Soul or of one simple knowledge which eminently and in one formality in a manner comprehends all these knowledges but neither of these seems possible not the first because 't would be a certain infinity either in act which is impossible or in power and then 't would be some continuity and a principle of continuall motion nor the later for such an universality seems not to have any thing above it 11. 'T is answer'd the manner of a separated Soul in some sort contains both though 't is neither way formally For since the parts in formall composition are not actually 't is plain that neither can there be in this composition of the knowledge of a separated Soul formall knots and articles of discourse consequently no actuall infinity Again since one part is not beyond another that is extended as in quantity but all by a certain identificaon grow together there can be no continuity between though the parts be in power that is only in the possibility of the Subject 12. Besides that this power is not such that there should be any correspondent naturall cause to reduce it into act but 't is only a certain defectibility of act upon which ther 's no active power but only a Logicall or a Creative one which will never act 13. 'T is therefore a certain actuall Metaphysicall composition in which there is a Logicall possibility that any of these later known things may be away without hurting those that were known before yet so that it can never come to passe it should be reduc'd into act Wherefore 't is neither the precise contemplation of one formality precontaining infinite nor yet any actuall infinity or naturall divisibility 14. But it may be compar'd to the Metaphysicall composition of degrees in which we see Peter or Bucephalus so agree with infinite Things or Animals that it contracts thence no multiplicity and yet we may alwaies frame some new apprehension of them in our Mind LESSON III. Of the eminency of a separated Souls acts above those it exercises in the Body 1. OUt of what has been said it may be evidenc'd that simple Intuition or the inexistence of a thing in the Soul serv's in stead of that composition which is found here in our judgements 2. It appears also that an actuall universall intuition of Things supplses abundantly any need of Discourse 3. 'T is plain too that with that ther 's no want of Memory or Remembrance ther 's no need of ordering or framing Idea's and lastly whatever the Soul operates here by distinct acts and in time there together and with one only labour not so much is wrought out as exists 4. Again whereas by reslexion those things we have in the body thought on we farther know that we have thought on them so that we can never know the last reflection though we had infinite a separated Soul by the simple inexistence of it self in it self necessarily see 's all its knowledge without any reflection 5. Again 't is plain that a separated Soul in another manner excells Place and Time then in the Body since in that it only abstracts from them but out of that it comprehends them For this universall and actuall knowledge places all Place and all Time within the Soul so that it can act in every place at once and together as far as concerns this respect and provide for all time wherefore 't is in a manner a Maker and Governour of time and place 6. It appears moreover that 't is active out of its very self for since it comprehends all things it needs not Sense as in the body to perceive that infinity of Individuality but it know's even to the utmost divisibility of Magnitude whatever circumstances are requir'd to action It knows too what is good for it self whence it naturally of it self has both power and an actuall will which alone are requir'd to act for power depends on pure Science and whoever is impotent is ignorant what is to be done by him to produce such an effect 7. Hence lastly it follows that the proportion of Pleasure and Grief out of the body is infinite to that in the body For since Pleasure is nothing else but a judgement concerning a good possest out of which follows an activity to enjoy and retain it and Grief is the same concerning an ill which the Soul desires to repell Whether we contemplate the Manner of the Souls Being to which its acts are proportion'd 't is of a superiour notion that is of an infinite eminency 8. Or the Firmnesse and Evidence of its Knowledge since all knowledge receives strength from antecedents and consequents it must of necessity attain an infinite excellency for every knowledge of a separated Soul has infinite things connected with it out of which 't is confirm'd 9. Or its Eminency above Time and Place 't is rays'd in a like degree Or lastly its force of Activity 't is beyond all comparison Wherefore to the least either Pleasure or Grief of the Future life even abstracting from the Perpetuity nothing can be comparable in this mortall state or considerable in respect of it 10. Again 't is collected out of what has been said that all separated Souls or at least the most part are improv'd in this that whatever false judgements they have taken up in the whole course of their lives they throw them off by Separation For since the excellency of a separated Soul is immense above the powers of an imbody'd one the connection of all Truths is immediately upon the Separation imprinted in it it must needs be that a true judgement of all things is impress'd since therefore Contradictories cannot consist together in the Soul the false judgements must be expell'd and Souls as to this be universally improv'd 11. Nor is it lesse evident that among Souls there will be some difference by reason of the employments they have follow'd in their life time For since whilst we live in the body one exercises his Understanding more about one thing another about another and as the first act works a knowledge of the thing so the following acts cannot but encrease this knowledge and more perfectly impresse it upon the Soul It follows since all these must needs participate of the elevation caus'd by the Separation the Soul must know more perfectly too in Separation its accustomed Objects and whatever depend on them in a due proportion then other things whence it comes to passe that the Sciences here acquir'd not only remain in the future life but are in the same proportion there as they were here LESSON IV. Of the Felicity and Infelicity of separated Souls and their Immutability 1. ANd because the Affections in the Soul are nothing else but judgements upon which operation does or is apt to follow and the stronger the judgement is so much the apter operation is to follow out of it if it be a judgement concerning good or ill it comes to passe that our Affections
the Discourse whilst they tamper with objecting The Work is but short and for a little while the affection of Credulity may be fairly exacted in a Learner that he may clearly apprehend the things propos'd When he shall have understood against what he 's to object there will be liberty enough of disputing You see a Walk or Garden may serve well enough for this exercise I have therefore given you a volume which will not load your Pocket I have follow'd that Method which the necessity of consequences drew on not the rules of Logick prescrib'd though yet it be not averse from this If you blame the Obscurity remember Acroases are so to be published that they become not publick that their penetration may be difficult without a Clue yet not unpassable to a resolute pursuance THE TABLE FIRST BOOK Containing that part of LOGICK which is necessary to Sciences LESSON I. OF Propositions as they are the parts of a Syllogism Pag. 1. II. Of a Syllogism and its Conclusion 4. III. Of the Predicaments in common and the three first in particular 8. IV. Of the rest of the Predicaments 13. V. Of the five Predicables and the signification of words 16. VI. Of Definition Division and Disputation 21. SECOND BOOK Containing those things which concern the Nature of BODIES in common LESSON I. OF the composition of bulk or Bignesse Pag. 27. II. Of the Nature of Quantity and Place 32. III. Of Time and locall Motion 39. IV. Of the four First Qualities 47. V. Of the Elements 51. VI. Of Mixtion and the Second Qualities or those which most immediately follow Mixtion 55. VII Of the manner of Mixtion and the Passion of Mixt things 59. VIII Of Impassibility Destruction and the Accidents of Mixt bodies 65. IX Of the Motion of heavy and light bodies and the Conditions of Acting 68. X. Of the Motions of Vndulation Projection Reflection and Refraction 71. XI Of the Electricall and Magneticall Attractions of hot bodies 76. XII Of the generation of Decomposit or compos'd-of-compounded bodies Plants 79. XIII Of the more universall parts of Plants 82. XIV Of the Accidents of Plants 85. XV. Of the generation and augmentation of Animals 88. XVI Of the Motion of the Heart and some consequents of it 92. XVII Of the progressive Motion of Animals 94. XVIII Of the five senses of Animals 98. XIX Of the Objects of the Senses 101. XX. Of Knowledge and Memory 104. XXI Of Sleep and Dreams 106. XXII Of Passions and the expression of them 109. XXIII Of the communicating Affections to others 112. XXIV Of the seeming-Rationall Actions of Animals 115. THIRD BOOK Containing those things which concern the WORLD and its greater Parts LESSON I. OF the limitation Vnity and composition of the World Pag. 118. II. Of the Mortality kinds of those things that are in the world 121. III. Of the parts of the Planetary world and specially those of the Earth 125. IV. Of the Sea and its Accidents 129. V. Of Fountains Rivers and Lakes 132. VI. Of the Aire and those things that are done in it near the Earth 137. VII Of Clouds Rain Snow Hail 140. VIII Of fiery meteors appearing in the Aire 147. IX Of truly fiery meteors hanging in the Aire 152. X. Of the generation and nature of Winds 156. XI Of Earth-quakes their Effects 163. XII Of the Meteors of the other parts of the world and especially of Comets 165. XIII Of the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea and its Accidents 168. XIV Of the Motion of the Earth and the Causes of it 174. XV. Of the Oppositions against the Motion of the Earth and of its Effects 177. XVI Of the Motion of the Aire with the Earth and its Effects 180. XVII Of the Causes of the Motion of the Moon and other Stars 183. XVIII Of the Primum Mobile the Duration and Quiddity of the World 187. FOURTH BOOK Containing that part of METAPHYSICK which explicates the Essentiall Notions of BODIES LESSON I. OF the divisibility of Substance into Formall parts Pag. 191. II. Of the formall parts of Substance in particular 195. III. Of the unity and distinction oâ— Bodies in common 199. IV. Of the essentiall Vnity and Distinction of the Elements and Mixt bodies 203. V. Of the Essence of Animals of the Soul 208. VI. Of the Chief Animal and the essentiall Distinction of Bodies 214. VII Of the mutation of the Individuality in the severall kinds of Bodies 219. VIII Of the proper Action of the Chief Animal 225. IX Of the Soul of the Chief Animal or of the MIND 231. X. Of the Proficiency Deficiency of MAN and of his Essence 236. FIFTH BOOK Containing that part of METAPHYSICK which treats of SUBSTANCES ABSTRACTED from Matter of the Operation of Things LESSON I. OF the Soul's Separation from the Body 243. â—I Of the Science of a separated Soul and its Vnity with the Soul 249. III. Of the Eminency of a separated Souls acts above those it exercises in the Body 255. IV. Of the Felicity and Infelicity of separated Souls and their Immutability 259. V. Of the nature of Existence and its unity with the Thing 264. VI. Of the Existence Simplicity and Eternity of GOD. 267. VII Of the perfection Immutability and Science of GOD. 272. VIII Of the Divine Volition and Liberty 277. IX Of the Divine Names how they are improperly spoken of GOD. 283. X. Of the Degrees of impropriety in the Divine Names 288. XI Of the Existence Nature and Science of INTELLIGENCES 293. XII Of the comparison of Intelligences to Souls and Bodies 297. XIII Of the Distinction Subordination and Number of Intelligences 302. XIV Of the Action of GOD Intelligences and Bodies severally 306. XV. Of the cooperation of the Agents to the making of Substances a Rationall Soul and to all other Effects 213. XVI Of the Government of GOD and the Locality of Incorporeall Things 318. XVII Of the Conservation of Creatures and the Durations of things 324. XVIII Of the Manner of Action on the Subjects side 330. APPENDIX CHAP. I. A Philosophicall Discourse concerning the Creation of Heaven and Earth Pag. 341. II. An Explication of GENESIS concerning the same 345. III. A Philosophicall Discourse of the works of the two first Daies 348. IV. An Explication of Genesis concerning the same 351. V. A Philosophicall Discourse of the works of the other four Daies 354. VI. An Explication of Genesi sconcerning the same 358. VII Some Animadversions about the Text of the first Chapter of Genesis 364. VIII A naturall Discourse of the Creation of Man 370. IX An Explication of Genesis concerning the Creation of Man 372. X. An Explication of the same concerning the Creation of Woman 378. XI An Explication of Genesis concerning Paradise 383. XII The History of ADAM'S FALL out of Genesis 387 XIII Of the Punishment of our first Parents out of the same 391. XIV Of the Evils derived to Posterity out of the same 399. XV. Of the
