she would in the first instant of her being be perfect in knowledge or she would not if she were then would she be a perfect and complete immateriall substance not a soule whose nature is to be a compartner to the body and to acquire her perfection by the mediation and seruice of corporeall senses but if she were not perfect in science but were only a capacity therevnto and like vnto white paper in which nothing were yet wâ—â—tten then vnlesse she were putt in a body she could neuer arriue to know any thing because motion and alteration are effects peculiar to bodies therefore it must be agreed that she is naturally designed to be in a body but her being in a body is her being one thing with the body she is said to be in and so she is one part of a whole which from its weaker part is determined to be a body Againe seeing that the matter of any thing is to be prepared before the end is prepared for which that matter is to serue according to that Axiome Quod est primum in intentione est vltimum in executione we may not deny but that the body is in being some time before the soule or at the least that it existeth as soone as she doth and therefore it appeareth wholy vnreasonable to say that the soule was first made out of the body and was afterwardes thrust into it seeing that the body was prepared for the soule before or at the least as soone as she had any beginning and so we may conclude that of necessity the soule must be begunne layed hatched and perfected in the body And although it be true that such soules as are separated from their bodies in the first instant of their being there are notwithstanding imbued with the knowledge of all thinges yet is not their longer abode therein vaine not only because thereby the species is multiplyed for nature is not content with barely doing that without addition of some good to the soule it selfe but as well for the wonderfull and I may say infinite aduantage that may thereby accrew to the soule if she make right vse of it for as any act of the abstracted soule is infinite in comparison of the acts which men exercise in this life according to what we haue already shewed so by consequence must any encrease of it be likewise infinite and therefore we may conclude that a long life well spent is the greatest and most excellent guift which nature can bestow vpon a man The vnwary reader may perhapps haue difficulty at our often repeating of the infelicity of a miserable soule since we say that it proceedeth out of the iudgements she had formerly made in this life which without all doubt were false ones and neuerthelesse it is euident that no false iudgements can remaine in a soule after she is separated from her body as we haue aboue determined How then can a soules iudgements be the cause of her misery But the more heedefull reader will haue noted that the misery which we putt in a soule proceedeth out of the inequality not out of the falsity of her iudgements for if a man be inclined to a lesser good more then to a greater he will in action betake himselfe to the lesser good and desert the greater wherein neyther iudgemeÌ„t is false nor eyther inclination is naught meerely out of the improportion of the two inclinations or iudgements to their obiects for that a soule may be duely ordered and in a state of being well she must haue a lesser inclination to a lesse good and a greater inclination to a greater good and in pure spirits these inclinations are nothing else but the strength of their iudgements which iudgements in soules whiles they are in their bodies are made by the repetition of more acts from stronger causes or in more fauourable circumstances And so it appeareth how without any falsity in any iudgement a soule may become miserable by her conuersation in this world where all her inclinations generally are good vnlesse the disproportion of them do make them bad THE TWELFTH CHAPTER Of the perseuerance of a soule in the state she findeth her selfe in at her first separation from her body THus we haue brought mans soule out of the body she liued in here and by which she conuersed and had commerce with the other partes of this world and we haue assigned her her first array and stole with which she may be seene in the next world so that now there remaineth only for vs to consider what shall betide her afterwardes and whether any change may happen to her and be made in her after the first instant of her being a pure spiritt separated from all consortshippe with materiall substances To determine this point the more clearely lett vs call to minde an axiome that Aristotle giueth vs in his logike which teacheth vs That as it is true if the effect be there is a cause so likewise it is most true that if the cause be in act or causing the effect must also be Which Axiome may be vnderstood two wayes the one that if the cause hath its effect then the effect also is and this is no great mystery or for it are any thankes due to the teacher it being but a repetition and saying ouer againe of the same thing The other way is that if the cause be perfect in the nature of being a cause then the effect is which is as much as to say that if nothing be waÌ„ting to the cause abstracting precisely from the effect then neyther is the effect wanting And this is the meaning of Aristotles Axiome of the truth and euidence whereof in this sense if any man should make the least doubt it were easy to euince it as thus if nothing be wanting but the effect and yet the effect doth not immediately follow it must needes be that it can not follow at all for if it can and doth not then something more must be done to make it follow which is against the supposition that nothing was wanting but the effect for that which is to be done was wanting To say it will follow without any change is senselesse for if it follow without change it followeth out of this which is already putt but if it do follow out of this which is precisely putt then it followeth against the supposition which was that it did not follow although this were putt This then being euident lett vs apply it to our purpose and lett vs putt three or more thinges namely A. B. C. and D whereof none can worke otherwise then in an instant or indiuisibly and I say that whatsoeuer these foure thinges are able to do without respect to any other thing besides them is completely done in the first instant of their being putt and if they remayne for all eternity without communication or respect to any other thing there shall neuer be any innouation in any of them or
prooued from her manner of operation which is grounded in being ibid. § 10. Lastly it is prooued from the science of Morality the principles whereof would be destroied if the soule were mortall pag. 421 CHAP. X. Declaring what the soule of a man separated from his body is and of her knowledge and manner of working pag. 422 § 1. That the soule is one simple knowing act which is a pure substance and nothing but substance ibid. § 2. That a separated soule is in no place and yet is not absent from any place pag. 424 § 3. That a separated soule is not in time nor subiect to it ibid. § 4. That the soule is an actiue substance and all in it is actiuitie pag. 425 § 5. A description of the soule pag. 426 § 6. That a separated soule knoweth all that which she knew whilst she wâ—s in her bodie ibid. § 7. That the least knowledge which the soule acquireth in her bodie of anie one thing doth cause in her when she is separated from her bodie a compleat knowledge of all thinges whatsoeuer pag. 427 § 8. An answere to the obiections of some Peripatetikes who maintaine the soule to perish with the body pag. 429 § 9 The former Peripatetikes refuted out of Aristotle pag. 431 § 10. The operations of a separated soule compared to her operations in her bodie ibid. § 11. That a separated soule is in a state of pure being and consequently immortall pag. 432 CHAP. XI Shewing what effects the diuers manners of liuing in this world do cause in a soule after she is separated from her body p. 433 § 1. That a soule in this life is subiect to mutation and may be perfected in knowledge ibid. § 2. That the knowledges which a soule getteth in this life will make her knowledge in the next life more perfect and firme pag. 434 § 3. That the soules of men addicted to science whilst they liued here are more perfect in the next world then the soules of vnlearned men pag. 435 § 4. That those soules which embrace vertue in this world will be most perfect in the next and those which embrace vice most miserable ibid. § 5. The state of a vitious soule in the next life pag. 437 § 6. The fundamentall reason why as well happinesse as misery is so excessiue in the next life pag. 439 § 7. The reason why mans soule requireth to be in a body and to liue for some space of time ioyned with it pag. 441 § 8. That the misery of the soule in the next world proceedeth out of inequality and not out of falsity of her iudgements pag. 442 CHAP. XII Of the perseuerance of a soule in the state she findeth herselfe in at her first separation from her body pag. 443 § 1. The explication and proofe of that maxime that if the cause be in act the effect must also be ibid. § 2. The effects of all such agents as worke instantaneously are complete in the first instant that the agents are putt ibid. § 3. All pure spirits do worke instantaneously pag. 444 § 4. That a soule separated from her body can not suffer any change after the first instant of her separation ibid. § 5. That temporall sinnes are iustly punished with eternall paines pag. 445 The Conclusion pag. 446 THE PREFACE THIS writing was designed to haue seene the light vnder the name of one treatise But after it was drawne in paper as I cast a view ouer it I found the prooemiall part which is that which treateth of Bodies so ample in respect of the other which was the end of it and for whose sake I meddled with it that I readily apprehended my reader would thinke I had gone much astray from my text when proposing to speake of the immortality of Mans Soule three parts of foure of the whole discourse should not so much as in one word mention that soule whose nature and proprieties I aymed at the discouery of To auoyde this incongruity occasioned mee to change the name and vnity of the worke and to make the suruay of bodies a body by it selfe though subordinate to the treatise of the soule Which notwithstanding it be lesse in bulke then the other yet I dare promise my Reader that if he bestow the paines requisite to perfect him selfe in it he will find as much time well spent in the due reading of it as in the reading of the former treatise though farre more large But I discerne an obiection obuious to be made or rather a question why I should spend so much time in the consideration of bodies whereas none that hath formerly written of this subiect hath in any measure done the like I might answere that they had vpon other occasions first written of the nature of bodies as I may instance in Aristotle and sundry others who either haue themselues professedly treated the science of bodies or haue supposed that part sufficiently performed by other pennes But truly I was by an vnauoydable necessity hereunto obliged which is a current of doctrine that at this day much raigneth in the Christian Schooles where bodies and their operations are explicated after the manner of spirituall thinges For wee hauing very slender knowledge of spirituall substances can reach no further into their nature then to know that they haue certaine powers or qualities but can seldome penetrate so deepe as to descend to the particulars of such Qualities or Powers Now our moderne Philosophers haue introduced such a course of learning into the schooles that vnto all questions concerning the proper natures of bodies and their operations it is held sufficient to answere they haue a quality or a power to doe such a thing And afterwards they dispute whether this Quality or Power be an Entity distinct from its subiect or no and how it is seperable or vnseperable from it and the like Conformable to this who will looke into the bookes which are in vogue in these schooles shall find such answers and such controuersies euery where and few others As of the sensible qualities aske what it is to be white or red what to be sweete or sower what to be odoriferous or stincking what to be cold or hott And you are presently paid with that it is a sensible quality which hath the power to make a wall white or red to make a meate agreeable or disagreeable to the tast to make a gratefull or vngratefull smell to the nose etc Likewise they make the same questions and resolutions of Grauity and Leuity as whether they be qualities that is entities distinct from their subiect and whether they be actiue or passiue which when they haue disputed slightly and in common with logicall arguments they rest there without any further searching into the physicall causes or effects of them The like you shall find of all strange effects of them The loadestone and Electricall bodies are produced for miraculous and not vnderstandable thinges and in which it must be
