which more gently austere The sense of touching was formed by the Gods to discern hot and cold soft and hard light and heavy smooth and rough and to iudge the differences of each of these Yielding bodies we call those which yield to the touch resisting those which yield not this proceedeth from the bases of bodies those which have large bases are firm and solid these which have narrow bases are yielding soft and easily changed Rough is that which is uneven and hard smooth that which is plain and thick As warm and cold qualities are most opposite so they proceed from the most different causes That which cutteth by the acutenesse and roughnesse of its parts begetteth a hot affection that which is more thick in penetration a cold whilst the more rare are expelled and the more dense compelled to penetrate into their room Thence ariseth a concussion and trepidation and an affection which is from hence begotten in bodies rigor CHAP. XX. Of Heavy and Light HEavy and light ought not to be defined by higher or lower place nothing is high or low for Heaven being absolutely round and its convexe extremity even we cannot term any thing higher or lower yet may we call that heavy which is hardly drawn to a place different from its Nature light which easily or heavy is that which consisteth of most parts light of fewest CHAP. XXI Of Respiration WE breath after this manner The externall Air compasseth us round about and passeth in at our mouth nostrills and invisible Pores of the body where being warmed it floweth back again to the externall Air by that part out of which it flowed it again thrusteth the externall Air to the interiour Thus there is an unintermitted succession of inspiration and expiration CHAP. XXII Of the Causes of Diseases OF Diseases Plato alledgeth many causes The first is defect or excesse of the Elements and a change into places which agree not with their Nature The second a preposterous generation of homogeneall parts as when of flesh is made blood or choler or flegme for all these are nothing but colliquation or putrefaction â—legm is a new collâ—quation of flesh sweat and tears are a kind of Serum of flegm Flegm intercepted in the outward parts begetteth Scurse and Leprosie in the inward being mingled with Melancholy it causeth the falling-sicknesse Sharp and salt flegme engender those affections which consist in rigour for all bodies that are inflamed with choler must suffer that A world of various diseases are engendred by choler and flegm As concerning feavours Plato conceiveth that a continuall feavour proceedeth from excesse of fire a quotidian from excesse of air a tertian from excesse of water a quartan from excesse of Earth It remaineth that we here begin to speak of the Soul though not without some danger of repeating the same things CHAP. XXIII Of the three principall powers of the Soul THE Gods the makers of mortall Creatures having received from the first God the Soul of Man immortall added unto it two mortall parts yet left the immortall divine part might be infected with mortall extravagances they seated as Prince of all in the tower as it were of the body the Head in figure resembling the Universe The rest of the body they appointed as a vehiculum to serve this To each mortall part they assigned its proper habitation placing the irascible in the heart the concupiscible in the midst betwixt the Navell and the Diaphragme binding it there as a furious savage Beast They framed the Lungs in respect of the heart soft bloodlesse hollow and spungy that the heart being somthing heated with anger might thereby be refrigerated and asswaged the Liver to excite and allay the concupiscible part having both sweetnesse and bitternesse as likewise for the clearing of divinations which are given by dreams for as much as in it by reason of its smoothnesse shining and brightnesse the power which proceedeth from the mind doth shine forth The Spleen was made for the benefit of the Liver to purge and cleanse it so that those corruptions which by some diseases are contracted about the Liver retire thither CHAP. XXIV Of the distinction of the parts of the Soul THat the Soul and parts thereof according to their proper faculties are threefold every part appointed by reason their severall places is manifest from hence Those things which are separated by Nature are divers passionate and reasonable are separate by nature this being conversant in Intelligibles that in things sad or joyful to omit the passive part which is common likewise to bruit Beasts Now these two being distinct by Nature must likewise be distinguished by place because for the most part they disagree and are repugnant to one another but nothing can be repugnant to it self neither can those things which are contrary to one another consist together in the same In Medea anger seemeth to contest thus with reason I know what I intend is ill But anger over-rules my will In Laius when he ravished Chrysippus concupiscence contested with Reason for so he saith Men to this crime the Gods confine To know the ill that they decline That the rationall power is different from the Passive is evident from this that they ordered by severall means one by discipline the other by habituall practice CHAP. XXV Of the Immortality of the Soul THat the Soul is immortall Plato proveth by these Arguments The Soul to every thing wherein it is conferreth life as being naturally innate in her self but that which conferreth life to others never admitteth death but what is such is immortall The Soul being immortall is likewise incorruptible for it is an incorporeall essence which cannot be changed substantially and is only perceptible by the Intellect not by the eyes and is uniform Hence it must be simple neither can be at any time dissolved or corrupted The body is contrary for it is subject to sight and other senses and as it is compounded so shall it again be dissolved and it is multiform When the Soul adhereth to those things which are preceptible by Intellect it acquieseeth Now to that by whose presence she is disturbed she cannot possibly be like wherefore she is more like to those things which are perceptible by Intellect but what is such is by nature incorruptible and perishable Again the Soul naturally doth preside over the body not the body over the Soul but that which by nature ruleth and commandeth is of kin to Divinity wherefore the Soul being next unto God must be immortall not subject to corruption Again Contraries which have no medium not by themselves but by some accident are so ordered by Nature that they may be mutually made of one another But that which men call life is contrary to that which they call death as therefore Death is a separation of the Soul from the body so islife a conjunction of the Soul with the body praeexistent to the Body But if she be praeexistent and shall
Blood and the like what they are and to what end their matter and reason but especially whence they have their motion next to proceed to dissimilar parts and lastly to speak of those which consist therof as men Plants and the like Hence Patricius conjectures that his Books of the parts of living Creatures did immediately succeed those of the Meteors wherein he treateth as he proposeth of Similar parts unto the tenth Chapter of the second Book and from thence of the dissimilar But to reduce his Books of living Creatures to this method is the lesse certain for as much as many of these besides those which treated particularly of Anatomy have been lost of which perhaps were some which might better have cleared the series for in the Books themselves concerning Animals there is nothing to ground it upon For the same reason it is uncertain where his Books of Plants ought to have been placed which are lost Perhaps they might precede those of Animals for he asserts that Plants have souls contrary to the Stoicks endued with vegetative power that they live even though cut asunder as insects whereby two or more are made of one that the substance they receive by aliment and the ambient air is sufficient for the preservation of their naturall heat As concerning Animals we have Of their Going one Book Of their History ten Books Of their parts four Books Of their Generation five Books So exquisitely hath he treated upon this subject as cannot well be expressed by an abridgement and therefore we shall omit it the rather because little or nothing was done herein by the Academicks or Stoicks a collation with whom is the principall design of this summary CHAP. XIV Of the Soul THe knowledge of the Soul conduceth much to all Truth and especially to Physick for the Soul is as it were the principle of animate things Animate things differ from inanimate chiefly by motion and sense Whence the antient Philosophers defined the Soul by these Democritus the Pythagoreans Anaxagoras by motion Empedocles and Plato by knowledge others by both others by incorporeity or a rare body Thales something that moveth Diogenes air Heraclitus exhalation an immortall substance Hippo water Critias blood The soule doth not move it selfe as Democritus held for whatsoever is moved is moved by another Again if the soul were moved perse it would be in place and it were capable of being moved violently and it would be of the same nature with the body and might return into the body after the separation Neither is the soul moved by it selfe but from its objects for if it were moved essentially it might recede from its essence The soul therefore is not moved perse but by accident only according to the motion of the body The soul is not Harmony a proportionate mixture of contraries for then there must be more souls in the same body according to the different constitution of its parts But though we commonly say the soul grieveth hopeth feareth c. we are not to understand that the soul is moved but only that these are from the soul in the body that is moved some by locall motion of the Organs others by alteration of them To say the soul is angry is no more proper then to say she builds for it is the man that is angry by the soul otherwise the soul were liable to age decay and infirmity as well as the organs of the body Neither is the soul a rare body consisting of elements for then it would understand nothing more then the elements themselves neither is there a soul diffused through all things as Thales held for we see there are many things inanimate Some from the different functions of the soul argue that there are more souls then one in man or that the soul is divisible the supream intellectuall part placed in the head the irascible in the heart concupiscible in the liver But this is false for the Intellect is not confined to any part of the body as not being corporeall nor organicall but immateriall and immortall The soul is the first intelechie of a naturall organicall body having life potentially First Entelechie Entelechie is two-fold the first is the principle of operation as Science the second the Act it selfe Of a Naturall not of an artificiall body as a Tower or Ship Organicall body that is endued with instruments for operation as the eye for seeing the ear for hearing even plants have simple Organs Having life potentially as it were in it selfe for potentially is lesse then actually actually as in him that wakes potentially as in him that is asleep The soul is otherwise defined that by which we first live feel and understand whence appeareth there are three faculties of the soul nutritive sensitive intellective the inferiour comprehended by the superiour potentially as a triangle by a quadrangle CHAP. XV. Of the Nutritive faculty THe first and most common faculty of the Soul is the Nutritive by which life is in all things the acts and operation thereof are to be generated and to take nourishment Nutriment is received either towards Nutrition or augmentation Nutrition is the operation of the Nutritive faculty conducing to the substance it self of the animate being Augmentation is the operation of the Nutritive faculty whereby the animate body encreaseth to perfect Magnitude In nutrition are considered the Soul nourishing the body nourished and the food by which the nourishment is made hereto is required a Naturall heat which is in all living creatures The aliment is both contrary or unlike and like to the body nourished as it is undigested we say nourishment is by the contrary as altered by digestion like is nourished by its like CHAP. XVI Of the Sensitive Faculty THE Sensitive faculty of the Soul is that by which sence is primarily in Animals Sense is a mutation in the Organ caused by some sensible Object It is not sensible of it self nor of its Organ not of any interiour thing To reduce it to act is requisite some externall sensible object for sense cannot move it self being a passive power as that which is combustible cannot burn it self Of sensible Objects there are three kinds proper which is perceived by one sense without errour as colour in respect of sight Common which is not proper to any one but perceived by all Accidentall which as such doth not affect the sense Sense is either Externall or Internall the externall are five Seeing Hearing Smelling Touching Tasting The object of Seeing is Colour and some thing without a name that glisters in the dark as the scales of fish glow-worms and the like Colour is the motive of that which is actually perspicuous nothing therefore is visible without light Perspicuous is that which is visible not by it self but by some other colour or light as Air Water Glasse Light is the act of a perspicuous thing as it is perspicuous It is not fire not
humidity being ratified by the Sun That the primitive humidity being diffused as a pool was burned by the motion of the Sun about it and the unctuous part bring exhaled the remainder became salt That assoon as the world was made and living creatures produced out of the world the world enclined of it selfe towards the south according to divine providence that some parts thereof might be habitable others not habitable by reason of the extremities of heat and cold That the mistion of the Elements is by apposition That the inundation of Nilus is caused by the snow of Aethiopia which is dissolved in summer and congealed in winter Sect 5. Of living Creatures THat Creatures were first generated of humidity calidity and earthly matter afterwards mutually of one another males on the right side females on the left That the soule is that which moveth that it is aeriall and hath a body of the nature of aire That there is a death of the soule likewise which is separation from the body That all Animalls have active reason That sleep is an action of the body not of the soul. That in the hand of man consists all his skill That the voice is made by the wind hitting against firm resisting air returning the counter-blow to our ears which is the manner whereby also the repercussion of the air is formed called Eccho That the Gall is the cause of acute diseases which overflowing is dispersed into the lungs veines and costs CHAP. III. His predictions SUidas saith he foretold many things of those two instances onely have been hitherto preserved The first thus related by Pliny The Grecians celebrate Anaxagoras of the Clozomenian and for foretelling by his learning and Science in the second yeare of the 78. Olympiad on what day a stone would fall from the Sun which happen'd in the day time in a part of Thrace at the river Agos which stone is at this day shewne about the bignesse of a became of an adust colour a Comet also burning in those nights Plutarch adds that it was in his time not onely shewen but reverenced by the Peloponnesians Eusebius reckons the fall of this stone upon the fourth yeare of the 78. Olympiad which is two yeares after Pliny accompts of the prediction Silenus cited by Laertius saith it fell when Dimylus was Archon which if it be to be red Dyphilus for the other name is not to be found neere these times will be the first yeare of the 84 Olympiad But the marble at Arundell House graven about the 129. Olympiad to be preferred before any other chronologicall accompt expressly names the fall upon the 4th yeare upon the 77. Olympiad when Theagenides was Archon two yeares before Pliny saith it was foretold It was beleeved to have portended as Plutarch testifies the great defeat given to the Athenians by Lysander at the river Agos 62. yeares after viz. the fourth yeare of the 39. Olympiad Of the wonder Aristotle gives a very slight accompt affirming It was a stone snatched up by the wind and fell in the day time a Comet happening in those nights which is disproved by Plutarch who hath this large discourse upon it It is said that Anaxagoras did prognosticate that one of the bodies included the Heavens it should be loosed by shaking fall to the ground the Stars are not in place where they were first created they are heavie bodies of the nature of stone shining by reflection of the aether being drawn up by force kept there by the violence of that circular motion as at the beginning in the first separation of things cold heavie they were restrained There is another opinion more probable which saith those which we call falling starres are not fluxions of the aether extinguisht in the aire almost as soon as lighted nor inflammations or combustions of any part of the aire which by it spreadeth upwards but they are coelestiall bodies failing of their retention by the ordinary course of heaven throwne downe not upon the habitable earth but into the Sea which is the cause we doe not see them yet the assertion of Anaxagoras is confirmed by Damachus who writeth in his book of Religion that 75. daies together before this stone fell they saw a great body of fire in the Air like a cloud enflamed which tarried not in one place but went and came uncertainly removing from the driving whereof issued flashes of fire that fell in many places like falling starrs when this great body of fire fell in that part of the Earth the Inhabitants emboldned came to the place to see what it was and found no appearance of fire but a great stone on the ground nothing in comparison of that body of fire Herein Damachus had need of favourable hearers But if what he saith be true he confuseth those Arguments who maintain it was a piece of a Rock by the force of a boistrous wind torn from the top of a Mountain and carried in the air so long as this whirlwind continued but so soon as that was laid the stone fell immediately unlesse this lightning body which appeared so many daies was fire indeed which coming to dissolve and to be put out did beget this violent storm of force to tear off the stone and cast it down This it is likely Charimander meant who in his book of Comets saith Anaxagoras observed in the Heavens a great unaccustomed light of the greatnesse of a huge pillar and that it shined for many daies The other memorable prediction of Anaxagoras was of a storm which hee signified by going to the Olympick games when the weather was fair in a shaggy gown the rain powring down all the Graecians saith Aelian saw and gloried that hee knew more divinely then according to humane Nature CHAP. IV. His Scholers and Auditors THese are remembred as his Scholars and Auditors Pericles Son of Xantippas being instructed by Anaxagoras could easily reduce the exercise of his mind from secret obstrusive things to publick popular causes Pericles much esteemed him was by him instructed in natural Philosophy and besides other virtues fre'd from superstitious fears arising from ignorance of physicall causes whereof there is this instance the head of a Ram with but one horn being brought to Pericles was by the South sayers interpreted prodigious Anaxagoras opening it showed that the brain filled not its naturall place but contracted by degrees in an ovall form toward that part where the horn grew Afterwards Anaxagoras neglected and decrepit with age in a melancholy resentment thereof lay down and cover'd his face resolving to starve himself which Pericles hearing came immediately to him bewailing not Anaxagoras but himself who should lose so excellent a Counsellor Anaxagoras uncovering his face said They Pericles who would use a Lamp must apply it with oil Archelaâ—s Son of Apollodorus was Disciple to Anaxagoras and as Laertius affirms called the
or silently desired That God takes care of all creatures is demonstrable from the benefits he gives them of light water and fire seasonable production of fruits of the earth that he hath particular care of man from the nourishment of all plants and creatures for mans service from their subjection to man though they excused him never so much in strength from the variety of mans sense accommodated to the variety of objects for necessity use and pleasure from reason whereby he discoursed through reminiscence from sensible objects from speech whereby he communicates all that he knows gives lawes governs states that God notwithstanding he is invisible hath a being from the instances of his Ministers invisible also as thunder and wind from the soule of man which hath something with the divine nature in governing those that cannot see it This is the effect of his discourse with Eâ—thidâ—mus The Soule is immortall for what is alwaies moveable is immortall but that which moveth another or is moved by an other hath a cessation of motion and life The soule is praeexistent to the body endued with knowledge of eternall Ideas which in her union to the body she loseth as stupisied untill awakened by discourse from sensible objects Thus is all her learning only reminiscence a recovery of her first knowledge The body being compounded is dissolved by death the soule being simple passeth into another life incapable of corruption The soules of men are divine to whom when they go out of the body the way of their return to heaven is open which to the best and most just is the most expedite The soules of the good after death are in a happy estate united to God in a blessed inaccessible place the bad in convenient places suffer condign punishment but to define what those places are is hominis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whence being demanded what things were in the other world he answered neither was I ever there nor ever did I speak with any that came from thence Sect. 2. Ethicks HIs moralls consider a man either as a single person or as the father of a family or as a member of the common-wealth In the first respect are his Ethicks wherein such sentences as have been preserved by Xenophon Diogenes Laertius Stobaeus and others are thus collected Of vertue and vice HE exhorted his friends to Endeavour to be the most wise and beneficiall because what wants reason wants respect as the bodies of dead friends and hair nailes and the like which are cut off and cast away To be employed is good and beneficiall to be idle hurtfull and evill they that do good are imployed they that spend their time in vain recreations are idle He that hath most advantage by gifts of nature as well as he that hath least must learn and meditate on those things wherein he would be excellent He only is idle who might be better imployed To do good is the best course of life therein fortune hath share They are best and best pleasing to God who do any thing with any art or calling who followeth none is uselesse to the publick and hated of God He taught every where that a just man and a happy were all one and used to curse him who first by opinion divided honesty and profit which are coherent by Nature as having done an impious act for they are truly wicked who separate profitable and just which depends on law The Stoicks have followed him so far that whatsoever is honest the same they esteem profitable He asked Memnon a Thessalian who thought himselfe very learned and that he had reached as Empedocles saith the top of wisdome what is vertue He answered readily and boldly that there is one vertue of a child another of an old Man one of a Man another of a Woman one of a Magistrate another of a private Person one of a Master another of a Servant Very good replies Socraâ—es I ask for one vertue and you give us a whole swarm truly conceiving that he knew not one vertue who named so many Being demanded by Gorgias If he accounted not the great King of Persia happy I know not answered he how he is furnished with learning and vertue as conceiving that true happinesse consisteth in these two not in the frail gifts of fortune Euripides in his Auge saying of vertue It is best carelessely to part with these he rose up and went away saying It was ridiculous to seek a lost servant or to suffer vertue so to go away He said he wondered at those who carve Images of stone that they take such care to make stones resemble men whilst they neglect and suffer themselves to resemble stones He advised young men to behold themselves every day in a glass that if they were beautifull they might study to deserve it if deformed to supply or hide it by learning He said to begin well is not a small thing but depending on a small moment He said vertue was the beautie vice the deformity of the soul. He said outward beauty was a sign of inward beauty and therefore chose such Auditors In that life of man as in an Image every part ought be beautifull Incense to God praise is due to good men Who are undeservedly accused ought to be defended who excell others in any good quality to be praised A Horse is not known to be good by his furniture but qualities a man by his mind not wealth It is not possible to cover fire with a garment sinne with time Being demanded who live without peâ—turbation hee answered thâ—y who are conscious to themselves of no ill To one who demanded what Nobility is he answered a good temper of soul and body Of affections Love Envy Grief Hope c. THat two brothers God meant should be more helpfull to each other then two hands feet eyes or whatsoever nature hath formed doubtlesse because if they love they may great distance mutually help one another is the scope of his discourse with Chaeracrates That all things are good and fair to those things where with they agree but ill and deformed in respect of those things with which they agree not is the conclusion of his second discourse with Aristippus Envy is a grief not at the adversity of friends nor the prosperity of Enemies but at the prosperity of friends for many are so foolishly enclined as to maligne those in good fortune whom in misfortune they pittied A ship ought not to trust to one Anchor nor life to one hope To ground hopes on an ill opinion is to trust a ship to a slight anchor The beauty of fame is blasted by envy as by a sicknesse Many adorn the tombes of tâ—ose whom living they persecuted with envy Envy is the saw of the soul. Nothing is
son of Thales his Father sent with others thither at the division of the Land upon their defection from and subjection by the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and returned to Athens at what time those Athenians were ejected by the Lacedemonians in aid of the Aeginetae He was of an eminent Family his Father Aristo Son of Aristoteles of the race of Codrus Son of Melanthus who as Thrasylus affirmes derived themselves from Neptune Melanthus flying Messena came to Athens where afterwards by a Stratagem killing Xanthus he was made King after Thymocles the last of the Theseidae His Mother Perictione by some called Potone whose Kindred with Solon is thus described by Laertius and Proclus Execestides had two Sons Solon and Dropides Dropides had Critias mentioned by Solon in his Poems Bid fair-haird Critias his Sire observe A wandring minde will from his leader swerve Critias had Callaeschrus Callaeschrus had Critias one of the thirty Tyrants and Glaucon whom Apuleius calls Glaucus Glaucon had Charmides and Perictione Perictione by Aristo had Plato the sixt from Solon Solon was descended from Neptune and Neleus Father of Nestor Thus Laertius from whom Proclus dissents only in that that he makes Glaucon Son of the first Critias Brother to Callaeschâ—us which Critias manifestly saith he in Plat. Charmides confirmes calling Glauco Father of Charmides his Uncle Thus was Plato descended both waies from Neptune â—here are saith Apuleius who assert Plato of a more sublime race Aristander followed by many Platonists thinks he was begotten on his Mother by some Spectrum in the shape of Apollo Speusippus in his Treatise entitl'd Plato or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Clearchus in his Eulogie of Plato Anaxiliâ—es in his second Book of Philosophers Plutarch Suidas and others affirm it to have been commonly reported at Athens that he was the Son of Apollo who appearing in vision to her being a woman of extraordinary Beautie Perictionae se miscuit she thereupon conceived Aristo her Husband having often attempted to enjoy her but in vaine at last Apollo appearing to him in a vision or dream and a voice commanding him to refrain the company of his Wife for ten Months untill her delivery were past he forbore whence Tyndarus He did not issue from a mortall bed A God his Sire a God-like life he led Some thereupon as Saint Hierom saith affirmed he was born of a Virgin and it was a common speech among the Athenians that Phoebus begat Aesculapius and Plato one to cure Bodies the other Soules Aristo had afterwards by Perictione two Sons Adimaretus and Glauco and a Daughter Potone Mother to Speusippus These relations of Plato will be more conspicuous in this Genealogicall Table For the Year of his Birth to omit the mistakes of Eusebius who placeth it in the fourth year of the eightie eight Olympiad in the Archonship of Stratocles and of the Chronicon Alexandrinum that placeth it the year following Laertius saith He was born according to the Chronologie of Apollodorus in the eightie eight Olympiad which seemes to be towards the beginning of the first year whilst Aminias was yet Archon For Laertius elsewhere saith that he was six years younger then Isocrates for Isocrates saith he was born when Lysimachus Plato when Aminias was Archon under whom Pericles dyed in the third year of the Peloponesian War This Aminias is by the Scholiast of Euripides called Ameinon by Athenaeus Epameinon by Diodorus Siculus Epaminondas The various reading occasion'd either by addition or detraction of the Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but by which of these two cannot easily be evinc'd Salmasius endevouring to prove the name to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 positively affirms that the Greeks never name an Archon without the Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but that errour Peâ— avius confutes whose opinion is confirmed by the antient Marble at Arundell-house which addeth not the Preposition to the names of the Archons Neither is the opinion of Athenaeus much different who affirmes Plato was born the Year before Apollodorus being Archon who succeeded Euthydemus who was Archon the third Year of the eightie seventh Olympiad and that under Euphemus in the fourth year of the nintieth Olympiad he was fourteen years old For both Laertius and Athenaeus agree in the Year of his death viz. the first of the hundred and eight Olympiad when Theophilus the successor of Callimachus was Archon Athenaeus only differeth in this that computing eightie two Archons he attributes so many years to Plato's life whereas it is certain that he lived but exactly eightie one The day of his birth according to Apollodorus was the seventh of Thargelion at which time the Delians did celebrate the Feast of Apollo So likewise Florus cited by Plutarch who addes that the Priests and Prophets call Apollo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as being born upon this seventh day whence perhaps was occasion'd the fiction that he was Son of Apollo which Plutarch esteemes no disparagement to his Deity In the first year of the eighty eight Olympiad the Neomenia of Hecatombaeon fell upon the second of August and upon those Hypotheses which we laid down formerly in the life of Socrates the Dominicall Letter for that Year being E. the seventh of Thargelion will according to the Julian accompt taken proleptically fall upon Friday the thirtieth of May according to the Gregorian upon Friday the ninth of Iune in the year of the Julian period 4286. This is according to the faith of the Historians with whom the Astrologers do not agree for Iulius Firmicus hath erected the Scheme of his Nativity after this manner If the Ascendent saith he shall be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 therein posited and if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then be placed in the seventh having 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for his signe and in the second the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the fifth house beholding the Ascendent with a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aspect and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the ninth from the Ascendent in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Geniture renders a man Interpreter of Divine and heavenly Institutiâ—ns who endued with instructive speech and the power of divine wit and formed in a manner by a celestiall Instâ—â—tion by the true license of disputations shall arrive at all the secrets of Divinity Thus Firmicus whose Scheme agreeth not with the other Calculation as being betwixt the midst of February and of March during which time the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hence will appear the great Anachronisme of those who affirm that Plato went to Aegypt in the time of the Prophet Hieremie whom Eusebius placeth in the thirtie sixt Olympiad and heard him there Hieremie at the captivity of the Jewes into
a youth over-bold with his Father Young man saith he will you under-value him who is the cause you over-value your selfe To one of his Disciples who took too much care of his body he said Why do you labour so much in building your own prison Of a prisoner fettered he said That man is dead in his own body he lives in another He said that whosoever neglected himselfe for another was the most happy of all persons for he enjoyed neither One Leo an eminent Citizen being blamed for loud and immoderate clamour in the Senate That is saith he to be a Lyon indeed His Disciples wondring that Xenocrates severe all his life time had said something that was pleasant Do you wonder saith he that Roses and Lillies grow among Thorns Xenocrates by reason of his severe conversation he advised to sacrifice to the Graces He used to say Prefer labour before idlenesse unlesse you esteem rust above brightnesse He exhorted the young men to good life thus Observe the different nature of vertue and pleasure the momentary sweetnesse of the world is immediately followed by eternall sorrow and repentance the short pain of the other by eternall pleasure He said that it was a great matter in the education of youth to accustome them to take delight in good things other waies he affirmed pleasure to be the bait of evill He affirmeth Philosophy to be the true help of the Soul the rest ornaments that nothing is more pleasing to a sound minde then to speak and hear truth then which nothing is better or more lasting To some who demanded what kinde of possessions were best to be provided for Children Those saith he which fear neither stormes nor violence of men nor Iove himselfe To Demonicus asking his advice concerning the education of his Son The same care saith he that we have of Plants we must take of our Children The one is Labour the other Pleasure But we must take heed that in this we be not too secure in that too vigilant To Thiledonus who blamed him that he was as Studious to learn as to teach and asked him how long he meant to be a Disciple as long saith he as I am not ashamed of growing better and wiser Being demanded what difference there is between a learned Man and an unlearned the same saith he as Betwixt a Physitian and a Patient He said Princes had no better Possessions then the familiarities of such men who could not â—latter that Wisdom is as necessary to a Prince as the Soul to the Body That Kingdoms would be most happy if either Philosophers Rule or the Rulers were inspired with Philosophy for nothing is more pernicious then power and arrogance accompanied with ignorance That Subjects ought to be such as Princes seem to be That a Magistrate is to be esteemed a Publick not a private good That not a part of the Common-wealth but the whole ought to be principally regarded Being desirous to take off Timotheus Son of Conon Generall of the Athenians from sumptuous Military Feasts he invited him into the Academy to a plaine moderate Supper such as quiet pleasing sleeps succeed with a good temper of body The next day Timotheus observing the difference said They who feasted with Plato were the better for it the next day and meeting Plato said unto him Your Supper Plato is as pleasant the next morning as overnight alluding to the excellent discourse that had past at that time Hence apears the truth of that Poet 's saying who being derided for acting a Tragedy none being present but Plato answered but this one person is more then all the Athenians besides CHAP. XII His Will and Death THus continuing a single life to his end not having any Heirs of his own he bequeathed his Estate to young Adimantus probably the Son of Adimantus his second Brother by his will thus recited by Laertius These things Plato hath Bequeathed and disposed The Eniphistidaean grounds bordering North on the high way from the Cephisian Temple South on the Heracleum of the Eniphistiades East on Archestratus the Phrearian West Philip the Cholidian this let it not be lawfull for any man to sell or alienate but let young Adimantus be possessour thereof in as full and ample manner as is possible And likewise the Enerisiadaean Farm which I bought of Callimachus adjoyning on the North to Eurymedon the Myrrinusian on the South to Demostratus Xypeteron on the East to Eurymedon the Myrrinusian on the West to Cephissus Three minae of Silver a Golden Cup weighing 160. a ring of Gold and an earing of Gold both together weighing four drachmes and three aboli Euclid the Stone-Cutter oweth me three Minae Diana I remit freely I leave Servants Ticho Bictas Apolloniades Dionysius Goods whereof Demetrius keepeth an Inventory I ow no man any thing Executors Sosthenes Speusippus Demetrius Hegias Eurimedon Callimachus Thrasippus If this Will be not forged that of Apuleius is false who averrs the Patrimony he left was a little Orchard adjoyning to the Academy two servants and a Cup wherein he supplicated to the Gods Gold no more then he wore in his ear when he was a boy an Emblem of his Nobility He died in the 13 tâ— year of the Reign of Philip King of Macedon in the first of the 108. Olympiad the 81. according to Hermippus Cicero Seneca and others of his age not as Athenaeus the 82. which number he compleated exactly dying that very day whereon he was born For which reason the Magi at Athens sacrificed to him as conceiving him more than man who fulfilled the most perfect number nine multiplyed into it self He died only of age which Seneca ascribes to his temperance and diligence Hermippus saith at a Nuptiall Feast Cicero saith as he was writing they therefore who affirm he dyed as Pherecydes of lice do him much injury upon his Tomb these Epitaphs The first Whose Temperance and Iustice all envies The fam'd Aristocles here buried lies If Wisdom any with renown indued Here was it most by envy not pursued The second Earth in her bosom Plato's body hides His Soul amongst the deathlesse Gods resides Aristo's Son whose fame to strangers spread Made them admire the sacred life he lead Another later Eagle why art thou pearcht upon this stone And gazâ—st thence on some Gods starry throne I Plato's Soul to Heaven flownrepresent His body buried in this Monument Phavorinus saith that Mithridates the Persian set up Plato's statue in the Academy with this Inscription MITHRIDATES SON OF RHODOBATES THE PERSIAN DEDICATED THIS IMAGE OF PLATO MADE BY SILANION TO THE MUSES CHAP. XIII His Disciples and Friends THE Fame of this Scool attracted Disciples from all parts of whom were Speusippus an Athenian Plato's Sisters Son whom he said he reformed by the example of his own life Xenocrates a Chalcedonian Plato's beloved Disciple an imitatour of his gravity and magnanimity Athenaeus saith hee was first the onely Disciple of Aeschines
