Selected quad for the lemma: soul_n

Word A Word B Word C Word D Occurrence Frequency Band MI MI Band Prominent
soul_n body_n death_n separation_n 20,420 5 10.8447 5 true
View all documents for the selected quad

Text snippets containing the quad

ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A51282 An account of virtue, or, Dr. Henry More's abridgment of morals put into English.; Enchiridion ethicum. English More, Henry, 1614-1687.; Southwell, Edward, 1671-1730. 1690 (1690) Wing M2637; ESTC R9573 136,263 290

There are 14 snippets containing the selected quad. | View lemmatised text

BUT the Highest Gift of all Moral Philosophy must ever be allow'd to be that Prudence which has been so accurately describ'd already and which has certainly a marvellous influence as well upon all Intellectual Habits as for the acquiring of True Wisdom And her inseparable Consort is that Philosophical Temperance we have spoken of before Let no Man hope without these two Virtues ever to attain the knowledg of Things Divine which is the onely Sapience or True Wisdom For as Plato has it in his Phaedo What Pretence can the Impure Man have to the things that are Pure And whereas the Philosopher was there contending as if no Man could obtain pure and sincere Virtue that had not first laid by his Body What shall we say of those who think much to shake off but the very Filth and Vices of their Bodies Men that think a little Industry and obstinate perseverance of the Mind will find out Truth without any necessity of parting with their darling Crimes But whether this be not the voice of a Fool or of a mad Man is not hard to determine VII WHOEVER can be Faulty in this kind appears to me as a Bleer-Ey'd Man whom nothing will content but to be gazing at things distant and to see them both clearly and distinctly He refuses all Remedy for his Eyes but resolves by obstinate and peremptory staring to find out the Mark. Thus he goes on till instead of seeing better he every Day grows more blind Whereas if he consulted the Rules of Prudence and of Temperance he would know both the Necessity and the way of first curing his Sight VIII Is there any Man living has Self-sufficiency enough to Contemplate God the Soul's Immortality and Divine Providence Or to consider of these things solidly and sedately without some sort of Separation or Abstraction of the Soul from the Body That is to say in Plato's Style Without such a Meditation of Death as seems to divorce us from Corporeal Affections Or can any Man without some such Translation be as it were rapt up into that State of Divine Love which can onely fit him for Truth and expound the Oracles and Mysteries of things which are otherwise Inscrutable For by how much all Sensual and Corporeal Impressions are extinguish'd in us by the application of that Prudence and of that Philosophical Temperance we have mention'd by so much do we grow Citizens of that Intellectual World and ascend into the Regions of Heavenly Light Wherefore Sapience or the knowledg of Divine Mysteries is the true Off-spring of that Virtue which is entire absolute and consummated IX As to those Blessings which refer to the Body such as Strength Agility Health and Comliness 'T is true that Strength is not so much the Gift of Virtue as of Nature tho 't is as true that the preservation of it is owing to Virtue Nay 't is not improbable but that a Body in declination of Health may by hardships exercise and some Fatigue become more vigorous and robust For Agility This may not onely be as the Pupil but even the Child of Virtue Since Temperance and Diligence do commonly wear down the bulk and excrescence of the Body and rather furnish a Stock of Spirits than of Flesh In which case Agility must succeed of course X. BUT the most high and conspicuous gift of Virtue is that of Bodily Health which as it may be owing in part to every Virtue so more especially to Temperance and Piety I think it was the Chaldean Oracle did thus pronounce Ad Pietatis Opus vegetum si extenderis Ignem Mentis hos fluxos sanabis corporis Artus Would you the best Physician find For a craz'd Body or afflicted Mind Try what the power of Piety can do It heals the Mind and cures the Body too For a purifi'd Mind goes a great way to the purging and purifying of the Body it darts upon it some Rays which have great effect and which corroborate the powers thereof Whereas if the Soul be taken up by consuming Cares and Cupidities If Hatred and Malice make all things ghastly and sour within How can it be but that the Body must also droop the Health wither and the Force decline If therefore such Dilapidations can arise from the remote impressions of the Mind What will not those more immediate strokes accomplish I mean Eating long and Drinking deep and daily and the insolence of an