these is God and the other God I know a formal distinction is commonly admitted i. e. that the conception of the one is not included in the conception of the other But are these different conceptions true or false If false why are they admitted if true there must be somewhat in the Nature of the thing corresponding to them But if we say they are distinct but most intimately and eternally united in the Divine Being by a necessary natural Union or that it is not impossible so to be what we say will I think agree with it self and not disagree with any other conception we are obliged to have concerning the blessed God In the mean time I profess not to judge we are under the precise Notions of Power Wisdom and Goodness to conceive of the Father Son and Holy Ghost nor that the Notions we have of those or any other divine Perfections do exactly correspond to vvhat in God is signify'd by these Names but I reckon that vvhat relief and ease is given our minds by their being disentangled from any apprehended necessity of thinking these to be the very same things may facilitate to us our apprehending the Father Son and Spirit to be sufficiently distinct for our affirming or under standing the affirmation of some things concerning some one without including the other of them XIV But some perhaps will say while we thus amplify the distinction of these glorious three we shall seem to have too friendly a look towards or shall say in effect what Dr. Sherlock is so highly blam'd for saying and make three Gods I answer that if with sincere minds we enquire after truth for its own sake we shall little regard the friendship or enmity honour or dishonour of this or that man If this were indeed so doth what was true become false because such a man hath said it But it is remote from being so There is no more here positively asserted than generally so much distinction betweeen the Father Son and Spirit as is in it self necessary to the founding the distinct attributions which in the Scriptures are severally given them that when the word or wisdom was said to be with God understanding it as the case requires with God the Father in the creation of all things we may not think nothing more is said than that he was with himself that when the Word is said to be made flesh 't is equally said the Father was made flesh or the Holy Ghost that when the Holy Ghost is said to have proceeded from or have been sent by the Father or the Son he is said to have proceeded from himself or have sent himself But in the mean time this is offered without determining precisely how great distinction is necessary to this purpose It is not here positively said these three are three distinct substances three infinite minds or spirits We again and again insist and inculcate how becoming and necessary it is to abstain from over-bold enquiries or positive determinations concerning the limits or the extent of this distinction beyond what the Scriptures have in general made necessary to the mentioned purpose that we may not throw our selves into guilt nor cast our minds into unnecessary straits by affirming this or that to be necessary or impossible in these matters XV. The case is only thus that since we are plainly led by the express revelation God hath made of himself to us in his Word to admit a trinal conception of him or to conceive this threefold distinction in his Being of Father Son and Spirit since we have so much to greaten that distinction divers things being said of each of these that must not be understood of either of the other since we have nothing to limit it on the other hand but the Unity of the Godhead which we are sure can be but One both from the plain Word of God and the nature of the thing it self since we are assured both these may consist viz. this Trinity and this Unity by being told there are three and these three i. e. plainly continuing three are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one thing which one thing can mean nothing else but Godhead as is also said concerning two of them elsewhere there being no occasion then to mention the third I and my Father are one thing We are hereupon unavoidably put upon it to cast in our own minds and are concerned to do it with the most religious reverence and profoundest humility what sort of thing this most sacred Godhead may be unto which this Oneness is ascribed with threefold distinction And manifestly finding there are in the Creation made Unions with sufficient remaining distinction particularly in our selves that vve are a soul and a body things of so very different natures that often the Soul is called the Man not excluding the Body and the body or our flesh called the Man not excluding the Soul we are plainly led to apprehend that it is rather more easily possible there might be two Spirits so much more agreeing in nature so united as to be one thing and yet continuing distinct and if two there might as well be three if the Creator pleased And hence are led further to apprehend that if such a made Union with continuing distinction be possible in created being it is for ought we know not impossible in the uncreated that there may be such an eternal unmade union with continuing distinction And all this being only represented as possible to be thus without concluding that thus it certainly is sufficiently serves our