in Sâ—ates Death That is a Plough-man's grave a Sailor's this To Sea and Land alike Death common is On one Shipwrack'd The cruell Sea which took my life away Forbore to strip me of my last array From this a covetous man did not refrain Acting a crime so great for so small gain But let him wear it to the shades and there Before great Pluto in my cloaths appear Another Safely O Saylors presse the Land and wave Yet know ye passe a Shipwrack'd persons grave On the Statue of Venus Paphian Cythera swimming crosse the Main To Guidas came her Statue there to see And from on high surveying round the plain Where could Praxiteles me spy saith shee He saw not what 's forbidden mortall Eyes 'T was Mars's Steel that Venus did incize Another Not carv'd by Steel or Praxitele's fam'd hand Thus nak'd before the Iudges did'st thou stand Love sleeping Within the Covert of a shady Grove We saw the little red-check'd God of Love He had nor Row nor Quiver those among The neighb'ring Trees upon a bough were hung Upon a Bank of tender Rose-buds laid He smiling slept Bees with their noise invade His rest and on his lips their honey made Pan Piping Dwell awfull Silence on the shady Hills Among the bleating flocks and purling rills When Pan the Reed doth to his lip apply Inspiring it with sacred Harmony Hydriads and Hamadryads at that sound In a well order'd measure beat the ground On the Image of a Satyre in a Fountain and Love sleeping A skilfull hand this Satyre made so near To life that only Breath is wanting here I am attendant to the Nymphs before I fill'd out purple wine now water powre Who ere thou art com'st nigh tread softly lest You waken Love out of his pleasing rest Another On horn'd Lyaeus I attend And powre the streams these Nayads lend Whose noise Lov 's slumber doth befriend Another This Satyre Diodorus did not make But charme asleep if prick'd he will awake On a Seal Five Oxen grazing in a flow'ry Mead A Iasper seal done to the life doth hold The little herd away long since had fled We'rt not inclos'd within â— pale of Gold THE DOCTRINE OF PLATO delivered by ALCINOVS CHAP. I. Of PHITOSOPHY and how a Philosopher must be qualified Such a Summary as this may be given of the Doctrine of Plato Philosophy is the desire of Wisdom or solution of the soul from the body and a conversion to those things which are true and perceptible by Intellect Wisdom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the Science of things Divine and Humane A Philosopher is he who takes denomination from Philosophy as a Musician from Musick He who is to be a Philosopher must be thus qualified First he must have a naturall capacity of all such Learning as is able to fit and bring him to the knowledge of that essence which is perceptible by Intellect not of that which is in continual fluxion or mutation Then he must have a naturall affection to Truth and an aversion from receiving falshood and besides this temperate in a manner by Nature for those parts which use to be transported with passions he must have reduced to obedience by Nature For whosoever hath once embraced those disciplines which are conversant in consideration of such things as truly exist and hath addicted all his study thereunto little valueth corporeall pleasure Moreover a Philosopher must have a liberall mind for the estimation of mean things is contrary to a man who intended to contemplate the truth of things Likewise he must naturally love Justice for he must be studious of Truth Temperance and Liberality He must also have an acute apprehension and a good memory for these inform a Philosopher those gifts of Nature if improved by Discipline and Education make a man perfect in Vertue but neglected are the cause of the worst ills These Plato useth to call by the same names with the Vertues Temperance Fortitude and Iustice. CHAP. II. That Contemplation is to be preferred before Action WHereas Life is twofold Contemplative and Active the chief Office of the Contemplative consisteth in the knowledge of truth as of the Active in the practice of those things which are dictated by Reason Hence the Contemplative life is first after which as necessary followeth the Active That it is so may easily be proved thus Contemplation is an Office of the intellect in the understanding of Intelligibles Action is an operation of the rationall Soul performed by meditation and service of the body For the Soul when it contemplateth the Divinity and the notions thereof is said to be best affected This affection is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wisdom which is nothing else but an assimilation to the Deity This therefore ought to be esteemed the first and principall as being most expetible and proper to man for there are no impediments that can hinder it from being within our power and it is cause of our proposed end But Active life and the practise thereof chiefly making use of the mediation of the body are many times obstructed Wherefore those things which the Contemplative life considers in order to the reformation of the manners of men a Philosopher as often as necessity requireth shall transferr to Action Then shall a good man apply himselfe to the administration of Civill Affairs when he seeth them ill managed by others He must look upon the leading of an Army administration of Justice and Embassies as things necessary The institution of Laws ordering the Common-wealth the compressure of Seditions education of youth in Discipline are the chiefest and among those things which relate to Action of greatest consequence Hence is it manifest that a Philosopher must not onely be perseverant in Contemplation but also cherish and increase it sometimes giving himself to Action as an attendant upon Contemplation CHAP III. The three parts of Philosophy THe study of a Philosopher seemeth according to Plato to be conversant chiefly in three things in the Contemplation and knowledge of things in the Practice of Vertue and in Disputation The Science of things that are is called Theoretick of those which pertain to Action Practick the disputative part Dialectick Dialectick is divided into Division Definition Induction and Syllogisme Syllogisme into the Apodeictick which concerneth necessary ratiocination and Rhetoricall which concerneth Enthymeme called an imperfect ratiocination and lastly into Sophismes This the Philosopher must look upon not as the chiefest but a necessary part Of Practick Philosophy one part is conversant about Manners another orders Families the last takes care of a Commonwealth The first called Ethick the second Oeconomick the third Politick Of Theoretick Philosophy one part enquires into things immutable and divine and the first causes of things this is called Theologie another the motion of the stars the revolution and restitution of Celestial Bodies and the constitution of the world This is called Physick That whereby we
subsist after the body it followeth that she be sempiternall for there cannot any thing be imagined whereby she may be corrupted Again if learning be Reminiscence the Soul must be immortall but that it is reminiscence we prove thus Learning cannot otherwise consist then by remembrance of those things we formerly know For if from Singulars we understand Universalls how could we discourse by singulars which are infinite or how from a few perceive Universalls we should therefore necessarily be deceived as if we judged that only to be a living Creature which breatheth or how could the notions themselves have the reason of principles By reminiscence therefore from some few which we have conceived in our mind we understand the rest and from some occurrent particulars we remember those which we knew long before but were then given over to oblivion when the Soul first descended into the Body Again if the Soul be not corrupted by its own proper ill neither can it be destroy'd by that or any other nor simply by any ill and being such shall remain uncorrupted Again that which is moved in it self as being the principle of motion in those things which are moved is alwaies moved that which is such is immortall but the Soul is moved of it self that which is moved of it self is the principle of all motion and generation and a principle is expert of generation and corruption wherefore the Soules of men and of the Universe it self are such for both partake of the same mistion He affirmeth the Soul to be moveable in her self because it hath an innate life alwaies operating by its power That rationall Soules are immortall may clearly be asserted out of Plato but whether the irrationall be such seemeth doubtfull yet is it probable that being guided only by Phantasie not endued with reason or judgement neither do they contemplate any thing or discern or collect from it nor can they discern ills but generally understand nothing nor are of the same nature with those Soules which have Intellect and Reason but are capable of dying and being corrupted For as much as they are immortall it followeth that they are put into bodies being planted into the formed Nature of Embrio's and transmigrate into severall bodies as well humane as others either according to some certain numbers which they expect or by the wil of the Gods or for intemperance of life or for love of the Body For the Body and Soul have a kind of affinity as Fire and Brimstone Moreover the Souls of the Gods have a dijudicative faculty called Gnostick and impulsive to some action called Parastatick which faculties being likewise in humane Soules become changed as soon as they come into the bodie the assistent into the concupiscible the impulsive into the Irascible CHAP. XXVI Of Fate and Free-will Concerning Fate Plato held thus All things are in fate yet all things are not decreed by Fate For Fate though it be like a Law yet it useth not to speak in this manner that this man shall do thus and to that man that shall befall which were to proceed into infinite there being an infinite generation of men and infinite accidents happening daily to them besides that this would take away our free-will our praise or dispraise and whatsoever is of that kind but rather thus Whatsoever Soul chooseth such a life and doth such things these shall follow the Soul therefore is free and it is left within its power to do or not to do without any compulsion or necessity But that which followeth the action is performed by Fate As from Paris's ravishing of Helena which it is within his power to do or not to do shall follow that the Grecians contend with the Trojans about Helena Thus Apollo foretold Laius If thou beget a Son that Son shall kill thee In the Oracle are comprehended both Laius and the begetting of a Son that which shall follow upon the begetting of the Son depends on Plato That which may be done is of a middle kind betwixt true and false and being so indefinite by Nature that which is in our power is carried on as it were unto it That which is done by our election is presently either true or false that which is in power is different from that which is said to be in habit and act That which is in power declareth an aptitude in that thing wherein the habit is not yet perfect So a boy may be said to be a Grammarian a Musician a Carpenter in power He is in habit of one or more of these when he hath acquired that habit He is said to be in act when he operateth according to that acquired habit That which we call possible to be done is none of these Indeterminate is that which is in our power and to which part soever it inclineth will be true or false CHAP. XXVII ETHICK Of the chief Good and of Virtues WE must next give a short account of Plato's Ethicks That which is worthy of all honour and is the Supreame good he conceived not easie to be found and if found not safe to be declared For this reason he communicated the contemplation of the chief good to very few and those of his most intimate acquaintance of whom his judgement made choice for this purpose But our good if we examine his books dillgently we shall find he placed in the knowledge of the first good which may rightly be called God and the first mind For all things which men call good he conceiveth to be called good in this respect for as much as they derive somthing from that good as all sweet and hot things are termed such from some participation of the first sweet and first hot Of those things which are in us only the mind and reason have a similitude of the first good Wherefore he calleth our good Fair Venerable Amiable Proportionate and lastly Beatitude Of those which are commonly called good as health beauty strength there is none good unlesse it be employed towards the practise of Vertue For being separated from Vertue they are like matter only and to those who make ill use of them only ill Yet these Plato sometimes calleth mortal goods Beatitude he reckoneth not amongst humane goods but amongst the divine and immortall Whence he asserteth that the souls of true Philosophers are replenish'd with vast admirable goods and after the dissolution of their mortall body are admitted to the table of the Gods and with them walk over and survey the field of Truth because they did see they used the utmost endeavours of their Soules to know it and esteemed it the most precious of all things by the benefit whereof they illustrated and excited their mind as a lost or blinded sight preferring the conservation thereof before many corporeall eyes Foolish men are like those who lead all their life in some Cave under ground where they never saw the light of the Sun but only some empty thin shadows of such
God Hence Platonists argue the World is eternall its soul being such and not capable of being without a body that also must be from eternity as likewise the motion of the Heavens because the Soul cannot be without moving Sect. VII THe antient Ethnick Theologians who cast Poeticall vails over the face of their mysteries expresse these three natures by other names Coelum they call God himself he produc'd the first Mind Saturn Saturn the Soul of the World Iupiter Coelum imples Priority and excellence as in the Firmament the first Heaven Saturn signifies Intellectuall nature wholly imploy'd in contemplation Iupiter active life consisting in moving and governing all subordinate to it The properties of the two latter agree with their Planets Saturn makes Men Contemplative Iupiter Imperious The Speculative busied about things above them the Practick beneath them Sect. VIII WHich three names are promiscuously used upon these grounds In God we understand first his Excellence which as Cause he hath above all his effects for this he is called Coelus Secondly the production of those effects which denotes conversion towards inferiours in this respect he is sometimes called Iupiter but with an addition Optimus Maximus The first Angelick nature hath more names as more diversity Every creature consists of Power and Act the first Plato in Philebo calls Infinite the second Finite all imperfections in the Mind are by reason of the first all perfections from the latter Her operations are threefold About Superiours the contemplation of God about the knowledge of herself about inferiours the production and care of this sensible World these three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferiour things but in either respect is firm within her self In the two first because contemplative she is called Saturn in the third Iupiter a name principally applyed to her power as that part from whence is derived the act of Production of things For the same reason is the soul of the World as she contemplates her self or superiours termed Saturn as she is imployed in ordering worldly things Iupiter and since the government of the World belongs properly to her the contemplation to the Mind therefore is the one absolutely called Iupiter the other Saturn Sect. IX THis World therefore as all other creatures consisteth of a Soul and Body the Body is all that we behold compounded of the four Elements These have their casuall being in the Heavens which consist not of them as sublunary things for then it would follow that these inferiour parts were made before the Celestiall the Elements in themselves being simple by concourse causing such things as are compounded of them Their formal being from the Moon down to the Earth Their participate and imperfect under the Earth evident in the Fire Air and Water experience daily finds there evinc'd by naturall Philosophers to which the antient Theologians aenigmatically allude by their four infernall Rivers Acheron Cocytus Styx and Phlegeton We may divide the body of the World into three parts Celestiall Mundane Infernall The ground why the Poets â—eign the Kingdom of Saturn to be shar'd betwixt his three Sons Iupiter Neptune and Pluto implying only the three-fold variation of this corporeall World which as long as it remains under Saturn that is in its Ideal Intellectual being is one and undivided and so more firm and potent but falling into the hands of his Sons that is chang'd to this material Being and by them divided into three parts according to the triple existence of bodies is more infirm and lesse potent degenerating from a spiritual to a corporeal estate The first part the heavenly they attribute to Iupiter the last and lowest to Pluto the middle to Neptune And because in this principality is all generation and corruption the Theologians express it by the Ocean ebbing or flowing continually by Neptune understanding the Power or deity that presides over Generation Yet we must not imagine these to be different souls distinctly informing these three parts the World her self being one can have but one Soul which as it animates the subterraneall parts is called Pluto the sublunary Neptune the celestiall Iupiter Thus Plato in Philebo averrs by Jove is understood a regall soul meaning the principall part of the World which governs the other This opinion though only my owâ—â— I suppose is more true then the expositions of the Grecians Sect. X. NExt that of the World Platonists assign many other rational souls The eight principall are those of the heavenly Spheres which according to their opinion exceeded not that number consisting of the seven Planets and the starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets Calliope the universall soul of the World is first the other eight are distributed to their severall Spheres Sect. XI PLato asserts That the Author of the World made the mundane and all other rationall souls in one Cup and of the same Elements the universall soul being most perfect ours least whose parts we may observe by this division Man the chain that ties the World together is placed in the midst and as all mediums participate of their extreams his parts correspond with the whole World thence called Microcosmus In the World is first Corporeall Nature eternall in the Heavens corruptible in the Elements and their compounds as Stones Mettals c. Then Plants The third degree is of Beasts The fourth rationall souls The fifth Angelicall minds Above these is God their origine In man are likewise two bodies one eternall the Platonists Vehiculum coeleste immediately inform'd by the rational soul The other corruptible subject to sight consisting of the Elements Then the vegetative faculty by which generated and nourished The third part is Sensitive and motive The fourth Rational by the Latine Peripateticks believ'd the last and most noble part of the Soul yet above that is the Intellectuall and Angelick the most excellent part whereof we call the Souls Union immediately joyning it to God in a manner resembling him as in the other Angels Beasts and Plants About thâ—se Platonists differ Proâ—lus and Porphyrius only allow the rationall part to be Immortall Zenocrates and Speusippus the sensitive also Numenius and Plotinus the whole Soul Sect. XII IDeas have their casuall being in God their formall in the first Minde their participated in the rationall Soul In God they are not but produced by him in the Angelick nature through this communicated to the Soul by whom illuminated when she reflects on her intellectuall parts she receives the true formes of things Ideas Thus differ the Souls of Men from the Celestiall these in their bodily functions recede not from the Intellectuall at once contemplating and governing Bodies ascend to them they descend not Those employ'd in corporeall office are depriv'd of contemplation borrowing science from sence to this wholly enclin'd full of errors Their only means of release from this bondage is the amatory life which by sensible beauties exciting in the soul a remembrance
when it is present only excited by the phantasy The object of the Theoretick Intellect is true or false of the practick good or ill The rationall soul in some manner is every thing for that which actually knoweth is in some maner the same with the thing known CHAP. XXIII Of the Motive faculty BEsides the nutritive sensitive and intellective faculties there is also a motive faculty in animate creatures That it is not the same with the nutritive is manifest in as much as it proceeds from imagination and apprehension which plants have not neither have they organs fit for motion which nature would have given them if they had this power That it is not the same with the sensitive appears in that some animals which have sense have not the power as Zoophytes which have not the organs fit for this motion Neither is it the same with the Theoretick Intellect for that judgeth not as to action but progressive motion is the action of an animal flying ill or pursuing good The principles of locall motion in animals are the practick Intellect under which is comprehended phantasy and appetite These two direct and impell the motive faculty to action intellect and phantasy by directing what is to be shunned what to be embraced appetite by shunning or embracing it Appetite is the chief principle thereof for that may move without intellect as in beasts and many times in men who desert their reason to follow their pleasure But intellect never moveth without appetite that is will for appetite is the principle of all motion honest and dishonest intellect only of honest motion In man appetite is two-fold Will which followeth the judgment of reason and sensuall appetite irascible or concupiscible which followeth sense and phantasy In the motion of animals three things are considered First that which moveth and that is two-fold the appetible object which moveth the appetite as a finall cause not as an efficient and the appetite it selfe which being moved by the appetible object moveth the animall Secondly by what it moves which is the heart of the animal by which instrument the appetible object moveth it Thirdly that which is moved the animall it selfe perfect Insects are moved locally as perfect animals are and consequently by the same principles appetite and phantasy but this phantasy is imperfect diffused through the whole body as appeareth by their uncertain motion only towards present occurrent objects That they have appetite is manifest in as much as they are sensible of pain and pleasure Beasts have sensitive phantasie only rationall creatures deliberative which compareth many things conducing to some foreknown end and chooseth the most expedient Yet somtimes the sensitive appetite in man overswayeth the rationall but by the order of nature the will which is the rationall ought as being the superiour to it to oversway the sensitive Thus there are three motions one of the will commanding another of the sensitive appetite resisting and a third of the body obeying But when the sensitive overruleth there are only two motions for the will resists not but is deceived CHAP. XIV Of Life and Death GEneration and dissolution are common to all living Creatures though all are not produced and dissolved in the same manner The generation of a living Creature is the first conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the naturall heat Life is the permanence of that Soul with the said heat Youth is the encrease of the first refrigerative part age the decrease thereof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the constant and perfect life which is betwixt both As long as an animate Creature liveth it hath naturall heat within it self and as soon as that faileth dieth The principle of this heat is in the heart If it be extinguish'd in any other part the Animal may live but if in the heart it cannot This heat is extinguish'd two waies first by consumption when it faileth of it self secondly by extinction from some contrary as in violent death the cause is the same in both defect of aliment which in the living Creature is its vital moisture as fire wanting refrigeration groweth more violent and soone consumeth the humidity which being gone it self must of necessity go out Refrigeration therefore is necessary to the conservation of the naturall heat Plants are refrigerated by the ambient air and by aliment their naturall heat is extinguish'd by excessive cold and dry'd up by excessive heat Animals which live in the air or in the water are refrigerated by the air or water some by breathing others without Death according to the extinction of naturall heat is two-fold violent or naturall violent when the cause is extrinsecall naturall when the principle thereof is in the animate Creature For that part wheron life dependeth the Lungs is so ordered by nature that its cannot perform its office for ever Death therefore cometh from defect of heat when through want of refrigeration the radicall humidity is consumed and dry'd up Refrigeration faileth naturally when by progresse of time the lungs in Creatâ—res that have breath the gils in fishes grow so hard that they are unapt for motion Old men die easily as having but little naturall heat and without pain because his dissolution comes not from any violent affection The lives of living Creatures as well of the same as of divers species differ in length the longest life most commonly is that of some Plants as the Palm and Cypresse that of Creatures which have blood rather then the bloodlesse that of terrestriall creatures rather then the aquatile that of those which have great bodies as of Elephants rather then those of little The causes of long life are first the quantity and quality of the vitall moisture if it be much and fat not easily dry'd up nor congealed Secondly natural hear which suffereth not that humour to be congealed Thirdly a due proportion betwixt this heat and that moisture Fourthly fewnesse of excrements for excrements are contrary to Nature and somtimes corrupt nature it self somtimes a part Salacious creatures or laborious grow soon old by reason of exiccation For the same reason men are shorter liv'd then women but more active In hot Countries animate creatures are larger and live longer then in cold Those animals which have little or no blood either are not at all produced in the Northern parts or soon dye Both Plants and Animals â—f they take not aliment die for the naturall heat when the aliment faileth consumeth the matter it self wherein it is the vitall moisture Aquatile creatures are shorter liv'd then the terrestriall and the bloodlesse then those that have blood because their humidity is more waterish and consequently more apt to be congealed and corrupted Plants live long as having lesse of waterish moisture which therefore is not so apt to be congealed The largenesse of the upper parts as well in Plants as Animals is a signe of long life because it argues much naturall
heat The upper part of a Plant is the root not the boughes THE THIRD PART CHAP. I. ETHICK WE come next to the Morall part of Philosophy including Ethick OEconomick and Politick Of the first we have ten Books of Aristotles written to his Son Nicomachus two Bookes called his Great Ethick one of Vertues Of OEconemick two Books of Politick eight We shall not have recourse to these for an account of his Doctrine in this kind being furnished by Stobaeus with a summary of what he and the rest of the Peripateticks asserted in Morality Ethick saith he is so called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from Custome for those things the principles and seeds whereof we receive from Nature are to be perfected by Custom and right institution Hence Ethick pertaineth only to living Creatures and particularly to man for the rest acquire Custom not by Reason but Necessity man by Reason Of the Soul one part is Rationall the other Irrationall the rationall part is Iudicative the irrationall Appetitive of the rationall that which is Theoretick conversant in divine things is called Science that which is Practick conversant in humane Actions is called Counsell Of the latter one part is concupiscible another irascible In like manner Vertue is twofold rationall and irrationall consisting in Theory and practise Ethick Vertue consisteth not in Science but in election of Goods Vertue is perfected by three things Nature Custom and Reason For man differing from other Creatures both in body and mind as being a species placed between divine essences and irrationall Creatures hath some affinity to both in what is rationall and agrees with the Soul he is ally'd to the Divinity in what is irrationall proper to the body he agrees with the irrationall Both these desire perfection by Reason and first he desireth to be for this is naturally insite in him Hence he affecteth things that are according to his Nature and is averse from things contrary to his nature He endeavoureth to preserve health pleasure life these being according to nature expetible in themselves and good On the contrary he shunneth sicknesse pain and death as being repugnant to nature and therefore ill and to be avoided We love our own bodies we love our own soules their parts their faculties their acts the principle of appetite office and vertue is a providentiall care of these If errour did not happen concerning things expetible and avoidable but that we lived continually participant of good and vold of ill we should not enquire in these for a true election But being in things expetible and avoidable through ignorance often deceived sometimes rejecting the good sometimes admitting the ill for good we necessarily have recourse to constancy of Iudgment which having obtain'd convenient to nature we call it from the excellency of its function Vertue admiring and honouring it above all things For actions and those which are called Offices proceed from election of things according to nature and rejection of things repugnant to nature Herein consist right actions and sinnes even on these dependeth almost the whole reason of Election as we shall briefly demonstrate That Children are expetible to parents not only for use of benefit but also in themselues is most evident There is no man so cruell and savage who doth not rather desire his children after his death should live happily and well then otherwise By this affection dying persons make Wills providing even for the unborn choosing Tutors and Guardians to assist them And as Children are loved for themselves so likewise we love Parents Brethren Wife Kindred Acquaintance Country-men for themselves as having some interest in them by nature For man is a sociable communicative creature and though of Friendships some are more remote then others it is nothing to the purpoâ—e for all friendship is for its own sake and not for use only And if friendship with Country-men be expetible in it selfe it will likewise be expetible in it selfe with all men for all those who benefit others are so affected towards them that they do most actions for the office sake Who will not free any man from a wilde beast if he be in his power Who will not direct a man that is out of his way Who will not relieve a man that is ready to starve or direct a man in a desart to a spring Who desires not to be well spoken of after death Who abhorrs not these speeches as unnaturall When I am dead let earth be mix'd with fire I care not so I now have my desire It is manifest therefore that we have a naturall goodwill and friendship towards all mankinde as being a thing expetible in it selfe and consonant to reason The race of Gods and Men is one From Nature both alike begun Love of all mankinde being thus common to us much more evidently it is expetible in it selfe towards those whom conversation hath made our friends A Friend Friendship and Good-will are expetible in themselves In like manner praise is expetible in it selfe for we contract society with those who praise us And if praise glory likewise which is nothing but the praise of many persons Now seeing that externall Goods are expetible in themselves much more are the goods of the soul and body expetible in themselves For if man be expetible in himselfe the parts of man must likewise be expetible in himselves The parts of man in generall are Soul and Body the body therefore is expetible in it selfe Why should the body of another person be dear to us and not our own Or why should our body be dear to us and not the parts and functions thereof Health therefore strength beauty swiftnesse sound sense and the rest are expetible in themselves for none of ordinary capacity would choose to be deformed or maimed though no inconvenience would happen thereupon so that deformity even without any inconvenience seemeth justly avoidable And if deformity be avoidable in it selfe beauty is expetible not for use only but in it selfe For that beauty pleaseth is manifest in as much as all have a naturall inclination besides that of conversation to such as are beautifull and endeavour to confer benefits on them so as it seemeth to procure benevolence In this respect therefore beauty is judged expetible in it selfe deformity avoidable in it selfe It is the same in health and sicknesse strength and weaknesse activity and heavinesse sense and privation of sense And if Corporeall goods are expetible in themselves and their contrary evills avoidable the parts and vertues of the soul must necessarily be expetible also For vertue beginning as we said from the body and externall goods and reflecting upon it selfe and considering how much more neer relation it hath to the soul contracteth a neerer affinity with it So that the vertues of the soul are much to be preferred before those of the body which is easily collected from what hath been said For if corporeall health be expetible in it selfe much more is Temperance
for from thence the soul conceiveth notions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of those things which are explained by definition and from thence is propagated and connexed the whole reason of Learning and Teaching Sense is a spirit proceeding from the supream part of the Soul and permeating to the Organs Whatsoever things are comprehended are manifestly comprehended by sense all conceptions of the minde depend upon sense Comprehension made by the senses is true and faithfull according to Zeno for as much as nature hath given it as a rule for science and principle of her selfe Nothing is more clear then this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evidence there cannot be any speech more perspicuous Of Sensibles and Intelligibles some are true but not directly sensible but by relation to those things which are next as falling under Intelligence CHAP. IV. Of Phantasy In the first place saith Diocles the Magnesian they put the reason concerning Phantasie and Sense as a judgment whereby the truth of things is discerned It is phantasie as to its genus and likewise in as much as the reason of assent comprehension and intelligence which is more excellent then the rest consists not without Phantasy for phantasy goeth first then the minde endued with elocution declareth by words what it suffers from the phantasy Phantasy is so called from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 light for as light sheweth it selfe and with it selfe all those things which are contained within it so phantasy sheweth it selfe and that which maketh it Phantasy is an impression in the Soul Cleanthes addes an impression by depression and eminence as that impression which is made in Wax by a Seal Chrysippus conceives this to be absurd for 1. saith he When the soule first apprehends a triangle and a square it will follow that the same body at the same time must have in it selfe severall figures which is absurd Again whereas many phantasies are together consistent in us the Soul must have divers figures which is worse then the former He therefore conceived that Zeno used the word Impression for Alteration meaning thus Fantasy is an alteration of the Soul whereby it is no longer absurd that the same body many severall phantasies being at the same time consistent in us should receive severall alterations For as the aire receiving at once innumerable different percussions hath presently many alterations so the supream part of the soule receiving various phantasies doth something which hath proportion and conformity thereto Some object that this exposition is not right because though every phantasy is an impression and alteration in the Soul yet every impression or alteration of the Soul is not phantasy as when the finger smarts or itches and the hand is rubbed there is then an impression and alteration in the soul but it is not phantasy because it is not in the supream part of the soul. They answer That in saying an impression in the Soul is implyed as in the Soul as fully as if we should say phantasy is an impression in the Soul as in the Soul as when we say the white in the eye we imply as in the eye that is the white is in a certain part of the eye which all men have so by nature So when we say Phantasy is an impression in the Soul we imply the impression to be made in the supream part thereof Others more elegantly answer that the word Soul is taken two waies either for the whole or for the principall part when we say man consists of soul and body or that death is a separation of the soul from the body we mean properly the supream part wherein properly consists the motion and goods of the Soul When Zeâ—o therefore calleth Phantasy an impression in the Soul he is not to be understood of the whole Soul but of part thereof as if he should say Phantasy is an alteration of the supream part of the Soul To this interpretation some object thus Appetition Assention and Comprehension are alterations in the supream part of the soul but these differ from phantasy that being a certain kinde of perswasion and affection whereas this is more operation then appetition therefore the definition is not good being competible to many other things They answer by recourse to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impliances that a definition is understood to be in all As he who saith Love is an application of the Soul towards procurement of Friendship implyeth amongst young people so when we say that phantasy is an alteration in the supream part of the soul we imply by perswasion for alteration is not made by operation Of Phantasies there are many kinds some are sensible others not-sensible Sensible are those which are received through one or more of the sences Not-sensible are those which are received through the minde as of incorporealls and other things comprehended by reason The sensible formed from things that are are made with concession and assent There are also apparitions of phantasies proceeding from things which are Again some are rationall others irrationall rationall those of reasonable creatures irrationall those of unreasonable The rationall are intelligence the irrationall have no name Again some are artificiall others in-artificiall for an Image is considered by an Artist one way by him that is not an artist another way Again some are probable some improbable The probable are those which make an easie motion in the soul as It is now day I discourse and the like The Improbable are of a contrary nature averting us from assent as it is day the Sun is not above the earth if it is dark it is day Both probable and improbable are those which by relation to other things are sometimes such as in doubtfull speeches neither probable nor improbable are such as these The staires are even the staires are odd Of probable and improbable Phantasies some are true some are false some are neither true nor false True are those whose predication is true as It is day 't is light False whose predication is false Both true and false as happened to Orestes in his madnesse meeting Electra that he met something it was true for it was Electra but that it was a fury was false Neither true nor false are those which are taken from the Genus for the Genus is not such as the Species in all respects as of men some are Grecians some are Barbarous but man in generall is not Grecian for then all men must be Grecians neither barbarous for the same reason Of true Phantasies some are comprehensive others are not-comprehensive Not-comprehensive are those which happen through sicknesse or perturbation of minde many being troubled with frenzie or melancholly attract a true phantasy which is not comprehensive even from that which extrinsecally occurrs casually for which reason they neither assert it often nor assent unto it Comprehensive phantasie is that which is impressed and signed by that which is and conformable to
choice of either are indifferent There is an appetition to the election of one but not more of this then of that The third kind of indifferents are those which are neither good nor ill expetible nor avoidable conducing neither to happinesse nor unhappinesse In this sense all things are called indifferent which are betwixt Vertue and Vice as health wealth strength glory and the like for we may be happy without these though their use hath some relation to happinesse their abuse to unhappinesse In this sense whatsoever we may somtimes use wel other times ill is indifferent which kind appertaineth chiefly to Ethick Again of Indifferents some are Naturall and move appetite as health strength soundnesse of sense and the like some Praeternaturall which move avertion as sicknesse infirmity and the like some Neuter which move neither appetite nor aversion as the constitution of the soul and body one capable of receiving Phantasies the other wounds Of naturall and praeternaturall indifferents some are primary others by participation Primary naturall Indifferents are motions or affections convenient with reason as health and strength Participant are those by which that motion or affection is communicated as a healthfull body â—ound sense Praeternaturall Indifferents are the contrary to these CHAP. XII Of Estimation EStimation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a certain concurrence with convenient life which concernes all good Estimation is two-fold one a mediate power or use concurring with life according to nature such we call health or wealth as far as they conduce to life according to nature The other is the valuation of the Estimator imposed by him who is skilfull in such things Again Estimation is taken three waies First for absolute donation Secondly for return of approbation Thirdly as Antipater calls it Elective by which when some things are proposed we rather choose these then those as health before sicknesse life before death and riches before poverty In like manner disestimation is taken three waies the termes only changed to the contrary Donation according to Diogenes is a judgment that a thing is according to nature or conferreth use thereto Approbation is in in man not in things Election only in the goood not the indifferent Hence followeth another distinction of indifferents whereof some are preserred some rejected some neither preferred nor rejected Preferred are those which though they are indifferents have neverthelesse a sufficient reason why they are to be had in estimation as health soundnesse of sense exemption from griefe glory and the like Rejected are those which are not worthy any estimation as poverty sicknesse and the like Neuter are those which are neither preferred nor rejected as to extend or contract the finger These termes preferred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and rejected 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were invented by Zeno upon this ground As when we speak of the Court no man â—aith the King himselfe is preferred to dignity but those who are in some honour next and second to him in rank so when we speak of life we call not those things which are in the first place the preferred or promoted but those which are in the second and so likewise in the rejected Now forasmuch as good hath the first place it followes that what is preferred is neither good nor ill No good is reckoned amongst the preferred because that hath the greatest estimation but the preferred having the second estimation approacheth somewhat to the nature of good It is called preferred not that it conduceth to Beatitude but in respect of the rejected We define it thus an Indifferent with mean estimation for it could not be that nothing should be left in mean things that is according to or contrary to nature neither being left that nothing should be placed in them which is sufficiently estimable this being granted that there is not somthing preferred Rightly therefore this distinction is made and may more fully be explained by this smile As if we should suppose our ultimate end to be so to cast the dy that it may chance right the dy that shall be so to cast as to fall right must have some thing preposed and preferred towards its end and on the other side the contrary yet the preposition of the dy nothing conduceth to that end to those which are preferred relate indeed to the end but nothing pertain to the power and nature thereof Of the preferred some are in the Soul as ingenuity art progression and the like some in the body as life health strength ability soundnesse beauty some externall as riches honour nobility and the like In like manner of the rejected some are in the Soul as he betude ignorance some in the body as death sicknesse infirmity maim deformity Some externall as poverty dishonour and meannesse Likewise of the Neuter some are in the Soul as imagination assent some in the body as whitenesse blacknesse some externall which having no estimation or use are of little value Those which are preferred in the Soul conduce more to living according to Nature and are of more worth then those of the body or the externall as to have a good disposition of mind is better then to have a good disposition of body Again of the preferred some are preferred for themselves as ingenuity countenance state notion and the like some for others because they effect somthing as Riches and Nobility some both for themselves and others as health strength soundnesse ability for themselves as being according to Nature for others as affording no small benefit As concerning Reputation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Chrysippus and Diogenes affirm that being separated from utility we should not so much as stretch out our finger for it But those who followed them not able to withstand Carneades affirmed Reputation to be preferred for it selfe and that it was proper for an ingenuous man freely educated to desire to be well spoken of by his Parents kinred and good men and that for the thing it self not for the use thereof adding that as we provide for Children though to be born after our death so we must provide for future reputation after death even for its own sake separated from all use In like manner of the rejected some are rejected for themselves some for others some both for themselves and others which appears by the rule of Contraries CHAP. XIII Of Actions and Offices OF those Actions which proceed from appetite some are offices some praeter-offices some neuter Office is that which is preferred and hath a good reason for the doing thereof as being convenient to life or as others Office is whatsoever reason requireth to be done as to honour our Brethren Parents Country to relieve our friends Zeno first gave it this name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Office 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is an action conformable to the dictates of nature and extends even to plants and irrationall living creatures for offices
