assertion equally false that the world is everlasting which could not be saith he if it had beginning That the world being Gods work is the fairest of things whatsoever disposed in lively order being a part thereof for which reason Pythagoras according to Plutarch called it first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That night is elder then day This circumstance of the creation was held likewise by Orpheus and Hesiod who had it from the Phoenicians for this reason the Numidians Germans and * Gaules reckoned by nights That the world is animated and that God is the soul thereof diffus'd through every part whose divine moving vertue penetrats through the element of water Thus explain'd by the Hermetick Philosophers â—he divine spirit who produc'd this world out of the first water being infus'd as it were by a continuall inspiration into the works of nature and diffus'd largely through by a certain secret and continuall act moving the whole and every particular according to its kind is the soul of the world That the World is contained in place This agrees with the definition of place by space but they who with Aristotle define place a superficies though they hold the parts of the world to be in place are forced to deny the whole to be so That in the world there is no vacuum in which as Plutâ—rch observes all Philosophers agree who affirm the world to be animated and govern'd by providence the contrary defended by those who maintain that it consisteth of Atomes is inanimate not governed by providence That matter is fluid and variable That Bodies are passible and divisible in infinitum and continuous as are also a line supersâ—cies place and time That mistion is made by composition of the elements That * the starrs are earthly yet fiery the Sun earthly They who affirm the starres to be fiery saith * Aristotle hold so as conceiving the whole superiour body to be fire That the Moon is of the same nature with the Sun that she is illuminatâ—d by him Plutarch and Stobaeus affirm this to be first held by Thales though Eudemus cited by Theon ascribe it to Anaximander That the monthly occulations of the Moon are caused by the neerness of the Sun shining round her That there is but one earth round in fashion of a Globe seated in the midst of the world to which relates that speech ascribed to him by Cleodemus that if the earth were taken out of the world there must of necessity follow a confusion of all things That the overflowing of Nilus is caused by the Etesian yearly winds which rise with the Dog star after the summer solstice and beginning to bâ—ow from the North spread as Aristotle describes them into remote quarters These saith Plutaâ—ch blowing directly against Aegypt cause the water so to swell that the sea driven by these winds entereth within the mouth of that River and hindereth it that it cannot discharge it selfe freely into the Sea but is repulsed Whereupon addes Diodorus Siculus it overflowes Aegypt which lyeth low and levell But this reason though it seem plausible is easily disproved for if this were true all the Rivers which are discharged into the Sea opposite to the Etesian winds should have the same overflowing Thus Diodorus in his excellent discourse upon this subject which concludes with the opinion of Agatharchides that it is occasion'd by rain coming from the mountaines of Ethiopia CHAP. VII Of his Geometry APuleius who calls Thales the inventer of Geometry amongst the Grecians is more just to his memory then Anticlides and others who ascribe the honour thereof to Moeris or to Pythagoras who by the acknowledgment of Iamblichus a Pythagorean learnt Mathematicks of Thales The originall and progresse of this science to the perfection it received from Pythagoras which gave occasion to that mistake is thus delivered by â—roclus Geometry was invented by the Egyptians taking â—is beginning from measuring fields it being necessary for them by reason of the inundation of Nilus which washed away the bounds of their severalls Nor is it to be wondered at that as well this as other sciences should have their beginning from commodiousnesse and opportunity since as is said in generation it proceeds from imperfect to perfect therefore not without reason is the transition from sense to consideration and from consideration to the mind As therefore among the Phaenicians by reason of merchandise and traffick the certain knowledge of numbers had its beginning so likewise among the Aegyptians Geometry was found out upon the foresaid occasion and Thales going to Egypt first brought over this science inâ—o Greece and many things he found out himselfe and taught his followers the principles of many things declaring some more generally other things more plainly Next him Ameristus brother to Stesichorus the Poet is remembred as having touched Geometry of whon Hippias the Elean makes mention as eminent in that knowledge After these Pythagoras considering the principles thereof more highly advanced it into a liberall science Sect. 1. Propositions invented by him THat he improved as Proclus implies the Geometry which he learnt of the Aegyptians with many propositions of his own is confirmed by Laertius who saith that he much advanced those things the invention whereof Callimachus in his Iambicks asscribes to Euphorbus the Phrygian as scalenous triangles and others Nor is it to be doubted but that many of them are of those which Euclid hath reduced into his Elements whose design it was to collect and digest those that were invented by others accurately demonstrating such as were more negligently proved but of them only these are known to be his 1. Every Diameter divides its circle into two equall parts This proposition which Euclid makes part of the definition of a Diameter Proclus affirmes to have been first demonstrated by Thales 2. In all Isosceles triangles the angles at the base are equall the one to the other and those right lines being produced the angles under the base are equall Proclus saith that for the invention of this likewise as of many other propositions we are beholding to Thales for he first observed and said that of every Isosceles the angels at the base are equall and according to the antients called equall like These are three passages in the demonstration which infer nothing toward the conclusion of which kind there are many in Euclid and seem to confirm the antiquity thereof and that it was lesse curiously reformed by him 3. If two lines cut one the other the verticle angles shall equall the one the other Eudemus attests this theorem to have been invented by Thales but first demonstrated by Euclid 4. If two triangles have two angles equall to two angles the one to the other and one side equall to one side either that which is adjacent to the equall
OF GEOMETRY ENTER HERE meant not only of the measure and proportion of lines but also of the inward Affections CHAP. VI. How he instituted a Sect. HAving thus setled himself in the Academy he began out of the Collection he had made from others and his own invention to institute a Sect called from the place where he taught Academick He mixed the Heraclitian discourses with the Socratick and Pythagorick following in sensibles Heraclitus in Intelligibles Pythagoras in Politicks Socrates Whereas Philosophy saith St. Augustine concerns either action or contemplation thence assuming two names Contemplative and Active the Active consisting in practise of morall Actions the contemplative in penetration of abstruse Physicall causes and the nature of the Divinity Socrates excelled in the Active Pythagoras in the Contemplative But Plato join'd them into one perfecâ— kind which he subdivided into three severall parts Morall consisting chiefly in Action Naturall in Contemplation Rationall in Distinction of true and false which though usefull in both the other yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation So that this Trichotomy contradicts not the other Dichotomy which includeth all within Action and Contemplation And as of old in a Tragedy the Chorus acted alone then Thespis making some intermissions of the Chorus introduc'd one Actour Aeschylus a second Sophocles a Third in like manner Philosophy was at first but of one kind Physick then Socrates added Ethick thirdly Plato inventing Dialectick made it perfect Of these three parts as they were held by Plato and the rest of the old Academy we cannot have a generall better accompt then this of Cicero Sect. 1. Ethick The first concerning well living they sought in Nature affirming that she ought to be obeyed and that in nothing else but Nature was to be had that chief good whereto all things should be referr'd that the ultimate being of desirable things and end of all good in the mind body and life were acquir'd by Nature Those of the body they placed in the whole and in the parts Health Strength Beauty in the whole in the parts sound Sence and a certain Excellâ—nce of particular parts as in the feet swiftnesse strength in the hands clearnesse in the voice in the Tongue plainnesse of expression Of the mind were those which are proper to comprehend the power of wit which they divided into Nature and Manners To Nature they ascribed quickness of apprehension and memory both proper to the mind and wit To manners belonged study and a kind of wisdom formed partly by continuall exercise partly by reason in which consisted Philosophy it self wherein that is begun and not perfected is called progression to vertue what is perfected Virtue perfection of Nature of all things in the mind the most excellent Thus of Minâ—s The Adjuncts of life that was the third they asserted such things as conduced to the practise of Vertue Sect. 2. Physick Of Nature for that was next they so treated as to divide it into two things One the efficient the other giving it self to this that thereof might be made somthing In that they conceived to be a power in this a certain matter to be effected in both matter could not cohere unlesse contained by some power nor the power without some matter for there is nothing which is not enforced to be some where that which consists of both they called Body and Qualitie Of Qualities some are primary others arising from these the primary are uniform and simple hose which arise from these are various and as it were multiform Air Fire Water and Earth are Primary of these arise formes of living Creatures and of those things which are made of the Earth These principles are called Elements of which Air and Fire have a faculty to move and effect the other parts Water and Earth to suffer To all these there is subjected a certain matter without form destitute of quality out of which all things are expressed and formed It is capable of admitting all and of changing all manner of waies in the whole and in every part This resolves nothing to nothing but into its own parts which are divisible into infinite there being in naâ—ure no least which cannot be divided Those which are moved are all moved by intervalls which intervalls likewise may be divided infinitely and that power which we call quality being moved and agitated every way they conceive the whole matter to be throughly changed and by that means those things which they call qualitative to be produced of which in all coherent nature continued with all its parts was effected the World beyond which there is not any part of matter or body The parts of the World are all things therein kept together by a Sensitive nature wherein is likewise perfect reason It is also sempiternall for there is nothing more strong whereby it may be dissolved This power they call the Soul of the World God a certain providence over all things subâ—ected to him regarding in the first place heavenly things next on the Earth those thing which appertain to man The same they somtimes call Necessity because nothing can be otherwise then is by him ordained a fatall immutable continuation of eternall order somtimes Fortune as producing many things not foreseen or expected by us by reason of the obscurity and our ignorance of the Causes Sect. 3. Dialectick Of the third part of Philosophy consisting in reason and dissertation they treated thus Though Iudgment arise from the Sense yet the Iudgment of truth is not in the Senses The mind they affirmed to be Iudge of things conceiving her only sit to be credited because she alone seeth that which is simple and uniform and certain This they called Idea All sense they conceived to be obtuse and slow and no way able to perceive those things which seem subject to sense which are so little as that they cannot fall under sense so moveable and various that nothing is one constant nor the same because all things are in continuall alteration and fluxion All this part of things they called Opimative Science they affirmed to be no where but in the Reasons and Notions of mind whence they approved definitions of things and applyed them to all whereon they discoursed They approved likewise explications of words by Etymologies They used Arguments and marks for things to prove and conclude what they meant to explain In this consisted all the discipline of Dialectick that is of Speech concluded by Reason This accompt in generall Cicero gives of the old Academy Plutarch Laertius Apuleius and others have made collections more particular we shall make choice of that of Alcinous as most full and perfect which by reason of the length is referred as an Appendix to Plato's life CHAP. VII His Inventions HE added much to learning and language by many inventions as well of things as of words To omit Dialectick of which we treated last Phavorinus attributes to his invention discoursing by
divided into six Scalenums The Icosaeders of twenty in the same manner but the element of a Cube is an Isosceles triangle for foure such triangles concurring make a square and six squares a Cube God made use of a Dodecaedron in the construction of the Universe whence there are twelve figures of living creatures in the Zodiack whereof each is divided into thirty parts Likewise in a Dodecaedron which consisteth of twelve Pentagones if each be divided into five triangles there are in every one six triangles so that in the whole Dodecaedron there will be 360 triangles as many as there are dâ—grees in the Zodiack When matter was put into those figures by God first it was moved rudely without order untill at last he reduced it to order each being conjoyned to one another and composed in due proportion Neither are these distinct in place but are in perpetuall motion which they give likewise into matter For being straitned by the compasse of the world and agitated by mutuall justlings they are driven the rare alwaies into the region of the solid whence nothing is left vacuous nothing void of body The inequality which remaineth amongst them causeth convulsion for matter is agitated amongst them and they reciprocally by matter CHAP. XIV Of the Soul of the World the Sphears and Stars FRom Bodies hee alloweth that we collect the powers of the Soul for seeing that we discern all things by the Soul hee justly placed the principles of all things therein that whatsoever should occur we might contemplate it by that which is of kin and neighbour unto it and attribute an essence thereunto consonant to the functions Then therefore he called one substance intelligible and indivisible he placed another divisible amongst bodies to signifie that the knowledge as well of the one as of the other may be had by Intellect And knowing that in things intelligible and sensible there is identity and diversity he fitly composed the Soul out of all these For either the like is known by the like as the Pythagoreans hold or as Heraclitus the Naturalist unlike alwaies by unlike That he would that the World should be generate we must not so understand as if there shall be any time wherein the world is not but in as much as it alwaies perisheth in generation and declareth that there is some more excellent and principall cause of its essence The soul of the world which was from all eternity was not made by God but only adorned by him in which respect he is sometimes said to have made it for that he exciteth it and converteth the mind thereof as out of a profound sleep unto himself that beholding his intelligibles and affecting his notions it should from thence receive Species and form whence it is manifest that the World was endued by God both with a Soul and mind For intending it to be the best he must have made it animate and intelligent since an animate thing is more excellent then an inanimate and an intelligent then an unintelligent perhaps the mind also could not subsist without a Soul This Soul being diffused from the Centre of the world to the extreams compreâ—endeth the whole body of the World so as it is extended throughout the Universe and in that manner joyneth and conserveth the whole The externall preside over the internall for they are not divided but these are divided into seven Circles from the first distributed according to duple and triple Intervalls That which is comprehended by the indivisible sphear is correspondent to it that which is divided to the other For the motion of Heaven which comprehendeth all things being not uncertain is one and ordinate but that of the things within it is changeable varied by rising and setting whence called Planetary The outermost sphear moveth to the right hand from East to West the innermost contrariwise to the left hand from West to East meeting the World God framed also the Stars and constellations some fixed for the Ornament of Heaven and might very many in number The Erratick are seaven serving for number and time and the illumination of all things for time is an intervall of the motion of the World as an image of eternity which is the measure of the state of the eternall World The Planets are not of equall power the Sun is the leader of all who illuminateth and sheweth all things to the eye Next the Moon which in respect of her power hath the second place The rest of the Planets each according to their severall proportions The Moon maketh the measure of a Month in that space compleating its circle and overtaking the Sun The Sun measureth the Year for running through the circle of the Zodiack he compleateth the seasons of the year Of the other starrs each hath its proper revolution with which all men are not acquainted but only the Learned By all those revolutions the absolute number of time is compleated when coming all to the same point they are in such order as if we should imagine a right line to be drawn from the sphear of fixed stars to the Earth the Centers of them all would be seen in that line There being seven Orbes in the Planetary sphear the maker of the World framed in them seven conspicuous bodies of matter for the most part fiery and inserted them into the sphears belonging to the other Erratick Circle The Moon he placed in that Circle which is next the Earth the Sun in the second the Morning-star and the sacred Star of Mercury in that Orbe which is equall in swiftnesse with the Sun The rest higher each in his proper sphear That of Saturn the slowest of all he placed in that Orbe which is next to the sixed stars Second to this is that which they call the sphear of Iupiter next that of Mars the eighth which is the Supream power includeth all These are all living intelligent Creatures and Gods endued with a sphericall figure CAAP. XV. Of Daemons and Elements THere are other Daemons also which we may call Intelligent Gods in each of the Elements partly visible partly invisible in the aether fire air and water that there be not any part of the World void of Soul or of an animate creature more excellent then humane nature Below these are all earthly sublunary things God is maker of the World of all Gods and Daemons This Universe by his Divine Wil shall not be dissolved Over the rest his Sons preside who by his command and example order whatsoever they do By these loâ—s nocturnall visions dreams Oracles and whatsoever men referre to divination is artificially wrought The Earth is fixed in the midst of all round about the Axletree which passeth through the midst of the World It is the observer of night and day the most antient of all Gods in Heaven Next the Soul of the World it affordeth us most nutriture about it the Heavens move and it self is a kind of Starre It remaineth in its
God Hence Platonists argue the World is eternall its soul being such and not capable of being without a body that also must be from eternity as likewise the motion of the Heavens because the Soul cannot be without moving Sect. VII THe antient Ethnick Theologians who cast Poeticall vails over the face of their mysteries expresse these three natures by other names Coelum they call God himself he produc'd the first Mind Saturn Saturn the Soul of the World Iupiter Coelum imples Priority and excellence as in the Firmament the first Heaven Saturn signifies Intellectuall nature wholly imploy'd in contemplation Iupiter active life consisting in moving and governing all subordinate to it The properties of the two latter agree with their Planets Saturn makes Men Contemplative Iupiter Imperious The Speculative busied about things above them the Practick beneath them Sect. VIII WHich three names are promiscuously used upon these grounds In God we understand first his Excellence which as Cause he hath above all his effects for this he is called Coelus Secondly the production of those effects which denotes conversion towards inferiours in this respect he is sometimes called Iupiter but with an addition Optimus Maximus The first Angelick nature hath more names as more diversity Every creature consists of Power and Act the first Plato in Philebo calls Infinite the second Finite all imperfections in the Mind are by reason of the first all perfections from the latter Her operations are threefold About Superiours the contemplation of God about the knowledge of herself about inferiours the production and care of this sensible World these three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferiour things but in either respect is firm within her self In the two first because contemplative she is called Saturn in the third Iupiter a name principally applyed to her power as that part from whence is derived the act of Production of things For the same reason is the soul of the World as she contemplates her self or superiours termed Saturn as she is imployed in ordering worldly things Iupiter and since the government of the World belongs properly to her the contemplation to the Mind therefore is the one absolutely called Iupiter the other Saturn Sect. IX THis World therefore as all other creatures consisteth of a Soul and Body the Body is all that we behold compounded of the four Elements These have their casuall being in the Heavens which consist not of them as sublunary things for then it would follow that these inferiour parts were made before the Celestiall the Elements in themselves being simple by concourse causing such things as are compounded of them Their formal being from the Moon down to the Earth Their participate and imperfect under the Earth evident in the Fire Air and Water experience daily finds there evinc'd by naturall Philosophers to which the antient Theologians aenigmatically allude by their four infernall Rivers Acheron Cocytus Styx and Phlegeton We may divide the body of the World into three parts Celestiall Mundane Infernall The ground why the Poets â—eign the Kingdom of Saturn to be shar'd betwixt his three Sons Iupiter Neptune and Pluto implying only the three-fold variation of this corporeall World which as long as it remains under Saturn that is in its Ideal Intellectual being is one and undivided and so more firm and potent but falling into the hands of his Sons that is chang'd to this material Being and by them divided into three parts according to the triple existence of bodies is more infirm and lesse potent degenerating from a spiritual to a corporeal estate The first part the heavenly they attribute to Iupiter the last and lowest to Pluto the middle to Neptune And because in this principality is all generation and corruption the Theologians express it by the Ocean ebbing or flowing continually by Neptune understanding the Power or deity that presides over Generation Yet we must not imagine these to be different souls distinctly informing these three parts the World her self being one can have but one Soul which as it animates the subterraneall parts is called Pluto the sublunary Neptune the celestiall Iupiter Thus Plato in Philebo averrs by Jove is understood a regall soul meaning the principall part of the World which governs the other This opinion though only my owâ—â— I suppose is more true then the expositions of the Grecians Sect. X. NExt that of the World Platonists assign many other rational souls The eight principall are those of the heavenly Spheres which according to their opinion exceeded not that number consisting of the seven Planets and the starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets Calliope the universall soul of the World is first the other eight are distributed to their severall Spheres Sect. XI PLato asserts That the Author of the World made the mundane and all other rationall souls in one Cup and of the same Elements the universall soul being most perfect ours least whose parts we may observe by this division Man the chain that ties the World together is placed in the midst and as all mediums participate of their extreams his parts correspond with the whole World thence called Microcosmus In the World is first Corporeall Nature eternall in the Heavens corruptible in the Elements and their compounds as Stones Mettals c. Then Plants The third degree is of Beasts The fourth rationall souls The fifth Angelicall minds Above these is God their origine In man are likewise two bodies one eternall the Platonists Vehiculum coeleste immediately inform'd by the rational soul The other corruptible subject to sight consisting of the Elements Then the vegetative faculty by which generated and nourished The third part is Sensitive and motive The fourth Rational by the Latine Peripateticks believ'd the last and most noble part of the Soul yet above that is the Intellectuall and Angelick the most excellent part whereof we call the Souls Union immediately joyning it to God in a manner resembling him as in the other Angels Beasts and Plants About thâ—se Platonists differ Proâ—lus and Porphyrius only allow the rationall part to be Immortall Zenocrates and Speusippus the sensitive also Numenius and Plotinus the whole Soul Sect. XII IDeas have their casuall being in God their formall in the first Minde their participated in the rationall Soul In God they are not but produced by him in the Angelick nature through this communicated to the Soul by whom illuminated when she reflects on her intellectuall parts she receives the true formes of things Ideas Thus differ the Souls of Men from the Celestiall these in their bodily functions recede not from the Intellectuall at once contemplating and governing Bodies ascend to them they descend not Those employ'd in corporeall office are depriv'd of contemplation borrowing science from sence to this wholly enclin'd full of errors Their only means of release from this bondage is the amatory life which by sensible beauties exciting in the soul a remembrance