purpose that no pretence might remain of excluding the eternal Word and the eternal Spirit the Godhead as if a Trinity therein were contradictious and impossible repugnant to reason and common sense Where novv is the coincidency XVI Nor is there hereupon so great a remaining difficulty to salve the Unity of the Godhead when the supposition is taken in of the natural eternal necessary Union of these three that hath been mentioned And it shall be considered that the Godhead is not supposed more necessarily to exist than these three are to coexist in the nearest and most intimate union with each other therein That Spiritual Being which exists necessarily and is every way absolutely perfect whether it consist of three in one or of only one is God We could never have known 't is true that there are such three coexisting in this one God if he himself had not told us What Man knoweth the things of a Man but the Spirit of a Man that is in him even so the things of God none knoweth but the Spirit of God In telling us this he hath told us no impossible no unconceivable thing It is absurd and very irreligious presumption to say this cannot be If a Worm were so far capable of thought as to determine this or that concerning our Nature and that such a thing were impossible to belong to it which we find to be in it we should trample
seen thorough an over-magnifying Opinion of our selves as if our Eye could penetrate that vast and sacred darkness or the glorious light equally impervious to us wherein God dwells too great rudeness to the rest of Men more than implicitly representing all Mankind besides as stark blind who can discern nothing of what we pretend clearly to see And it is manifest this cannot be said to be impossible upon any other Pretence but that it consists not with the Unity of the Godhead in opposition to the multiplication thereof or with that simplicity which stands in opposition to the concurrence of all Perfections therein with distinction greater than hath been commonly thought to belong to the Divine Nature For the former we are at a certainty But for the latter how do we know what the Original Natural State of the Divine Being is in this respect or what simplicity belongs to it or what it may contain or comprehend in it consistently with the Unity thereof or so but that it may still be but one Divine Being What distinction and unity conserved together we can have otherwise an Idéa of without any apprehended inconsistency absurdity or contradiction we shall rashly pronounce to be impossible or somewhat imperfectly resembled thereby in the Divine Being unless we understood it better than we do Some prints and characters of that most perfect Being may be apprehended in the creatures especially that are intelligent such being expresly said to have been made in the Image of God And if here we find Oneness with distinction meeting together in the same created intelligent being this may assist our Understandings in conceiving what is possible to be in much higher Perfection tho not to the concluding what certainly is in the uncreated V. Waving the many artificial Unions of distinct things that united and continuing distinct make one thing under one Name I shall only consider what is natural and give instance in what is nearest us our very selves tho the truth is we know so little of our own Nature that it is a strange assuming when we confidently determine what is impossible to be in the divine Nature besides what he hath told us or made our own Faculties plainly tell us is so and what he hath made any mans Faculties to tell him he hath made all mens that can use them But so much we manifestly find in our selves that we have three Natures in us very sufficiently distinguishable and that are intimately united the vegetative sensitive and the intellective So that notwithstanding their manifest distinction no one scruples when they are united to call the whole the humane nature Or if any make a difficulty or would raise a Dispute about the distinction of these three Natures I for the present content my self with what is more obvious not doubting to reach my mark by degrees viz. that we are made up of a mind and a body somewhat that can think and somewhat that cannot sufficiently distinct yet so united that not only every one without hesitation calls that thing made up of them one man but also every one that considers deeply will be transported with wonder by what more-than-magical knot or tye two things so little a-kin should be so held together that the one that hath the power of will and choice cannot sever it self and return into the same union with the other at pleasure But VI. Since we find this is a thing actually done the making up of two things of so different Natures into one thing that puts the matter out of doubt that this was a thing possible to be done 't was what God could do for he hath done it And if that were possible to him to unite two things of so very different natures into one thing let any colourable reason be assigned me why it should not be as possible to him to unite two things of a like nature i. e. If it were possible to him to unite a spirit and a body why is it less possible to him to have united two spirits And then I further enquire If it were possible to him to unite two would it not be as possible to unite three