sort opposite there must of necessity out of the conjunction of these rise a middle temper which cannot but be fit for some certain motions 2. And because all things with us here are beset with heat the solid parts cannot be kept moist that is mixt throughly with actuall moisture unlesse there be some continuall cause or Fountain out of which the moisture so consumable and subject to be wasted by the power of heat may be perpetually supply'd 3. Now that Fountain may be suppos'd within and intrinsecall to the Mixtum or else conjoyn'd that is in a body joyn'd to it But if it be this later way 't is plain that watred Mixtum is not of its mere self constantly what it is but through its situation or conjunction to another from which if it be separated it perishes 4. But that which is watred the former way has within it self what is necessary to keep it still a constant Instrument in nature of that operation which 't is fram'd to undertake and consequently it has one Form from that one Operation 't is ordain'd to and that one Order of parts conform'd to such an operation 5. And because we find these in all and only Animals an Animal is evidently counted to be One naturall Thing having one Form 6. You 'l say if the severall similary parts of an Animal subsisting in their proper forms were connected they 'd have the same effect as they have now in the Animal ther 's no need therefore of the particular form of an Animal 7. 'T is answer'd Ther 's no particular nature in any similary part of an Animal which is common to that part alive and dead as if there could be some form as it were indifferent but the nature of a living part is contrary to the nature of a dead part Now naturall Things are naturall parts of the world unerringly flowing from the ESSENTIFICALL IDEA'S and therefore they receive essentiall notions according to the Order they have in the Universe 8. But because the parts of an Animal are so fram'd that one should water that is alter or move another 't is plain that of necessity they must be of severall conditions and figures wherefore the complex of them is an Organicall bodie having within it self Life that is a power of moving it self and its Form is the Act of such a body that is a Soul 9. But since the notion of a Soul requires that the parts of its subject whose orm it is be some Movers others Moved 't is clear that it does not inform each of the parts or is not in every part as 't is usually said and as it happens in Elementary forms but that 't is only in the whole and immediately the Form of the Whole 10. Notwithstanding the parts have not therefore partiall or particular Forms because they are not actually in the whole nor have actually any nature by which they could subsist out of the whole as appears in that being but divided they presently die 11. Hence 't is collected wherein consists the Metaphysicall notion of an Animal viz. that 'T is a Thing of many parts order'd among themselves as to Action that is whereof some are active upon others and the rest are passive from them 12. To which the Morall definition adjoyn's that 'T is an Instrument for Action that is for that operation or motion to which they apply themselves such as is locall motion which all participate 13. And the Physicall definition considers that many Mixtum's are contain'd in an Animal as also Organicall parts that is parts woven and compos'd of many Mixtum's and so conjoin'd that the libertie of each is not taken away but that they are active upon one another as if they were distinct Things 14. And since from the presence of an Object an impression is made upon an Animall whence it begins to act about that which is without so as is convenient for the nature it self of the Animall yet this impression is such as makes no sensible change in the Animall we apprehend the Object to be in the Animall as neither perfecting nor hurting it but indifferently and purely As another thing and this we call Knowing and that the Animall operates out of it self as it were what is convenient for it supposing this knowledge and this we call working out of knowledge 15. Again because it appears by our Physicks that the proper motions of an Animall derive their Origin from the Heart which directs the Spirits into the nerves that are necessary for all kinds of motion and that this Impulse is call'd Passion moreover that all Passions depend and emerge from LOVE and in an Animall rightly dispos'd are subject and conformable to love It follows that Its prime Love or the prosecution of its chiefly beloved is that Passion or Motion or Action to which the fabrick and compagination of an Animall is immediately order'd and consequently that Animals by these excell one another 16. Now the prime pursuit of an Animall is after Food and Food is what is conformable to the quality of a body and preserves and causes a right disposition Since therefore an Animall agrees with other bodies in being an Instrument to be apply'd by another and an Instrument is in so much more perfect as it can perform more easily and more efficaciously more or more Noble works that Animall will be better then the rest which is more easily applyable and to more things for commonly the more noble operation consists of the more parts and what 's apply'd more easily operates more efficaciously 17. The Food therefore of that Animall is best which renders it of a calm Fancy and of an Appetite the most indifferent which commonly follow one another and that Animall is the best which is primarily affected to such Food LESSON VI. Of the Chief Animal and the essentiall distinction of Bodies 1. OUt of what has been said it may be convinc'd if some Animal can be apply'd to one or more determinate operations and another to whatever without any term or limitation this later kind has so great an eminency above the former that they are not of the same Order wherefore It will be the noblest and something above the Order of the rest 2. 'T is plain too that nothing greater can be imagin'd in the notion of an Animal no nor of a Body For if a Bodie be an Instrument applyable to a determinate action an Instrument to all extends to both the noblest and the most Wherefore nothing can be conceiv'd higher in the notion either of a Body or an Animall 3. Since therefore in our Physicks it appears that a Man even in his Body is provided to do any thing whatever 't is plain that a Man is the prime both of Bodies and Animals and something beyond them 4. It appears out of what has been said that there cannot be any other differences of Bodies which are not comprehended in the fore-mentioned For the Elements differing in
light he may be led to the Truth and if invited by apparences he has follow'd the Truth by others he may be averted again 13. Whence 't is evident ther 's some opposition in the Soul that is some acts incompossible at once in it for since those things which are in the Soul inhere in it in vertue of Being 't is plain it must be gather'd out of the very notion of Being what things consist together in the Soul and what not Now 't is clear that 't is against the notion of Being that the same should Be and not-Be but of those things that are all agree in the notion of Being nor does any thing hinder that white and black light and darknesse hot and cold should coexist wherefore neither does any thing forbid their being together in the Soul but for the same to Be and not-Be which is to be affirm'd and deny'd 't is wholy repugnant 14. Since therefore Man suffers no repugnancy in himself to have whatever other things together in his Mind it comes to passe that he is capable and cognoscitive of all Things He can therefore know what 's best for himself or in what State he may most perfectly enjoy himself Nor will he doubt that he is to strain towards this by all his actions wherefore he will be govern'd against nature if he be employ'd otherwise then is convenient to attain This last End 15. Whether therefore one Man rules another or whether some superiour Power governs him he govern'd against nature if he withdraw him from This chiefest Good And because Nature is the Principle of acting a Man as far as he is able will reduce himself to a rectitude and straight course towards his ULTIMATE GOOD and will resist all contrary operation 16. Though Man therefore be an Instrument fram'd to be mov'd by another as all other Animals yet 't will be with this difference that other Animals are ordain'd to be mov'd to the End of the Mover without any respect to their proper good but Man is govern'd to the Mover's End no farther then as the same is a Motion towards the proper Good of Man 17. MAN therefore is an Instrument fram'd by nature apt for universality of Action that is to do any thing whatever so it be in order to his proper good or a Thing of connected parts in a passive and active order that is which can order themselves or lastly Consisting of a RATIONALL SOUL and an ANIMAL BODY Peripateticall INSTITUTIONS Fifth Book Containing that part of METAPHYSICK which treats of SUBSTANCES ABSTRACTED from Matter and of the Operation of Things LESSON I. Of the Souls separation from the Body 1. OUt of what has been said 't is evident that a Humane Soul perishes not at the dissolution of its Body For since whilst it exists in the Body it has immanent acts which cannot belong to a Body it must of necessity have of its proper self the vertue of a Thing or of receiving Existence Since therefore ther 's nothing farther requir'd to exist in a thing already existing but the having in it self a power of sustaining existence and 't is plain that the body being taken away this power is not withdrawn since 't is in the Soul apart from and besides the Body 't is evident that by the dissolution of the Body the Soul is not dissolv'd 2. Adde to this that since there is no other substantiall divisibility but of Form and Matter and Matter is not necessary to the Souls existence ther 's no divisibility in the Subject of existence as existence is in the Soul by means whereof the Soul can be alienated from Being 3. We see too that all mortality of Bodies either proceeds from contrariety or from the divisibility of a quantitative Subject whereof since neither is to be found in the Soul separated 't is plain that 'T is not subject to corruption 4. You 'l object if the Soul in the body is capable of existence 't is capable of action or of a Motive power as quantitative parts though they have a common existence yet act upon one another 'T is answer'd quantitative parts are accessory to and find the Substance already perfect but formall parts at least essentiall ones do not presuppose the Substance establisht whence the active power follows not any one but all 5. You 'l say that Existence too supposes all the parts of a Thing as 't is a Thing wherefore neither will the Soul be capable of existence in the Body 'T is answer'd that action belongs to the Soul in the Body as existence does For existence makes not the Soul while 't is in the Body to be a Thing for that 's primely of the whole and the whole Man is the Thing but it makes the Soul to be That which may be a Thing So also 't is not absolutely a principle of acting but 't is a principle by which action becomes other then 't would be without it and consequently it has a Being whence action may be but not whence ' t is 6. It appears again that the Soul separated is not truly the same Thing with the Soul in the Body but is substantially chang'd For first 't was joyn'd substantially to the Body and was one with it but 't is clear that when by division more things are made of one the Thing divided is chang'd especially when the Unity it self was substantiall as in the present case since the Soul adheres to the corporeall Substance not by quantity but by identification 7. Again the Soul now separated is the immediate and adequate Subject of its own existence whereas in the body the Man himself was the Thing and the Soul only a part of the Thing or whereby the Thing was Yet 't is the same Thing as to its notion and definition since it consists of those predicates it had in the Body 8. You 'l object In the Body it had not a power of receiving existence in it self therefore neither will it have out of the Body for a part and a Thing are of an intirely different kind and vastly distinct from one another 'T is answer'd that as in the parts of a Magnitude 't is manifest that they are neither Things nor only parts of a Thing but something between which is so a part that it may be some kind of whole So it repugns not that there should be something in formall parts which is de facto a part and yet may be a whole and that should be a kind of Middle thing which has enough in it self to become a whole yet should not actually be a whole Whence when the Soul is separated there is not any thing added to it to make it more capable of existence but that is withdrawn from it which hindred it from existing 9. Now he that desires to frame to himself in some sort a notion of a separated Soul let him ponder with himself that object which corresponds to the words Man or Animal as such