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY In Eight Parts By THOMAS STANLEY LONDON Printed for Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring and are to be sold at the Princes Armes in Saint Paul's Church-Yard and at the George in Fleet-street neer Cliffords-Inne 1656. THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The First Part. Containing those on whom the Attribue of VVISE was conferred LONDON Printed for Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring and are to be sold at the Princes Armes in Saint Paul's Church-Yard and at the George in Fleet-street neer Cliffords-Inne 1656. TO MY HONOVRED VNCLE IOHN MARSHAM Esq SIR I Send this Booke to you because you first directed me to this designe The learned Gassendus was my precedent whom neverthelesse I have not followed in his partiality For he though limited to a single person yet giveth himselfe liberty of enlargement and taketh occasion from his subject to make the world acquainted with many excellent disquisitions of his owne Our scope being of a greater latitude affords lesse opportunity to favour any particular whilst there is due to every one the commendation of their owne deserts This benefit I hope to have received from the variety of the subject but far more are those I owe to your encouragement which if I could wish lesse I should upon this occasion that there might seeme to have been expressed something of choice and inclination in this action which is now but an inconsiderable effect of the gratitude of Dear Vncle Your most affectionate Nephew and humble servant THOMAS STANLEY PREFACE HIstory which by expounding actions past teacheth to regulate the future and furnisheth us with wisdom at the cost of other mens experience is not unlike Painting their scope is the same and as in the latter it argues want of skill to look upon the whole draught with an indifferent eye but to select and insist upon some chiefe particular is proper to an Artist so he who rests satisfied with the generall relation of affairs not fixing upon some eminent Actour in that story loseth it greatest benefit since what is most particular by its nearer affinity with us hath greatest influence upon us Hence it is that there are two kinds of History One represents generall affairs of State The other gives account ef particular persons whose lives have rendred them eminent Homer hath given an essay of each of the first in his Iliads a relation of a war betwixt different Nations of the second in his Odysses confined to the person of Ulysses Now the life of man being either practick busied in civill affairs of peace and war or Contemplative retir'd from publick businesse to speculation and study of wisdome divine or humane it followes that this personall history bee twofold likewise describing either the actions of such persons as are wholly interested in affairs of state properly compar'd to the persons of a drammaticall designe whose single Characters and parts serve one onely to make up one joint plot Such are most of those whose lives are related by Plutarch the twelve Caesars of Sueronius Or the lives of such as have been excellent in some kind of learning Thus Antipho writ of Poets Eudemus of Astrologers Cicero and Plutarch of Oratours Suetonius of Grammarians They who writ of Philosophers exceeded the rest far in number of whom to give a particular accompt will be unnecessary because their workes are not extant and therefore we shall onely name them Aetius Anaâ—ilides Antigonus Antisthenes Aristocles Aristoxenus Callimachus Clitomachus Diocles Diogenes Laâ—rtius Eunapius Heraclides Hermippus Hesychius Hippobotus son Idomeneus Nicander Nicias Panaetius Porrius Plutarch Sotion and Theodorus Of almost all these which is much to be deplored there remaine not any footsteps the onely Author in this kind for the more antient Philosophers is Diogenes Laertius for the later Eunapius And to make the misfortune the greatâ—r that which Laertius gives us is so far short of what he might have done that there is much more to be found of the same persons dispersed amongst other authors which I have here collected and digested with what diligence I could Nor is it unseasonable at this time to examine the tenents of old Philosophers when so great variety of opinions daily spring up some of which are but raked out of the ruines of antiquity which ought to be restored to their first owners others being of late invention will receive addition when advanced to such height wee look down to the bottom from which Philosophy took her first rise and see how great a progresse she hath made whose beginnings are almost inscrutable Although some Grecians have challenged to their Nation the Originall of Philosophy yet the more learned of them have acknowledged it derived from the East To omit the dark traditions of the Athenians concerning Musaâ—us of the Thebans concerning Linus and of the Thracians about Orpheus it is manifest that the original of the Greek Philosophy is to be deriv'd from Thales who travelling into the East first brought Naturall learning Geometry and Astrology thence into Greece for which reason the attribute of wise was conferred upon him and at the same time upon six others for their eminence in morality politicks Thus learning in the antientest times was by the Greeks called Sophia wisdom and the prafessour thereof who raised his soul to an 〈◊〉 degree of knowledge Sophos wise Pythagoras first named it Philosophy love of wisdom and himself a Philosopher affirming that no man is wise but onely God As concerning those who were honoured with this attribute of wise Damon the Cyrenaean undervalues them all especially the seven Anaximenes saith they were all addicted to Poetry Dicaearchus that they were neither wise men nor Philosophers but upright men and Law givers Archetimus the Syracusian wrote concerning their meeting with Cypselus Father to Periander whereat he saith himself was present Ephorus affirms they all met with Croesus Thales onely excepted Some say they met also at the Panionian feast and at Corinth with Periander at Delphi There is some controversy concerning their sentences of which some are ascribed to severall persons as that Lacedaemonian Chilon this profest Nothing too much a mean in all is best There is no lesse dissent concerning their number Leandrius for Cleobulus and Myson inserts Leophantus Son of Gorsiades a Lebedion or Ephesian and Epimenides the Cretan Plato in his Protagoras substitutes Myson for Periander Ephorus Anacharsis for Myson Some adde Pythagoras Dicaearchus alledgeth four acknowledg'd by all Thales Bias Pittacus and Solon then names six more out of which are to be selected three Aristodemus Pamphilus Chilon the Lacedaemonian Cleobulus Anacharsis Periander some adde Acusilaus Son of Caba or Scabra an Argive Hermippus in his Treatise of the seven wise men saith they were in all seventeen of which seven were variously named which were Solon Thales Pittacus Bias Chilon Cleobulus Periander Anacharsis Acusilaus Epimenides Leophantus Pherecydes Aristodemus Pythagoras Lasus of Hermionea Son of Charmantides or according to
he declared God to be the first of Beings But that the Mens of â—naxagoras for the annexing of which to matter he was so much famed was no more then what he borrowed from Thales the words of Cicero make good He affirmed that God by the immutable decree of his providence governs the world Thales saith Stobaeus being demanded what was most strong answered Necessity for it rules all the world Necessity is the firm judgment and immutable power of providence Hither we must likewise referre what is cited under his name by the same Stobaeus that the first mover is immovable which Aristotle hath borrow'd from him not owning the Author Something imperfectly was before delivered by Orpheus concerning God alledged by Clemens Alexandrinus and others but as Cicero saith Thales was the first among the Grecians who made any search into these things and that he brought it out of Aegypt the Grecians themselves deny not for they acknowledge that they received the names of their Gods from thence and beleeved the Aegyptians to be the first who looking up to the world above them and admiring the nature of the universe reflected upon the Deity Sect. 3. Of Daemons THales saith Plutarch with Pythagoras Plato and the Stoicks hold that Daemons are spirituall substances and the Hero's souls separated from the bodies of which sort there are two good and bad the good Hero's are the good souls the bad the bad The same order Athenagoras attests to be observed by Thales ranking the three degrees thus First that of the immortall Gods next Daemons thirdly Heroes This was followed by Pythagoras that the Gods were to be prefered in reverence before Daemons Hero's before men He affirm'd as Stobaeus saith the world to be full of these Daemons This is thought the meaning of that of Aristotle repeated by Cicero Thales thought that all things were full of Gods The same assertion Laertius ascribes to Pythagoras that all the aire is full of souls which are Hero's and Daemons This opinion was asserted by the Greeks before the time of Thales particularly by Hesiod but whether that be argument enough to deny that Thales had it from the Aegyptians I question that they held it in the same manner we may learn by Iamblichus Besides Pythagoras and Plato whom Plutarch joynes in this Tenet with Thales drew their learning from the same fountain Sect. 4. Of the Soul PLutarch and Stobaeus say that Thales first affirm'd the soul to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a selfe moving nature Aristotle that he calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect to the motion it gives to other things in which are included both parts of the definition of the Platonists a substance having within it selfe a power to move it selfe and other things which Plato argues to this effect The first of motions is that whereby a thing moves it selfâ— the second that whereby it moves another every thing that moves it selfe lives every living thing lives because it moves it selfe the resore the power of selfe motion is the essence of that substance which we call the soul which soul is the cause of the first generation and motion of things which are nere and shall be and of all their contraries as of all transmutation the principall of motion and therefore more antient than the body which it moves by a second motion And afterwards declares these to be the names of the souls motion to will to consider to take care to consult to judge rightly and not rightly to joy to grieve to dare to fear to hate to love and the like These which are the first motions and suscipient of the second corporall bring all things into augmention and dâ—creâ—se conversion or condâ—mnation and descretion or rarefaction This opinion first raised by Thales was entertained in the schooles with the assent of Pythagoras Anaxagoras Socrates and Plato till exploded by Aristotle whose chief arguments against it were these 1. That nothing is moved but what is in place nothing in place but what hath quantity which because the soul wants none of the foure kinds of motion viz. Lation Alteration diminution accretion are competible perse to her Secondly that selfe motion is not essentiall to the Soul because she is moved accidentally by externall objects The first if understood of Circumscription not only denies the motion of all things that are definitively in place as spirits but of the highest sphear if compared with Aristotles definition of place yet that some of these species of motion though in a different extraordinary manner are competent to the soul and not accidentally may be argued 1. From the further diffusion of the soul according to the augmentation of the body 2. From intellection which is acknowledg'd a perfection and consequently a kind of alteration which that Thales understood to be one of the soul's motions is clear from that Apothegme ascribed to him by Lâ—ertius the swiftest of things is the mind for it over-runs all things Whence Cicero confessing almost in the very words of Thales that nothing is swifter then the mind that no swiftnesse may compare with the swiftnesse of the mind would interpret the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Aristotle a continued and perpetuall motion The second reason may be questioned by comparing the acts of the memory and reminiscence the first occasion'd by exterior things yet objective only so that the motion is within her selfe but by the other she moves her selfe from a privation to a habit without the help of any exterior It is worth notice that among these and other reasons alledg'd by Aristotle to destroy this assertion one is the possibility of the resurrection of the body but this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 From the second part of the difference in the definition viz. from moving other things Thales argued that the Load-stone and Amber had soules the first because it drawes Iron the second Straw He further saith Laertius asserted those things we count inonimate to have souls arguing it from the loadstone and Amber the reason of which latter example Aldobrandinuâ— falsely interprets its change of colour and jarring as it were at poison But Aristotle more plainly for of those whom we mentioned Thales seems to have taken the soul to be something 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 apt to move since he affirmed a stone to have a soul because it moved Iron He asserted likewise the soul of man to be immortall and according to Cherilus was the first that held so Cicero ascribes the originall of this opinion to Pherecydes but it rather seems to have been brought by Thales from the Egyptians that they held so Herodotus attests Sect. 5. Of the World THales held that there was but one world and that made by God which truth was follow'd by all Philosophers as Aristotle confesseth untill he rejected it to defend by the contâ—arie an
Say not ought is juster then thy Parents Procure not friends in hast nor procur'd part with in hast By learning to obey you shall know how to command What forfeiture you impose on others undergoe your selfe Advise not Citizens what is most pleasant but what is best Be not arrogant Converse not with wicked persons Consult the Gods Cherish thy friend Reverence thy Parents Make reason thy guid What thou seest speak not What thou knowest conceal Be mild to those that belong to thee Conjecture hidden things from apparent His particular sentence according to Didymus and Laertius was Nothing too much according to Ausonius Know thy selfe who ascribes these also to him Him I dare happy call whose end I see Match with thy like unequalls not agree By fortune guided none to honour raise A friend in private chide in publick praise Honours atchiev'd created far exceed If fates be sure what helps it to take heed And if unsure there is of fear lesse need Of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Laertius mentions these Of every man be carefull lest he hear A sword conceald within his breast a cleer Aspect a double tongue a mind severe CHAP. X. How be opposed Pisistratus and reprehended Thespis DUring the absence of Solon the former dissention broke forth again in the City Lycurgus was head of the country men Megacleâ— of the Maritimes Pisistratus of the Townsmen who were most violent against the rich Solon's lawes were still observed in the City but the people aimed at novelty and change not as thinking it most just but in hopes to be Masters of other mens goods and to suppresse the adverse party Solon whilst things stood thus returned to Athens where he was much reverenced and honoured by all but could not speak or act in publick through the weaknesse of his body and spirits yet privately taking every one of the Commanders apart he endeavoured to reconcile their differences wherein Pisistratus seemed the most ready to be perswaded with whom he had a very antient friendship grounded aswell upon their kindred as upon the good qualities of Pisistratus then whom as Solon used to say there could not be a person of more worth if he were cured of his ambition About this time according to Plutarch which was in the fiftieth Olympiad Thespis began to present Tragedies which Suidas erroneously accounts ten Olympiads latter as is observed by Meursius the people were much taken with the novelty of the thing for as yet there were no contentions therein Solon naturally desirous to hear and learn and by reason of his age indulging more to ease and pleasure feasting and musick went to see Thespis himself act as was then the manner the Play ended he went to Thespis and asked him if he were not ashamed to speak so many lies before so great an auditory Thespis answered it was no shame to act or say such things in jest Solon striking the ground hard with his staffe replyed but in a short time we who approve this kind of jest shall use it in earnest in our contracts and transactions In fine he absolutely forbad him to teach or act tragedies conceiving their falsity unprofitable whereto he dissimulated the deceit of Pisistratus who soon after having wounded himselfe came into the Forum in a Chariot pretending to have been so used by his enemies in the behalfe of the common-wealth and inflamed the people with much rage Solon comming near to him son of Hippocraâ—es saith he you act Homers Vlysses ill in using the same means to deceive the Citizens wherewith he whipping himself deluded the enemie Immediately the people flocked in to defend Pisistratus Aristo mov'd he might be allowed a standing guard of fiftie men Solon rose up to oppose it using speeches the effect whereof he afterwards thus exprest in verse If evill your impieties befall Gods not the Author of those mischiefs call Your selves the causes have given power to those Who in requitall servitude impose Lion whom the footsteps of the fox pursue Whose souls deceit and Vanity endue The mans smooth tongue and speech you only heed But never penetrate into the deed He also foretold them the aimes of Piâ—istratus in an elegy to this effect Vapours condens ' dingender hail and snow And thunder doth from radiant lightning flow The sea is troubled by the raging wind When not disturb'd by that nothing more kind A Citty by great persons is orethrown And taught beneath a Monarchy to groan But seeing the poorer sort much addicted to Pisistratus and tumultuous the richer afraid consulting their safetie by flight he retired saying Athenians I am wiser then some valianter then others wiser then those who understand not the deceit of Pisistratus valianter then those who understand it yet hold their peace through fear The Senate being of the same faction with Pisâ—stratus said he was mad whereto he answered A little time will to the people cleer My madnesse when ' th ' midst truth shall appear The people having granted Pisistratus his request concerning a guard question'd not the number of them but conniv'd so long at his pressing and maintaining as many souldiers as he pleased that at last he possest himselfe of the Tower whereupon the Citty being in a tumult Megacles with the rest of the Alcmaeonidae fled Solon now very old and destitute of those that might back him went into the Forum armed with a spear and shield and made an oration to the people partly accusing them of folly and cowardise partly inciting them not to forsake their libertie using this celebrious speech It had been far easier to have supprest this tyranny in the grouth but much more noble to cut it off now it is at the height No man daring to hear him he went home and taking his armes set them in the street before his door Laertius saith before the Magazâ—n saying I have helped my Country and the Law as much as lay in me or as Laertius O Country I have assisted thee both in word and deed Plutarch addes that from that time he lived retired addicted to his study and told by many the Tyrant would put him to death and demanded wherein the confided so much he answered in his age but Laertius affirmes which seemes truer that assoon as he had laid down his armes he forsook the Country and Agellius that in the raign of Scovius Tullius Pisistâ—atus was Tyrant of Athens Solon going first away into voluntary exile CHAP. XI How he travelled to Lydia and Cilicia SOlon at his departure from Athens received invitations from many by Thales desired to come to Miletus by Bias to Priene by Epimenides to Creet by Cleobulus to Lindus as is evident from their severall letters to that effect even Pisistratus pressed him to return home by this Epistle Pisistratus to Solon Neither am I the only person of the Greeks nor am I without right to the Kingdome I possesse as being descended from Codrus that
a ship to transport him back to Creet he refused their gift and money nor would accept of any thing but a little branch of sacred Olive out of the Tower wherewith having procured a league betwixt the Cnossians and Athenians he returned home and soon after died 157. years old or according to others 150. the Cretans say he wanted but one of 300. Xenophanes affirmes he heard him when he was 154 years of age His body the Lacedemonians kept by direction of the Oracle It was taken up many years after marked all over with Characters whence arose a proverb concerning abstruse things the skin of Epimenides He called himselfe Aeacus others named him Curâ—s He was a great Poet and writ many things in verse the subjects of his writings were these Initations Lustrations and other obscure matters in verse The generation and Theogony of the Curetes and Corybantes 5000 verses The building of Argo and expedition of Jason to Colchos 6500 verses Of sacrifices in prose Of the Cretan Common-wealth Of Minos and Rhadamanthus Of Oracles and responses out of which Saint Paul cites this verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Cretans are alwaies liers evill beasts slow bellies There is extant under his name saith Laertius an Epistle to Solon concerning the orders of Government given by Minos to the Cretans which Demetrius conceives of later date not written in the Cretan but Athenian language but I have met with another to this effect Epimenides to Solon Be of comfort friend for if Pisitratus were ruler of Athenians inured to servitude and void of discipline his way perhaps might continue for ever But now he subjects not base people but such as are mindfull of Solons instructions who ashamed of their bondage will not brook his Tyranny And though he should settle himself in the government unmoveable yet I hope it will not devolve to his children for it is hard for free persons brought up under excellent lawes to suffer bondage As for you wander not but come to Creet to me where you will find no oppressive Monarch If in travailing up and down you should light upon some of his friends I fear you may suffer some mischief There were two more of this name one a Genealogist the other writ in the Dorick dialect concerning Rhodes PHERECYDES PHerecydes was of Syrus one of the Cyclades near Delus son of Badys or as others Babis born according to Suidas in the 46. Olympiad he lived in the time of Alyaltes King of Lydia contemporary with the seven Sophists by some accompted one of them Laertius saith he was in the fifty ninth Olympiad Ciceâ—o in the time of Servius Tullus There are who affirm he heard Pittacuâ— others say he had no Master but procured and studied by himself the abstruse books of the Phoenicians Many strange things are related of him In Syrus being thirsty he required water of one of his Scholers which being drawn out of a well he drank and thereupon declared there would be an Earthquake within three daies in that Island which happening as he foretold gained him much credit though ascribed by Cicero not to a divine but naturall cause Again going to Iuno's Temple in Ianus he beheld a ship with full sail entring the Harbour he said to those that were present it would never come into the Haven whilst he was speaking a storm arose and the ship sunk in their sight Going by Messana to Olympia he advised Perilaus at whose house he lay to remove thence with all his Family which hee obey'd not Messana was soon after taken He bad the Lacedaemonians not to esteem gold or silver Hercules having so commanded him in a dream who appeared likewise to the Kings and bad them obey Pherecydes this some ascribe to Pythagoras He held opinions contrary to Thales but agreed with him in that of water that it is principle of all things Hee said the Gods called a Table 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He first asserted â—he immortality of the soul according to some Tzetzes affirms he was Master to Thales but that suits with their times That he in structed Pythagoras is generally acknowledg'd The manner of his death is variously related Hermippus saith in a war betwixt the Ephesians Magnesians he desirous the Ephesians might be victors demanded of one present whence he was who answered of Ephesus draw me then saith he by the leggs into the Magnesian Territory and bid your country men after they have gained the battle bury me I am Pherecydes This message he delivered they overcame the Magnesians and finding Pherecydes dead buried him honourably some affirm he went to Delphi and threw himself from the Corycean Mountain But the more generall opinion is that he died most miserably his whole body eaten up with lice Pliny saith with Serpents which broke out of his skin whereby when his face became deform'd he avoided and refused the sight of his acquaintance when any one came to visit him as Pythagoras did and demanded how he did he putting out his finger at the key hole consumed by his disease showed them the condition of his whole body Saying 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the skin showeth which words the Philosophers take in an ill sense The Delians affirm the God of that place sent this disease to him out of anger because he boasted much of his own wisdom to his disciples saying if he should never sacrifice to any God he should lead a life no lesse pleasant then those that offered hecatombs Pythagoras buried him his tomb carried this inscription Of wisdom I comprise the utmost bound Who further would be satisfied must sound Pythagoras of Greeks the most renown'd Some affirm he was the first that writ in prose which others ascribe to Cadmus He writ Heptamuchos or Thocrasia perhaps the same with his Theology ten books containing the origine and succession of the Gods if not mistaken for the Theogony of the younger Pherecydes an obscure dark work the allegories whereof Isidore cited by Clemens Alexandrinus conceives taken from the prophecy of Cham. Concerning this Book there is extant an Epistle under the name of Pherecydes but may well be suspected to be spurious Pherecydes to Thales WEll may you die when ever your fatall hower arrives as soon as I received your letter I fell sick was overrun with lice and had a feavour whereupon I gave order to my servants that as soon as I were buried they should carry the Book to you if you with the rest of the wise men approve it publish it if you approve it not publish it not for me it doth not please there is no certainty in it whatsoever the Theologist saith you must understand otherwise for I write in fables Constrain'd by my disease I have not admitted of any Physician or friend but when they came to the door and asked how it was with me putting my finger out at the
