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A44287 The primitive origination of mankind, considered and examined according to the light of nature written by the Honourable Sir Matthew Hale, Knight ... Hale, Matthew, Sir, 1609-1676. 1677 (1677) Wing H258; ESTC R17451 427,614 449

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remembring Faculty whether they have a kind of Discursive Faculty which some call Reason whether they do prescind or abstract touching their Voyces how far they are significant and whether they intentionally signifie by them how far their Animal motions are spontaneous or meerly mechanical and which are of one kind which of another or whether as Des Cartes would have it all are purely Mechanical Many vain things have been asserted by men that would be counted eminent Wits but without debating in this place the truth of any of these things it is no marvel if we are to seek what are the manner of these operations of abstract Spirits or Brutes we cannot know them unless we were in them so as to be acquainted with their inward motions or at least unless they had some such way of communicating their Perceptions and Phantasms unto us as we have to our selves or one to another But whatever can be known of them we may easily by inspecting and observing our selves know much concerning our own Souls and the operations of them We may know that we have a principle within which we do as it were feel distinct from our Bodies whereby we think and we know we think whereby we do discursively and by way of ratiocination deduce one thing from another whereby we abstract divide and define whereby we have notions of things which were never derived to us by Sense as the Substance or the Substratum of those Accidents of things which are derived to us by our Sense whereby we do correct the errors of our Sense and judge otherwise touching things represented than the Sense represents them The Sense represents the Sun no bigger than a Bushel there is somewhat within us tells and that truly that it is bigger than the Earth because we find Distance diminisheth the appearance of Bodies Our Sense tells us that the representation in the Looking-Glass hath all the motions the bulk figure colour of that corporeal Moles it represents and represents the same under all the renditions of a Body as it doth the thing it self reflected but there is that within tells us and that truly that it is but a meer shadow and no real Substratum under that appearance of any such corporeal Moles We do most certainly know that there is that within us that doth exercise a rational Empire over our passions and sensual appetite that believes hopes and acts in order to ends that respect another Life than that of Sense We do find as it were the principal seats of these operations we feel our selves to understand in our Head and that we will and resolve and love and hate and pity in our Heart almost as plainly as we find our selves see with our Eyes or hear with our Ears I feel the propensions and inclinations of my Mind as really as I feel my Body to be cold or warm I find in my self that this inward principle doth exert many of its actions intentionally and purposely I resolve and cast about to remember things that I would remember I cast about for all circumstances that may revive my Memory or Reminiscence When I command any Muscle of my most remote Limb to move it doth it in an instant in the moment I will it and hereby I understand the motions of my Mind are no way Mechanical though the motion of the Muscle be such I move ride run or speak because I will do it without any other physical impulse upon me and when I see many analogal motions in Animals which though I cannot call them voluntary yet I see them spontaneous I have reason to conclude that these in their principle are not simply mechanical although a Mouse-trap or Architas his Dove moved mechanically from an artificial principle And because I find that the remotest Muscle in my Body moves at the command of my Will and since I see the energy of my Soul in every particle of my Body though not using intellectual actions in every part yet using some that are imperate as Local Motion some that are natural and involuntary as the Pulse of my Heart the Circulation of my Blood my Digestion Sanguification Distribution Augmentation And because at the same time I understand consider determine speak walk digest and exercise as well intelectual imperate and involuntary actions and all from the same vital Principle though operating differently in several Faculties and Operations I therefore experimentally feel that my Soul though it hath the residence of the exercise of his nobler Faculties in my Head and Heart yet it pervades my whole Body and exerciseth Vital Offices proportionate to the Exigences or Use of every part the Flesh the Bones the Blood the Spirits Nerves Veins Arteries Seminal Parts and this I feel to be through my whole Body and if I find any part of my Body be so mortified as it becomes like a rotten Branch of a Tree whether it be Nerve or Joint whereby that principle