Let Reason here be put upon its utmost stretch and tell me what in all this is less possible than what we see is actually done Will any man say two or three spirits united being of the same nature will mingle be confounded run into one another and lose their distinction I ask supposing them to pre-exist apart antecedently to their Union are they not now distinguished by their own individual essences let them be as much united as our Souls and Bodies are why should they not as much remain distinct by their singular essences There is no more hazard of their losing their distinction by the similitude of their natures than of our Soul and Body's transmuting one another by their dissimilitude I know not but the dictates of so vogued an Author with many in this Age as Spinosa may signifie somewhat with some into whose hands this may fall who with design bad enough says that from whence one might collect the remaining distinction of two things of the same nature in such a supposed union were the more easily conceivable of the two i. e. than of two things of different natures For in his Posthumous Ethicks de Deo He lays this down in Explication of his second Definition Cogitatio aliâ cogitatione terminatur At corpus non terminatur cogitatione nec cogitatio corpore Some may regard him in this and it would do our business For my patt I care not to be so much beholden to him for it would at the long run overdo it and I know his meaning But I see not but two congenerous natures are equally capable of being united retaining their distinction as two of a different kind and that sufficiently serves the present purpose However let any man tell me why it should be impossible to God so to unite three spirits as by his own power to fix their limits also and by a perpetual Law inwrought into their distinct beings to keep them distinct so that they shall remain everlastingly united but not identifyed and by vertue of that union be some one thing which must yet want a name as much and as truly as our Soul and Body united do constitute one man Nor is it now the question whether such an union would be convenient or inconvenient apt or inept but all the question is whether it be possible or impossible which is as much as we are concerned in at this time But you will say suppose it be possible to what purpose is all this How remote is it from the supposed Trinity in the Godhead You will see to what purpose it is by and by I therefore adde VII That if such an Union of three things whether of like or of different Natures so as that they shall be truly one thing and yet remain distinct tho united can be effected
of the same name and nature As the body and soul of a man are one individual body and one individual soul but both together are but one individual man And the case would be the same if a man did consist of two or three spirits so or more nearly united together as his soul and body are Especially if you should suppose which is the supposition of no impossible or unconceivable thing that these three spirits which together as we now do suppose do constitute a man were created with an aptitude to this united coexistence but with an impossibility of existing separately except to the Divine Power which created them conjunct and might separate them so as to make them exist apart which yet cannot be the Case in respect of three such uncreated spiritual Beings whose Union is supposed to be by natural eternal necessity as their Essences are and are therefore most absolutely inseparable XX. Or if it should be said I make the Notion of God to comprehend Father Son and Holy Ghost and a Godhead besides common to these three I answer nothing I have said or supposed implies any such thing or that the Notion of God imports any thing more of real being than is contained in Father Son and Holy Ghost taken together and most intimately naturally and vitally by eternal necessity united with one another As in a created being consisting of more things than one taken together and united a Man for instance there is nothing more of real entity besides what is contained in his Body and his Soul united and taken together 'T is true that this term a Man speaks somewhat very divers from an humane body taken alone or an humane soul taken alone or from both separately taken but nothing divers from both united and taken together And for what this may be unjustly collected to imply of composition repugnant to Divine Perfection it is before obviated Sect. 13. If therefore it be askt What do we conceive under the Notion of God but a necessary spiritual Being I answer that this is a true Notion of God and may be passable enough among Pagans for a full one But we Christians are taught to conceive under the Notion of God a necessary spiritual Being in which Father Son and Spirit do so necessarily coexist as to constitute that Being and that when we conceive any one of them to be God that is but an inadequate not an entire and full conception of the Godhead Nor will any place remain for that trivial Cavil that if each of these have Godhead in him he therefore hath a Trinity in him but that he is one of the three who together are the One God by necessary natural eternal Union Which Union is also quite of another kind than that of three Men as for instance of Peter James and John partaking in the same kind