which when he shall see abstracts from Place and Time and is a Substance by the only necessity of the Terms let him conceive the like of a separated Soul 10. Then let him attentively consider some self-evident and most naturall proposition in which when he shall have contemplated that the object is in the Soul with its proper existence and as it were by it let him think a separated Soul is a Substance that is all other things by the very connexion of Existences 11. Lastly when in Bodies he shall observe that Motion proceeds from the quality of the Mover a certain impulse and that this impulse is deriv'd again from another impulse and so up even to that which is first mov'd and beyond let him imagine the Soul is a kind of principle of such impulse whatsoever thing that must be 12. What is said of the Substance of the Soul undoubtedly must be understood too of its proper Accidents for since they depend only upon it being something of it nay even the very Soul and it would be more imperfect without them they must run the same fortune with it unlesse some speciall reason interpose 13. Whatever things therefore were in the Man according to his Soul at the instant of his Death remain in the Soul after separation wherefore all his Resolutions or Iudgements whether speculative or practicall shall remain in it where since they cannot be without Apprehensions even they too shall remain And since all things which are made to follow out of or have connexion with these are in a separated Soul in vertue of these its Science must needs be extended to all those all such therefore which have once been in it and are not blotted out after death all remain 14. Since therefore in a Soul ther 's an infinite capacity and ther 's no opposition of apprehensions among themselves nor any other opposition but of contradiction whereby the same is affirm'd to be and not-be all the apprehensions scrap'd up together in the whole life and judgements unretracted must of necessity remain unlesse some speciall Cause withstand 15. The whole Notion therefore of the past life all the particular acquaintances of Familiars and other Individuums all Sciences and Arts attain'd in the life time survive after Death LESSON II. Of the Science of a separated Soul and its unity vvith the Soul 1. BUt all these things being so now in the Soul that time was they were not 't is plain they are so conjoyn'd to it that ther 's no repugnancy it may be without them wherefore so there be a cause they may be dividâ—d from it some kind of divisibility then there is between the Soul and the things in it 2. Not that which is between the parts of a Magnitude since here 's an indivisibility on both sides whereas a Magnitude is not made up of indivisibles Nor that which is between Matter and Form since the Soul which is before is able to preexist of it self and whatever things come into it supervene to a Thing already existing Nor that which is between Substance and Quantity since Quantity is in a Thing as somewhat of it but things known are in the Knower as other things which preexist out of him 3. 'T is therefore a speciall manner of divisibility which is not exactly found in bodies For since a body essentially includes a power or possibility the unity of a body is by the privation of act on one side whence follows the unity of act in the Compound But a separated Soul is compos'd only of Act or Quiddity as white or hot and Existence or Being as when we say 't is whence its unity to another actually existing must be so as an act can be joyn'd to an act that is by identification or a community of Being and after this manner are in a separated Soul whatever are in it 4. Whence first this is evident that a separated Soul knows it self For since to be in another by way of knowing is distinguish't in this from the other manners of inexisting that in others what inexists is now no Thing in it self but that 's in which it is things know'n by inexisting lose not the being what they were though they acquire the being of that which they were not for Heat in that which is hot is something of the Subject nor has any proper Being of its own but the hot Subject which is felt is so in him that 's sensible of it that he knows 't is hot therefore this Subject to be actually hot is in the person that 's sensible of it 5. In like manner the Soul exists substantially because Being is made something of the Soul Again this that the Soul is is in the Soul for since the Soul is a certain Power of being all things that exist and it self also exists it cannot but by reason of its intimate conjunction be present to it self according to this its power which is that it cannot but be understood 6. Again since all those things are in the Soul which we have above recounted they must needs be too all known in the Soul And because 't is clear that in a Syllogism the Conclusion is nothing but the very Premisses all is known by a separated Soul which is deducible out of those things that are in the Soul 7. And because such is the connexion of Truths that out of any one all others may by links be drawn in it comes to passe that a Soul which knows any whatever sensible Truth knows intirely all cognoscible things that is every Soul penetrates absolutely all things 8. For if any Infant never knew its own Being it is not to be esteem'd to have arriv'd at all to the nature of Man For since even in us to be sensible of or to know is by suffering from another we know another thing is because we know we have suffered from it but if we know we have suffered from it we already know we are the first knowledge therefore even in the body includes the knowledge of our selves 9. And since Passion is a participation of the Thing from which we suffer it must needs be that the Thing is in us when we are sensible of it and because it does not denominate according to its own proper appellation but according to the quality of that wherein it is for we do not call an Eye white or wooden but a Seeer of white or wood it must needs be that 't is in it as another thing and as of the nature of the sensitive Subject Now the reason why in the body too the Soul does not know it self but the Man a part of whom it is is because 't is he that is and not it as has been said 10. You 'l object this multiplicity of knowledge is fram'd or aggregated either of severall knots and articles as it were so that whatever was knowable in this world by new discourse the same is in some sort a new addition in the
to our Acquaintance and Friends and the rest which we have cultivated in this life shall remain in the future wherefore we shall both better know and more rejoyce in our Parents and Friends then in others other circumstances alike 2. And because the Affections shall remain that in the proportion they were in during life it follows that those who have in this life delighted in those things Sciences which the Soul is apt and fit to enjoy in Separation for example in naturall Contemplation or that of abstracted Spirits especially if with great affection will have a vast Pleasure in the State of Separation through the perfection of the knowledge they 'l enjoy 3. But those that have given themselves up wholly to corporeall pleasures will be affected with vast Grief through the impossibility of those pleasures there 4. You 'l object that separated Souls will see the unworthinesse of such pleasures and consequently will correct in themselves such erroneous and false judgements nor will have such appetites as would torment them 'T is answer'd these griefs follow not out of false but inordinate judgements for 't is true that such like pleasures are a good of the body and of the Man whose appetite is the appetite of the Soul again supposing the deordination of the Soul 't is true that these pleasures are conformable and good even to it but grief follows hence that the judgements or affections about these are greater then in proportion to those other desires which ought to be preferr'd before them 5. Whence it comes to passe that the Soul 's seeing these objects to be unworthy and not regardable in comparison of the better increases its pains whilst it can neither cease to desire those it desires through the excesse of these affections above the rest and yet sees they are vile and unworthy 6. Moreover out of what has been said 't is deduc'd that in the state of separation no variety can happen to Souls from a body or the change of bodies For since a change passes not from any body into the Soul but through the identification of the Soul with its own body and this identification ceases by the state of Separation it follows that no action nor mutation can be derived from any Body to the Soul 7. Nor has the Soul of it self a principle of changing it self not from hence only because an Indivisible cannot act upon it self but also because since a mutation of the Soul cannot be any other then either according to the Understanding or Will but the Understanding is suppos'd to know all things together and for-ever whence by the course of nature ther 's no room left either for ignorance or new Science and the Will is either not distinct from the Understanding or at least is adequately govern'd in the state of separation it follows that naturally no mutation can happen to a separated Soul from within or caus'd by it self 8. Nor yet from any other Spirit without the interposition of the body For since all Spirits are indivisible their operations too will be such but an indivisible effect supposing all the causes of necessity exists in the same instant wherefore if any thing be to be done between Spirits 't is all in one instant so done and perfected that afterwards another action cannot be begun for if it begin either the causes were before adequately put or not if they were the effect was put if they were not some of the causes is chang'd that it may now begin to act and not this but the former is the first mutation whereof 't is to be urg'd whether the causes were put before 9. If you say the Spirit waits a certain time First time is motion and not without a body Then since among Spirits nothing is chang'd by time one that acts according to reason could not expect a time by which nothing could be chang'd Certain therefore it is that There can be no change by the power of nature in a separated Soul 10. From the collection of all has been said concerning the Soul 't is deducible that Our life is a Mould or a March to our Eternity and according as a Man behaves himself in this life such an Eternity he shall hereafter possess since Good-deeds and Rewards Crimes and Punishments are equally eternall 11. To conclude He that has liv'd perfectly shall be perfect in the future life he that has liv'd better shall be better he that has liv'd well shall be well he that has liv'd ill shall be ill he that has liv'd worse shall be worse they that live worst they too shall be worst of all for ever so true it is that THINGS WILL NOT BE ILL GOVERN'D that is their very Nature exacts and forces them into a good Government LESSON V. Of the nature of Existence and its Vnity vvith the Thing 1. OUt of what has been said 't is clear that all bodies and a separated Soul it self sometimes are and time was they were not whence 't is evident that the notion of Being or Existence is different from the notion of that Thing whereof 't is affirm'd since 't is deny'd too of it and since of all Substances that are so different 't is said according to the same notion that they are 2. Besides if for Peter or a Man not to be were the same with Peter not to be Peter or a Man not to be a Man 't were a proposition destructive of it self and consequently impossible but now 't is prudent and pertinent to Sciences 3. Neither would there any one and the same thing be a Subject of contradictory enunciations or of affirmation and negation and consequently the art of Logick and the foundation of all humane discourse would be taken away Nothing therefore is more evident then that Existence is distinguisht mentally or by definition from the Thing whereof 't is spoken 4. But yet that it should differ really actually and as it were numerically or in the Subject from the Thing whose 't is 't is equally impossible since so they would either of them be Things the whole therefore would not be one and a Thing as above in the like case is deduc'd 5. Notwithstanding since a Thing really acquires and loses existence for to be made is to receive to be dissolv'd is to lose existence 't is evident ther 's a reall divisibility between a Thing and Existence 6. But this divisibility is lesse then any of those hitherto explicated both because in separation neither part of the Compound remains as also because existence out of a Compound is not intelligible since 't is its ultimate actuality or actuation And as 't is commonly said that Union cannot be understood out of Composition nor Action without a Term so neither can Being without it actually be and consequently make those things be which are by it 7. Lastly 't is evident that existence is the perfection of every and all Things since the notion of all
