be separa le from it than fire may be without heat or water without moisture a man can be without time for that also is in nature after his essence and he may be without a faculty of will or understanding or of affections or of growing to his state or being nourished and then he will be a strange man who will neither have the power of will or understanding of desiring or avoiding of nourishment or growth or any thing that can distinguish him from a beast or a tree or a stone for these are all later than the essence for they are all essential emanations from it thus also quantity can be separated from a substantial body if every thing that is later than the forme can be separated from it When you wrote this you thought it a grosse absurdity to averre that quantity could be separated from a substantial body when you have answered your selfe I shall then take up the Cudgels and reply unto your answer in the mean while I shall consider your argument by which you endeavour to prove quantity separable from a body It stands thus in the resurrection bodies shall be spiritual therefore to be quantitative which is now an essential predicate shall be then taken away For answer 1. If the bodies of the Saints shall be raised without quantity then without extension without integral parts without heads eyes armes legs feet and this would be a very pretty and proper resurrection it would indeed be an invisible resurrection this is a very strange and false assert on contrary as to the constant tenet of both ancient and moderne Divinity so also unto expresse scripture In my flesh saies Job shall I see God whom I shall see for my-selfe and my eyes shall behold and not another Job 19.26 27 the bodies of the Saints shall in the resurrection be conformed unto Christ's glorious body in his Philip 3.21 and that was a visible and palpable body it might be seen and felt it had flesh and bones and hands feet and sides Luk. 24 39 40 John 20.27 see Aquin sup ad 3 am part sum c quaest 30. Art 1. Tertullian upon these words of the Apostles this corruptible shall put on incorruption hath this glosse quantitativam eandem numero essentiam digito demonstrat magis enim expressè loqui non poterat nâ—si cutem suam manibus teneret 2. As for the spirituality of our bodies in the resurrection that shall not be destructive of their quantity for they shall be spiritual not in regard of substance but in respect of either immediate supportance by the spirit or else resemblance unto a spirit 1. In respect of immediate supportance by the spirit without the help of bodily meanes meates drinks sleep medicaments c he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his spirit that dwelleth in you Rom. 3.11 or else 2. As others conjecture in regard of resemblance unto a spirit as touching some particulars in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage but are as the Angels of God in Heaven Matth. 22.30 But that spirituality of the body in Paul's sense of the word is no impeachment unto the quantity of it is evident enough from what you say in your treatise of the Real-presence c for therein you rightly averre that Christ's body is now a spiritual body and yet maintain against the Papists that 't is endued with quantity and hath partem extra partem one part without the other answering to the parts of his place Your second instance is to have succession of duration this is essential to a body think you yet in the resurrection when our bodies shall be eternal it shall be taken away But here Sir my poor Pupils because you are so great a Metaphysitian care not much if they tell you That succession in duration is so far from being essential to a body as that it doth not at all agree thereunto and they have learnt at out of Scheibler Metap lib. 1. cap. 16. n. 48.53.91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 cap. 19. n. 9 10 11 31 32 33 34 35. And Saurez disp 50. Sect. 5. and 7. Metaphysitians no ways inferior unto your great self Out of them they thus argue whatsoever hath a successive duration hath also a successive essence or being but now no body hath a successive essence or being therefore no body hath a successive duration The Major is evident because as Suarez and Scheibler well prove the duration of a thing is not distinguished from the actual existence thereof really but onely ratione ratiocinatâ And then for the Minor it may be thus confirmed Whatsoever hath a successive essence or being hath the parts of its essence in fluxu so that 't is partly past partly present and in part to come but no such thing can be affirm'd of any body and therefore no body hath a successive essence or being Or thus No permanent being hath a successive being or essence but every body is a permanent being therefore no body hath a successive being or essence The Minor that alone askes proof may be thus confirmed Whatsoever hath all the parts of its essence or being together so that in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requisite unto its essential integrity that is a permanent being but every body hath all the parts of its essence or being together so that in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requisite unto its essential integrity Therefore every body is a permanent being