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spirit_n body_n let_v soul_n 7,333 5 5.2669 4 false
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ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A55472 A rational catechism, or, An instructive conference between a father and son Popple, William, d. 1708. 1687 (1687) Wing P2966; ESTC R25590 45,595 164

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S. My aim being to seek my own Happiness I conceiv easily that it is not obtainable first without som competent Knowledg of my self who am the Subject of it next without som Knowledg of that Happiness which is the Object of my Desire and lastly without the Knowledg of the Means that lead unto it And therfore I conclude it may be proper enough for me to begin my Study with an Enquiry into my own Nature That I suppose wil also shew me what sort of Happiness I am capable of And I esteem that it wil then be seasonable to look after it F. Very wel I like thy Method It is orderly And the prosecution of it wil probably bring into consideration whatever other Topic may be material to our Subject Now that we may proceed therin I would have thee reflect seriously upon what thou judgest most observable in thy self and then tel me what manner of thing thou takest thy self to be S. I can not but observ that where ever I am I fil som place even as al other material things that surround me And therfore what ever I am I think my self to be framed of the same matter as they ar F. So far right But dost thou not further perceiv som Facultys in thy self which ar peculiar to Mankinde and which none of those other material things that surround us ar endued with S. Yes I have Sense which is not found in Stocks and Stones And I have further this Faculty of thinking reflecting or reasoning wherin you now exercise me which I take to denote som Excellency in Mankinde vastly different from any thing even in Animals and that not onely in Degree but Essence F. These two Observations of thine lmply this Definition of our selvs That we ar thinking Substances But it remains stil to be enquired Whether that forementioned material part of us which thou hast observed to fil som place or as others express it to be extended I say Whether that be not the very same thing with that which thinks and that so this thinking and reasoning be nothing else but an effect produced by the different Modification and Motion of that Matter wherof we ar composed Or on the contrary Whether our thinking Faculty proceed from any other different and really distinct Principle This Consideration is important Weigh it carefully S. I hope I have not been too rash in hinting already that I ghest that Faculty to denote som Excellency in us essentially different from any thing in Animals whose Composition I suppose to be one of the perfectest Productions of modifyed Matter F. I do not say thou hast been too shra in that Assertion But however without determining any thing about Animals the knowledge of whose Nature is of little Consequence to us I desire to hear thee explain more particularly upon what ground thou fancyest any Principle in thy self to be essentially different from Matter S. If I finde any Operation whatsoever in my self abov the Power of matter I must needs conclude that it proceeds from som Principle of a different Nature F. Canst thou giv me any Instances of such like Operations S. When I reflect upon the nature of Matter its extension its divisibility its aptitude to receiv never so various Modifications and Motions yet into what ever Form or Motion I conceiv it put I can not for my life finde any such thing to result from thence as that bare Sensation which I am endowed withal Much less therfore is it to be reputed the Principle of my nobler Facultys F. What ar those nobler Facultys which thou thinkest meer Matter least capable to produce S. They are chiefly Memory and Ratiocination F. Why dost thou affirm that Matter is not capable of Memory S. If we were composed onely of meer Matter then al the Remembrance that we have of any thing would be effected by material Impresses or Characters placed in that part of our Body where that Faculty resides F. I grant it And why may we not believ that it is so S. The multitude of things that we remember would upon that Supposition require such a multitude of different Characters that it is impossible any such part of our Body wherin that Faculty can be placed should contain them much less could it retain them in that Order and represent them in that manner to our Imagination as we finde we have them F. It dos indeed seem absurd that so many various things as we have in our Minde should have there so many distinct material Existencys And that wil appear yes the more absurd if we observ that amongst those Ideas which replenish our Minde there ar som of them of things immaterial as Truth and Falsehood Vertu and Vice Honor and Dishonor and the like But lot us go on Explain to me now why Ratiocination can not be performed by meer Matter S. That needs no further explaining than onely to settle the meaning of the word By Ratiocination therfore I understand that Act of the Minde wherby comparing together such Notions as either have been long or ar but newly implanted therin we from thence draw Consequences and raise other Notions which we were formerly ignorant of Now if Memory alone be beyond the Power of Matter it is past al doubt that this further Act which revises and compares such things as ar already in the Memory must needs be much more so F. These Difficultys of explaining divers Operations that we finde in our selvs by the Power of Matter I allow to be invincible But therfore since we ar stil sure that we ar capable of those Operations it remains that thou explain unto me by what other means they ar performed and shew me that different Principle from which they proceed S. Alas you now pose me I am not able to do it Those very things Thinking and Reasoning ar themselvs the most essential Characters that I know of that Being which exercises them I am onely sure that I have them in my self but how they ar performed I am utterly ignorant F. If it be so indeed that thou canst go no further yet consider now at least what all this disquisition we have hitherto made into Humane Nature amounts unto and what consequences arise from thence for thy use S. My knowledg hitherto amounts to this That we have in us two distinct Principles the one wherof is material whose eminent property is Extension the other immaterial whose eminent property is Thought F. Those two principles ar termed Matter and Spirit or in ordinary speech Body and Soul Let us make use therfore of those received expressions And now do thou go on to tel me what consequences thou perceivest to arise from this distinction S. The most important consequence therof is this That our Bodys and Souls being of different natures ar disposed for different injoyments and sufferings The Body is not capable of those pleasures which ar peculiar to the Soul. Nor is the Soul by any evident