Oracle's direction apply'd him to his own trade of carving Statues contrary to his inclination whereupon some have argu'd him of disobedience reporting that often times when his Father bad him work he refused and went away following his own will His Father dying left him according to Libanius four score minae which being entrusted with a friend for improvement they miscarried This losse though it were of all his stock and he thereby reduc'd to incredible poverty Socrates past over with silence but was thereupon necessitated to continue his trade for ordinary subsistence This Suidas intimates when he saith he was first a Statuary Duris Pausanias and the * Scholiast of Arâ—stophanes affirm three statues of the Graces cloathed for so they were most antiently made not naked set up before the entrance into the Tower at Athens were his work Pausanias implieth as much of a statue of Mercury in the same place which Pliny seems not to have understood who saith they were made by a certain person named Socrates but not the painter Hence Timon From these the fluent statuary came Honour'd through Greece who did against the name Of Oratour abusivâ—y declaim But being naturally averse from this profession â—ee onely follow'd it when necessity enforc'd him Aristoxenus saith he wrought for money and laid up what he got till it came to a little stock which being spent hee betook himself again to the same course These intermissions of his Trade were bestowed upon Philosophy whereunto he was naturally addicted which being observed by Crito a rich Philosopher of Athens hee took him from his shop being much in love with his candor and ingenuity and instructed or rather gave him the means to be instructed by others taking so much care of him that he never suffer'd him to want necessaries And though his poverty were at first so great as to be brought by some into a Proverb yet he became at last as Demetrius affirms Master of a house and fourscore minae which Crito put out to interest But his mind saith Libanius was raised far above his fortune and more to the advantage of his Country not aiming at wealth or the acquisition thereof by sordid arts he considered that of all things which man can call his the soul is the chief That he onely is truly happy who purifies that from vice That the onely means conducing thereto is wisdom in pursuit whereof he neglecteth all other waies of profit and pleasure CHAP. I. His Master THE first Master of Socrates was Anaxagoras whereby amongst other circumstances it is demonstrable that the accompt of Laertius is corrupt Anaxagoras not dying in the 78. but 88. Olympiad Aristoneus saith that as soon as Anaxagoras left the City he applyed himself to Archelaus which according to Porphyrius was in the 17. year of his age Of him he was much belov'd and travell'd with him to Samos to Pytho and to the Istmus He was Scholar likewise to Damon whom Plato calls a most pleasing teacher of Musick and all other things that he would teach himself to young men Damon was Scholar to Agathocles Master to Pericles Clinias and others intimate with Prodicus He was banish'd by the unjust Ostracism of the Athenians for his excellence in Musick He heard also as he acknowledgeth Prodicus the Sophist a Cian whom Eusebius rankes in the 86. Olympiad contemporary with Gorgias Hippias and Hippocrates the Physician To these adde Diotyma and Aspasia women excellently learned the first suppos'd to have been inspir'd with a propheticall spirit By her hee affirmeth that he was instructed concerning love by corporeall Beauty to find out that of the soul of the Angelicall mind of God See Plato's Phaedrus and that long discourse in his Symposium upon this subject which Socrates confesseth to be owing to her Aspasia was a famous Milesian woman not onely excellent her self in Rhetorick but brought many Scholers to great perfection in it of whom were Pericles the Athenian and as himself acknowledgeth Socrates Of Euenus he learn'd Poetry of Ichomachas Husbandry of Theodorus Geometry Aristagoras a Melian is named likewise as his Master Last in his Catalogue is Connus nobilissimus fidicen as Cicero termes him which art Socrates learn'd of him in his old age for which the boyes derided Connus and called him the old mans Master CHAP. IV. Of his School and manner of Teaching THat Socrates had a proper School may be argu'd from Aristophanes who derides some particulars in it and calls it his Phronâ—istâ—rium Plato and Phaedrus mention as places frequented by him and his Auditors the Academy Lycaeum and a pleasant meadow without the Ciâ—y on the side of the River Ilissus where grew a very fair plane-tâ—eâ— Thence according to the fable Boreas sâ—atch'd away Orithia to whom three farlongs from thence there was a Temple and another to Diana Xenophon affirms he was continually abroad that in the morning be visiâ—ed the places of publick walking and exercise when it was full the Forum and the rest of the day he sought out the most populous meetings where he dâ—sputed â—penly for every one to hear that would He did not onely teach saith Plutarch when the benches were prepar'd and himself in the Chair or in set hours of reading and disâ—ourse or appointments of walking with his friends but even when he played when â—e eat or drank when he was in the camp or market finally when he was in prison thus he made every place a school of vertue His manner of teaching was answerable to his opinion that the soul praeexistent to the body in her first separate condition endewed with perfect knowledge by immersion into matter became stupified and in a manner lost untill awakned by discourse from sensible objects whereby by degrees she recovers her first knowledge for this reason he taught onely by Irony and Induction the first Quintilian defines an absolute dissimulation of the will more apparent then confest so as in that the words are different from the words in this the sense from the speech whilest the whole confirmation of the cause even the whole life seems to carry an Irony such was the life of Socrates who was for that reason called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is one that personates an unlearned man and is an admirer of others as wise In this Irony saith Cicero and dissimulation he far exceeded all men in pleasantnesse urbanity it is a very elegant sweet and facete kind of speech acute with gravity accommodated with Rhetorick words and pleasant speeches He detracted from himself in dispute and attributed more to those hee meant to confute so that when he said or thought another thing he freely used that dissimulation which the Greeks call Irony which Annius also saith was in Africanus Induction by Cicero desin'd a manner of discoâ—rse which gaines the
of Socraâ—es but extended to such friends as conversed with him whereof him self gives these instances Charmides Son of Glauco going to exercise in the Nemean race as he was discoursing with Socrates was by him upon notice of the voice dissuaded from going to which he answered that perhaps the voice onely meant that he should not get the victory but said he however I shall advantage myself by exercising at this time which said he went to the Games where he met with some accident which though it be not related is acknowledg'd to have iustified the counsell given him by the Daemon Tymarchus and Philemon Son of Philemonides having plotted together to murther Nicias Son of Hircoscomander were at the same time drinking with Socrates Timarchus with intention to execute what they had determin'd offer'd to rise from the table saying to Socrates well Socrates drink you on I will but step a little way and return immediately Rise not said Socrates hearing the Daemon as soon as he spake for the Daemon hath given me the accustomed sign whereupon he sate stil presently after he offer'd again to be gone Socrates hearing the voice withheld him At last as Socrates was diverted by something and did not mind him he stole away and committed the murther for which being brought to execution his last words to his brother Glitomachus were that he was come to that untimely end for not obeying Socrates Another time seeing his friend Crito's eie ti'd up he asked him the reason who answering that as he walked in the field one pulling a bough it gave a jerk back and hit him in the eye Then you did not take my advise replies Socrates for I call'd you back making use as I have accustomed of divine presage That it had likewise a great influence upon the soules of those who conversed with him and liv'd with him he alledgeth as examples Aristides Son of Lysimachus and Thucydides Son of Melissus The first leaving Socrates to go to the wars lost with his company the habit of learning which he acknowledg'd to have gained not by any verball instructions of which he had none from him but by being neer him seeing him and sitting in the same room with him The second as easily by the same means attained the same habit And not only to particular persons but to generall affairs did these predictions extend He foretold some friends the defeat of the Athenian Army in Sicily as is attested by Plutarch and mentioned by himself in Plato where he gives another fair example or rather tryall of the truth of the Daemons predictions speaking of a businesse whereof the event was at that time doubtfull You will hear saith he from many in Sicily to whom it is known what I foretold concerning the destruction of the Army and we may now have an experiment if the Daemon speak true Samionus son of Calus is gone in an expedition the sign came to me he goes with Thrasylus to war against Ephesus and Jonia my opinion is that he will either be slain or at least in much danger I greatly fear the whole design These are his words in Plato delivered as before the event of that action which fell out according to his prediction for Thrasylus was repulsed and beaten by the Ephesians the Athenians put to flight with the losse of foure hundred men of which Victory the Ephesians erected two trophies this was in the twentie one year of the Peloponnesian war We have alledg'd the universall consent of Authors that Socrates had such a spirituall attendant yet is there some disagreement concerning the name more concerning the nature of it It is commonly named his Daemon by which title he himselfe owned it Plato sometimes calls it his Guardian Apuleius his God because saith Saint Augustine the name of Daemon at last grew odious But we must observe that he did not account it a God but sent from God and in that sence affirmed the signes to come from God to wit by mediation of this spirit This besides other places we may argue from his first Epistle where he speaks of the sign it selfe he useth the word Daemon when of the advise whereof that sign was the instrument he names God Thus are we to understand these and all other places of the same nature in Plato where Socrates speaking of the Daemon saith if it please God you shall learn much and the sign from God did not offer to stay me As for the signe or manner of the prediction some affirme it was by sneezing either of himselfe or others if any chanced to sneeze standing before him behind him or on his right hand he went immediately about that which he intended if on the left hand he refrained or desisted if he sneezed himselfe before the enterprise it was applausive if in the action disswasive There needs not much argument to prove this opinion If this sternutation proceeded either from chance or his naturall constitution it could not have that provident supernaturall effect if it proceeded from some more excellent outward cause we recurre to the Genius Others confine this prescience within the soule of Socrates himself that he said his Genius advised him they interpret it as we usually say his mind gave him or so inclined him In this sense indeed Daemon is not seldome taken but this is inconsistent with the description which Socrates gives of a voice and signes ab exteriore besides this knowledge is not above humane nature Plutarch having exploded the opinion of Terpsion concerning sneezing conjectured first that it might be some apparition but at last concludes that it was his observation of some inarâ—culate unaccustomed sound or voice conveighed to him by some extraordinary way as we see in dreams This avoids not the inconvenience of the former if Socrates did first of himselfe interpret this sound it is the same with the last opinion that his soule had a Prophetick inspiration if by any help it will come at last to the Genius Some conceive it to be one of those spirits which have the particular care of men which Maximus Tyrius and Apuleius describe in such manner that they want only the name of a good Angell But there want not those who give it that appellation Lactanius having proved that God sends Angells to guard mankind addes and Socrates affirmed that there was a Daemon constantly neer him which kept him company from a child by whose beck and instruction he guided his life Eusebius upon these words of the Psalmist He hath given his Angells charge over thee that they should keep thee in all thy waies We learn out of Scripture saith he that every man hath a Guardian appointed him from above and Plato doubteth not to write in this manner All soules having chosen a condition of living they proceed in order thereunto being moved by the Daemon which is proper to every one and is sent along with them
others red others white so is it likewise consonant to reason that they who are affected according to nature by reason of the different constitution of senses are not moved alike by the same things but one way the white another way the black another way he whose eyes are blew another way he whose eyes are black whence we impose common names on things having our selves proper and particular affections Sect. 2. Of the End or chief Good TO these assertions continueth Sextus Empericus concerning the Judicatories agreeth what they assert concerning Ends. Of Affections some are pleasant some harsh and troublesome some mean the harsh and troublesome are ill whose end is griefe the pleasant good whose end which cannot be deceived is pleasure The mean are neither good nor ill whose end is neither good nor ill which is an affection between pleasure and griefe Affections therefore are the judges and ends of all things and we live say they observing evidence and liking evidence in the rest of the affections liking in pleasure Laertius saith they assert two passions or affections Griefe and Pleasure pleasure a soft smooth motion griefe a harsh motion One pleasure differeth not from another pleasure nor is one pleasure sweeter then another pleasure this pleasure is coveted by all living creatures the other shunned They assert corporeall pleasure to be our ultimate end as Panaetius saith in his book of Sects not catastematick permanent pleasure which consisteth in privation of griefe and a quiet void of all disturbance which Epicure held The End differeth from Beatitude for the End is some particular pleasure Beatitude is that which consisteth of all particular pleasures wherein are included both the past and future Again particular plâ—asure is expetible in it selfe felicity not in it selfe but for particular pleasures That pleasure is our chiefe end is manifest in that from our first infancy without any instruction of others we naturally aime thereat and having obtain'd it seek nothing else Moreover we avoide not any thing so much as its contrary griefe Pleasure is good though proceeding from the most sordid dishonest thing as Hippobotus in his Book of Sects for although the action be dishonest yet the pleasure thereof is expetible in it selfe and good Indolence which Epâ—cure held they esteem not pleasure nor want of pleasure griefe for both these consist in motion but Indolence and want of pleasure consists not in motion for Indolence is like the state of a sleeping man They hold that some men may not desire pleasure through perversity of minde All spirituall pleasures and pains arise not from corporeall pleasures and pains for from the simple prosperity of our Country or our selfe we are affected with joy But neither the remembrance of past goods nor expectation of future compleat pleasure as Epicure thought for by time and expectation the motion of the soul is dissolved Pleasure according to Aristippus is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consisteth only in one part of time the present for the remembrance of past pleasures or expectation of the future is vain and frivolous and nothing appertaineth to beatitude but that only is good which is present With those pleasures which he received heretofore or shall receive hereafter Aristippus said he was nothing at all moved the first being gone the other not yet come and what it will prove when it is come is uncertain Hence he argued that men ought not to be folicitous either about things past or future and that not to be troubled at such things is a signe of a constant clear spirit He also advised to take care only for the present day and in that day only of the present part thereof wherein something was done or thought for he said the present only is in our power not the past or â—uture the one being gone the other uncertain whether ever it will come Neither do pleasures consist meerly in simple sight or hearing for we hear with delight those who counterfeit lamentation and those who lament truely we hear with displeasure This privation of pleasure and griefe they called mean states The pleasures of the body are much better then those of the soule and the pains or griefs thereof much worse for which reason those who offend actually are most grievously punished To grieve is more unnaturall to us to delight more naturall for which reason much more care is requisite for the ordering of one then of the other yet many times we reject things which effect pleasure as being grievous so that the concurrence of pleasures which effecteth beatitude is very difficult Moreover they hold that every wise man doth not live pleasantly nor every wicked man unpleasantly but so for the most part for it is enough that a man be affected and reduced by incidence of one single pleasure They held that Griefe is the greatest ill that griefe is not effected by every ill but by the unexpected and unforeseen that one man is more grieved then another They assert that Riches are efficient causes of pleasure yet not expetible in themselves Sect. 3. Of Vertue ALL good consisteth in Pleasure Vertue it selfe is only laudable as being an efficient cause of pleasure Nothing is just honest or dishonest by Nature but by Law and Custome yet a good man will do nothing that is evill because of the censure or esteem which would fall upon his actions and that such a one is wise Prudence is a good yet not expetible in it selfe but for the sake of those things which proceed from it A friend is to be embraced for the use we may have of him as the body cherisheth every part thereof as long as it remaineth found Of Vertues some are in the unwisâ—e Corporeall exercise conduceth to the acquisition of Vertue A wise man is not subject to Enâ—y Love or Superstition for all these proceed from the vanity of Opinion but he is subject to Griefe or Fear as being Naturall accidents CHAP. V. How he went to Dionysius his Court. ABout this time Dionysius the Sicilian Tyrant flourished to whom resorted many Philosophers amongst the rest Aristippus invited by his sumptuous magnificence Dionysius asked him the reason of his comming he answer'd to give what I have and to receive what I haâ—e not or as others when I wanted wisdome I went to Socrates now I want mony I come to you He soon insinuated into the favour of Dionysius for he could conform himself to every place time and person act any part construe whatsoever happened to the best and thus enjoying present pleasure never troubled himself for the absent as Horace Every condition habit and event with Aristippus suits with all content Of his compliance with Dionysius's humour there are these instances Dionysius at a Feast commanded that all should put on purple robes Plato refused saying I will not with a female robe disgrace My self who am a man of manly race But Aristippus took it and beginning
satisfied with this evasion ordered that he should depart the City Hereupon Theodorus sirnamed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 said in derision How came Stilpo to know this did he put aside her vail and look upon her breast Theodorus was bold of speech but Stilpo reserved in so much as being demanded by Crates whether the Gods delighted in bent knees and prayers Thou fool saith he do not question me in publick but when we are alone together He was sincere and plain void of all artifice Crates the Cynick not answering him but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I knew saith he you would speak any thing rather then that which is decent Crates in propounding a question delivered a fig to him which he took and eat Crates presently cryed out that he had lost his fig Yes saith he and your question also of which that was in earnest Seeing Crates halfe frozen in cold weather Crates saith he me thinks you want 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which one way implies a new garment another way both a garment and wit Crates ashamed answered thus Stilpo at Megara I saw opprest Where vast Typhocus lies with weight opprest To hear him wrangle many Schollers came Fair truth to chace away was all their aime At Athens he wrought so much upon the people that they would run out of their shops to see him They wonder at thee Stilpo said one to him as a monster No saith he but as a true man As he was speaking with Crates in the midst of their discourse he went away to buy fish Crates pursued him crying out that he gave over the discourse No saith he I carry along the discourse with me but I leave you the discourse will stay the fish must be bought Being asked what is harder then a stone he answered a fool CHAP. II. His Philosophy HE was Master of the Megarick School excellent in Eristick Disputes by his subtle Tenents and Discourses beautifying himselfe his Country and friends He took away all Species Universalls affirming that he who saith a man denotes not any man the Terme being not proper to this or that person for why to one rather then to another therefore not to this and again that which we see is not an Herbe for an Herb was many years ago Therefore this was not an Herbe He likewise denyed one thing to be praedicated of another arguing thus if running be praedicated of an Horse the subject is not the 〈◊〉 with the praedicate the definition of man is one thing that oâ— good another so an horse is a diâ—â—ering thing from running for upon 〈◊〉 we give severall Definitions of each for if a man and good or a horse and runing were the same how could good be praedicated of Food or Physick and running of a horse which are things so different Thus he admitted no conjunction with the subject in things which are in a subject or praedicated of a subject but conceived that both these unlesse they be the very same with the subject cannot be praedicated of it even not as an Accident This though it were one of those little sayings which Stilpo sportively used to cast out amongst the Sophisters Colotes the Epicurean opposed so eagerly that he framed a large discourse against Stilpo grounded only upon this assertion which yet he neither reâ—elled nor resolved affirming that by holding one thing is not praedicated of another he takes away good life But that Stilpo saith Plutarch was offended only at some words and opposed the manner of speaking but took not away the course of life or abolished things is most evident He asserted the chief good to be a mind not subject to passion CHAP. III. His Disciples He so far exceeded others in fluent discourse and learning that he converted almost all Greece to the Megarick Sect Philippus of Megara saith he drew Metrodorus sirnamed the Theoretick and Timagoras the Geloan from Theophrastus 〈◊〉 and Simmias from Aristotle the Cyrenaean Of Dialecticks Paeonius from Aristides Diphilus Son of Euphantus and Myrmex Son of Exenaetus coming to dispute against him became both followers of him Thus far Philippâ—s he likewise attracted Phaesidemus the Peripatetick excellent in Natural Philosophy Alcimus the most eminent Oratour at that time in Greece Zeâ—o the Phaenician an Epicurean Philosopher Crates and others in a word whomsoever he would himself Heraclides saith that Zeno the Citican founder of the Stoicall Sect was his Disciple CHAP. IV. His Death Writings HErmippus affirmeth that he died of age but drank a draught of wine to hasten his end Suidas saith he wrote 20. Dialogues Laertius but nine and those not very efficacious their Titles these Moschus Aristippus or Callias Ptolemaeus Chaerecrates Mitrocles Anaximenes Epigenes To his Daughter Aristotle He had a Son named Dryso a Philosopher also THE ELEACK ERETRIACK SECTS PHAEDO THe Eleack Sect was instituted by Phaedo an Elean of a noble Family It chanced that he was taken by Thieves or Pyrates and sold to a House of common dishonest resort where being forced to sit at the door he was observed by Socrates in passing who noting the ingenuity of his countenance which was extraordinary perswaded as Laertius saith Alcibiades or Plato or as Agellius Cebes to buy him from which time he addicted himself diligently to Philosophy and was a constant Disciple of Socrates so much affected by Plato that he called that most excellent discourse of the immortality of the Soul after him Phaedo He instituted a Sect called from him Eleack The Dialogues ascribed to him were Zopyrus Medus Simon Antimachus or the old man Nicias Simmias Alcibiades Critolaus Panaetius doubts whether any of these were written by Phaedo Medus is by some ascribed to Aeschines by others to Poliaenus as are also Antimachus and the Scythian discourses PLISTHENES THe Eleack Sect was continued by Plisthenes an Elean successour to Phaedo Plisthenes was succeeded by Menedemus and Asclepiades MENEDEMVS CHAP. I. His Country Parents Teachers MEnedemus was one of those Philosophers that continued the School of Phaedo which hitherto was called Eleack but from Menedemus was termed Eretriack he was an Eretrian Son of Clisthenes Clisthenes was of the Family of the Theopropidae yet though noble by descent Mechanick by profession and indigent some affirm he was a maker of Tents Hesychius Illustris terms him an Architect adding that he taught both Arts to his son Menedemus so that when Menedemus wrote a decree an Alexinian Philosopher reproved him saying it becomes not a wise man to frame both Tents and decrees Menedemus being sent by the Eretrians with a command of Souldiers to Megara went from thence to Athens to hear Plato at the Academy with whom he was so taken that he gave over his Military employment By Asclepiades a Phlyasian his intimate friend he was carried to Stilpo at Megara whom they both heard Thence taking a journey to Elis they met with Anchypillus and Moschus who belonged to