cannot communicate it self to it it putrifies and corrupts and is not participant of the motion or influence derived from my Soul because it is now no longer in it to quicken it And as I find my whole Body the Province or Territory of my Soul in which it universally acts according to the different organization and use of every part so I find that my Soul as to its substantial existence is confined within the precints of it and doth not physically act without it and by all this I learn that my Soul if it be a Spirit may be circumscribed within the compass of a determinate space that though it be a Spirit yet its operations while it is in the Body may be if not altogether yet in a great measure organical I understand remember and reason better in my health than in my sickness and better in my riper years than when I was a Child and had my organical Parts less digested and inconcocted And though it be a Spirit yet I find it is no inconvenience to have some analogy at least of co-extension with my Body And although it may be a simple Spirit and univocally and essentially the same as well in my Toe as my Head yet according to the variety of the disposition and organization of the several parts of my organical Body it exerciseth variety of operations the same Soul that understands in the Brain and sees in the Eye and hears in the Ear neither understands nor sees nor hears in the Fingers but moves and feels These and many such Perceptions I have touching that principle of Life Sense and Intellection within me and of these I have as great a certainty as possibly I can have of any thing in the world First Although I cannot immediately have any immediate sight of my Soul or of its immediate operations or internal actings yet I sensibly see and feel the effects thereof with as great an evidence and demonstration that it is such as if I saw the Principle it self and its immediate
latitude such as are moral and supernatural Good 3. The Acts of this Faculty are generally divided into Volition Nolition and Suspension That division that herein better suits with my purpose are these Election and Empire 1. Election or choice and this in reference both to means and end for though the Schools tell us that Electio is only mediorum non finis this is to be intended of the general end or good at large and in its universal conception for when several particular ends are in proposal there is belonging to the Will a power of Election of these as well as of the means to attain them 2. The Imperium voluntatis over the Body and the Faculties We may observe in the humane as well as the animal Body two kinds of motions or exertions of Faculties some are stiled natural or involuntary such is the motion of the Heart the Circulation of the Blood the perception of the Senses when the Organs are open and the Object applied these natural though vital Faculties and Motions are not under the command of the Will immediately for whether I will or will not while I live my Heart beats my Blood circulates my Ventricle digests what is in it my Eye sees when open But there be other Motions in the humane and also in the animal Nature that are subject to the command of the Will in Man and to the appetite in Brutes as local motion which in Animals is under the regiment of the Appetite in Man under the regiment of the Will Now this Imperium voluntatis may be considered in relation 1. To it self It can suspend its own acting either of electing or rejecting 2. To the Understanding Though it cannot suspend its perception omnibus ad percipiendum requisitis adhibitis yet it may suspend its decision or determination or at least its obsequium to such decision 3. The Passions which are as it were the Satellites voluntatis and follow the command of the Will where the Will acts according to its power and authority 4. To the animal Spirits and the Vessels in which they are received when designed to Motion namely the Nerves and Muscles those are all subject to the Empire of the Will as to Local Motion of the whole Body or any part thereof when the Spirits Nerves and Muscles are in their due and natural state 5. To the sensual Appetite And indeed herein is evident both the Empire and Sovereignty of the Will and also the visible discrimination between the Humane Nature and the Animal or Brutal Nature and its preference before it In the animal Nature it is evident that the sensual Appetite is that which hath and exerciseth the sovereignty and dominion over the spontaneous actions of the animal Nature that commands the Foot to go the Mouth to eat and all other the spontaneous motions in order to a sensible good But in Man the sensual Appetite is Regimen sub graviere regimine the government of the Appetite is under the government of the Will and controlled by it at least where the reasonable Faculty is not embased and captived by ill custom or disorder And this appears two ways 1. Sometimes the very motion of the Appetite it self is restrained by the Empire of the Will so that a man doth not appetere that sensible good which otherwise he might or would because he will