he declared God to be the first of Beings But that the Mens of â—naxagoras for the annexing of which to matter he was so much famed was no more then what he borrowed from Thales the words of Cicero make good He affirmed that God by the immutable decree of his providence governs the world Thales saith Stobaeus being demanded what was most strong answered Necessity for it rules all the world Necessity is the firm judgment and immutable power of providence Hither we must likewise referre what is cited under his name by the same Stobaeus that the first mover is immovable which Aristotle hath borrow'd from him not owning the Author Something imperfectly was before delivered by Orpheus concerning God alledged by Clemens Alexandrinus and others but as Cicero saith Thales was the first among the Grecians who made any search into these things and that he brought it out of Aegypt the Grecians themselves deny not for they acknowledge that they received the names of their Gods from thence and beleeved the Aegyptians to be the first who looking up to the world above them and admiring the nature of the universe reflected upon the Deity Sect. 3. Of Daemons THales saith Plutarch with Pythagoras Plato and the Stoicks hold that Daemons are spirituall substances and the Hero's souls separated from the bodies of which sort there are two good and bad the good Hero's are the good souls the bad the bad The same order Athenagoras attests to be observed by Thales ranking the three degrees thus First that of the immortall Gods next Daemons thirdly Heroes This was followed by Pythagoras that the Gods were to be prefered in reverence before Daemons Hero's before men He affirm'd as Stobaeus saith the world to be full of these Daemons This is thought the meaning of that of Aristotle repeated by Cicero Thales thought that all things were full of Gods The same assertion Laertius ascribes to Pythagoras that all the aire is full of souls which are Hero's and Daemons This opinion was asserted by the Greeks before the time of Thales particularly by Hesiod but whether that be argument enough to deny that Thales had it from the Aegyptians I question that they held it in the same manner we may learn by Iamblichus Besides Pythagoras and Plato whom Plutarch joynes in this Tenet with Thales drew their learning from the same fountain Sect. 4. Of the Soul PLutarch and Stobaeus say that Thales first affirm'd the soul to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a selfe moving nature Aristotle that he calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect to the motion it gives to other things in which are included both parts of the definition of the Platonists a substance having within it selfe a power to move it selfe and other things which Plato argues to this effect The first of motions is that whereby a thing moves it selfâ— the second that whereby it moves another every thing that moves it selfe lives every living thing lives because it moves it selfe the resore the power of selfe motion is the essence of that substance which we call the soul which soul is the cause of the first generation and motion of things which are nere and shall be and of all their contraries as of all transmutation the principall of motion and therefore more antient than the body which it moves by a second motion And afterwards declares these to be the names of the souls motion to will to consider to take care to consult to judge rightly and not rightly to joy to grieve to dare to fear to hate to love and the like These which are the first motions and suscipient of the second corporall bring all things into augmention and dâ—creâ—se conversion or condâ—mnation and descretion or rarefaction This opinion first raised by Thales was entertained in the schooles with the assent of Pythagoras Anaxagoras Socrates and Plato till exploded by Aristotle whose chief arguments against it were these 1. That nothing is moved but what is in place nothing in place but what hath quantity which because the soul wants none of the foure kinds of motion viz. Lation Alteration diminution accretion are competible perse to her Secondly that selfe motion is not essentiall to the Soul because she is moved accidentally by externall objects The first if understood of Circumscription not only denies the motion of all things that are definitively in place as spirits but of the highest sphear if compared with Aristotles definition of place yet that some of these species of motion though in a different extraordinary manner are competent to the soul and not accidentally may be argued 1. From the further diffusion of the soul according to the augmentation of the body 2. From intellection which is acknowledg'd a perfection and consequently a kind of alteration which that Thales understood to be one of the soul's motions is clear from that Apothegme ascribed to him by Lâ—ertius the swiftest of things is the mind for it over-runs all things Whence Cicero confessing almost in the very words of Thales that nothing is swifter then the mind that no swiftnesse may compare with the swiftnesse of the mind would interpret the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Aristotle a continued and perpetuall motion The second reason may be questioned by comparing the acts of the memory and reminiscence the first occasion'd by exterior things yet objective only so that the motion is within her selfe but by the other she moves her selfe from a privation to a habit without the help of any exterior It is worth notice that among these and other reasons alledg'd by Aristotle to destroy this assertion one is the possibility of the resurrection of the body but this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 From the second part of the difference in the definition viz. from moving other things Thales argued that the Load-stone and Amber had soules the first because it drawes Iron the second Straw He further saith Laertius asserted those things we count inonimate to have souls arguing it from the loadstone and Amber the reason of which latter example Aldobrandinuâ— falsely interprets its change of colour and jarring as it were at poison But Aristotle more plainly for of those whom we mentioned Thales seems to have taken the soul to be something 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 apt to move since he affirmed a stone to have a soul because it moved Iron He asserted likewise the soul of man to be immortall and according to Cherilus was the first that held so Cicero ascribes the originall of this opinion to Pherecydes but it rather seems to have been brought by Thales from the Egyptians that they held so Herodotus attests Sect. 5. Of the World THales held that there was but one world and that made by God which truth was follow'd by all Philosophers as Aristotle confesseth untill he rejected it to defend by the contâ—arie an
assent of him with whom it is held to things not doubtfull by which assents it causeth that he yâ—eld to a doubtfull thing by reason of the likenesse it hath to those things whereunto he assented this kind of speech Socrates most used because he would not himselfe use any argument of perswasion but rather chose to work something out of that which he granted him with whom he disputed which he by reason of that which he already yeelded unto must necessarily approve of which he gives a large example in Plato's Meno Thus whosoever disputed with him of what subject soever his end being only to promote vertue was at last brought round about to give an account of his life past and present whereinto being once entered he never gave him over till he had sufficiently examined those things and never let them go Proteus like till they came at last to themselves For this reason he used to say his skill had some affinity with that of his mother he being like a Midwife though barren as he modestly affirms in himselfe endeavoured with a particular gift in assisting others to bring forth what they had within themselves and this was one reason why he refused to take mony affirming that he knew nothing himselfe and that he was never Master to any These disputes of Socrates were committed to writing by his Schollers wherein Xenophon gave example to the rest in doing it first as also with most punctualnesse as Plato with most liberty intermixing so much of his own as it is not easie to distinguish the Master from the Scholar whence Socrates hearing him recite his Lysis said how many things doth this young man feign of me And Xenophon denying Socrates ever disputed of heaven or of naturall causes or the other disciplines which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith they who ascribe such dissertaâ—ions to him lye falsely wherein as Agellius observes he intends Plato in whose books Socrates discourseth of Naturall Philosophy Musick and Geometry CHAP. V. Of his Philosophy POrphyrius who was so abusive as Nicephorus observes that hetraduced Socrates with no lesse bitternesse then as if he endeavoured to outdoe his accusers Anytus and Melitus affirmes He was ingenious in nothing unlearned in all scarce able to write which when upon any occasion he did it was to derision and that he could read no better then a stammering schoole-boy To which we shall oppose these Authorities Xenophon who attests he was excellent in all kinds of learning instanceth in Arithmetick Geometry and Astrology Plato in Naturall Philosophy Idâ—meneus in Rhetorick Laertius in Medicine In a word Cicero averres that by the testimony of learned men and the judgment of all Greece as well in wisdome acutenesse politenesse and sultlety as in eloquence â—aâ—ietie and copiousnesse to wha soever part he gave himselfe he was without exception Prince of all Having searched into all kinds of Science he observed these inconveniences and imperfections First That it was improper to leave those affaires which concern mankind to enquire into things without us Secondly That these things are above the reach of man whence are occasioned all disputes and oppositions some acknowledging no God others worshipping stocks and stones some asserting one simple being others infinite some that all things are moved others that all things are immovable And Thirdly that these things if attained could not be practised for he who contemplating divine mysteries enquires by what necessity things were made cannot himselfe make any thing or upon occasion produce winds waters seasons or the like Thus esteeming speculative knowledge as far only as it conduceth to practice he cut off in all sciences what he conceived of least use In Arithmetick he approved only as much as was necessary Plato instanceth in Merchandise and Tacticks but to proceed to uselesse operations he disallowed In Geometry he allowed that part which teacheth measuring as no lesse easie then usefull but to proceed to infinite propositions and demonstrations he disallowed as wholly unprofitable In Astrology he approved the knowledge of the Starres and observation of the night months and seasons as being easily learned and very beneficiall in Navigation and to those who hunt by night but to examine the difference of sphears distance of starres from the earth and their circles he disswaded as uselesse Finally noting how little adâ—antâ—ge speculation brought to the life and conversation of mankind he reduced â—er to action He first saith Cicero called Philosophy away from things involved by nature in secrecy wherein untill his time all Philosophers had been employed and brought her to common life to enquire of â—ertues and â—ices good and evill Man who was the sole subject of his Philosophy having a twofold relation of divine speculation and human conversation his Doctrines were in the former respect Metaphysicall in the latter Morall Sect. 1. Metaphysicks His Metaphysicall opinions are thus collected and abridged out of Plato Xenophon Plutarch and others Philosophy is the way to true happinesse the offices whereof are two to contemplate God and to abstract the soul from corporeall sense There are three principles of all things God matter and Ideas God is the universall intellect matter the first subject of generation and corruption Idea an incorporeall substance the intellect of God God the intellect of the world God is one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perfect in himselfe giving the being and well being of every creature what he is saith he I know not what he is not I know That God not chance made the world and all creatures is demonstrable from the reasonable disposition of their parts as well for use as defence from their care to preserve themselves and continue their species that he particularly regards man in his body from the excellent uprighâ— form thereof from the gift of speech from allowance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in his soule from the excellency thereof above others in both for divinations predicting dangers that he regards particulars from his care of the whole species that he will reward such as please him and punish such as displease him from his power to do it from the belief he hath imprinted in a man that he will do it profest by the most wise and civilized Cities and ages that he at once seeth all things from the instances of the eye which at once over-runs many miles and of the mind which at once considereth things done in the most distant places Finally that he is such and so great as that he at once sees all hears all is every where and orders all This is the sum of his discourse with Aristodemus to which we may annex what is cited under his name if not mistaken by Stobaeus Care if by care ought may effected be If not why caâ—'st thou when God cares for thee He held that the Gods knew all things said done
pleasant or unpleasant by nature but by custom Unseasonable love is like hate Being demanded what is grievous to the good he answered the prosperity of the wicked Being demanded how a man might live without trouble he answered it was not possible but that he who lives in a City or a Family must sometimes be afflicted Wicked hopes like ill guides deceive a man and lead him into sin A woman cannot conceive without a man nor a good hope produce any benefit without labour Winter had need of garments old age of disingagement from grief In life as in a Theater wee should continue so long as the sight of things and actions of life seem delightfull The mad should be bound the ignorant instructed That we should endeavour to shun the censorious and to apply our selves to such as are candid that wee should undertake onely such things as we can perform and decline such as we cannot that whensoever we undertake any thing we should employ therein our utmost study and endeavour is the sum of his advise to Eutherus He said the office of a wise man is to discern what is good and honest and to shun that which is dishonest They who know what they ought to do and do it not are not wise and temperate but fooles and stupid Justice and every other virtue is wisdom To be ignorant of our selves to seem to know those things wherof we are ignorant is next to madnesse That a pious person is rightly defined such a one as knows what is lawfull as to the gods a just he that knowes what is lawfull as to men that a man is wise as far as he knows that what is profitable is fair to that whereto it is profitable that they who know how to use terrible things and dangerous are valiant the contrary timerous is the sum of his discourse with Euthydamus He conceived the onely wisdom of man to consist in not thinking he understands those things which he doth not understand To one that complained he had not benefited himself by travell and not without reason saith he because thou didest travell with thy self He affirmed there is but one good thing knowledge one ill ignorance but that riches and nobility had nothing in them of worth but on the contrary all evills When a wise man openeth his mouth the virtues of his are manifested as Images in a Temple In navigation wee ought to be guided by the Pilot in the course of life by those of better judgement Being demanded what wisdom was he answered the composure of the Soul being demanded who were wise they saith he who not easily erre The souls reason augmenteth it self as in a play the wisest not the richest ought to bear the prize Fugitives fear though not pursued fooles though not in adversity are troubled Seeing a young man rich and unlearned behold saith he golden slave The luxurious is hardly cured in sicknesse the fool in adversity The coward useth armes against himself the fool money Acâ—illes armour sits not Thersiles nor the good habits of the soul a fool Be not forward in speech for many times the tongue hath cut off the head In war steel is better then gold in life wisdom excelleth wealth Of Piety and Obedience THat the greatest of vices is ingratitude of obligations that to Parents that a disobedient Son the Gods will not blesse nor men love as doubting his return of either knowing he doth it not where so much is due is the sum of his discourse with Apiles Our prayers should be for blessings in generall for God knows best what is good for us our offerings proportioned to our abilities for he considers integrity not munificence He said with the Pythian Oracle that the Gods are to be worshipped according to the Law of the City where a man lives they who do otherwise he thought superstitious and vain The best way of worshipping God is to do what he commands Superstition is obedient to pride as its parent A harsh Father like a severe law must not withstanding be obeyed The reproof of a Father is a kind remedy it brings more ease then pain Of fortitude and imbecillity THat a man ought to inure himself to voluntary labour sufferance so as what shall be imposed by necessity may appear in him not compulsive but free that soft waies of living in pleasures beget no good constitution of body nor knowledge of the mind That tolerance raiseth us to high attempts is the effect of his discourse with Aristippus To one who was fearfull to go so far on foot as Olympia he demonstrated to make the journey seem easie that it was no more then his daily walk within doors if extended at length would easily reach One that complained he was weary of a journey he reproved hiâ— for being more weary then his servant that followed him laden He said death resembled either a deep sleep or a long journey out of our Native Country or an absolute annihilation of soul and body examining all which he affirmed death to be in none of those respects evill as to the first saith Plutarch it is not ill with those that sleep and wee esteem that sleep sweetest which is deepest as if we look on it as a journey it is rather a blessing for thereby we are freed from the slavery and affections of the flesh which possesse and infatuate the mind in the last respect it makes us insensible of ill and pain as well as of good and pleasure A statue stands firm on its base a vertuous man on firm resolutions Voluntary labours are delighted with assurance of ease idlenesse and transitory pleasures beget neither a good constitution of body nor any good habit in the Soule Being demanded what is strength he answered the motion of the soul with the body Seeing the gates of Corinth strongly barr'd he asked dwell women here An honest death is better then a dishonest life He used to say liberty is sister to sloth instancing in the Indians and Persians both lazy the Phrygians and Lydians very industrious as being under servitude Of Temperance Continence and Contentednesse HE advised to shun all occasions of incontinence affirming that such as conversed much with fair women could not easily be continent That the sight and kisses of the fair infuse a poison more dangerous then that of Scorpions and Spiders is the sum of his discourse to Xenophon and Critobulus That a free man ought not to entertain a servant addicted to pleasures that he which is slave to pleasures should pray to the gods for better Masters is the conclusion of his discourse de continentia That happinesse consists not in luxury and pride that to want nothing is divine to want the least next
to divine is the the conclusion of his discourse with Antipho He advised such as could not easily abstain at feasts to take heed of such things as perswade those that are not hungry to eat and those that are not thirsty to drink for they destroyed the appetite the head and the soul. He used to say merrily Circ◠turned men into Swine by feasting them with such meats but that ulysses partly through Minerva's advice partly through his own temperance refraining from such things remained unchanged That health of body ought diligently to be preserved as that whereon all knowledge of the soule dependes Is the summe of his discourse with Epigenes He advised one that complained he took no delight in his meat to refrain from eating whereby his diet would become more pleasant cheap and wholesome In the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to feast the particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 implies that we should eat only such things as will not hurt the mind nor the body and are easie to be gotten That only temperate persons that discern and choose the best things refraining from the worst that by temperance men become the most excellent and most happy sittest for discourse is the summe of his discourse with Euthidemus Hearing one of his friends say this Town is exceeding deer Chian wine costs a Mina purple three a pint of honey five Denaries he carried him to the Meal-men hear saith he a pint is sold for an obolus it is cheap living in this Town then to those that sold Olives a Chaenix two farthings thence to the frippery a Suit ten Drachmes things are cheap in this Town He said the hungry wanted no sauce the thirsty no choice of wines He commended quiet and leasure above all things He said they who buy early fruits at dear rates believe they will not come in their due season Being asked what was a young mans vertue he answered to do nothing too much Seeing one eate broth very greedily he said Which of you here present useth bread for broth and broth for bread Of which see more at large Xenophon his Memorab Lib. One saying that it was a great matter to abstain from what a man desires he answered but it is much a greater not to desire at all A cleer fire becomes the chimney serenity the mind He said We ought not to seek pleasures in others but in our selves the body being predisposed according as it ought He said It is the property of God to need nothing to need least nighest to God Being demanded from what things we ought to refrain most he answered from sordid unjust pleasures Contentednesse is like a short and pleasant way it hath much delight little toile He that would see vertue as his Country must passe by pleasures as Syrens Being demanded whom he thought richest he answered him who is contented with least for content is the riches of Nature Being demanded what continence is he answered government of corporeall pleasures He said the wicked live to eat but the good eat to live When a woman saith she loveth thee take heed of those words more then when she revileth thee Of Liberality Prodigality and Covetousnesse HE conceived that they who took mony of any owned them for their Masters in the meanest degree of servitude That wisdome is prostituted as well as beauty by taking mony for it that he who meets with an ingenious person ought to acquaint him with all the good he can gratis whereby he acquires a friend and doth the part of a good member of the common-wealth is the summe of his second discourse with Antipho He said if a rich man be proud of his wealth that he could not praise him till he knew how he would employ it None can safely manage a horse without a bit nor riches without reason He compared covetous persons to birds one devoures what ever it meets till it choakes it selfe the rest falling upon what the first left are one after another choaked also The wealth of covetous persons is like the Sun after he is set delights none He that gives to a rich man throwes water into the Sea The life of a covetous person is like the feasts made for the dead he hath all but enjoyes nothing He compared the wealth of prodigalls to fig-trees growing on a precipice for these none are the better but Kites and Crowes for those only harlots and flatterers Being demanded who were covetous he answered such as seek after sordid gain and neglect their necessary friends Wine changeth with the Vessell riches follow the manners of the owner Of Magnanimity and Pride TO one angry for having saluted a man that returned not his salutations It is ridiculous saith he if you are not angry with every one you meet of worse shape or for◠then your self to be angry with any for having leste manners Pride like an ill potter or statuary represents the forms of things inverted Wind puffes up empty bladders opinion fooles To be exalted with good fortune is to runne in a slippery way Of Patience THere is lesse danger in drinking intemperately of troubled water then with a troubled mind full of wrath before it be allayed and purified to satisfie thy anger in the punishment of a kinsman or countryman If every one should bring his misfortunes into a publick stock to be shar'd alike amongst all men the greater part of those that now complain so much would be contented and glad to keep their own It is all one if a man being overcome in any gymnick sports should sue his adversary as for a man over master'd by Fortune to accuse her not knowing upon what conditions we entered into the contests of life Of Veracity and Flattery THere is no better way to glory then to endeavour to be good as well as to seem such The kindnesse of flatterers is chased away by adversity Hunters take hares with hounds many take fooles with their own praises Wolves resemble dogs and flatterers friends but their aimes are quite contrary Flattery is like a painted armour only for show not use Think not those faithfull who praise all thy words and actions but those who reprove thy faults Suffer not a talker and slanderer for he tells not thee any thing out of good will but as he discourseth the secrets of others so will he thine to others Good men must let the world see that their manners are more firme then an oath Of Vrbanity and Conversation A Little Hall will serve to dance in and every place and posture to speak Wind kindles fire conversation Love Freedome of discourse like the seasons of the year is best in its proper time It s arrogance to speak all and to be unwilling to
be because saith he I never did any unjust act which I conceive the best apologie but we often see Judges saith Hermogenes overswai'd by Rhetorick to condemne the innocent and acquit the guilty the truth is replyed Socrates going about to make my apology I was twice withheld by the Daemon whereat Hermogenes wondring is it strange continues hee that God should think it fit for me to dy at this time hitherto no man hath lived more uprightly which as it is now my greatest comfort so it was the greatest delight to my selfe and friends if I live longer I know I mustundergoe what is proper to old age defects of hearing and sight slownesse to apprehend aptness to forget how can I then be pleased to live longer and grow worse It is likely God in his love to mee hath ordained that I should die in the most convenient age and by the gentlest meanes for if I die by sentence I am allowed the benefit of the most easie kind of death I shall give my friends the least trouble I shall doe nothing unseemely before those that are present and shall depart sound in body and soule is not this very desirable God with much reason forbids me to make any defence If I could effect it I should onely stay longer to be taken away by the torment of diseases and imperfections of age which truly Hermogenes I desire not If when I give an accompt of my actions towards God and men the Judges think fit to condemne me I will rather chufe to die then to beg of them a life worse then death Other friends used the same perswasions to him with assurance of victory Lycias an excellent Oratour offered him an Oration which he had written in his defence desiring him if he thought good to make use of it at his tryall Socrates perused it and told him that it was a good one but not fit for him Lysias asking how that could be why saith he may not a garment or shooes be rich yet not fit for me if you should bring me Sicyonian shooes I would not weare them though they were fit for my feet because they are effeminate he conceived the Oration to be ingenious and eloquent but not stout and manly for though it were very bitter against the Judges yet was it more rhetoricall then became a Philosopher The day of tryall being come Anytus Lyco and Melitus prepared to accuse him one in behalfe of the people the second of the Oratours the last of the Poets Melitus first went up into the chaire proper for that purpose and there spoke an Oration which was in it felt mean enough but withall deliver'd so unhappily and school-boy-like that sometimes he was out with fear and turned about to be prompted like a player enough to beget laughter even in those that were most concern'd in so serious a caufe Part of the effect whereof seems to be the same which is thus by Xenophon dispersedly deliver'd some particulars whereof are confirmed by Libanius That Socrates perswaded his auditors to contemn the received Lawes saying it was sit onely for fooles to bee govern'd by a bean meaning the suffrages of the Senate so gather'd That he was intimately conversant with Critias and Alcibiades one most covetous and violent in the Oligarchy the other ambitious of Tyranny That he taught direspect and obedience to Parents telling his scholers hee would make them wiser than their Fathers and that it was lawfull for any one to bind his Father if hee were mad and for those that were the more wise to do as much to those that were lesse wise That he taught also direspect of all other kinsmen saying they were not usefull to the sick or to the accused the first being in more need of a Physician the latter of an Oratour that the good will of unable friends was nothing worth that onely the most knowing persons were most worthy of honour by which means he would arrogate all respect to himself That he selected out of the Poets some ill places and perverted others that were not so to excite his friends to impious actions as that of Hesiod There is no work pursued shame 'T is idleness hat merits blame He expounded as if the Poet meant all acts might be committed for gain That he often repeated and misinterpreted tese words of Homer as if the poet allowed the poor to be beaten When he a Prince or some great person meets Such with soft language kindly thus he greets Happy above the reach of fear are you Sit down and bid your followers do so too But of the lower fort when any speaks Forth these words with blows his anger breaks Be quiet to shy betters wretch submit For action and advice alike unsit Melitus his oration ended came down next him came Anytus with a long malicious speech and last of all Lyco with all the artisice of Rhetorick concluded the accusation Socrates would not as was the custom procure an Advocate to plead for him all the while his accusers were speaking he seemed to employ his mind about nothing lesse as soon as they had done he went up into the chair in which action he observed that the Daemon did not withhold him anâ— with an angry smile begun this unpremeditated answer not as a suppliant or guilty person but as if Master of the Judges themselves with a free contumacy proceeding not from pride but the greatnesse of his mind But I wonder first Athenians how Melitus came by this knowledge that as he saith I do not worship those Gods the City worships Others have seen me and to might Melitus if he had pleas'd sacrifice at common festivalls on the publick Altars How do I introduce new deities when I professe to be directed in all my actions by the voice of God they who observe the notes of birds or answers of men are guided by the voice none doubts of thunder whether it bee loud or oraculous Doth not the Priestesse on the Tripod convey to us by voice what the God delivers to her and that he foreknowes events communicating them to whom pleaseth him all men as well as I believe and professe others call those that foretell events Augurs Soothsayers and Diviners I the Daemon and I conceive more religiously then they who ascribe a Divine power to birds That I am no impostor herein many can attest who have asked my advice and never found it fail Here there arose a murmur in the Senate some not believing others envying what he said that he should surpasse them in such a particular favour of the deity Let such as are incredulous hear this also to confirm their opinion that I am not favour'd of the Gods when Chaerephon in the presence of many witnesses question'd the Delphian Oracle concerning me Apollo answered that no man was more free more just or more wise here another murmur arose amongst the Judges he proceeded Yet
before we could be admitted for the eleven Officers were there taking off his fetters having brought him word that he must die to day not long after he came out again and told us we might go in where when we came we found Socrates his fetters newly taken off and Xantippe sitting by him with a child in her armes She as soon as she saw us burst forth into tears and cried out ah Socrates this is the last time thy friends shall ever speak to thee or thou to them Crito saith Socrates addressing himself to him let some body cary her home whereupon some of Crito's servants lead her away exclaiming and beating her brest Socrates who was sitting upon the bed drew up his leg and rubb'd it saying the whilst How strange a thing friends is that which men call pleasure how near a kin to pain to which it seems so contrary they arrive not indeed together but hee that takes one is immediately overtaken by the other as if they were tied together If Aesop had observ'd this certainly hee would have made some fable of it as if God willing to compose their difference had joined them by the end not being able to make them absolutely one so that whosoever hath one must strait have the other also As it happens to me at this time the pain my â—etters even now gave me is now turned to a kind of pleasure and tickles me You have opportunely said Cebes put me in mind to ask why since your imprisonment which you never did before you have writ Poems a hymnne to Apollo and Aesops Fables render'd into verse many have question'd me about it particularly Eâ—â—nus if hee repeat this demand what answer shall I give him Tell him answers Socrates that truly I did it not to to contend with him and his verses but to comply with a dream which I have had more then once enjoyning me to practise Musick in obedience whereunto I first made verses in honour of the God whose feast this was Then conceiving it essential to a Poet to write sictions which of my self I use not I made use of some of Aesops which I had in memory as they first came into my fancy Tell Euenus this and bid him from me farewell and if he be wise follow me for it seems I must go hence to day the Athenians have so order'd it What is that said Stmmtas which you bid Euemus do I have often conversed with him but as far as I understand him hee will not be at all ready to be rul'd by you what saith he is he not a Philosopher he seem so answers Sâ—mmias then he will replyed Socrates and so will all who deserve that name but perhaps he will not lay violent hands upon himself that is not lawfull and as he was speaking thus he set down his leg again to the ground and sitting so continued all the rest of the dispute Then Ceâ—es asking why how it could be that it should be prohibited to ones self yet that a Philosopher ought to desire to follow a dying person he answered men are the possessions of God would you not be angry if your slave should kill himself against your will and if it were in your power punish him we must expect a suinmons from God an inevitable necessity such as I have at this time to take us hence This is truth replied Cebâ—s but what you asserted even now is inconsistent with it God taking care of us as his possessions can a wise man desire to be out of his protection he cannot think to mend his condition by freeing himself from so excellent a government Socrates seemed much pleased with the subtlety of Cebâ—s and turning to us said Cebes is alwaies inquisitive nor will easily admit any thing to me said Simmtas what he hath said seemâ— reason how can wise men endure much lesse endeavour to part with those that are so much better then themselves but Coâ—es herein reflects upon you who are so ready to leave us and the Gods whom you acknowledge good Governours you say well answers Socrates I suppose your would have me answer as in a Court of Judicature by all meanes saith Simmiasâ— well then replies he I will endeavour to defend my self better against you then I did before the Judges Truly did I not believe I should go to just Gods and to men better then any living I were inexcusable for contemning death but I am sure to go to the Gods very good Masters and hope to meet with good men and am of good courage hoping that something of man subsists after death and that it is then much better with the good then with the bad Here Crito interrupting him told him that he who was to administer the poison advis'd him to speak little not heat himself with dispute for it agreed not with that kind of poison which some neglecting had bin constrained to take it two or three times mind him not said Socrates let him provide as much as may serve twice or thrice if need be Then he proceeded in a large discourse to declare that the chief office of a Philosopher is to meditate on death therefore he ought not to fear the approach of it That as death is the solution of the Soul from the Body so is it the office of a Philosopher to free the soul from corporeall affections That if we understand the better the more the soul is disengaged from sense we shall understand most perfectly when she is wholly freed from the body by death which perfection of knowledge is the sole end of Philosophy This part of the discourse ended Cebes occasions the renewing of it by the desiring him to prove the immortality of the soule which he doth first from the necessary succession of generation corruption as contraries the ground of the Pythagorean transmigration next from the Soules manner of reasoning which being only by reminiscence argues it had a being before the body when it had perfect knowledge of those Ideas which upon occasion of sensible objects it recovers and consequently shall subsist after it much more is spoken by Plato under his name whereof almost all is manisestly Plato owne nor is it possible to select that which is not from the rest the conclusion of his discourse as contracted by Cicero was That there are two waies and a twofold course of Soules when they goe out of the body for such as have defiled themselves with humane vices given over to pleasures where with they are blinded according as they are polluted with domestick sins or have used inexpiable deceits to wrong the publike take a by way secluded from the Councell of the Gods But they who have preserved themselves intire chast from the least contagion of their bodyies having alwaies withdrawne themselves from them and in humane slesh imitated the lives of Gods find a ready way open for them leading them to those from whom they came and as swans