existence which is posteriour to and supposes its existence 2. Since too its Essen̄ce is limited to a certain degree of existence whereof 't is capable 't is clear the plenitude of Being is not essentiall to It Since therefore by Its knowledge It has the plenitude of Being knowledge is not essentiall to It There is therefore a non-repugnancy in Its essence to the not-having such knowledge and consequently a reall divisibility of its Essence against its knowledge 3. You 'l say that power is in vain which is never reduc'd to act but this divisibility is not reduc'd to act therefore 't is in vain ther 's none 'T is answer'd 't is not a power but a non-repugnancy which was in act whilst the Intelligence existed not 4. Out of what has been said we are arriv'd to the comparison of an Intelligence to a separated Soul for as they agree in that they are both immateriall Things existing by their own existence so they disagree in that an Intelligence is adequate to its existence but a separated Soul exists by an existence which is by nature common to the Body and consequently 't is not adequate to its existence 5. Again though both understand their own Essence and by that other things yet 't is with this difference that an Intelligence has this knowledge of it self from its manner of existing but a separated Soul from its Body for when as 't is above said something strikes a man it makes him know that is because it strikes him but his being struck includes that he is therefore in all knowledge a man must needs know that himself is The Soul therefore has in its first knowledge the notice of its own existence and from the body receiv's the knowledge of its Being which unlesse it carry'd along with it it could not reflect upon it self whilst 't is separated because 't is a power or possibility for a power is indifferent to an act and non-act and has neither but by force of an Agent distinct from it 6. This therefore is the universall difference of separated Souls from Intelligences and proper to them as they are incompleat Spirits that a Soul out of the pure notion of its identity with its Intellect does not inform its Understanding for otherwise it would not be a power but an Intelligence has this out of the very genericall manner of its nature by the force of identity To be present to its intellective vertue 7. Hence again it follows that a Soul in vertue of those things which are in it by the communion of the body is carry'd to all other things but an Intelligence in vertue of its own Essence existing 8. A Soul therefore even in separation uses these common notions it findes impress'd in it and consequently too by other such like attains to the plenitude of Being but an Intelligence by the pure degrees of Things at sight of one Thing transcends to another nor needs incomplete notions 9. Lastly a Soul because 't is naturally the compart of a certain Body is determin'd to that nor can act upon another but by means of the motion and affection of its own Body and it affects its proper body by identification because the impression or alteration of one is of necessity the alteration of the other according to its manner by reason of their identity 10. But an Intelligence is not determin'd to any Body but indifferent and is determin'd only by choice to this rather then that and changes that because being of it self in act and exercise the exercise according as the corporeall nature is subject to It passes into the Body by reason the Intelligence is in such a determination 11. Again since an Intelligence and a Body are call'd univocally Things and the notion of existence is found the same in both and all existence which is a compart with essence is of necessity proportion'd to a part of Being and limited but between two limited Things under the same univocall notion there must needs be a proportion 't is evident that Bodies are not infinitely inferiour to Intelligences in the notion of Substance and consequently that the action too of an Intelligence upon a Body is not but in proportion 12. And indeed if the operation of an Intelligence viz. motion were suppos'd unlimited in respect of a Body it would not be connaturall for an Intelligence to move a Body but to change it instantly nor for a Body to be mov'd by It That nature therefore might grow up by continu'd degrees there would need a kind of Thing of a middle nature between Bodies and separated Souls on one side as the Summe and fruit of Bodies and an Intelligence on the other to which middle Creature it should be connaturall to move Bodies 13. Be it therefore certain that an Intelligence's power of moving is limited but yet rais'd too above the motive power of a Soul and immediately 't is deduc'd that because there are many primarily-mov'd Bodies and as it were Suns nor is it likely that one Intelligence can move them all many Intelligences too viz. a severall to the severall Suns must be assign'd LESSON XIII Of the Distinction Subordination and Number of Intelligences ANd because To be another thing as another is the notion of Knowledge and out of that follows the comparative power or that many may inexist together it appears that the perfection of Understanding is argu'd from hence that more may be together in one Understander then in another but since in Intelligences as also in a separated Soul all things inexist together this togethernesse must not be referr'd to the time but to the way of Knowledge that they should be accounted together which are contain'd under one Step or divisibility 2. Intelligences therefore will be essentially distinguisht in that One comprehends the Universe by fewer links and knots as it were then another so that the Supreme by one divisibility knows whatever is and what according to the order of nature can follow out of these and this capacity follows out of the amplitude and eminency of its Substance the lowest is that which has for the severall Substances severall divisibilities 3. 'T is manifest out of what has been said that there is a perfect Subordination amongst the Intelligences for the Superiours comprehend the adequate perfection of the Inferiours and not in part only as 't is in Bodies 4. Moreover a Superiour is active upon a greater body or more active upon an equall body then an Inferiour whence if each be suppos'd willing to act diversly upon the same body the Superiour will prevail and the Inferiour will not be able to act 5. It appears notwithstanding that this Subordination extends not to this that a Superiour Intelligence can act upon an Inferiour or contrariwise for since there is not in an Intelligence any notion of power or possibility consequently neither is there any mutability but as Its existence once infus'd by reason of the connection with
the Country where Man liv'd of all its beauty and introducing colds brought in the mortall state of the World and Man was forc'd to guard himself with Garments CHAP. IX An explication of Genesis concerning the Creation of MAN 1. THese things are dictated out of Nature concerning which ther 's an ampler relation out of the sacred Records For first God is said to have spoken thus to the Angels let us make Man to our Image and Similitude the word let us make signifies a speciall concourse of God and not a generall only as to the other things 2. An Image differs from a Similitude in that an Image speaks a relation of a thing either measur'd by or deriv'd from a pattern but a Similitude neither Besides an Image may be and for the most part is of a nature inferiour to its pattern but a Similitude falls so far short of the perfection of a Similitude as it participates of another nature Man therefore was created to the Image of God and to the Similitude of Angels according to that and they shall be like the Angels of God and again Thou hast abas'd him a little lower then the Angels 3. The Creation of Man is describ'd thus He form'd of the Mud of the Earth the primitive propriety has thinking to make or to frame as a Potter whereby is express'd that the work of Man was a greater task then that of other Creatures and that it specially requir'd the operation of an Intelligence Where our Text says of the Mud of the Earth in the Originall 't is dust of red Earth Now of framable Earths that the red are the best Pots for Pleasure made of them witnesse which yield a savoury rellish to the drinkers And the force of the word Dust is to make us understand the Earth was decocted into minutest parts for almost in all Arts the more the matter is divided the more exquisite the work proves 4. It follows And He breath'd into his Face the breath of life in which words ther 's a clear expression of another operation after the forming of his body to shew that the production of a Rationall Soul does not adequately proceed out of second causes 5. And the words which follow And Man was made a living Soul shew that there is no other but the rationall Soul in Man since his vegetation proceeded out of that That there are not therefore more subordinate Forms in any Matter appears from the propriety of the sacred Doctrine 6. Again the holy Writ says God therefore took the Man and placed him in a paradise of Pleasure to work and keep it and He commanded him saying Of every Tree c. Though it be not expressely taught that the knowledge of God was infus'd into Man yet in that 't is said He breath'd into his face and again that He took him and commanded him 't is apparent enough that God was first known to him and by God his science was deriv'd to other things For his first object at the opening his Eyes was his Inspirer before his face Him therefore first he knew ador'd and lov'd and being shew'd by Him the Herbs and Plants the Beasts and Birds he distinguish'd both the Vertue natures of each received them of Him for his own Use Service 'T is plain therefore that he could not chuse but Believe God's sayings Hope in his Promises Love him as his Father 7. That he learnt of God the Vertue of Herbs and Plants 't is evident out of those words Thou shalt eat of every Tree c. for whilst He puts both an Universality and an exception he insinuates that Adam knew both Moreover those words where he 's said to be plac'd in Paradise to work and keep it which he could not doe unlesse he knew the nature of Plants argue that he knew them Lastly since 't is expressely said of the Beasts and Birds that by only seeing them he throughly saw into their nature in those words to see what he would call them and again whatever Adam call'd any living Soul that is its name since 't is most certain that the names were fitted to the natures of things and consequently were impos'd upon the knowledge of them 'T is clear that the inferiour natures too were as easily known to him 8. The sacred Authour adds But to Adam there was not found a helper like him the primitive expression is And to the Man he found not a help as it were before him or as others explicate as it were against him It appears therefore that the WOMAN was made not out of the necessity of nature alone but by the consent and will of Adam God governing Man a Reasonable Creature by perswasion and induction not by force and command that is according to the nature which he had given him 9. It appears again that the Man was not only in his Matter but even in his Mind the Authour and Superiour and as it were the Maker of the Woman 10. But since Adam had not yet felt the stings of the Flesh neither knew he as yet the need of a Woman as Woman but only he desir'd one to discourse with to whom he might declare his knowledge and conferre about his doubts This is that which was so grievous to the Man that God said 't was not good for him to be alone and provided not only for the present but for ever that he should have such as he might teach and converse with 12. Nor makes it against this that a Man may seem more proper for the conversation of a Man for 't is not true neither in regard of his Mind nor of his Body For 't is known that as to his Body a Man chuses to converse with the beauteous and Beauty is proper to Women as they are condistinguisht to Men And as for the Mind a knower chuses to converse with one that will learn acquiesce rather then one that will be refractory but Women are more credulous and obedient then Men And in respect to both Body and Mind the conversation is more sweet and agreeable with such as reciprocate love but Women are more obnoxious to love then Men. 12. And that she was requir'd for Conversation the very genuine expression shews in those words a help as it were against him For since the countenances of those that talk together are mutually turn'd towards one another and Man is made to be mov'd forward it appears that the faces of those that discourse together are as it were of entrers by opposite and contrary ways and consequently the faces themselves according to the same line are opposite and contrary Such a help therefore was not found amongst all the Animals whence 't was ill with Adam CHAP. X. An explication of the same concerning the Creation of WOMAN 1. GOd therefore cast the holy Text proceeds a sleep upon Adam the Propriety is and He made a sleep fall for sleep begins from the Brain and the Head