practise of them as in like manner to vnderstand the other kind of plaine language we must obserue how the wordes that compose it are apprehended vsed and applyed by mankind in generall and not receiue into this examination the wrested or Metaphoricall senses of any learned men who seeke oftentimes beyond any ground in nature to frame a generall notion that may comprehend all the particular ones which in any sense proper or improper may arise out of the vse of one word And this is the cause of greate errors in discourse soe greate and important as I cannot too much inculcate the caution requisite to the auoyding of this rocke Which that it may be the better apprehended I will instance in one example of a most plaine and easie conception wherein all mankind naturally agreeth how the wresting it from its proper genuine and originall signification leadeth one into strange absurdities and yet they passe for subtile speculations The notion of being in a place is naturally the same in all men liuing aske any simple artisan Where such a man such a howse such a tree or such a thing is and he will answere you in the very same manner as the learnedest Philosopher would doe he will tell you the man you aske for is in such a church sitting in such a piew and in such a corner of it that the howse you enquire after is in such a streete and next to such two buildinges on each side of it that the tree you would find out is in such a forest vpon such a hill neere such a fountaine and by such a bush that the wine you would drinke of is in such a cellar in such a part of it and in such a caske In conclusion no man liuing that speaketh naturally and freely out of the notion hee findeth clearely in his vnderstanding will giue you other answere to the question of where a thing is then such a one as plainely expresseth his conceit of being in place to be no other then a bodies being enuironed and enclosed by some one or seuerall others that are immediate vnto it as the place of a liquor is the vessell that containeth it and the place of the vessell is such a part of the chamber or house that it resteth vpon together with the ambient ayre which hath a share in making vp the places of most thinges And this being the answere that euery man whatsoeuer will readily giue to this question and euery asker being fully satisfied with it we may safely conclude that all theire notions and conceptions of being in a place are the same and consequently that it is the naturall and true one But then some others considering that such conditions as these will not agree vnto other thinges which they likewise conceite to be in a place for they receiue it as an Axiome from theire sense that whatsoeuer is must be somewhere and whatsoeuer is no where is not att all they fall to casting about how they may frame some common notion to comprehend all the seuerall kindes of being in place which they imagine in the thinges they discourse of If there were nothing but bodies to be ranked by them in the Predicament of place then that description I haue already sett downe would be allowed by them as sufficient But since that spirits and spirituall thinges as Angels rationall soules verities sciencies arts and the like haue a being in nature and yet will not be comprised in such a kind of place as a body is contained in they racke theire thoughts to speculate out some common notion of being in place which may be common to these as well as to bodies like a common accident agreeing to diuerse subiects And so in the end they pitch vpon an Entity which they call an Vbi and they conceite the nature and formall reason of that to be the ranking of any thing in a place when that Entity is therevnto affixed And then they haue no further difficulty in settling an Angell or any pure spirit or immateriall essence in a place as properly and as completely as if it were a corporeall substance It is but assigning an Vbi to such a spirit and he is presently riueted to what place you please and by multiplying the Vbies any indiuiduall body vnto which they are assigned is at the same instant in as many distant places as they allott it different Vbies and if they assigne the same Vbi to seuerall bodies so many seuerall ones as they assigne it vnto will be in one and the same place and not onely many bodies in one place but euen a whole bodie in an indiuisible by a kind of Vbi that hath a power to resume all the extended partes and enclose them in a point of place All which prodigious conceits and impossibilities in nature doe spring out of theire mistake in framing Metaphysicall and abstracted conceptions insteed of contenting themselues with those plaine easy and primary notions which nature stampeth a like in all men of common sense and vnderstanding As who desireth to bee further instructed in this particular may perceiue if he take the paines to looke ouer what M. White hath discoursed of Place in the first of his Dialogues De Mundo Vnto which booke I shall from time to time according as I shall haue occasion referre my Reader in those subiects the Author taketh vppon him to prooue being confident that his Metaphysicall demonstrations there are as firme as any Mathematicall ones for Metaphysicall demonstrations haue in themselues as much firmenesse certainty and euidency as they and so will appeare as euident as they vnto whosoeuer shall vnderstand them throughly and shall frame right conceptions of them which how plaine soeuer they seeme to bee is not the worke of euery pretender to learning THE SECOND CHAPTER Of Quantity AMONG those primary affections which occurre in the perusall of a body Quantity as I haue obserued in the precedent chapter is one and in a manner the first and the roote of all the rest Therefore according to the caution we haue beene so prolixe in giuing because it is of so maine importance if we ayme at right vnderstanding the true nature of it we must examine what apprehension all kindes of people that is mankind in generall maketh of it By which proceeding we doe not make the ignorant multitude iudge of that learning which groweth out of the consideration of Quantity but onely of the naturall notion which serueth learned men for a basis and foundation to build scientificall super-structures vpon For although sciencies be the workes and structures of the vnderstanding gouerned and leuelled by the wary and strict rules of most ingenious artificers yet the ground vpon which they are raised are such plaine notions of thinges as naturally and without any art doe present themselues to euery mans apprehension without which for matter to worke vpon those artificiall reflections would leaue the vnderstanding as vnsatisfied as a cooke
phlegmes and earth Now these are not pure and simple partes of the dissolued body but new coÌ„pounded bodies made of the first by the operation of heat As smoake is not pure water but water and fire together and therefore becometh not water but by cooling that is by the fire flying away from it So likewise those spirits salts oyles and the rest are but degrees of thinges which fire maketh of diuers partes of the dissolued body by seperating them one from an other and incorporating it selfe with them And so they are all of them compounded of the foure Elements and are further resoluable into them Yet I intend not to say that there are not originally in the body before its dissolution some loose partes which haue the properties of these bodies that are made by the fire in the dissoluing of it for seeing that nature worketh by the like instruments as art vseth she must needes in her excesses and defects produce like bodies to what art doth in dissolution which operation of art is but a kind of excesse in the progresse of nature but my meaning is that in such dissolution there are more of these partes made by the working of fire then were in the body before Now because this is the naturall and most ordinary dissolution of thinges lett vs see in particular how it is done suppose then that fire were in a conuenient manner applyed to a body that hath all sortes of partes in it and our owne discourse will tell vs that the first effect it worketh will be that as the subtile partes of fire do diuide and passe through that body they will adhere to the most subtile partes in it which being most agile and least bound and incorporated to the bowels of the body and lying as it were loosely scattered in it the fire will carry them away with it Thâ—se will be the first that are seperated from the maine body which being retained in a fitt receiuer will by the coldenesse of the circumdant ayre grow outwardly coole themselues and become first a dew vpon the sides of the glasse and then still as they grow cooler condense more and more till att the length they fall downe congealed into a palpable liquor which is composed as you see of the hoatest partes of the body mingled with the fire that carried them out and therefore this liquor is very inflammable and easily turned into actuall fire as you see all spirits and Aquae ardentes of vegetables are The hoat and loose partes being extracted and the fire continuing and encreasing those that will follow next are such as though they be not of themselues loose yet are easyest to be made so and are therefore most separable These must be humide and those little dry partes which are incorporated with the ouerflowing humide ones in them for no partes that we can arriue vnto are of one pure simple nature but all are mixed and composed of the 4 Elements in some proportion must be held together with such grosse glew as the fire may easily penetrate and separate them And then the humide partes diuided into little atomes do sticke to the lesser ones of the fire which by their multitude of number and velocity of motion supplying what they want of them in bulke do carry them away with them And thus these phlegmaticke partes fly vp with the fire and are afterwardes congealed into an insipide water which if it haue any sauour is because the first ardent spirits are not totally separated from it but some few of them remaine in it and giue some little life to the whole body of that otherwise flatt liquor Now those partes which the fire separateth next from the remaining body after the firy and watry ones are carryed away must be such as it can worke vpon and therefore must abound in humidity But since they stirre not till the watry ones are gone it is euident that they are composed of many dry partes strongly incorporated and very subtilely mixed with the moist ones and that both of them are exceeding small and are so closely and finely knitt together that the fire hath much adoe to gett betweene them and cutt the thriddes that tye them together and therefore they require a very great force of fire to cary them vp Now the composition of these sheweth them to be aeriall and together with the fire that is mingled with them they congeale into that consistence which we call oyle Lastly it can not be otherwise but that the fire in all this while of continuall application to the body it thus anatomiseth hath hardned and as it were rosted some partes into such greatnesse and drynesse as they will not fly nor can be carried vp with any moderate heate But greate quantity of fire being mingled with the subtiler partes of his baked earth maketh them very pungent and acrimonious in tast so that they are of the nature of ordinary salt and are so called and by the helpe of water may easily be separated from the more grosse partes which then remaine a dead and vselesse earth By this discourse it is apparant that fire hath been the instrument which hath wrought all these partes of an entire body into the formes they are in for whiles it carryed away the fiery partes it swelled the watry ones and whiles it lifted vp them it digested the aeriall partes and whiles it droue vp the oyles it baked the earth and salt Againe all these retaining for the most part the proper nature of the substance from whence they are extracted it is euident that the substance is not dissolued for so the nature of the whole would be dissolued and quite destroyed and extinguished in euery part but that onely some partes containing the whole substance or rather the nature of the whole substance in them are separated from other partes that haue likewise the same nature in them The third instrument for the separation and dissolution of bodies is water Whose proper matter to worke vpon is salt And it serueth to supply what the fire could not performe which is the separation of the salt from the earth in calcined bodies All the other partes fire was able to seuer But in these he hath so baked the little humidity he hath left in them with their much earth as he can not diuide them any further And so though he incorporateth him selfe with them yet he can carry nothing away with him If then pure water be putt vpon that chalke the subtilest dry partes of it do easily ioyne to the superuenient moysture and sticking close to it do draw it downe to them but because they are the lighter it happeneth to them as when a man in a boate pulleth the land to him that cometh not to him but he remoueth himselfe and his boate to it so these ascend in the water as they dissolue And the water more and more penetrating them and by addition of its partes making the humidity which
