in the view the Mind hath of its own Ideas which is the utmost Light and greatest Certainty we with our Faculties and in our way of Knowledge are capable of Here you resolve our Knowledge and Certainty into the view of the Ideas in our Minds therefore by those Ideas we may come to know the Certainty of things not in the Frame and inward Essence of them as you often tell us but by the Powers and Properties which belong to them Whatever say you be the secret and abstract Nature of Substance in general all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas And you take pains to prove That Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances and their secondary Qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to distinguish Substances one from another which secondary Qualities as has been shewn are nothing but bare Powers So that our Knowledge cannot reach the inward Substance of things and all our Certainty of Knowledge as to them and their Distinction from each other must depend on those Powers and Properties which are known to us One would think sometimes that you would allow Mankind no more Knowledge than suits with the Conveniencies of Life but this would overthrow the great design of your Book which is to put us into a way of real Certainty by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas and where ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas there is certain Knowledge So that here you own we may come to a Certainty of Knowledge which is beyond mere Probability and that by perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas 2. If we can find the Disagreement of any two Ideas upon your own Principles we must do those of Body and Spirit For the Idea of Matter in general you say That in Truth it contains nothing but the Idea of a solid Substance which is every-where the same every-where uniform And that Body stands for a solid extended figured Substance So that Solidity Extension and Figure are the inseparable Properties of Bodies And in another place you have these Words The primary Ideas we have peculiar to Bodies as contradistinguished to Spirit are the Cohesion of solid and consequently separable Parts and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulse These you think are the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body for Figure is but the consequence of finite Extension Here we have the Idea of Body laid down by your self as contradistinguished to Spirit Therefore by your own confession we may perceive the Disagreement of these two Ideas of Body and Spirit and consequently may certainly know their Distinction from each other by their inseparable Properties But if it be possible for Matter to think then these Ideas must be confounded Yet you distinguish the Ideas of a Material and Immaterial Substance in these Words Putting together the Ideas of Thinking and Willing and the Power of Motion or Rest added to Substance we have the Idea of a Spirit and putting together the Ideas of solid coherent Parts a Power of being moved joyned with Substance we have the Idea of Matter The one is as clear and distinct an Idea as the other the Idea of Thinking and Moving a Body being as clear and distinct Ideas as the Ideas of Extension Solidity and being moved Can any thing now be plainer than the Disagreement of these two Ideas by the several Properties which belong to them But if after all this Matter may Think what becomes of these clear and distinct Ideas And yet you have thâ—se Words Thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking Perceiving Liberty and Power of moving themselves and other things we have as clear a Perception and Notion of Immaterial Substances as we have of Material Here it is plain that you make Thinking and Perceiving to be part of the Complex Idea of an Immaterial Substance How is this possible if a Material Substance be capable of Thinking as well as an Immaterial either therefore you must renounce your own Doctrine of Certainty by Ideas or you must conclude that Matter cannot think 3. But I urge this yet further from your Notion of Liberty and Necessity Liberty you say is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any Action according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind whereby either of them is preferred to the other So that Liberty cannot be where there is no Thought no Volition no Wish And again Agents that have no Thought no Volition at all are necessary Agents But you make a Power of Thinking and Liberty to be parts of the Complex Idea of an Immaterial Substance in the Words before cited But what Liberty can you conceive in mere Matter For you grant That Bodies can operate upon one another only by Impulse and Motion that the Primary Qualities of Bodies which are inseparable from it are Extension Solidity Figure and Mobility from any Body Now how can the Idea of Liberty agree with these simple Ideas of Body
THE Bishop of Worcester's ANSWER TO Mr. Locke's Letter Concerning Some PASSAGES Relating to his ESSAY OF Humane Understanding Mention'd in the late Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity With a POSTSCRIPT in answer to some Reflections made on that Treatise in a late Socinian Pamphlet LONDON Printed by I. H. for Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yard 1697. THE Bishop of Worcester's Answer TO Mr. Locke's Letter c. SIR I Have seriously consider'd the Letter you were pleased to send me and I find it made up of two Parts A Complaint of me and a Vindication of your self To both which I shall return as clear and distinct on Answer and in as few words as the matter will permit 1. As to the Complaint of me it runs quite through the Book and even your Postscript is full of it The substance of it is that in answering Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason I produce several Passages out of your Essay of Humane Vnderstanding as if they were intended by you to that Purpose but you declare to the World p. 150. that it was written by you without any Thought of the Controversie between the Trinitarians and Unitarians and p. 224. That your Notions about Ideas have