others red others white so is it likewise consonant to reason that they who are affected according to nature by reason of the different constitution of senses are not moved alike by the same things but one way the white another way the black another way he whose eyes are blew another way he whose eyes are black whence we impose common names on things having our selves proper and particular affections Sect. 2. Of the End or chief Good TO these assertions continueth Sextus Empericus concerning the Judicatories agreeth what they assert concerning Ends. Of Affections some are pleasant some harsh and troublesome some mean the harsh and troublesome are ill whose end is griefe the pleasant good whose end which cannot be deceived is pleasure The mean are neither good nor ill whose end is neither good nor ill which is an affection between pleasure and griefe Affections therefore are the judges and ends of all things and we live say they observing evidence and liking evidence in the rest of the affections liking in pleasure Laertius saith they assert two passions or affections Griefe and Pleasure pleasure a soft smooth motion griefe a harsh motion One pleasure differeth not from another pleasure nor is one pleasure sweeter then another pleasure this pleasure is coveted by all living creatures the other shunned They assert corporeall pleasure to be our ultimate end as Panaetius saith in his book of Sects not catastematick permanent pleasure which consisteth in privation of griefe and a quiet void of all disturbance which Epicure held The End differeth from Beatitude for the End is some particular pleasure Beatitude is that which consisteth of all particular pleasures wherein are included both the past and future Again particular plâ—asure is expetible in it selfe felicity not in it selfe but for particular pleasures That pleasure is our chiefe end is manifest in that from our first infancy without any instruction of others we naturally aime thereat and having obtain'd it seek nothing else Moreover we avoide not any thing so much as its contrary griefe Pleasure is good though proceeding from the most sordid dishonest thing as Hippobotus in his Book of Sects for although the action be dishonest yet the pleasure thereof is expetible in it selfe and good Indolence which Epâ—cure held they esteem not pleasure nor want of pleasure griefe for both these consist in motion but Indolence and want of pleasure consists not in motion for Indolence is like the state of a sleeping man They hold that some men may not desire pleasure through perversity of minde All spirituall pleasures and pains arise not from corporeall pleasures and pains for from the simple prosperity of our Country or our selfe we are affected with joy But neither the remembrance of past goods nor expectation of future compleat pleasure as Epicure thought for by time and expectation the motion of the soul is dissolved Pleasure according to Aristippus is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consisteth only in one part of time the present for the remembrance of past pleasures or expectation of the future is vain and frivolous and nothing appertaineth to beatitude but that only is good which is present With those pleasures which he received heretofore or shall receive hereafter Aristippus said he was nothing at all moved the first being gone the other not yet come and what it will prove when it is come is uncertain Hence he argued that men ought not to be folicitous either about things past or future and that not to be troubled at such things is a signe of a constant clear spirit He also advised to take care only for the present day and in that day only of the present part thereof wherein something was done or thought for he said the present only is in our power not the past or â—uture the one being gone the other uncertain whether ever it will come Neither do pleasures consist meerly in simple sight or hearing for we hear with delight those who counterfeit lamentation and those who lament truely we hear with displeasure This privation of pleasure and griefe they called mean states The pleasures of the body are much better then those of the soule and the pains or griefs thereof much worse for which reason those who offend actually are most grievously punished To grieve is more unnaturall to us to delight more naturall for which reason much more care is requisite for the ordering of one then of the other yet many times we reject things which effect pleasure as being grievous so that the concurrence of pleasures which effecteth beatitude is very difficult Moreover they hold that every wise man doth not live pleasantly nor every wicked man unpleasantly but so for the most part for it is enough that a man be affected and reduced by incidence of one single pleasure They held that Griefe is the greatest ill that griefe is not effected by every ill but by the unexpected and unforeseen that one man is more grieved then another They assert that Riches are efficient causes of pleasure yet not expetible in themselves Sect. 3. Of Vertue ALL good consisteth in Pleasure Vertue it selfe is only laudable as being an efficient cause of pleasure Nothing is just honest or dishonest by Nature but by Law and Custome yet a good man will do nothing that is evill because of the censure or esteem which would fall upon his actions and that such a one is wise Prudence is a good yet not expetible in it selfe but for the sake of those things which proceed from it A friend is to be embraced for the use we may have of him as the body cherisheth every part thereof as long as it remaineth found Of Vertues some are in the unwisâ—e Corporeall exercise conduceth to the acquisition of Vertue A wise man is not subject to Enâ—y Love or Superstition for all these proceed from the vanity of Opinion but he is subject to Griefe or Fear as being Naturall accidents CHAP. V. How he went to Dionysius his Court. ABout this time Dionysius the Sicilian Tyrant flourished to whom resorted many Philosophers amongst the rest Aristippus invited by his sumptuous magnificence Dionysius asked him the reason of his comming he answer'd to give what I have and to receive what I haâ—e not or as others when I wanted wisdome I went to Socrates now I want mony I come to you He soon insinuated into the favour of Dionysius for he could conform himself to every place time and person act any part construe whatsoever happened to the best and thus enjoying present pleasure never troubled himself for the absent as Horace Every condition habit and event with Aristippus suits with all content Of his compliance with Dionysius's humour there are these instances Dionysius at a Feast commanded that all should put on purple robes Plato refused saying I will not with a female robe disgrace My self who am a man of manly race But Aristippus took it and beginning
you 〈◊〉 my advice for the education of young Aristippus go to Athens and above all esteem Xantippe and Myrto who have often spoke to me to bring you to the Eleusinâ—an Festivalls Whilst you lead this pleasant life with these let the Cyrenaean Praefects be as unjust as they please in your naturall end they cannot prejudice you Endeavour to live with Xantippe and Myrto as I did hereto fore with Socrates composing your selfe to their conversation for pride is not proper in that place If Tyrocles the son of Socrates who lived with me at Mâ—gara come to Cyrene it will be well done to supply him and to respet as your own son If you will not nurse a daughter because of the great trouble it gives you send for the daughter of Eubois to whom you have heretofore expressed so much kindness and named after my Mother and I also have often called her my friend Above all take care of little Aristippus that he may be worthy of us and of Philosophy Eor this I leave him as his true inheritance the rest of his estate finds the Cyrenaean Magistrates adversaries But you writ me not word that any offered to take that away from you Rejoyce dear daughter in the possession of those riches which are in your power and make your son possess them likewise I wish he were my son but being disappointed of that hope I depart with this assurance that you will lead him in the pa hs trodden by good men Farewell and grieve not for us Of his Children besides this Arete his Daughter whom he educated in Philosophy is remembered also a Son whom for his stupidity he disenherited and turned out of dores for which being reproved by his Wife who alledged that he came from himselfe He spitting said This comes from me too but profiteth me nothing Or as Laertius We cast 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all unnecessary things as far as we can from us Arete had a Son named from his Grandfather Aristippus and from his Mothers instructing him in Philosophy surnamed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Besides these two Aristippus the Grandfather and the Grandson Laertius reckons two more of the same name One writ the History of Arcadia the Other was of the new Academy CHAP. IX His Disciples and Successors Of the Auditors of Aristippus besides his daughter Arete whom he taught with much care and brought up to great perfection in Philosophy are remembred Aethiops of Ptolemais and Antipater of Cyrene Arete communicated the Philosophy she received from her Father to her Son Aristippus the younger Aristippus transmitted it to Theodorus the Atheist who instituted a Sect called Theodorean Antipater communicated the Philosophy of Aristippus to Epitimides his Disciple Epitimides to Paraebates Paraebates to Hegesias and Anniceris These two last improving it by some additions of their own obtained the honour each of them to have a Sect named after them Hegesiack and Annicerick HEGESIAS CHAP. I. His Life HEGESIAS Disciple to Paraebates was surnamed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Death's Oratour from a book he writ entituled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon occasion of one who had famish'd himself nigh to death but was called back to life by his friends in answer to whom hee in this Book demonstrated that death takes us away from ill things not from good and reckon'd up the incommodities of life and represented the evills thereof with so much Rhetorick that the sad impression thereof penetrated so far into the breasts of many hearers that it begot in them a desire of dying voluntarily and many laid violent hands upon themselves Whereupon hee was prohibited by Ptolomy the King to discourse any more upon this Subject in the Schools CHAP. II. His Philosophy HIS Disciples were from him called Hegesians They held the same chief good and Evill with the Cyreneans further asserting That Kindnesse Friendship and Benevolence are in themselves nothing not expetible but in respect of those benesits which cannot consist without those persons That Perfect Felicity is absolutely impossible because the body is disordered by many troubles in which the Soul shares and most of those things which we hope are prevented by chance That Life and Death are in our choice That nothing is by nature pleasant or unpleasant but by the raâ—ity and unusuallness of things or satiety some are delighted therewith others not That Poverty and Wealth conferre nothing to Pleasure neither are the rich poor affected with Pleasure severall waies Servitude and Liberty Nobility and Meanness Glory and ignominy differ nothing in this respect That to live is advantageous for a fool indifferent to a wise man That a wise man ought to do all things in consideration of himself and preferre none before himself for though possibly he may receive benefits from others very great in outward appearance yet are they nothing in comparison of those which he dispenseth That Sense conferrs nothing to certain knowledge for all act by the rules of tâ—eir own reason That offences ought to be pardon'd for no man offends willingly but compelled by some affection That we should hate no man but instruct him better That a wise man should not insist so much upon choice of good things as upon evill making it his scope and end to live neither in Labour nor Grief which they do who are inclined neither way to the objects of Pleasure ANNICERIS CHAP. I. His Life ANNICERIS was of Cyrene Disciple to Paraebates yet Suidas saith he was an Epicurean and that he lived in the time of Alexander He was excellent in Chariot-racing of which one day he gave a testimony before Plato and drove many courses round the Academy so exactly that his wheeles never went out of the track to the admiration of all that were present except Plato who reprehended his too much industry saying it was not possible but that he who employed so much paines about things of no value must neglect those of greater concernment which are truly worth admiration When Plato by the command of Dionysius was sold as a slave in Aegina Anniceris fortuned to be present who redeemed him for 20. or according to others 30. minae and sent him to Athens to his friends who presently returned the mony to Anniceris but he refused it saying they were not the only persons that deserved to take care of Plato He had a Brother named Nicoteles a Philosopher hee had likewise the famous Posidonius to be his Disciple CHAP. II. His Philosophy HIS Disciples were called Annicerians They as the rest placed all good in Pleasure and conceived virtue to be only commendable as far as it produced Pleasure They agreed in all things with the Hegesians but they abolished not friendship good will duty to parents and actions done for our Country They held That although a wise man suffer trouble for those things yet he will lead a life nothing the lesse happy though he enjoy but few Pleasures
Oratour who dyed and left me all he had I tore and burnt his Papers went to Athens and there applyed my selfe to Philosophy This is the blood and race I boast to own Thus much concerning my selfe Let Perseus therefore and Philonides forbear to enquire after these things and look you upon me as I am in my selfe You do not use O King when you send for Archers to enquire of what Parentage they are but set them up a mark to shoot at Even so of friends you should not examine whence but what they are Bion indeed setting this aside was of a versatile wit a subtle Sophist and gave many furtherances to the exercisers of Pâ—ilophy in some things he was He first heard Crates the Academick but despising that Sect rook a â—ordid Cloak and Scrip and became a Cynick to which Laertius ascribes his constancy expert of perturbation Then he followed Theodorus the Atheist who profest all manner of learning to whose opinions he addicted himselfe and was called a Tâ—â—odoreaâ— Afterwards he heard Theophrastus the Pâ—ripatetick CHAP. II. His Apophthegms HE left many memorialls and profitable Apophthegmes as Being reproved for not endeavouring to Catch a young man new Cheese saith he will not stick to the hook Being demanded what man is most perplexed he saith he who aimes at the highest Content To one who asked his advice whether he should marry or not for this some ascribe to Bion which Agellius to Bias the mistake perhaps grounded upon the nearnesse of their Names he answered if you take a fowl Wife she will be a Torment if a fair Common He said that Age is the Haven to which all ills have recourse That Glory is the Mother of years That beauty is a good which concerns others not our selves That Riches are the Sinewes of Things To one who had consumed his Patrimony Earth saith he devoured Amphiaraus but you devour Earth He said it is a great ill not to be able to bear ill He reproved those who burn men as having no Sense and again burn them as having Sense He used to say it is better to yeeld our own youth and Beauty to others then to attempt anothers for he that doth so injures both his body and Soul He vilified Socrates saying if he could enjoy Alcibiades and did not he was a fool if he could not he did no great matter He said the way to the next World is easie for we find it blindfold He condemned Alcibiades saying when he was a boy he drew away Husbands from their Wives when a man Wives from their Husbands At Rhodes whilst the Athenians exercised Rhetorick he taught Philosophy for which being reproved I bought Wheat saith he and shall I fell Barley He said they who are punished below would be more tormented if they carried Water in whole Vessells then in Vessells full of holes One that was extreamly talkative desiring his assistance in a businesse I will doe what I can for you saith he if you send a Messenger to me and come not your self Travelling with very ill Company they fell amongst theeves we shall be undone saith he unlesse we be known He said Arrogance is the obstruction of Virtue Of a rich man Covetous he hath not money saith he but money him He said Covetous persons keep their Wealth so strictly that they have no more use of their own then of anothers He said when we are young wee use Courage when old Wisdom Wisdom excells other Vertues as the Sight the other Senses He said no man should be reproached for old age that being a Condition all pray they may arive at it To an envious man sad I know not saith he whether some ill hath befaln you or some good another He said impiety is an ill companion to bold language For though his Speech he free To Bondage yield must hee That friends whatsoever they prove ought to be retained lest we seem to have conversed with wicked persons or to shunne Good Being Demanded if there were any Gods he said Old man wilt thou not drive this â—roud away He conceived that he might make a Field fertile sooner by praising then by manuring it He said they who love to be flattered are like Pots carried by the ear To one who asked him what folly is he said the Obstruction of Knowledge He said good men though Slaves are free but wicked men though free are slaves to many Pleasures He said Grammarians whilst they enquire after the Errors of Ulysses mind not their own nor see that they themselves go astray as well as he in taking pains about uselesse things He said Avarice is the Metropolis of all Evill Seeing a Statue of Persaeus under which was written 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Persaeus of Zeno a Cittiean he said the writer mistook for it should be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Zeno's servant as indeed he was CHAP. III. His Death AT last falling sick as those of Chalcis say for he died there he was perswaded to suffer ligatures by way of charme hee recanted and profest repentance for all hee had said offensive to the Gods Hee was reduced to extream want of such things as are most necessary to sick persons untill Antigonus sent to him two servants and himself followed in a litter as Phavorinus affirms in his various History of that sicknesse he dyed on whose death thus Laertius Bion the Boristhenite By his Birth to Scythia known Did religious duties slight Gods affirming there were none If to what he then profest Firm he had continued still Then his tongue had spoke his breast And been constant though in ill But the same who Gods deni'd He who sacred fanes despis'd He who mortalls did deride When to Gods they sacrific'd Tortur'd by a long disease And of deaths pursuit afraid Guifts their anger to appease On their hearths and Altars laid Thus with smoak and incense tries To delight their sacred scent I have sinn'd not only cries And what I profest repent But unto an old wives charms Did his willing neck submit And about his feeble armes Caus'd them leather thongs to knit And a youthfull sprig of bayes Did set up before his gate Every means and way essaies To divert approaching fate Fool to think the Gods might be Brib'd with gifts their favours bought Or the sacred Deitie Were and were not as he thought But his wisdoms titles now Tum'd to ashes not avail With stretch'd arms I know not how Hail he cried great Pluto hail Of this name Laertius reckons ten The first contemporary with Pherecydes the Syrian of Proconnesus who writ two Books extant in his time The second a Syracusian wrote of the Art of Rhetorick The third this Philosopher The fourth an Abderite of the Family of Democritus a Mathematician he wrote in the Attick and Ionick Dialect He first said there were some habitable parts of the earth where it was six months day and six months night The fift of Soleis he wrote the Aethiopick
assertion of Protagoras that Science is Sence against which he disputes largely the summe this That the Soul apprehends some things by mediation of the Body others without of the first kind are things warm light dry sweet c. of the other Essence and not being similitude and dissimilitude identitie and diversity uniâ—e and number Hence it followes that Sence apprehends not Essences and consequently not Truths for Essence and Truth are convertible This assertion of Plato Alcimus deduceth from Epicharmus who saith he hath plainly spoken of things subject to Sence and Reason in these words Gods alwaies were to be desisted never Like them Eternall still the same persever Chaos the first begotten Deitie Is stil'd of something how can nothing be Thence nor the first nor second nothings are How we â—steem of those we thus declare If we an even or uneven summe Alter by adding or substracting one Seems it to you the same to me not so If a continu'd measure shrink or grow It is not the same measure such the lives Of Men are one decayes another thrives That Nature which new being ever takes Is different from the being it forsakes Not yesterday the same were I and you Nor shall tomorrow be what we are now Again Alcimus The wise say that the soul apprehends some things by mediation of the body as when she hears or sees others she conceiveth within her selfe without using the body whence of beings some are subject to sence others câ—mprehensible by the Intellect Therefore Plato saith that they who desire to know the principles of the Universe must first distinguish the Ideas in themselves as similitude unity multitude magnitude restauration Secondly add in it selfe honest good just and the like thirdly examines what Idaea's cohaere mutually with one another as Science Magnitude Power and withall to think that those who are amongst us because they participate of them should be called by the same name as for instance just things are those which participate of Iust Honest which of honest one of every Species is eternall perceptible by the mind and consequently free from perturbation Wherefore he asserts Idaea's in nature as Exemplars after whose likenesse other things are made Thus Alcimus the first part whereof seems to be taken out of Plato's Theaetetus the latter out of his Parmenides The words of Epicharmus concerning Gods and Idea's to which Alcimus referrs this of Plato are these Is Musick then a thing It is the man Musick no what then a Musician A man or not he is the same of good Good from the thing apart is understood whoever learns good by tâ—at art is made who Musick a Musitian of each trade As dancing weaving and the like the same The Art and Artist have a different name Again Alcimus Plato in his opinion of Idea's saith thus if there is memory there must be also Idea's for memory is of a quiet permanent thing but nothing is permanent except Idea's for how saith he could living creatures be preserved unlesse by their Idea and receiving a naturall mind Now they remember Similitude and their nourishment showing that all Creatures have an innate understanding of their own similitude and therefore perceive things belonging to their kind Thus Alcimus What place of Plato he means I know not Scaliger reads 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. omitting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if he made a doubt whether that both of the opinions of Idea's were Plato's but I rather think Alcimus meant not the title of any Book having named none in the rest of his citations but what himself abstracts out of Plato's opinion concerning Idea's Plato in Philedo teacheth this concerning memory that sence is a motion common to the Soul and Body this suffering from externall Senses the other acting and dijudicating that memory is a conservatory or repository of the Senses For the Soul as oft as she in her self or by assistance of the Body calls to mind what she hath suffer'd she is said to remember To Plato's assertion Alcimus applyeth this of Epicharmus Eumaeus Wisdome's not to one consin'd Various in every living knowing mind The Hen first doth not living things beget But sits and hatcheth with enliv'ning heat This Wisdom only Nature's friend discerns Of whom her Mistresse she this lesson learns And again This is not strange for every thing we find Is to its proper species most enclin'd To Dogs a Bitch seems fairest and to kine A Bull an Asse to Asses swine to swine These things Laertius cites out of Alcimus adding that there are more of the same kind in those four Books whereby he intimates the help that Plato receiv'd by the writings of Epicharmus neither was Epicharmus himself ignorant of his own wisdom as may be collected from these Verses predicting that he should have a follower This I assert and what I now maintain Shall Monuments to future times remain Some one hereafter will my verse review And cloathing it in language rich and new Invincible himself others subdue Moreover Phavorinus alledgeth the whole form of Plato's Common-wealth in Protagoras's Antilogicks others say he borrowed his Politicks from Socrates Lastly it is related that much of Plato's morality was in the Books of Sophron the Mimographe which having been long neglected were by him first brought to Athens and were found lying under his head when he was dead CHAP. V. His School BEing return'd to Athens from his Journey to Aegypt he setled himself in the Academy a Gymnasium or place of Exercise in the Suburbs of that City beset with woods taking name from Ecademus one of the Hero's as Eupolis In sacred Hecademus shady walks And Timon The fluent sweet-tongu'd Sage first led the way Who writes as smoothly as from some green spray Of Hecademe Grashoppers chirp their lay Hence it was first called Ecademy the occasion of his living here was that he was poor and had nothing but one Orchard in or adjoyning to the Academy which was the least part of his Successours This Orchard at first yeelded but three aurei nummi of yearly rent to the Owners afterwards the whole Revenue amounted to a thousand or more It was in processe of time much enlarged by well-willers and studious persons who dying bequeathed by will something to the Professours of Philosophy their riches to maintain the quiet and tranquillity of a Philosophicall life Plato the Academy being said to be a sickly place and Physicians advising him to transfer his School to the Lyceum would not be perswaded but answered I would not live on the top of Athos to linger my life The unwholsomnesse of the place brought him to a Quartan ague which lasted eighteen months but at length by sobriety and care he master'd it and recover'd his strength more perfect then before First he taught Philosophy in the Academy and after in the Gardens of Colonus At the entrance of his School in the Academy was written LET NONE IGNORANT
OF GEOMETRY ENTER HERE meant not only of the measure and proportion of lines but also of the inward Affections CHAP. VI. How he instituted a Sect. HAving thus setled himself in the Academy he began out of the Collection he had made from others and his own invention to institute a Sect called from the place where he taught Academick He mixed the Heraclitian discourses with the Socratick and Pythagorick following in sensibles Heraclitus in Intelligibles Pythagoras in Politicks Socrates Whereas Philosophy saith St. Augustine concerns either action or contemplation thence assuming two names Contemplative and Active the Active consisting in practise of morall Actions the contemplative in penetration of abstruse Physicall causes and the nature of the Divinity Socrates excelled in the Active Pythagoras in the Contemplative But Plato join'd them into one perfecâ— kind which he subdivided into three severall parts Morall consisting chiefly in Action Naturall in Contemplation Rationall in Distinction of true and false which though usefull in both the other yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation So that this Trichotomy contradicts not the other Dichotomy which includeth all within Action and Contemplation And as of old in a Tragedy the Chorus acted alone then Thespis making some intermissions of the Chorus introduc'd one Actour Aeschylus a second Sophocles a Third in like manner Philosophy was at first but of one kind Physick then Socrates added Ethick thirdly Plato inventing Dialectick made it perfect Of these three parts as they were held by Plato and the rest of the old Academy we cannot have a generall better accompt then this of Cicero Sect. 1. Ethick The first concerning well living they sought in Nature affirming that she ought to be obeyed and that in nothing else but Nature was to be had that chief good whereto all things should be referr'd that the ultimate being of desirable things and end of all good in the mind body and life were acquir'd by Nature Those of the body they placed in the whole and in the parts Health Strength Beauty in the whole in the parts sound Sence and a certain Excellâ—nce of particular parts as in the feet swiftnesse strength in the hands clearnesse in the voice in the Tongue plainnesse of expression Of the mind were those which are proper to comprehend the power of wit which they divided into Nature and Manners To Nature they ascribed quickness of apprehension and memory both proper to the mind and wit To manners belonged study and a kind of wisdom formed partly by continuall exercise partly by reason in which consisted Philosophy it self wherein that is begun and not perfected is called progression to vertue what is perfected Virtue perfection of Nature of all things in the mind the most excellent Thus of Minâ—s The Adjuncts of life that was the third they asserted such things as conduced to the practise of Vertue Sect. 2. Physick Of Nature for that was next they so treated as to divide it into two things One the efficient the other giving it self to this that thereof might be made somthing In that they conceived to be a power in this a certain matter to be effected in both matter could not cohere unlesse contained by some power nor the power without some matter for there is nothing which is not enforced to be some where that which consists of both they called Body and Qualitie Of Qualities some are primary others arising from these the primary are uniform and simple hose which arise from these are various and as it were multiform Air Fire Water and Earth are Primary of these arise formes of living Creatures and of those things which are made of the Earth These principles are called Elements of which Air and Fire have a faculty to move and effect the other parts Water and Earth to suffer To all these there is subjected a certain matter without form destitute of quality out of which all things are expressed and formed It is capable of admitting all and of changing all manner of waies in the whole and in every part This resolves nothing to nothing but into its own parts which are divisible into infinite there being in naâ—ure no least which cannot be divided Those which are moved are all moved by intervalls which intervalls likewise may be divided infinitely and that power which we call quality being moved and agitated every way they conceive the whole matter to be throughly changed and by that means those things which they call qualitative to be produced of which in all coherent nature continued with all its parts was effected the World beyond which there is not any part of matter or body The parts of the World are all things therein kept together by a Sensitive nature wherein is likewise perfect reason It is also sempiternall for there is nothing more strong whereby it may be dissolved This power they call the Soul of the World God a certain providence over all things subâ—ected to him regarding in the first place heavenly things next on the Earth those thing which appertain to man The same they somtimes call Necessity because nothing can be otherwise then is by him ordained a fatall immutable continuation of eternall order somtimes Fortune as producing many things not foreseen or expected by us by reason of the obscurity and our ignorance of the Causes Sect. 3. Dialectick Of the third part of Philosophy consisting in reason and dissertation they treated thus Though Iudgment arise from the Sense yet the Iudgment of truth is not in the Senses The mind they affirmed to be Iudge of things conceiving her only sit to be credited because she alone seeth that which is simple and uniform and certain This they called Idea All sense they conceived to be obtuse and slow and no way able to perceive those things which seem subject to sense which are so little as that they cannot fall under sense so moveable and various that nothing is one constant nor the same because all things are in continuall alteration and fluxion All this part of things they called Opimative Science they affirmed to be no where but in the Reasons and Notions of mind whence they approved definitions of things and applyed them to all whereon they discoursed They approved likewise explications of words by Etymologies They used Arguments and marks for things to prove and conclude what they meant to explain In this consisted all the discipline of Dialectick that is of Speech concluded by Reason This accompt in generall Cicero gives of the old Academy Plutarch Laertius Apuleius and others have made collections more particular we shall make choice of that of Alcinous as most full and perfect which by reason of the length is referred as an Appendix to Plato's life CHAP. VII His Inventions HE added much to learning and language by many inventions as well of things as of words To omit Dialectick of which we treated last Phavorinus attributes to his invention discoursing by
and relief of his poverty seduced from him by Plato Aristotle a Stagirite whom Plato used to call a Colt foreseeing that he would ungratefully oppose him as a Colt having suckt kicks at his Dam Xenocrates was slow Aristotle quick in extremity whence Plato said of them what an Asse have I and what a horse to yoak together Philippus an Opuntian who transcribed Plato's Laws in wax to him some ascribe Epinomis Hestiaeus a Perinthian Dion a Syracusian whom Plato exceedingly affected as is evident from his Epigrams seeing him in the height of honour all mens eyes fixt upon his noble actions hee advised him to take heed of that vice which makes men care onely to please themselves a consequent of solitude Amyclus or as Aelian Amyclas a Heracleote Erastus and Coriscus Scepsians Temolaus a Cyzicene Euaemon a Lampsacene Pithon whom Aristotle calls Paron and Heraclides Aenians Hippothales and Callippus Athenians Demetrius of Amphipolis Heraclides of Pontus Two women Lasthenia a Mantinean and Axiothia a Phliasian who went habited like a man Theophrastus as some affirm Oratours Hyperides Lycurgus Demosthenes Lycurgus saith Philistus was a person of great parts and did many remarkable things which none could perform who had not been Plato's auditor Demosthenes when he fled from Antipater said to Archias who counsell'd him to put himselfe into his hands upon promise to save his life Far be it from me to choose rather to live ill than to die well having heard Xenocrates and Plato dispute of the Soules immortality Mnesistratus a Thasian To these reckoned by Laertius add Aristides a Locrian Eudoxus a Gnidian who at a great Feast made by Plato first found out the manner of sitting in a circular form Hermodorus of whom the Proverb Hermodorus traffiques in words Heracleodorus to whom Demosthenes writing reprehends him that having heard Plato he neglected good arts and lived disorderly Euphratus who lived with Perdiccas King of Macedonia in so great favour that he in a manner shared command with him Euagon of Lampsacum Timaeus of Cyzicum Chaeron of Pellene Isocrates the Oratour with whom Plato was very intimate Praxiphanes published a discourse they had together in a field of Plato's who at that time entertained Isocrates as a Guest Aster Pâ—aedrus Alexis Agatho young men whom Plato particularly affected as appears by his Epigrams Aristonymus Phormio Mededimus his familiar friends already mentioned CHAP. XIV His Aemulatours and Detractours AS Plato's eminent learning gained on one side many Disciples and admirers so on the other side it procured him many emulators especially amongst his fellow Disciples the followers of Socrates amongst these Xenophon was exceedingly disaffected towards him they emulated each other and writ both upon one subject a Symposium Socrates his Apologie morall commentaries One writ of a Commonwealth the other the Institution of Cyrus which book Plato notes as commentitious affirming Cyrus not to have been such a person as is there exprest Though both writ much concerning Socrates yet neither makes mention of the other except Xenophon once of Plato in the third of his Commentaries Antisthenes being about to recite something that he had written desired Plato to be present Plato demanding what he meant to recite he answered that to contradict is not lawfull How come your saith Plato to write upon that subject And thereupon demonstrating that he contradicted himselfe Antisthenes writ a Dialogue against him intituled Satho Aristippus was at difference with him for which reason in Phaedone he covertly reproves Aristippus that being near at Aegina when Socrates died he came not to him He writ a book of the luxury of the antients some ascribe the amatory Epigrams to his invention his designe in that treatise being to detract from eminent persons amongst the rest from Socrates his Master and Plato and Xenophon his fellow Disciples Aeschines and Plato also disagreed some affirme that when Plato was in favour with Dionysius Aeschines came thither very poor and was despised by Plato but kindly entertained by Aristippus But the Epistle of Aeschines put forth by Allatius expresseth the contrary The discourse which Plato relates betwixt Crito and Socrates in Prison Idomeneus saith was betwixt Socrates and Aeschines by Plato out of ill will to Aeschines attributed to Crito But of Aeschines he makes not any mention in all his works except twice slightly once in Phaedone where he names him amongst the persons present at Socrates his death and again in his Apology speaking of Lysanias his Father Phaedo if we credit the detractions of Athenaeus was so much maligned by Plato as that he was about to frame an indictment against him to reduce him to that condition of servitude out of which by the procurement of Socrates he had been redeemed but his designe being discovered he gave it over Besides his condisciples Diogenes the Cynick derided his Laws and assertion of Ideas concerning the first he asked if he were writing Lawes Plato assented Have you not written already a Commonwealth saith Diogenes Yes answered Plato Had that Commonwealth Lawes saith Diogenes Plato affirmed it had Then replyed Diogenes what need you write new Another time Diogenes saying he could see the things of the world but not Ideas Plato answered that is no wonder for you have and use those eyes which behold such things but the minde which only can see the other you use not Molon in detraction from him said It was not strange Dionysius should be at Corinth but that Plato should be at Sicily From these private differences arose many scandalous imputations forged and spread abroad by such as envyed or maligned him as That he profest one thing and practised another that he loved inordinately Aster Dion Phaedrus Alexis Agatho and Archeanassa a Curtesan of Colopho That he was a calumniatour envious proud a gluttonous lover of Figgs that he was the worst of Philosophers a parasite to Tyrants and many other accusations alike improbable from these the Comick Poets and others took liberty to abuse him Theopompus in Autochare for one is none And two as Plato holds is hardly one Anaxandrides in Theseo When Olives he like Plato doth devour Timon As Plato feignes in framing wonders skill'd Alexis in Meropide Aptly thou comest I walking round could meet Like Plato nothing wise but tir'd my feet And in Anchilione Thou speak'st of things thou understands not go To Plato thence Nile and onyons know Amph in Amp hicrate What good from hence you may expect to rise I can no more then Plato's good comprise And in Dexidemide Plato thou nothing knowst but how To look severe and knit the brow Cratylus in Pseudobolymaeo A man thou art and hast a soul but this With Plato not sure but opinion is Alexis in Olympiodoro My body mortall is grown dry My soul turn'd air that cannot dy Taught Plato this Philosophy And in Parasito Or thou with Plato rav'st alone
enquire Geometrically and those other disciplines which are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is termed Mathematick Philosophy being thus divided wee must first according to Plato speak of the Dialectick part and in that first of the Iudiciarie CHAP. IV. DIALECTICK Of the Iudiciary part WHereas there is somthing that judgeth somthing which is judged it is necessary also that there be somthing which is made of both these properly called Iudgement This Judgement may not unfitly be termed Judiciary but more commonly that which judgeth This is twofold one from which another by which judgement is made That is intellect this the naturall Organ accommodated for judgement primarily of true things secondarily of false neither is it any thing but naturall reason To explain this more fully of things which are a Philosopher who judgeth the things themselves may be called a Iudge reason likewise is a Iudge by which truth is judged which even now we called an Organ Reason is twofold one incomprehensible and true the other is never deceived in the knowledge of those things which are The first is in the power of God not of man the second in that of man also This likewise is twofold the first Science and scientifick reason the second Opinion The first hath certitude and stability as being conversant in things certain and stable The second similitude of truth and opinion as being conversant in things subject to mutation Of science in Intelligibles and opinion in sensibles the principles are Intellection and Sense Sense is a passion of the soul by the mediation of the body first declaring a passive faculty When through the Organs of sense the species of things are impress'd in the soul so as they are not defac'd by time but remain firm and lasting the conservation thereof is called Memory Opinion is the conjunction of memory and sense for when some object occurreth which can first move the sense thereby sense is effected in us and by sense memory Then again is the same thing objected to our sense we joyne the precedent with the consequent sense and now say within our selves Socrates a Horse Fire and the like This is termed opinion when we joyne the precedent memory with the late sense when these agree within themselves it is a true opinion if they disagree a false for if a man having the species of Socrates in his memory meet with Plato and think by reason of some likenesse betwixt them he hath met Socrates again and afterwards joyne the sense of Plato which he took as it were from Socrates with the memory which he preserved of Socrates there will arise a false opinion That wherein sense and memory are formed Plato compareth to a tablet of wax but when the soul by cogitation reforming these things which are conceived in opinion by memory and sense sooketh upon these as things from which the other are derived Plato sometimes calleth this a picture and phantasie Cogitation he calleth the soules discourse within her selfe Speech that which â—loweth from the Cogitation through the mouth by voice Intellection is an operation of the Intellect contemplating first Intelligibles It is two-fold one of the soul beholding Intelligibles before she cometh into the body the other of the same after she is immers'd in the body The first is properly called Intellection the other whilst she is in the body is termed naturall knowledge which is nothing but an intellection of the soul consined to the body When we say Intellection is the principle of Science we mean not this latter but the other which is competible to the soul in her separate state and as we said is then called Intellection now naturall Knowledge The same Plato termeth simple Knowledge the wing of the soul sometimes Reminiscence Of these simple Sciences consisteth Reason which is born with us the efficient of naturall Science and as reason is two-fold Scientifick and opinionative so Intellection and Sense It is likewise necessary that they have their objects which are Intelligibles and Sensibles And for asmuch as of Intelligibles some are Primary as Idaeas others Secondary as the Species that are in matter and cannot be separated from it Intellection likewise must be two-fold one of Primaries the other of Sâ—condaries Again forasmuch as in Sensibles some are Primary as qualities colour whitenesse others by accident as white coloured and that which is concrete as fire in the same manner is Sense first of Primaries second of Secondaries Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles not without Scientifick knowledge by a certain comprehension without discourse Secondaries the same scientifick reason judgeth but not without Intellection Sensibles as well Primary as Secondary sense judgeth but not without opinionative reason That which is concrete the same reason judgeth but not without sense And since the Intelligible world is the Primary Intelligible the sensible something concrete the first Intellection judgeth with reason that is not without reason The other opinionative reason not without sense whereas there is both contemplation and action right reason discerneth not in the same manner those which are subject to contemplation and those which are subject to action In contemplation it considereth what is true what false in things that belong to action what is proper what improper what that is which is done For having an innate knowledge of that which is good and honest by using reason and applying it to those naturall notions as to certain rules we judge whether every thing be good or bad CHAP. V. The Elements and Office of Dialectick OF Dialectick the first and chiefest Element according to Plato is first to consider the essence of every thing next the accidents thereof What a thing is it considers either from its superiors by division and definition or contrariwise by Analysis Accidents which adhere to substances are considered either from those things which are contained by induction or from those which do contain by Syllogisme Hence the parts of Dialectick are these Division Definition Analysis Induction Syllogisme Of Divisions one is a distribution of the Genus into Species and of the whole into parts as when we divide the Soule into the rationall part and the irrationall and the latter into the concupiscible and the irascible Another is of a world into divers significations when the same may be taken severall waies A third of accidents according to their subjects as when we say of good some belong to the soul some to the body some are externall The fourth of subjects according to their accidents as of men some are good some ill some indifferent Division of the Genus into its Species is first to be used when we examine the essence of a thing this cannot be done but by definitions Definition is made by Division in this manner we must take the Genus of the thing to be defined as that of man living creature that we must divide by the next differences descending to its species as rationall and irrationall mortall