ungovernable Lust XI THE Diseases of the Body are for the most part from the Vices of the Mind and even the Off-spring of sinful Parents do often inherit their Infirmities as well as their Acres But there is no Remedy so powerful for such an Incumbrance as a severe application to Virtue and Piety For as Justice had a Being before all the Vices of the Mind so was Health more ancient than all the Sicknesses of the Body Thus is one brought in by Maximus Tyrius to pray O Health the most Ancient of all the other Goddesses What wou'd I give to enjoy thee but the little remainder of my days Certainly no Man can better pretend to such a Wish than he who is sincerely Vertuous and Devout XII AND as bodily Health is thus gotten and sustained by Virtue so does Virtue confer Comliness and Decorum to all the Parts For Beauty is but as the Fruit or flower of Health nay 't is very Health it self just as Virtue is the very health and beauty of the Soul For where this presides the inward motion of the Spirits throws joy into the Countenance and such sparkling through the Eyes that the Beholders are drawn into love and admiration by it Even the whole Body when actuated by a beautiful Soul is pleasing in all its Gestures Lib. 10. Sect. 15. Antoninus said That a good Man could not conceal himself if he did but open his Eyes For his Benignity and Probity broke out and reveal'd him to all Beholders XIII ON the contrary we may easily observe the Crisis when a Man is falling from his native Innocence or acquir'd Virtue and is warping towards Vice and Immorality He carries a sort of Traytor in his Countenance who reveals all he is about For tho the shape and colour of his Face may look the same to vulgar Eyes yet a sharper sight will find a fading and declination in all the Finer Parts that which once was fresh and florid is now withering that which sparkled is hardly bright the Air it self of the countenance made up of quick and congruous motions resulting from every part and as it were darting Life is now stupid and irregular Alas those inward Spirits that supported all are sick and their activity is but counterfeit So that as now the whole contrivance of the Meen and Gesture is grown Artificial it will in a short time become also Impudent But this is not the Face of Virtue or the Image of that Moral Beauty we have hitherto set forth XIV FOR we also affirm that those
Foe to Friendship and as producing rather Hatred and Ill-will But to me it has ever been a sort of Riddle in Human Affairs and deserving laughter to see how the generality of Men hate the voice of that very Judge unto whom however they perpetually seem willing to appeal Certainly no firm and durable Friendship can subsist any more without Truth than without Faith and Simplicity which are the Pillars of all true Friendship Cicero says Neither the Double-minded nor the Changeable Intriguer must be rely'd on for Fidelity And let us add to these the Men of Darkness and great Reserve He that does even molest his Friend with Truth has less to answer for than a flattering Parasite who is obsequious to every Vice and can indulge or abet his Friend to his utter destruction To Men of sincere Virtue this Truth never comes amiss for every prudent Admonition that is not attended with Scoffs or Contumely is a Sermon they hearken to with Wonder and Delight For as they grow better by it so they have testimony of what is very Rare namely perfect Virtue and perfect Friendship together XXIV IT were easie for me I confess to be more copious and dwell longer upon such Particulars But these Hints will be enough to inculcate How much Virtue imports to the Acquisition of all External Goods And that against the Changes and Chances of this Human Life there is no other true Sanctuary but Virtue CHAP. X. Of that Good which is External Supreme and Eternal according to the Mind of the Philosophers I. THERE now only remains one External Good which also is Eternal To Heaven it is that we all Aspire and to the Society of Blessed Spirits And there is no other Path or Stratagem can lead hereto but Virtue This is set forth in that of the Oracle touching the Ghost of Plotinus and its passing to the Happy State Ad Coetum jam venis almum Heroum blandis spirantem leniter auris Heîc ubi amicitia est ubi molli fronte cupido Laetitiâ replens liquidâ pariterque repletus Semper ab Ambrosiis foecundo è numine rivis Unde serena quies castorum dulcis amorum Illecebra ac placidi suavissima flamina venti Which may be Englished thus And now you 're come to th' Happy Quire Of Heroes where their blessed Souls retire Where softest Winds do as soft Joys inspire Here dwells chast Friendship with so pure a flame That Love knows no satiety or shame But gives and takes new Joys and yet is still the same Th' Ambrosian Fountains with fresh