no Connexion with any Objections that are made by others against the Doctrine of the Trinity or against Mysteries And therefore you complain of it as an Injury done to you in imputing that to you which you have not done p. 95. or at least in leaving it so doubtfull that the Reader cannot distinguish who is meant p. 96. and this you call my peculiar way of Writing in this part of my Treatise Now to give you and others satisfaction as to this matter I shall first give an account of the Occasion of it and then shew what Care I took to prevent Misunderstanding about it The Occasion was this Being to answer the Objections in Point of Reason which had not been answered before the first I mention'd was That it was above Reason and therefore not to be believed in answer to this I proposed two Things to be consider'd 1. What we understand by Reason 2. What Ground in Reason there is to reject any Doctrine above it when it is proposed as a matter of Faith As to the former I observ'd that the Vnitarians in their late Pamphlets talk'd very much of clear and distinct Ideas and Perceptions and that the Mysteries of Faith were repugnant to them but never went about to state the Nature and Bounds of Reason in such a manner as those ought to have done who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe But I added that a late Author in a Book call'd Christianity not Mysterious had taken upon him to clear this Matter whom for that cause I was bound to consider the design of his Discourse related wholly to Matters of Faith and not to Philosophical Speculations so that there can be no Dispute about his Application of those he calls Principles of Reason and Certainty When the Mind makes use of intermediate Ideas to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas received into them this Method of Knowledge he saith is properly called Reason or Demonstration The Mind as he goes on receives Ideas two ways 1. By Intromission of the Senses 2. By considering its own Operations And these simple and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning And so all our Certainty is resolved into two things either immediate Perception which is self-Evidence or the use of intermediate Ideas which discovers the Certainty of any thing dubious which is what he calls Reason Now this I said did suppose That we must have clear and distinct Ideas of what-ever we pretend to any Certainty of in our minds by Reason and that the only way to attain this Certainty is by comparing these Ideas together which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reason where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas From hence I proceeded to shew that we could not have such clear and distinct Ideas as were necessary in the present Debate either by Sensation or Reflection and consequently we could not attain to any Certainty about it for which I instanced in the Nature of Substance and Person and the Distinction between them And by vertue of these Principles I said That I did not wonder that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning had almost discarded Substance out of the Reasonable Part of the World Which Expression you tell me you do not understand But if you had pleased to have look'd back on the Words just before a Person of your Sagacity could not have missed the Meaning I intended Which are Now this is the case of Substance it is not intromitted by the Senses nor depends upon the Operations of the Mind and cannot be within the compass of our Reason But you say That if I mean that you deny or doubt that there is in the World any such thing as Substance I shall acquit you of it if I look into some Passages in your Book which you refer to But this is not the point before us whether you do own Substance or not but whether by vertue of these Principles you can come to any Certainty of Reason about it And I say the very places you produce do prove the contrary which I shall therefore set down in your own Words both as to Corporeal and Spiritual Substances When we talk or think of any particular sort of Corporeal Substance as Horse Stone c. tho' the Idea we have of either of them be but the Complication or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities which we use to find united in the thing called Horse or Stone yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone or one in another we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject which Support we denote by the name Substance tho' it be certain we have no clear or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support The same happens concerning Operations of the Mind viz. Thinking Reasoning c. which we considering not to subsist of themselves nor apprehending how they can belong to Body or be produced by it we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Substance which we call Spirit whereby yet it is evident that having no other Notion or Idea of Matter but something wherein those many sensible Qualities which affect our Senses do subsist by supposing a Substance wherein Thinking Knowing Doubting and a Power of Moving c. do subsist we have as clear a Notion of the Nature or Substance of Spirit as we have of Body the one being supposed to be without knowing what it is the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without and the other supposed with a like Ignorance of what it is to be the Substratum to those Operations which we experiment in