Father and Author of all things Idaea as to God is the notion of God as to us the primary Intelligible as to matter a manner as to this sensible world an Exemplar as to it selfe Essence For whatsoever is made with understanding must necessarily be referred to something as if something be made from another as my picture from me the exemplar thereof must be presupposed and if there be nothing eternall every Artist conceiveth it first within himselfe then transferreth the formes thereof into matter They define Idaea an eternall exemplar of things which are according to Nature for the greater part of Platonists will not allow an Idaea to be of things that are made by Art as of a Shield or Lute nor of things which are praeternaturall as of a Feavour or unnaturall Choler nor of singulars as of Socrates or Plato nor of vile abject things as of silth or strawes nor of relatives as of greater and longer For Idaeas are the eternall notions of God perfect in themselves That there are Idaeas they prove thus Whether God be Intellect or something Intelligent he must have his Intelligibles and those eternall and immovable if so there are Idaeas For if matter it selfe be in it selfe void of measure it is necessary that it receive measure from some superiour that is wholly remote from matter But the Antecedent is true therefore the consequent and if so there are Idaeas certain measures void of matter Again if the world were not made by chance it must only be made of something but by something and not only so but after the likenesse of something but that after whose likenesse it was made what is it but an Idaea whence it followeth that there are Ideas Again if intellect differ from true opinion that which is intelligible differeth from that which is opinionable and if so there are intelligibles distinct from opinionables wherefore there are first Intelligibles as well as first Sensibles whence we conclude there are Idaeas CHAP. X. Of God VVE come next to speak of the third principle which Plato though he think it almost ineffable conceiveth may bee express'd in this manner If there are intelligibles and those neither sensibles nor coherent with sensibles but adherent to first Intelligibles then are there first simple Intelligibles as there are first sensibles the Antecedent is true therefore the consequent But men subject to perturbation of sence when they would contemplate somthing intelligible presently fall upon the thought of somthing sensible whereby at the same time they imagine magnitude or figure or colour and therefore cannot understand this sincerely But the Gods being void of corporeall mixtion understand purely and sincerely Now because the Intellect is better then the Soul and that Intellect which is alwaies in act and at once understandeth all things is better then that Intellect which is in power and of these that is most excellent which is the cause ef the other and superiour to all This can be nothing else but God whom we call the first as being the Cause that the Intellect of the Word alwaies acteth He being himself immoveable acteth upon the Intellect of the World as the Sun upon the Eye when it turn eth towards him And as that which is desired moveth the Appetite it self remaining immoveable so doth this Intellect move the Intellect of all Heaven Now this first Intellect being most fair must have the most fair Intelligible but nothing is fairer then it self therefore it alwaies understandeth it self and its own notions which Act is called Operation Moreover God is first eternall ineffable perfect in himself that is needing none and ever perfect that is absolute in all times and every way perfect that is absolute in every part Divinity Essence Truth Harmony good Neither do we so name these to distinguish one from the other but rather by them all to understand one He is said to be Good because he bestoweth his benefits upon all according to their severall capacities and so is the cause of all goods Fair because he is in his essence both more and equall Truth because he is the principle of all truth as the Sun of all light And Father as being cause of all things and adorning the mind of Heaven and Soule of the World after his own exemplar and notions For according to his own will hee filled all things with himself exciting the Soul of the World and converting it to himself for hee is cause of that Intellect which being adorned by the Father adorneth also the Nature of all this World He is likewise ineffable and as we said can only be perceived by the mind for he is neither genus nor species nor difference neither can any accident be applyed to him He is not ill for that it were impiety to affirm nor good for so he should be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of goodnesse Nor difference for that cannot be made according to the notion of him nor qualited for he is not made that which he is by quality nor perfected thereby Nor void of quality for he is not deprived of any quality that appertaineth to him Nor part of any thing nor as a whole constituted of parts nor as the same or divers for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be distinguished from others Neither doth he move or is he moved Hence the first apprehension of him is by abstraction from these things as wee understand a point by abstraction from sensibles considering first a superficies then a line then a point The second is by Analogie in this manner As the Sun is to sight and visible things himself not being sight yet affording the one to see the other to be seen so is the first Intellect to that Intellect which is in our Soule and to those things which it understandeth For it self is not the Intellect yet it perfecteth in these the Act of Intellection to those it affordeth that they are understood enlightning that truth which is in them The third way to understand him is thus when a man beholdeth that Beauty which is in Bodies hee proceedeth to that which is in the Soul then to that which is in Offices and Lawes Lastly to the vast Ocean of Beauty after which he considereth that which is good it self amiable it self expetible it self which shineth like a light and meeteth the Soul that which ascends unto it by these degrees By this he comprehendeth God himself through reason of that excellence which consisteth in adoration of him He considereth God void of parts for nothing was before him a part and that of which something consisteth is precedent to that whereof it is a part for a superficies is before a body and a line before a superficies Moreover God not having many parts can neither be locally moved nor altered by qualities For if hee be altered it must be done by himself or some other if by some other that other must be of greater power
divided into six Scalenums The Icosaeders of twenty in the same manner but the element of a Cube is an Isosceles triangle for foure such triangles concurring make a square and six squares a Cube God made use of a Dodecaedron in the construction of the Universe whence there are twelve figures of living creatures in the Zodiack whereof each is divided into thirty parts Likewise in a Dodecaedron which consisteth of twelve Pentagones if each be divided into five triangles there are in every one six triangles so that in the whole Dodecaedron there will be 360 triangles as many as there are dâ—grees in the Zodiack When matter was put into those figures by God first it was moved rudely without order untill at last he reduced it to order each being conjoyned to one another and composed in due proportion Neither are these distinct in place but are in perpetuall motion which they give likewise into matter For being straitned by the compasse of the world and agitated by mutuall justlings they are driven the rare alwaies into the region of the solid whence nothing is left vacuous nothing void of body The inequality which remaineth amongst them causeth convulsion for matter is agitated amongst them and they reciprocally by matter CHAP. XIV Of the Soul of the World the Sphears and Stars FRom Bodies hee alloweth that we collect the powers of the Soul for seeing that we discern all things by the Soul hee justly placed the principles of all things therein that whatsoever should occur we might contemplate it by that which is of kin and neighbour unto it and attribute an essence thereunto consonant to the functions Then therefore he called one substance intelligible and indivisible he placed another divisible amongst bodies to signifie that the knowledge as well of the one as of the other may be had by Intellect And knowing that in things intelligible and sensible there is identity and diversity he fitly composed the Soul out of all these For either the like is known by the like as the Pythagoreans hold or as Heraclitus the Naturalist unlike alwaies by unlike That he would that the World should be generate we must not so understand as if there shall be any time wherein the world is not but in as much as it alwaies perisheth in generation and declareth that there is some more excellent and principall cause of its essence The soul of the world which was from all eternity was not made by God but only adorned by him in which respect he is sometimes said to have made it for that he exciteth it and converteth the mind thereof as out of a profound sleep unto himself that beholding his intelligibles and affecting his notions it should from thence receive Species and form whence it is manifest that the World was endued by God both with a Soul and mind For intending it to be the best he must have made it animate and intelligent since an animate thing is more excellent then an inanimate and an intelligent then an unintelligent perhaps the mind also could not subsist without a Soul This Soul being diffused from the Centre of the world to the extreams compreâ—endeth the whole body of the World so as it is extended throughout the Universe and in that manner joyneth and conserveth the whole The externall preside over the internall for they are not divided but these are divided into seven Circles from the first distributed according to duple and triple Intervalls That which is comprehended by the indivisible sphear is correspondent to it that which is divided to the other For the motion of Heaven which comprehendeth all things being not uncertain is one and ordinate but that of the things within it is changeable varied by rising and setting whence called Planetary The outermost sphear moveth to the right hand from East to West the innermost contrariwise to the left hand from West to East meeting the World God framed also the Stars and constellations some fixed for the Ornament of Heaven and might very many in number The Erratick are seaven serving for number and time and the illumination of all things for time is an intervall of the motion of the World as an image of eternity which is the measure of the state of the eternall World The Planets are not of equall power the Sun is the leader of all who illuminateth and sheweth all things to the eye Next the Moon which in respect of her power hath the second place The rest of the Planets each according to their severall proportions The Moon maketh the measure of a Month in that space compleating its circle and overtaking the Sun The Sun measureth the Year for running through the circle of the Zodiack he compleateth the seasons of the year Of the other starrs each hath its proper revolution with which all men are not acquainted but only the Learned By all those revolutions the absolute number of time is compleated when coming all to the same point they are in such order as if we should imagine a right line to be drawn from the sphear of fixed stars to the Earth the Centers of them all would be seen in that line There being seven Orbes in the Planetary sphear the maker of the World framed in them seven conspicuous bodies of matter for the most part fiery and inserted them into the sphears belonging to the other Erratick Circle The Moon he placed in that Circle which is next the Earth the Sun in the second the Morning-star and the sacred Star of Mercury in that Orbe which is equall in swiftnesse with the Sun The rest higher each in his proper sphear That of Saturn the slowest of all he placed in that Orbe which is next to the sixed stars Second to this is that which they call the sphear of Iupiter next that of Mars the eighth which is the Supream power includeth all These are all living intelligent Creatures and Gods endued with a sphericall figure CAAP. XV. Of Daemons and Elements THere are other Daemons also which we may call Intelligent Gods in each of the Elements partly visible partly invisible in the aether fire air and water that there be not any part of the World void of Soul or of an animate creature more excellent then humane nature Below these are all earthly sublunary things God is maker of the World of all Gods and Daemons This Universe by his Divine Wil shall not be dissolved Over the rest his Sons preside who by his command and example order whatsoever they do By these loâ—s nocturnall visions dreams Oracles and whatsoever men referre to divination is artificially wrought The Earth is fixed in the midst of all round about the Axletree which passeth through the midst of the World It is the observer of night and day the most antient of all Gods in Heaven Next the Soul of the World it affordeth us most nutriture about it the Heavens move and it self is a kind of Starre It remaineth in its
proper place which by reason of its even weight is the Centre the aether extâ—riour is divided into the sphear of fixed Starrs and that of Planets Next to these is the Air in the midst the Earth with its humidity CHAP. XVI Of the younger Gods makers of men AFter that all these were framed there remained three kinds of living Creatures which were to be mortall Volatile Aquatile and Terrestriall the generation whereof he committed to his Son left if he himself had begotten them they should have been immortall as well as the rest They borrowing some little parts from first matter for a certain time formed mortall living Creatures and because of Mankind as being next to the Gods both the Father of all things and his Sons likewise have a particular care the Maker of all things sent down himself their Soules into the earth equall in number to the Starrs having imposed each one his proper Star as a vehiculum like a Law-giver he pronounced decrees unto them that he himself might be inculpable which was that there should arise mortall affections from the body first senses next pleasure then grief and fear and anger which those soules that should overcome and not suffer themselves to be transported by them should justly be accounted Victors and at the last return to their proper Star though they which should be transported by injustice should in the second generation undergoe the lives of women wherein if they ceased not from their wickednesse they should at last transmigrate into the Nature of brute Beasts the end of these Labours shall then be when they have overcome the innate affections of the body and then return to their proper habit CHAP. XVII Of the Body and parts of man and Powers of the Soul THe Gods first formed man of Earth Fire Air and Water borrowing some parts from matter to be restored in their due time which they so connected to one another by secret ties as that of all these they framed one body The most excellent part of the soul that was sent down from Heaven they placed in the Head for which as a manured Field they prepared the Brain About the face they disposed Organs proper for sense Marrow they made of smooth straight triangles of which the Elements were formed that it should be the Origine of prolifick seed Benes they formed of Marrow and Earth the Earth moistned and often dipt in Water and Fire Flesh is compounded of salt and sharpe as of a kind of ferment Marrow they enclosed with bones bones with sinewes instead of chaines that by these inflexions the knitting of the joints might be plyant Over these as a cover is extended the Skin partly white partly black for beauty and use Of these likewise consist the internall bowells and the belly and the intestines every where rolled about it And from the mouth above the aspera arteria and the oesophagus of which one commeth down to the stomack the other to the Lungs Meat is digested in the belly by spirit and heat and thence distributed to the whole body according to their severall constitutions The two veines passing along the spine of the Back meet and crosse at the head where they spread into many parts Thus when the Gods had made man and given him a soul as the Mistresse of his body they placed the principall part of that soul to which Reason appertaineth in the head Whence is derived marrow and sinewes and by the different affection of this the minde likewise is altered Moreover they gave him senses as the attendants of Reason and the power of judging and contemplating with Reason Those parts of the soul which are moved by meaner affections they seated in lower places the irascible part in the heart the concupiscible about the belly and the parts next to the Navell of which hereafter CHAP. XVIII Of sight AFter that the Gods had placed the eyes conduits of light in the face they included in them a fiery light which being smooth and in some manner thick they conceived of kin to diurnall light This breaketh forth every where at the Eyes but chiefly through the Eye-balls as being there most pure and clear This agreeing with the externall light as like with like affordeth the sense of sight whence in the night when the light vanisheth and is obscured this ray of ours no longer mingleth with the immediate air but on the contrary withdrawing it self inwards smooths and diffuses the motions that are in us and so bringeth on sleep whereby the eyelids are shut If it bring much rest the sleep is little disturb'd with dreams but if there remain any motions behind we are troubled with many illusions In this manner phantasies whether true or false arise Of the same Nature are images which we see in glasses or other smooth pellucid bodies which exist only by reflection For as the glasse is concave or convex or oblong the object is differently represented to the beholder The light being reflected to other parts those which are dispersed in convex meet in the concave for in some the right and left sides seem quite inverted in others alike in others those which are upwards seem downwards and on the contrary those which are downwards upwards CHAP. XIX Of the rest of the Senses HEaring is given for the perception of voice it ariseth from a motion made about the head and setteth in the liver Voice is that which passeth through the ears brain and bloud to the Soul A sharp voice is that which is moved swiftly deep which slowly great which much small which little Next followeth the sense proper to the Nostrills perceptible of odour Odour is an affection which passeth from the veines of the Nostrills to the parts of the Navell The Species thereof have no name except the two that are most common pleasant and unpleasant commonly called sweet and stinking All Odour is more thick then Air more thin then Water for Odour is properly said to be of those things which have not yet received perfect mutation but consist of a communion of Air and Water as smoke and mists For by the resolution of these into one another the sense of smelling is made Tast was made by the Gods to be the judge of different savours Hence are veines extended to the Heart by whcih several â—avours are examined These Veins by dilating or contracting themselves severally according to the Sapors presented to them discern their differences The differences of Sapours are seven sweet sharp sowre picqueant salt acid bitter the Nature of sweet Sapour is contrary to all the rest for by its power it sootheth and pleaseth the moisture of the tongue whereas of the rest some disturb and â—dispell it as acute Sapors some heat and fly upwards as the hot others being abstersive dissolve it as the bitter others are by degrees purgative and abstersive as the salt Of these some contract the passages they which do it more roughly are called acid they
bodies as are with us upon the Earth which seeing they think they see true bodies As these if ever they should be brought out of darknesse into the clear light would questionlesse despise all things which they saw before and themselves much more as having been absolutely deceived So they who rise up out of the darknesse of this life to those things which are divine and fair in all likelyhood will contemn what before they most esteemed and love more vehemently this contemplation Thus it appeareth that only what is good is honest and that Vertue sufficeth to Felicity Moreover that good and fair consist in knowledge of the first good he declareth in whole volumes As concerning those which are good by participation he speaketh thus in his first Book of Laws Good is twofold Humane and Divine c. If anything be disjoyned from the first good and void of the essence thereof that is called good by the foolish which in Euthydemo he affirmeth to be a greater ill to the Possessor That he conceiveth the Vertues to be eligible in themselâ—es is manifest in as much as he affirmeth that only to be good which is honest which he demonstrateth in many Dialogues particuly in those of the Common-wealth Hence he conceiveth that man to be most happy and blessed who hath attained the Science we mentioned yet not in respect of the honours which attend such a person nor of any other reward for though he be unknown to all men and such things as are commonly accounted Ills as dishonour banishment and death happen unto him he is notwithstanding happy On the contrary a man who wants this knowledge though he possesse all things commonly esteemed good riches power health strength and Beauty he is nothing the more happy He asserteth an ultimate end conformable to all these which is to be made like unto God as far as Humanity is capable of being such This he expounds variously somtimes as in Theaeteto he affirms our resemblance to God to consist in being prudent just and holy wherefore we must endeavour to fly with all possible celerity from hence to those This flight is the resemblance to God as much as is possible The similitude consisteth in Prudence Justice and Sanctity somtimes in Justice only as in his last Book of the Common-wealth For a man is never deserted by God whilst he endeavoureth to be just and by the very act of Vertue as much as man is capable of he is rendred like unto God In Phaedone he asserteth that this resemblance to God is acquired by Temperance and Justice thus Are not they blessed and happy and from hence shall go into the best place who have practised the popular civill Vertue which they call Temperance and Iustice Again somtimes he affirmed that the end of life is to be like unto God somtimes to follow God as when hee saith God indeed according to the old saying containing the beginning midale and end of all things c. Somtimes he joyneth both together as when he saith The Soul following God and being rendred like unto him c. The principle of Utility is good it self but this is said of God therefore the end conformable to the principle is to become like unto God to the Celestiall or rather supercelestiall God who hath not Vertue but is more excellent then all Vertue Wherefore it is rightly said that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 misery is a perversity of the Genius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beatitude is a good habit of the Genius This similitude to God we shall obtain if we enjoy convenient nature in our manner education and sense according to Law and chiefly by reason and discipline and institution of wisdom withdrawing our selves as much as possible from humane affairs and being conversant in those things only which are understood by contemplation the way to prepare and as it were to cleanse the Demon that is in us is to initiate our selves into higher disciplines which is done by Musick Arithmetick Astronomy and Geometry not without some respect of the body by Gymnastick whereby it is made more ready for the actions both of Warre and Peace CHAP. XXVIII The definition and kinds of Virtue VErtue being divine is the perfect and best affection of the Soul which adorneth a man and rendreth him more excellent and ready as well for speech as action whether he do it alone or with others Of the Vertues some are placed in the rationall part some in the irrationall For whereas the Nature of the rationall part is one that of the irascible another that of the concupiscible another the perfection of these must likewise be different That of the rationall is Prudence of the irascible Fortitude of the concupiscible Temperance Prudence is the Science of things Good Bad and betwixt both Temperance is an apt moderation of desires and appetites when when we call Temperance a moderation and obedience we mean only this that it is a faculty causing all appetites to be subjected unto it in decent order and submisse obedience to be commanded by nature This is the rationall part Fortitude is a lawfull observation of a command difficult or not difficult that is it is a faculty which keepeth a lawfull precept Iustices is an agreement amongst all these which causeth that the three parts of the Soul agree with one another and that each be worthily conversant in those things which are proper and belong unto it Thus it is a common intire perfection of these three Vertues Prudence Fortitude and Temperance in such manner that reason commandeth and the rest of the parts each according to its severall property are restrained by Reason and obey it Hence it followeth that the Vertues are mutally consequent to one another Fortitude being the conservation of a lawfull precept is likewise conservative of right reason Right reason proceedeth from Prudence Prudence cohereth with Fortitude for it is the knowledge of good things but no man can discern that which is good if he be distracted by fear or involved in the like troubles In like manner neither can any man be wise and intemperate for then he is overcome by affections If a man do somthing contrary to reason Plato affirmeth he doth through ignorance and imprudence so that can be prudent that is intemperate or fearfull Whence it followeth that the perfect Vertues cohere to one another and are inseparable CHAP. XXIX Of Virtues Vices and their differences THe gifts of Nature and progress in them are called Vertues also by reason of their similitude with the perfect Vertues assuming the same name In this sence we call all souldiers stout and sometimes call imprudent and rash persons stout when we speak not of the perfect Vertues for the perfect neither increase nor decrease but Vices are intended and remitted One man is more imprudent and more unjust then another neither do all the vices follow one another for they are certain contraries which are not competible to the same
weak man both are dishonest but to do wrong is worse by how much it is more dishonest It is as expedient that a wicked man be punished as that a sick man should be cured by a Physician for all chastisement is a kind of medicine for an offending Soul Since the greater part of Vertues are conversant about passions it is necessary that we define passion Passion is an irrationall motion of the Soul arising out of some good or ill it is called an irrationall motion because neither judgments nor opinions are passions but motions of the irrationall parts of the Soul For in the irrationall part of the Soul there are motions which though they are done by us are yet nothing the more in our power They are often done therefore contrary to our inclination and will for somtimes it falleth out that though we know things to be neither pleasing nor unpleasing expetible nor avoidable yet we are drawn by them which could never be if such passions were the same with Judgement For we reject judgement when we disapprove it whether it ought to be so or otherwise In the definition is added arising from some good or some ill because of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt these no passion is ever excited in us All passions arise from that which seemeth good or ill If we see good present we rejoice if future we desire On the conrrary if ill be present we grieve if imminent we fear The simple affections and as it were elements of the rest are two Pleasure and Grief the rest consist of these Neither are fear and desire to be numbred among the principall passions for he who feareth is not wholly deprived of pleasure nor can a man live the least moment who despaireth to be freed or eased of some ill But it is more conversant in grief and sorrow and therefore he who feareth sorroweth But he who desireth like all those who desire or expect somthing is delighted insomuch as he is not absolutely confident and hath not a firm hope he is grieved And if desire and fear are not principall passions it will doubtlesse follow that none of the other affections are simple as anger love emulation and the like for in these Pleasure and Grief are manifest as consisting of them Moreover of Passions some are rough others mild the mild are those which are naturally in men and if kept within their bounds are necessary and proper to man if they exceed vitious Such are Pleasure Grief Anger Pitty Modesty for it is proper to man to delight in those things which are according to Nature and to be grieved at their contraries Anger is necessary to repell and punish an injury Mercy agreeth with Humanity Modesty teacheth us to decline sordid things Other passions are rough and praeternaturall arising from some depraved or perverse custom Such are excessive laughter joy in the misfortunes of others hatred of Mankind These whether intense or remisse after what manner soever they are are alwaies erroneous and admit not any laudable mediocrity As concerning Pleasure and Grief Plato writeth thus These passions are excited in us by Nature Grief and sorrow happen to those who are moved contrary to Nature Pleasure to those who are restored to the proper constitution of their Nature For he conceiveth the naturall state of man to consist in a mean betwixt Pleasure and Grief not moved by either in which state we live longest He asserteth severall kinds of Pleasure whereof some relate to the Body others to the Soul Again of Pleasures some are mix'd with grief some are pure Again some proceed from the remembrance of things past others from hope of things to come Again some are dishonest as being intemperate and unjust others moderate and joyned with good as joy for good things and the Pleasure that followeth Vertue Now because most Pleasures are naturally dishonest he thinks it not to be disputed whether Pleasure can be simply and absolutely a good that being to be accounted poor and of no value which is raised out of another and hath not a principall primary essence For Pleasure cohereth even with its contrary Grief and is joyned with it which could not be if one were simply good the other simply ill CHAP. XXXIII Of the formes of Common-wealths OF the formes of Common-wealth some are supposed only and conceived by abstract from the rest These he delivers in his book of a Commonwealth wherein he describeth the first concordant the second discordant enquiring which of these is the most excellent and how they may be constituted He also divideth a Commonwealth like the Soul into three parts Keepers Defenders and Artisicers The office of the first is to Counsel to advise to command of the second to defend the Commonwealth upon occasion by armes which answereth to the irascible power To the last belong Arts and other services He will have Princes to be Philosophers and to contemplate the first good affirming that so only they shall govern rightly For Mankind can never be freed from ill unlesse either Philosophers govern or they who govern be inspired with Philosophy after a divine manner A Commonwealth is then governed best and according to Justice when each part of the City performeth its proper Office So that the Princes give Laws to the People the Defenders obey them and sight for them the rest willingly submit to their Superiours Of a Commonwealth he asserteth five kinds the first Aristocracy when the best rule the second Timocracy when the ambitious the third Democracy when the people the fourth Oligarchy when a few the last Tyranny which is the worst of all He describeth likewise other supposed formes of Common-wealth as that in his Book of Laws and that which reformeth others in his Epistles which he useth for those Cities that in his Books of Laws he saith are sick These have a distinct place and select men out of every age as according to the diversity of their nature and place they require different institution education and armes The Maritime people are to study Navigation and Sea-sight the Iland fighting on foot those in mountanous Countries to use light armour those on the shore heavy Some of these to exercise fighting on horseback In this City he alloweth not a Community of women Thus is Politick a Verue conversant both in Action and Contemplation the end wherof is to constitute a City good happy and convenient to it self It considers a great many things amongst the rest whether War be to be waged or not CHAP. XXXIV Of a Sophist HItherto we have spoken of a Philosopher from whom a Sophist differeth In Manners because he teacheth young men for gain and desireth rather to seem then to be good In matter for a Philosopher is conversant in those things which alwaies are and continually remain in the same manner but a Sophist in that which is not for which reason he seeketh darknesse that he may not be known to be what
he is To things that are that which is not is not opposed as contrary for it neither existeth nor is participant of any essence nor can be understood So that if any man endeavour to expresse it in words or comprehend it by thought he is deceived because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant Yet that which is not as far as it is spoken is not a pure negation of that which is but implyeth a relation to another which in some manner is joined to Ens. So that unlesse we assume somthing from that which is to that which is not it cannot be distinguished from other things but thus as many kinds as they are of Ens so many are there of Non-Ens because that which is not an Ens is a Non-Ens Thus much may serve for an introduction into Plato's Philosophy Some things perhaps are said orderly others dispersedly or confusedly yet is all so laid down that by those which we have delivered the rest of his Assertions may be found out and contemplated After so serious a Discourse it will not be amisse to give the Reader a Poeticall entertainment upon the same Subject being A PLATONICK DISCOURSE Written in Italian by IOHN PICUS Earl of MIRANDULA In explication of a Sonnet by HIERONIMO BENIVIENI The first PART Sect. I. IT is a principle of the Platonists That every created thing hath a threefold being Causal Formal Participated In the Sun there is no heat that being but an elementary quality not of Celestiall nature yet is the Sun the cause and Fountain of all hear Fire is hot by nature and its proper form Wood is not hot of its self yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire Thus hath heat its Causall being in the Sun its Formall in the Fire it s Participated in the Fuel The most noble and perfect of these is the Causal and therefore Platonists assert That all excellencies are in God after this manner of being That in God is nothing but from him all things That Intellect is not in him but that he is the original spring of every Intellect Such is Plotinus's meaning when he affirms God neither understands nor knows that is to say after a formall way As Dionysius Areopagita God is neither an Intellectuall nor Intelligent nature but unspeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge Sect. II. PLatonists distinguish Creatures into three degrees The first comprehends the corporeall and visible as Heaven Elements and all compounded of them The last the invisible incorporeal absolutely free from bodies which properly are called Intellectual by Divines Angelicall Natures Betwixt these is a middle nature which though incorporeall invisible immortall yet moveth bodies as being obliged to that Office called the rationall Soul inferiour to Angells superiour to Bodies subject to those regent of these Above which is God himselfe author and principle of every Creature in whom Divinity hath a casuall being from whom proceeding to Angells it hath a formall being and thence is derived into the rationall Soul by participation of their lustre below which no nature can assume the Title of Divine Sect. III. THat the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplyed who is but one the principle and cause of all other Divinity is evidently proved by Platonists Peripateticks and our Divines About the second viz. The Angelick and Intellectuall Platonists disagree Some as Proclus Hermias Syrianus and many others betwixt God and the rationall Soul place a great number of creatures part of these they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligible part intellectuall which termes Plato sometimes confoundeth as in his Phaedo Plotinus Porphyrius and generally the most refined Platonists betwixt God and the Soul of the World assigne only one Creature which they call the Son of God because immediately produced by him The first opinion complies most with Dionysius Areopagita and Christian Divines who assert the number of Angells to be in a manner infinite The second is the more Philosophick best suiting with Aristotle and Plato whose sense we only purpose to expresse and therefore will decline the first path though that only be the right to pursue the latter Sect. IV. VVE therefore according to the opinion of Plotinus confirmed not only by the best Platonists but even by Aristotle and all the Arabians especially Avicenna affirm That God from eternity produced a creature of incorporeall and intellectuall nature as perfect as is possible for a created being beyond which he produced nothing for of the most perfect cause the effect must be most perfect and the most perfect can be but one for of two or more it is not possible but one should be more or lesse perfect than the rest otherwise they would not be two but the same This reason for our opinion I rather choose then that which Avicen alledges founded upon this principle That from one cause as one can proceed but one effect We conclude therefore that no creature but this first minde proceeds immediately from God for of all other effects issuing from this minde and all other second causes God is only the mediate efficient This by Plato Hermes and Zoroaster is called the Daughter of God the Minde Wisdome Divine Reason by some interpreted the Word not meaning with our Divines the Son of God he not being a creature but one essence coequall with the Creator Sect. V. ALL understanding agents have in themselves the form of that which they design to effect as an Architect hath in his minde a figure of the building he undertakes which as his pattern he exactly strives to imitate This Platonists call the Idea or Exemplar believing it more perfect then that which is made after it and this manner of Being Ideal or Intelligible the other Materiall and Sensible So that when a Man builds a house they affirm there are two one Intellectuall in the Workmans mind the other sensible which he makes in Stone Wood or the like expressing in that matter the form he hath conceiv'd to this Dante alludes â—None any work can frame Unless himself become the same Hereupon they say though God produced only one creature yet he produced all because in it he produced the Ideas and forms of all and that in their most perfect being that is the Ideal for which reason they call this Mind the Intelligible World Sect. VI. AFter the pattern of that Mind they affirm this sensible World was made and the exemplar being the most perfect of all created things it must follow that this Image thereof be as perfect as its nature will bear And since animate things are more perfect then the inanimate and of those the rational then the irrationall we must grant this World hath a Soul perfect above all others This is the first rationall Soul which though incorporeall and immateriall is destin'd to the function of governing and moving corporeall Nature not free from the body as that mind whence from Eternity it was deriv'd as was the mind from