to subjection either by fraud or force Iustice is threefold Towards the Gods they who sacrifice as the Law requires aâ—d perform the Divine rites are just towards the Gods Towards men They who restore what was lent or committed to their trust are just towards men Towwards the dead They who take care of Sepulchers are just towards the dead Science is threefold Practick as playing on the flute lute and the like which effect nothing visible Mechanick as architecture of Houses Ships or the like which produceth a visible effect Theoretick as Geometry Harmonick Astronomy which act not neither produce any thing The Geometrician considers the proportion of lines to one another Harmonick sounds Astronomy stars and the World Medicine is of five kinds Pharmaceutick cureth diseases by application of Medicine Chirurgick by incision or cauterising Diaetetick by diet Nosognomonick discernes diseases Boethetick removeth diseases Law is twofold Written such are those by which states are governed Not written grounded upon custom as that no man shall go naked into the forum or habited like a woman is not forbâ—dden by any written law but forborn because of the unwritten Speech is of five kinds Politicall used in Orations by such as govern States Rhetoricall used by Lawyers in pleading either to confirm praise dispraise or accuse Vulgar used by people in common discourse Dialecticall used by such as discourse in short questions and answers Artificiall used by Tradesmen in their severall professions Musick is threefold Of the Voice onely Of the Voice and hands as singing to the Lute Of the Hand only as the Harp Nobility is of four kinds If the Predecessors were upright just and honest If the Predecessours were rulers of Princes If the Predecessours acquired honours as the command of an Army or were crown'd in publick games those who are descended from such we call Noble If a man be endued with a generous mind this is the best kind of Nobility Beauty is threefold Commendable as a fair form Usefull as an instrument house or the like Beneficiall as all that belongs to institution of Laws The Soule hath three parts the Rationall the principle whereby we judge discourse and the like Concupiscible whereby we desire meat coition and the like Irascible whereby we are emboldned joyned grieved enraged Perfect virtue hath four kinds Wisdom the principle of doing things aright Justice the principle of doing things equally in private conversation and publick affairs Fortitude the principle of not flying danger through fear but meeting it Temperance the principle of subduing desires and yielding to no pleasures but living moderately Government is of five kinds By Law Those who are chosen Magistrates in a City govern by Law By Nature the males not only of mankind but of most other creatures are predominant over the Females by nature By Custome as that which Masters have over their Disciples By Descent as the Lacedaemonian Kings who succeed out of one Family and in Macedonia they use the same custome By force as those who rule a Kingdom against the will of the people Of Rhetorick are six kinds Adhortation as when we perswade to war against any Dehortation as when we disswade from War Accusation when we declare that we have been injured by one whom we prove cause of our misfortune Defence when a man proves he did not an injury or offence Enâ—omium when we speak well of another Vituperation when we declare a man to be wicked Of Right speaking are four kinds when wee speak What is requisite those things which will benefit both the hearer and speaker As much as is requisite if we speak neither more nor lesse then concerns the businesse To those to whom it is requisite as when we speak to old men that have done amisse in such terms as are fit for old men or to young as becomes young When it is requisite neither too soon nor too late for if that be not observed nothing can be spoken aright Benificence is of four kinds In Wealth when we relieve the wants of any according to our means In Body when we succour those who are beaten In Knowledge when we instruct cure teach any good In Speech he who pleadeth in defence of another helpeth him in words The end of things is of four kinds Legall imposing an end to things by decree Naturall such as dayes years and houres have Artificiall as the building of a house Accidentall by chance unexpected Of powers are four kinds One in the minde to think and conjecture Another of the body to walk give receive and the like A third consisting in a multitude of Souldiers and store of wealth in which respect Princes are called Powerfull The fourth as to suffer good or evill to be done to us as to be capable of Sicknesse Learning health or the like Of Humanity are three kinds In calling as those who call all they meet and salute them taking them by the hand In relieving in relieving the misfortunes of another willingly In feasting and conversation Felicity is divided into five parts Prudent Counsell acquired by learning and experience Soundnesse of senses consisting in the parts of the body as to see with the eyes to hear with the ears to smell and tast Prosperity of affairs when those things which a man intendeth he performeth fully Good reputation amongst men when a man is well spoken of Plenty of riches and things necessary to life so as to be able to supply friends and perform works of publick magnificence He who hath all these five kinds is perfectly happy Arts are of three kinds The first diggeth out mettalls and fells wood The second gives varietie of shape to things as Wood-work and Iron-work The third maketh use of these as horsemanship of bridles Soldiery of arms musick of instruments Good is of four kinds One as wen wee call a man good from his proper goodnesse A second as we call Virtue and Justice it self good A third as we say food exercise and medicines are beneficiall The fourth good we call the act of playing on musick or acting in a play Of things some are Ill alwaies capable to do hurt as ignorance imprudence injustice and the like Good the contrary to the former Indifferent which somtimes may benefit sometimes hurt as walking sitting eating or cannot do hurt at all being neither good nor bad Good Government is threefold If the Laws be good If the Laws be well kept If without Laws the people live orderly by custome Ill Government is threefold If the Laws be bad for Natives and Forainers If the Laws in being are not observed If there are no laws at all Contraries are of three kinds Good to ill as justice to injustice wisdom to imprudence and the like Ill to ill as prodigality to avarice unjust torments to just Neither to neither as heavy to light swift to flow black to white Good is of three kinds Some we have as Justice and Health Of some we participate as good it self
who assoon as he had read it was so disaffected to life that he threw himselfe from a high wall into the Sea upon whom thus Callimachus Cleombrotus cries out farewell this light And headlong throwes himselfe int'endlesse night Not that he ought had done deserving death But Plato read and weary grew of breath The Dialogues generally noted as spurious not to say any thing of his Epinomis though some ascribe it to Philippus the Opuntian are these Midon or the Horse-courser Erixias or Erasistratus Alcyon Acephali or the Sisyphi Axiochus Phaeaces Demodochus Chelidon The seventh Epimenides Of these Alcion is ascribed by Phavorinus to Leon. His stile Aristotle saith is betwixt Prose and Verse He useth variety of names that his work may not easily be understood by the unlearned He conceiveth wisdome properly to be of intellectuall things Knowledge of reall Beings conversant about God and the soul separate from the body Properly he calleth Philosophy Wisdome being the appetition of divine Knowledge but commonly he calleth all skill knowledge as an Artificer a wise man He likewise used the same names in divers significations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which properly signifies Evill he useth for Simple as Euripides in his Lycimnius of Hercules 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The same word Plato sometimes takes for honest sometimes for little He likewise useth 〈◊〉 names to signifie the same thing Idaea he useth both for species and genus Exemplar both principle and cause Sometimes he useth contrary expressions to signifie the same thing Sensible he calleth a being and no being a being as having been produced no being in respect of its continuall mutation Idaea neither moveable nor permanent the same both one and many The like he useth often in other things The method of his discourse is three-fold first to declare what that is which is taught then for what reason it is asserted whether as a principall cause or as a comparison and whether to defend the Tenent or oppugne the contrary Thirdly whether it be rightly said The marks which he usually affixed to his writtings are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denotes Platonick words and figures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doctrines and opinions proper to Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Choice expressions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Corrections 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Things superfluous 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Double signification or use 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Philosophicall institution 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 agreement of opinions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Improbation Hitherto Laertius There are two Epistles under Plato's name besides those in his works already mentioned one in Laertius his life of Architas Plato to Architas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THe Commentaries which came from you we received with extraordinary content infinitely admiring the writer who appears to us a person worthy of those antient predecessors for those men are said to be Myraeans of those Trojans which were banished in the time of Laomedon good men as Tradition speaks them Those Commentaries of mine concerning which you write are not yet polished however as they are I have sent them to you in the keeping of them we agree both so as I nâ—ed not give you any directions Farewell Another published by Leo Allatius amongst the Socratick Epistles I had not any of those things to send to Syracuse which Archytas desired to receive by you as soon as possible I will send to you Philosophy hath wrought in me I know not whether good or bad a hatred of conversing with many persons justly I think since they erre in all kind of folly as well in private as publick affairs but if unjustly yet know I can hardly live and breath otherwise For this reason I have fled out of the City as out of a Den of wild Beasts living not far from the Ephestiades and the places thereabouts I now see that Timon hated not men he could not affect Beasts therefore lived â— alone by himself perhaps not without danger Take this as you please my resolution is to live far from the City now and for ever hereafter as long as God shall grant me life In Poesy he writ Dithyrambs An Epick Poem Four Tragedies all which as we said he burned The Atlantick story of which thus Plutarch Solon begun the Atlantick story which he had learnt of the Priests of Sais very proper for the Athenians but gave it over by reason of his old age and the largenesse of the work Plato took the same argument as a wast piece of fertile ground fallen to him by hereditary right He manured it refined it enclosed it with large Walls Porches and Galleries such as never any Fable or Poem had before but because he undertook it late he was prevented by Death The more things written delight the more their not being perfected is For as the Athenian City left the Temple of Jupiter so Plato's Wisdom amongst many exâ—â—llent writings left the Atlantick argument alone imperfect Epigrams of which these are extant in Laertius and the Anthologie Upon one named After The Stars my Star thou view'st Heav'n I would be That I with thousand eyes might gaze on Thee Upon his Death A Phosphor 'mongst the living late wert thou But shin'st among the dead a Hesper now Epitaph on Dion engrav'd on his Tomb at Siracuse Old Hecuba the Trojan Matron's years Were interwoven by the Fates with Tears But thee with blooming hopes my Dion deckt Gods did a Trophy of their pow'r erect Thy honour'd reliques in their Country rest Ah Dion whose love rages in my breast On Alexis Fair is Alexis I no sooner said When every one his eyes that way convey'd My soul as when some dog a bone we show Who snatcheth it lost we not Phaedrus so On Archaeanassa To Archae'nassa on whose furrow'd brow Love sits in triumph I my service vow If her declining Graces shine so bright What flames felt you who saw her noon of light On Agathon My Soul when I kiss'd Agathon did start Up to my lip just ready to depart To Xantippe An Apple I Love's emblem at the throw Thou in exchange thy virgin-Virgin-zone bestow If thou refuse my suite yet read in this How short thy years how frail thy Beauty is I cast the apple loving those love thee Xantippe yeeld for soon both old will be On the Eretrians vanquish'd by the Persians We in Eubaea born Eretrians are Buried in Susa from our Country far Venus and the Muses Virgins said Venus to the Muses pay Homage to us or Love shall wound your Hearts The Muses answer'd take these toyes away Our Breasts are proof against his childish darts Fortune exchang'd One finding Gold in change the halter quits Missing his Gold 'tother the halter knits On Sappho He who believes the Muses Nine mistakes For Lesbian Sappho ten their number makes Time Time all things bring to passe a change creates In Names in Formes in Nations and
enquire Geometrically and those other disciplines which are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is termed Mathematick Philosophy being thus divided wee must first according to Plato speak of the Dialectick part and in that first of the Iudiciarie CHAP. IV. DIALECTICK Of the Iudiciary part WHereas there is somthing that judgeth somthing which is judged it is necessary also that there be somthing which is made of both these properly called Iudgement This Judgement may not unfitly be termed Judiciary but more commonly that which judgeth This is twofold one from which another by which judgement is made That is intellect this the naturall Organ accommodated for judgement primarily of true things secondarily of false neither is it any thing but naturall reason To explain this more fully of things which are a Philosopher who judgeth the things themselves may be called a Iudge reason likewise is a Iudge by which truth is judged which even now we called an Organ Reason is twofold one incomprehensible and true the other is never deceived in the knowledge of those things which are The first is in the power of God not of man the second in that of man also This likewise is twofold the first Science and scientifick reason the second Opinion The first hath certitude and stability as being conversant in things certain and stable The second similitude of truth and opinion as being conversant in things subject to mutation Of science in Intelligibles and opinion in sensibles the principles are Intellection and Sense Sense is a passion of the soul by the mediation of the body first declaring a passive faculty When through the Organs of sense the species of things are impress'd in the soul so as they are not defac'd by time but remain firm and lasting the conservation thereof is called Memory Opinion is the conjunction of memory and sense for when some object occurreth which can first move the sense thereby sense is effected in us and by sense memory Then again is the same thing objected to our sense we joyne the precedent with the consequent sense and now say within our selves Socrates a Horse Fire and the like This is termed opinion when we joyne the precedent memory with the late sense when these agree within themselves it is a true opinion if they disagree a false for if a man having the species of Socrates in his memory meet with Plato and think by reason of some likenesse betwixt them he hath met Socrates again and afterwards joyne the sense of Plato which he took as it were from Socrates with the memory which he preserved of Socrates there will arise a false opinion That wherein sense and memory are formed Plato compareth to a tablet of wax but when the soul by cogitation reforming these things which are conceived in opinion by memory and sense sooketh upon these as things from which the other are derived Plato sometimes calleth this a picture and phantasie Cogitation he calleth the soules discourse within her selfe Speech that which â—loweth from the Cogitation through the mouth by voice Intellection is an operation of the Intellect contemplating first Intelligibles It is two-fold one of the soul beholding Intelligibles before she cometh into the body the other of the same after she is immers'd in the body The first is properly called Intellection the other whilst she is in the body is termed naturall knowledge which is nothing but an intellection of the soul consined to the body When we say Intellection is the principle of Science we mean not this latter but the other which is competible to the soul in her separate state and as we said is then called Intellection now naturall Knowledge The same Plato termeth simple Knowledge the wing of the soul sometimes Reminiscence Of these simple Sciences consisteth Reason which is born with us the efficient of naturall Science and as reason is two-fold Scientifick and opinionative so Intellection and Sense It is likewise necessary that they have their objects which are Intelligibles and Sensibles And for asmuch as of Intelligibles some are Primary as Idaeas others Secondary as the Species that are in matter and cannot be separated from it Intellection likewise must be two-fold one of Primaries the other of Sâ—condaries Again forasmuch as in Sensibles some are Primary as qualities colour whitenesse others by accident as white coloured and that which is concrete as fire in the same manner is Sense first of Primaries second of Secondaries Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles not without Scientifick knowledge by a certain comprehension without discourse Secondaries the same scientifick reason judgeth but not without Intellection Sensibles as well Primary as Secondary sense judgeth but not without opinionative reason That which is concrete the same reason judgeth but not without sense And since the Intelligible world is the Primary Intelligible the sensible something concrete the first Intellection judgeth with reason that is not without reason The other opinionative reason not without sense whereas there is both contemplation and action right reason discerneth not in the same manner those which are subject to contemplation and those which are subject to action In contemplation it considereth what is true what false in things that belong to action what is proper what improper what that is which is done For having an innate knowledge of that which is good and honest by using reason and applying it to those naturall notions as to certain rules we judge whether every thing be good or bad CHAP. V. The Elements and Office of Dialectick OF Dialectick the first and chiefest Element according to Plato is first to consider the essence of every thing next the accidents thereof What a thing is it considers either from its superiors by division and definition or contrariwise by Analysis Accidents which adhere to substances are considered either from those things which are contained by induction or from those which do contain by Syllogisme Hence the parts of Dialectick are these Division Definition Analysis Induction Syllogisme Of Divisions one is a distribution of the Genus into Species and of the whole into parts as when we divide the Soule into the rationall part and the irrationall and the latter into the concupiscible and the irascible Another is of a world into divers significations when the same may be taken severall waies A third of accidents according to their subjects as when we say of good some belong to the soul some to the body some are externall The fourth of subjects according to their accidents as of men some are good some ill some indifferent Division of the Genus into its Species is first to be used when we examine the essence of a thing this cannot be done but by definitions Definition is made by Division in this manner we must take the Genus of the thing to be defined as that of man living creature that we must divide by the next differences descending to its species as rationall and irrationall mortall
which more gently austere The sense of touching was formed by the Gods to discern hot and cold soft and hard light and heavy smooth and rough and to iudge the differences of each of these Yielding bodies we call those which yield to the touch resisting those which yield not this proceedeth from the bases of bodies those which have large bases are firm and solid these which have narrow bases are yielding soft and easily changed Rough is that which is uneven and hard smooth that which is plain and thick As warm and cold qualities are most opposite so they proceed from the most different causes That which cutteth by the acutenesse and roughnesse of its parts begetteth a hot affection that which is more thick in penetration a cold whilst the more rare are expelled and the more dense compelled to penetrate into their room Thence ariseth a concussion and trepidation and an affection which is from hence begotten in bodies rigor CHAP. XX. Of Heavy and Light HEavy and light ought not to be defined by higher or lower place nothing is high or low for Heaven being absolutely round and its convexe extremity even we cannot term any thing higher or lower yet may we call that heavy which is hardly drawn to a place different from its Nature light which easily or heavy is that which consisteth of most parts light of fewest CHAP. XXI Of Respiration WE breath after this manner The externall Air compasseth us round about and passeth in at our mouth nostrills and invisible Pores of the body where being warmed it floweth back again to the externall Air by that part out of which it flowed it again thrusteth the externall Air to the interiour Thus there is an unintermitted succession of inspiration and expiration CHAP. XXII Of the Causes of Diseases OF Diseases Plato alledgeth many causes The first is defect or excesse of the Elements and a change into places which agree not with their Nature The second a preposterous generation of homogeneall parts as when of flesh is made blood or choler or flegme for all these are nothing but colliquation or putrefaction â—legm is a new collâ—quation of flesh sweat and tears are a kind of Serum of flegm Flegm intercepted in the outward parts begetteth Scurse and Leprosie in the inward being mingled with Melancholy it causeth the falling-sicknesse Sharp and salt flegme engender those affections which consist in rigour for all bodies that are inflamed with choler must suffer that A world of various diseases are engendred by choler and flegm As concerning feavours Plato conceiveth that a continuall feavour proceedeth from excesse of fire a quotidian from excesse of air a tertian from excesse of water a quartan from excesse of Earth It remaineth that we here begin to speak of the Soul though not without some danger of repeating the same things CHAP. XXIII Of the three principall powers of the Soul THE Gods the makers of mortall Creatures having received from the first God the Soul of Man immortall added unto it two mortall parts yet left the immortall divine part might be infected with mortall extravagances they seated as Prince of all in the tower as it were of the body the Head in figure resembling the Universe The rest of the body they appointed as a vehiculum to serve this To each mortall part they assigned its proper habitation placing the irascible in the heart the concupiscible in the midst betwixt the Navell and the Diaphragme binding it there as a furious savage Beast They framed the Lungs in respect of the heart soft bloodlesse hollow and spungy that the heart being somthing heated with anger might thereby be refrigerated and asswaged the Liver to excite and allay the concupiscible part having both sweetnesse and bitternesse as likewise for the clearing of divinations which are given by dreams for as much as in it by reason of its smoothnesse shining and brightnesse the power which proceedeth from the mind doth shine forth The Spleen was made for the benefit of the Liver to purge and cleanse it so that those corruptions which by some diseases are contracted about the Liver retire thither CHAP. XXIV Of the distinction of the parts of the Soul THat the Soul and parts thereof according to their proper faculties are threefold every part appointed by reason their severall places is manifest from hence Those things which are separated by Nature are divers passionate and reasonable are separate by nature this being conversant in Intelligibles that in things sad or joyful to omit the passive part which is common likewise to bruit Beasts Now these two being distinct by Nature must likewise be distinguished by place because for the most part they disagree and are repugnant to one another but nothing can be repugnant to it self neither can those things which are contrary to one another consist together in the same In Medea anger seemeth to contest thus with reason I know what I intend is ill But anger over-rules my will In Laius when he ravished Chrysippus concupiscence contested with Reason for so he saith Men to this crime the Gods confine To know the ill that they decline That the rationall power is different from the Passive is evident from this that they ordered by severall means one by discipline the other by habituall practice CHAP. XXV Of the Immortality of the Soul THat the Soul is immortall Plato proveth by these Arguments The Soul to every thing wherein it is conferreth life as being naturally innate in her self but that which conferreth life to others never admitteth death but what is such is immortall The Soul being immortall is likewise incorruptible for it is an incorporeall essence which cannot be changed substantially and is only perceptible by the Intellect not by the eyes and is uniform Hence it must be simple neither can be at any time dissolved or corrupted The body is contrary for it is subject to sight and other senses and as it is compounded so shall it again be dissolved and it is multiform When the Soul adhereth to those things which are preceptible by Intellect it acquieseeth Now to that by whose presence she is disturbed she cannot possibly be like wherefore she is more like to those things which are perceptible by Intellect but what is such is by nature incorruptible and perishable Again the Soul naturally doth preside over the body not the body over the Soul but that which by nature ruleth and commandeth is of kin to Divinity wherefore the Soul being next unto God must be immortall not subject to corruption Again Contraries which have no medium not by themselves but by some accident are so ordered by Nature that they may be mutually made of one another But that which men call life is contrary to that which they call death as therefore Death is a separation of the Soul from the body so islife a conjunction of the Soul with the body praeexistent to the Body But if she be praeexistent and shall
subsist after the body it followeth that she be sempiternall for there cannot any thing be imagined whereby she may be corrupted Again if learning be Reminiscence the Soul must be immortall but that it is reminiscence we prove thus Learning cannot otherwise consist then by remembrance of those things we formerly know For if from Singulars we understand Universalls how could we discourse by singulars which are infinite or how from a few perceive Universalls we should therefore necessarily be deceived as if we judged that only to be a living Creature which breatheth or how could the notions themselves have the reason of principles By reminiscence therefore from some few which we have conceived in our mind we understand the rest and from some occurrent particulars we remember those which we knew long before but were then given over to oblivion when the Soul first descended into the Body Again if the Soul be not corrupted by its own proper ill neither can it be destroy'd by that or any other nor simply by any ill and being such shall remain uncorrupted Again that which is moved in it self as being the principle of motion in those things which are moved is alwaies moved that which is such is immortall but the Soul is moved of it self that which is moved of it self is the principle of all motion and generation and a principle is expert of generation and corruption wherefore the Soules of men and of the Universe it self are such for both partake of the same mistion He affirmeth the Soul to be moveable in her self because it hath an innate life alwaies operating by its power That rationall Soules are immortall may clearly be asserted out of Plato but whether the irrationall be such seemeth doubtfull yet is it probable that being guided only by Phantasie not endued with reason or judgement neither do they contemplate any thing or discern or collect from it nor can they discern ills but generally understand nothing nor are of the same nature with those Soules which have Intellect and Reason but are capable of dying and being corrupted For as much as they are immortall it followeth that they are put into bodies being planted into the formed Nature of Embrio's and transmigrate into severall bodies as well humane as others either according to some certain numbers which they expect or by the wil of the Gods or for intemperance of life or for love of the Body For the Body and Soul have a kind of affinity as Fire and Brimstone Moreover the Souls of the Gods have a dijudicative faculty called Gnostick and impulsive to some action called Parastatick which faculties being likewise in humane Soules become changed as soon as they come into the bodie the assistent into the concupiscible the impulsive into the Irascible CHAP. XXVI Of Fate and Free-will Concerning Fate Plato held thus All things are in fate yet all things are not decreed by Fate For Fate though it be like a Law yet it useth not to speak in this manner that this man shall do thus and to that man that shall befall which were to proceed into infinite there being an infinite generation of men and infinite accidents happening daily to them besides that this would take away our free-will our praise or dispraise and whatsoever is of that kind but rather thus Whatsoever Soul chooseth such a life and doth such things these shall follow the Soul therefore is free and it is left within its power to do or not to do without any compulsion or necessity But that which followeth the action is performed by Fate As from Paris's ravishing of Helena which it is within his power to do or not to do shall follow that the Grecians contend with the Trojans about Helena Thus Apollo foretold Laius If thou beget a Son that Son shall kill thee In the Oracle are comprehended both Laius and the begetting of a Son that which shall follow upon the begetting of the Son depends on Plato That which may be done is of a middle kind betwixt true and false and being so indefinite by Nature that which is in our power is carried on as it were unto it That which is done by our election is presently either true or false that which is in power is different from that which is said to be in habit and act That which is in power declareth an aptitude in that thing wherein the habit is not yet perfect So a boy may be said to be a Grammarian a Musician a Carpenter in power He is in habit of one or more of these when he hath acquired that habit He is said to be in act when he operateth according to that acquired habit That which we call possible to be done is none of these Indeterminate is that which is in our power and to which part soever it inclineth will be true or false CHAP. XXVII ETHICK Of the chief Good and of Virtues WE must next give a short account of Plato's Ethicks That which is worthy of all honour and is the Supreame good he conceived not easie to be found and if found not safe to be declared For this reason he communicated the contemplation of the chief good to very few and those of his most intimate acquaintance of whom his judgement made choice for this purpose But our good if we examine his books dillgently we shall find he placed in the knowledge of the first good which may rightly be called God and the first mind For all things which men call good he conceiveth to be called good in this respect for as much as they derive somthing from that good as all sweet and hot things are termed such from some participation of the first sweet and first hot Of those things which are in us only the mind and reason have a similitude of the first good Wherefore he calleth our good Fair Venerable Amiable Proportionate and lastly Beatitude Of those which are commonly called good as health beauty strength there is none good unlesse it be employed towards the practise of Vertue For being separated from Vertue they are like matter only and to those who make ill use of them only ill Yet these Plato sometimes calleth mortal goods Beatitude he reckoneth not amongst humane goods but amongst the divine and immortall Whence he asserteth that the souls of true Philosophers are replenish'd with vast admirable goods and after the dissolution of their mortall body are admitted to the table of the Gods and with them walk over and survey the field of Truth because they did see they used the utmost endeavours of their Soules to know it and esteemed it the most precious of all things by the benefit whereof they illustrated and excited their mind as a lost or blinded sight preferring the conservation thereof before many corporeall eyes Foolish men are like those who lead all their life in some Cave under ground where they never saw the light of the Sun but only some empty thin shadows of such