Pleasures spring And gentle Zephyrus does new Odours bring These gifts for Inoffensive Ease are lent And both conspire to make Love Innocent II. THAT holy Vow and Profession which was made by Cato in Tully's Book de Senectute has resemblance with this very Description Cicero de Senectute For he says I repent me not of having Liv'd because I have lived so as never to have thought I was born in vain and I depart this Life not as from my House but as from an Inn. For Nature has not here afforded us an Habitation but barely a resting Place O glorious Day when I shall hasten to the great Assembly of blessed Souls and be delivered from this Croud and from that Dungeon wherein I live III. De Consolatione THIS Opinion Cicero in his Treatise de Consolatione repeats as his own saying I am none of those who believe the Soul can die with the Body and that so great a Light kindled by Divine Nature in the Mind can be extinguish'd but rather that after some certain space of time it will return to Immortality Now this by him is so express'd as if our present life were a sort of a death to the Soul And the same in his Somnio Scipionis is elegantly affirm'd by Africanus De somnio Scipionis when Cornelius ask'd him If his dead Friends should live Yes says he they truly live who are extricated from the Chains of the Body as from a Prison For your Life as you so call it is Death Many are the passages of this Force up and down in Cicero Not to speak of what might be found in Plotinus and Plato IV. NOW inasmuch as the hope of Immortality was so plain and conspicuous of old even to mere Pagans How could we possibly exclude it from Moral Philosophy For by this it appears that whatever external vexations innocent Virtue shall in this Life suffer whether by hidden Fate or by the Violence Envy or Improbity of wicked Men there will be a just and most infallible compensation for it Wherefore the Good and the Magnanimous being exalted by this Hope look on the World with contempt They trample upon inferiour things and cannot regard any human Accidents as culpable since nothing has regard to them but what is of Virtue and Immortality 'T is to this very Sense that Cicero does elsewhere magnifie the power of Virtue V. SOCRATES is memorable for this same Confidence and Hope since in the strength thereof he was enabled to undervalue both his Enemies and his Death He whom the Oracle of Apollo pronounced the wisest Man would memorably in this deserve that Character For while he doubted of all other things as to the Soul's Immortality he was ever fix'd So Laelius testifies of him in Tully That he was now of one Sentiment and then of another in most other things Yet as to the Point of Immortality he always affirm'd That the Minds of Men were Divine and that as soon as they departed the Body there was a most expeditious return of every just and vertuous Soul into Heaven VI. ON this Contemplation let every Man therefore resolve that altho Virtue may in some Cases appear to be against our Interest in reference to worldly things yet are we to stand by it with an unshaken Mind especially since after this span of Life is past there will redound a vast reward and gratification to the Just Nay let us rather count that what we suffer in Externals as suppose in Fortune or in Health is rather to our Advantage Since if we make a wise use of our misfortunes and understand them for kind Admonitions as indeed they are by how much we are disappointed or despoil'd in outward Things by so much and more also will the Mind be sanctifi'd and enrich'd 'T is worth observing that all Good which is External must fade and corrupt even as the Body it self while yet the Internal Things are as lasting as the Soul So that to think what we suffer in Body or Goods to be a detriment or Curse when we are likely to gain by it a more ample and perpetual Recompence is a strange Error in Accounts VII NAY farther yet If a Man had bought a thing at ten times less than the Value Would it not sound odd to hear him complain that the bargain had undone him Even so is it with the loss of outward Things Men