of Nature who notwithstanding exist separately and apart from each other These three are supposed to coexist in natural necessary eternal and most intimate Union so as to be one Divine Being Nor is it any prejudice against our thus stating the Notion of the Godhead that we know of no such Union in all the Creation that may assist our Conception of this Union What incongruity is there in supposing in this respect as well as in many others somewhat most peculiarly appropriate to the Being of God If there be no such actual Union in the Creation 't is enough to our purpose if such a one were possible to have been And we do know of the actual union of two things of very different Natures so as to be one thing and have no reason to think the Union of two or more things of the same sort of Nature with sufficient remaining distinction less possible or less intelligible XXI Upon the whole let such an union be conceived in the Being of God with such distinction and one would think tho' the Complexions of Mens minds do strangely and unaccountably differ the absolute perfection of the Deity and especially the perfect felicity thereof should be much the more apprehensible with us When we consider that most delicious society which would hence ensue among the so entirely consentient Father Son and Spirit with whom there is so perfect rectitude everlasting harmony mutual complacency unto highest delectation according to our way of conceiving things who are taught by our own Nature which also hath in it the Divine Image to reckon no Enjoyment pleasant without the consociation of some other with us therein we for our parts cannot but hereby have in our minds a more gustfull Idea of a blessed state than we can conceive in meer eternal solitude God speaks to us as Men and will not blame us for conceiving things so infinitely above us according to the Capacity of our Natures provided we do not assume to our selves to be a measure for our Conceptions of him further than as he is himself pleased to warrant and direct us herein Some likeness we may taught by himself apprehend between him and us but with infinite not inequality only but unlikeness And for this Case of delectation in Society we must suppose an immense difference between him an all-sufficient self-sufficient Being comprehending in himself the infinite fulness of whatsoever is most excellent and delectable and our selves who have in us but a very minute portion of being goodness or felicity and whom he hath made to stand much in need of one another and most of all of him But when looking into our selves we find there is in us a disposition often upon no necessity but sometimes from some sort of benignity of temper unto Conversation with others we have no reason when other things concur and do fairly induce and lead our thoughts this way to apprehend any incongruity in supposing he may have some distinct object of the same sort of propension in his own most perfect Being too and therewith such a propension it self also XXII As to what concerns our selves the observation is not altogether unapposit what Cicero treating of Friendship discourses of perpetual solitude that the affectation of it must signifie the worst of ill Humour and the most savage Nature in the World And supposing one of so sour and morose an Humour as to shun and hate the Conversation of Men he would not endure it to be without some one or other to whom he might disgorge the virulency of that his malignant Humour Or that supposing such a thing could happen that God should take a Man quite out of the Society of Men and place him in absolute solitude supplyed with the abundance of whatsoever Nature could covet besides who saith he is so made of Iron as to endure that kind of Life And he introduces Architas Tarentinus reported to speak to this purpose That if one could ascend into Heaven behold the frame of the World and the beauty of every Star his admiration would be unpleasant to him alone which would be most
similitude viz. a natural union of these supposed distinct essences without which they are not under the greatest union possible and which being supposed necessary and eternal cannot admit these should be more than one God 2. I note that what he opposes to it so defectively represented is as defective that the Christian Trinity doth not use to be represented thus c. What hurt is there in it if it can be more intelligibly represented than hath been used But his gentle treatment of this hypothesis which he thought as he represents it not altogether unintelligible and which with some help may be more intelligible became one enquiring what might most safely and with least torture to our own minds be said or thought in so awful a Mystery It however seems not proper to call this an hypostatical union much less to say it amounts to no more It amounts not to so much For an hypostatical or personal union would make the terms united the unita the things or somewhats under this union become by it one hypostasis or person whereas this union must leave them distinct persons or hypostases but makes them one God In the use of the Phrase hypostatical or personal union the denomination is not taken from the subject of the union as if the design were to signifie that to be divers hypostases or persons but from the effect or result of the mentioned union