them duely which must be done by serious and continued reflection and not by cursary reading or by interrupted attempts yet since we haue still a whole field of proofes vntouched and that in so important a matter no euidence can be too cleare nor any paines be accounted lost that may redouble the light although it shine already bright enough to discerne what we seeke we will make vp the concert of vnanimous testimonies to this already established truth by adding those arguments we shall collect out of the manner of our soules proceeding to action vnto the others we haue drawne from our obseruations vpon her apprehensions her iudgements and her discourses Looking then into this matter the first consideration we meete withall is that our vnderstanding is in his owne nature an orderer and that his proper worke is to ranke and putt thinges in order for if we reflect vpon the workes and artes of men as a good life a common-wealth an army a house a garden all artefactes what are thâ—y but compositions of well ordered partes And in euery kind we see that he is the Master and the Architect and is a accouÌ„ted the wisest and to haue the best vnderstanding who can best or most or further then his fellowes sett thinges in order If then to this we ioyne that quantity is a thing whose nature consisteth in a capacity of hauing partes and multitude and consequently is the subiect of ordering and ranking doth it not euidently follow that our soule compared to the whole masse of bodies and to the very nature of corporeity or quantity is as a proper agent to its proper matter to worke vpon Which if it be it must necessarily be of a nobler straine and of a different and higher nature then it and consequently can not be a body or be composed of Quantity for had matter in it selfe what it expecteth and requireth from the agent it would not neede the agents helpe but of it selfe it were fitt to be an Agent Wherefore if the nature of corporeity or of body in its full latitude be to be ordered it followeth that the thing whose nature is to be an orderer must as it is such be not a body but of a superiour nature and exceeding a Body which we expresse by calling it a spirituall thing Well then if the soule be an orderer two thinges belong necessarily vnto her the one is that she haue this order within her selfe the other is that she haue power to communicate it vnto such thinges as are to be ordered The first she hath by science of which enough already hath beene said towardes proouing our intent Next that her nature is communicatiue of this order is euident out of her action and manner of working But whether of her selfe she be thus communicatiue or be so by her coniunction to the body she informeth appeareth not from thence But where experieÌ„ce falleth short reason supplyeth and sheweth vs that of her owne nature she is communicatiue of order for seeing that her action is an ordering and that in this line there are but two sortes of thinges in the world namely such as do order and such as are to be ordered it is manifest that the action must by nature and in the vniuersall consideration of it beginne from the orderer in whom order hath its life and subsistence and not from that which is to receiue it then sithence ordering is motion it followeth euidently that the soule is a moouer and a beginner of motion But since we may conceiue two sortes of moouers the one when the agent is mooued to mooue the other when of it selfe it beginneth â—he motion without being mooued we are to enquire vnto which of these two the soule belongeth But to apprehend the question rightly we will illustrate it by an example lett vs suppose that some action is fitt to beginne at tenne of the clocke now we may imagine an agent to beginne this action in two different manners the one that the clocke striking tenne breedeth or stirreth somewhat in him from whence this action followeth the other manner is that the agent may of his owne nature haue such an actuall comprehension or decurrence of time within himselfe as that without receiuing any warning from abroad but as though he moued and ordered the clocke as well as his owne instruments he may of himselfe be fitt and ready iust at that houre to beginne that action not as if the clocke told him what houre it is but as if he by gouerning the clocke made that houre to be as well as he causeth the action to beginne at that houre In the first of these manners the agent is mooued to mooue but in the second he mooueth of himselfe without being mooued by any thing else And in this second way our soule of her owne nature communicateth her selfe to quantitatiue thinges and giueth them motion which followeth out of what we haue already prooued that a soule in her owne nature is the subiect of an infinite knowledge and therefore is capable of hauing such a generall comprehension as well of time and of the course of all other thinges as of the particular action he is to doe and consequently standeth not in neede of a Monitor without her to direct her when to beginne If then it be an impreuaricable law with all bodies that none whatsoeuer can mooue vnlesse it be mooued by an other it followeth that the soule which mooueth without being stirred or excitated by any thing else is of a higher race then they and consequently is immateriall and voyde of Quantity But lett me not be mistaken in what I come from saying as though my meaning were that the soule exerciseth this way of mouing her selfe and of ordering her actions whiles she is in the body for how can she seeing she is neuer endewed with complete knowledge requisite for any action neuer fully comprehending all the circumstances of it But what I intend is that the nature of the soule considered in it selfe is such as hath a capacity and may reach to this manner of working whence I inferre that she is not a body but a spirit without determining whether she worke thus in the body or out of it that enquiry belongeth not to this place it will follow by and by But for the present hauing considered vnto what kind of working the nature of the soule in abstract is capable of attaining we will conclude this Chapter with reflecting vpon those actions of hers which fall dayly vnder our remarke as being exercised in the body In all of them we may obserue that she proceedeth with a certaine vniuersality and indifferency beyond the practise of all other creatures whatsoeuer for example if a man be spoken to or asked of a hundred seuerall thinges that he neuer thought of before in all his life he will immediately shape pertinent replyes to all that is said and returne fitting answeres to euery question as Whither such
any further working among them but they will alwayes remayne immutable in the same state they were in at the very first instant of their being putt for whatsoeuer A can doe in the first instant is in that first instant actually done because he worketh indiuisibly and what can be done precisely by A and by his action ioyned to B doth precisely follow out of A and his action and out of B and his action if B haue any action independent of A and because all these are in the same instant whatsoeuer followeth precisely out of these and out of any thing else that is in the same instant and that worketh indiuisibly as they do is necessarily done in that very instant but all the actions of C and D and of whatsoeuer by reflection from them may be done by A and B being all of them indiuisible and following precisely out of some of the forenamed actions they do follow out of thinges being in this instant and because they are indiuisible they may be in this instant and therefore all is done in this instant Now supposing all to be done that can be done by them in this instant and that nothing can follow from them vnlesse it follow precisely out of what is in this instant and that it is all indiuisible it followeth clearely that whatsoeuer concerning them is not in this instant can neuer be These two conclusions being thus demonstrated lett vs in the next place determine how all actions of pure spirits which haue no respect to bodies must of necessity be indiuisible that is must include no continuate succession by which I meane such a succession as may be deuided into partes without end for if we looke well into it we shall find that a continuate succession can not be a thing which hath in it selfe a Being and the reason is because the essence of such a succession consisteth in hauing some of its partes already passed and others of them yet to come but on the other side it is euident that no such thing can be whose essentiall ingredients are not it selfe and therefore it followeth euidently that such a thing as we call succession can haue no being in it selfe seeing that one essentiall part of it neuer is with the other therefore such a succession must haue its being in some permanent thing which must be diuisible for that is essentially required in succession but permanent diuisibility is that which we call Biggenesse or Quantity from which pure spirits are free and therefore it is most euident that all their actions in respect of themselues are absolutely indiuisible Now to make vse of this doctrine to our intent we say that since our soule when it is separated from our body is a pure spiritt or vnderstanding and that all her actions are indiuisible and that all actiōs of other spirits vpō her must likewise be such and by cōsequence that there can be no continuate succession of action among them we must of necessity conclude that according to the priuate nature of the soule and according to the common notion of spirituall thinges there can be no change made in her after the first instant of her parting from her body but what happinesse or misery betideth her in that instant continueth with her for all eternity Yet is it not my mind to say that by the course of the vniuersall resolutions from which she is not wholy exempt and from supernaturall administration of corporeall thinges there may not result some change in her But the consideration of that matter I remitt to those treatises vnto which it belongeth as not depending nor ensuing from the particular nature of the soule and therefore not falling vnder our discussion in this place This same conclusion may be proued by an other argument besides this which we haue now vsed and it is this Whatsoeuer worketh purely by vnderstanding and minde can not be changed in its operations vnlesse its vnderstanding or minde be altered but this can not happen vnlesse eyther it learne somewhat it knew not before or forgetting a foreknowne truth it beginne afterwardes to thinke a falsity This second part is impossible as we haue already shewed when we proued that falsehood could haue no admittance into a separated soule and the former is as impossible it being likewise proued that at her first instant of her separation she knoweth all thinges wherefore we may hence confidently conclude that no change of minde that is no change at all can happen to an abstracted soule And thus by discourse we may arriue to quitt ourselues easily of that famous obiection so much pestering Christian Religion how God can in iustice impose eternall paines vpon a soule for one sinne acted in a short space of time For we see it followeth by the necessary course of nature that if a man dye in a disorderly affection to any thing as to his chiefe good he eternally remaineth by the necessity of his owne nature in the same affection and there is no imparity that to eternall sinne there should be imposed eternall punishment THE CONCLVSION AND now I hope I may confidently say I haue beene as good as my word and I doubt not but my Reader will finde it so if he spend but halfe as much time in perusing these two treatises as the composing them hath cost me They are too nice and indeede vnreasonable who expect to attaine without paines vnto that which hath cost others yeares of toyle Lett them remember the wordes of holy Iob that wisedome is not found in the land of those that liue at their ease Lett them cast their eyes on every side round about them and then tell me if they meete with any employment that may be compared to the attaining vnto these and such like principles whereby a man is enabled to gouerne himselfe vnderstandingly and knowingly towards the happinesse both of the next life and of this and to comprehend the wisemans theme what is good for a man in the dayes of his vanity whiles he playeth the stranger vnder the sunne Lett vs feare Gods Iudgements Lett vs carefully pursue the hidden bounties he hath treasured vp for vs. Lett vs thanke him for the knowledge he hath giuen vs and admire the excellency of Christian Religion which so plainely teacheth vs that vnto which it is so extreme hard to arriue by natural meanes Lett vs blesse him that we are borne vnto it And lett vs sing to him That it is he who preacheth his doctrine to Iacob and giueth his lawes to Israël He hath not done the like to all nations nor hath he manifested his secret truthes vnto them BVT before I cutt of this thridde which hath cost me so much paines to spinne out to this Length I must craue my Readers leaue to make some vse of it for my owne behoofe Hitherto my discourse hath beene directed to him now I shall entreate his patience that I may reflect it in a word