9. § 12. and that they must needs have a Being inasmuch as they are felt Hence by a sense of Virtue ariseth a wonderful Peace and Tranquillity to the Mind a permanent sweetness and complacency which is never to be repented of It surmounts not only all those Pleasures which conclude with Repe●…ance and Bitterness of the Soul but excels all Opinions and Philosophical Speculations whatsoever This certainly upon many other accounts is so besides that main one that in those matters a man may almost ever be doubting But in this which is Passion and not Opinion there can be no room for doubt XIII LAST of all besides this Use of the Passions which is almost common to all of them that they strike or rather ingrave the Soul with a more lively Impression of the Object there is another use of them deserving notice as namely the rating of things that are laudable and just according as we find our Passions excited by them or as they are felt and relished by a sort of Connexion with our Souls For passionate affecting is the mo●… intimate and immediate Fruit of Life an● tho we may adorn the best of things with superficial and imaginary approbation ye● our-Souls are not able without such Passion● to wed the Object and as it were to intermix it with our Sense and Life Nay we know not how by any other ways to discover the Union there is between our Souls and those Objects unless we have an equal antipathy against things vise and ignoble whether in our selve or others For this is the nature of true Virtue to love the best things and hate the worst even to abhorrence in whomsoever they appear Evil in one man is evil in another and is detestable as being such And it is the most perfect state of Life to love good things and to hate the bad at least to bear them with indignation whenever they are obtruded upon us For this gives testimony that the inferior part of the Soul submits and is overawed by the superior and that the whole man is as it were in the firy Chariot of his Affections Elias-like carried up towards God and Heaven XIV BUT if any man shall under a pretended affectation of Peace Prudence or Tranquillity set up for submitting to any lewd usurpation over the common Rights of Mankind and the eternal Laws of Virtue and yet upon every trivial affront to himself she out and even burn with indignation and wrath this were Hypocrisie in such a degree as not barely to deserve Scorn but Detestation XV. PASSIONS therefore are not only good but singularly needful to the perfecting of human life Yet must they be with these two Conditions First that our Desires steer towards a proper Object which may be called The true Impulse For those who offend herein are the worst of sinners such as are the malicious and those that delight in Blood and Tortures and others of that strain The second Rule is That the Desires be adequate to the Object or the End and that according to the thirteenth Noema the best and greatest things be pursued with our chiefest Passion the middle things with less and the lowest with the least But this also in such sort as never to allow any such violence in the Desire as may either eclipse the Light of Reason or obstruct that end to which Nature aspires by the help of those Affections wherewith she has endowed our Souls So that this Rule we may call A moderate Impulse of the Passions XVI BUT if any man should propose the rooting up of all Desires L. 1. c. 12. § 9. in order to free the Soul from Discord and to end all strife and combustion which the Passions maintain against the Soul or among themselves This to me would sound no better than as if one to prevent Discord on the Harp should let down all the Strings or than as if another should with Drugs set all the Humors of his Body in a Ferment for fear of falling sick Wherefore Theages the Pythagorean said very elegantly That it was not the part of Virtue to discharge the Passions of the Soul such as Pleasure and Pain but to temper them aright He also after this extends himself in that double similitude we have mentioned about a due mixture in the Humors of the Body and a right Harmony in the tuning of the Strings which we need not here repeat XVII BUT what is now to be the Rule and Measure by which the Desires are to be temper'd and rectified the two Conditions afore-mentioned do set forth And to one of these that famous Declaration of the Orator may be referred Quaest Tuscul lib. 4. He therefore says Tully whoever it be that by Constancy and Moderation is of a quiet Mind and at peace with himself who is neither wasted with Troubles or distracted with Fears nor burnt up with Thirst of any inordinate Passion or undoing himself with vain and trivial Delights This is the wise man whom we long to behold And he also is the happy Man to whom nothing can arrive in human Affairs so intolerable as to depress his mind or yet so joyful as to transport him But on the other side when we see a Man inflamed with Lust and mad with Ambition catching at all things with insatiable Avarice and that the more his Wealth pours in or his Pleasures abounded the more ravenous he became This saith Tully is he whom a wise Man would not scruple to pronounce the most unhappy and the most perverted of all Men. CHAP. VII Of Passions properly so called according to their kinds I. FORASMUCH as no Man has in my Opinion more accurately summed up or distinctly defined the several kinds or species of Passions than the renowned Philosopher Des Cartes I will tread for the most part in his Footsteps