Peripateticall INSTITUTIONS In the Way of that eminent Person and excellent Philosopher Sr. KENELM DIGBY The THEORICALL PART ALSO A THEOLOGICALL APPENDIX of the BEGINNING of the WORLD BY THOMAS WHITE Gent. LONDON Printed by R. D. and are to be sold by John Williams at the sign of the Crown in S. Paul's Church-yard M.DC.LVI Virg. Georg. 2. Happy who things Causes has attain'd to know And all Fears and inexorable Fate Has trampled under feet The Method of Studying Whoe're profoundly searches after Truth And would not be misled by stragling Paths Let him turn on himself his inmost Eye And bend into a Ring his ranging Thoughts Making his Soul see what she seeks abroad In her own native Treasures stor'd up lies What the black cloud of Errour hid will soon Shine clearer then the Sun it self at noon Boet. de Consol Philosoph lib. 3. Metr 11. The Translatour's ADDRESSE THis happy Analysis of Nature which the infinite kindness of my beft Friend the Authour has encourag'd and enabled some pains of mine own to render plain English to my self I dutifully present to my Country Where so many clear Wits and strong Judgements the perfect Aptitude to such a Philosophy may through the want or disuse of Latine be disabled or by the extream concisenesse of the Stile and incorrectnesse of the Presse discourag'd from strugling for It in the Originall The Subject Nature and her generall course is universall and practically indifferent to all Nations it seems therefore but just her Interpreter Philosophy should speak all languages at least to that fair degree of currentnesse as abstracted Reason it self is every where intelligible Upon this resentment the incomparable Sir Kenelm Digby whose Expression would I could glory so proportionably to have hit as my Master may his Mind began lately to teach it Our Idiom which it so soon and perfectly attain'd as clear evidences His to be the truly Naturall Philosophy What ingenuous Courage once throughly engag'd and under so sure a Champion the same advantagious Way in the same noblest Field could resist the temptation to follow such a Leader and such Successe upon so necessary a Design In short I have dar'd nor I hope altogether unfortunately at least if an Authentick touch of Illustration upon most of the knots and obscurities in the Originall both Matter and Delivery may excuse the tolerating still some few Terms purely out of the stubbornnesse of their Nature unreduc'd and perhaps unreducible These Reader are the Translatour's Apology and Addresse the Authour 's His known Name and the Work it self The Authour's DESIGN IN what darknesse Philosophy lies hudled up and how perplexing Chimaera's reduce it to desperation 't is needlesse to mention They see 't whoever see any thing in it As superfluous therefore 't were to Apologize why I would lend it my slender endeavours Why such as you see I offer them take this Account The main fault seem'd to me to lye at their doores who neither do themselves nor can endure others should expect any certainty from It. Of these I have observ'd two sorts Some there are that avouch as much of Geometry it self some that attribute this not to the defect of Nature but to the difficulty of the Matter and the intricatenesse of Natures folds And I was about to provide a preambulatory disputation to the former when this Dilemma came into my head that They either admit the evidence of a legitimate Syllogism or not if they admit it they cannot contest against Geometry if they admit it not I saw not what farther evidence there was in Nature able to force them They were therefore desertours of humane Nature nor otherwise to be dealt with then as Mad-men Turning then to the later sort I saw ther 's no so smart proceeding as the Geometricall way where when 't is ask'd whether a thing can be demonstrated the Affirmer producing a demonstration presently destroyes the Probleme So I thought I was to proceed by Instances if I meant to perswade any thing Thence sprung this grain of Mustard-seed which to what growth it may hereafter rise 't is not yet evident Why I have stiled them Institutions the shortnesse and concise connection of the work sufficiently discover I call them Peripateticall because throughout they subsist upon Aristotle's Principles though the conclusions sometimes dissent That I declare them written in the way of that eminent Person and excellent Philosopher Sir Kenelm Digby 't is because since in that so justly-to-beenvy'd Book Of the Immortality of the Soul he has dissected the whole composition of Nature from the first Notion of Body to the very joynts and articles of an invisible spirituall Soul and laid it before the eyes of all any other way then that He had traced out I neither would nor could proceed Whatever therefore you meet with upon that Subject is borrow'd thence but so as that I have transferr'd only the naked Bones scarce hanging together by their sinews wholly destitute of those Nerves and Colours with which they are sated there There look for Nature where you shall misse neither Oratour nor Philosopher we only act the part of Abridgers or Summulists The other things which are treated through this whole work ly yet hid in His Cabinet expecting the pains of greater leisure If I have call'd this the Theoricall part I would not thence have you expect another Practicall one for I meant only to declare that I touch't nothing upon the Morall In Logick you have a little yet something unlesse I 'm deceiv'd more then need for few Precepts are to be prescrib'd for Use but a great deal of exercise Out of the rest if I have cut off the intricate and unprofitable petty Questions methinks I have deserved thanks Do you ask What fruits I expect That you should believe there is in Nature and in things beyond Nature a no-lesse connection of Terms force of Consequences then in Mathematicks For this the Order and Brevity and the invincible firmnesse surely of some Consequences will obtain of an unobstinate person This if I shall have attain'd since all Science is lastly resolv'd into the unity of Definitions I hope naturall Science will be rescu'd from desperation I have divided the Books into Lessons and very frequent Breaks both for the greater clearness commodity of Citation as also because conceiving the entrance into these Institutions would be scarcely open to Novices without the help of some more skilfull I have call'd a Lesson so much as may at one fitting be explicated a Break that which at one breath or with one effort of the Mind and Voice to afford betwixt the Breaks a breathing space from speaking To the Auditours Questioning is permitted in that kind as may make them understand the things propos'd Opposition is prohibited till they have once or twice run through the whole Work For whilst they are yet ignorant of what lies hid in the things to follow by forestalling the order they spoil
conjunction to the body nor be at all conjoyned to it for it must be either entitatively and this cannot be otherwise then by unity of Substance for a Thing speaks Substance or some other accidentall way whereof ther 's nothing common to a body and a Spirit 8. You 'l say Since a Spirit is a Thing of another order then a body how can it concurre into the same Thing then how will it be cemented and what neighbourhood of one to the other 'T is answered that as in a Magnitude one part is fastned to another and has the power of a Subsister without division that is the propriety of a sever'd Thing without separation so the Soul also may be the same with the body without confusion of properties 9. And because in a corporeall Substance ther 's admitted a certain negatively indivisible vertue antecedent to divisibility viz. a not-yet divisibility of the Substance before the Quantity such as is the connexion and gradation from the divisibility to the negative indivisibility another like that will be apt to unite without a Paradox the Mind positively indivisible to the Substance negatively indivisible 10. And how will it unite but according to those parts in which the Substance primarily and principally resides which as 't is principally in the Heart that being a certain Fountain of the whole Thing so specially as to the notion of Animality 't is in the Brain whence Sense and Motion is deriv'd to the whole Animal which are those operations from which 't is denominated an Animal 11. Since therefore the other actions which do not affect the Heart nor the Brain strike not home to the inmost Substance so neither do they reach Mentall Knowledge or the integrity of the Soul but the changes that strike upon these Principles affect the Soul too and it comes to passe that not-the-same ordination of bodily parts especially of the Spirits and Heart follows in Man from the Brain 's being affected which would follow in another Animal but one from the propriety of the affected Substance conformable to the whole not to the body alone 12. But any other unity then that the Soul should intimely be comprehended in the definition of Man and consequently should consist of the same notion and indistinct predicates is not to be look'd for in Substance LESSON X. Of the Proficiency and Deficiency of Man and of his Essence 1. THis therefore is out of Controversie that Man as to his Soul suffers from Corporeall Agents For since the Soul it self is a certain Affection or Qualification of a divisible Substance which is introduc'd and expell'd by corporeall actions 't is clear that those actions which reach to the very Substance must of necessity affect and be receiv'd in it after its manner 2. Consequently it acquires Science For since 't is nothing but a certain Possibility to Science as to its perfection 't is manifest that all its change is towards Science viz. to be some kind of Knowledge either perfect or imperfect 3. Whence even they that deny the Soul acquires Science say that 't is excited and admonish't by the presence of the body but to be excited and admonish't is to receive knowledge the Soul therefore acquires knowledge from the Body 4. Nor makes against this Socrates's experiment of a Boy orderly ask'd and answering right to Geometricall propositions for this questioning was a production of Science not a renovation for 't was an application of the notion of the same Being which is between the Terms to the understanding of the Boy whereby it came to passe that the Truth to be known was by the notion of Thing knit to the Soul of the Boy and made as it were a part of it in which the vertue of knowledge and Science consists 5. Yet the Soul has not by this Science a power to move the body For we see Science is often overcome by Passion but if it had any proper activity it could not be resisted by any power of its own body Moreover it would no longer be a part of a Man but something grafted in him of a superiour nature according to that vertue 6. It follows therefore that by vertue of the Soul more motives of goods or ills are conjoynd to the singular objects by whose conjunction the Heart and the body is affected otherwise to those goods or ills then it would be had they not that conjunction So that the force of Pain and Pleasure is that which moves a Man even then when he seems to follow the firmest Reason namely because to be Reasonable to follow this and to fly that is nothing else but that more of delightfull is conjoynd with this and more of painfull with that 7. In vertue of these therefore a Man is chang'd and acts otherwise then if he had not understanding Nor is he carry'd from the very beginning by reason or any proper power to this connection of goods with ills but is prevented by some chance or obvious disposition of objects corporeall causes either intrinsecall or extrinsecall 8. Now this disposition in the Soul upon which Operation follows we call the WILL and the first beginning Volition which 't is apparent is left by precedent judgements chiefly those that are about good or ill since by such judgements 't is plain a Man is determin'd to action 9. Hence it appears how the Soul fails in Opining For seeing Objects occurre to the Soul not deduc'd and drawn-in by its own force and nerves as it were but by the agitation of bodies if the affection to any thing so presses a Man to action that it leaves not room for the objects to run in that order which is necessary for demonstration the Man must needs fall to acting before he has any absolute evidence what 's to be done 10. If this be done by reflection a Man see 's that he 's mov'd uncertainly but he see 's too that nature requires he should move upon apparences whence he does no unbeseeming incongruous thing But if it be done without reflection a Man takes an uncertainfor a certain which is to Opine for he says this is which he has no determinate cause to say 11. From this precipitation of action it happens that one Man operates better another worse according as one more frequently or more grievously precipitates his action then another And those that come nearest to evidence as far as nature will bear doe the uttermost of their power which is to operate vertuously but those that very much recede from it are call'd vitious between which a certain middle state of Men inclines notoriously to neither part 12. 'T is clear therefore whence the defectibility of Vice rises in Man-kind to wit because by too much precipitation of bodily motion false or the worse opinions are generated Whence it follows that man is not only changeable from imperfect to perfect but also from good to evil and contrariwise For if he has opin'd a falsity upon farther