in discourse and of the vast extent of it Dialo de mundo 4 Of humane actions and of those that concerne ourselues 5 Of humane actions as they concerne our neighbours 6 Of Logike 7 Of Grammar 8 Of Rhetorike 9 Of Poetry 10 Of the Power of speaking 11 Of arts that concerne dumbe and insensible creatutes 12 Of Arithmetike 13 Of Prudence 14 Obseruations vpon what hath beene said in this Chapter 1 That humane actions proceed from two seuerall principles vnderstanding and sense 2 How our generall and inbred maximes doe concurre to humane actioÌ„ 3 That the rules and maximes of arts doe worke positiuely in vs though we thinke not of them 4 How the vndestaÌ„ding doth cast about when it wanteth sufficient grounds for action 5 How reason doth rule ouer sense and passion 6 How we recall our thoughts from distractions 7 How reason is sometimes ouercome by sense and passion 1 The coÌ„nection of the subsequent Chapters with the precedent 2 The inexisteÌ„ce of corporeall thinges in the soule by the power of apprehension doth proue her to be immateriall 3 The notion of being which is innate in the soule doth proue the same 4 The same is proued by the notion of respects 5 That corporeall thinges are spiritualized in the vnderstanding by meanes of the soules working in and by respects 6 That the abstracting of notions from all particular and indiuiduall accidents doth proue the immaterialitie of the soule 7 That the vniuersalitie of abstracted notions doth proue the same 8 That collectiue apprehensions do proue the same 9 The operations of the soule drawing allways from multitude to vnitie do proue the same 10 The difference betwixt the notion of a thing in our vnderstanding and the impression that correspondeth to the same thing in our fansie doth proue the same 11 The apprehensioÌ„ of negatioÌ„s and priuations do proue the same 1 The manner of iudging or deeming by apprehending two thinges to be identified doth proue the soule to be immateriall 2 The same is proued by the manner of apprehending opposition in a negatiue iudgement 3 That thinges in themselues opposite to one an other hauing no opposition in the soule doth proue the same 4 That the first truthes are identified to the soule 5 That the soule hath an infinite capacitie and consequently is immateriall 6 That the opposition of contradictory propositions in the Soule doth proue her immaterialitie 7 How propositions of eternall truth do proue the immaterialitie of the soule 1 That in discoursing the soule coÌ„taineth more in it at the same time then is in the fantasie which prooueth her to be immateriall 2 That the nature of discourse doth prooue the soule to be ordered to infinite knowledge and consequeÌ„tly to be immateriall 3 That the most naturall obiects of the soule are immateriall and consequently the soule her selfe in such 1 That the soules being a power to order thinges proueth her to be immateriall 2 That the soules being able to mooue without being mooued doth prooue her to be immateriall 3 That the soules proceeding to action with an vniuersality and indifferency doth prooue the same 4 That the quiet proceeding of reason doth prooue the same 5 A conclusion of what hath beene said hetherto in this second Treatise 1 That Mans Soule is a substance 2 That man is compounded of some other substance besides his body 3 That the soule doth subsist of it selfe independently of the body 4 Two other arguments to prooue the same one positiue the other negatiue 5 The same is prooued because the soule can not be obnoxious to the cause of mortality 6 The same is prooued because the soule hath no contrary 7 The same is prooued from the end for which the soule was created 8 The same is prooued because she can mooue without being mooued 9 The same is prooued from her manner of operation which is grounded in being 10 Lastly it is prooued from the science of Morality the principles whereof would be destroied if the soule were mortall 1 That the soule is one simple knowing act which is a pure substance and nothing but substance 2 That a seperated soule is in no place and yet is not abseÌ„t from any place Boetius 3 That a seperated soule is not in time nor subiect to it 4 That the soule is an actiue substance and all in it is actiuitie 5 A description of the soule 6 That a seperated soule knoweth all that which she knew whilst she was in her bodie 7 That the least knowledge which the soule acquireth in her bodie of anie one thing doth cause in her when she is seperated from her bodie a compleat knowledge of all thingâ— whatsoeuer 8 An answere to the obiections of some Peripatetikes who maintaine the soule to perish with the body 9 The former Peripateâ—ickeâ— refuted out of Aristotle 10 The operations of a seperated soule compared to her operations in her bodie 11 That a separated soule is in a state of pure being and consequently immortall 1 That a soule in this life is subiect to mutation and may be perfected in knowledge 2 That the knowledges which a soâ—le getteth in this life will make her knowledge in the next life more perfect and firme 3 That the soules of meÌ„ addicted to science whilst they liued here are more perfect in the next world then the soules of vnlearned men 4 That those soules which embrace vertue in this world will be most perfect in the next and those which embrace vice most miserable 5 The state of a vicious soule in the next life 6 The fundamentall reason why as well happinesse as miserie is so excessiue in the next life 7 The reason why mans soule requireth to be in a body and to liue for some space of time ioyned with it 8 That the misery of the soule in the next world proceedeth out of inequality and not out of falsity of her iudgements 1 The explication and proofe of that maxime that if the cause be iâ— act the effect must also bâ— 2 The effects of all such ageÌ„ts as worke instantaneously arâ— complete in the first instant that the agents are putt 3 All pure spirits do worke instantaneously 4 That a soule separated from her body can not suffer any change after the first instant of her separation 5 That temporall sinnes are iustly punished with eternall painâ—s
haue formerly declared in the making of salt by force of fire This button thus dilated and brought to this passe we call the fruite of the plant whose harder part encloseth oftentimes an other not so hard as dry The reason whereof is because the outward hardenesse permitteth no moysture to soake in any aboundance through it and then that which is enclosed in it must needes be much dryed though not so much but that it still retaineth the common nature of the plant This drought maketh these inner partes to be like a kind of dult or att the least such as may be easily dryed into dust when they are brused out of the huske that encloseth them And in euery parcell of this dust the nature of the whole resideth as it were contracted into a small quantity for the iuice which was first in the button and had passed from the roote through the manifold varieties of the diuers partes of the plant and had suffered much concoction partly from the sunne and partly from the inward heate imprisoned in that harder part of the fruite is by these passages strainings and concoctions become att the length to be like a tincture extracted out of the whole plant and is att the last dryed vp into a kind of magistery This we call the seede which is of a fitt nature by being buried in the earth and dissolued with humour to renew and reciprocate the operation we haue thus described And thus you haue the formation of a Plant. But a sensiue creature being compared to a plant as a plant is to a mixed body you can not but conceiue that he must be compounded as it were of many plantes in like sort as a plant is of many mixed bodies But so that all the plants which concurre to make one animal are of one kind of nature and cognation and besides the matter of which such diuersity is to be made must of necessity be more humid and figurable then that of an ordinary plant and the artificer which worketh and mouldeth it must be more actiue Wherefore we must suppose that the masse of which an animal is to be made must be actually liquid and the fire that worketh vpon it must be so powerfull that of its owne nature it may be able to conuert this liquide matter into such breathes and steames as we see do vse to rise from water when the sunne or fire worketh vpon it Yet if the masse were altogether as liquide as water it would vanish away by heate boyling it and be dryed vp therefore it must be of such a conuenient temper that although in some of its partes it be fluide and apt to runne yet by others it must be held together as we see that vnctuous thinges for the most part are which will swell by heate but not flye away So then if we imagine a great heate to be imprisoned in such a liquour and that it seeketh by boyling to breake out but that the solidenesse and viscousnesse of the substance will not permitt it to euaporate it can not choose but comport it selfe in some such sort as we see butter or oyle in a frying panne ouer the fire when it riseth in bubbles but much more efficaciously for their body is not strong enough to keepe in the heate and therefore those bubbles fall againe whereas if it were those bubbles would rise higher and higher and stretch themselues longer and longer as when the soape boylers do boyle a strong vnctuous lye into soape and euery one of them would be as it were a litle brooke whereof the channell would be the enclosing substance and the inward smoake that extendeth it might be compared to the water of it as when a glasse is blowne out by fire and ayre into a long figure Now we may remember how we haue said where we treated of the production and resolution of mixed bodies that there are two sortes of liquide substantiall partes which by the operation of fire are sent out of the body it worketh vpon the watry and the oyly partes For though there appeare some times some very subtile and aethereall partes of a third kind which are the aquae ardentes or burning spirits yet in such a close distilling of circulation as this is they are not seuered by themselues but do accompagny the rest and especially the watry partes which are of a nature that the rising Ethereall spirits easily mingle with and extend themselues in it whereby the water becometh more efficacious and the spirits lesse fugitiue Of these liquide partes which the fire sendeth away the watry ones are the first as being the easiest to be raysed the oyly partes rise more difficultly and therefore do come last And in the same manner it happeneth in this emission of brookes the watry and oyly steames will each of them flye into different reserues and if there arriue vnto them aboundance of their owne quality each of them must make a substance of its owne nature by settling in a conuenient place and by due concoction Which substance after it is made and confirmed if more humidity and heate do presse it will againe break forth into other litle channels But when the watry and oyly partes are boyled away there remaine yet behind other more solide and fixed partes and more strongly incorporated with fire then eyther of these which yet can not drye vp into a fiery salt because a continuall accessiō of humour keepeth them alwayes flowing and so they become like a couldron of boyling fire Which must propagate it selfe as wide as eyther of the others since the actiuity of it must needes be greater then theirs as being the source of motion vnto them and that there wanteth not humidity for it to extend it selfe by And thus you see three rootes of three diuers plants all in the same plant proceeding by naturall resolution from one primitiue source Whereof that which is most watry is fittest to fabricate the body and common outside of the triformed plant since water is the most figurable principle that is in nature and the most susceptible of multiplication and by its cold is easyest to be hardened and therefore fittest to resist the iniuries of enemy bodies that may infest it The oyly partes are fittest for the continuance and solidity of the plant for we see that viscosity and oylinesse hold together the partes where they abound and they are slowly wasted by fire but do conserue and are an aliment to the fire that consumeth them The partes of the third kind are fittest for the conseruation of heate which though in them it be too violent yet it is necessary for working vpon other partes and for mainetaining a due temper in them And thus we haue armed our plant with three sortes of riuers or brookes to runne through him with as many different streames the one of a gentle balsamike oyle an other of streaming fire and the third of a connaturall and cooler water to irrigate