not and this is the most natural and noble regiment of the Will over the sensual Appetite 2. Though it may fall out that the sensual Appetite may appetere bonum sensibile yet the Will may and doth controll the empire of the Appetite in the execution of that appetition As for instance A man sees delicious fruit and he desires it in so much that were there not a controll over the empire of his Appetite it would command the Hand to reach it and the Mouth to eat it But the contrary command of the Will supersedes the command of the Appetite the Appetite desires it but the Hand is forbidden by the Will to reach it Now if any man shall say this contradiction appears not only in the reasonable Nature but even in the sensible The sensible Appetite is checked in its execution oftentimes by sensual Fear as in Dogs and Horses and other Brutes yea sometimes by the remembrance of a former suffering for the like attempt to gratifie his sensual Appetite and yet they are destitute of any superior faculty of Will to interpose a prohibition upon the Appetite I answer this is true for in such cases the impendent Fear is either present or in memory and so expected and it being of a sensible evil hath the same influence upon the sensual Appetite as the present good and therefore if the evil feared or impendent be a greater sensible evil than the good it over-rules the Appetite to aversation as the Fish that loves the bait yet feareth the hook which it discerns as a greater sensible evil the very Appetite is thereby determined to aversation But the controll of the Will upon the Appetite in the reasonable Nature is many times and indeed most often done not upon the account of a sensible evil felt or feared which of it self were sufficient to determin the Appetite but sometimes upon the account of such hopes or fears as fall not under a sensitive notice as of the command or prohibition by God yea many times upon a bare Moral account of the indecorum unreasonableness unseasonableness or utter unfitness of the thing it self without any other motive of fear either of a present or future sensible inconvenience thereby which Moral consideration can no way move the sensible Appetite were it not for the Will which being a rational Faculty is moved by it And this is all that I shall say touching the two great Faculties of the Soul the Understanding and Will I shall not add any thing here touching Passions or Affections of the Mind 1. Because they are but a kind of appendices to the Will the Satellites voluntatis those of the concupiscible kind being as it were the flowers of the motion of Volition those of the irascible kind the flowers of the motion of Aversation 2. Because the Passions for the most part are found in the sensible Nature namely those of love hatred delight grief expectation and fear and therefore I shall not here treat of them 3. I come now to consider of those rational Instincts as I call them the connate Principles engraven in the humane Soul which though they are Truths acquirable and deducible by rational consequence and argumentation yet they seem to be inscribed in the very crasis and texture of the Soul antecedent to any acquisition by industry or the exercise of the discursive Faculty in Man and therefore they may be well called anticipations prenotions or sentiments characterized and engraven in the Soul born with it and growing up with it till they receive a check by ill customs or educations or an improvement and advancement
Siculus Thucidides Herodotus and others do give us some true and some fabulous Derivations of the Names of Places or Countries from the Men that seemed to be the Heads or Roots of those Denominations yet though they should be all admitted to have truly given those Denominations to those Countries it doth by no means follow that they were the Parents of the Inhabitants thereof but they were such as either by War or Power or Election of the People presided in those places and gave them thereupon their denomination Thus they tell us That Helen gave the denomination to that part of Greece which was called Helenica and those Grecians were called Helenistae Pelasgus was he that gave the denomination to the Pelasgi another part of Greece Latinus to Latium and the Latins Danaus to another Cept of the Grecians Tenes the Son of Cygnus to Tenedos Cretas to Creta and the Cretians Italus as some say to Italia and the Italians Romulus to Rome and the Romans And infinite more such Allusions of Denominations of Countries and People from the Name of him that presided either in the Army or Colony or Countrey unto which such Denominations were after given And yet Latinus nor Pelasgus nor Cretas nor Helen were any more the Natural Parents of all those persons that were called Pelasgi or Cretenses or Helenistae or Latini than Romulus was the Natural Parent of all those people that were the first Inhabitants of Rome or of those that were after Incorporated and Infranchised into that Name City or Government Indeed these were such persons as perchance were the Captains of those Armies or Colonies that were commanded