Such is fury to Cowardice and prodigality to covetousnesse nor can there be any man at once possessed of all Vices no more then a body tormented by all diseases Moreover there is a mean affection which inclineth not plainly either to Vice or Vertue for it is not necessary that all men must be good or bad they are such who have arrived at the height of these for it is not easie to passe suddenly from Vertue to Vice because betwixt extreames there is a great intervall and distance Of Vertues some are principall others concomitant principall are those which are in the rationall part of the Soul and by which the other Vertues are perfected Concomitant are those which are in the other part which are subject to Affections These act honest things according to Reason not that which is in them for they have none but that which they receive from Prudence which is confirmed in them by custom and exercise Now for as much as neither science nor art consisteth in any part of the soul but in the rationall those vertues which are in the other part that is subject to affections cannot be taught because they are neither Arts nor Sciences neither have they a peculiar Doctrine Prudence is a Science which prescribeth unto every one what is proper to him as a Pilot or Master of a Ship to inferiour ignorant Sailors The like in a common Souldier and a Generall For as much as Ills are intended and remitted offences cannot be equall but some must be greater others lesser for which reason they who make Lawes punish some more gently other more severely And though Vertues are certain Heights as being perfect and like unto that which is right yet in another respect they are called mediocrities because all or the most of them are placed betwixt two Vices whereof one sinneth in excesse the other in defect as on the one side of Liberality is Covetousnesse on the other Prodigality For in affections we recede from the mean when we relinquish that which is placed in Vertue either by excesse or defect But neither he who beholding his Parents wronged is nothing moved thereat nor he who is incens'd at the smallest matters void of passion or moderate but the quite contrary He who at the death of his Parents grieveth not is void of passion He who destroyeth himself with grieving is overpassionate and immoderate he who grieveth moderately is moderately passionate In like manner he who feareth upon all occasions and more then needs is timerous he who feareth nothing is rash He only is stout that can keep a mean betwixt fear and rashnesse the like in all the rest And for as much as that which is mean in affections is likewise best and mediocrity is nothing but a mean betwixt excesse and defect there are these Vertues termed Mediocrities because in humane perturbations and passions they affect us a middle kind of way CHAP. XXX That Vertue is voluntary Vice involuntary VErtue being chiefly of those things which are in our power not compulsive for it could not deserve praise if it came either by nature or divine decree it followeth that Vertue is voluntary begotten by a servent generous and firm impulsion From this that Vertue is voluntary it followeth that Vice is involuntary For who in the most excellent part of himselfe would ever voluntarily choose that which is the greatest of all Ills When a man is carried on to Vice he first inclineth to it not as if it were ill but good and if he fall into ill doubtlesse he is deceived with thinking that this way by a lesser ill he may arrive at a greater good and goeth in this manner unwillingly to it For it is not possible a man should pursue ill as it is ill without any hope of good or fear of a greater ill All ill things therefore which an ill man doth are involuntary for injustice being involuntary to act unjustly is so much more involuntary as the action of Vice is beyond the idle habit thereof Yet though wicked actions are involuntary the wicked neverthelesse ought to be punished and that not after one manner but according to the variety of hurt which they do to those they wrong That which is involuntary consisteth in ignorance of perturbations all which may be diverted either by reason or civill custome or diligence CHAP. XXXI Of Love and Friendship FRiendship properly so termed is made by a mutuall reciprocall benevolence This is when either is as much concerned for the happinesse of the otâ—er as of his own which equality is preserved only by similitude of manners For the like is friend to its like if they be both moderate but the intemperate cannot agree either with themselves or the moderate There are other things which are thought friendships but are are not such in which there appeareth some shew of vertue Of these is the naturall goodwill of Parents to their Children and of Kindred one to another as also that which is called civill and sociable These are not alwaies accompanyed with mutual benevolence Likewise the amatory art is a kind of friendship That which is honest is proper to a generous soul dishonest to a perverse mean to one meanly affected For as the habit of the rationall soul is three-fold right dishonest and mean so many different kinds are there of love which appeareth most clearly in the difference of the ends they propose unto themselves The dishonest aimes only at corporeall pleasure and therefore is absolutely bruitish The honest considereth the minde only as far as vertue appeareth in it The mean desireth both the beauty of the soul and of the body of which love he who is worthy is mean likewise that is neither absolutely honest nor dishonest Hence that love which aimeth only at the body ought to be tearmed a Demon rather then a Deity which never descendeth to an human bodie transmitting divine things to men and human to God Of the three kinds of love that which is proper to a good man being remote from vicious affections is artificiall whence it is placed in the rationall part of the soul. The contemplations thereof are these to discern who is worthy of love and to contract friendship with him and enjoy it This discernment is made from his aimes or desires whether they are generous and directed to a good end or violent and servent The contraction or acquisition of friendship is made not by wanton excessive praise but rather by reprehension shewing him that it is not convenient he should live in that manner he doth when he enjoyeth the love of him whom he affects he must alwaies exhort him to those things by exercise whereof he may arrive at perfect habit Their end is that of lover and beloved they may at last become friends CHAP. XXXII Of Passions IN justice is so great an ill that it is better to suffer wrong then to do wrong for one belongeth to a wicked man the other to a
weak man both are dishonest but to do wrong is worse by how much it is more dishonest It is as expedient that a wicked man be punished as that a sick man should be cured by a Physician for all chastisement is a kind of medicine for an offending Soul Since the greater part of Vertues are conversant about passions it is necessary that we define passion Passion is an irrationall motion of the Soul arising out of some good or ill it is called an irrationall motion because neither judgments nor opinions are passions but motions of the irrationall parts of the Soul For in the irrationall part of the Soul there are motions which though they are done by us are yet nothing the more in our power They are often done therefore contrary to our inclination and will for somtimes it falleth out that though we know things to be neither pleasing nor unpleasing expetible nor avoidable yet we are drawn by them which could never be if such passions were the same with Judgement For we reject judgement when we disapprove it whether it ought to be so or otherwise In the definition is added arising from some good or some ill because of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt these no passion is ever excited in us All passions arise from that which seemeth good or ill If we see good present we rejoice if future we desire On the conrrary if ill be present we grieve if imminent we fear The simple affections and as it were elements of the rest are two Pleasure and Grief the rest consist of these Neither are fear and desire to be numbred among the principall passions for he who feareth is not wholly deprived of pleasure nor can a man live the least moment who despaireth to be freed or eased of some ill But it is more conversant in grief and sorrow and therefore he who feareth sorroweth But he who desireth like all those who desire or expect somthing is delighted insomuch as he is not absolutely confident and hath not a firm hope he is grieved And if desire and fear are not principall passions it will doubtlesse follow that none of the other affections are simple as anger love emulation and the like for in these Pleasure and Grief are manifest as consisting of them Moreover of Passions some are rough others mild the mild are those which are naturally in men and if kept within their bounds are necessary and proper to man if they exceed vitious Such are Pleasure Grief Anger Pitty Modesty for it is proper to man to delight in those things which are according to Nature and to be grieved at their contraries Anger is necessary to repell and punish an injury Mercy agreeth with Humanity Modesty teacheth us to decline sordid things Other passions are rough and praeternaturall arising from some depraved or perverse custom Such are excessive laughter joy in the misfortunes of others hatred of Mankind These whether intense or remisse after what manner soever they are are alwaies erroneous and admit not any laudable mediocrity As concerning Pleasure and Grief Plato writeth thus These passions are excited in us by Nature Grief and sorrow happen to those who are moved contrary to Nature Pleasure to those who are restored to the proper constitution of their Nature For he conceiveth the naturall state of man to consist in a mean betwixt Pleasure and Grief not moved by either in which state we live longest He asserteth severall kinds of Pleasure whereof some relate to the Body others to the Soul Again of Pleasures some are mix'd with grief some are pure Again some proceed from the remembrance of things past others from hope of things to come Again some are dishonest as being intemperate and unjust others moderate and joyned with good as joy for good things and the Pleasure that followeth Vertue Now because most Pleasures are naturally dishonest he thinks it not to be disputed whether Pleasure can be simply and absolutely a good that being to be accounted poor and of no value which is raised out of another and hath not a principall primary essence For Pleasure cohereth even with its contrary Grief and is joyned with it which could not be if one were simply good the other simply ill CHAP. XXXIII Of the formes of Common-wealths OF the formes of Common-wealth some are supposed only and conceived by abstract from the rest These he delivers in his book of a Commonwealth wherein he describeth the first concordant the second discordant enquiring which of these is the most excellent and how they may be constituted He also divideth a Commonwealth like the Soul into three parts Keepers Defenders and Artisicers The office of the first is to Counsel to advise to command of the second to defend the Commonwealth upon occasion by armes which answereth to the irascible power To the last belong Arts and other services He will have Princes to be Philosophers and to contemplate the first good affirming that so only they shall govern rightly For Mankind can never be freed from ill unlesse either Philosophers govern or they who govern be inspired with Philosophy after a divine manner A Commonwealth is then governed best and according to Justice when each part of the City performeth its proper Office So that the Princes give Laws to the People the Defenders obey them and sight for them the rest willingly submit to their Superiours Of a Commonwealth he asserteth five kinds the first Aristocracy when the best rule the second Timocracy when the ambitious the third Democracy when the people the fourth Oligarchy when a few the last Tyranny which is the worst of all He describeth likewise other supposed formes of Common-wealth as that in his Book of Laws and that which reformeth others in his Epistles which he useth for those Cities that in his Books of Laws he saith are sick These have a distinct place and select men out of every age as according to the diversity of their nature and place they require different institution education and armes The Maritime people are to study Navigation and Sea-sight the Iland fighting on foot those in mountanous Countries to use light armour those on the shore heavy Some of these to exercise fighting on horseback In this City he alloweth not a Community of women Thus is Politick a Verue conversant both in Action and Contemplation the end wherof is to constitute a City good happy and convenient to it self It considers a great many things amongst the rest whether War be to be waged or not CHAP. XXXIV Of a Sophist HItherto we have spoken of a Philosopher from whom a Sophist differeth In Manners because he teacheth young men for gain and desireth rather to seem then to be good In matter for a Philosopher is conversant in those things which alwaies are and continually remain in the same manner but a Sophist in that which is not for which reason he seeketh darknesse that he may not be known to be what
he is To things that are that which is not is not opposed as contrary for it neither existeth nor is participant of any essence nor can be understood So that if any man endeavour to expresse it in words or comprehend it by thought he is deceived because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant Yet that which is not as far as it is spoken is not a pure negation of that which is but implyeth a relation to another which in some manner is joined to Ens. So that unlesse we assume somthing from that which is to that which is not it cannot be distinguished from other things but thus as many kinds as they are of Ens so many are there of Non-Ens because that which is not an Ens is a Non-Ens Thus much may serve for an introduction into Plato's Philosophy Some things perhaps are said orderly others dispersedly or confusedly yet is all so laid down that by those which we have delivered the rest of his Assertions may be found out and contemplated After so serious a Discourse it will not be amisse to give the Reader a Poeticall entertainment upon the same Subject being A PLATONICK DISCOURSE Written in Italian by IOHN PICUS Earl of MIRANDULA In explication of a Sonnet by HIERONIMO BENIVIENI The first PART Sect. I. IT is a principle of the Platonists That every created thing hath a threefold being Causal Formal Participated In the Sun there is no heat that being but an elementary quality not of Celestiall nature yet is the Sun the cause and Fountain of all hear Fire is hot by nature and its proper form Wood is not hot of its self yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire Thus hath heat its Causall being in the Sun its Formall in the Fire it s Participated in the Fuel The most noble and perfect of these is the Causal and therefore Platonists assert That all excellencies are in God after this manner of being That in God is nothing but from him all things That Intellect is not in him but that he is the original spring of every Intellect Such is Plotinus's meaning when he affirms God neither understands nor knows that is to say after a formall way As Dionysius Areopagita God is neither an Intellectuall nor Intelligent nature but unspeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge Sect. II. PLatonists distinguish Creatures into three degrees The first comprehends the corporeall and visible as Heaven Elements and all compounded of them The last the invisible incorporeal absolutely free from bodies which properly are called Intellectual by Divines Angelicall Natures Betwixt these is a middle nature which though incorporeall invisible immortall yet moveth bodies as being obliged to that Office called the rationall Soul inferiour to Angells superiour to Bodies subject to those regent of these Above which is God himselfe author and principle of every Creature in whom Divinity hath a casuall being from whom proceeding to Angells it hath a formall being and thence is derived into the rationall Soul by participation of their lustre below which no nature can assume the Title of Divine Sect. III. THat the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplyed who is but one the principle and cause of all other Divinity is evidently proved by Platonists Peripateticks and our Divines About the second viz. The Angelick and Intellectuall Platonists disagree Some as Proclus Hermias Syrianus and many others betwixt God and the rationall Soul place a great number of creatures part of these they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligible part intellectuall which termes Plato sometimes confoundeth as in his Phaedo Plotinus Porphyrius and generally the most refined Platonists betwixt God and the Soul of the World assigne only one Creature which they call the Son of God because immediately produced by him The first opinion complies most with Dionysius Areopagita and Christian Divines who assert the number of Angells to be in a manner infinite The second is the more Philosophick best suiting with Aristotle and Plato whose sense we only purpose to expresse and therefore will decline the first path though that only be the right to pursue the latter Sect. IV. VVE therefore according to the opinion of Plotinus confirmed not only by the best Platonists but even by Aristotle and all the Arabians especially Avicenna affirm That God from eternity produced a creature of incorporeall and intellectuall nature as perfect as is possible for a created being beyond which he produced nothing for of the most perfect cause the effect must be most perfect and the most perfect can be but one for of two or more it is not possible but one should be more or lesse perfect than the rest otherwise they would not be two but the same This reason for our opinion I rather choose then that which Avicen alledges founded upon this principle That from one cause as one can proceed but one effect We conclude therefore that no creature but this first minde proceeds immediately from God for of all other effects issuing from this minde and all other second causes God is only the mediate efficient This by Plato Hermes and Zoroaster is called the Daughter of God the Minde Wisdome Divine Reason by some interpreted the Word not meaning with our Divines the Son of God he not being a creature but one essence coequall with the Creator Sect. V. ALL understanding agents have in themselves the form of that which they design to effect as an Architect hath in his minde a figure of the building he undertakes which as his pattern he exactly strives to imitate This Platonists call the Idea or Exemplar believing it more perfect then that which is made after it and this manner of Being Ideal or Intelligible the other Materiall and Sensible So that when a Man builds a house they affirm there are two one Intellectuall in the Workmans mind the other sensible which he makes in Stone Wood or the like expressing in that matter the form he hath conceiv'd to this Dante alludes â—None any work can frame Unless himself become the same Hereupon they say though God produced only one creature yet he produced all because in it he produced the Ideas and forms of all and that in their most perfect being that is the Ideal for which reason they call this Mind the Intelligible World Sect. VI. AFter the pattern of that Mind they affirm this sensible World was made and the exemplar being the most perfect of all created things it must follow that this Image thereof be as perfect as its nature will bear And since animate things are more perfect then the inanimate and of those the rational then the irrationall we must grant this World hath a Soul perfect above all others This is the first rationall Soul which though incorporeall and immateriall is destin'd to the function of governing and moving corporeall Nature not free from the body as that mind whence from Eternity it was deriv'd as was the mind from
of the Intellectuall raiseth her from this terrene life to the eternall by the flame of love refined into an Angell The Second PART Sect. I. THE apprehensive faculties of the Soul are employ'd about truth and falshood assenting to one dissenting from the other The first is affirmation the second negation The desiderative converse in good and ill inclining to this declining to that The first is Love the second Hate Love is distinguish'd by its objects if of riches termed covetousnesse of honour ambition of heavenly things piety of equalls friendship these we exclude and admit no other signification but the desire to possesse what in it selfe or at least in our esteem is fair of a different nature from the love of God to his Creatures who comprehending all cannot desire or want the beauty and perfections of another and from that of friends which must be reciprocall We therefore with Plato define it * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 * The desire of beauty Desire is an inclination to reall or apparent good As there are divers kinds of good so of desire Love is a species of desire Beauty of good Desire is Naturall or Knowing All creatures have a particular perfection by participation of the divine goodnesse This is their end including that degree of felicity whereof they are capable to which center they tend This desire we call Naturall a great testimony of Divine Providence by which they are unwittingly as an Arrow by the Archer directed to their mark With this all Creatures desire God as being the Originall good imprinted and participated in every particular This is in every Nature as more or lesse capable addressed to ends more or lesse noble yet is the ultimate end of all the same to enjoy God as far as they may Thus as the Psalmist Every thing worships and praiseth God like suppliants turning and offering themselves up to him saith Theodoret. Sect. II. THe other Species of Desire is employed only about things known given by Nature that to every apprehensive faculty there might be a desiderative to embrace what it judgeth good to refuse what it esteemeth evill in its own nature enclin'd to good None ever desires to be miserable but the apprehensive Vertue many times mistaking Evill for Good it oft falls out that the desiderative in its selfe blind desires evill This in some sence may be said voluntary for none can force it in another sence not voluntary deceived by the judgment of its Companion This is Plato's meaning when he saith No man sins willingly Sect. III. IT is the Property of every desiderative Vertue that He who desires possesseth in part the thing he desires in part not for if he were wholly deprived of its Possession he would never desire it this is verified two waies First nothing is desired unlesse it be known and to know a thing is in some part to possesse it So Aristotle The Soul is all because it knowes all And in the Psalmist God saith All things are mine I know them Secondly there is alwaies some convenience and resemblance betwixt the desirer and desired Every thing delights and preserves it selfe by that which by naturall affinity is most conformable to it by its contrary is grieved and consum'd Love is not betwixt things unlike Repugnance of two opposite natures is naturall hate Hate is a repugnance with knowledge Hence it followeth that the nature of the desired is in some manner in the desirer otherwise there would be no similitude betwixt them yet imperfectly else it were vain for it to seek what it entirely possesseth Sect. IV. AS desire generally followes knowledge so severall knowing are annexed to severall desiring Powers We distinguish the knowing into three degrees Sence Reason Intellect attended by three desiderative Vertues Appetite Election Will Appetite is in Bruits Election in Men Will in Angels The sense knowes only corporeall things the Appetite only desires such the Angelick Intellect is wholly intent on Contemplation of spirituall Conceptions not inclining to Materiall Things but when divested of matter and spiritualiz'd their Will is only fed with intemporall spirituall Good Rationall Nature is the Mean betwixt these Extreams sometimes descending to Sense sometimes elevated to Intellect by its own Election complying with the desires of which she pleaseth Thus it appears that corporeall Objects are desired either by Sensuall Appetite or Election of Reason inclining to Sense Incorporeall by Angelick Will or the Election of Reason elevated to Intellectuall Height Sect. V. BEauty in generall is a Harmony resulting from severall things proportionably concurring to constitute a third In respect of which temperament and mixture of various Natures agreeing in the composition of one every Creature is Fair and in this sence no simple being is Beautifull not God himselfe this Beauty begins after him arising from contrariety without which is no composition it being the union of contraries a friendly enmity a disagreeing concord whence Empedocles makes discord and concord the principles of all things by the first understanding the varietie of the Natures compounding by the second their Union adding that in God only there is no Discord He not being the Union of severall Natures but a pure uncompounded Unity In these compositions the Union necessarily predominates over the contrariety otherwise the Fabrick would be dissolved Thus in the fictions of Poets Venus loves Mars this Beauty cannot subsist without contrariety she curbs and moderates him this temperament allaies the strife betwixt these contraries And in Astrologie Venus is plac'd next Mars to check his destructive influence as Iupiter next Saturn to abate his malignancy If Mars were alwaies subject to Venus the contrariety of principles to their due temper nothing would ever be dissolved Sect. VI. THis is Beauty in the largest sence the same with Harmony whence God is said to have framed the World with musicall harmonious temperament But Harmony properly implies a melodious agreement of Voices and Beauty in a restrict acception relates to a proportionable concord in visible things as Harmony in audible The desire of this Beauty is Love arising only from one knowing faculty the Sight and that gaye Plotonius Enâ—ead 3. lib. 5. 3. occasion to deprive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Love from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sight Here the Platonist may object If Love be only of visible things how can it be applyed to Ideas invisible natures We answer Sight is twofold corporeal and spirituall the first is that of Sense the other the Intellectuall faculty by which we agree with Angels this Platonists call Sight the corporeall being only an Image of this So Aristotle Intellect is that to the Soul which sight is to the Body Hence is Minerva Wisdom by Homer call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bright-ey'd With this sight Moses Saint Paul and other Saints beheld the face of God this Divines call Intellectuall â—â—tuitive cognition the Beâ—tificall vision the Reward of the Righteous Sect. VII AS Sight so Beauty itâ—object