much as that He can be nothing or defect 6. Worse yet is the notion of Cause and Effect in respect of Himself attributed to God for example that his Attributes flow vertually from his Essence that He understands other things because He understands himself that He wills the means because He wills the end and the like for 't is clear that the notion of an effect likewise speaks imperfection whence 't is no eminency to precontain it 7. Like this 't is to put Instants either of nature or Intellectuall in one of which some thing should be and another thing not-be in God till the next instant for by this there is put a posteriority in God which is imperfection 8. But foulest of all God is put to suppose Creatures or to depend on them whether possible or actuall as when 't is said the Intuitive Vision of God supposes the futurition of Creatures that God knows not a free act but in its existence that a conditionate futurition is presuppos'd before the disposition of the divine Providence and such like which since they make the Divine essence really both posteriour to and depending upon Creatures are intolerable and absurd 9. The Imperfections too either of the Things God has made or of our Understanding they unwarily cast upon God as when God wills the Means should be for the End they weakly suspect that He wills the Means because He wills the End when any one act of God is conceiv'd by us we not conceiving another they believe that there is something in God too whence one notion may be though another be suppos'd not-to-be 10. It appears out of what has hitherto been said that of all the names attributed to God the name of BEING sounds least imperfection for both it stands in the highest degree of Actuality whereas the rest speak Act only and 't is most Universall whence it has this both to contain all things and not to be bound to differences and therefore to include the plenitude of perfection and lastly Being or Existence is perfecter then Essence which is nothing but a capacity to that but all other things are in the order of Essences and more imperfect LESSON XI Of the Existence Nature and Science of INTELLIGENCES 1. OUt of the premisses 't is easily collected that there is some Substance by its nature and originally incorporeall For since God alone is Being of himself and whatever is produc'd participates existence from Him and Existence among those things which integrate a Thing is the least unlike God and is the most perfect and supreme it appears that all other things which are in a Thing are caus'd by God by the means of Existence and that alone immediately flows from God and by consequence nothing is immediately made by God which is not in the Creature in vertue of Existence 2. Again 't is clear that supposing whatever Bodies to exist they because they are many must be in a determinate place and because the same things being put and none chang'd there alwaies remains the same all Bodies in vertue of Existence alone if nothing be chang'd in them will alwaies remain in the same place and consequently in vertue of God alone and Bodies there will not any Motion follow 3. Since therefore it appears in bodies that there is motion 't is evident there is some incorporeall Creature which because 't is requir'd to give the first motion to Bodies cannot be a separated Soul whose birth presupposes the motion of Bodies 4. 'T is plain again that since this Creature receiv's its Being from God of it self it may not-be consequently includes in it self a divisibility of Existence from its Essence 5. Again out of what has been said concerning a Body 't is evident that 't is not compounded of Matter and Form and a composition of Existence with any thing above it is impossible since Existence is the most formall Form of a Thing and consequently there can be nothing more formall or superiour to it in the Thing whose ' t is 6. Counting therefore those things which integrate a Thing or Being there are three kinds of Things GOD filling the highest degree of Existence Bodies by their latitude immensly expanding the infinity of Matter and This middle kind of Act neither essentially actualiz'd nor flowing into matter possessing and filling a kind of middle order of subsisting 7. 'T is therefore a pure Act because 't is not mingled with a substantiall power or possibility 't is not the purest because 't is compounded with Existence which is a Substantiall composition as is manifest common to all but that One Thing of-it-self 8. Again 't is evident that an incorporeall Creature is Intellective so actually Understanding for since the necessity of its existence is collected from the motion of Bodies 't is evident it has some power to alter Bodies that their motion may follow wherefore since action proceeds from an Agent as it actually is that motion of Bodies must of necessity be actually in this Creature consequently the Bodies chang'd 9. Since therefore ther 's no Matter in this Creature nor consequently any determination of matter as its motion or quality it comes to passe that Bodies are in It as existing in themselves that is as another thing since therefore to be known is to be as another thing in another this our Creature is Cognoscitive and since to be known by the notion of Being or as existing is to be understood and movable things are known to exist the Creature we are in search of is an INTELLIGENCE 10. It follows too that an Intelligence in its own essence known knows God and all other things that exist For since an Intelligence has whereto an existing thing may be conjoyn'd retaining the property of its being another it s own Essence existing is intimately conjoyn'd to this power 't is clear that It primarily and formally so inexists 11. And since knowing that its own Essence exists it must needs see that It exists accidentally it sees evidently that It has a Cause of existing and that such an One as we have been in search of above It sees therefore in its own Essence that God is and is such as we have been enquiring after and far perfecter then we can decypher 12. It sees therefore that nature actually emanes and flows out from Him and because it sees what is the End of nature viz. that so many kinds and subdivisions of Animals should shoot-out and ripen into Spirits of eternall Being It sees what is necessary for this and consequently the whole Plot of the World and wherein It self will be usefull for it LESSON XII Of the comparison of Intelligences to Souls and Bodies 1. T Is clear too that an Intelligence has a reall divisibility of Essence from knowledge for since 't is of the notion of the knowledge of its Essence that it exists and its existing is divisible from Its essence much more the knowing its
existence in a particular manner as if it were something of It self whence 't is plain that the Intelligence by the act of its own being stands bent to the Body upon which 't is to act according to all the circumstances necessary out of its own knowledge to the Effect 10. On the other side 't is plain both that the Body is susceptible of the desired effect and that the effect follows out of or rather is but the eminency and excesse of its own act or Form that is Quantity upon matter nay of its commonest act or corporeity as also that the Body is in some sort continu'd to the Intelligence by its Form or Substantiall act 11. And though the act of the Intelligence is of another kind yet because the notion of existence to which both dispose is the same the act of the Body must needs from the assistance of the Intelligence grow as it were and be chear'd and consequently more overmaster its possibility and which follows the Substance be made rarer either to the transmutation of the Substantiall Form or within the same nature 12. We answer again 'T is evident that precisely out of the notion of Understanding ther 's a connection between the understander and that which is understood In such an one as receiv's his Science from the Objects the Object is the cause of Understanding in one whose Understanding is His being the being of the thing understood is from the understanding lastly in one whose Understanding is neither his being nor from the object but concreated and naturall to him the changes in that which is understood if it admit of any without the change of existence may be from him 13. Next from hence is understood the operation of a Body wherein that consists viz. in nothing else but in the formall power of existing what it is For let there be three bodies A B C. following one another between the parallell sides of three places or of one place equall to all the three and let an Intelligence rarify A since that cannot encrease unlesse either B be diminish't or driven on so long as 't is easier for B to be condens'd then to drive on C so long B will be condens'd when 't is arriv'd to the term of condensation by little and little it encroaches into the place of C and forces C to enter into the place of another till 't is come into so ample or condensable a field that the rarefaction of A operates nothing else but condensing the farthest body and then the motion ceases 14. The operation therefore of A is to be greater whence follows A 's being united according to some part of it to the place of B Again the operation of B is either to be made lesse and so only to quit its place or else keeping it self in its Quantity to unite it self with the place of C Since therefore to be united to the place of C is nothing else but to be a Magnitude between which and the place of C ther 's nothing interpos'd the whole operation of B and A is no other then to be what they are by a kind of formall consistence 15. Because therefore a body has no operation but division 't is plain that the whole action of a body is reduc'd to Being what it is or a formall consistency in its proportion of Quantity to Matter and its continuity to place and that its true power of acting is infus'd by Intelligences 16. 'T is plain too that an Intelligence by that one rarefactive Vertue can operate whatever is to be done by Bodies For since all corporeall action is perfected by division and division is arriv'd to by this vertue all action of a Body is attain'd to by this vertue LESSON XV. Of the cooperation of the Agents to the making of Substances a rationall Soul and to all other effects 1. HEnce we are arriv'd to the production of Substances For since some are produc'd out of nothing some out of others preexisting the former must of necessity have flow'd immediately from God The Agent therefore which produces out of nothing makes all the other qualities and conditions of the Thing by the notion of existence Existence therefore is first in execution and since the greater is not made for the lesse it must be first too in intention 2. Wherefore since every Agent by acting endeavours to expresse its own essence upon the effect the Essence of him that produces out of nothing must be Existence it self 3. Nor is it to be expected that another Creature should be made use of as to preparing the matter both because Existence is nobler then all the rest in a Thing whence it admits not of any preparation for the rest since preparations are only in the baser in order to a better as also because existence being put the Thing is already put whence the operation upon nothing is compleat by the very putting of existence and consequently of that cause alone which puts existence 4. Supposing then that God has created certain Substances and that because of themselves they are defectible they alwaies have that being from God 't is infer'd that God perpetually poures out the power of being as the Sun Light Imagine now an accidentall transmutation on Body's part such as is explicated in our Physicall discourse and as 't is declared above through certain changes an arrivall to a constancy of being in another degree 5. It must needs be that As when the Earth is turn'd to the Sun or Wood laid on the Fire from the perpetuall and minutable action of the Sun or Fire joyn'd with the mutability of the Earth and Wood sometimes one sometimes another part of the Earth will be enlightned and sometimes one sometimes another part of the Wood will burn So supposing that naturall motions make Matter in severall Sites sometimes capable of a perfecter existence sometimes of a more imperfect from the same constant effusion of existence on Gods side the Substance must needs be sometimes nobler sometimes more ignoble respectively 6. Suppose farther an existent body so chang'd that the matter may be capable of a Form which in its essence includes some notion that exceeds the power of matter is it not plain that out of the very same constant effusion of existence from God a Substance will exist which will be so corporeall that 't will be in some respect Spirituall 7. For since the putting of existence puts a Thing purely at the second causes determinating God to the position of such an existence not that alone is put but whatever follows out of it though it exceed the power of second causes And so it appears how putting the generation of a Man a rationall Soul is put and how the power of nature so concurres to it that yet the notion of Creation or rather of con-creation supervenes and is necessary 8. Lastly how it both is and is-not ex traduce and at once by Generation and Creation and how