If you should say That God onely hath permanency of being according to that of the Psalmist Psal 102.26 27. The Heavens shall perish but thou sha't endure yea all of them shall wax old like a garment as a vesture shalt thou change them and they shall be changed but thou art the same Unto this they will answer That you do but trifle with the equivocation of the word permanency it is they will say opposed unto either mutability or succession if it be opposed unto mutability and defectibility of being then God alone hath permanency of being but if it be opposed unto succession of being then every created being besides motion hath permanency of being and this Scheibler hath taught them Met lib. 1. cap. 19. n. 35. Nullae rei inquit convenit fluxus vel successio partium essentialium praeterquam motui permissive loquendo unde non est tempus successivum nisi tempus quo durat ipse motus nempe sicut essentia motus consistit in successione partium ita etiam duratio motûs consistit in successione partium proinde utrumque est ens successivum si tamen a parte rei loquamur tùm solum unum ens est successivum nempe motus duratio enim motus à parte rei cadem est cum essentiâ ipsà If you should say with Bonaventure and others That succession of duration distinguisheth
superiori agente ad unum oppositum potest potentia propinqua exire in aliud oppositum Concedo ergo quod infert quod Michael beatus sit peccabilis in sensu divisionis loquendo de potentiâ remotâ Dr. Taylor But Sir what think you of Mortality is that essential or of the nature of man I suppose you will not deny it But yet I also believe you will confess that though we are sown a corruptible body yet we shall be raised an incorruptible and the mortal shall put on immortality Ieanes For answer I shall propound a distinction of mortality that is very obvious and ordinary A thing may be said to be mortal either respectu potentiae remotae or respectu potentiae propinquae 1. In respect of a remote power of dying which hath in it the remote cause of dissolution an elementary matter 2. In regard of a near power of dying arising from the actual conflict and corruptive influence of the Elements and their contrary qualities The latter Mortality is separable but then it is not essential As for the former Mortality which alone is essential I think very few doubt but that 't is also inseparable from the nature of a mans body for the immortality and incorruption of the bodies of the Saints in the resurrection will not be by taking away out of their bodies the remote causes of corruption the Elements and their contrary qualities for then their bodies would not be mixt and so not for substance the same that they were but by an hinderance or prevention of the corruptive influence of the Elements and their contrary qualities That I am not singular in this I shall manifest by transcribing the Testimonies of some few School-men who though they differ one from another in assigning the cause and reason of the impassibility and incorruptibility of glorified Bodies yet they all agree with Durand in this That glorified Bodies are not impassible per privationem potentiae passivae sed per aliquod praestans impedimentum actualis passionis nè fiat The first shall be of Scotus lib. 4. dist 49. quaest 13. Dico ergo quod causa impassibilitatis est voluntas divina non coagens causae secundae corruptivae per hoc est illud impassibile non potentia remota sed propinqua non à causâ intrinsecá sed extrinsecâ impediente sicut dictum est de impeccabiliuate supra c. exemplum hujus de igne in camino qui non egit ad consumptionem trium puerorum non quidem per aliquam impassibilitatem intrinsecam pueris nec ex carentrâ potentiae passivae nee ex contrario intrinseco impediente sed quia Deus ex voluntate suá non cooperabatur ad illam actionem The second is of Durand lib. 4. dist 44. quaest 4. Restat ergò quod corpora gloriosa non erunt impassibilia simplicitèr absolutè per privationem principii passivi cùm natura corporum gloriosorum sit futura eadem quae prius sed erunt impassibilia pâ—r aliquid praestans impedimentum actualis passionis nè fiat Quid autem sit illud utrum sit aliqua forma inhaerens an solum virtus divina assistens duplex est opinio dicunt enim quidam quod talis impassibilitas erit per aliquam formam inexistentem c. Alius modus est quod impassibilitas corporum gloriosorum non erit per aliquam formam inhaerentem sed solum per virtutem divinam assistentem beatis ad nutum prohibentem actionem cujuscunque extriaseci inserentis passionem This latter way Durand takes himself and endeavoreth to confirm it by three Reasons The third shall be of Suarez in tertiam part Thom disp 48. p. 531. nam licet in corpore glorioso maneat eadem materia idemque temperamentum ex qualitatibus contrartis inde solum fit corpus illud in nudâ naturâ suâ consideratum esse corruptibile in beatitudine retinere quasi causam remotam seu naturalem radicem corruptionis nihilominus tamen secundum proximam dispositionem intrinsecam esse incorruptibile impassibile quia affectum est aliâ quadam perfectione quae ex se potest impdire nè illa naturalis corruptibilit as in actum reducatur Dr. Taylor Once more Is it natural to be a natural that will not be denyed But then remember that although