so interpreted by Origen and some Platonists expound the Ocean stil'd by Homer Father of Gods and Men this Angelick Minde Principle and Fountain of all other Creatures Gemistius Neptune as Commander of all Waters of all Mindes Angelicall and Humane This is that living Fountain whereof he that drinketh shall never thirst These are the Waters whereon David saith God hath founded the World Sect. XIV POrus the Affluence of Ideas proceeding from God is stiled by Plato the Son of Metis Counsell in Imitation of the Scripture whence our Saviour by Dionysius Areop is termed the Angel of Counsell that is the Messenger of God the Father so Avicen calls the first Cause conciliative the Minde not having Ideas from it selfe but from God by whose Counsell she receiveth Knowledge and Art to frame this visible World Sect. XV. LOve according to Plato is Youngest and Oldest of the Gods They as all other things have a two-fold Being Ideal and Naturall The first God in his Naturall Being was Love who dispenc'd theirs to all the rest the last in his Ideal Love was born in the Descent of the Ideas into the Angelick Minde which could not be perfect till they its Essence were made so by loves conversion to God The Angelick Minde owing its naturall being to Love the other Gods who succeeded this Minde necessarily are younger then He in their naturall Being though they precede him in their Ideal as not born till these Ideas though imperfectly were joyn'd to the inform'd Nature Sect. XVI THe Kingdome of Necessity is said to be before that of Love Every Creature consists of two Natures Materiall the imperfect which we here understand by Necessity and Formall the occasion of perfection That whereof it most partakes is said to be predominant and the Creature to be subject to it Hence is Necessity matter suppos'd to raigne when the Ideas were imperfect and all imperfections to happen during that time all perfections after Love began his reign for when the Minde was by him converted to God that which before was imperfect in her was perfected Sect. XVII VEnus is said to commend Fate The order and concatenation of causes and effects in this sensible World called Fate depends on the order of the Intelligible World Providence Hence Platonists place Providence the ordering of Ideas in the first Minde depending upon God its ultimate end to which it leads all other things Thus Venus being the order of those Ideas whereon Fate the Worlds order depends commands it Fate is divided into three parts Clotho Lachesis and Atropos That which is one in Providence indivisible in Eternity when it comes into Time and Fate is divisible into Past Present and Future Others apply Atropos to the fixed Sphear Clotho to the seven Planets Lachesis to sublunary things Temporall corporeall things only are subjected to Fate the Rationall Soul being incorporeall predominates over it but is subjected to Providence to serve which is true liberty By whom the Will obeying its Lawes is led to the Acquisition of her desired end And as often as she endeavours to loose her selfe from this Servitude of Free she becomes a Servant and Slave to Fate of whom before she was the Mistresse To deviate from the Laws of Providence is to forsake Reason to follow Sense and Irrationall Appetite which being corporeall are under Fate he that serves these is much more a servant then those he serves Sect. XVIII AS from God Ideas descend into the Angelick Mind by which the Love of Intellectuall Beauty is begot in her called Divine Love so the same Ideas descend from the Angelick Minde into the Rationall Soul so much the more imperfect in her as she wants of Angelicall Perfection From these springs Human Love Plato discourseth of the first Plotinus of the latter who by the same Argument whereby he proves Ideas not accidentall but substantiall in the Angelick Minde evinceth likewise the specificall Reasons the Ideas in the Soul to be substantiall terming the Soul Venus as having a specious splendid Love in respect of these specificall Reasons Sect. XIX VUlgar Love is the Appetite of sensible Beauty through corporeall sight The cause of this Beauty is the visible Heaven by its moving power As our motive faculty consists in Muscles and Nerves the Instruments of its Operation so the motive faculty of Heaven is fitted with a Body proper for circular sempiternall motion Through which Body the Soul as a Painter with his Pencill changeth this inferiour matter into various Forms Thus vulgar Venus the beauty of materiall forms hath her casuall being from the moving power of the Heavens her formall from colour enlightned by the visible Sun as Ideas by the invisible her participate in the Figure and just order of parts communicated to sight by mediation of light and colour by whose Interest only it procures love Sect. XX. AS when the Ideas descend into the Minde there ariseth a desire of enjoying that from whence this Ideall Beauty comes so when the species of sensible Beauty flow into the Eye there springs a two-fold Appetite of Union with that whence this Beauty is derived one Sensuall the other Rationall the principles of Bestiall and Human Love If We follow Sense We Judge the Body wherein We behold this Beauty to be its Fountain whence proceedes a desire of Coition the most intimate union with it This is the Love of irrationall Creatures But Reason knowes that the Body is so far from being its Originall that it is destructive to it and the more it is sever'd from the Body the more it enjoyes its own Nature and Dignity We must not fix with the species of Sense in the Body but refine that species from all reliques of corporeall infection And because Man may be understood by the Rationall Soul either considered apart or in its union to the Body in the first sence human Love is the Image of the Celestiall in the second Desire of sensible Beauty this being by the Soul abstracted from matter and as much as its nature will allow made Intellectuall The greater part of men reach no higher than this others more perfect remembring that more perfect Beauty which the Soul before immers'd in the Body beheld are inflam'd with an incredible desire of reviewing it in pursuit whereof they separate themselves as much as possible from the Body of which the Soul returning to its first dignity becomes absolute Mistresse This is the Image of Celestiall Love by which man ariseth from one perfection to another till his Soul wholly united to the Intellect is made an Angell Purged from materiall drosse and transformed into spirituall flame by this Divine Power he mounts up to the Intelligible Heaven and happily rests in his Fathers bosome Sect. XXI VUlgar Love is only in Souls immerst in Matter and overcome by it or at least hindred by perturbations and passions Angelick Love is in the Intellect eternall as it Yet but inferr'd the greater part turning
Aristotle fully acquits himselfe in his Epistles to An ipater where he professeth that he married her only out of tâ—e good will which he bore unto Hermias and out of a compassion for the great misfortunes that had happened to her Brother adding that she was a woman endowed with extraordinary modesty and all other vertues His second wife was named Herpylis a woman of Stagira whom Apellico cited by Eusebius and perâ—aps from him â—uâ—das affirm he married after the death of Pythais With her he lived to his end as Hermippus cited by Athenaeus and â—imothaeus by Laertius affirm Timaeus a profess'd calumniator of Aristotle saith she was his Concubine and that Aristoâ—le lived with her following the counsell of Hesiod in his Georgiâ—ks from which calumny Hesiod is fully vindicated by Proclus By Herpylis he had one son as Apellico affirmeth whom he named after his own Father Nicomachus To him he dedicated his great Moralls which Cicero thinks to have been written by Nicomachus himselfe For I see not saith he why the son might not be like the Father This Nicomachus was a disciple of Theophrastus and much beloved by him under whom he profited exceedingly in Philosophy and arrived at much eminence therein Suidas saith he writ eight Books of Physick four of Ethick Cicero compares him both with his Tutor and Father Aristocles cited by Eusebius affirmeth he was bred up an Orphan by Theophrastus afterwards died young in the Warrs which relation agrees not with Aristotle's Will nor with Suidas or Cicero who averr that he writ Books out of which Laertius brings a citation in Eudoxo He had a Daughter also called Pythais who as Sextus Empericus affirmes was thrice married First to Nicanor the Stagirite friend to Aristotle Secondly to Procles who derived his pedigree from Demaratus King of Lacedemonia By him she had two Sons Procles Demaratus who studied Philosophy under Theophrastus Her last husband was Metrodorus Disciple of Chrysippus the Gnidian Master of Erastratus By him she had a son named after her Father Aristotle Of this Aristotle there is mention in the Will of Theophrastus where he is called the Son of Midias not Metrodorus Suidas affirmeth he died before his Grandfather CHAP. XIV His Disciples and Friends THe Disciples of Aristotle were so many and so eminent that Nicander of Alexandria wrote an expresse Book upon that subject which had it been extant would doubtlesse have given us an exact account of them whereas now we must rest satisfied with an imperfect Catalogue To omit the three Princes that were his Disciple Hermias Alexander of whom already and Antipâ—ter Successor to Alexanander in Macedonia who amongst other things wrote two books of Epistles in one whereof he related the death of Aristotle in the first place is mentioned Theophrastus of Eressus a City of Leshos the most eloquent of his Disciples Him he appointed to succced him in the School Phanias of Eressus also He wrote many Books often cited by Athenaeus amongst the rest Ammonius cites his Categories Analyticks and of Interpretation Eudemus of Rhodes esteemed by Aristotle in the second place next to Theophrastus His life was written by Damias as Simplicius affirmes who often mentions him He wrote Analyticks and a Geometricall History both cited by Simplicius and some other Histories cited by Laertius wherein hee said the Magi were of opinion that men should rise again after death He survived Aristotle Eudemus of Cyprus who died in Sicily where he took Dion's part as appeareth from Plutarch Aristotle in honour of him called his Dialogue of the Soul after his name Pasicrates Brother of Eudemus the Rhodian To him some ascribe the first lesser Book of Metaphysicks as Philoponus affirmeth Theodectes To him Aristâ—â—le dedicated some Books of Rhetorick mentioned by Valerius Maximus which hee afterward retracted Patricius conceives hee was rather a companion then a Disciple of Aristotle because he mentions him seven times in his Rhetorick which he is never observed to have done of any Disciple Clearchus of Soli. He wrote many Books often cited by Atheâ—aeus Dicaearchus Son of Phidias of Mâ—ssena in Sicily a Philosopher Oratour and Geometriâ—ian as Suiâ—as affirmeth He is cited by Cicero mention'd often by Plutarch amongst the best Philopâ—ers Arisloxenus Son of Mâ—esias a Musician of Tarentum in Italy who going to Maâ—tinia there studied Philosophy and Musick He heard his Father and Lamprus an Erythraean and Xenopholus a Pythagorean and last of all Aristoâ—le whom after his death he calumniated and wronged much because he had left Theophrastus his successour in the School whereas himimself was in great esteem amongst the Disâ—iples Thus Suidas Nicanor mentioned in his Will Philo who wrote against one Sophocles who caused the Philosophers to be voted out of Attica Plato the younger mentioned by Laertiâ—s and Philâ—pâ—nus Socrates a Bithynian mentioned by Laâ—râ—ius Mâ—ason a Phocian mentioned by Aelian as one of hose who assisted Aristotle in the ejection of Plaâ—o out of the Academy Galen likewise mentions him as Author of some mâ—dicinall writings ascribed to Aristotle Phrasidemus a Phocian mentioned by Laertius as a Peripatetick Philosopher It is likely he was a Disâ—iple of Aâ—â—stâ—â—le for he was contemporary with Theopâ—rastus Palaephatus of Abydas an Historian much beloved of Aristotle Callisthenes an Olynthian Aristotles Sisters Sonne of whom already Hipparchus a Stagirite of kin to Aristotle He wrote as Suidas affirmeth oâ— the distinctions of Sexes amongst the Gods of mariage and the like Leoâ— a Byzantine a Peripatetick Philosopher and Sophist Some aâ—firâ— he was a Disâ—iple of Aristoâ—les He was so excessively fat that coming to Athens upon an Embassy the people laught at him to whom he said do you laugh to see me thus fat I have a wife a great deal 〈◊〉 yet when we agree one bed will hold us both but when we disagree not the whole house The people suspecting him of conâ—ederacy with 〈◊〉 upon a 〈◊〉 of his came in a tumult to his house whereupon fearing to be stoned he strangled himselfe Aeschrion of Mitylene a heroick Poet loved much by Aristotle as Suidas saith Callippus an Athenian who also heard Plato Satyrus whose books of lives and characters are cited by Athenaeus Hieronimus the Rhodiaâ— eminent in Philosophy That he was Aristotle's disciple is acknowledged by Athenaeus Heraclides of Pontus a great Philologist To these add of lesse note Echecratides a Methymnaean and Adrastus a Macedonian both mentioned by Stephanus Euxithius mentioned by Plutarch Clitus a Milesian Menon the Historian Diâ—teles and Timarchus CHAP. XV. His Detractours AS the friends and followers of Aristotle were more in number then those of any other Philosopher so were also his detractours of whom having already had occasion to make some mention we shall not need to give any further account then this of Aristotles alledged by Eusebius How then is it possible that what Epicure relates of Aristotle can be true that when he was a young man
which freeth us from the fury of the passions And if corporeall strength ought to be numbered amongst goods much more ought magnanimity by which the soul is strengthened And if corporeall Beauty be expetible in it selfe much more is that of the soul Iustice. In like manner is it with the vertues For there are three kinds of Goods which though different have some kinde of analogie That which in the body is called Health in the soul is called Temperance and in externals Riches What in the body is Strength in the soul is Magnanimity in externals Power What in the body is Vigour of Sense in the soul is Prudence in externals Felicity What in the body is Beauty in the soul is Iustice in externals Friendship There are three kinds of Goods expetible in themselves those concerning the soule those concerning the body and the externall but especially those of the soul for the soul is more excellent then the body Yet though corporeall and externall vertues be inferiour to those of the soul they are not to be neglected partly as being expetible in themselves partly as conducing to civill sociable and contemplative life for life is defined by civill sociable and contemplative actions Vertue according to this Sect not being a lover of it selfe but communicative and civill For when we say vertue is neerest ally'd to it selfe the desire of the knowledge of truth necessarily followeth it so as wise men may rightly part with their life and fools rightly preserve theirs since that to those who are perfect it is an equall thing to depart this life or not The excellency of vertue is much encreased by corporeall and externall goods yet the end cannot any way be compleated by them The function therefore of vertue is Beatitude by successefull actions Corporeall and externall goods are said to be efficient of beatitude for as much as they confer something thereto not that they compleat it for Beatitude is life Life consists of actions but those can neither be reckoned amongst actions nor functions Hereupon comes in Beneficence grace humanity love of Children and Brethren of our Country Parents Benevolence of Kinsfolk Friendship Equality and the whole company of Vertues which who neglect manifestly sin as to expetible goods and avoidable evills and also in the acquisition and use of Goods they sin in election by judgment in acquisition by the manners in use by ignorance In election they sin as desiring that which is not good or preferring the lesser good as most prefer Pleasant before Pâ—ofitable profitable before Honest. In acquisition as not considering whence nor in what manner nor how far it ought to be acquired In use for as much as all use being referred either to it selfe or some other in the former they observe no moderation in the latter no decency In these things though the wicked sin yet do the just behave themselves uprightly following vertue as their leader In all vertues there is Iudgment Election and Aâ—tion there is no Vertue without these Prudence hath the first place the rest follow Vertue is called the best affection which may be collected from Induction The Vertue of a shoemaker is that by which he knoweth how to make shoes and of an Architâ—ct that by which he knoweth how to build a handsom house Vertue therefore is the best of Affections Of Vertue there are two principles as it were Reason and Passion which somtimes agree somtimes disagree for Pleasure or grief when Reason gets the Mastery it is called Temperance when passion Intemperance The Harmony and Concord of both is Vertue one rightly commanding the other obeying Expetible is that which attracteth the appetite to it self avoidadable that which repelleth it reason consenting thereto Expeâ—ible and good were by the Ancients esteemed the same for they affirmed Good to be that which all desire Of Goods they say some are expetible for themselves some for others the first are either honest or necessary Honest are the Vertues and their functions necessary Life and those things which pertain unto it as the body with its parts and uses and those which are called externall goods as riches peace glory Liberty friendship for each of these conferreth to the use of Vertue Beatitude consisteth of Good and successful actions wherefore it is wholly good as playing upon pipes is wholly Artificial for the use of the matter doth not take away the goodnesse from Beatitude as the use of Instruments taketh not away from the Art of Medicine Such things as are made use of towards this perfection are not to be reckoned as parts for they without which the action cannot be are not rightly parts thereof for parts conduce to the whole the rest conduce to the end Good is divided into honest profitable and pleasant these are the scopes of all actions Beatitude consists of all these It is the use of perfect Vertue in perfect life with prosperous successe and the function of perfect life according to Vertue and the use of Vertue according to nature without any impediment Though some assert that the End is to be happy and Beatitude the scope as Riches are Good and to be rich that which is behovefull yet is it better to follow the Antients who assert the End to be that for whose sake all things are it self not being for the sake of any other or the ultimate of things expetible or Life according to Vertue in corporeall and externall goods either in all or the most principall This being the greatest Good useth the Ministry of the rest for as those things which conferr hereunto are to be esteemed Goods so those things which resist it are Indifferents for every good action doth not effect Beatitude They assert Beatitude to be the use of perfect Vertue as holding some Vertues to be perfect others imperfect The perfect are Iustice and Integrity the imperfect are Ingenuity and Progression The perfect agreeth with the perfect so as the end thereof is the function of that Vertue whereof no part is wanting They added perfect life to shew that Beatitude is in men of full age for a young man is imperfect and so is his life Beatitude therefore is in perfect time the longest that is appointed for us by the Gods As one Verse makes not a Poem nor one step a dance nor one swallow a Summer so neither doth a short time conferre Beatitude for Beatitude is perfect and requireth a perfect Man and Time They added successefull Function of Vertue because the Goods of Nature are necessarily requisite to Beatitude for a good man may exercise Vertue in misery but cannot be happy For as Vertue is the only efficient of honest actions so is Beatitude of honest good and excellent Neither doth it abide amongst ill or unhappy things but enjoyeth the Good nor is deprived of the contemplation of good or the conveniences of life Beatitude being the most pleasant fairest of things increaseth like an Art by the multitude of its
for from thence the soul conceiveth notions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of those things which are explained by definition and from thence is propagated and connexed the whole reason of Learning and Teaching Sense is a spirit proceeding from the supream part of the Soul and permeating to the Organs Whatsoever things are comprehended are manifestly comprehended by sense all conceptions of the minde depend upon sense Comprehension made by the senses is true and faithfull according to Zeno for as much as nature hath given it as a rule for science and principle of her selfe Nothing is more clear then this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evidence there cannot be any speech more perspicuous Of Sensibles and Intelligibles some are true but not directly sensible but by relation to those things which are next as falling under Intelligence CHAP. IV. Of Phantasy In the first place saith Diocles the Magnesian they put the reason concerning Phantasie and Sense as a judgment whereby the truth of things is discerned It is phantasie as to its genus and likewise in as much as the reason of assent comprehension and intelligence which is more excellent then the rest consists not without Phantasy for phantasy goeth first then the minde endued with elocution declareth by words what it suffers from the phantasy Phantasy is so called from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 light for as light sheweth it selfe and with it selfe all those things which are contained within it so phantasy sheweth it selfe and that which maketh it Phantasy is an impression in the Soul Cleanthes addes an impression by depression and eminence as that impression which is made in Wax by a Seal Chrysippus conceives this to be absurd for 1. saith he When the soule first apprehends a triangle and a square it will follow that the same body at the same time must have in it selfe severall figures which is absurd Again whereas many phantasies are together consistent in us the Soul must have divers figures which is worse then the former He therefore conceived that Zeno used the word Impression for Alteration meaning thus Fantasy is an alteration of the Soul whereby it is no longer absurd that the same body many severall phantasies being at the same time consistent in us should receive severall alterations For as the aire receiving at once innumerable different percussions hath presently many alterations so the supream part of the soule receiving various phantasies doth something which hath proportion and conformity thereto Some object that this exposition is not right because though every phantasy is an impression and alteration in the Soul yet every impression or alteration of the Soul is not phantasy as when the finger smarts or itches and the hand is rubbed there is then an impression and alteration in the soul but it is not phantasy because it is not in the supream part of the soul. They answer That in saying an impression in the Soul is implyed as in the Soul as fully as if we should say phantasy is an impression in the Soul as in the Soul as when we say the white in the eye we imply as in the eye that is the white is in a certain part of the eye which all men have so by nature So when we say Phantasy is an impression in the Soul we imply the impression to be made in the supream part thereof Others more elegantly answer that the word Soul is taken two waies either for the whole or for the principall part when we say man consists of soul and body or that death is a separation of the soul from the body we mean properly the supream part wherein properly consists the motion and goods of the Soul When Zeâ—o therefore calleth Phantasy an impression in the Soul he is not to be understood of the whole Soul but of part thereof as if he should say Phantasy is an alteration of the supream part of the Soul To this interpretation some object thus Appetition Assention and Comprehension are alterations in the supream part of the soul but these differ from phantasy that being a certain kinde of perswasion and affection whereas this is more operation then appetition therefore the definition is not good being competible to many other things They answer by recourse to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impliances that a definition is understood to be in all As he who saith Love is an application of the Soul towards procurement of Friendship implyeth amongst young people so when we say that phantasy is an alteration in the supream part of the soul we imply by perswasion for alteration is not made by operation Of Phantasies there are many kinds some are sensible others not-sensible Sensible are those which are received through one or more of the sences Not-sensible are those which are received through the minde as of incorporealls and other things comprehended by reason The sensible formed from things that are are made with concession and assent There are also apparitions of phantasies proceeding from things which are Again some are rationall others irrationall rationall those of reasonable creatures irrationall those of unreasonable The rationall are intelligence the irrationall have no name Again some are artificiall others in-artificiall for an Image is considered by an Artist one way by him that is not an artist another way Again some are probable some improbable The probable are those which make an easie motion in the soul as It is now day I discourse and the like The Improbable are of a contrary nature averting us from assent as it is day the Sun is not above the earth if it is dark it is day Both probable and improbable are those which by relation to other things are sometimes such as in doubtfull speeches neither probable nor improbable are such as these The staires are even the staires are odd Of probable and improbable Phantasies some are true some are false some are neither true nor false True are those whose predication is true as It is day 't is light False whose predication is false Both true and false as happened to Orestes in his madnesse meeting Electra that he met something it was true for it was Electra but that it was a fury was false Neither true nor false are those which are taken from the Genus for the Genus is not such as the Species in all respects as of men some are Grecians some are Barbarous but man in generall is not Grecian for then all men must be Grecians neither barbarous for the same reason Of true Phantasies some are comprehensive others are not-comprehensive Not-comprehensive are those which happen through sicknesse or perturbation of minde many being troubled with frenzie or melancholly attract a true phantasy which is not comprehensive even from that which extrinsecally occurrs casually for which reason they neither assert it often nor assent unto it Comprehensive phantasie is that which is impressed and signed by that which is and conformable to