in this case an Instrument in some sort is made use of for Creation 9. And because the internall Dispositions of a Soul as to know and to will even they are indivisible and follow out of the materiall impressions made upon the Body it must needs be that as the Soul it self follows out of the generation of Man by the help of the universall Action of God so these Dispositions too from the impression made upon the man and from the nature of the Soul must indivisibly alter the Soul 10. And whoever would see an evident example of these things let him conceive how by cutting a piece of wood is made more for all the time of the cutting the figure is chang'd yet the wood remains by the same unity one but indivisibly the cutting being finisht they are now two pieces of wood without the dualities beginning at all before or any thing of its nature but only some variation about the Figure 11. Out of what has been said we are deduc'd to see how God performs all the works of the Creatures in them For first if we speak of Intelligences Since their internall operations are nothing else but to be all other things after a certain manner 't is manifest they are actually even to the uttermost positive circumstances by force of their Creation 12. For by force of that their essence is conjoyn'd to it self as 't is a cognoscitive vertue and out of this conjunction the next divisibility which is of God to the same cognoscitive vertue since all the causes are put is of necessity in them 13. And what is said of this divisibility is with the same facilnesse discover'd of all the rest whatever since they are all connected their externall action too Matter which is its subject being put follows by force of their internall without any other change in them LESSON XVI Of the government of God and the locality of Incorporeall Things 1. AS for the rest the same way leads to the discovery that God is not the cause of any imperfection and not-being or ill which is in created things and their action For since the action of God is only to infuse Being and this as much as the Creature is capable 't is plain what there is of Being is to be attributed to God but what ther 's wanting of Being is to be refunded into the incapacity of the Subject 2. And since the defect of action proceeds out of the defect of the Principle that is out of some not-being in the principle in the same manner all defect in acting is to be reduc'd likewise into some defect in being of the Creature and not into God as its cause Wherefore God is the Authour of all Good because all good is from being but of no ill since ill is from not-being 3. Consequently 't is evident that God cannot annihilate any thing or withdraw his concourse from the action of any Creature For to be able to annihilate is to be able to make a no-Thing and to withdraw his concourse is not to give Being to things created either of which cannot happen but from a defect of Goodnesse and of the overflowing as it were of Being in God 4. You 'l say Therefore God does not act freely ad extra that is upon the Creatures But this Consequence is to be deny'd as 't is said above when we treated of the Liberty of God 5. You 'l say again In the same manner therefore it must be said that God cannot make any thing which He will not make But this Consequence also is deny'd for his Power is refer'd to possible things or which have entity and intelligibility and therefore 't is not to be deny'd that he can doe any thing that 's possible though in another respect it be impossible it should happen that He should actually make this 6. But the Power of God which is the very notion of Being and Thing has not for its act the not-being of any thing and not-acting and therefore 't is not to be said that He can give not-being or can not-act 7. Let us remember now that God understands all and every thing done by the Creatures and wills all things which follow out of his operation and we have it that God is Governour of the World and that there can be no resistance against his Will 8. For since whatever is has its birth from his will nor can there be any thing which is not effected by Him and His works 't is clear whatever He wills not is not nor can be so long as he wills not that it be 9. Nor is it lesse evident that neither the Contingency of naturall causes nor the Liberty of rationall Creatures is infring'd by this government of God For since Contingency is nothing else but that the nature of the cause is such that it may and uses to be hindered by other causes and Liberty that a Creature upon the consideration of more proceeds to action and 't is so manifest that both these are in nature and no waies touched by the operation of God as that operation is explicated that it needs only the remembring 't is clear that the government of God is sweet and offers no violence to the natures of naturall causes 10. You 'l object that Propositions concerning a future whether contingent or free Subject are determinately true especially since they are known by God and are predefin'd wherefore the effect cannot not-be there is therefore no either contingency or liberty whether this happens out of the force of Contradiction or of the irrefragable will of God 11. 'T is answer'd 't is false that Propositions concerning a future contingent have a determinate truth for since a man speaks out of consideration of causes the Sense of his proposition is What the causes may bear Nor imports it whether it be pronounc'd actively or passively as if you should say what the causes will act or what effect will be made by them for it signifies still the same 12. If it be therefore ask'd what men mean by such propositions 't will rain 't will be hot Socrates will be angry or go to Sea c 't is clear they mean to explicate effects as in defectible causes and consequently they have no determinate truth But if it be ask'd what the proposition will signify if it be referr'd immediately to the effect as it sounds 't is answer'd no sensible man uses to speak so or make such propositions and so it belongs not to the present question But if there be suppos'd such a power of Contradiction in the Objects as to determine the truth of propositions all things must fall out by the necessity of Fate and be from themselves which is above sufficiently demonstrated impossible 13. 'T is plain lastly that this action of God by which He moves a Creature is miscall'd a Concourse since such a word leads the hearer into an apprehension of a certain equality in acting between God
then a vertuall succession intervening in the Creature 12. For what has formally the vertue which is in succession can as well perform this as succession it self but such we have said is the action of God whence 't is plain that even from this effect the notion of Gods Eternity is demonstrated à posteriori 13. Hence 't is deduc'd that the duration of corporeall and spirituall Substances is intrinsecally different Since corporeall Substances have from the notion of Matter an intrinsecall possibility to not-be and consequently a weaker connection to Being intrinsecally out of their own nature but duration consists in the connection of existence and essence as to the effect of permanence 14. Adde to this that there are in nature causes which destroy Bodies but there are none which are able to infest Spirituall Substances whence since God destroyes nothing of Himself Intelligences are absolutely immortall as also separated Souls and Bodies when motion ceases will be immortall accidentally in the mean time they are simply mortall unlesse perhaps there are some exempt from the generall order 15. Out of what has been said too both the notion and difference of three Durations is evident of Time explicated at the beginning of Eternity when we treated of God lastly of Eviternity in Intelligences LESSON XVIII Of the manner of Action on the Subject's side 1. THe solution also of that old Question is evident Why God made not the World before For if we consider that ther 's no beginning of an Infinite and that where ther 's no beginning there can be no determinate distance from the beginning it will appear that 't is impossible there should be any eternall flux of Time or instants even by imagination wherein there can be taken a now and then and any constant difference of duration or something to be before something after determin'd 2. Wherefore such a Question proceeds from the weaknesse and infirmity of our understanding and signifies nothing and consequently bears no answer For for God to make this world before in time that he made it would be to have made a world before a world since the time of the beginning of the world is nothing else but the very motion with which the world began to be mov'd 3. In like manner evident is the solution of that question Whether God could make a permanent Thing that is whose essence includes not succession from all eternity For if there be no quiddity or possibility of an infinite in succession 't is clear that God could not so make a Creature that it should have Eternity by relation to infinite succession Therefore not otherwise then by some positive eminence confer'd on it Since therefore Duration consists in the connection of existence to a Thing He could no otherwise make a Creature from Eternity then by giving it such a connection by which simply it could not not-be wherein consists the very Eternity it self of God Clearly therefore 't is impossible that even a permanent Thing could have been from Eternity 4. But as for the not-immediate action of God or which is all one as 't is the same with the action of the Creature 't is plain the same account is to be given as of the action of the Creature And of these Philosophers have pronounc'd that Action is something between the Agent and effect as in the change of Place between the Rest in the term whence and the term whether there interven's motion which they falsely imagine to be more beings-in-place successively since as Aristotle has demonstrated all that time the movable happens not to be in a place equall to it whereas yet equality is of the very notion of Place 5. So too in other mutations especially that which is call'd Substantiall generation the Subject by the precedent motion which properly is the very action is not neither actually nor in part in the term it self but is chang'd only in its Quality 6. So too it falls out in Rarefaction which is immediately from an Intelligence for since the proportion of an Intelligence to a Body is finite It cannot instantaneously reduce a body to any how-little-soever-a degree of rarity wherefore there must of necessity between It prepar'd for action and the term intervene some motion during which the body rarify'd is neither in any determinate degree of rarity nor in any determinate Place 7. Out of all which this at length is concluded what a kind of being Passion or mutation has in the Subject for since 't is repugnant the Formall parts in a Compound should be actuall they must be only in possibility or power and some other third thing resolvable into parts actually exist 8. This third thing therefore has a certain resolvable and changeable nature wherefore 't is clear there is some cause which has the power of changing it Let B therefore be the changeable nature A the changing cause if A be apply'd to B must not B of necessity become another thing then it was that is be chang'd 9. This is therefore for B to have suffered by means of A viz. to become another thing then it was another thing I say or altered for if nothing perceivable remain 't is become another thing but if there remain whereby it may be mark'd to be this same as was before 't is only altered because the foundation or that which is the sustainer still remaines but 't is innovated in some respect 10. For example Let there be a Gallon of water in a Cubicall vessell and to avoid dispute about a thing that concerns us not let 's suppose the Figure to be nothing else but that that very quantity according to its three dimensions be no farther extended then actually 't is which conceit being purely negative can adde nothing to the quantity let the same water then be suppos'd in a vessell of another figure and consequently it self too to have put on other limits Since the former terms were nothing but the very Quantity of the water neither can the later differ from it 11. 'T is evident therefore that this Quantity remaining a Gallon which is its difference whereby as quan-tity 't is limited has a possibility to be now Pyramidall now Cubicall and consequently is changeable no Thing being chang'd To this possibility therefore if the power of two such vessells be suppos'd successively apply'd 't is clear purely upon the water 's and their conjunction there follows a change in the Quantity of the water by little and little and at length what in one vessell was of one figure in another becomes of another chang'd according to the manner unchang'd according to the notion of Quantity 12. Thus Substances become altered according to Qualities the Quantity unchang'd according to Quantity the Substance unchang'd according to Substance the Matter remaining for no other cause but that the Subject or that which suffers is so mutable and an Efficient which has the power of changing is apply'd A THEOLOGICALL APPENDIX