to be natural is essential that is of the essence of the body yet the natural shall arise without its naturality it is sown a natural body it is raised a spiritual Jeanes 1. That that which is natural is natural will not be denyed as you say but 't is propositio identica nugax a most trifling Tautology and unto what purpose you propound a question concerning it I know not 2. Of things natural unto man some are natural powers some are naturall acts Natural first powers may be and are essential unto the body and so they are inseparable too our Bodies when they shall be raised shall not want so much as one such natural power But natural acts are accidental and in the resurrection there may be no place for the exercise of at least some of them viz Generation Nutrition and the like as touching such things we shall be like the angels in Heaven as it were spiritual 3. In the Apostle 1 Cor. 15.44 it is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a natural body but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an animal or souly body that is actuated and animated by the soul after a natural way and manner by the intervention of bodily helps such as eating drinking sleeping and the like And in all congruence of opposition hereunto a glorious body is said to be a spiritual in regard of an immediate supportance by the spirit without any corporeal means and without any use of the generative and nutritive faculties Dr. Taylor So that you see if I had said this which you charge upon me which is contrary to my thoughts and so against my purpose yet your Arguments could not have overthrown it Jeanes Whether you do not here boast and triumph without a victory I am very well contented to refer it unto the learned Reader Since my penning of my exceptions sent unto Mr. C. I have read the Metaphysicks of Dr. Robert Baro that learned Scot and in them I finde the like of these three last Arguments of mine urged against the error of Flaccius Illyricus that Original Sin is of the substance of man and essential to him after the fall a proposition subalternate unto that which I charge you with his words are as followeth Prima opinio damnanda à nostris Theologis a Pontificiis de naturâ peccati originalis est absurdissima haeresis Illyrici statuentis peccatum originale esse de substantia hominis seu esse quid homini essentiale post lapsum contra quam sententiam Bellarminus disputans varias affert rationes praecipuae hae sunt Primò si peccatum esset pars substantiae
to awake and consider whether your second reason be not coincident with your third for your second reason as you expound it stands thus inclination to evill is after our nature and not together with it in reall being And your third reason is this inclination to evill is superinduc'd unto nature and is after it c. Dr Taylor Although I have not much to doe with it yet because you are so great a Logioian and so great an admirer of that which every one of your Pupils knowes I mean Porphyries definiton of an accident I care not if I tell you that the definition is imperfect and false Jeanes 1. You have ever and anon an uncivil sling at my poor Logick But Sir let me be so bold as to tell you that as my Logick is the object of your contempt so that my Pupils cannot find in that Logick which you manifest in these your papers matter for either their envy or emulation 2. Why pray Sir doe you say that I am so great an admirer of Porphyries definition of an accident indeed I say that 't is a celebrated definition of an accident but thereby I signify only that 't is frequently and much used commonly known and in every man's mouth and this acception of the word is usuall in Cicero as these instances following evidence Celebratur omnium sermone laetitiáque coavivium hoc delatum est tum ad vos pontifices post omaium sermone celebratum quemadmodum iste omnia fecit quod ita esse constanti fama atque omnium sermone celebratum est quid porro in graeco sermone tam tritum atque celebratum est quam c. 3. Though you care not to tell me that Porphyries definition of an accident is false and imperfect yet you should have been carefull to have brought stronger objections against it than those you have urged for they containe such grosse and absurd untruths as that every one that understands them will think you a very incompetent judge of the definitions of Porphyrie and Aristotle Indeed how farre you are to seek in the nature of accidents appeares by your talking of accidents constitutive of a substance in your discourse of the Real-presence c Sect 11. num 12 pag 209. but let us heare your objections Dr Taylor It is not convertible with the definitum for even essential things may be taken away fine interitu subjecti Jeanes For an answer unto this I shall referre you to your selfe in your book but now mentioned of the Real-presence of Christ in the holy Sacrament Sect. 11. num 30. p. 244. 