that which is so as it cannot be of that which is not To comprehensive phantasie three conditions are requisite 1. That it arise from that which is for many phantasies arise from that which is not as in mad men 2. That it be conformable to that which is for some phantasies are from that which is but represents the similitude of that which is not as Orestes derived a phantasie from that which was viz. from Electra but not according to that which was for he thought her to be one of the furies Comprehensive phantasie must be conformable to that which is and so impressed and signed as that it may imprint artificially all the properties of the thing phancied as Gravers touch all the parts of those things which they imitate and the impression made by a Seal on Wax exactly and perfectly beareth all its characters Lastly that it be without impediment for sometimes comprehensive phantasie is not creditable by reason of outward circumstances as when Hercules brought Alcestis taken out of the Earth to Admetus Admetus drew from Alcestis a comprehensive phantasie but did not credit it for he consider'd that she was dead and therefore could not rise again but that sometimes Spirits appear in the shape of the deceased Phantasy Phantaston Phantasticon and Phantasme according to Chrysippus differ thus Phantasy is a passion made in the Soul which sheweth it selfe and that which made it as when with our eyes we see white it is a passion engendred by sight in the Soul and we may call this a passion because the object thereof is a white thing which moveth us the like of smelling and touching Phantaston is that which maketh phantasie as the white and the cold and whatsoever is able to move the Soul that is phantaston Phantasticon is a frustaneous attraction a passion in the Soul proceeding from nothing as in those who sight with shadowes or extend their hands in vain for to phantasy is objected phantaston but phantasticon hath no object Phantasme is that to which we are attracted by that frustraneous attraction which happens in melancholy or mad persons as Orestes in the Tragedy when he saith Bring hither Mother I implore These snakie bloodie Maids no more Whose very lookes wound me all o're This he saith in his madnesse for he saw nothing wherefore Electra answers him Ah quiet in thy bed unhappy lie Thou seest not what thou thinkst before thy eye CHAP. V. Of True and Truth TRUE according to Zeno is that which is impressed in the minde from that whence it is in such manner as it cannot be from that which is not or as others True is that which is and is opposed to something False is that which is not yet is opposed to something also Truth and true differ three waies by Essence by Constitution by Power By Essence for truth is a body but true is incorporeall for it is a dicible 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore incorporeall On the contrary Truth is a body as being the enunciative Science of all true things All Science is in some measure the supream part of the Soul which supream part is a body therefore truth in generall is corporeall By Constitution True is conceived to be something uniforme and simple by nature as It is day I discourse Truth as being a Science consisteth of many things by a kinde of conservation Wherefore as a People is one thing a Citizen another a People is a multitude consisting of many Citizens but a Citizen is no more then one In the same manner differeth truth from true Truth resembleth a People true a Cittizen for truth consisteth of many things collected true is simple By Power for true doth not absolutely adhere to truth A fool a child a mad-man may speak something true but cannot have the Science of that which is true Truth considers things with Science insomuch that he who hath it is wise for he hath the Science of true things and is never deceived nor lyeth although he speak false because it proceedeth not from an ill but good affection CHAP. VI. Of Comprehension COmprehension 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was first used in this sence by Zeno by a metaphor taken from things apprehended by the hand which allusion he exprest by action For shewing his hand with the fingers stretched forth he said such was Phantasy then bending them a little said such was Assent then compressing them and clutching his fist such was Comprehension Comprehension is a firm and true knowledge non-comprehension the contrary for some things we only think that we see hear or feel as in dreams and frenzies other things we not only think but truly do see or hear or feel These latter all but the Academicks and Scepticks conceive to fall under firm knowledge the other which we imagine in dreams or frenzy are false Whatsoever is understood is comprehended by the minde one of these two waies either by evident incursion which Laertius calls by sense or by transition from evidence Laertius collection by demonstration of which latter there are three kinds by Assimilation by Composition by Analogy By incurrent evidence is understood white and black sweet and soure By Transition from evidents by Assimilation is understood Socrates by his Picture by Composition as of a horse and a man is made a Centaure for putting together the limbes proper to both species we comprehend by phantasy that which was neither horse nor man but a Centaur compounded of both By Analogy things are understood two waies either by augmentation or when from common ordinary men we by augmentation phansy a Cyclops who not like Men that with Cares gifts are fed But some tall hill erects his head Or by Diminution as a Pigmey Likewise the Center of the earth is understood by analogy from lesser Globes To these kinds add Comprehension by transference as eyes in the breast by contrariety as death by transference as dicibles and place by privation as a man without hands just and good are understood naturally CHAP. VII Of Assent THese things being enough known which we have already explained let us now speake a little of Assent and approbation termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not that is not a large place but the grounds thereof have been already laid For when we explained the power that was in the senses we likewise declared that many things were comprehended and perceived by the senses which cannot be done without Assent Moreover seeing that betwixt an inanimate and an animate being the greatest difference is that the inanimate doth nothing the animate doth something we must either take away sense from it or allow it assent which is within our power When we will not have a thing either to perceive or assent we in a manner take away the soule from it for as it is necessary that the scale of ballance which is laden should tend downwards so is it that the soule should
yeeld to things that are perspicuous Although assent cannot bee made unlesse it bee moved by Phantasie yet when that phantasy hath an immediate cause it hath not according to Chrysippus this principall reason not that it can be made without any extrinsecall excitation for it is necessary that assent be moved by phantasie but it returnes to its Cylinder and Cone which move not by impulsion then of their owne nature the Cylinder seemes to rowle and the Cone to turne round As therefore he who thrust the Cylinder gave it the beginning of motion but did not give it volubility so the objected phantasy imprinteth and as it were sealeth in the soule its species yet the assent is in our power and that as we said in a Cylinder extrinsecally impelled the motion is continued by its own power and nature Phantasies wherewith the mind of man is presently affected are not voluntary or in our own power but inferre themselves by a kind of violence approbations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by which these phantasies are knowne and judged are voluntary and made according to our arbitrement So as upon any dreadfull noyse from heaven or by the fall of any thing or sudden newes of some danger or the like it is necessary that the minde of a wise man bee a little moved and contracted and appalled not through opnion perceived of any ill but certaine rapid and inconsiderate motions which praevert the office of the mind and reason But presently the same wise man approveth not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 those dreadfull phantasies that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rejects and refuses them nor is there any thing in these which seemeth to him dreadfull Thus differs the soules of wise and unwise men The unwise when phantasies appeare cruell and difficult at the first impulsion of the mind thinke them to be truly such as they appeare and receiving them as if they were justly to be feared approve them by their assent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this word the Stoicks use vpon this occasion But a wise man suddenly changing colour and countenance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assents not but retaineth the state and vigour of his judgment which he alwaies had of these phantasies as nothing dreadfull but terrifying only with a false shew and vain fear CHAP. VIII Of Notions FRom Sense the rule of Science Notions are imprinted in the Soul by which not only principles but larger waies to reason are found out A man when he is born hath the supream part of his Soul like unto clean paper upon which every notion is inscribed The first manner of inscription is by the Senses as for example They who perceive a thing that is white after it is taken away retain the memory thereof but when they have conceived many remembrances of one species then they say they have experience for experience is a multitude of similitudes Of Notions some are naturall which are in such manner as we we have said and without Art Others gained by learning and industry These are properly called Notions the other Anticipations The reason for which we are called rationall is said to be perfected by anticipations in the first seven years Intelligence is the phantasme of the intellect of a rationall creature for phantasm when it lighteth upon a rationall Soul is then called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligence a word taken from the Intellect For to other Creatures there happen not phantasmes to the Gods only and to us these are incident Those which belong to us are Phantasmes as to their genus Notions as to their species as denaries and staters when paid for transportation are called Naula Common notions are planted in all men in which they all agree together one is not repugnant to another for who holds not that good is profitable and ought to be chosen with utmost endeavours Who holds not that what is just is fair and well-beseeming Whence then proceed contentions and differences to wit from the application of first notions to singular things These Notions and whatsoever is of this kinde which right reason conformeth in us being long examined are true and suitable to the natures of things CHAP. IX Of Science and Opinion THat which is comprehended by Sense Zeno call'd Sense and if so comprehended as not to be plucked away by reason Science otherwise Ignorance from which proceedeth Opinion which is weak and common to the false and unknown These three are joyned together Science Opinion and Comprehension which borders upon the other two Science is a firme stable immutable comprehension with reason Opinion an infirm weak assent Comprehension which commeth between both is an assent to comprehensive phantasy Comprehensive phantasy is true in such manner that it cannot be false Therefore Science is in wise men only Opinion in fooles Comprehension is common to both as being that by which truth is judged and is for this reason reckon'd by Zeno neither amongst the right 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor amongst the bad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but betwixt science and ignorance affirming that this only is to be credited CHAP. X. Of Voice Speech and Words These three are joyned to one another that which is signified that which signifieth and the contingent That which signifieth is the voice as Dion That which is signified is the thing it selfe declared by the voice it is that which we apprehend and is present in our cogitation The contingent is the outward subject as Dion himselfe Dialectick being conversant about that which signifieth and that which is signified is divided into two places one of Significats the other of Voice The place of significats is divided into phantasies and subsistents on phantasie dicibles axioms c. In the other place concerning Voice is declared literall Voice the parts of speech the nature of Solaecisms and Barbarisms Poems Ambiguities Song Musick and according to some definitions and divisions The phantasies of the minde precede speech Of these therefore we have already treated then the minde endued with the faculty of speaking declareth by speech what it receiveth from the phantasie For this reason the consideration of Dialectick by the joynt consent of all seemes as if it ought to be first taken from the place of voice Voice is aire percussed the proper sensible object of hearing as Diogenes the Babylonian in his Art of Voyce The voice of a living sensitive creature is aire percussed with appetite the voice of man is articulate proceeding from the minde at his four teenth year it is perfected Speech as Diogenes saith is a literate voice as It is day Word is a significative voice proceeding from the minde Language is a speech according to the variety of Nations whereof each useth its peculiar dialect as the Attick saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Ionick 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Voice and Speech differ in that voice is a sound but speech
of those things which are about them yet with respect of something externall If therefore any thing with difference respect another it is only relative as habit science and sence but if it respect another not out of inherent difference but in pure habit it is quodammodotative-relative For a Father and right side to their consistence require some externall things for as much as there being no mutation made in them he is no longer a Father his Son being dead and the right side is no longer so after he is risen in respect of whom it was said to be such but sweet and bitter will not alter unlesse their power be likewise changed If therefore quodammodotative are changed in habit to another although they receive no passion in themselves it is manifest they have their being in the habit alone not in difference This genus was first introduced by Aristo who defined quodammodotative relatives to be those whose being is the same with their quodammodotative being to one another And so also Andronicus defines them CHAP. XVIII Of Dicibles TO the place concerning things and significats belongeth that concerning Dicibles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to which true and false is common Dicible is that which conâ—isteth according to rationall phantasy Rationall phantasy is that by which what is comprehended by phantasy may be expressed by speech Every thing that may be said ought to be said for from thence is derived the denomination Dicible is a mean betwixt notion and thing Dicibles are notions that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not meerly and simply notions which in as much as they are the principles of science and are intelligences are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but in asmuch as they reside in the minde are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and are genus's and species in which manner being ready for expression they are called dicibles and pertain to the enunciative faculty of the soule For whatsoever is said if it be so considered as it is said of something they are Categorems if so as it breaketh forth into voice and with voice they are words if retained in the minde ready to break forth they are dicibles Dicible therefore is a word and yet signifies not a word but that which is understood in the word and is contained in the minde Of Dicibles there are two kinds the defective and the perfect The defective are those which an imperfect enunciation not compleating the sentence but requiring something to follow as writeth for we ask who To this kinde belongeth Categorems which are praedicated of other things The perfect are such as have a perfect enunciation Of these there are two kinds The first peculiarly called perfect which though they compleat the sentence yet signifie neither true nor false Of these there are many kinds as Interrogation percontation imperative adjurative optative imprecative or execrative substitutive hypotheticall compellative like to or transcending an axiome and dubitative Interrogation is that which is a perfect sentence but requireth an answer as Is it day for this is neither true nor false so that it is day is an axiom is it day an interrogation Percontation is a thing for which we cannot answer significantly as in Interrogation yes but as thus he dwelleth in such a place Imperative is a thing in speaking whereof wee command as Go thou to the Inachian stood Adjurative as witness thou Earth Optative which he we speak wishing as Great Iove who dost in Ida reign The Victory let Ajax gain Imprecative or execrative as As on the ground this wine I poure So may the Earth his blood devour Substitutive or expositive as let this be a right line Hypotheticall as supposing the Earth to be the Centre of the Globe of the Sun Compellative is a thing in speaking which we call another as Atrides Agamemnon King of men Like to or transcending an axiom is that which hath an axiomaticall manner of speaking but because it superabounds in some particle or affection it is not ranked amongst axioms as How beautious is thy Virgin-Train How like to Priam's Son that swaine Dubitative is a thing different from an axiom which whosover speaks maketh a doubt as Then are not life and grief of kin all these are neither true nor false The other kind of perfect dicibles which compleat the Sentence affirmeth or denyeth and is either true or false It is called axtom CHAP. XIX Of Categoremes CAtegoreme is that which is praedicated of another or a thing construed with one or more or as Apollodorus a defective dicible construed with the right case to make an axiom Whatsoever is praedicated of another is praedicated of the name of the case and both these are either perfect as that which is praedicated and together with the subject sufficient to make an Axiom Or they are deâ—ective and require some addition to make thereof a perfect praedicate If that which is praedicated of a name make an axiom it is a Categorem or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a congruity as walkeâ—h for example Socrates walketh But if it be predicated of the case whereby transitions are made from one person to another wherein it is necessary that some oblique case be likewise pronounced with the right they are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an addition to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or as Priscian renders it lesse then congruities as Cicero saved his Country Again if that which is praedicated of some nown require a case of some other nown to be added to make up the axiom so as the construction bee made of two oblique cases they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 incongruities or according to Ammonius lesse then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it pleases me to come to thee whether the nounes onely or the words require it Again of Categoremes there are four kinds right supine neuter and reciprocally active and passive Right are those which have a motion tending to another and are construed with one of the oblique cases for the making of a Categorem as heareth seeth discourseth Supine are those which are consider'd from habit to an agent and is construed with a passive particle as I am heard I am seen Neuter as those which are neither way as to be wise to walk Reciprocally active and passive are those which seem supines but are not for they are acts as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for therein is included 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The right or nominative case is so called by the Stoicks whom the Grammarians follow because it falleth directly from the notion which is in the mind Oblique cases are the Genitive Dative and Accusative CHAP. XX. Of simple Axioms AXiom is that which is either true or false or a thing perfect by it selfe negative or affirmative as far as it extends or according to Chrysippus in his dialectick definitions Axiom is that which affirmeth
in a Wildernesse abstain from any thing that is evill but that the very deformity and dishonesty thereof deterrs them Nothing therefore is more clear then that honest things are expetible in themselves and dishonest things avoidable in themselves Hence it followeth that what is honest is more estimable then those mean things which accrue by it And when we say that folly temerity injustice and intemperance are avoidable in respect of those things which are consequent to them it contradicts not the former assertion that what is dishonest only is ill because they relate not to the hurt of the body but to dishonest actions which proceed from vice All good is equall and every good is highly expetible and admits neither increase nor decrease Here commeth in a great controversy betwixt the Stoicks and the Peripateticks which though Carneades affirm to be only verball Cicero holdeth to be more in things then words The Peripateticks hold that all goods are requisite to happy life the Stoicks that whatsoever is worthy estimation compreâ—iendeth happy life Those holding pain to be an ill it followes that a wise man cannot be happy upon the rack These who account not pains among the ills hold that a wise man continueth happy in the midst of torments For if some bear those pains with greater courage for their Country or some lighter cause opinion not nature increaseth or diminisheth the power of the pain Again the Peripateticks asserting three kinds of good affirm a man to be so much the more happy the fuller he is of externall corporeall goods or in the Stoicks expression he who hath most corporeall estimables is most happy for as much as by them Beatitude is compleated On the contrary the Stoicks hold that those goods which they call of nature make not by their frequency a life more happy or are more expetible or more estimable For then wisdome being expetible and health expetible both together would be more expetible then wisdome alone whereas either being worthy estimation both are not more worthy of estimation then wisdome alone For the Stoicks who hold health to be estimable but place it not amongst the goods hold likewise that no estimation is to be preferred before vertue From this the Peripateticks dissent asserting that an honest action without pain is more expetible then the same action with pain the Stoicks otherwise For as a Taper is darkened by the light of the Sun and as a drop of water is lost in the vastnesse of the Aegean Sea and as in the riches of Croesus the accession of one farthing and one step in the way between this and India so in that end of all good which the Stoicks assert all the estimation of corporeall things must necessarily be obscured overwhelmed and perish by the splendour and magnitude of vertue And as opportunity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not made any thing greater by production of time for whatsoever is opportune hath its measure so right affection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the good it selfe placed in it that it be conformable to nature admitteth no accession of encrease For as that opportunity to those of which we speak are not made greater by production of time for which reason the Stoicks conceive that a happy life is not more to be desired if it be long then if it be short and they use this simile As it is the praise of a shoe to fit the foot neither are many shoes preferred before two nor the greater before the lesse So in those things whose good is confined to opportunity and convenience neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer nor the longer before the shorter Nor do they argue acutely who say if long health be more to be esteemed then short then likewise a long use of wisdome more then a short they understand not that the estimation of health is judged by space that of vertue by opportunity as if they should say likewise a good death or a good labour to a woman in travell is better long then short So that they see not that some things are more esteemed for their shortnesse others for their length CHAP. VI. Of Eupathies AS soon as any object is presented to us which seemeth good Nature as we said drives us on to the acquisition thereof which being done constantly and prudently is called Will imprudently and excessively Desire Moreover while we are so moved that we are in some good that happeneth also two waies when the Soul is moved quietly and constantly according to reason this is called Joy when vainly and excessively Pleasure In like manner as we desire good things by nature so by nature we decline the ill This declination if done according to reason is called Caution if without reason Fear Caution is only in a wise man of fear he is not capable Hence it appeareth that there are three kinds of good affections of the minde called Eupathies or Constancies Ioy Caution Will. 1. Ioy is contrary to pleasure as being a rationall elevation of the minde 2. Caution is contrary to fear as being a rationall declination of ill 3. Will is contrary to desire as being a rationall appetite These are the primarie Eupathies and as under the primary passions are comprehended many subordinate passions so are there secondary Eupathies subordinate to those Under Ioy are 1. Delectation 2. Cheerfulnesse 3. Aequanimity Under Caution 1. Respect 2. Cleernesse Under Will are 1. Benevolence 2. Salutation 3. Charity Notwithstanding that Eupathies and passions are contrary yet are there but three Eupathies though there are foure passions for there is no Eupathie contrary to Grief CHAP. VII Of Passions FRom falsities proceedeth a perversitie of Intellect hence spring up severall passions and causes of disorder Zeno defineth passion a praeternaturall motion of the Soul or as Cicero renders it a commotion of the Soul aâ—erse from right reason against Nature Others more briefly a more vehement appetite More vehement they call that which recedeth from the constancy of Nature and is contrary to nature wherefore all passion is an excessive stupide desire The kinds of passion arise from two opinionated goods and two opinionated evils so they are four From the good desire and pleasure pleasure from present good desire from future from the ill fear and grief fear from the future grief from the present for these things whose coming we fear when they do come grieve us Pleasure and desire arise from an opinion of good things desire is fervently transported to that which seemeth good pleasure rejoyceth when wee have obtained what we desire Thus desire and fear go formost that to apparent good this to apparent ill pleasure and grief follows pleasure when we attain what wee desire griefe when wee incurre what wee fear All passions arise from Iudgement and Opinion whence they are more strictly defined that it may appear not