To be moved only by Impulse from another Body and from the free Determination of our own Thoughts are two Ideas as disagreeing with each other as we can well imagine But if Matter may Think it may have Liberty too because you join these together but if it be uncapable of Liberty which goes along with Thinking how can you imagine it should be capable of Thinking I argue from your Notion of Personal Indentity which you place in self Consciousness For you tell us That a Person is a thinking intelligent Being that has Reason and Reflection and can consider it self as it self the same thinking thing in different times and places which it does only by that Consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and seems to you essential to it From whence it follows that if there can be no Self-consciousness in Matter then it cannot think because it wants that which you say is Essential to it It being impossible for any one to perceive but he must perceive that he doth perceive But what is there like Self-consciousness in Matter Or how is it possible to apprehend that meer Body should perceive that it doth perceive For Bodies you say operate only by Impulse and Motion i. e. one Body upon another But how can a Body operate upon it self without Motion Those you call the Secondary Qualities of Bodies are only you say the effect of the Powers in some Bodies upon others endued with Sense and Perception So that the effects of these Powers in Bodies or of the Primary Qualities of Bulk Site Figure Motion c. is not upon themselves but upon other Bodies either by changing those Primary Qualities in them by different Site Figure Motion c. or producing those Effects in us or which we call Sensible Qualities But either of these ways there is no possibility for Matter to operate upon it self in a way of Self-consciousness If then every intelligent thinking Being have this so inseparably belonging to it that you say It is impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he doth perceive and it be impossible from the Idea of Matter to make out that a meer Body can perceive that it doth perceive I think it is more than probable in the way of Ideas that Matter cannot think 5. I argue from the power of Abstracting which you make proper to a thinking Substance This is done say you by considering Ideas in the Mind as separate from the Circumstances of Time and Place And this power of abstracting you add puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to You tell me That you did not say the chief Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly or any ways in this that Brutes cannot abstract for Brutes not being able to do any thing cannot be any Excellency of Mankind But I hope it is the Excellency of Mankind that they are able to do what the Brutes cannot And you say This puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes and I had thought in comparing Man and Brutes that which put a perfect Distinction was the chief Excellency with respect to them But let that be as it will the thing I insist upon is the power of Abstracting following that of Thinking so closely that you utterly deny it to Brutes but if it may be in the power of Matter to think how comes it to be so impossible for such Organized Bodies as the Brutes have to inlarge their Ideas by Abstraction Pomponatius thinks to avoid the Argument from Abstraction to prove the Souls Imateriality by saying That in the most abstract Speculation the Mind rests upon Particulars Vniversale in singulari speculatur But this doth not reach the force of the Argument which is not whether the Mind hath not an Eye to Particulars when it forms Universal Notions but whether the power of forming such Abstract Ideas from Particulars do not argue a Power which meer Matter can never attain to And all that Philosopher hath said doth not amount to the least Proof of it 6. Lastly I argue from the Reason you give why God must be an Immaterial Substance For these are the words in your Letter And the Idea of an Eternal actual knowing Being is perceived to have a Connection with the Idea of Immateriality by the Intervention of the Idea of Matter and of its actual Division Divisibility and Want of Perception c. Here the want of Perception is owned to be so essential to Matter that God is therefore concluded to be Immaterial and this is drawn from the Idea and Essential Properties of Matter and if it be so Essential to it that from thence you concluded God must be an Immaterial Substance I think the same Reason will hold as to any thinking Substance Because the Argument is not drawn from any thing peculiar to the Divine Perfections but from the general Idea of Matter But after all you tell me That God being Omnipotent may give to a System of very subtil matter Sense and Motion Your words before were a Power to perceive or think and about that all our debate runs and here again you say That the Power of Thinking joined to Matter makes it a Spiritual Substance But as to your Argument from God s Omnipotency I answer That this comes to the same Debate we had with the Papists about the Possibility of Transubstantiation For they never imagin'd that a Body could be present after the manner of a Spirit in an ordinary way but that by God's Omnipotent Power it might be made so but our Answer to them was That God doth not change the Essential Properties of things while the things themselves remain in their own Nature And that it was as repugnant for a Body to be after the manner of a Spirit as for a Body and Spirit to be the same The same we say in this Case We do not set bounds to God's Omnipotency For he may if he please change a Body into an Immaterial Substance but we say that while he continues the Essential Properties of Things it is as impossible for Matter to think as for a Body by Transubstantiation to be present after the manner of a Spirit and we are as certain of one as we are of the other These things I thought necessary on this occasion to be cleared because I look on a mistake herein to be of dangerous Consequence as to the great Ends of Religion and Morality which you think may be secured although the Soul be allowed to be a Material Substance but I am of a very different Opinion For if God doth not change the Essential Properties of things their Nature remaining then either it is impossible for a Material Substance to think or it must be asserted that a Power of thinking is within the Essential Properties of Matter and so thinking will be such a Mode of Matter as Spinoza hath made