in this Pursuit and which is general to al Mankinde For such it must be or none S. I think I can And if I had not ghest at it beforehand this last Character which you require in it is too evident a Distinction to leav any Doubt therupon In a Word The Rule of al our Actions is or ought to be Right Reason This Faculty of Reasoning judges of Truth and Error of Good and Evil weighs one thing with another and chuses the best The Progress you have already helped me to make therin assures me of a greater Perfection hereafter than what I have yet attained unto I now indeed grope after an unknown way and advance not without som Doubts and Fears But I am perswaded that a continued sincere and strict Application to this Exercise wil produce a steady firmness of Judgment capable to direct my Practice And abov al I say that your last forementioned Character takes away al Doubt upon this matter For if God have given any such Rule unto Mankinde as it hath been already proved that he must of necessity have given som it can be no other than this Rule of Reason Becaus none other than this is or can be General And this being so must therfore be esteemed Natural that is to say from God and by consequence also Sufficient F. I'wil not just dispute against these general Arguments which thou hast made use of to prove that God has obligedus unto som sort of Duty and given us the means of knowing it But however I shal esteem the thing yet better proved as wel as illustrated when I shal see thee go through thy next proposed Enquiry with any Accuracy and shew me those particular Dutys that we ar obliged unto S. To do that I must refer our Dutys unto certain principal Heads which are very obvious and from which al particular Branches take their Rise They ar these To God to our Neighbors and to our Selvs And I chuse to begin with the last of them Let us reflect therefore upon our own Nature which we have concluded to be composed of two Principles Matter and Spirit or Body and Soul. These two Principles in us contest frequently between themselvs drawing several ways The Body delights onely in the present gratification of its Senses without knowing any Bounds therof or foreseeing any Consequences The Soul has not onely its own Delights of a more refined nature but it also judges concerning those of the Body It weighs a sensual Gratification with a spiritual Inconvenience a present Good with a future Evil and it is able upon the Comparison of al Circumstances to chuse what is most conducive to the Happiness of the whole Man. Now from this simple Consideration of our own Nature I affirm that there results this plain Duty incumbent upon us viz. That we ought to keep our Bodys in continual Subjection unto our Souls as Servants unto their Masters And the reason of that Duty wil appear yet more evident by the Mischiefs that follow a contrary Practice For where this Subordination is not established al corporeal Gratifications grow excessive And the Excess of such Gratifications breeds enless Inconveniencys Those of eating and drinking cloud and darken the Understanding by the gross Vapors which they send up into the Brain Others enervate the Strength of the Body The very Desire of any of them with earnestness excites Passions breeds Disorder in the Minde and unfits it for Deliberation And the too frequent Indulgment therof possesses the whole Soul and stifles al Thoughts of any nobler Injoyment In a Word therefore it is our indispensable Duty to use great Moderation in al bodily Satisfactions and to preserv the absolute Dominion of the Soul over the Body unviolated F. This is very wel But it is nothing else than what thou sayd'st even now That we ought to govern al our Actions by Reason S. I am very glad it is so And I hope what I shal have occasion to say further in the remainder of my Researches wil continu to prove so likewise I mean that Right Reason and Tru Interest wil be always found to be but one and the same thing F. Proceed then in thy own Method to what thou thinkest fit to explain in the next place S. My next Task is to inquire into those particular Dutys which we ar obliged unto towards our Neighbors And that I may discern them clearly I judg it convenient to take a View of my own Circumstances and of the Relations wherein I stand towards others I consider my self as born naked into the World uncapable to provide or help my self even with the Necessarys much less with the Conveniencys of Life and therefore standing in absolute need of others Assistance From that Estate by the Assistance of others I grow up gradually unto som measure of Strength and become capable of many things But with al that Capacity I am yet far short of being able to provide alone for my own Subsistance For in effect that Provision implys no less than to cultivate the Earth and prepare the Fruits of it for Food and Rayment to kil the Beasts and prepare likewise their Flesh for Meat and their Skins and Fleeces for cloathing to dig up Stones out of the Entrails of the Earth to hew down Trees and build Houses for Defence against the Injurys of Weather The least of which things requires so many Instruments wherwithal they ar to be don so much Art and Labor in the doing that few Men ar capable of executing any one of them without taking Advantage and making use of som thing don by others much less can any Man be ever capable of al. Nevertheless al these things ar so absolutely necessary for us that it is not possible without them to preserv Life or tho it could be preserved yet even Life it self in that Condition would not be desirable This being so I have continual need of my Neighbor's assistance in one thing or another and my Neighbor has the same need of mine To obtain his I must therefore giv him mine and to obtain mine he must giv me his It is not to be had on either side at any other price Thus the Necessity of mutual Succor t ys al Mánkinde together in one common bond It makes it as necessary for each individual Person to endeavor the good of the whole as of himself in particular because he cannot injoy the one but in contributing towards the other There is the obligation of intrest which inforces the duty And our duty resulting from hence is plainly this That we bear an universal Lov and Good-will towards al Men. Or more particularly That we look upon our Neighbor's concernment as our own and that so we be as ready to serv him in any occasion as we desire he should be to serv us Nay that we look upon the general Conternment of Mankinde as far more important than our own and that so we preser the public