is twofold the two Venusâ—â— celebrated by Plato Sympos and our Poet Sensible called Vulgar Venus Intellectuall in Ideas which are the object of the Intellect as colour of sight nam'd Celestiall Venus Love also is twofold Vulgar and Celestial for as Plato saith Venus's Sect. VIII VEnus then is Beauty whereof Love is generated properly his Mother because Beauty is the cause of Love not as productive principle of this act to Love but as its object the Soul being the efficient cause of it as of all his acts Beauty the materiall For in Philosophy the efficient is assimilated to the Father the material to the Mother Sect. IX CElestiall Love is an Intellectuall desire of Ideall Beauty Ideas as we said before are the Patterns of things in God as in their Fountain in the Angelick Mind Essentiall in the Soul by Participation which with the Substance partakes of the Ideas and Beauty of the first Mind Hence it follows that Love of Celestial Beauty in the Soul is not Celestiall Love perfectly but the nearest Image of it It s truest being is with the desire of Ideal Beauty in the first Mind which God immediately adorns with Ideas Sect. X. LOve saith Plato was begot on Penia by Porus the Son of Metis in Iupiters Orchard being drunk with Nectar when the Gods met to celebrate Venus Birth Nature in it self inform when it receives form from God is the Angelick Mind this form is Ideas the first Beauty which in this descent from their divine Fountain mixing with a different nature become imperfect The first mind by its opacousness eclipsing their lustre desires that Beauty which they have lost this desire is love begot when Porus the affluence of Ideas mixeth with Penia the indigence of that informe nature we termed Iupiter 1. 8. in whose Garden the Ideas are planted with those the first Mind adorned was by the Antients named Paradise to which contemplative life and eternall felicity Zoroastres inviting us saith seek Seek Paradisâ— our Divines transfer it to the Coelum Empyraeum the seat of the happy Souls whose blessednesse consists in contemplation and perfection of the Intellect according to Plato This Love begot on Venus birth-day that is when the Ideal Beauty though imperfectly is infused into the Angelick Mind Venus yet as a Child not grown to perfection All the Gods assembled at this Feast that is their Ideas as by Saturn we understand both the Planet and his Idea an expression borrowed from Parmenides These Gods then are those Ideas that precede Venus She is the beauty and Grace resulting from their variety Invited to a Banquet of Nectar and Ambrosia those whom God feasts with Nectar and Ambrosia are eternall beings the rest not These Idea's of the Angelick Mind are the first eternals Porus was drunk with Nectar this Ideal affluence fill'd with Eternity other Idea's were not admitted to the Feast nor indued with Immortality Orpheus upon the same grounds saith Love was born before all other Gods in the bosom of Chaos Because Nature full of indistinct imperfect forms the Mind replenished with confused Ideas desires their perfection Sect. XI THe Angelick Mind desires to make these Idea's perfect which can onely be done by means opposite to the causes of their imperfection these are Recession from their Principle and mixtion with a contrary Nature Their Remedy separation from the unlike Nature and return and conjunction as far as possible with God Love the desire of this Beauty excites the Mind to conversion and re-union with him Every thing is more perfect as nearer its Principle This is the first Circle The Angelick Mind proceeding from the Union of God by revolution of intrinsecall knowledge returneth to him Which with the Antients is Venus adulta grown to perfection Every Nature that may have this conversion is a Circle such alone are the Intellectuall and Rationall and therefore only capable of felicity the obtaining their first Principle their ultimate end and highest good This is peculiar to Immortall Substances for the Materiall as both Platonists and Peripateticks grant have not this reflection upon themselves or their Principle These the Angelick Mind and Rationall Soul are the two intelligible Circles answerable to which in the corporeall World are two more the tenth Heaven immoveable image of the first Circle the Celestiall Bodies that are moveable image of the second The first Plato mentions noâ— as wholly different and irrepresentable by corporeall Nature of the second in Timaeo he saith That all the Cirâ—les of this visible Heaven by him distinguished into the fixed sphere and seven Planets represent as many Circles in the Rationall Soul Some attribute the name of Circle to God by the antient Theologists called Coelus being a Sphear which comprehends all as the outmost Heaven includes the World In one respect this agrees with God in another not the property of beginning from a point and returning to it is repugnant to him who hath no beginning but is himself that indivisible point from which all Circles begin and to which they return And in this sence it is likewise inconsistent with materiall things they have a beginning but cannot return to it In many other Properties it agrees with God He is the most perfect of beings this of figures neither admit addition The last Sphear is the place of all bodies God of all Spirits the Soul say Platonists is not in the Body but the body is in the Soul the Soul in the Mind the Mind in God the outmost Place who is therefore named by the Cabalists 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sect. XII THe three Graces are Handmaids to Venus Thalid Euphrosyne Aglaia Viridity Gladnesse Splendour properties attending Ideal Beauty Thalia is the permanence of every thing in its entire being thus is Youth called green Man being then in his perfect state which decaies as his years encrease into his last dissolution Venus is proportion uniting all things Viridity the duration of it In the Ideall World where is the first Venus is also the first Viridity for no Intelligible Nature recedes from its being by growing old It communicates this property to sensible things as far as they are capable of this Venus that is as long as their due proportion continues The two other properties of Ideal Beauty are Illustration of the Intellect Aglaia Repletion of the wil with desire and joy Euphrosyne Of the Graces one is painted looking toward us The continuation of our being is no reflex act The other two with their faces from us seeming to return the operations of the Intellect and Will are reflexive What comes from God to us returnes from us to God Sect. XIII VEnus is said to be born of the Sea Matter the Inform Nature whereof every Creature is compounded is represented by Water continually flowing easily receptable of any form This being first â—n the Angelick Minde Angells are many times exprest by Water as in the Psalms The Waters above the Heavens praise God continually
so interpreted by Origen and some Platonists expound the Ocean stil'd by Homer Father of Gods and Men this Angelick Minde Principle and Fountain of all other Creatures Gemistius Neptune as Commander of all Waters of all Mindes Angelicall and Humane This is that living Fountain whereof he that drinketh shall never thirst These are the Waters whereon David saith God hath founded the World Sect. XIV POrus the Affluence of Ideas proceeding from God is stiled by Plato the Son of Metis Counsell in Imitation of the Scripture whence our Saviour by Dionysius Areop is termed the Angel of Counsell that is the Messenger of God the Father so Avicen calls the first Cause conciliative the Minde not having Ideas from it selfe but from God by whose Counsell she receiveth Knowledge and Art to frame this visible World Sect. XV. LOve according to Plato is Youngest and Oldest of the Gods They as all other things have a two-fold Being Ideal and Naturall The first God in his Naturall Being was Love who dispenc'd theirs to all the rest the last in his Ideal Love was born in the Descent of the Ideas into the Angelick Minde which could not be perfect till they its Essence were made so by loves conversion to God The Angelick Minde owing its naturall being to Love the other Gods who succeeded this Minde necessarily are younger then He in their naturall Being though they precede him in their Ideal as not born till these Ideas though imperfectly were joyn'd to the inform'd Nature Sect. XVI THe Kingdome of Necessity is said to be before that of Love Every Creature consists of two Natures Materiall the imperfect which we here understand by Necessity and Formall the occasion of perfection That whereof it most partakes is said to be predominant and the Creature to be subject to it Hence is Necessity matter suppos'd to raigne when the Ideas were imperfect and all imperfections to happen during that time all perfections after Love began his reign for when the Minde was by him converted to God that which before was imperfect in her was perfected Sect. XVII VEnus is said to commend Fate The order and concatenation of causes and effects in this sensible World called Fate depends on the order of the Intelligible World Providence Hence Platonists place Providence the ordering of Ideas in the first Minde depending upon God its ultimate end to which it leads all other things Thus Venus being the order of those Ideas whereon Fate the Worlds order depends commands it Fate is divided into three parts Clotho Lachesis and Atropos That which is one in Providence indivisible in Eternity when it comes into Time and Fate is divisible into Past Present and Future Others apply Atropos to the fixed Sphear Clotho to the seven Planets Lachesis to sublunary things Temporall corporeall things only are subjected to Fate the Rationall Soul being incorporeall predominates over it but is subjected to Providence to serve which is true liberty By whom the Will obeying its Lawes is led to the Acquisition of her desired end And as often as she endeavours to loose her selfe from this Servitude of Free she becomes a Servant and Slave to Fate of whom before she was the Mistresse To deviate from the Laws of Providence is to forsake Reason to follow Sense and Irrationall Appetite which being corporeall are under Fate he that serves these is much more a servant then those he serves Sect. XVIII AS from God Ideas descend into the Angelick Mind by which the Love of Intellectuall Beauty is begot in her called Divine Love so the same Ideas descend from the Angelick Minde into the Rationall Soul so much the more imperfect in her as she wants of Angelicall Perfection From these springs Human Love Plato discourseth of the first Plotinus of the latter who by the same Argument whereby he proves Ideas not accidentall but substantiall in the Angelick Minde evinceth likewise the specificall Reasons the Ideas in the Soul to be substantiall terming the Soul Venus as having a specious splendid Love in respect of these specificall Reasons Sect. XIX VUlgar Love is the Appetite of sensible Beauty through corporeall sight The cause of this Beauty is the visible Heaven by its moving power As our motive faculty consists in Muscles and Nerves the Instruments of its Operation so the motive faculty of Heaven is fitted with a Body proper for circular sempiternall motion Through which Body the Soul as a Painter with his Pencill changeth this inferiour matter into various Forms Thus vulgar Venus the beauty of materiall forms hath her casuall being from the moving power of the Heavens her formall from colour enlightned by the visible Sun as Ideas by the invisible her participate in the Figure and just order of parts communicated to sight by mediation of light and colour by whose Interest only it procures love Sect. XX. AS when the Ideas descend into the Minde there ariseth a desire of enjoying that from whence this Ideall Beauty comes so when the species of sensible Beauty flow into the Eye there springs a two-fold Appetite of Union with that whence this Beauty is derived one Sensuall the other Rationall the principles of Bestiall and Human Love If We follow Sense We Judge the Body wherein We behold this Beauty to be its Fountain whence proceedes a desire of Coition the most intimate union with it This is the Love of irrationall Creatures But Reason knowes that the Body is so far from being its Originall that it is destructive to it and the more it is sever'd from the Body the more it enjoyes its own Nature and Dignity We must not fix with the species of Sense in the Body but refine that species from all reliques of corporeall infection And because Man may be understood by the Rationall Soul either considered apart or in its union to the Body in the first sence human Love is the Image of the Celestiall in the second Desire of sensible Beauty this being by the Soul abstracted from matter and as much as its nature will allow made Intellectuall The greater part of men reach no higher than this others more perfect remembring that more perfect Beauty which the Soul before immers'd in the Body beheld are inflam'd with an incredible desire of reviewing it in pursuit whereof they separate themselves as much as possible from the Body of which the Soul returning to its first dignity becomes absolute Mistresse This is the Image of Celestiall Love by which man ariseth from one perfection to another till his Soul wholly united to the Intellect is made an Angell Purged from materiall drosse and transformed into spirituall flame by this Divine Power he mounts up to the Intelligible Heaven and happily rests in his Fathers bosome Sect. XXI VUlgar Love is only in Souls immerst in Matter and overcome by it or at least hindred by perturbations and passions Angelick Love is in the Intellect eternall as it Yet but inferr'd the greater part turning
from the Intellect to sensible things and corporeall cares But so perfect are these Celestiall Souls that they can discharge both Functions rule the Body yet not be taken off from Contemplation of Superiours These the Poets signifie by Ianus with two faces one looking forward upon Sensible things the other on intelligible lesse perfect Souls have but one face and when they turn that to the Body cannot see the Intellect being depriv'd of their contemplation when to the Intellect cannot see the Body neglecting the Care thereof Hence those Souls that must forsake the Intellect to apply themselves to Corporeall Government are by Divine Providence confin'd to caduque corruptible Bodies loosed from which they may in a short time if they fail not themselves return to their Intellectuall felicity Other Soules not hindred from Speculation are tyed to eternall incorruptible Bodies Celestial Souls then design'd by Ianus as the Principles of Time motion intervening behold the Ideal Beauty in the Intellect to love it perpetually and inferiour sensible things not to desire their Beauty but to communicate this other to them Our Souls before united to the Body are in like manner double-fac'd but are then as it were cleft asunder retaining but one which as they turn to either object Sensuall or Intellectuall is deprived of the other Thus is vulgar love inconsistent with the Celestiall and many ravish'd at the sight of Intellectuall Beauty become blinde to sensible imply'd by Callimachus Hymn 5. in the Fable of Tyresias who viewing Pallas naked lost his sight yet by her was made a Prophet closing the eyes of his Body she open'd those of his Minde by which he beheld both the Present and Future The Ghost of Achilles which inspir'd Homer with all Intellectuall Contemplations in Poetry deprived him of corporeal sight Though Celestiall Love liveth eternally in the Intellect of every Soul yet only those few make use of it who declining the Care of the Body can with Saint Paul say Whether in the Body or out of the Body they know not To which state a Man sometimes arrives but continues there but a while as we see in Extasies Sect. XXII THus in our Soul naturally indifferent to sensible or intelligible Beauty there may be three Loves one in the Intellect Angelicall the second Human the third Sensuall the two latter are conversant about the same object Corporeall Beauty the sensuall fixeth its Intention wholly in it the human separates it from matter The greater part of mankind go no further then these two but they whose understandings are purified by Philosophy knowing sensible Beauty to be but the Image of another more perfect leave it and desire to see the Celestial of which they have already a Tast in their Remembrance if they persevere in this Mental Elevation they finally obtain it and recover that which though in them from the beginning yet they were not sensible of being diverted by other Objects The Sonnet I. LOve whose hand guides my Hearts strict Reins Nor though he govern it disdains To feed the fire with pious care Which first himself enkindled there Commands my backward Soul to tell What Flames within her Bosom dwell Fear would perswade her to decline The charge of such a high design But all her weak reluctance fails 'Gainst greater Force no Force avails Love to advance her flight will lend Those wings by which he did descend Into my Heart where he to rest For ever long since built his Nest I what from thence he dictates write And draw him thus by his own Light II. LOve flowing from the sacred spring Of uncreated Good I sing When born how Heaven he moves the soul Informs and doth the World controwl How closely lurking in the heart With his sharp weapons subtle art From heavy earth he Man unites Enforcing him to reach the skies How kindled how he flames how burns By what laws guided now he turns To Heaven now to the Earth descends Now rests 'twixt both to neither bends Apollo Thee I invocate Bowing beneath so great a weight Love guide me through this dark design And imp my shorter wings with thine III. WHen from true Heav'n the sacred Sun Into th' Angelick Mind did run And with enliv'ned Leaves adorn Bestowing form on his first-born Enflamed by innate Desires She to her chiefest good aspires By which reversion her rich Brest With various Figures is imprest And by this love exalted turns Into the Sun for whom she burns This flame rais'd by the Light that shin'd From Heav'n into th' Angelick Mind Is eldest Loves religious Ray By Wealth and Want begot that Day When Heav'n brought forth the Queen whose Hand The Cyprian Scepter doth Command IV. THis born in amorous Cypris arms The Sun of her bright Beauty warms From this our first desire accrues Which in new fetters caught pursues The honourable path that guides Where our eternall good resides By this the fire through whose fair beams Life from above to Mankind streams Is kindled in our hearts which glow Dying yet dying greater grow By this th' immortal Fountain flows Which all Heaven forms below bestows By this descends that shower of light Which upwards doth our minds invite By this th' Eternall Sun inspires And souls with sacred lustre fires V. AS God doth to the Mind dispence Its Being Life Intelligence So doth the Mind the soul acquaint How't understand to move to paint She thus prepar'd the Sun that shines In the Eternal Breast designs And here what she includes diffuses Exciting every thing that uses Motion and sense beneath her state To live to know to operate Inferiour Venus hence took Birth Who shines in heav'n but lives on earth And o're the world her shadow spreads The elder in the Suns Glass reads Her Face through the confused skreen Of a dark shade obscurely seen She Lustre from the Sun receives And to the Other Lustre gives Celestiall Love on this depends The younger vulgar Love attends VI. FOrm'd by th' eternal Look of God From the Suns most sublime abode The Soul descends into Mans Heart Imprinting there with wondrous Art What worth she borowed of her star And brought in her Celestiall Carre As well as humane Matter yields She thus her curious Mansion builds Yet all those fames from the divine Impression differently decline The Sun who 's figu'rd here his Beams Into anothers Bosom streams In whose agreeing soul he staies And guilds it with its virtuous Raies The heart in which Affection 's bred Is thus by pleasing Errour fed VII THe heart where pleasing Errour raigns This object as her Child maintains By the fair light that in her shines A rare Celestiall Gift refines And by degrees at last doth bring To her first splendours sacred spring From this divine Look one Sun passes Through three refulgent Burning-glasses Kindling all Beauty which the Spirit The Body and the Mind inherit These rich spoiles by th' eye first caught Are to the Souls next Handmaid brought Who
he is Man by the Intellectuall communicates with Angels As Man he dies reviv'd an Angell Thus the Heart dies in the flames of Intellectuall Love yet consumes not but by this death growes greater receives a new and more sublime life See in Plato the Fables of Alcestes and Orpheus V. This Stanza is a description of sensible Beauty The elder in the Suns glasse reads Her face through the confused skreen Of a dark shade obscurely seen Sensible light is the act and efficacy of Corporeall spirituall light of Intelligible Beauty Ideas in their descent into the inform Angelick Minde were as colours and figures in the Night As he who by Moon-light seeth some fair object desires to view and enjoy it more fully in the day so the Minde weakly beholding in her selfe the Ideal Beauty dim and opacous whch our Author calls the skreen of a dark shade by reason of the Night of her imperfection turns like the Moon to the eternall Sun to perfect her Beauty by him to whom addressing her selfe she becomes Intelligible light clearing the Beauty of Celestiall Venus and rendring it visible to the eye of the first Minde In sensible Beauty we consider first the object in it selfe the same at Midnight as at Moon Secondly the light in a manner the Soul thereof the Author supposeth that as the first part of sensible Beauty corporeall forms proceeds from the first part of Intellectual Beauty Ideal forms so sensible light flowes from the intelligible descending upon Ideas VI. VII VIII Corporeall Beauty implies first the materiall disposition of the Body consisting of quantity in the proportion and distance of parts of quality in figure and colour Secondly a certain quality which cannot be exprest by any term better then Gracefulnesse shining in all that is fair This is properly Venus Beauty which kindles the fire of Love in Mankinde They who affirm it results from the disposition of the Body the sight figure and colour of features are easily confuted by experience We sâ—e many persons exact and unaccustomable in every part destitute of this grace and comlinesse others lesse perfect in those particular conditions excellently gracefull and comely Thus Catullus Many think Quintia beauâ—ious fair and tall And sâ—reight she is apart I grant her all But altogether beautious I deny For not one grace doth that large shape supply He grants her perfection of quality figure and quantity yet not allowes her handsome as wanting this Grace This then must by consequence be ascribed to the Soul which when perfect and lucid transfuseth even into the Body some Beams of its Splendour When Moses came from the divine Vision in the Mount his face did shine so exceedingly that the people could not behold it unlesse vail'd Porphyrius relates that when Plotinus his soul was elevated by divine Contemplation an extraordinary brightnesse appeared in his looks plotinus himselfe averres that there was never any beautifull Person wicked that this Gracefulnesse in the Body is a certain sign of perfection in the Soul Proverbs 17. 24. Wisdome shineth in the countenance of the Wise. From materiall beauty wee ascend to the first Fountain by six Degrees the Soule through the sight represents to her self the Beauty of some particular person inclines to it is pleased with it and while she rests here is in the first the most imperfect material degree 2. She reforms by her imagination the Image she hath received making it more perfect as more spirituall and separating it from Matter brings it a little nearer Ideal Beauty 3. By the light of the agent Intellect abstracting this Form from all singularity she considers the universall Nature of Corporeal Beauty by it self This is the highest degree the Soul can reach whilst she goes no further then Sense 4. Reflecting upon her own Operation the knowledge of universall Beauty and considering that every thing founded in matter is particular shee concludes this universality proceeds not from the outward Object but her Intrinsecal Power and reasons thus If in the dimme Glasse of Materiall Phantasmes this Beauty is represented by vertue of my Light it follows that beholding it in the clear Mirrour of my substance divested of those Clouds it will appear more perspicuous thus turning into her self shee findes the Image of Ideal Beauty communicated to her by the Intellect the Object of Celestiall Love 5. Shee ascends from this Idea in her self to the place where Celestiall Venus is in her proper form Who in fulness of her beauty not being comprehensible by any particular Intellect she as much as in her lies endeavours to be united to the first Mind the chiefest of Creatures and general Habitation of Ideal Beauty obtaining this she terminates and sixeth her journey this is the sixt and last degree They are all imply'd in the 6 7 and 8 Stanza's Form'd by th' Eternal look c. Platonists affirm some Souls are of the nature of Saturn others of Iupiter or some other Planet meaning one Soul hath more Conformity in its Nature with the Soul of the Heaven of Saturn then with that of Iupiter and so on the contrary of which there can be no internal Cause assigned the External is God who as Plato in his Timâ—eus Soweth and scattereth Souls some in the Moon others in other Planets and Stars the Instruments of Time Many imagine the Rational Soul descending from her Star in her Vehiculum Coeleste of her self forms the Body to which by that Medium she is united Our Author upon these grounds supposeth that into the Vehiculum of the Soul by her endued with Power to form the Body is infused from her Star a particular formative vertue distinct according to that Star thus the aspect of one is Saturnine of another Joviall c. in their looks wee read the nature of their Souls But because inferiour matter is not ever obedient to the Stamp the vertue of the Soul is not alwaies equally exprest in the visible Effigies hence it happens that two of the same Nature are unlike like the matter whereof the one consists being lesse disposed to receive that Figure then the other what in that is compleat is in this imperfect our Author infers that the figures of two Bodies being formed by vertue of the same Star this Conformity begets Love From the Suns most sulime aboad The Tropick of Cancer by which Soules according to Platonists descend ascending by Capricorn Cancer is the House of the Moon who predominates over the vitall parts Capricorn of Saturn presiding over Contemplation The Heart in which affection 's bred Is thus by pleasing Errour fed Frequently if not alwaies the Lover believes that which hee loves more beautious then it is he beholds it in the Image his Soul hath formed of it so much fairer as more separate from Matter the Principle of Deformity besides the Soul is more Indulgent in her Affection to this Species considering it is her own Child produc'd in her Imagination one Sun passes Through three
care that he brought him to his own house and kept him there untill he were quite cured He likewise by the compulsion of his Brother studied Rhetorick and being by nature vehement in discourse and of indefatigable industry he addicted himselfe likewise to Poetry There is an Epigram of his extant upon Attalus to this effect For armes and horses oft hath been the name Of Pergamus through Pisa spread by fame But now shall if a mortall may divine To future times with greater glory shine There is another Epigram of his Menodorusâ— son of Eudemus Far hence is Thyatire far phrygian earth Whence Menodore thou didst derive thy birth But down to Acheron unpierc'd by day From any place thou knew'st the ready way To thee this Tâ—mb Eudemus dedicates Whom Love hath wealthy made though poor the Fates Although his Brother Maereas would have had him profâ—ssed Rhetorick yet was he naturally more enclined to Philosophy to which end he first became a hearer of Theophrastus in which time Crantor being much taken with him spoke that verse of Euripides to him out of his Andromeda Mayd if I save thee wilt thou thankfull be He answer'd in the following verse Stranger for wife or slave accept of me From thence forward they lived in intimate friendship whereaâ— Theophrastus troubled said He had lost a youth of extraordinary wit and quicknesse of apprehension He emulated Pyrrho as some affirm and studied Dialectick and the Eretriack Philosophy whence Aristo said of him Pyrrho behinde Plato before And in the middle Diodore And Timon Next leaden Menedemus he pursues And Pyrrho doth or Diodorus choose And soon after maketh him say thus I le swim to Pyrrho and crook'd Diodore He was a great admirer of Plato whose Bookes he had CHAP. II. Vpon what occasion he constituted the middle Academy CRates dying Arcesilaus took upon him the government of the School which was yielded to him by Socratides Being possessed of that place he altered the Doctrine and manner of Teaching which had been observed by Plato and his successors upon this occasion Plato and his followers down to Arcesilaus held as was said That there are two kinds of things some perceptible by Sence others perceptible only by Intellect That from the latter ariseth Science from the former Opinion That the Minde only seeth that which alwaies is simple and in the same manner and such as it is that is Ideas But that the Senses are all dull and slow neither can they perceive those things which seem subjected to Sense because either they are so little that they cannot fall beneath sense or so movable and transient that not one of them is constant or the same but all are in continuall lapse and fluxion Hence they called all this part of things Opiâ—â—onable affirming that Science is no where but in the notions and reasons of the minde Yet did they professe against those who said the Academy took away all sence for they affirmed not that there was no such thing as colour or tast or sapor or sound but only maintained there was no proper mark of true and certain in the senses there being no such any where Hence they allowed that we make use of the senses in actions from the reason that appeareth our of them but to trust them as absolutely true and infallible they allowed not Thus held the Academicks down to Poleme of whom Arcesilaus and Zenâ— were constant Auditors but Zeno being older then Arcesilaus and a very subtle disputant endeavoured to correct his doctrine not that as Theophrastus saith he did enervate vertue but on the contrary he placed all things that are reckon'd among the good in vertue only and this he called honest as being simple sole one good Of the rest though neither good nor evill he held that some were according to Nature others contrary to Nature others Mediate Those which are according to Nature he held to be worthy estimation the contrary contrary the neuter he left betwixt both in which he placed no value Of those which were eligible some were of more estimation some of lesse those which were of more he called preserred those of lesse rejected And as in these he did not change so much the things themselves as the words so betwixt a rectitude and a sin an office and a praeterossice he placed some things mediate holding that Rectitudes consisted only in good actions sins in evill but offices either performed or omitted he conceived mediate things And whereas the Philosophers of the old Academy did not hold all Vertue to consist in Reason but some vertues to be perfected by nature or custome Zeno on the contrary placed all Vertue in Reason and whereas the Academicks held as we said in the life of Plato that all those vertues may be separated Zeno maintained that could not be averring that not only the use of vertue as the Academicks held but the habit thereof was excellent in it selfe neither had any one vertue who did not alwaies make use of it And whereas the Academicks took not away passion from man affirming that we are subject to compassion desire fear and joy by nature but only contracted them and reduced them within narrower limits Zeno affirmed that from all these as from so many diseases a wise man must be free And whereas they held that all passions were naturall and irrationall and placed in one part of the Soule Concupiscence in the other Reason Neither did Zeno herein agree with them for he asserted that passions are voluntary that opinions are taken up by judgment that immoderate intemperance is the Mother of all passion Thus much for Ethicks As for Physick He did not allow that fift nature besides the foure Elements of which the Academicks held Sence and Minde to be effected for He asserted Fire to be that nature which begetteth every thing both Minde and Sence He likewise dissented from them in that he held nothing can be made by a thing which hath no body of which nature Xenocrates and the old Academicks thought the soule to be and that whatsoever made any thing or was it selfe made must of necessity be a Body He likewise asserted many things in the third part of Philosophy wherein He asserted some things new of the Senses themselves which he conceived to be joyned by a certain extrinsecall impulsion which he called Phantasie To these phantasies received by the Senses He added Assent of the mind which he held to be placed in us and voluntary Heâ— did not allow all phantasies to be faithfull and worthy â—reditâ— but only those which have a proper declaration of those things which they seem which phantasie when it is seen is called comprehensible when received and approved he calleth it comprehension That which was comprehended by sense he calleth Sense and if it were so comprehended that it could not be pulled away by reason Science if otherwise Ignorance of which kinde was opinion infirme and
which freeth us from the fury of the passions And if corporeall strength ought to be numbered amongst goods much more ought magnanimity by which the soul is strengthened And if corporeall Beauty be expetible in it selfe much more is that of the soul Iustice. In like manner is it with the vertues For there are three kinds of Goods which though different have some kinde of analogie That which in the body is called Health in the soul is called Temperance and in externals Riches What in the body is Strength in the soul is Magnanimity in externals Power What in the body is Vigour of Sense in the soul is Prudence in externals Felicity What in the body is Beauty in the soul is Iustice in externals Friendship There are three kinds of Goods expetible in themselves those concerning the soule those concerning the body and the externall but especially those of the soul for the soul is more excellent then the body Yet though corporeall and externall vertues be inferiour to those of the soul they are not to be neglected partly as being expetible in themselves partly as conducing to civill sociable and contemplative life for life is defined by civill sociable and contemplative actions Vertue according to this Sect not being a lover of it selfe but communicative and civill For when we say vertue is neerest ally'd to it selfe the desire of the knowledge of truth necessarily followeth it so as wise men may rightly part with their life and fools rightly preserve theirs since that to those who are perfect it is an equall thing to depart this life or not The excellency of vertue is much encreased by corporeall and externall goods yet the end cannot any way be compleated by them The function therefore of vertue is Beatitude by successefull actions Corporeall and externall goods are said to be efficient of beatitude for as much as they confer something thereto not that they compleat it for Beatitude is life Life consists of actions but those can neither be reckoned amongst actions nor functions Hereupon comes in Beneficence grace humanity love of Children and Brethren of our Country Parents Benevolence of Kinsfolk Friendship Equality and the whole company of Vertues which who neglect manifestly sin as to expetible goods and avoidable evills and also in the acquisition and use of Goods they sin in election by judgment in acquisition by the manners in use by ignorance In election they sin as desiring that which is not good or preferring the lesser good as most prefer Pleasant before Pâ—ofitable profitable before Honest. In acquisition as not considering whence nor in what manner nor how far it ought to be acquired In use for as much as all use being referred either to it selfe or some other in the former they observe no moderation in the latter no decency In these things though the wicked sin yet do the just behave themselves uprightly following vertue as their leader In all vertues there is Iudgment Election and Aâ—tion there is no Vertue without these Prudence hath the first place the rest follow Vertue is called the best affection which may be collected from Induction The Vertue of a shoemaker is that by which he knoweth how to make shoes and of an Architâ—ct that by which he knoweth how to build a handsom house Vertue therefore is the best of Affections Of Vertue there are two principles as it were Reason and Passion which somtimes agree somtimes disagree for Pleasure or grief when Reason gets the Mastery it is called Temperance when passion Intemperance The Harmony and Concord of both is Vertue one rightly commanding the other obeying Expetible is that which attracteth the appetite to it self avoidadable that which repelleth it reason consenting thereto Expeâ—ible and good were by the Ancients esteemed the same for they affirmed Good to be that which all desire Of Goods they say some are expetible for themselves some for others the first are either honest or necessary Honest are the Vertues and their functions necessary Life and those things which pertain unto it as the body with its parts and uses and those which are called externall goods as riches peace glory Liberty friendship for each of these conferreth to the use of Vertue Beatitude consisteth of Good and successful actions wherefore it is wholly good as playing upon pipes is wholly Artificial for the use of the matter doth not take away the goodnesse from Beatitude as the use of Instruments taketh not away from the Art of Medicine Such things as are made use of towards this perfection are not to be reckoned as parts for they without which the action cannot be are not rightly parts thereof for parts conduce to the whole the rest conduce to the end Good is divided into honest profitable and pleasant these are the scopes of all actions Beatitude consists of all these It is the use of perfect Vertue in perfect life with prosperous successe and the function of perfect life according to Vertue and the use of Vertue according to nature without any impediment Though some assert that the End is to be happy and Beatitude the scope as Riches are Good and to be rich that which is behovefull yet is it better to follow the Antients who assert the End to be that for whose sake all things are it self not being for the sake of any other or the ultimate of things expetible or Life according to Vertue in corporeall and externall goods either in all or the most principall This being the greatest Good useth the Ministry of the rest for as those things which conferr hereunto are to be esteemed Goods so those things which resist it are Indifferents for every good action doth not effect Beatitude They assert Beatitude to be the use of perfect Vertue as holding some Vertues to be perfect others imperfect The perfect are Iustice and Integrity the imperfect are Ingenuity and Progression The perfect agreeth with the perfect so as the end thereof is the function of that Vertue whereof no part is wanting They added perfect life to shew that Beatitude is in men of full age for a young man is imperfect and so is his life Beatitude therefore is in perfect time the longest that is appointed for us by the Gods As one Verse makes not a Poem nor one step a dance nor one swallow a Summer so neither doth a short time conferre Beatitude for Beatitude is perfect and requireth a perfect Man and Time They added successefull Function of Vertue because the Goods of Nature are necessarily requisite to Beatitude for a good man may exercise Vertue in misery but cannot be happy For as Vertue is the only efficient of honest actions so is Beatitude of honest good and excellent Neither doth it abide amongst ill or unhappy things but enjoyeth the Good nor is deprived of the contemplation of good or the conveniences of life Beatitude being the most pleasant fairest of things increaseth like an Art by the multitude of its