by them or were such as were the Heads or Founders of the Monarchies or Kingdoms that they thus founded or such as did sustinere nomen personam totius communitatis and thereby had the Power and Priviledge to give a Denomination to those Countries or People they governed calling them after their own Names But they were not the Natural Roots or common Natural Parents of all them that bore their Denomination though it may be very likely they had some Children of their own which might participate in that common Denomination This therefore singly considered namely the Denomination of People from some one Person is not sufficient to assure us that all those Persons that bore that Denomination were derived by Natural Propagation from him whose Name they so bear but though it may be true that such a Denomination may be communicated to such only as descended by Natural Propagation from him as I shall hereafter instance yet it may be otherwise Therefore I have no reason to conclude That wheresoever I find a Society of Men bearing the Denomination of one Man that that Man was the Natural Parent of those that bear that Denomination unless I have some better Evidence than Allusion of Names since it is apparent in these Histories that it is otherwise Upon this Reason it seems plain that it will not be possible from any Prophane History to find the Original Parents of any one Kingdom much less of Mankind It is very evident indeed that by help of a continuation of Prophane Histories or other common Monuments well kept together the Genealogies and Ramifications of some single Families even to a vast and numerous extension may be preserved But that will not do the business that I intend For it is rare and beyond Example in any Author that I know that the entire and complete Pedigree of the whole Descendents of any particular Family is deduced down through the space of a thousand Years last past whereas such Instances as must serve my turn must be such as are at least five thousand Years old or otherwise I shall fail in the application of this Topick now in hand to the Matter in question It remains therefore that for Instances of such Antiquity useful to my purpose I must resort to the ancientest History namely the History of Moses which as it is a History of the ancientest Times and Occurrences in the World so it is a History that was written at the greatest distance from this Time and nearest to the Times and Things whereof he writes no History in the World being so ancient as this by near eight hundred Years for so long lived Moses the Author of this Book before Homer the first Prophane Historian that is extant And if any Man shall object against the competency of this Instance 1. Because the same Moses whom I use in this Topick is the person that asserts the thing de quo ambigitur namely the first Production of Mankind and therefore that he is incompetent in this Case 2. Because all that urge the Testimony of Moses urge him as infallible divinely inspired and so whatsoever he saith must not be contradicted and upon such a Supposition there were a compendious way of evincing the Question in hand of the Inception of Mankind by telling us that Moses who wrote by an infallible Spirit and Inspiration tells us that Mankind was Created by GOD about 6669 Years since according to the Seventy and so there needs no farther Reason nor can be any farther Controversie touching it To this I shall say these things That although it is certain that Moses was Inspired by an Infallible Spirit in what he wrote and that he doth in plain terms tell us that Man was at first Created by Almighty God and therefore to me or any else that is satisfied of the Infallible Authority of the Holy Scripture this is sufficient to satisfie that the truth is as Moses hath informed us and there needs no other Argument to support my Faith of the truth hereof yet because I am writing of those Natural and Moral Evidences of this Truth that may be of strength enough to evince the truth of this Assertion upon the apparent Moral Evidences of the credibility of the Writings of Moses I shall here urge the Authority of Moses for the Proof of the Matters of Fact in question as I would urge Herodotus or Livy to prove a Matter of Fact alleged by them and at this time and in this Dispute shall only use his Testimony as a Moral Evidence of the Truth he asserts as an Evidence of Credibility And as I shall not exact a Subscription to the Truths he delivers upon the account of his Infallibility so it is not reason to deny that Credibility of what he relates which would be allowed to a Prophane Author especially when it carries with it singly without the contribution of the Supposition of a Divine Authority as great an evidence of truth as any History in World besides And as to that which is said That the Supposition of the truth of what Moses asserts is to suppose the thing controverted because Moses asserts the Creation of Mankind I say 1. That I shall not at all instance in that Assertion as to determin the Question but only so far forth as it is a Moral Evidence of the