descends upon the rest of the Members as also the Cold of the Night which proceeds from Vapours that having been rais'd up high by the Sun and refrigerated by its departure descend is a cause of sleep in both respects therefore 't is more aptly express'd He made fall then He cast 2. Moreover both Sopor and the primitive word expresse a deep sleep and like to a Lethargy the Septuagint interprets it an Ecstasy which so binds up the Senses that the ecstatick person cannot feel any under the intensest pain 3. Now 't is easie to observe that this sleep at least in part proceeded from the former great contention and travail of his Mind to discern the natures of all Animals and from his pensivenesse that he found not his comfort or satisfaction in them all 4. Adam lay down therefore on his right side for Aristotle teaches that this posture is the aptest for sleeping And what did God He took says the holy Writ one of his ribs and fill'd up Flesh for it In the Hebrew the Letter is more obscure but thus with propriety 't is express'd and He took one of his sides and shut up flesh under it and built the side which He had taken from the Man into a Woman The word which we have express'd by He took is very large and includes whatever manner of taking for example to lay hold on and the word which we have interpreted He shut up is taken largely too for He compass'd about The very Letter therefore in fine yields this sense God took to him one of Adam's sides and encompass'd it with flesh and built that is fram'd or erected it into a Woman So that the sense may be that God multiply'd the flesh about one of his sides and the flesh or side already swollen He by little and little distributed and fashion'd into a Woman so that the Woman may seem to have proceeded out of the Man as a Bough out of the Trunk 5. For as the Sun drawing up the moisture of the Earth into the Trunk fix'd in the Earth by percolation through the substance of the Trunk makes the moisture assume the nature of the Tree and increase the Trunk rise up and be distributed into parts befitting the intire Plant So God straining that sleepy humour through the side of Adam first made the side swell out with a great deal of flesh then be distributed into all the similary parts and lastly into the dissimilary 6. And besides that this Sense is very apt to the words nothing is more agreeable to the nature of things For to the three degrees of Man the triple procreation corresponds Adam as a Mixtum was form'd Eve as a Plant grew out of Adam Abel as an Animal was born of Animals Besides reason requires that since in Adam there was the next immediate matter of the Woman she should not be made out of any other then that but like is made out of like by accretion according to Nature Moreover She is produc'd out of his Side because ther 's both flesh and bone and through the nearnesse of the Bowells especially of the Heart to the left side it necessarily participates more of the Vegetative Vertue then any other member of the exteriour Cataphragm Bringing to here is clearly to be interpreted not for a translation from place to place but for an Oblation or exhibition It follows in the Divine History This now is bone of my bones and for now the Hebrews read this time The force of both terms is the same viz. that God otherwhiles offered him incongruous things but now something agreeable and naturall 8. Under the name of Bone and Flesh the whole Body is understood that is the rest of the similary parts whereof a Man is compacted 9. She shall be call'd c. Since what Adam call'd every living Soul that is its name the term given the Woman must signify the proper notion of Woman which is desum'd not from her Matter but from her Form and End how comes therefore this name which Adam impos'd even himself being witnesse to be taken from the Matter It must be said that those words because she is taken out of Man do not signifie because she is made of Man which is common with her to Lice and Fleas but because she is of the same nature with Man And 't is to be observ'd that the Hebrew word signifies prince or chief or fundamentall or subsistent so that the sense may be Because she is of the nature of Man to excell the Animals as He himself 11. Adam says farther that they should be two in one flesh or as the primitive reading has it into one flesh viz. three manner of ways in the Issue which proceeds from both in the Woman since Physicians affirm that the Seed of the Man disappears being transum'd into the flesh of the Woman and lastly by Consent for Copulation for since that is perfect which is apt to make its like neither the Man nor the Woman without one another is perfect both therefore as they combine to the production of their like integrate one Physically-perfect Animal 11. Whence 't is understood why God neither said let Woman be made nor let us make Woman but I will make for so the truth of the holy language has it namely because the mixtion of the Elements into Flesh which was the proper action of the Angels was already done in the forming of Adam and the augmentation of that exceeded not the power of Adam's nature the rest therefore was only the concreation of a Soul which belong'd to God alone CHAP. XI An explication of Genesis concerning PARADISE 1. THus Man was entirely perfected what misfortunes afterward befell him let 's enquire out of the mysticall Book It says therefore And the Lord God had planted a Paradise of Pleasure from the beginning wherein he put the Man whom he had formed The Hebrews read a Garden which says the same thing but what is signifi'd by these names must be sought out of the description First of all therefore we are taught that out of the ground there was born in it every Tree fair to sight and sweet to eat which from the description of the Third day 't is clear agrees to the whole Earth 2. The next is that the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Science of Good and evil as Eve witnesses were in the middle of Paradise now 't is an Hebrew propriety to say in the middle for that which is among or within The letter has it thus And God made to spring out of the Earth every Tree fair to sight and sweet to eat the Tree also of Life in the middle of Paradise and the Tree of the Science of Good and evil that is All kind of Trees pleasant to sight and tast among which were good Trees and conducing to life and some which were apt to make a Man experience evil things as well as good 3. 'T is added that
if we observe that Distillers to extract the moisture of Herbs besprinkle the plants they are about with water or some other proportionate liquour if lastly we remember that Gold-smiths to separate the Silver mixt in a little quantity with other metalls mix more Silver withall 'T will be evident that when the Earth redounded with well-digested moisture there was no better way of drying it then by adding another moisture to render that was in it more separable and presse out both together as Nature it self operates in rottennesse 7. Supposing therefore the Earth became both colder and dryer the Plants and Animals must of necessity have drawn a more malignant juyce food out of it For since Vegetation consists in heat moisture Death and Old Age must be in their opposites and out of them be deriv'd to living Creatures wherefore since after the Deluge men sometimes liv'd 150 200 years the long life of the Patriarchs before the Floud mention'd in the Scriptures is not incredible Hence 't is that Animals were now assign'd to man for food and 't is not said that he shall rule over them as at the beginning but the terrour of him shall be upon the other Animals For at first they serv'd him as Instruments but now they were to become fierce and wild whence man would contrive to kill them and they consequently like perverse servants fly and be affraid of him as their chastizer 8. And these indeed God gave to man but another thing far greater For because the Earth was become dryer the Aire too round about man was made purer and thinner and both by his Food and by the Aire his Body was rendred as not so vast and durable so more subtile-spirited and more apt to be subjected to his Soul and fitter for the operations proper to it 9. Men therefore grew sharper witted and more addicted to Sciences and Arts and by consequence computing all things the World became better and perfecter since there would necessarily be many more men by reason of the littlenesse of their Bodies and such frequent changes through the shortnesse of their lives and yet nay much the rather more forward and riper for the eternall life of the future world CHAP. XIX Of the second propagation of Mankind into severall Countries Out of the same holy History 1. IT remains for describing perfectly the Beginning of the World to declare how the benediction given to Noe and his Sons to encrease and fill the earth began to be fulfill'd The divinely-deliver'd History therefore saies that the first off-spring of Noe agreed perfectly together and were very unwilling to separate which is collected out of those words that in the originall text say the Earth was one lip and the same words for that a lip signifies the words of men is found by the sense every where as when they are call'd Deceitfull lips Our lips are from our selves and in a thousand other places but where 't is taken for a Language I know not 2. But because the sense of the following terms must be different and the same words this Phrase will signifie that they desired and sought how to remain united as 't is said more manifestly below Whence 't is no light suspicion that this mind in them proceeded from the instigation of some One that affected a Tyranny over Mankind which some Historians also witnesse 4. Proceeding therefore in this thought they sat down in the fields about Babylon and there either mutually impell'd by one another or else by some one as I said they deliberated from the opportunity commodiousnesse of Bricks and Pitch to build themselves a City and a Tower for two reasons To get themselves a Name and to prevent their being dispersed over the Earth for so the Hebrew reading has it least perhaps or rather least at any time which ours renders before 5. They imagin'd therefore that fixing their abode by reason of the commodiousnesse of the vast City and for the famousnesse of the Tower which would have no fellow all men would willingly stay about those places Of the Tower 't is said in the Hebrew whose head in Heaven that is where the Birds fly or even the Clouds intimating that they design'd to continue on this edifice even to the Clouds which Naturalists say sometimes are not rais'd more then 340 paces above the Earth which height is not so vast and extravagant that it might not fall into the thoughts of men and even be perfected too according to what God said that They would not desist till they should have accomplisht them in deed 5. But God turn'd their own very counsells upon their own heads for the fond pains and perhaps which some Histories insinuate because the Tower when it had been brought to a very great height was thrown down by the winds and lightnings as it uses to happen to extreme high Fabricks made them weary of the work and its Authour so that they would no longer obey him nor even agree together but severall Companies as they could agree among themselves departed into severall countries the Authour of the work with those that consented to him remaining still in Babylon 6. And this explication is clear nor in any sort violent to the letter and according to the nature of things whereas that which the most follow contains so vast a Miracle and whereof we have no other example unlesse perhaps in the effusion of the Holy Ghost that it may seem violent to extract it out of words in their ordinary sense signifying another thing For to be of one lip lips to be confounded or Tongues agrees with common sense to signifie the one consent the other dissention but to transferre these to multitude of languages is lesse naturall which yet if otherwise there were a sufficient Authority to shew the effect done is no waies to be rejected but if the whole story draws its originall from this only Text it will have no bottome nor solidity 7. But hence perhaps some may ground their belief that 'T is not easie to imagine whence Languages should have been divided amongst mankind and have grown into so many kinds To which we reply that whoever shall but observe what is usuall in his own City or Countrey will easily discern how so great a variety of Dialects has grown into the world For 't is evident the perfection of a Language consists among the Better-bred and the rude People corrupt the lesse usuall words those that speak fast cut them short the Countrey folks likewise make a speciall pronunciation of their own Adde to these that divers Cities and Provinces have form'd Dialects of their own which yet ther 's no doubt are contain'd all under one Idiome 8. Consider then the minglings of distinct languages a Country sometimes being subdu'd by a Nation of a different Idiome sometimes by the frequent Travels of single persons the words of one Idiome being deriv'd to another 9. Lastly let 's reflect on the