Instruments It is not the same in God and Man neither is it equall amongst good men for it may somtimes be taken away by oppression of miseries Hence it is to be doubted whether a man may be termed happy as long as he is alive considering the uncertainty of Fortune whence Solon said Consider the end of a long life whether it be happy Those who sleep are not participant of Beatitude but after some manner as the function of the Soule is capable of awaking Lastly they added Nature because every waking of good men is not the use of perfect Vertue but only that which is according to Nature that is free from madnesse for madnesse as well as sleep depriveth men of use and of this Reason and maketh them like Brutes As Beatitude is said to be the use of Vertue so is misery of Vice yet not so that as this sufficeth to misery so that doth to Beatitude Life is made four and unpleasant to the Good by excessive adversity to the ill even in prosperity because they sin more nor can rightly be termed happy Having asserted Beatitude to be the chief Good it followeth that we expound how many waies it is taken Good is understood three waies First for that which is the cause of preservation to all beings next for that which is predicated of every good thing Lastly for that which is expetible in it self The first is God the second the Genus of Goods the third the end to which all are referred Beatitude That which is expetible in it selfe is said three waies either that for which something is done or for which all things are done or some part of these Again of these some are finall some efficient finall are the actions proceeding according to vertue efficient the materials of expetible things Of goods some are honourable some laudable some faculties some profitable Honourable as God our Prince Parent Laudable as Riches Empire Liberty Profitable the efficient as Health Again of things good and expetible some are expetible in themselves some for others in themselves as the honourable laudable and faculties for others as the Profitable which effect and conserve other things Again of things good in themselves some are ends others not ends Ends as Iustice Vertue Health and whatsoever consisteth of these Not ends as Ingenuity Memory Learning Again of Goods some are wholly perfect others not of the first are Vertue and Prudence which benefit all of the latter Riches and Power which require to be used by a good man The same things whereof a good man maketh right use a wicked man abuseth as the same which a good Musician useth well he who is ignorant of Musick useth amisse Whosoever maketh ill use of any thing is hurt thereby as a good horse which is a help to him that knoweth how to ride hurts the unskilfull rider Again of Goods some are in the soul some in the body some externall In the soul are ingenuity art vertue wisdome prudence pleasure in the body health soundnesse of sense beauty strength soundnesse of limbs and all parts with their faculties and functions Externall are riches glory nobility power friendâ— kindred country The goods of the soul are either conferred by naâ—ure as Wit and Memory or acquired by diligence as the Liberall Sciences or fall into perfection as Prudence Iustice and lastly Wisdome Again of Goods some may be both obtained and lost as Riches some obtained but not lost as Felicity and Immortality some lost but not obtained as Sense and Life some neither obtained nor lost as Nobility Again of Goods some are only expetible in themselves as Pleasure and Indolence some efficient only as Riches some both efficient and expetible in themselves as Vertue Friends Health Goods are divided more waies then these as not belonging all to one Genus but to all the ten Categories These things laid down we come next to speak more accurately concerning Vertue which they place in both parts of the soul In the rationall part Integrity Prudence Wisdome Memory and the like In the irrationall part Temperance Iustice Fortitude and other vertues These say they may be extinguished by excesse which they prove by testimony of the senses as things obscure by manifest For as by excesse or defect of exercise health is corrupted but by moderate exercise is preserved In like manner is it in Temperance Fortitude and other vertues For as we do call him who feareth the Thunder mad not valiant so on the contrary he who feareth shadowes is a coward but he is valiant who neither feareth all things nor nothing These things encrease or extinguish vertue being moderate they encrease courage being too great or too little they extinguish it In like manner are all other vertues extinguished by excesse or defect increased by mediocrity Neither is vertue only limited by these but by pleasure and griefe likewise in as much as for pleasure we commit wickednesse and for griefe shun good To explain this more fully they unâ—old the nature of the soul wherein are seen three things passions faculties habits Passions as anger fear hate love emulation pitty and the like to which is subsequent pleasure or griefe Faculties by which we make use of passions and are angry do emulate and the like Habits are those from which the functions of these proceedeth rightly or otherwise If any man be so disposed that he is angry upon any occasion he hath the habit of anger if so as to be angry upon no occasion he hath the habit of stupidity both which are blamable The laudable habit is that of meeknesse by which we are angry in due time and place Vertues therefore are habits by which the functions of passions become laudable All vertue consisteth in action all action is continuous Whatsoever things are continuous like magnitude have excesse defect and mediocrity either in relation to one another or to us The mean relating to us is in all the best this is not quantitative but qualitative and therefore is perfect whereas the extreams excesse and defect being contrary are repugnant to one another and to the mean But the mean is to both extreams as equality is to inequality greater then the least lesse then the greatest Vertue therefore is a deliberative habite consisting in mediocrity relating to our selves Theophrastus having laid down some qualities following his Master endeavoureth to conclude from each of them The examples he alledgeth are these Temperance Intemperance Stupidity Meekness Wrath Indolence Fortitude Boldnesse Timidity Justiâ—e Liberality Prodigality Avarice Magnanimity Pusillanimity Arrogance Magnificence Ostentation For of these habits some are ill through excesse or defect others good through mediocrity He is not temperate who desireth nothing nor he who desireth all things one like a stone desireth not even naturall expetibles the other through excessive desire becommeth intemperate He only is temperate who desireth honest things with reason in due time and measure He is not meek who is angry upon all
men lived Crates by chance passing by the Bookseller pointed to him saying follow that man which he did and from that time forward became a Disciple of Crates CHAP. II. Of his Masters ZEno thus changing the course of his life applyed himselfe to Crates being apt to Philosophy but more modest then suited with the Cynicall Sect. Which Crates to remedy gave him a pot full of pottage to carry through the Ceramick and perceiving him to hide it as ashamed with his Coat he struck the pot with his stick and broke it Zeno running away all wet what said he are you running away little Phoenician no body hurt you Hee made a litle hollow cover of a pot in which he carried the money of his Master Crates that it might be in readinesse when hee went to buy meat Thus hee lived a while with Crates during which time he writ his Book of the Common-wealth whence some jeasting said it was written under the Dog's tail At last deserting Crates he apply'd himself to Stilpo the Megarick Philosopher Apollonius Tyrius saith that taking hold of his Cloak to pluck him away from Stilpo he said O Crates the handles by which the Philosophers are to be taken hold of are their ears Lead me by those your way or else though you constrain my body to be with you my mind will be with Stilpo With Stilpo he remained ten years From Stilpo he went to Xenocrates being so well satisfied with the instruction of these two Masters that he said he made a very good voyage when he was shipwrack'd though others apply it to his living with Crates He afterwards apply'd himself to Diodorus Cronus as Hippoâ—otus avers under whom he studied Dialâ—ctick to which Science he was so much addicted that when a certain Philosopher of that Sect had informed him of seven species of Dialectick in that sallacy which is called the Mower he asked him what he was to give him for his reward the Philosopher demanded a hundred pieces of Silver Zeno so much was he affected to Learning gave him two hundred Lastly notwithstanding that he had made a great progresse in Philosophy he heard Polemon whose Doctrine was against Pride whereupon Polemon told him Zeno I am not ignorant that you lie in ambush and come slily into my Garden as the Phoenicians use to steal away Learning CHAP. III. His School and institution of a Sect. HAving been long a hearer of others he at last thought fit to communicate the Learning which he had received and improved To this end he made choice of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the painted walk so named from the pictures of Polygnotus otherwise called Pisianactia Here he constantly walked and discoursed resolving to settle there and make the place as full of tranquillity as it had been before of trouble For in the time of the thirty Tyrants neer 1400 Citizens were there put to death Hither resorted a great many Disciples to him who were at first called Zenonians as Epicure affirmeth from their Master afterwards from the place where he taught Stoicks as Eratosthenes in his eight Book of antient Comedy adding that not long before some Poets that lived there were called Stoicks also upon which occasion the name was very well known He was subtle in disquisition and dispute He disputed earnestly with Philo the Dialectick and exercised himselfe together with him so that Zeno the younger admired him no lesse then his Master Diodorus He first seemeth saith Laertius to have set a bound to the loosnesse and extravagance of propositions But of this more when we come to speak of his Philosophy which by reason of its largenesse we remit to the end of his life CHAP. IV. What honours were conferr'd upon him ZENO by the Philosophy which he taught and the practise of his life conformable to that doctrine gained so high an estimation amongst the Athenians that they deposited the keyes of the City in his hands as the only person fit to be entrusted with their liberties His name was likewise much honoured by his own Country-men as well those at Cyprus as those who lived at Sidon Amongst those who honoured and favoured Zeno was Antigonus Gonotus King of Macedonia a Prince no lesse eminent for his Vertue then his Greatnesse much esteemed him and as often as he went to Athens heard him He sent many times to invite him to come to him amongst the rest one Letter to this effect alledged by Apollonius Tyrius King Antigonus to Zeno the Philosopher health I Think that I exceed you in Fortune and Glory but in Learning and Discipline and that perfect felicity which you have attained I am exceeded by you Wherefore I thought it expedient to write to you that you will come to me assuring my selfe you will not deny it Use all means therefore to come to us and know you are not to instruct me only but all the Macedonians For he who teacheth the King of Macedonia and guideth him to Vertue it is evident that he doth likewise instruct all his Subjects in Vertue For such as is the Prince such for the most part are those who live under his Government Zeno answered thus To King Antigonus Zeno health I Much esteem your earnest desire of Learning in that you aime at Philosophy not popular which perverteth manners but that true discipline which conferreth profit avoiding that generally commended pleasure which effeminates the soules of some young men It is manifest that you are enclined to Generosity not only by nature but by choice A generous nature with indifferent exercise assisted by a Master may easily attain to perfect Vertue But I am very infirm of body by reason of my age for I am fourescore years old and therefore not able to come to you Yet I will send you some of my con-Disciples who in those things that concern the Soul are nothing inferiour to me in those of the Body are much superiour to me of whom if you make use you will want nothing conducing to perfect Beatitude Thus Zeno absolutely refused to go to Antigonus but sent him his Disciple Persaeus son of Demetrius a Cittiean who flourish'd in the 130th Olympiad Zeno being then very old and Philonides a Theban both mentioned by Epicurus in his Epistle to Aristobulus as having been with Antigonus CHAP. V. His Apophthegmes OF his Apophthegmes are remembered these Of a man very finely drest stepping lightly over a Kennell He doth not care for the dirt saith he because he cannot see his face in it A certain Cynick came to him to borrow Oyle saying he had none left Zeno deny'd him and as he was going away Now saith he consider which of us two are the more impudent Cremonides whom he much affected and Cleanthes sitting down beside him he arose whereat Cleanthes wondring I have heard good Physicians say saith he that the best remedy for tumâ—urs is rest Two sitting by him at a Feast he
that which is so as it cannot be of that which is not To comprehensive phantasie three conditions are requisite 1. That it arise from that which is for many phantasies arise from that which is not as in mad men 2. That it be conformable to that which is for some phantasies are from that which is but represents the similitude of that which is not as Orestes derived a phantasie from that which was viz. from Electra but not according to that which was for he thought her to be one of the furies Comprehensive phantasie must be conformable to that which is and so impressed and signed as that it may imprint artificially all the properties of the thing phancied as Gravers touch all the parts of those things which they imitate and the impression made by a Seal on Wax exactly and perfectly beareth all its characters Lastly that it be without impediment for sometimes comprehensive phantasie is not creditable by reason of outward circumstances as when Hercules brought Alcestis taken out of the Earth to Admetus Admetus drew from Alcestis a comprehensive phantasie but did not credit it for he consider'd that she was dead and therefore could not rise again but that sometimes Spirits appear in the shape of the deceased Phantasy Phantaston Phantasticon and Phantasme according to Chrysippus differ thus Phantasy is a passion made in the Soul which sheweth it selfe and that which made it as when with our eyes we see white it is a passion engendred by sight in the Soul and we may call this a passion because the object thereof is a white thing which moveth us the like of smelling and touching Phantaston is that which maketh phantasie as the white and the cold and whatsoever is able to move the Soul that is phantaston Phantasticon is a frustaneous attraction a passion in the Soul proceeding from nothing as in those who sight with shadowes or extend their hands in vain for to phantasy is objected phantaston but phantasticon hath no object Phantasme is that to which we are attracted by that frustraneous attraction which happens in melancholy or mad persons as Orestes in the Tragedy when he saith Bring hither Mother I implore These snakie bloodie Maids no more Whose very lookes wound me all o're This he saith in his madnesse for he saw nothing wherefore Electra answers him Ah quiet in thy bed unhappy lie Thou seest not what thou thinkst before thy eye CHAP. V. Of True and Truth TRUE according to Zeno is that which is impressed in the minde from that whence it is in such manner as it cannot be from that which is not or as others True is that which is and is opposed to something False is that which is not yet is opposed to something also Truth and true differ three waies by Essence by Constitution by Power By Essence for truth is a body but true is incorporeall for it is a dicible 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore incorporeall On the contrary Truth is a body as being the enunciative Science of all true things All Science is in some measure the supream part of the Soul which supream part is a body therefore truth in generall is corporeall By Constitution True is conceived to be something uniforme and simple by nature as It is day I discourse Truth as being a Science consisteth of many things by a kinde of conservation Wherefore as a People is one thing a Citizen another a People is a multitude consisting of many Citizens but a Citizen is no more then one In the same manner differeth truth from true Truth resembleth a People true a Cittizen for truth consisteth of many things collected true is simple By Power for true doth not absolutely adhere to truth A fool a child a mad-man may speak something true but cannot have the Science of that which is true Truth considers things with Science insomuch that he who hath it is wise for he hath the Science of true things and is never deceived nor lyeth although he speak false because it proceedeth not from an ill but good affection CHAP. VI. Of Comprehension COmprehension 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was first used in this sence by Zeno by a metaphor taken from things apprehended by the hand which allusion he exprest by action For shewing his hand with the fingers stretched forth he said such was Phantasy then bending them a little said such was Assent then compressing them and clutching his fist such was Comprehension Comprehension is a firm and true knowledge non-comprehension the contrary for some things we only think that we see hear or feel as in dreams and frenzies other things we not only think but truly do see or hear or feel These latter all but the Academicks and Scepticks conceive to fall under firm knowledge the other which we imagine in dreams or frenzy are false Whatsoever is understood is comprehended by the minde one of these two waies either by evident incursion which Laertius calls by sense or by transition from evidence Laertius collection by demonstration of which latter there are three kinds by Assimilation by Composition by Analogy By incurrent evidence is understood white and black sweet and soure By Transition from evidents by Assimilation is understood Socrates by his Picture by Composition as of a horse and a man is made a Centaure for putting together the limbes proper to both species we comprehend by phantasy that which was neither horse nor man but a Centaur compounded of both By Analogy things are understood two waies either by augmentation or when from common ordinary men we by augmentation phansy a Cyclops who not like Men that with Cares gifts are fed But some tall hill erects his head Or by Diminution as a Pigmey Likewise the Center of the earth is understood by analogy from lesser Globes To these kinds add Comprehension by transference as eyes in the breast by contrariety as death by transference as dicibles and place by privation as a man without hands just and good are understood naturally CHAP. VII Of Assent THese things being enough known which we have already explained let us now speake a little of Assent and approbation termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not that is not a large place but the grounds thereof have been already laid For when we explained the power that was in the senses we likewise declared that many things were comprehended and perceived by the senses which cannot be done without Assent Moreover seeing that betwixt an inanimate and an animate being the greatest difference is that the inanimate doth nothing the animate doth something we must either take away sense from it or allow it assent which is within our power When we will not have a thing either to perceive or assent we in a manner take away the soule from it for as it is necessary that the scale of ballance which is laden should tend downwards so is it that the soule should
it as by a head-strong horse and therefore properly may use that saying Against my Iudgement Nature forceth me Meaning by judgement the knowledge of right things for man is carried beyond nature by passion to transgresse naturall reason and right All those who are led by passion are diverted from reason but in another manner then those who are deceived For the deceived as for example They who think Atomes to be the principles of all things when they come to know that they are not change their judgement but those that are in passion although that they are taught not to grieve or fear or give way to any passion in the Soule yet they do not put them off but are led on by their passions untill they come to be subject to their tyrannicall sway CHAP. VIII Of Sicknesse and Infirmities THE fountain of all passions is Intemperance which is a totall defection from the minde and from right reason so averse from the prescription of reason that the appetites of the Soul can by no means be ruled or contained As therefore Temperance allayeth appetites and causeth them to obey right reason and preserveth the considerate judgments of the minde so Intemperanâ—e the enemy thereto enflameth troubleth and enciteth the state of the Soul Thus griefes and fears and the rest of the passions all arise from this For as when the blood is corrupt or flegme or choler aboundeth sicknesses and infirmities arise in the body so the disorder of ill opinions and their repugnance to one another devesteth the Soule of health aâ—d troubleth it with diseases By passions the minde becommeth indisposed and as it were sick Sicknesse of minde 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is an opinion and desire of that which seemeth greatly expetible but is not such as love of women of wine of mony These 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 have likewise their contraries in the other extream as hatred of women of wine of men This sicknesse of minde happening with imbecillity is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 infirmity For as in the body there are infirmities as Gouts Convulsions and the like so are there inFirmities in the minde as love of glory love of pleasure And as in bodies there is a propensity to some particular diseases so in the minde there is a proclivity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to some particular passions as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 propensity to envy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 propensity to unmercifulnesse and the like In this place much pains hath been taken by the Stoicks chiefly by Chrysippus to compare the sicknesses of the minde with those of the body Passion for as much as opinions are inconstantly and turbulently tossed up and down is alwaies in motion and when this fervour and concitation of the minde is inveterate and as it were setled in the veines and marrow then ariseth sicknesse and infirmity and those aversions which are contrary to those infirmities and diseases These differ only intentionally but really are the same arising from desire and pleasure for when mony is desired and reason not immediately apply'd as a Socratick medicine to cure that desire the evill spreadeth through the veines and cleaveth to the bowells and becommeth sicknesse and infirmity which when they grow inveterate cannot be plucked away The name of this sicknesse is avarice In like manner arise other sicknesses as desire of glory desire of women 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the rest of sicknesses and infirmities Their contraries arise from fear as hatred of women 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hatred of mankinde inhospitality all which are infirmities of the minde arising from fear of those things which they flie and shun Infirmity of minde is defined a vehement opinion inherent and wholly implanted in us of a thing not to be desired as if it were exceedingly to be desired That which ariseth from aversion is defined a vehement opinion inherent and throughly implanted in us of a thing that ought not to be shunn'd as if it ought to be shunned This opinion is a judging our selves to know what we have not Under Infirmity are these species Love of mony of honour of women of curious meats and the like Love of mony Avarice is a vehement opinion inherent and throughly implanted in us as if it were exceedingly to be desired In the like manner are all the rest defined Aversions are defined thus Inhospitality is a vehement opinion inherent and throughly implanted in us that guests ought to be shunned In like manner is defined hatred of women-kinde such as was that of Hippolitus and of man-kinde as that of Timon As some are more prone to one sicknesse then to another so are some more inclinable to fear others to other passions in some is anxiety whereby they are anxious in others choler which differeth from anger for it is one thing to be cholâ—rick another to be angry as anxiety differs from griefe for all are not anxious who are sometimes grieved nor are all that are anxious grieved alwaies as there is a difference betwixt ebriety and ebriosity and it is one thing to be a lover another to be amorous This propensity of severall persons to severall sicknesses is called from an analogy to the body Infirmity whereby is understood a propensity to be sick but in good things because some are more apt to some goods then to others it is stiled Facility in ill things Proclivity implying a lapsion in neuters it hath the former name As there is sicknesse infirmity and defect in the body so in the minde Sicknesse is the corruption of the whole body Infirmity is sicknesse with some weaknesse Defect is when the parts of the body disagree with one another whence ariseth pravity distortion deformity of the limbs so that those two sicknesse and infirmity arise from the confusion and trouble of the health of the whole body defect is seen in perfect health But in the minde sicknesse is not distinguish'd from infirmity but by cogitation only Vitiosity is a habit or affection inconstant in it selfe and oft differing in the whole course of life so that in one by corruption of opinions is bred sicknesse and infirmity in the other inconstancy and repugnance For every viâ—e hath not disagreeing parts as of them who are not far from wisdome that affection is different from it selfe as being unwise but not distorted nor depraved Sicknesses and infirmities are parts of vitiosity but whether passions are parts thereof also it is a question For vices are permanent affections passions are moving affections so that they cannot be parts of permanent affections And as in all things the Soul resembleth the Body so in good likewise In the body the chieâ—est are beauty strength health foundnesse agility so likewise in the minde And as the good temper of the body is when those things whereof we consist agree well among themselves so the health of the Soule is when the judgments and opinions thereof
agree This is the vertue of the Soul which some affirm to be Temperance others a Soule obedient to the precepts of Temperance and obsequious thereunto not having any speciousnesse of her own But whether one or other it is only in a wiseman yet there is one kinde of health of the soul which is common also to the unwise when by the care of Physicians the distemper of the minde is removed And as there is in the body an apt figure of the limbs together with a sweetnesse of colour which is called Beauty so in the soule equality and constancy of opinions and judgments following vertue with a certain firmnesse and stability or including the very power of vertue is called Beauty Likewise correspondent to the powers nerves and efficacity of the body in the same termes are named the powers of the Soul Agility of body is called quicknesse the same commendation is ascribed to wit in respect that the Soul overrunneth many things in a short time Only there is this difference betwixt Soules and bodies Strong soules cannot be assaulted by diseases strong bodies may◠but the offensions of bodies may happen without any fault those of the Soule cannot all whose sicknesses and passions proceed from contempt of reason and therefore are in men only for though beasts do somethings like this yet they fall not into passions Betwixt acute and obtuse persons there is this difference the ingenious as Corinthian Brasse rusteth slowly falling into sicknesse and more quickly got out of it the dull do not so neither doth the soul of an ingenious person fall into every sicknesse and passion for there are not many things extreamly savage and cruell and some also have a shew of humanity as compassion griefe fear But the infirmities and sicknesses of the minde are lesse easily rooted out then those great vices which are contrary to the vertues for the sicknesses remaining the vices may be taken away because the sicknesses are no sooner healed then the vices are removed CHAP. IX Of Vertue and Vice VErtue is a convenient affection of the Soul throughout all life Of vertues there are three kinds The first generall taken for any perfection of a thing as of a Statue The second are Sciences or contemplative which according to Hecaton consist in speculation as Prudence and Iustice. The third not-sciences or not-contemplative which are considered as consequent to the speculative as health strength hope joy and the like Health is consequent to Temperance a theoretick vertue as strength to the building of an Arch. They are called not-contemplative because they require no assent but are by after-accession and common even to the wicked as health and strength Vice is the contrary to vertue for the rationall creature is perverted sometimes by the perswasion of exteriour things sometimes by the counsell of those with whom he converseth contrary to nature who gives us inclinations unperverted Of vices therefore there are two kinds The first ignorance of those things whereof vertues are the knowledge as imprudence intemperance injustice The second not-ignorances as pusillanimity imbecillity Panaetius asserteth two vertues Theoretick and Practick others three Rationall Naturall Morall Pessidonius foure Cleanthes Chrysippus and Antipater more Apollodorus one only Prudence Of vertues some are primary others subordinate The primary are foure Prudence Temperance Fortitude Iustice the first conversant in offices the second in appetite the third in tolerance the fourth in distribution Prudence is the Science of things that are to be done and not to be done and neuter or the knowledge of good bad and neuter in civill life The Vertues subordinate to Prudence are five 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of things that are to be done how thy may be done beneficially 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of comprehending things to be effected 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of finding out our office 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of attaining the scope in every thing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of finding out the issues of things Temperance is the Science of things expetible avoidable and neuter Under Temperance are these species 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of time and order for the weldoing of things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of honest and dishonest motions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of avoiding just blame Fortitude is the Science of things grievous not grievous and neuter the species under it these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science tenacious of right reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science persisting in right judgement 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science whereby we trust that no ill shall happen to us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of overcoming those things which happen to the good and bad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science of the Soule which renders her invincible 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of going through to the attainment of that which we propose to our selves Iustice is the Science of distributing to every one according to his desert under Justice are four subordinate vertues 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Science of worshiping the gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of well-doing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of equality in community 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Science of contracting honestly with others In like manner of Vices some are 〈◊〉 others subordinate to the primary The primary vices are Imprudence Intemperante Pusillanimity Injustice Imprudence is the ignorance of things good ill and neuter and the ignorance of things to be done not to be done and neuter Intemperance is the ignorance of things expetible avoidable and neuter Pusillanimity is the ignorance of things grievous not grievous and neuter Injustice is the ignorance of distributing to every one according to his deserts The subbordinate vices to these are correspondent to the secondary vertues as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which are defined answerably to their opposite vertues These vertues are perfect and consist in contemplation but there are other vertues which are not arts but faculties consisting in exercise as health of the Soul integrity and strength thereof and pulchritude For as the health of the body is a good temperature of hot cold dry and moist so the health of the soul is a good temperature of the doctrines in the soul. And as the strength of the body consisteth in a tension of the nerves so the strength of the soul in a proper extension thereof to judgment and action And as the beauty of the body is a symmetry of all the parts to one another and to the whole so the beauty of the soule is the symmetry of the reason and parts thereof to the whole and to one another All those vertues which are Sciences and Arts have common theorems and the same end
wherefore they are as Zeno saith inseparable connexed to one another as Chrysippus Apollodorus and Hecaton affirm He who hath one hath all saith Chrysippus and he who doth according to one doth according to all He who hath vertue is not only contemplative but also practick of those things which are to be done Things which are to be done are either expetible tolerable distributible or retainable so that whosoever doth one thing wisely doth another justly another constantly another temperately and so is both wise magnanimous just and temperate Notwithstanding these vertues differ from one another by their heads For the heads of prudence are to contemplate and do well that which is to be done in the first place and in the second to contemplate what things are to be avoided as obstructive to that which is to be done The proper head of temperance is to compose our own appetites in the first place and to consider them in the second those under the subordinate vertues as being obstructive and divertive of appetites The heads of Fortitude 〈◊〉 the first place to consider all that we are to undergo in the second other subordinate vertues The heads of justice are in the first place to consider what every one deserves in the second the rest For all vertues consider the things that belong to all and the subordinate to one another Whence Panaetius saith it is in vertue as in many Archers who shoot at one mark distinguished by divers colours every one aims at the mark but one proposes to himselfe the white line another the black and so of the rest For as these place their ultimat end in hitting the mark but every one proposes to himselfe a severall manner of hitting so all vertues have Beatitude which is placed conformably to nature for their end but severall persons pursue it severall waies As vertues are inseparable so are they the same substantially with the supream part of the soul in which respect all vertue is said to be a body for the Intellect and Soul are a body for the soul is a warm spirit innate in us Therefore our soul is a living creature for it hath life and sence especially the supream part thereof called the Intellect Wherefore all vertue is a living creature because it is essentially the Intellect And therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for that expression is consequent to this assertion Between vertue and vice there is no medium contrary to the Peripateticks who assert a mean progression betwixt vertue and vice for all men have a naturall appetite to good and as a stick is either straight or crooked so man must be either just or unjust but cannot be either more or lesse just or unjust That vertue may be learned is asserted by Chrysippus in his first book of the End and by Cleanthes and Possidonius in his Exhortations and Hecaton because men of bad are made good That it may be lost is likewise affirmed by Câ—rysippus deny'd by Cleanthes The first â—aith it may be lost by drunkennesse or madnesse the other that it cannot be lost by reason of the firm comprehensions of the soul. Vertue is in it selfe vertue and not for hope or fear of any externall thing It is expetible in it selfe for which reason when we do any thing amisse we are ashamed as knowing that only to be good which is honest In vertue consisteth Felicity for the end of vertue is to live convenient to nature Every vertue is able to make a man live convenient to nature for man hath naturall inclinations for the finding out of Offices for the composure of Appetites for tolerance and distribution Vertue therefore is selfe-sufficient to Beatitude as Zeno Chrysippus and Hecaton assert For if â—aith he magnanimity as conceiving all things to be below it selfe is selfe-sufficient and that be a part of vertue vertue it selfe which despiseth all things that obstruct her must also be selfe-sufficient to Beatitude But Panaetius and Possidonius deny that vertue is selfe-sufficient affirming that it requireth the assistance of health strength and necessaries yet they hold that vertue is alwaies used as Cleanthes affirms for it cannot be lost and is alwaies practised by a perfect minde which is good Justice is not by nature but by prescription as law and right reason Thus Chrysippus in his book of honest Vertue hath many attributes it is called 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good because it leadeth us to right life 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is approved without any controversy as being most excellent 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is worthy of much study 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it may justly be praised 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it inviteth those who desire it 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it conduceth to goodnesse of life 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is usefull 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is rightly expetible 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because being present it profiteth being absent it it doth not 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it hath an use that exceeds the labour 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is alone sufficient to him that hath it 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it takes away all want 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is common in use and extendeth to all the uses of life CHAP. X. Of the End THe end is that for whose sake all offices are done but it self is not done for the sake of any or that to which all things done conveniently in life are referred it selfe is referred to nothing The end is taken three waies First for the finall good which consisteth in rationall conversation Secondly for the scope which is convenient life in relation thereto Lastly for the ultimate of expetibles unto which all the rest are referred Scope and end differ for scope is the proposed body which they who pursue Beatitude aim at Felicity is proposed as the scope but the end is the attainment of that felicity If a man throw a spear or an arrow at any thing he must do all things that he may take his aim aright and yet so as to do all things whereby he may hit So when we say it is the ultimate end of man to obtain the principles of nature we imply in like manner he must do all things necessary to taking aim and all things likewise to the hitting of the mark but this is the last the chiefe good in life that as to be selected notdesired Reason being given to rationall creatures for the most perfect direction to live according to reason is in them to live according to nature that being the Artificer of Appetite Hence Zeno first in his discourse of human nature affirmes that the end is to live conformably that is to live according to one reason concordantly as on the contrary savage Beasts
honour is the reward of vertue the wicked wanting this are justly dishonourable A wise man only is ingenuous and noble according to some of the Stoicks but others deny it referring these not to nature but institution only according to the proverb Custome is a second Nature So that ingenuity is an habit of nature or institution apt to vertue Nobility is a habit of descent or institution apt to vertue A wise man is pleasing pâ—rswasive opportune and sincere for he is expert in every thing affable in conversation and helpfull to the publick The wicked are the contrary A wise man is the best Physician for he hath considered his constitution and those things which are requisite for his health A wise man may lawfully part with his life the wicked cannot because in their life they never acquire vertue nor eschew vice But life and death are limited by offices and their contraries A wise man will accept of Empire and â—ohabit with Princes but not unlesse he porceive it may be done without danger and to much advantage A wise man never lyeth for he who speaketh a falshood is not properly said to lie unlesse it be with intent to deceive A lie may be used many waies without assent as in War against enemies or in the like necessity A wise man neither deceiveth nor is deceived for he never sinneth he useth not his sight hearing or any other sense ill He is not suspicious nor repenteth for both these are proper to fallacious assent He can no way be chang'd or erre or opinionate A wise man only though not all wise men is happy in Children in old age in death A wise man doth nothing contrary to his appetite for all such things are done with a privation and nothing adverse unforeseen happeneth to him But in the primitive time there was some wise man that did not desire or will any thing because that those things which were then present were not sufficient to be required by him A wise man is meek for meeknesse is a habit whereby things are done meekly not breaking forth into Anger A wise man is peacefull and modest Modesty is the Science of decent motion tranquillity the order of natural motions The contrary to these are seen in the wicked A wise man is free from all Calumny he calumniates none and is not calumniated by any for Calumny is a lying imputation of fained friends to which the wise are not liable for they are true friends the wicked are for they are feigned A wise man delayeth 〈◊〉 bing for delay is an omission of Office through slothfulnesse of which Hesiod Nothing deferre a year a month a day He fights aginst himself that doth delay A wise man can only incite and be incited to Vertue a fool cannot for he neglecteth praecepts and goeth no further then the words not proceeding to Action A wicked man is not desirous to hear or learn as not being capable by reason of his imprudence of what is rightly said whence it followeth that he can neither be incited nor incite to Vertue He that is capable to be incited or to incite must be prepared by Philosophy which is not competible to a wicked man for he who diligently heareth Philosopher is not prepared to Philosophy but â—e who expresseth their doctrine in their life and actions This no wicked man can do for he is prepossess'd by Vice If he should be incited Vice would pull him baâ—k but none that is vicious incited to Vertue as none sick to health Every wicked man is an exile wanting Law and Country for both these are good That a City or Country is good Cleantâ—es proveth thus If there be a habitation where those who fly for succour find justice it is good but a City is such a habitation therefore a City is good A City is taken three waies for a habitation for a convention of men and for both In the two latter significations it is called good Every wicked man is râ—stick for rusticity is ignorance of Laws and civill manners A wicked man refuseth to live according to Law and is hurtfull as a savage Beast A wicked man is tyrannical cruell violent and inâ—urious whensoever he gets an occasion A wicked man is ungratefull not obliging nor requiting for he doth nothing by Friendship A wicked man is not perseverant for perseverance is the Science of obtaining our purpose not being deterred by labour A wicked man is not capable of the right of donation Donation is the good bestowing of estimation but nothing that is good is competible to the wicked Eâ—ery wicked man is delighted with his wickednesse which wee may perceive not so much by his discourse as actions which showes that he is carried on to wickednesse THE THIRD PART CHAP. I. PHYSICK and the parts thereof PHYSICK is divided into these places Of Bodies Of Principles Of Elements Of Gods of Place Of Vacuum thus especially but generally into three places Of the world Of Elements Aitiologick of Causes That concerning the VVorld is divided into two parts whereof one Contemplation is common also to the Mathematicks concerning fixed stars and Planets as whether the Sun be of the same magnitude as he appears to be and whether the Moon be so likewise of their periods and the like The other contemplation proper only to Physick to enquire into the essence of these whether the Sun and Stars consist of matter and form whether generate or ingenerate whether animate or inanimate whether corruptible or incorruptible whether govern'd by Providence or the like The place concerning Causes is likewise twofold whereof one Contemplation is common also to medicinall disquisitions whereby they enquire concerning the principall part of the soul and those things which are produced in the Soul seed and the like The other is likewise usurped by the Mathematicks as in what manner we see what is the cause of the visuall phaâ—tasie How are made Clouds Thunder Rainbows Halo's Comets and the like CHAP. II. Of Bodies NAturall Philosophy brancheth into two parts of Corporealls and Incorporealls A body is that which doeth or sufficeth It is the sense with essence or substance and finite whatsoever is is a body for whatsoever is either doeth or suffereth Principles are Bodies void of form Elements are bodies endued with form Causes are corporâ—all because they are spirits Qualities are Corporâ—all for they are spirits and aeriall intentions which affect the parts of all things generated with form and figure Vertues Vices Arts Mâ—mory â—haâ—tasies Affections Appetitions Assents are bodies existing in the Supream part of the Soul The Soul is a Body because it maketh us to be living Creatures Night and day are bodies Voice is a body for it maketâ—â— that which is heard in a word whatsoever is is a body and a subject