which the contained substance should goe out as the moystening of the stringes and mouth of a purse almost shutteth it vntill in some for example the stomacke after a meale the humour being attenuated by little and little getteth out subtilely and so leauing lesse weight in the stomacke the bag which weighth downe lower then the neather orifice at which the digested meate issueth riseth a little and this rising of it is also furthered by the wrinkling vp and shortning of the vpper part of the stomacke which still returneth into its naturall corrugation as the masse of liquid meate leaueth soaking it which it doth by degrees still as more and more goeth out and so what remaineth filleth lesse place and reacheth not so high of the stomacke and thus at leÌ„gth the residue and thicker substance of the meate after the thinnest is gott out in steame and the middling part is boyled ouer in liquor cometh to presse and grauitate wholy vpoÌ„ the orifice of the stomacke which being then helped by the figure and lying of the rest of the stomacke and its stringes and mouth relaxing by hauing the iuice which swelled them squeezed out of them it openeth it selfe and giueth way vnto that which lay so heauy vpon it to tumble out In others for example in a woman with childe the enclosed substaÌ„ce retained first by such a course of nature as we haue sett downe breaketh it selfe a passage by force and openeth the orifice at which it is to goe out by violence when all circumstances are ripe according to natures institution But yet there is the expulsion which is made by physicke that requireth a little declaration It is of fiue kindes vomiting purging by stoole by vrine sweating and saliuation Euery one of which seemeth to consist of two partes namely the disposition of the thing to be purged and the motion of the nerues or fibers for the expulsion as for example when the Physitian giueth a purge it worketh two thinges the one is to make some certaine humour more liquid and purgeable theÌ„ the rest the other is to make the stomacke or belly sucke or vent this humour For the first the property of the purge must be to precipitate that humour out of the rest of the bloud or if it be thicke to dissolue it that it may runne easily For the second it ordinarily heateth the stomacke and by that meanes it causeth the stomacke to sucke out of the veines and so to draw from all partes of the body Besides this it ordinarily filleth the belly with winde which occasioneth those gripings men feele when they take physicke and is cause of the guttes discharging those humours which otherwise they would retaine The like of this happeneth in saliuation for the humours are by the same meanes brought to the stomacke and thence sublimed vp to be spitten out as we see in those who taking Mercury into their body eyther in substance or in smoake or by applicatioÌ„ do vent cold humours from any part the Mercury rising from all the body vp to the mouth of the patient as to the helme of a sublimatory and the like some say of Tobacco As for vomiting it is in a manner wholy the operation of the fibers prouoked by the feeling of some inconuenient body which maketh the stomacke wrincle it selfe and worke and striue to cast out what offendeth it Sweating seemeth to be caused by the heating of some introus body by the stomake which being of subtile partes is by heate dispersed from the middle to the circumference and carrieth with it light humours which turne into water as they come out into the ayre And thus you see in generall and as much as concerneth vs to declare what the naturall faculties are and this according to Galen his owne mind who affirmeth that these faculties do follow the complexion or the temper of the partes of a mans body Hauing explicated how voluntary motion proceedeth from the braine our next consideration ought to be to examine what it is that such an obiect as we brought by meanes of the senses into the braine from without doth contribute to make the braine apply it selfe to worke such voluntary motion To which purpose we will goe a steppe or two backe to meete the obiect at its entrance into the sense and from thence accompany it in all its iourney and motions onwardes The obiect which striketh at the senses dore and getting in mingleth it selfe with the spirits it findeth there is eyther coÌ„forme and agreeable to the nature and temper of those spirits or it is not that is to say in short it is eyther pleasing or displeasing to the liuing creature or it may be of a third kind which being neyther of these we may terme indifferent In which sort soeuer the obiect affect the sense the spirits carry it immediately to the braine vnlesse some distemper or strong thought or other accident hinder them Now if the obiect be of the third kind that is be indiffent as soone as it hath strucken the braine it reboundeth to the circle of the memory and there being speedily ioyned to others of its owne nature it findeth them annexed to some pleasing or displeasing thing or it doth not if not in beastes it serueth to little vse and in men it remayneth there vntill it be called for But if eyther in its owne nature it be pleasing or displeasing or afterwardes in the memory it became ioyned to some pleasing or annoying fellowshipp presently the hart is sensible of it for the hart being ioyned to the braine by straight and large nerues full of strong spirits which ascend from the hart it is impossible but that it must haue some communication with those motions which passe in the braine vpon which the hart or rather the spirits about it is eyther dilated or compressed And these motions may be eyther totally of one kind or moderated and allayed by the mixture of its contrary if of the former sort one of them we call ioy the other griefe which do continue about the hart and peraduenture do oppresse it if they be in the vtmost extremity without sending any due proportion of spirits to the braine vntill they settle a little and grow more moderate Now when these motions are moderate they immediately send vp some aboundance of spirits to the braine which if they be in a conuenient proportion they are by the braine thrust into such nerues as are fitt to receiue them and swelling them they giue motion to the muscles and tendons that are fastened to them and they do moue the whole body or what part of it is vnder command of those nerues that are thus filled and swelled with spirits by the braine If the obiect was conformable to the liuing creature then the braine sendeth spirits into such nerues as caâ—â—y the body to it but if otherwise it causeth a motioÌ„ of auersion or flight from it To the cause of this latter we giue
as soone as the mastering violence leaueth them at liberty Pleasure therefore must be contrary to this and consist in a moderate dilatation for an immoderate one would cause a compression in some adherent partes and there would become paine And conformable to this we experience that generally they are hard thinges which breed paine vnto vs and that these which breed pleasure are oyly and soft as meates and odours which are sweete to the taste and smell and soft substances which are gratefull to the touch the excesse of all which proueth offensiue and painefull so that from the extremity of pleasure one entereth presently vpon the confines of paine Now then lett vs consider how the little similitudes of bodies which from without do come into the fantasy must of necessity worke there according to their little power effects proportionable to what they wrought first in the outward senses from whence they were conueyed to the braine for the senses that is the nerues and the Septum Lucidum hauing both of them their origine from the very substance of the braine and differing only in degrees of purity and refinement the same obiect must needes workelike effects in both compressing or dilating them proportionably to one an other which compression or dilatation is not paine or pleasure as it is in the outward sense but as it is reported to the hart and that being the seate of all paines or pleasures wrought in other partes and that as it were dyeth them into those qualities is not capable of feeling eyther it selfe so that the stroakes of any little similitudes vpon the fantasy do make only compressions or dilatations there not paines or pleasures Now their bodies or similitudes if they be reuerberated from the fantasy or septum Lucidum vpon the little rootes of the nerues of the sixt couple which goe to the hart they must needes worke there a proportionable impression to what they wrought vpon the fansy eyther compressing or dilating it and the hart being extremely passiue by reason of its exceeding tendernesse and heate can not choose but change its motion at the least in part if not in whole and this with relation to two causes the one the disposition of the hart it selfe the other the vehemency of the stroake This change of motion and different beating of the hart is that which properly is called passion and is euer accompanyed with pleasure or with griefe according to the nature of the impression that eyther contracteth or dilateth the hart and the spirirs about it and is discouered by the beating of the arteries and of the pulse Conformable wherevnto Physitians do tell vs that euery passion hath a distinct pulse These pulses are diuided in common by aboundance or by want of spirits yet in both kinds they may haue common differencies for in aboundance the pulse may be quicke or slow regular or irregular equall or vnequall and the like may happen in defect of spirits according to the motions of the hart which are their causes Againe the obiect by being present or absent neerer or further off maketh the stroake greater or lesser and accordingly varyeth the motion of the hart Lett vs then call to mind how we haue formerly declared that life consisteth in heate and humidity and that these two ioyned together do make a thing great and we may conclude that of necessity the motion which is most liuely must haue a great full and large stroake like the euē rolling waues of a wyde and smooth sea and not too quicke or smart like the breaches of a narrow Fretum agitated by tempestuous windes From this other motions may vary eyther by excesse or by deficiency the first maketh the stroake become smart violent and thicke the other slackeneth it and maketh it grow little slow weake and thinne or seldome And if we looke into the motions of our hart we shall see these three differencies of them follow three seuerall chiefe passions The first followeth the passion of ioy the second the passion of anger and the third the passion of griefe Nor neede we looke any further into the causes of these seuerall motions for we see that ioy and griefe following the stroake of sense the one of them must consist in an oyly dilatation that is the spirits about the hart must be dilated by a gentle large great and sweete motion in a moderation between velocity and slownesse the other contrarywise following the stroake of sense in paine as the first did in pleasure must contract the spirits and consequently make their motion or stroake become little and deficient from all the properties we haue aboue sett downe As for anger the motion following that passion is when the aboundance of spirits in the hart is a little checked by the contrary stroake of sense but presently ouercometh that opposition and then as we see a hindered water or a man that suddainely or forcibly breake through what withstood their motion go on with a greater violence then they did and as it were precipitately so the hart hauing ouercome the contraction which the sense made in it dilateth it selfe with a fury and maketh its motion smart and vehement Whence also it followeth that the spirits grow hoater then they were and accordingly it is often seene that in the scoulding of a woman and in the irritation of a dogg if euer now and then one thwart them and interpose a little opposition their fury will be so sharpened and heightened that the woman will be transported beyond all limits of reason and the dogg will be made madde with nothing else done to him but angring him at conuenient times and some men likewise haue by sleight oppositions iterated speedily vpon them before their spirits could relent their vehement motion and therefore must still encrease it beene angred into feauers This passion of anger seemeth almost to be solitary on the side of excesse beyond ioy which is as it were the standard and perfection of all passions as light or whitenesse is of all colours but on the otherside of deficiency there are seuerall middle passions which participate more or lesse of ioy and griefe as particularly those two famous ones which gouerne mans life Hope and Feare Concerning which Physitians tell vs that the pulse or beating of feare is quicke hard and vnequall vnto which I conceiue we may safely adde that it must also be small and feeble the perfection of ioy decreasing in it on one side to witt from greatnesse and largenesse but not intirely so that a kind of quicknesse supplyeth in part the other defect Hope on the other side is in such sort defectiue from ioy that neuerthelesse it hath a kind of constancy and moderate quantity and regularity in its motion and therefore is accounted to be the least hurtfull of all the passions and that which most prolongeth mans life And thus you see how those motions which we call passions are engendred in the hart and what