Man not for any Specifick Name but because his Properties shew him to be endued with the true real Essence of a Man I said that the general Idea is not made from the simple Ideas but by meer Act of the Mind abstracting from Circumstances but from Reason and Consideration of things You Reply That you thought Reason and Consideration had been meer Acts of the Mind when any thing was done by them I hope the Ideas you have of the Acts of your own Mind are clearer than those you have of other Mens For it is plain I opposed your General and Abstract Idea by a meer Act of the Mind to a Rational Inference from the Nature and Properties of things For I added for when I see so many Individuals that have the same Powers and Properties we thence inferr there must be something common to all which makes them of one kind and if the difference of Kinds be real that which makes them of one kind and not of another must not be a Nominal but a Real Essence Is there now no difference between these Two Acts of the Mind viz. Abstraction and Ratiocination And you grant that the Inference is true But you say it doth not follow that the general or specifick Idea is not made by the meer Act of the Mind Where do I deny that Abstraction is made by an Act of the Mind But that is not the Question but whether the Notion of Essence in Individuals of the same kind be a meer Act of the Mind by Abstraction or have a real Foundation in the Nature of Things i. e. whether it be a Real or a Nominal Essence But you say There may be Objections to the Name of Nominal Essence My Objection is not to the Name but to the Thing you understand by it viz. that there is nothing beyond Individuals but Names which utterly overthrows the Difference of Nature and Person For if there be nothing really but an individuated Essence then it must follow that there can be no difference of Hypostases in the same Nature For Nature individuated must take in the Hypostasis and Nature being taken as common is affirmed by you to be nothing but an Abstract and Complex Idea and a mere Nominal Essence You say That we cannot know the differences of things by their real Essences And what then Do I ever deny that the difference of kinds is to be understood from the different Properties But we are not upon our Knowledge of the difference of Species but upon the Real and Nominal Essence And I shew'd that the real Essence doth not depend upon Complex Ideas because if men mistake never so much in the Combination of Ideas yet the same Essence remains as I instanced in the Essence of a Man a Horse and a Tree True you say Our Thoughts or Ideas cannot alter the real Constitutions of things that exist but the Change of Ideas can and does alter the signification of their Names and thereby alter the kinds which by these Names we rank and sort them into But this doth by no means reach the point which is not concerning our sorting of Things which is by Names but God's sorting them when he made them of different kinds For so I said that the Essences remain always the same because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men but on the Will of the Creator who hath made several sorts of Beings All the Answer you give is this That the real Constitution or Essence of particular things existing do not depend on the Ideas of Men but on the Will of the Creator but their being ranked into sorts under such and such Names does depend and wholly depend upon the Ideas of Men. But my Argument did not proceed upon particular things existing but upon the several kinds of God's making and is it possible for you to think that the kinds are not of his making but that Men only by their Ideas make the several sorts If so I have very little hopes to remove you from your Ideas but I am bound to do what in me lies to hinder such Notions from overthrowing the Mysteries of our Faith And it is a great satisfaction to me to find that these Notions of Ideas as far as they tend that way have so very little Foundation in Reason or rather are so manifestly repugnant to them Before I conclude my self I must take notice of your Conclusion viz. That you must content your self with this condemned way of Ideas and despair of ever attaining any knowledge by any other than that or farther than that will lead me to it Which is in effect to say that you see no way to avoid Scepticism but this but my great Prejudice against it is that it leads to Scepticism or at least that I could find no way to attain to Certainty in it upon your own grounds For 1. you say That Knowledge to you seems to be nothing but the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas In this alone it consists Whence it unavoidably follows that where we can have no Ideas we can have no Knowledge But you go about to prove That there are many more Beings in the World of which we have no Ideas than those of which we have any and that one holds no Proportion to the other So that we are excluded from any Possibility of attaining to knowledge as to the far greatest part of the Universe for want of Ideas and yet you say That he that will consider the infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness of the Creator of all things will find Reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable mean and impotent a Creature as he will find man to be who in all Probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings And not long after you say That the Intellectual World is a greater Certainly and more beautifull World than the Material But whence comes this Certainty where there can be no Ideas Is a general Reason sufficient without particular Ideas Then why not in other cases as well 2. Suppose we have no Ideas of the Intellectual World yet surely we may have as to the visible World No you say That although we have Ideas of Bulk Figure and Motion in general yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk Figure and Motion of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Vniverse we are ignorant of the several Powers Efficacies and Ways of Operation whereby the Effects we daily see are produced These are hid from us in some things by being too remote in others by being two minute So that you confess We can attain to no Science either as to Bodies or Spirits And what a narrow compass must our Knowledge then be confined to You confess We have no Ideas of the Mechanical Assertions of the minute Particles of Bodies and this hinders our