for the Stoiâ—ks take away intellectuall substances affirming all things that are to be comprehended by sense onely differences are not subsistent A solid body according to Apollodorus is divisible three waies into length breadth and depth A superficies is the terme of a body or that which hath onely length and breadth but no depth thus Possidonius A line is the terme of a Superficies or a length without breadth that which hath length only A point is the terme of a line or thâ— least mark A body is divisible into infinite yet it consisteth not of infinite bodies CHAP. III. Of Principles THe place concerning bodies is divided into two degrees into those which produce and those which are produced the first Principles the second Elements â—Principles and Elements differ Principles are ingenerate incorruptible Elements shall perish by conflagration Moreover Principles are bodies and void of form Elements have forme There are two principles of all things the Agent and the Patient The Patient is a substance void of quality called Matter the Agent is the reason which is 〈◊〉 the Matter God Matter is sluggish a thing ready for all things but will cease if none move it The Causâ— that is the Reason â—formeth mâ—tter and moldeth it which way he pleaseth out of which he produceth various woâ—ks There must therefore be something out of which a thing is made and also by which it â—s made This is the Cause that Matter The Cause or active Reason is God In the Agent there is power in the Patient a certain matter or capacity and in both both for matter it selfe could not 〈◊〉 if it were not kept together by a power nor that power without some matter for there is nothing which is not compelled to be somewhere Both 〈◊〉 God and the World the Artist and his work they compâ—ehend within this terme Nature as if nature were God mixed through the World Sometimes they call that naturâ— which containeth the World sometimes that which generateth and produceth things upon the earth The Agent is as we said called the Cause A Cause according to Zeno is that by which there is an effect which is not a Cause 30 or as 〈◊〉 the reason of the effect or as Pâ—ssâ—donius the first Author of a thing A Cause is a body a not Cause a Categorem It is impossible that the cause being assigned the effect should not be present which is to be understood thus The Soule is the â—ause through which we live Prudence the Cause by which we are wise It is impossible that he who hath a Soule should not live or he who hath Prudence should not be wise CHAP. IV. Of Matter THe substance of all qualitative beings is first Matter according to Zeno and â—hrysippuâ— in his first of Physicks Matter is that of which every thing is made it hath two names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Substance and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Matter Substance is of all things in generall Matter of particulars Universall matter is according to Zeno wholly eternall not admitting as Chrysippus saith encâ—â—ase or deâ—rease Particular matter admitteth augmentation and diminution for it remaineth not alwaies the same but is separated and mixed so that according to Chrysippus its parts perish by separation and exist by mutuall mistion But those who call fire aire water and earth Matter assert not a thing void of forme but of a body Matter is a body and finite Possidonius saith that the substance and matter of the Universe is void of quality and form in as much as it hath not a certain figure and quality in it selfe but it is alwaies seen in some figure and quality But the substantiall nature of the Universe differs from matter intentionally only Matter is passible for if it were immutable things could not be generated of it Hence it followeth that it is divisible into infinite yet it selfe as Chrysippus saith it not infinite for nothing that is divisible is infinite but matter is continuous Through this matter Zeno affirmeth that the reason of the World which some call Fate is diffused as feed CHAP. V. Of the World OF this matter was made the World The World hath severall appellations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the World 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the â—ll 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Whole 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 World is taken three waies First for God himselfe who is properly qualified with all Essence incorruptible and ingenerate who framed the Universe after a certain period of time who resolved all nature into himselfe and again generated it out of himselfe Secondly for the starry Ornament and thirdly that which consists of both The All 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one way taken as Apollodorus saith for the World and another way for the System of the World and the vacuity beyond it The World is finito the vâ—â—uity infinite Thus likewise they distinguish betwixt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 includeth also an infinite vacuity in which the world is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the world without that vacuity which neither is increased nor diminished but its parts are sometimes extended sometimes contracted It began from the earth as its center for the center is the beginning of a Circle The world is that which is properly qualited with the essence of all things or as Chrysippus and ` Possidonius define it a System of Heaven and Earth and of the natures therein contained or a System of God and Men and of all things that were made for them The world was made by God for if saith Chrysippus there be any thing which produceth such things as Man though indued with reason cannot produce that doubtlesse is greater and stronger and wiser then man But a Man cannot make the Celestiall things therefore that which made them transcendeth man in Art Counsell Prudence and Power and what can that be but God The World was made for those animate â—ssences which have the use of Reason these are the Gods and men then whom nothing is better All things of which it consisteth and which it produceth within it selfe are accommodated to the use of Man The World was made in this manner God in the beginning being alone by himself converted all substance which according to Zeno was fire first into air then into Water And as in the Plant the seed is contained so God who is the prolisick reason of the World left such a â—eed in the humidity as might afford easie and apt matter for the generation of those things that were to be produced Zeno addeth that one part tending downward was condensed into Earth another part remained partly water and partly being exhal'd air of a particle of which air flashed out fire Cleanthes describeth it in this
the great Ocean The earth is in the midst being in the nature of a Center one and finite sphericall in figure The water is likewise sphericall having the same center with the earth The earth hath five Zones one northern beyond the Artick Circle uninhabitable through extremity of cold another temperate a third not habitable by reason of extream heat whence it is called Torrid a fourth temperate a fift southern not habitable by reason of cold But Possidonius conceiveth the Climate under the Equinoctiall to be temperate for saith he under the Tropicks where the Sun dwells longest the places are habitable and why not then under the Aequator Again the night being equall to the day affordeth leisure enough for refrigeration which is assisted likewise by showers and winds The generation of the world began from the earth as from the Center for the Center is the beginning of a sphear Plants have not any soul at all but spring up of themselves as it were by chance CHAP. XIII Of Mistion and Temperament CHrysippus asserteth a Spirit moving it selfe to it selfe and from it selfe or a spirit moving it selfe backwards and forwards He calleth it spirit as being moved aire answering in some proportion to the Aether so that it both meets in one and this motion is only according to those who think that all nature receiveth mutation solution composition and the like Composition mixtion temperament and confusion are different Composition is a contract of bodies whose superficies are contiguous to one another as in heaps of grain or sand Mixtion is of two or more bodies whose qualities are diffused through the whole as we see in fire and red hot iron and in our own â—oules for every where there is a diffusion through entire bodies so as one body doth passe through another Temperament is of two or more humid bodies whose qualities are diffused through the whole Mixtion is also common to drie bodies as to fire and iron to the soul and the body temperament only to the humid For qualities appear from the temperament of severall humid things as of wine honey water vinegar and the like that in such temperament the qualities of the things tempered remain is evident from this that oftentimes they are by some art separated from one another For if we put a spunge dipped in oyle into wine mixt with water the water separating it selfe from the wine will gather to the spunge Lastly confusion is the transmutation of two or more qualities into another of a different nature as in composition of Unguents and Medicines CHAP. XIV Of Generation and Corruption POssidonius asserteth foure species of generation and corruption of things that are into things that are for that of things that are not and of things that are not he rejected conceiving there is none such Of transmutations into things that are one is by division another by alteration a third by confusion a fourth of the whole by resolution Of these alteration concerneth the substance the other three are of the qualities which inhere in the substance According to these are generations made But the substance it selfe is neither augmented nor diminished by apposition or detraction but is only altered as happeneth to numbers and measures But in things properly qualited as Dion and Theon there is augmentation and diminution wherefore the quality of each remaineth from the generation untill the corruption thereof in plants and living creatures which are capable of corruption In things properly qualited he asserted two susceptible parts one according to the substance another according to the quality This as we have often said admitteth augmentation and diminution Neither is the thing properly qualited and the substance out of which it is all one nor divers but only not all one because the substance is a part and occupateth the same place but things that are divers have distinct places and are not consider'd in part That as to the thing properly qualited and as to the substance it is not the same Mnesarchus affirmeth to be evident because it is necessary that to the same happen the same things For if for example a man having formed a horse should break it and make a dog we would presently beholding it say this was not before but it is now So are the qualited and the substance divers Neither is it likely that we should all be the same as to substance for it often happens that the substance is preexistent to the generation as the substance of Socrates was before Socrates was and after the corruption and death of Socrates the substance remaineth though Socrates himselfe be not CHAP. XV. Of Motion MOtion according to Chrysippus is a mutation of parts either in whole or in parts or an excession out of place either in whole or in part or a change according to place or figure Iaculation is a vehement motion from on high Rest is partly a privation of motion in a body partly the same habit of a body before and after There are two first motions right and oblique from the mixtion of these ariseth great variety of motions Zeno affirmes the parts of all things consisting by themselves are moved towards the midle of the whole and likewise of the World it self wherefore it is rightly said that all parts of the World tend to the midle thereof and principally the heavy and that there is the same cause of the rest of the World in the infinite vacuity and of the rest of the Earth in the World in the midst of which it is constituted as a point All bodies have not gravity as air and fire yet these in some manner tend to the midst of the World CHAP. XVI Of Living Creatures OF animate Creatures there are two kinds for Plants as wee said have no souls some are appetitive and concupiscible others rationall The Soul according to Zeno Antipater and Pâ—ssidonius is a hot spirit for hereby we breath and move Cleanthes saith we live so long as that heat holdeth Every soul hath sense and is a spirit innate in us wherefore it is a body and shall not continue after death yet is it by Nature corruptible notwithstanding that it is a part of the Soul of the Universe which is incorruptible Yet some hold that the lesse firm Souls such as are those of the unlearned perish at the dissolution of the body the stronger as those of the wise and virtuous shall last even untill the generall conflagration The Soul hath eight parts whereof five are the Sences the sixth generative the seventh Vocall the eighth Hegemonick The Supream or Hegemonick part of the Soul is that which maketh Phantasies assent sense appetite This Supreme part is called Ratiocination it is seated in the Heart some say in the Head as in its sphear From the Hegemonick issue and are extended to the body the seven other parts which it guideth by their proper Organs as a
which is perfect But the world it selfe forasmuch as it comprehendeth all things neither is there any thing which is not in it is every way perfect What therefore can be wanting to that which is best But there is nothing better then the minde and reason therefore these cannot be wanting to the world Chrysippus addeth this comparison As all things are best in the most perfect and mature creatures as in a Horse better then in a Colt in a Dog better then in a Whelp in a Man better then in a Child So that which is best in all the world must be in that which is perfect and absolute but then the world nothing is more perfect nothing better then vertue therefore the world hath proper vertue The nature of man is not perfect yet in man there is vertue how much more then in the world The world therefore hath vertue therefore it is wise and consequently God Thus the notion and apprehension men have of God is first by conceiving the beauty of those things which are objected to their eyes for no beautifull thing hath been made by chance and adventure but composed and framed by some ingenious and operative art Now that the heaven is beautifull appeareth by the form colour and bignesse thereof by the variety also of starres disposed therein Moreover the world is round in manner of a ball which figure of all others is principall and most perfect for it alone resembleth all the parts for being round it selfe it hath the parts also round As to the second part of the question God is an immortall being rationall perfect or intellectuall in Beatitude voide of all evill provident over the world and things in the world not of human form maker of all and as it were father of all They define God a spirit full of intelligence of a â—ieâ—y nature having no proper form but transforming himselfe into whatsoever he pleaseth and resembling all things We understand by God saith Antipater a living nature or substance happy incorruptible doing good to mankinde Allâ— men acknowledge the Gods immortall They who deprive the Gods of beneficence have an imperfect notion of them as thâ—y likewise who think they are subject to generation and corruption Yet are there some Gods saith Chrysippus generative and mortall as well as there are others ingenerate â—The world starres and earth are Gods but the supream God is the aetheâ—iall minde Iupiter The sun moon and other such like Gods were begotten but Iupiter is eternall Other Gods use a certain nourishment whereby they are maintained equally but Iupiter and the world after another sort then the generated which shall be consumed by fire Iupiter groweth continually untill such time as all things be consumed in him death being the separation of the soul and body for seeing that the soul of the world never departeth at all but augmenteth continnally untill it have consumed all the matter within it selfe we cannot say that the world dieth The substance of God Zeno affirmes to be the whole World and Heaven so also Chrysippus in his 11th of the Gods and Possidonius in his first of the Gods But Antipater in his 7th of the world affirmes his substance to be aâ—riall Boethius in his book of nature saith the substance of God is the sphear of fixed stars Sometimes they call him a nature containing the world sometimes a nature producing all upon earth As concerning the third part of the question they affirm that God is an operative artificiall fire methodically ordering and effecting the generation of the world comprehending in himselfe all prolifick reason by which every thing is produced according to Fate God is a Spirit diffused through the whole world having severall denominations according to the severall parts of the matter through which he spreadeth and the severall effects of his power shewn therein They call him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by whom all things are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the author 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of life Minerva as diffused through the aether Iuno as through the aire Vulcan as through the artificiall fire Neptune as through the water Ceres as through the earth In like manner the resâ— of his names were imposed with respect to some property This place was first discoursed upon by â— Zenoâ— after whom Cleanthes and Chrysippus dilated more largely upon it By this Providence the World and all parts of the World were in the beginning constituted and are in all time ordered This disputation they divided into three parts The first from the same reason that teacheth us there are Gods inferreth that the World is ordered by them seeing that there is nothing higher or more excellent then this administration The second from that reason which teacheth us that all things are subjected to an understanding nature and exquisitely ordered by it inferreth that it is generated of animate principles The third place is derived from admiration of celestiall and terrestriall things Upon these Cicero discourseth at large according to the opinion of the Stoicks As to the fourth part of the question in generall concerning the Gods that they have a particular providentiall care of man-kinde it is manifest in that whatsoever is in this world was made for the use of man and is conducible thereunto and if for the whole fpecies they must consequently have the same care of particulars which they expresse by many portents and all those fignes whereupon the art of Divination depends There was never any great person without some divine inspiration But we must not argue from hence that if the corn or vineyard of any man be hurt by a Tempest or Fortune deprive him of any of the conveniencies of life that he to whom this hath happened may be judged to be hated or neglected of God The Gods take care of great things the little they neglect but to great persons all things have alwaies a happy issue Chrysippus in his fourth Book of Providence saith there is nothing more ignorant nothing more sordid then those persons who think good might have been without ill For Good and Ill being contraries it is necessary that both consist together mutually sustaining one another as it were by opposition For how could we understand Iustice unlesse there were Injuries What is Justice but a privation of Injustice How can Fortitude be understood but by opposition to Fear How Continence but from Intemperance How Prudence if there were not Imprudence Why do not these fooles desire that Truth might be without Falshood Such are good and ill happinesse and misery griefe and pleasure one is ty'd to the other as Plato sayes by their contrary ends Here followeth the question whether that Providence which framed the world and mankinde did make likewise those corporeall infirmities and sicknesses which men suffer Chrysippus affirmeth it was not the intent of Nature to make men obnoxious to
and though he prais'd it as naturall yet it becommeth Curtezans rather then Gods Moreover what he saith of those that writ of Tables is false not to be found neither in Polemo nor Hipsicrates nor Antigonus but forged by himselfe In his book of a Commonwealth he allowes marriage with a mother and a daughter and repeats the same in the beginning of his book Concerning things expetible in themselves In his third book of Iustice extending to a thousand Paragraphs he advised to feed upon the very dead In his second book of Life and Transaction he affirmeth a wise man ought to take care to provide himselfe food but to what end must he provide himselfe food for Livelyhood Life is an indifferent For Pleasure Pleasure also is indifferent For Vertue that is selfe sufficient for Beatitude Such kinds of acquisition of wealth are very ridiculous If they proceed from a King there is a necessitie of complying with him if from a friend that friendship is veniall if from wisdome that wisdome is mercenary For these things saith Laertius some have inveigh'd against him CHAP. IV. His death HE died according to Apollodorus in the 143d Olympiad so supply Laertius in whom the centenary number is wanting by Suidas having lived 73 years The manner of his death is differently related Hermippus affirmes that being in the Odaeum a kinde of publick Theatre at Athens his Disciples called him away to Sacrifice and thereupon taking a draught of wine he was immediately seiz'd by a Vertigo of which at the end of five daies he died Others report he died of excessive laughter Seeing an Asseeafigs he bad his woman offer it some wine and thereat fell into such extremity of laughter that it killed him As to his person he was very little saith Laertius as appeareth by his Statue in the Ceramick which is almost hid by the horse that stands next it whence Carneades called him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hid by a horse The posture of this Statue Cicero saith was sitting and stretching forth his hand Pausanias saith it was set up in the Gymnasium called Ptolomaean from the Founder not far from the Forum Laertius reckons foure more of this name The first a Physician to whom Erasistratus acknowledgeth himselfe beholding for many things The Second his sonne Physician to Ptolomy who upon the calumnies of some that maligned him was publickly punished and beaten with rods The third Disciple to Erasistratus The fourth a writer of Georgicks ZENO ZENO was of Tarsis or according to others of Siodn his Father named Dioscorides He was Disciple to Chrysippus and his successor in the School He wrote few bookes but left behinde him many Disciples DIOGENES DIOGENES was born at Seleucia he was sirnamed the Babylonian from the vicinity of that place He was Disciple of Chrysippus and is stiled by Cicero an eminent and serious Stoick Seneca relates that discoursing earnestly concerning anger a foolish young man standing by spat in his face which he took meekly and discreetly saying I am not angry but am in doubt whether I ought to be so or not He was one of the three that was sent from Athens on Embassy to Rome of which already in the life of Carâ—eades who learn'd Dialectick of him Cicero saith he lived to a great age Amongst other things he wrote a treatise of Divinaâ—ion ANTIPATER ANTIPATER was of Sidon Disciple to Diogenes the Babylonianâ— Cicero calls him a most acute person Senecae one of the great authors of the Stoicall Sect. He declined to dispute with Carneades but filled his bookes with confutations of him whence he was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the clamorous penman He disputed much against those who asserted nothing Besides other things he writ two books of Divination Cicero at the latter end of his second book of Offices saith he then was lately dead at Athens PANAETIUS PANAETIUS was of Rhodes his Ancestours eminent for Martiall affairs and exercises He was Disciple to Antipater intimate friend to â— Scipio Africanus whom he accompanyed in his journey to Alexandria Cicero calls him almost Prince of the Stoicks a person extreamly inigenous and grave worthy the familiarity of Scipio and Laelius He was a great admirer of Plato whom every where he calleth divine most wise most holy the Homer of Philosophers But his opinion of the immortality of the Soul he approved not arguing thus Whatsoever is generated dieth but soules are generated as is manifest from the likenesse of those that are begotten to their Parents not only in body but disposition His other argument was There is nothing that is grieved or pained but is subject to be sick whatsoever is subject to sicknesse is likewise subject to death souls are subject to griefe therefore they are subject to death He alone rejected Astrologicall predictions and receded from the Stoicks as to Divination yet would not positivly affirm there was no such art but only that he doubted it He wrote three books of Offices much commended by Cicero Lipsius conjectures he died old because Cicero affirmeth out of Posidonius that he lived thirty years after he had written his Bookes of offices POSIDONIUS POSIDONIUS was born at Apamea in Syria He lived at Rhodes and there managed civill affairs and taught Philosophy Pompey in his return from Syria went to Rhodes purposely to hear him and coming to his dore forbad the Lictor to knock as was the custome but he saith Pliny to whom the East and West had submitted himselfe submitted his Fases at this Gate But understanding that he was very sick of a great pain in his joynts he resolved only to give him a visit At his first coming and salutation he told him with much respect that he was extreamly sorry he could not hear him Posidonius answer'd You may for no corporeall pain shall make me frustrate the coming of so great a person And thereupon he discoursed seriously and copiously upon this subject as he lay in his bed That nothing is good but what is honest And as often as his pain took him he would say Pain it is to no purpose though thou art troublesome I will never acknowledge thou art ill He made a Sphear wherein were all the conversions of the Sun Moon and Planets exactly as they moved in the Heavens every day and night Of his writings are cited by Cicero five Bookes of Divination as also five bookes of the nature of the Gods Thus far we have a continued succession of the Stoick Philosophers the last School according to Laertius's disposition of thsoe that were descended from Thales FINIS 2  52  3  53  4  54 Pisistratus died having raigned 17 years Arist. Polit. 5. Lxiii  55  2  56  3  57  4  58  Lxiv Miltiades Hâ—l 7. 59  2  60  3  61  4  62  Lxv Â
of the Intellectuall raiseth her from this terrene life to the eternall by the flame of love refined into an Angell The Second PART Sect. I. THE apprehensive faculties of the Soul are employ'd about truth and falshood assenting to one dissenting from the other The first is affirmation the second negation The desiderative converse in good and ill inclining to this declining to that The first is Love the second Hate Love is distinguish'd by its objects if of riches termed covetousnesse of honour ambition of heavenly things piety of equalls friendship these we exclude and admit no other signification but the desire to possesse what in it selfe or at least in our esteem is fair of a different nature from the love of God to his Creatures who comprehending all cannot desire or want the beauty and perfections of another and from that of friends which must be reciprocall We therefore with Plato define it * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 * The desire of beauty Desire is an inclination to reall or apparent good As there are divers kinds of good so of desire Love is a species of desire Beauty of good Desire is Naturall or Knowing All creatures have a particular perfection by participation of the divine goodnesse This is their end including that degree of felicity whereof they are capable to which center they tend This desire we call Naturall a great testimony of Divine Providence by which they are unwittingly as an Arrow by the Archer directed to their mark With this all Creatures desire God as being the Originall good imprinted and participated in every particular This is in every Nature as more or lesse capable addressed to ends more or lesse noble yet is the ultimate end of all the same to enjoy God as far as they may Thus as the Psalmist Every thing worships and praiseth God like suppliants turning and offering themselves up to him saith Theodoret. Sect. II. THe other Species of Desire is employed only about things known given by Nature that to every apprehensive faculty there might be a desiderative to embrace what it judgeth good to refuse what it esteemeth evill in its own nature enclin'd to good None ever desires to be miserable but the apprehensive Vertue many times mistaking Evill for Good it oft falls out that the desiderative in its selfe blind desires evill This in some sence may be said voluntary for none can force it in another sence not voluntary deceived by the judgment of its Companion This is Plato's meaning when he saith No man sins willingly Sect. III. IT is the Property of every desiderative Vertue that He who desires possesseth in part the thing he desires in part not for if he were wholly deprived of its Possession he would never desire it this is verified two waies First nothing is desired unlesse it be known and to know a thing is in some part to possesse it So Aristotle The Soul is all because it knowes all And in the Psalmist God saith All things are mine I know them Secondly there is alwaies some convenience and resemblance betwixt the desirer and desired Every thing delights and preserves it selfe by that which by naturall affinity is most conformable to it by its contrary is grieved and consum'd Love is not betwixt things unlike Repugnance of two opposite natures is naturall hate Hate is a repugnance with knowledge Hence it followeth that the nature of the desired is in some manner in the desirer otherwise there would be no similitude betwixt them yet imperfectly else it were vain for it to seek what it entirely possesseth Sect. IV. AS desire generally followes knowledge so severall knowing are annexed to severall desiring Powers We distinguish the knowing into three degrees Sence Reason Intellect attended by three desiderative Vertues Appetite Election Will Appetite is in Bruits Election in Men Will in Angels The sense knowes only corporeall things the Appetite only desires such the Angelick Intellect is wholly intent on Contemplation of spirituall Conceptions not inclining to Materiall Things but when divested of matter and spiritualiz'd their Will is only fed with intemporall spirituall Good Rationall Nature is the Mean betwixt these Extreams sometimes descending to Sense sometimes elevated to Intellect by its own Election complying with the desires of which she pleaseth Thus it appears that corporeall Objects are desired either by Sensuall Appetite or Election of Reason inclining to Sense Incorporeall by Angelick Will or the Election of Reason elevated to Intellectuall Height Sect. V. BEauty in generall is a Harmony resulting from severall things proportionably concurring to constitute a third In respect of which temperament and mixture of various Natures agreeing in the composition of one every Creature is Fair and in this sence no simple being is Beautifull not God himselfe this Beauty begins after him arising from contrariety without which is no composition it being the union of contraries a friendly enmity a disagreeing concord whence Empedocles makes discord and concord the principles of all things by the first understanding the varietie of the Natures compounding by the second their Union adding that in God only there is no Discord He not being the Union of severall Natures but a pure uncompounded Unity In these compositions the Union necessarily predominates over the contrariety otherwise the Fabrick would be dissolved Thus in the fictions of Poets Venus loves Mars this Beauty cannot subsist without contrariety she curbs and moderates him this temperament allaies the strife betwixt these contraries And in Astrologie Venus is plac'd next Mars to check his destructive influence as Iupiter next Saturn to abate his malignancy If Mars were alwaies subject to Venus the contrariety of principles to their due temper nothing would ever be dissolved Sect. VI. THis is Beauty in the largest sence the same with Harmony whence God is said to have framed the World with musicall harmonious temperament But Harmony properly implies a melodious agreement of Voices and Beauty in a restrict acception relates to a proportionable concord in visible things as Harmony in audible The desire of this Beauty is Love arising only from one knowing faculty the Sight and that gaye Plotonius Enâ—ead 3. lib. 5. 3. occasion to deprive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Love from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sight Here the Platonist may object If Love be only of visible things how can it be applyed to Ideas invisible natures We answer Sight is twofold corporeal and spirituall the first is that of Sense the other the Intellectuall faculty by which we agree with Angels this Platonists call Sight the corporeall being only an Image of this So Aristotle Intellect is that to the Soul which sight is to the Body Hence is Minerva Wisdom by Homer call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bright-ey'd With this sight Moses Saint Paul and other Saints beheld the face of God this Divines call Intellectuall â—â—tuitive cognition the Beâ—tificall vision the Reward of the Righteous Sect. VII AS Sight so Beauty itâ—object
fish its claws Sense is an apprehension by the Sensitive Organ or a comprehension Sense is taken many waies For the faculty habit act phantasie whereby the sensible object is comprehended and the Hegemonick parts of the Soul are called Sense Again the Sensories are intelligent spirits diffused from the Hegemonick to the Organs The senses are Sight Hearing Smell â—ast Touch. Sight is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Eies Sight is made by contraction of that light which is between the eye and the object into a Cone according to Chrysippus Apollodorus saith that part of the Air which is Conicall is next the sight the Base next the Object so as that which is seen is pointed out to by the Air as by a stick Colour is the first figuration or habit of matter Darknesse is visible for from the sight there issueth a splendor which passeth round about that darknesse Neither is the sight deceived for it truly sees that it is dark Chrysippus saith that we see according to the intention of the mediate air which is struck by the visuall spirit which passeth from the Hegemonick to the apple of the eye and after that blow falleth upon the ear next extending it self in a Conicall figure Again from the eye are emitted fiery raies not black or dusky and therefore darknesse is visible Hearing is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Ears Hearing is made when the Air betwixt the speaker and hearer is verberated in a circulation and at last by agitation passeth in at the Ears as the circles that are made in a pond by casting in a stone Smelling is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the nostrils Tasting is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Tongue Touching is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the superficies so that it perceiveth that which is obliged to it The sixt part of the Soul is the Generative which is a spirit from the Hegemonick to the Parastatae of this part see Laertius from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Pluâ—arch de Philosoph Plac. lib. 5. cap. 4 5 9 11 12 13 15 16 17 23. The seventh and last part of the Soul is that which Zeno calls vocall commonly called the Voice It is a spirit proceeding from the Hegemonick part to the throat tongue and other proper Instruments of speech Voice is Air not composed of little pieces but whole and continuous having no vacuity in it This Air being struck by the wind spreadeth into circles infinitely untill the Air round about it be filled like the Water in a pond by throwing in of a stone only the Water moves spherically the Air circularly Voice is a body for it acteth it striketh upon and leaveth an impression in our Ear as a seal in Wax Again whatsoever moveth and disturbeth some affection is a body Harmony moveth with delight discord disturbeth Again whatsoever is moved is a body but Voice is moved and reverberated from smooth places as a ball against a Wall So in the Aegyptian Pyramids one Voice is redoubled four or five times CHAP. XVII Of God HItherto of the Material principle and that which is produced of it we come now to the other principle the Agent God This question they divide into four parts first that there are Gods secondly what they are thirdly that they order the world fourthly that they take care of humane affairs Cleanthes saith that the notions of God are imprinted in the minds of men from four causes First from Divination for the Gods afford us signes of future things wherein if there be any mistake it is not from their part but from the errour of humane conjecture The second is from the multitude of good things wee receive by the temperature of Heaven the fertility of the Earth and abundance of other benefits The third from the Terrour of Thunder Tempest Rain Snow Hail Devastation Pestilence Earthquakes and somtimes groanings showers of stones and blood Portents Prodigies Comets and the like with which men are affrighted into a belief that there is a heavenly divine power The fourth and greatest cause is the aequability of the motion and revolution of Heaven the Sun Moon and starres their distinctions variety beauty order the very sight whereof declares that they were not made by chance That there are Gods Chrysippus proveth thus If there is something in Nature which the mind reason power and faculties of man could not make that which did make it is better then Man but Celestiall things and all those whose order is sempiternal could not be made by Man there is therefore somthing which made them which is better then Man and what is that but God For if there are no Gods what can there be in Nature better then Man for in him only is reason then which nothing is more excellent But for a man to think that there is nothing in the World better then himself is a foolish arrogance Therefore there is somthing better and consequently there is a God Zeno more concisely thus That which is rationall is better then that which is irrationall but nothing is better then the World therefore the World is rationall In like manner may be proved that the World is wise that it is happy that it is eternall for all these are better then the want of these But there is nothing better then the World whence it followeth that the World is God Again he argues thus No part of an insensible thing hath sense but the parts of the World have sense therefore the World hath sense He proceedeth to urge this more strictly Nothing saith he that is void of minde and reason can of it selfe generate that which is animate and rationall but the world generates animate and rationall creatures therefore the world is animate and rationall Likewise according to his custome he concludeth his argument with a similitude IF out of an Olive-tree should come harmonious Pipes that made Musick you would not doubt but that the science of Musick were in the Olive-tree What if a Plain-tree should bear Musicall instruments you would think there were musick in those Plain-trees Why then should we not judge the world to be animate and wise that produceth out of it selfe animate and wise creatures There is nothing besides the world which wanteth nothing and which is perfect and compleat in all its numbers and parts for as the cover saith Chrysippus was made for the shield's sake and the scabberd for the swords so besides the world all other things were made for the sake of something else Fruites of the earth were made for living creatures living irrationall creatures for the use of man horses for carriage oxen for tillage dogs for hunting and defence but man himselfe was made to contemplate and imitate the world Not that he is at all perfect but only a part of that