rest do nibble vpon it there and do feede themselues first with that which consequently hindereth the groweth of the corne And here againe men will contend that this must be done by prouidence and discourse to preuent that their store should not grow out of their reach and changing nature become vselesse to them in their neede To conclude the foreknowing of beastes is nothing else but their timely receiuing impressions from the first degrees of mutation in thinges without them which degrees are almost imperceptible to vs because our fantasies and spirits hâ—ue otherwise such violent agitations more then theirs which hinder them from discerning gentle impressioÌ„s vpon them If you be at sea after along calme a while before a gaile bloweth to fill your sailes or to be discernable by your sense in quality of wind you shall perceiue the sea beginne to wrinkle his smooth face that way the wind will come which is so infaillible a signe that a gaile will come fâ—om that coast as marriners immediately fall to trimming their sailes accordingly and vsually before they can haue done the wind is with them shall we therefore say that the sea hath a prouidence to foresee which way the wind will blow Or that the cornes vpon our toes or calluses or broken bones or ioyntes that haue beene dislocated haue discourse and can foretell the weather It is nothing else but that the wind rising by degrees the smooth sea is capable of a change by it before we can feele it and that the ayre being changed by the forerunners of worse weather worketh vpon the crasiest partes of our body when the others feele not so small a change so beastes are more sensible then we for they haue lesse to distract them of the first degrees of a changing weather and that mutation of the ayre without them maketh some change within them which they expresse by some outward actions or gestures Now they who obserue how such mutations and actions are constantly in them before such or such weather do thinke they know beforehand that raine for example or wind or drought is coming according to the seuerall signes they haue marked in them which proceedeth out of the narrownesse of their discourse that maketh them resort to the same causes whensoeuer they meere with like effects and so they conceiue that thinges must needes passe in beastes after the same tenour as they do in meÌ„ And this is a generall and maine errour running through all the conceptions of mankind vnlesse great heede be taken to preuent it that what subiect soeuer they speculate vpon whether it be of substances that haue a superiour nature to theirs or whether it be of creatures inferiour to them they are still apt to bring them to their owne standard and to frame such conceptions of them as they would do of themselues as when they will haue Angels discourse and moue and be in a place in such sort as is naturall to men or when they will haue beastes rationate and vnderstand vpon their obseruing some orderly actions performed by them which in men would proceed from discourse and reason And this dangerous rocke against which many fine conceptions do suffer shipperackâ— whosoeuer studyeth truth must haue a maine caution to auoyde Sed nos immensum spatijs confecimus aequor Etiam tempus equum fumantia soluere colla THE CONCLVSION OF THE FIRST TREATISE THus at the last by Gods assistance we are clymbed vp to the toppe of the hill from whence looking downe ouer the whole region of bodies we may delight our selues with seeing what a height the weary steppes we ascended by haue brought vs vnto It is true the path we haue walked in is of late so vntrodden and so ouergrowne with bryars as it hath not beene without much labour that we haue made our way through And peraduenture it may seeme toylesome vnto others to follow vs especially such as are not much enured to like iourneyes but I hope the fruite which both we and they are now arriued to gather of our paines in this generall view we haue taken of the empire of matter and of corporeall agents is such as none of vs hath reason to be ill satisfyed with the employing of them For what can more powerfully delight or more noblâ— entertaine an vnderstanding soule then the search and discouery of those workes of nature which being in their effects so plainely exposed to our eyes are in their causes so abstruse and hidden from our comprehension as through despaire of successe they deterre most men from inquiring into them And I am persuaded that by this summary discourse short indeede in regard of so large a scope how euer my lame expressions may peraduenture make it appeare tedious it appeareth euidently that none of natures greatest secrets whereof our senses giue vs notice in the effects are so ouershaded with an impenetrable veyle but that the diligent and wary hand of reason might vnmaske them and shew them to vs in their naked and genuine formes and delight vs with the contemplation of their natiue beauties if we had as much care and constancy in the pursuite of them as we dayly see men haue in heaping vp of wealth or in striuing to satisfy their boundelesse ambitions or in making their senses swimme in the muddy lake of base and contemptible pleasures For who shall througly consider and weigh what we haue hitherto said will plainely see a continuall and orderly progresse from the simplest heighest and most common conception that we frame of a body in generall vnto the furthest and most abstruse effects that in particular are to be found in any body whatsoeuer I meane any that is meerely corporeall without mixture of a nobler nature for hitherto we haue not moued nor so much as looked out of that oâ—be He shall find one continued thridde spunne out from the beginning to the end He will see that the various twisting of the two specieses of Bodies Rare and Dense do make the yarne of which all thinges and actions within the sphere of matter are wouen And although peraduenture in the drawing out of the thridde there may be some litle brackes or the stuffe made of it be not euery where so close wrought as a better workeman at more leisure might haue done yet truly I beleeue that the very consent of thinges throughout is such as demonstrateth that the maine contexture of the doctrine I haue here touched is beyond quarrelling at It may well be that in sundry particulars I haue not lighted vpon exact truth and I am so farre from maintaining peremptorily any thing I haue here said as I shall most readily haâ—ken to whatsoeuer shall be obiected against it and be as ready vpon cause to desert my owne opinions and to yield vnto better reason But withall I conceiue that as the fayling of a bricke here and there in the rearing of the walles of a house doth nothing at all preiudice the
vniuersality or particularity for that vnity which the two termes whose identification is enquired after must haue by being ioyned with the third becometh much varied by such diuers application and from hence shooteth vp that multitude of kindes of syllogismes which our Logitians call moodes All which I haue thus particularly expressed to the end we may obserue how this great variety hangeth vpon the sole string of identity Now these Syllogismes being as it were interlaced and wouen one within an other so that many of them do make a long chaine whereof each of them is a linke do breede or rather are all the variety of mans life they are the stepps by which we walke in all our conuersations and in all our businesses man as he is man doth nothing else but weaue such chaines whatsoeuer he doth swaruing from this worke he doth as deficient from the nature of man and if he do ought beyond this by breaking out into diuers sortes of exteriour actions he findeth neuerthelesse in this linked sequele of simple discourses the art the cause the rule the boundes and the modell of it Lett vs take a summary view of the vast extent of it and in what an immeÌ„se Ocean one may securely sayle by that neuer varying compasse when the needle is rightly touched and fitted to a well moulded boxe making still new discoueries of regions farre out of the sight and beliefe of them who stand vpon the hither shore Humane operations are comprised vnder the two generall heades of knowledge and of action if we looke but in grosse vpon what an infinity of diuisions these branch themselues into we shall become giddy our braines will turne our eyes will grow weary and dimme with ayming only att a suddaine and rouing measure of the most conspicuous among them in the way of knowledge We see what mighty workes men haue extended their labours vnto not only by wild discourses of which huge volumes are coÌ„posed but euen in the rigorous methode of Geometry Arithmetike and Algebra in which an Euclide an Apollonius an Archimedes a Diophantus and their followers haue reached such admirable heights and haue wound vp such vast bottomes sometimes shewing by effects that the thing proposed must needes be as they haue sett downe and can not possibly be any otherwise otherwhiles appaying the vnderstanding which is neuer truly at rest till it hath found the causes of the effects it seeth by exposing how it cometh to be so that the reader calling to mind how such a thing was taught him before and now finding an other vnexpectedly conuinced vpon him easily seeth that these two put together do make and force that third to be whereof he was before in admiration how it could be effected which two wayes of discourse are ordinarily knowne by the names of Demonstrations the one called a Priori the other a Posteriori Now if we looke into the extent of the deductions out of these we shall find no end In the heaueÌ„s we may perceiue Astronomy measuring whatsoeuer we can imagine and ordering those glorious lights which our Creator hath hanged out for vs and shewing them their wayes and pricking out their pathes and prescribing them for as many ages as he pleaseth before hand the various motions they may not swarue from in the least circumstance Nor want there sublime soules that tell vs what mettall they are made of what figures they haue vpon what pillars they are fixed and vpon what gimals they moue and performâ— their various periodes wittnesse that excellent and admirable worke I haue so often mentioned in my former Treatise If we looke vpon the earth we shall meete with those that will tell vs how thicke it is and how much roome it taketh vp they will shew vs how men and beastes are hanged vnto it by the heeles how the water and ayre do couer it what force and power fire hath vpon them all what working is in the depths of it and of what composition the maine body of it is framed where neyther our eyes can reach nor any of our senses can send its messengers to gather and bring back any relations of it Yet are not our Masters contented with all this the whole world of bodies is not enough to satisfy them the knowledge of all corporeall thinges and of this vast machine of heauen and earth with all that they enclose can not quench the vnlimited thirst of a noble minde once sett on fire with the beauty and loue of truth Aestuat infoelix angusto limite mundi Vt Gyarae clausus scopulis paruâque seripho But such heroike spirits cast their subtile nettes into an other world after the winged inhabitans of the heauens and find meanes to bring them also into account and to serue them how imperceptible soeuer they be to the senses as daynties at the soules table They enquire after a maker of the world we see and are ourselues a maine part of and hauing found him they conclude him oâ—t of the force of contradiction to be aeternall infinite omnipotent omniscient immutable and a thousand other admirable qualities they determine of him They search after his tooles and instruments wherewith he built this vast and admirable pallace and seeke to grow acquainted with the officiers and stewardes that vnder him gouerne this orderly and numerous family They find them to be inuisible creatures exalted aboue vs more then we can estimate yet infinitely further short of their and our maker then we are of them If this do occasion them to cast their thoughts vpon man himselfe they find a nature in him it is true much inferiour to these admirable Intelligences yet such an one as they hope may one day arriue vnto the likenesse of them and that euen at the present is of so noble a moulde as nothing is too bigge for it to faddome nor any thing too small for it to discerne Thus we see knowledge hath no limits nothing escapeth the toyles of science all that euer was that is or can euer be is by them circled in their extent is so vast that our very thoughts and ambitioÌ„s are too weake and too poore to hope for or to ayme at what by them may be coÌ„passed And if any man that is not invred to raise his thoughts aboue the pitch of the outward obiects he coÌ„uerseth dayly with should suspect that what I haue now said is rather like the longing dreames of passionate louers whose desires feede them with impossibilities then that it is any reall truth or should imagine that it is but a poetike Idea of science that neuer was or will be in act or if any other that hath his discoursing faculty vitiated and peruerted by hauing beene imbued in the schooles with vnsound and vmbratile principles should persuade himselfe that howsoeuer the pretenders vnto learning and science may talke loude of all thinges and make a noise with scholastike termes and persuade their ignorant hearers that they speake