to signifie that which results to be one person or hypostasis As the matter is plain in the instance wherein it is of most noted use the case of the two Natures united in the one Person of the Son of God where the things united are not supposed to be two Persons but two Natures so conjoyn'd as yet to make but one person which therefore is the Negative result or effect of the union viz. that the person is not multiply'd by the accession of another Nature but remains still only one But this were an union quite of another kind viz. of the three hypostases still remaining distinct and concurring in one Godhead And may not this be supposed without prejudice to its Perfection For the Schools themselves suppose themselves not to admit a composition prejudicial to the Perfection of the Godhead when they admit three modes of subsistence which are distinct from one another and from the Godhead which they must admit For if each of them were the very Godhead each of them as is urged against us by you know who must have three Persons belonging to it as the Godhead hath And your self acknowledge three somewhats in the Godhead distinct or else they could not be three I will not here urge that if they be three somewhats they must be three things not three nothings for however uneasie it is to assign a Medium between something and nothing I shall wave that Metaphysical contest But yet collect that simplicity in the very strictest sense that can be conceiv'd is not in your account to be ascribed to God either according to his own word or the reason of things It may here be urged how can we conceive this Natural Union as I have adventur'd to Phrase it of the three Persons supposing them distinct things substances or Spirits Is such an Union conceivable as shall make them be but one God and not be such as shall make them cease to be three distinct things substances or Spirits We find indeed the mentioned unions of Soul and Body in our selves and of the two Natures in Christ consistent enough with manifest distinction but then the things united are in themselves of most different Natures But if things of so congenerous a Nature be united will not their distinction be lost in their union I answer 1. That a Spirit and a Spirit are numerically as distinct as a Body and a Spirit And 2. That we may certainly conceive it as possible to God to have united two or three created Spirits and by as strict union as is between our Souls and Bodies without confounding them and I reckon the union between our Souls and Bodies much more wonderful than that would have been Why then is an unmade uncreated union of three Spirits less conceivable as that which is to be presupposed to their mutual consciousness I shall not move or meddle with any Controversie about the Infinity of these three supposed Substances or Spirits it being acknowledged on all hands that Contemplations of that kind cannot but be above our measure And well knowing how much easier it is to puzzle oneself upon that Question An possit dari infinitum infinito infinitius than to speak satisfyingly and unexceptionably about it to another And tho' I will not use the expressions as signifying my formed judgment that there are three things substances or Spirits in the Godhead as you that there are three somewhats yet as I have many Years thought I do still think that what the learned W. J. doth but more lightly touch of the Son and the Holy Ghost being produced which term I use but reciting it as he doth not by a voluntary external but by an internal necessary and emanative Act hath great weight in it In short my sense hath long lain thus and I submit it to your searching and candid Judgment viz. That tho' we need not have determinate thoughts how far the Father Son and Holy Ghost are distinguished yet we must conceive them in the general to be so far distinguished as is really necessary to the founding the distinct attributions which the Scriptures do distinctly give them And that whatever distinction is truly necessary to that purpose will yet not hinder the two latters participation with the first in the Godhead which can be but one because that tho' we are led by plain Scripture and the very import of that word to conceive of the Father as the Fountain yet the Son being from him and the Holy Ghost from them both not contingently or dependently on will and pleasure but by eternal natural necessary promanation these two latter are infinitely distinguisht from the whole Creation Inasmuch as all Creatures are contingent beings or dependent upon will and pleasure as the Character is given us of created things Rev. 4. 11. Thou hast made all things and for thy pleasure they are and were created But that whatever is what it is necessarily is God For I have no doubt but the Dreams of some more anciently and of late concerning necessary matter and the Sophisms of Spinosa and some others tending to prove the necessity and identity of all substance are with what they aim to evince demonstrably false The Summe of all will be this 1. That we can be more certain of nothing than that there is but one God 2. We are most sure the Father Son and Holy Ghost are sufficiently distinguished to give a just ground to the distinct attributions which are in Scripture severally given to them 3. We are not sure what that sufficient distinction is