245. God can doe what he pleaseth and he can reverse the lawes of his whole creation because he can change or annihilate every creature or alter the manners and essences but the question now is what lawes God hath already established and whether or no essentials can be changed the things remaining the same that is whether they can be the same when they are not the same he that sayes God can give to a body all the essentiall properties of a spirit saies true and confesses God's Omnipotency but he sayes also that God can change a body from being a body to become a spirit but if he saves that remaining a body it can receive the essentials of a spirit he does not confesse God's omnipotency but makes the Article difficult to be believed by making it not to work wisely and possibly God can doe althings but are they undone when they are done that is are the things changed in their essentials and yet remaine the same then how are they chang'd and then what hath God done to them But to come unto your instances Dr. Taylor I instance to be quantitative is essential to a body and to have succession of duration but yet in the resurrection when bodyes shall be spiritual and eternal those other which are now essential predicates shall be taken away yet the subject remain be improved to higher and more noble predicates Jeanes 1. As for the 1. of these instances it is without doubt that to be quantitative is essentiall unto a body à posteriori and consecutive as a proprium thereof 4 to modo but. 1. That quantity is separable from a body was never affirmed by any besides the Patrons of either transubstantiation or consubstantiation 2. If a body were without quantity it would be without extension and so would exist in an undivisible point without distinction of parts and so it would be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a bodilesse body which is a flat contradiction But for refutation of this I shall referre you to your own selfe in your discourse of the Real-presence c. Sect. 11.13 pag. 211. But I demand when we speak of a body what we mean by it for in all discourses and entercourses of mankind by words we must agree concerning each others meaning when we speak of a body of a substance of an accident what does man-kind agree to mean by these words all the Philosophers and all the wise men in the world when they speak of a body and separate it from a spirit they mean that a spirit is that which hath no material divisible parts Physically that which hath nothing of that which makes a body that is extension limitation by lines and superficies And Pag. 212. when we speak of a body all the world meanes that which hath a finite quantity Pag. 219.220 that which I now insist upon is that in a body there cannot be indistinction of parts but each must possesse his own portion or place and if it does not a body cannot be a body Sect. II. num 18. Again Tag 221. num 20 ejusd Sect If Christ's body be in the Sacrament according to the manner of a substance not of a body I demand according to the nature of what substance whether of a material or an immaterial if according to the nature of a material substance then it is commensurate by the dimensions of quantity which he is now endeavouring to avoid If according to the nature of an immateriall substance then it is not a body but a spirit or else the body may have the being of a spirit whil'st it remains a body that is be a body and not a body at the same time Here every material substance by your opinion is commensurate by the division of quantity and therefore no material substance can be without the dimensions of of quantity afterwards in pag. 241. 242. num 29. ejusd Sect you bring in a shift of Bellarmines unto which you returne a very good answer both which I shall transcribe Bellarmine sayes that to be coextended to a place is separable from a magnitude or body because it is a thing that is extrinsecal and consequent to the intrinsecal extension of parts and being later than it is by divine power separable but this is as very a sophism as all the rest for if whatever in nature is later than the substance
the creature from the Creator and therefore every creature hath succession of duration They will again out of the forementioned Authors distinguish of a two-fold succession privative and positive 1. A privative or negative succession and that is either betwixt not being and being or betwixt being and not being thus when a man is begotten his being succeeds his not being and when he dies his not being succeeds his being and this privative succession doth distinguish the creature from the Creator and therefore doth or may agree to every creature for even the Angels had a beginning and so there was a succession of their being unto their not being and they might have an end by Gods omnipotency if he had not decreed otherwise nay God could annihilate them meerly by the withdrawing of his preservative influence and so there might have been a succession of their not being unto their being this succession is opposed unto an intrinsecal necessity of existence or unto an immutable permanency seu stabilitati permanentiae as Suarez phraseth it Disp 50. Sect. 5. n. 26. and not unto permanency of being as such This succession if we speak of the power and capacity of it is essential to our bodies and withal 't is inseparable from them for even after the resurrection God could if he had not determined the contrary reduce them unto their first nothing A positive succession hath for both its extreams a positive being and this is again they will say either discrete or continuous 1. Discrete