soules Mortality is to be esteemed such There remaineth yet one consideration more and peraduenture more important then any we haue yet mentioned to conuince the soules immortality which is that spirituall thinges are in a state of Being But we shall not be able to declare this vntill we haue proceeded a litle further THE TENTH CHAPTER Declaring what the soule of a man seperated from his body is and of her knowledge and manner of working VNhappy man how long wilt thou be inquisitiue and curious to thine owne perill Hast thou not already payed too deare for thy knowing more then thy share Or hast thou not heard that who will prye into maiesty shall be oppressed by the glory of it Some are so curious shall I say or so ignorant as to demaund what a humane soule will be after she is deliuered from her body and vnlesse they may see a picture of her and haue whereby to fansie her they will not be persuaded but that all are dreames which our former discourses haue concluded as if he who findeth himselfe dazeled with looking vpon the sunne had reason to complaine of that glorious body and not of his owne weake eyes that can not entertaine so resplendent a light Wherefore to frame some conceit of a seperated soule I will endeauour for their satisfaction to say some what of her future state Lett vs then first consider what a Thought is I do not meane that corporeall spiritt which beateth at our common sense but that which is within in the inward soule whose nature we find by discourse and effects though we can not see it in it selfe To this purpose we may obserue that if we are to discourse or to do any thing we are guided the right way in that subiect we haue in hand by a multitude of particular thoughts which are all of them terminated in that discourse or action and consequently euery act of our mind is as it were an actuall rule or direction for some part of such discourse or action so that we may conceiue a complete thought compounded of many particular ones to be a thing that ordereth one entire discourse or action of our life A thought being thus described lett vs in the next place trye if we can make an apprehension what a science or an art is as what the science of Astronomy is or what the art of playing on the Organes is when the Astronomer thinketh not of the motions of the heauens nor the Organist of playing on his instrument which science and art do neuerthelesse euen then reside in the Astronomer and in the Organist and we find that these are but the resultes of many former complete thoughts as being those very thoughts in remainder whatsoeuer this may signify Lastly lett vs conceiue if we can a power or capacity to Being vnto which capacity if any Being be brought that it is vnseperably glewed and riueted vnto it by its very being a Being and if any two thinges be brought vnto it by the vertue of one Being common to both those thinges that both of them by this one being do become one betwixt themselues and with this capacity and that so there is no end or periode of this addition of thinges by the mediation of Being but that by linkes and ringes all the thinges that are in the world may hang together betwixt themselues and to this Power if all of them may be brought vnto it by the glew and vertue of being in such sort as we haue formerly declared passeth in the soule Now lett vs putt this together and make vp such a thing as groweth out of the capacity to Being thus actuated and cleauing to all thinges that any way haue being and we shall see that it becometh a whole entire world ordered and clinging together with as great strength and necessity as can proceede from the nature of Being and of contradiction and our reason will tell vs that such a thing if it be actiue can frame a world such an one as we liue in and are a small parcell of if it haue matter to worke vpon and can order whatsoeuer hath Being any way that it is capable of being ordered to do by it and to make of it whatsoeuer can be done by and made of such matter All these conceptions especially by the assistance of the last may serue a litle to shadow out a perfect soule which is a knowledge an art a rule a direction of all thinges and all this by being all thinges in a degree and straine proper and peculiar to it selfe and an vnperfect soule is a participation of this Idea that is a knâ—wledge a rule and a direction for as much as it is and as it attaineth vnto Now as in our thoughts it is the corporeall part only which maketh a noise and a shew outwardly but the spirituall thought is no otherwise perceiued then in its effect in ordering the bodily acts in like sort we must not conceiue this knowledge to be a motion but meerely to be a thing or Being out of which the ordering and mouing of other thinges doth flow it selfe remaining fixed and immoueable and because all that is ioyned vnto it is there riueted by Being or identification and that when one thing is an other the other is againe it it is impossible that one should exceed the other and be any thing that is not it and therefore in the soule there can be no partes no accidents no additions no appendances nothing that sticketh to it and is not it but whatsoeuer is in her is soule and the soule is all that which is within her so that all that is of her and all that belongeth vnto her is nothing but one pure simple substance peraduenture Mâ—taphysically or formally diuisible in such sort as we haue explicated in the first Treatise of the diuisibility betweene quantity and substance but not quantitatiuely as bodies are diuisible In fine substance it is and nothing but substance all that is in it being ioyned and imped into it by the very nature of Being which maketh substance This then is the substantiall conceite of a humane soule stripped of her body Now to conceiue what proprieties this substance is furnished with lett vs reflect vpon the notions we frame of thinges when we consider them in common as when we think of a man of bread of some particular vertue of a vice or of whatsoeuer else and lett vs note how in such our discourse determineth no place nor time nay if it should it would marre the discourse as Logitians shew when they teach vs that scientificall syllogismes can not be made without vniuersall propositions so that we see vnlesse these thinges be stripped from Place and Time they are not according to our meaning and yet neuerthelesse we giue them both the name and the nature of a Thing or of a substance or of a liuing Thing or of whatsoeuer else may by our manner of conceiuing or
so much knowledge as to be able to determine that some one thing which hath connexion with all the rest is in such a time but then why out of this very conception she should not be able to clymbe vp by degrees to the knowledge of all other thinges whatsoeuer since there is a connexion betweene that and all the rest and no vntransible gappe or Chaos to seuer them I professe I do not see Which if it be so then the soule of an abortiue in his mothers wombe if he once arriue to haue sense and from it to receiue any impression in his soule may for ought I know or can suspect to the contrary be endewed in the next world with as much knowledge as the soule of the greatest Clerke that euer liued and if an abortiue do not arriue so farre as to the knowledge of some one thing I know no reason why we should belieue it arriued to the nature of man Whence it followeth that this amplitude of knowledge is common to all humane soules of what pitch soeuer they seeme to bee here when they are seperated from their bodies as also that if any errour haue crept into a mans iudgement during this life whether it be of some vniuersall conclusion or of some particular thing all such will be abolished then by the truth appearing on the opposite side sithence two contradictory iudgements can not possesse our soule together as euen in this world as well experience as reason teacheth vs. But vnawares I haue engulfed my selfe into a sea of contradiction from no meane aduersaries for Alexander Aphrodiseus Pomponatius and the learnedest of the Peripatetike schoole will all of them rise vp in maine opposition against this doctrine of mine shewing how in the body all our soules knowledge is made by the working of our fansie and that there is no act of our soule without speculation of fantasmes residing in our memory therefore seeing that when our body is gone all those litle bodies of fantasmes are gone with it what signe is there that any operation can remaine And hence they inferre that seeing euery substance hath its Being for its operations sake and by consequence were vaine and superfluous in the world if it could not enioy and exercise its operation there is no necessity or end why the soule of a man should suruiue his body and consequently there is no reason to imagine other then that it perisheth when the man dyeth This is the substance of their argument which indeede is nothing else but to guesse without ground or rather against all ground but howsoeuer this comfort I haue that I haue to do with Peripatetikes men that will heare and answere reason and to such I addresse my speech To ioyne issue then with them and to encounter them with their owne weapons lett vs call to minde what Aristotle holdeth light to be He saith that it is a suddaine and momentary emanation of what it is following the precedent motion of some body but without motion in it selfe As for example when the sunne cometh into our horizon saith he the illumination of the horizon is an effect in an instant following from the motion which the sunne had since his setting in the other hemisphere vntill he appeare there againe so that according to him the way of making this light is the sunnes locall motion but the effect of the being enlightened is a thing of a very different nature done without beginning and continuing vntill the sunne departe againe from our horizon And as he explicateth this action of illumination in the same manner doth he the actions of sense and of vnderstanding Vpon all which I vrge that no Peripatetike will deny me but that as in euery particular sensation or thinking there precedeth a corporeall motion out of which it ensueth so this generall motion which we call the life of Man precedeth that twinkle or moment in which she becometh an absolute spiritt or inhabitant of the next world Wherefore it can not be said that we introduce a doctrine aliene from the Peripatetike way of Philosophising if we putt a momentary effect of motion according to their phrase of speaking to follow out of the course of mans life since they putt diuers such effects to follow out of particular partes of it Now this momentary change or what they please to call it is that which maketh at one blow all this knowledge we speake of for if we remember that knowledge is not a doing or a motion but a Being as is agreed betweene the Peripatetikes and vs they can not for the continuing it require instruments and motors for they are necessary only for change not for Being Now all this mighty change which is made at the soules deliuery we conceiue followeth precisely out of the change of her Being for seeing it is supposed that her Being was before in a body but is now out of a body it must of necessity follow that all impediments which grew out of her being in a body must be taken away by her being freed from it Among which impediments one is that time is then required betwixt her knowledge of one thing and her knowledge of an other thing and so her capacity that of it selfe is infinite becometh confined to that small multitude of obiects which the diuision and straightnesse of time giueth way vnto Now that which length of time could in part worke in the body the same is entirely done in a moment by the changing of her manner of Being for by taking away the bondes by which she was enthralled in the body and was kept in to apprehend but according to the measure of the body and was constrained to be and to enioy her selfe as it were but at the bodies permission she is putt in free possession of her selfe and of all that is in her And this is nothing else but to haue that large knowledge we haue spoken of for her knowing all that is no other thing but her being her selfe perfectly Which will appeare euident if we consider that her nature is to be a Knower and that knowledge is nothing else but a Being of the obiect in the Knower for thence it followeth that to know all thinges is naught else then to be all thinges since then we concluded by our former discourse that all thinges were to be gathered out of any one it is cleare that to be perfectly her selfe and any one thing is in truth to know all thinges And thus we see that for the soules enioying all this knowledge when she is out of the body she needeth no obiects without her no phantasmes no instruments no helpes but that all that is requisite is cōtained absolutely in her being her selfe perfectly And so we retort our Aduersaries obiection on themselues by representing to them that since in their owne doctrine they require no body nor instruments for that precise action which they call vnderstanding it is without all ground for them