agree This is the vertue of the Soul which some affirm to be Temperance others a Soule obedient to the precepts of Temperance and obsequious thereunto not having any speciousnesse of her own But whether one or other it is only in a wiseman yet there is one kinde of health of the soul which is common also to the unwise when by the care of Physicians the distemper of the minde is removed And as there is in the body an apt figure of the limbs together with a sweetnesse of colour which is called Beauty so in the soule equality and constancy of opinions and judgments following vertue with a certain firmnesse and stability or including the very power of vertue is called Beauty Likewise correspondent to the powers nerves and efficacity of the body in the same termes are named the powers of the Soul Agility of body is called quicknesse the same commendation is ascribed to wit in respect that the Soul overrunneth many things in a short time Only there is this difference betwixt Soules and bodies Strong soules cannot be assaulted by diseases strong bodies may◠but the offensions of bodies may happen without any fault those of the Soule cannot all whose sicknesses and passions proceed from contempt of reason and therefore are in men only for though beasts do somethings like this yet they fall not into passions Betwixt acute and obtuse persons there is this difference the ingenious as Corinthian Brasse rusteth slowly falling into sicknesse and more quickly got out of it the dull do not so neither doth the soul of an ingenious person fall into every sicknesse and passion for there are not many things extreamly savage and cruell and some also have a shew of humanity as compassion griefe fear But the infirmities and sicknesses of the minde are lesse easily rooted out then those great vices which are contrary to the vertues for the sicknesses remaining the vices may be taken away because the sicknesses are no sooner healed then the vices are removed CHAP. IX Of Vertue and Vice VErtue is a convenient affection of the Soul throughout all life Of vertues there are three kinds The first generall taken for any perfection of a thing as of a Statue The second are Sciences or contemplative which according to Hecaton consist in speculation as Prudence and Iustice. The third not-sciences or not-contemplative which are considered as consequent to the speculative as health strength hope joy and the like Health is consequent to Temperance a theoretick vertue as strength to the building of an Arch. They are called not-contemplative because they require no assent but are by after-accession and common even to the wicked as health and strength Vice is the contrary to vertue for the rationall creature is perverted sometimes by the perswasion of exteriour things sometimes by the counsell of those with whom he converseth contrary to nature who gives us inclinations unperverted Of vices therefore there are two kinds The first ignorance of those things whereof vertues are the knowledge as imprudence intemperance injustice The second not-ignorances as pusillanimity imbecillity Panaetius asserteth two vertues Theoretick and Practick others three Rationall Naturall Morall Pessidonius foure Cleanthes Chrysippus and Antipater more Apollodorus one only Prudence Of vertues some are primary others subordinate The primary are foure Prudence Temperance Fortitude Iustice the first conversant in offices the second in appetite the third in tolerance the fourth in distribution Prudence is the Science of things that are to be done and not to be done and neuter or the knowledge of good bad and neuter in civill life The Vertues subordinate to Prudence are five 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of things that are to be done how thy may be done beneficially 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of comprehending things to be effected 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of finding out our office 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of attaining the scope in every thing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of finding out the issues of things Temperance is the Science of things expetible avoidable and neuter Under Temperance are these species 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of time and order for the weldoing of things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of honest and dishonest motions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of avoiding just blame Fortitude is the Science of things grievous not grievous and neuter the species under it these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science tenacious of right reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science persisting in right judgement 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science whereby we trust that no ill shall happen to us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of overcoming those things which happen to the good and bad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science of the Soule which renders her invincible 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of going through to the attainment of that which we propose to our selves Iustice is the Science of distributing to every one according to his desert under Justice are four subordinate vertues 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of worshiping the gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of well-doing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of equality in community 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of contracting honestly with others In like manner of Vices some are 〈◊〉 others subordinate to the primary The primary vices are Imprudence Intemperante Pusillanimity Injustice Imprudence is the ignorance of things good ill and neuter and the ignorance of things to be done not to be done and neuter Intemperance is the ignorance of things expetible avoidable and neuter Pusillanimity is the ignorance of things grievous not grievous and neuter Injustice is the ignorance of distributing to every one according to his deserts The subbordinate vices to these are correspondent to the secondary vertues as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which are defined answerably to their opposite vertues These vertues are perfect and consist in contemplation but there are other vertues which are not arts but faculties consisting in exercise as health of the Soul integrity and strength thereof and pulchritude For as the health of the body is a good temperature of hot cold dry and moist so the health of the soul is a good temperature of the doctrines in the soul. And as the strength of the body consisteth in a tension of the nerves so the strength of the soul in a proper extension thereof to judgment and action And as the beauty of the body is a symmetry of all the parts to one another and to the whole so the beauty of the soule is the symmetry of the reason and parts thereof to the whole and to one another All those vertues which are Sciences and Arts have common theorems and the same end
and though he prais'd it as naturall yet it becommeth Curtezans rather then Gods Moreover what he saith of those that writ of Tables is false not to be found neither in Polemo nor Hipsicrates nor Antigonus but forged by himselfe In his book of a Commonwealth he allowes marriage with a mother and a daughter and repeats the same in the beginning of his book Concerning things expetible in themselves In his third book of Iustice extending to a thousand Paragraphs he advised to feed upon the very dead In his second book of Life and Transaction he affirmeth a wise man ought to take care to provide himselfe food but to what end must he provide himselfe food for Livelyhood Life is an indifferent For Pleasure Pleasure also is indifferent For Vertue that is selfe sufficient for Beatitude Such kinds of acquisition of wealth are very ridiculous If they proceed from a King there is a necessitie of complying with him if from a friend that friendship is veniall if from wisdome that wisdome is mercenary For these things saith Laertius some have inveigh'd against him CHAP. IV. His death HE died according to Apollodorus in the 143d Olympiad so supply Laertius in whom the centenary number is wanting by Suidas having lived 73 years The manner of his death is differently related Hermippus affirmes that being in the Odaeum a kinde of publick Theatre at Athens his Disciples called him away to Sacrifice and thereupon taking a draught of wine he was immediately seiz'd by a Vertigo of which at the end of five daies he died Others report he died of excessive laughter Seeing an Asseeafigs he bad his woman offer it some wine and thereat fell into such extremity of laughter that it killed him As to his person he was very little saith Laertius as appeareth by his Statue in the Ceramick which is almost hid by the horse that stands next it whence Carneades called him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hid by a horse The posture of this Statue Cicero saith was sitting and stretching forth his hand Pausanias saith it was set up in the Gymnasium called Ptolomaean from the Founder not far from the Forum Laertius reckons foure more of this name The first a Physician to whom Erasistratus acknowledgeth himselfe beholding for many things The Second his sonne Physician to Ptolomy who upon the calumnies of some that maligned him was publickly punished and beaten with rods The third Disciple to Erasistratus The fourth a writer of Georgicks ZENO ZENO was of Tarsis or according to others of Siodn his Father named Dioscorides He was Disciple to Chrysippus and his successor in the School He wrote few bookes but left behinde him many Disciples DIOGENES DIOGENES was born at Seleucia he was sirnamed the Babylonian from the vicinity of that place He was Disciple of Chrysippus and is stiled by Cicero an eminent and serious Stoick Seneca relates that discoursing earnestly concerning anger a foolish young man standing by spat in his face which he took meekly and discreetly saying I am not angry but am in doubt whether I ought to be so or not He was one of the three that was sent from Athens on Embassy to Rome of which already in the life of Carâ—eades who learn'd Dialectick of him Cicero saith he lived to a great age Amongst other things he wrote a treatise of Divinaâ—ion ANTIPATER ANTIPATER was of Sidon Disciple to Diogenes the Babylonianâ— Cicero calls him a most acute person Senecae one of the great authors of the Stoicall Sect. He declined to dispute with Carneades but filled his bookes with confutations of him whence he was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the clamorous penman He disputed much against those who asserted nothing Besides other things he writ two books of Divination Cicero at the latter end of his second book of Offices saith he then was lately dead at Athens PANAETIUS PANAETIUS was of Rhodes his Ancestours eminent for Martiall affairs and exercises He was Disciple to Antipater intimate friend to â— Scipio Africanus whom he accompanyed in his journey to Alexandria Cicero calls him almost Prince of the Stoicks a person extreamly inigenous and grave worthy the familiarity of Scipio and Laelius He was a great admirer of Plato whom every where he calleth divine most wise most holy the Homer of Philosophers But his opinion of the immortality of the Soul he approved not arguing thus Whatsoever is generated dieth but soules are generated as is manifest from the likenesse of those that are begotten to their Parents not only in body but disposition His other argument was There is nothing that is grieved or pained but is subject to be sick whatsoever is subject to sicknesse is likewise subject to death souls are subject to griefe therefore they are subject to death He alone rejected Astrologicall predictions and receded from the Stoicks as to Divination yet would not positivly affirm there was no such art but only that he doubted it He wrote three books of Offices much commended by Cicero Lipsius conjectures he died old because Cicero affirmeth out of Posidonius that he lived thirty years after he had written his Bookes of offices POSIDONIUS POSIDONIUS was born at Apamea in Syria He lived at Rhodes and there managed civill affairs and taught Philosophy Pompey in his return from Syria went to Rhodes purposely to hear him and coming to his dore forbad the Lictor to knock as was the custome but he saith Pliny to whom the East and West had submitted himselfe submitted his Fases at this Gate But understanding that he was very sick of a great pain in his joynts he resolved only to give him a visit At his first coming and salutation he told him with much respect that he was extreamly sorry he could not hear him Posidonius answer'd You may for no corporeall pain shall make me frustrate the coming of so great a person And thereupon he discoursed seriously and copiously upon this subject as he lay in his bed That nothing is good but what is honest And as often as his pain took him he would say Pain it is to no purpose though thou art troublesome I will never acknowledge thou art ill He made a Sphear wherein were all the conversions of the Sun Moon and Planets exactly as they moved in the Heavens every day and night Of his writings are cited by Cicero five Bookes of Divination as also five bookes of the nature of the Gods Thus far we have a continued succession of the Stoick Philosophers the last School according to Laertius's disposition of thsoe that were descended from Thales FINIS 2  52  3  53  4  54 Pisistratus died having raigned 17 years Arist. Polit. 5. Lxiii  55  2  56  3  57  4  58  Lxiv Miltiades Hâ—l 7. 59  2  60  3  61  4  62  Lxv Â
Sense is true phantasy often false Sense is only of things present phantasy of the absent likewise Phantasy is not Science or Intellect for that is alwaies of things true and reall phantasy often is of things false Phantasy is not opinion for opinion is follow'd by faith phantasy is not Phantasy is a motion in animals from sense in act by which motion they are variously affected and conceive things sometimes true and sometimes false The errour of phantasy ariseth from the errour of the senses Phantasy therefore is of neer affinity with sense for though it be not sense yet it exists not without sense or in things that have no sense It is derived 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from light for sight the most excellent of senses cannot act without light Many things are done by Animals according to phantasie either because they have not Intellect as Beasts or that intellect is obscured in them CHAP. XIX Of Memory and Reminiscence FRom Phantasy proceeds Memory which is of things past as sense is of the present opinion of the future Sense and Intellection are necessarily previous to memory Hence those Animals only which have sense of time remember as horses and dogs yet memory is not without phantasm even not that memory which is of Intelligible things for he that remembreth is sensible that he first saw heard or learn'd what he remembreth Memory therefore is reducible per se to phantasie as being of Phantasmes to intellect only by accident Hence in the same part of the Soul wherein Phantasie exists resideth likewise memory for if it were placed only in the intellectual faculty it would not be competent to Beasts which we see it is Memory is made by impression of some image by the sense upon the Soul Hence they who retain not the image and figure of sense either by continuall motion or excessive humidity as children or drought as old men remember not To memory therefore is required a moderate temperature of the brain yet more inclined to dry Reminiscence is not a resumption or assumption of memory but differs specifically from both these for Beasts have not Reminiscence though they have memory Reminiscence being made by discourse and diligent disquisition collecting one thing from another by a continued series and order untill at last we cal that to mind which we had forgotten CHAP. XX. Of Sleep and Waking TO Sense belongeth Sleep and Waking for those animate things which want sense neither sleep nor wake as Plants Sleep is an immobility and band as it were of sense waking is a solution and remission of sense The chief seat of sleep is the common sense which being bound up by sleep all the exteriour senses whereof this is the common Centre are bound up likewise and restrained for the rest and health of the Animal which is the end of waking also Every impotence of sense is not sleep but only that which is caused by evaporation of the Aliment Hence we are most subject to sleep after meat for then much humid vapour ascends which first maketh the head heavy by consistence there then descends and repells the heat whereby is induced sleep That sleep is made in this manner is evident from all soporiferous things as poppy which causeth heaviness in the head by sending up vapours Labour produceth sleep by dispersing the humours whence produceth vapour Drunken men Children are subject to sleep much melancholy persons little for they are so cold within that the vapour exhaleth not especially they being of a dry constitution Sleep therefore is a recession of the heat inward with a naturall kind of circumobsistence CHAP. XXI Of Dreams DReaming is an affection of the sensory part in as much as it is phantastick A Dream is an apparition or phantasme seen in sleep After the functions of the externall senses there remain their motions and similitudes induced by their objects into their Organs These occurring in sleep cause dreams but not at all times nor at every age for their species show not themselves but upon cessation of the humours Hence Dreams are not immediatly after sleep nor in infants soon after their birth for then there is too great commotion by reason of the alimentary heat As therefore in troubled water no image appeareth or if any much distorted but when it is calm the image is rendred clearly so when there is a tumult and agitation of the humours there are no images presented or those dreadfull such as are the Dreams of melancholly and sick persons but when the blood passeth smoothly and the humours are setled we have pure and pleasing Dreams A Dream therefore is a phantasm caused by motion of sensibles already perceived by sense occurring to Animals in sleep CHAP. XXII Of the Intellective Faculty THe third faculty of the Soul is the Intellective proper to man Intellect is that part of the Soul whereby it knoweth and understandeth It is twofold Patient and Agent Patient Intellect is that by which Intellect becometh all things for Intelâ—ection is like sense Sense is by passion from a sensible object intellect from an intellectuall The properties of patient Intellect are these it is void of corruptive passion it is apt for reception of species it is that species potentially it is not mixt with the body it hath no corporeall Organs it is the place of species That there is also an agent Intellect is manifest for in whatsoever kind there is somthing that is potentially all of that kind there is somthing likewise which is the efficient cause of all in that kind this is the agent Intellect a cognoscitive power which enlightneth phantasms and the patient Intellect The properties thereof are that it is separable from the body immortall and eternall that it is not mixt with the body that it is void of passion that it is ever in act but the patient Intellect is mortall which is the cause of Forgetfulness The action of the Intellect is twofold one Intellection of indivisibles in which is neither truth nor falshood as all simple apprehensions the other complex when we compound and unite notions by affirmation or negation This is alwaies either true or false the other neither The simple is precedent to the complex Intellect in act is either Practick or Theoretick As a sensible object reduceth the sensible faculty from power to act so doth an intellectuall object the intellectuall faculty and as the operation of sense is threefold simple apprehension judgment if it be good or ill and lastly appetition or aversion according to that perception So likewise is the operation of the practick intellect threefold First it is moved by phantaâ—mes as sense is by externall sensibles Secondly it judgeth the object to be good or ill by affirmation or negation Thirdly it moveth the will to pursue or shun it whence it is called practick This practick intellect is moved as well when the sensible object is absent as
when it is present only excited by the phantasy The object of the Theoretick Intellect is true or false of the practick good or ill The rationall soul in some manner is every thing for that which actually knoweth is in some maner the same with the thing known CHAP. XXIII Of the Motive faculty BEsides the nutritive sensitive and intellective faculties there is also a motive faculty in animate creatures That it is not the same with the nutritive is manifest in as much as it proceeds from imagination and apprehension which plants have not neither have they organs fit for motion which nature would have given them if they had this power That it is not the same with the sensitive appears in that some animals which have sense have not the power as Zoophytes which have not the organs fit for this motion Neither is it the same with the Theoretick Intellect for that judgeth not as to action but progressive motion is the action of an animal flying ill or pursuing good The principles of locall motion in animals are the practick Intellect under which is comprehended phantasy and appetite These two direct and impell the motive faculty to action intellect and phantasy by directing what is to be shunned what to be embraced appetite by shunning or embracing it Appetite is the chief principle thereof for that may move without intellect as in beasts and many times in men who desert their reason to follow their pleasure But intellect never moveth without appetite that is will for appetite is the principle of all motion honest and dishonest intellect only of honest motion In man appetite is two-fold Will which followeth the judgment of reason and sensuall appetite irascible or concupiscible which followeth sense and phantasy In the motion of animals three things are considered First that which moveth and that is two-fold the appetible object which moveth the appetite as a finall cause not as an efficient and the appetite it selfe which being moved by the appetible object moveth the animall Secondly by what it moves which is the heart of the animal by which instrument the appetible object moveth it Thirdly that which is moved the animall it selfe perfect Insects are moved locally as perfect animals are and consequently by the same principles appetite and phantasy but this phantasy is imperfect diffused through the whole body as appeareth by their uncertain motion only towards present occurrent objects That they have appetite is manifest in as much as they are sensible of pain and pleasure Beasts have sensitive phantasie only rationall creatures deliberative which compareth many things conducing to some foreknown end and chooseth the most expedient Yet somtimes the sensitive appetite in man overswayeth the rationall but by the order of nature the will which is the rationall ought as being the superiour to it to oversway the sensitive Thus there are three motions one of the will commanding another of the sensitive appetite resisting and a third of the body obeying But when the sensitive overruleth there are only two motions for the will resists not but is deceived CHAP. XIV Of Life and Death GEneration and dissolution are common to all living Creatures though all are not produced and dissolved in the same manner The generation of a living Creature is the first conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the naturall heat Life is the permanence of that Soul with the said heat Youth is the encrease of the first refrigerative part age the decrease thereof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the constant and perfect life which is betwixt both As long as an animate Creature liveth it hath naturall heat within it self and as soon as that faileth dieth The principle of this heat is in the heart If it be extinguish'd in any other part the Animal may live but if in the heart it cannot This heat is extinguish'd two waies first by consumption when it faileth of it self secondly by extinction from some contrary as in violent death the cause is the same in both defect of aliment which in the living Creature is its vital moisture as fire wanting refrigeration groweth more violent and soone consumeth the humidity which being gone it self must of necessity go out Refrigeration therefore is necessary to the conservation of the naturall heat Plants are refrigerated by the ambient air and by aliment their naturall heat is extinguish'd by excessive cold and dry'd up by excessive heat Animals which live in the air or in the water are refrigerated by the air or water some by breathing others without Death according to the extinction of naturall heat is two-fold violent or naturall violent when the cause is extrinsecall naturall when the principle thereof is in the animate Creature For that part wheron life dependeth the Lungs is so ordered by nature that its cannot perform its office for ever Death therefore cometh from defect of heat when through want of refrigeration the radicall humidity is consumed and dry'd up Refrigeration faileth naturally when by progresse of time the lungs in Creatâ—res that have breath the gils in fishes grow so hard that they are unapt for motion Old men die easily as having but little naturall heat and without pain because his dissolution comes not from any violent affection The lives of living Creatures as well of the same as of divers species differ in length the longest life most commonly is that of some Plants as the Palm and Cypresse that of Creatures which have blood rather then the bloodlesse that of terrestriall creatures rather then the aquatile that of those which have great bodies as of Elephants rather then those of little The causes of long life are first the quantity and quality of the vitall moisture if it be much and fat not easily dry'd up nor congealed Secondly natural hear which suffereth not that humour to be congealed Thirdly a due proportion betwixt this heat and that moisture Fourthly fewnesse of excrements for excrements are contrary to Nature and somtimes corrupt nature it self somtimes a part Salacious creatures or laborious grow soon old by reason of exiccation For the same reason men are shorter liv'd then women but more active In hot Countries animate creatures are larger and live longer then in cold Those animals which have little or no blood either are not at all produced in the Northern parts or soon dye Both Plants and Animals â—f they take not aliment die for the naturall heat when the aliment faileth consumeth the matter it self wherein it is the vitall moisture Aquatile creatures are shorter liv'd then the terrestriall and the bloodlesse then those that have blood because their humidity is more waterish and consequently more apt to be congealed and corrupted Plants live long as having lesse of waterish moisture which therefore is not so apt to be congealed The largenesse of the upper parts as well in Plants as Animals is a signe of long life because it argues much naturall