between beings totally perfect as the knowledge of one Plant succeeds the knowledge of another Plant But this succession doth not constitute a successive being There is another succession which they call continuous and that is not betwixt total beings but betwixt parts of the same being when they do not exist together but one after another in fluxu as they say and this succession is proper and peculiar unto motion though not unto every motion Thus far my Pupils Dr. Taylor This I have here set down not that I at all value the problem whether it be so or no but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article or that I think the bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are here I believe them the same bodies but enobled in their very beings for to a specifical and substantial change is required that there be introduction of new forms Jeanes 1. You will not be throughly and sufficiently distinguished from the Socinians in this Article if you think the bodies in the resurrection shall be numerically distinct from what they are here and therefore I shall intreat you to tell us in your next how far you accord with or dissent from them in this particular 2. You here say that to be quantitative shall be taken away from our bodies in the resurrection and the sequel of this is that bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are here for a quantitative substance and a substance without quantity are specifically distinct because the one is material a body and the other immaterial a spirit and not a body at all unlesse nomine tenus Dr. Taylor But yet the improving of essential predicates is no specification of subjects but a melioration of the first Jeanes The ordinary Reader may perhaps think that there is some great mystery wrapt up under these hard words but the plain meaning of them is as I suppose that the improving of essential predicates doth not make a specifical change of subjects but onely advance a subject unto a better being Essential predicates may be said to be improved three manner of ways 1. By abolition of them 2. By intension of them 3. By addition unto them The two latter are impertinent to this business in hand for suppose though not grant that the essential predicates of substances might be improved by intension of them or by addition unto them yet what will this make to the separability of essentials from a subject The improving of essential predicates that belongs unto our present purpose is by abolition of them and by substituting new and more noble essentials in their room and that essentials may be abolished and new essentials substituted in their rooms the things remaining the same is a thing you may magisterially and imperiously dictate but can never Scholastically prove But perhaps you will say that you take essential in a Moral and Theological sense But Sir you must remember that you are not to take essential here in such a latitude as to include accidental and contingent predicates for if you should Porphyry's definition of Accidens will remain unshaken by what you say Would not this be a ridiculous Argument accidental and contingent predicates may be taken away sine subjecti interitu therefore adesse abesse sine subjecti interitâ— is no excellent definition of an accident and yet this will be your very argument if by essential predicates you mean any thing besides the four first predicables unto which all essential predicates are reducible Dr. Taylor But the consequent is that abesse adesse sine subjecti interitu is not an excellent definition of an accident Jeanes The arguments from which you infer this consequent are overthrown and therefore this consequent falleth to the ground of it self without you support it by some fresh arguments Dr. Taylor And yet further it follows That if sin were as essential to a man as mortality is or to be quâ—ntitative yet there is no more need that man should rise with sin then with mortality Ieanes And pray Sir why do not you adde and with quantity Do you begin to startle at this Proposition that men shall rise without quantity But as touching the separability of both mortality and quantity from bodies in the resurrection I have spoken already so fully as that I may spare to say any thing anew of it Dr. Taylor But Aristotles Philosophy and Porphyry's Commentary are but ill measures in Theology and you should do well to scour bright that armor in which you trust which unless it be prudently conducted will make a man a Sophister rather then a Theologue but you are wiser Ieanes Aristotle and Porphiry are no contemptible Authors in Philosophy but who ever thought them infallible in Philosophy or their Books measures in Theology Philosophy is a very usefull Hand-maid unto Divinity and none will decry it but such whose sayings and writings cannot endure the test thereof nothing that is true in Philosophy can be false in Divinity for verum vero non opponitur one truth doth not cannot clash with another As for my Philosophy I hope God will preserve me from trusting in it or in any other arm of flesh If you can detect any error therein I shall be ready to retract it and be very thankful to you for your pains as for the dirt you have hitherto thrown thereon it will not stick but recoileth