to require bodies and instruments in the next life that the soule may there be that which they acnowledge she is in her body without any such helpes And as for that axiome or experience that the soule doth not vnderstand vnlesse she speculate phantasmes as on the one side I yield to it and confesse the experience after the best and seriousest tryall I could make of it so on the other side when I examine the matter to the bottome I find that it cometh not home to our aduersaries intention For as when we looke vpon a thing we conceiue we worke vpon that thing whereas in truth we do but sett our selues in such a position that the thing seene may worke vpon vs in like manner our looking vpon the phantasmes in our braine is not our soules action vpon them but it is our letting them beate at our common sense that is our letting them worke vpon our soule The effect whereof is that eyther oursoule is bettered in her selfe as when we study and contemplate or else that she bettereth something without vs as when by this thinking we order any action But if they will haue this Axiome auayle them they should shew that the soule is not of her selfe a knowledge which if they be able to do euen then when to our thinking she seemeth not so much as to thinke we will yield they haue reason but that will be impossible to them to do for she is alwayes of her selfe a knowledge though in the body shâ—â—euâ—â— expresseth so much but when she is putt to it Or else they should shâ—w that this knowledge which the soule is of her selfe will not by changing the manner of her Existence become an actuall knowledge insteed of the habituall knowledge which now appeareth in her But as these Aristotelians embrace and sticke to one Axiome of their Patrone so they forgoe and preuaricate against an other for as it is Aristotles doctrine that a substance is for its operation and were in vaine and superfluous if it could not practise it so likewise is it his confessed doctrine that Matter is for its forme and not the forme for the 〈◊〉 And yet these men pretend that the soule serueth for nothing 〈…〉 gouerning of the body whereas contrawise both all 〈…〉 doctrine and common sense conuinceth that the body must 〈…〉 soule Which if it be nothing can be more consentaneous to 〈◊〉 then to conceiue that the durance which the soule hath in the 〈…〉 assigned her to worke and moulde in her the future state which 〈…〉 haue after this life and that no more operations are to be expected from her after this life but insteed of them a settled state of Being seeing that euen in this life according to Aristotles doctrine the proper operations of the soule are but certaine Beings so that we may conclude 〈◊〉 a soule were growne to the perfection which her nature is capable of the would be nothing else but a constant Being neuer changing from the happenesse of the best Being And although the texts of Aristotle which remaine vnto vs be vncertaine peraduenture not so much because they were originally such in themselues as through the mingling of some comments into the body of the text yet if we had his booke which he wrote of the soule vpon the death of his frend Eudemus it is very likely we should there see his euident assertion of her Immortality since it had beene very impertinent to take occasion vpon a frends death to write of the soule if he intended to conclude that of a dead man there were no soule Out of this discourse it appeareth how those actions which we exercise in this life are to be vnderstood when we heare them attributed to the next for to think that they are to be taken in their direct plaine meaning and in that way in which they are performed in this world were a great simplicity and were to imagine a likenesse betweene bodies and spirits We must therefore eleuate our mindes when we would penetrate into the true meaning of such expressions and consider how all the actions of our soule are eminently comprehended in the vniuersality of knowledge we haue already explicated And so the Apprehensions iudgements discourses reflections talkings together and all other such actions of ours when they are attributed to separated soules are but inadaequate names and representations of their instantaneall sight of all thinges for in that they can not choose but see others mindes which is that we call talking and likewise their owne which we call reflexion the rest are plaine partes and are plainely contained in knowledge discourse being but the falling into it iudgement the principles of it and single apprehensions the coÌ„ponents of iudgements then for such actions as are the beginning of operatioÌ„ there can be no doubt but that they are likewise to be found and are resumed in the same Vniuersality as loue of good consultation resolution prudentiall election and the first motion for who knoweth all thinges can not choose but know what is good and that good is to be prosecuted and who seeth completely all the meanes of effecting and attaining to his intended good hath already consulted and resolued of the best and who vnderstandeth perfectly the matter he is to worke vpon hath already made his prudentiall election so that there remaineth nothing more to be done but to giue the first impulse And thus you see that this vniuersality of knowledge in the soule comprehendeth all is all performeth all and no imaginable good or happinesse is out of her reach A noble creature and not to be cast away vpon such trash as most men employ their thoughts in Vpon whom it is now time to reflect and to consider what effects the diuers manners of liuing in this world do worke vpon her in the next if first we acquitt ourselues of a promise we made at the end of the last Chapter For it being now amply declared that the state of a soule exempted from her body is a state of pure being it followeth manifestly that there is neyther Action nor Passion in that state which being so it is beyond all opposition that the soule can not dye for it is euident that all corruption must come from the action of an other thing vpon that which is corrupted and therefore that thing must be capable of being made better and of being made worse Now then if a separated soule be in a finall state where she can neyther be bettered or worsened as she must be if she be such a thing as we haue declared it followeth that she can not possibly loose the Being which she hath and sithence her passage out of the body doth not change her nature but only her state it is cleare that she is of the same nature euen in the body though in this her durance she be subiect to be forged as it were by the hammers of corporeall obiects beating
the rest euery one of which perfecteth the vnderstanding of that thing and of all that dependeth vpon the knowledge of it and maketh it become more vigorous and strong euen the often throwing of a boule at the same marke begetteth still more and more strength and iustnesse in the arme that deliuereth it for it can not be denyed but that the same cause which maketh any thing must of necessity perfect and strengthen it by repeating its force and stroakes We may then conclude that the knowledge of our soule which is indeed her selfe will be in the next life more perfect and strong or more slacke and weake according as in this life she hath often and vigorously or faintly and seldome busied her selfe about those thinges which begett such knowledge Now those thinges which men bestow their paines to know we see are of two kindes for some thirst after the knowledge of nature and of the variety of thinges which eyther their senses or their discourse tell them of but others looke no higher then to haue an insight into humane action or to gaine skill in some art whereby they may acquire meanes to liue These later curiosities are but of particulars that is of some one or few species or kindes whose common that comprehendeth them falleth within the reach of euery vulgar capacity and consequently the thinges which depend vpon them are low meane and contemptible whereas the beauty vastnesse and excellency of the others is so much beyond them as they can be brought into no proportion to one an other Now then if we consider what aduantage the one sort of these men will in the next world haue ouer the other we shall find that they who spend their life here in the study and contemplation of the first noble obiects will in the next haue their vniuersall knowledge that is their soule strong and perfect whiles the others that played away their thoughts and time vpon trifles and seldome raysed their mindes aboue the pitch of sense will be fainte through their former laizinesse like bodies benummed with the palsey and sickely through their ill dyett as when a well shaped virgin that hauing fed vpon trash insteed of nourishing meates languisheth vnder a wearisome burthen of the greene sickenesse To make this point yet more cleare we may consider how the thinges which we gaine knowledge of do affect vs vnder the title of good and conuenient in two seuerall manners The one is when the appearance of good in the abstracted nature of it and after examination of all circumstances carryeth our hart to the desire of the thing that appeareth so vnto vs the other is when the semblance of good to our owne particular persons without casting any further or questioning whether any other regard may not make it preiudiciall doth cause in vs a longing for the thing wherein such semblance shineth Now for the most part the knowledges which spring out of the later obiects are more cultiuated by vs then those which arise out of the other partly by reason of their frequēt occurring eyther through necessity or through iudgement and partly by the addition which passion giueth to the impressions they make vpon vs for passion multiplyeth the thoughts of such thinges more then of any others if reason do not crosse and suppresse her tumultuary motions which in most men she doth not The soules then of such persons as giuing way to their passion do in this life busie themselues about such thinges as appeare good to their owne persons and cast no further must needes decede from their bodies vnequally builded if that expression may be permitted me and will be like a lame vnwieldy body in which the principall limbes are not able to gouerne and moue the others because those principall ones are fainte through want of spirits and exercise and the others are ouergrowne with hidropicall and nociue humours The reason whereof is that in such soules their iudgements will be disproportioned to one an other one of them being vnduely stronger then the other What effect this worketh in regard of knowledge we haue already declared and no lesse will it haue in respect of action for suppose two iudgements to be vnequall and such as in the action one contradicteth the other for example lett one of my iudgements be that it is good for me to eate because I am hungry and lett the other be that it is good for me to study because I am shortly to giue an account of my selfe if the one iudgement be stronger then the other as if that of eating be stronger then that of studying it importeth not that there be more reason all circumstances considered for studying because reasons do moue to action according to the measure in which the resolution that is taken vpon them is strong or weake and therefore my action will follow the strongest iudgement and I shall leaue my booke to goe to my dinner Now to apply this to the state of a separated soule we are to remember how the spirituall iudgements which she collected in the body do remaine in her after she is diuested of it and likewise we are to consider how all her proceeding in that state is built not vpon passion or any bodily causes or dispositions but meerely vpon the quality and force of those spirituall iudgements and then it euidently followeth that if there were any such action in the next life the pure soule would apply it selfe therevnto according to the proportion of her iudgements and as they are graduated and qualifyed It is true there is no such action remaining in the next life yet neuerthelesse there remaineth in the soule a disposition and a promptitude to such action and if we will frame a right apprehension of a separated soule we must conceite her to be of such a nature for then all is nature with her as hereafter we shall discourse as if she were a thing made for action in that proportion and efficacity which the quartering of her by this variety of iudgements doth afford that is that she is so much the more fitt for one action then for an other were she to proceed to action as the iudgement of the goodnesse of one of these actions is stronger in her then the iudgement of the others goodnesse which is in effect by how much the one is more cultiuated then the other And out of this we may conclude that what motions do follow in a man out of discourse the like will in a separated soule follow out of her spirituall iudgements So that as he is ioyed if he do possesse his desired good and is discontented and displeased if he misse of it and seizeth greedily vpon it when it is present to him and then cleaueth fast vnto it and whiles he wanteth it no other good affecteth him but he is still longing after that Masterwish of his heart the like in euery regard but much more vehemently befalleth vnto a separated soule So