unless upon great Motives to the contrary But it is not amiss in the first place to lay down a larger Definition of Passions and to apply the same to the kinds thereof which follow II. PASSION then is a vehement Senfation of the Soul which refers especially to the Soul it self and is accompanied with an unwonted motion of the Spirits Here I say Passion is rightly called Sensation since in Passion the Soul is sensible that it suffers and with Vehemence because it vehemently suffers That the Soul it self is said in this Sensation especially to suffer is to distinguish it from other Sensations whether of Odors Sounds and Colors c. which refer to external Objects or of Hunger Thirst and Pain c. which regard our Bodies Next I say that this Sensation is accompanied with the Motion of the Spirits rather than to say that it results therefrom inasmuch as the former evermore happens but this not always or very seldom if you but exclude such Motion as results from Eating Drinking or the Change of Air. For in external Objects which agitate the Sense or Imagination it is the Soul
is no less harassed by the Evils that lie upon us than from the Want of those Benefits which should advantage us VIII IT is plain that Nature seems more solicitous to drive away Evil than to partake of Pleasure And this appears in those efficacious sorts of Eloquence she has bestowed on so many of the Creatures when they are oppressed for the drawing of Compassion towards them Such is the querulous and lamenting tone of the Voice the dejection of the Eyes and Countenance Groaning Howling Sighs and Tears and the like For all these have Power to incline the Mind to Compassion whether it be to quicken out Help or to retard the Mischiefs we intended IX NOR is Nature wanting altogether in that part which concerns the procuring of Pleasure For every motion of the Eyes and Countenance when we are pleased is much more welcome and agreeable to the Lookers on And even this small Effect of our Joy is by Nature instituted as a Bait or Allurement to draw on mutual Complacency and to create a desire towards the Contentation of each other Just as those former Effects of Sorrow were to dehort us from afflicting any who deserved it not but rather to melt us and push us on to a timely succor of all who are oppress'd But forasmuch as excessive Joy does sometimes bring on what they call Extasie and even swooning away I know not if Nature does not hint hereby that our Souls are capable of greater Pleasure as well as Felicity than our present corporeal and terrestrial State can bear or is able to support Wherefore as to Love and Hatred Grief and Joy the Interpretation of them is this That we do as much as in us lies purchase Good to our selves and others Next that we hurt no Man but on the contrary drive away Evil most industriously and affectionately from others as well as our selves X. ALL Diligence is animated by Cupidity which is the most Mercurial and awakened Passion and which agitates the Heart with more violence than any other Affection It sends up a greater quantity of Spirits to the Brain which diffusing themselves again into the Members of the Body not only render it more active and more vigorous but the Soul also is hereby drawn in and concurs in a grateful and chearful Vivacity For the Soul if it want suitable Entertainment or Objects that are worthy of it is but too apt to rust and grow Lethargick even as the Lord Bacon has somewhere truly admonished That the Life of Man without a proposed End is altogether loose or languishing However if we would rightly govern and make use of this Cupidity to good purpose let us beware that it fly not to Objects that are without our reach or more impetuously to those within it than our Health and the Frailty of our Condition can bear For to make more hast after things within our Power than will consist with our Strength or Ability is but attempting things that are plainly impossible So that such unadvised Cupidity would end rather in Sorrow and Vexation than in Contentment Lastly since 't is so manifest what the end of Cupidity is Namely to excite Vigor in the Execution of our Purposes this Passion must wholly be laid by till we are just on the Borders of acting what by Counsel we have resolved For else this Ardor and especially in weak Constitutions would not only be useless but by inflaming the Spirits would exhaust our strength dry the whole Body and overthrow our Health CHAP. IX The Vse and Interpretation of Love and Hatred which are in the Second Classis I. AMONG the Sorts or Species of Love there is principally to be considered not only Devotion and Complacency but what the Greeks call Storge which is that strong Intercourse of Filial Parental Sympathy that is founded in the Bowels of Nature So likewise in the sorts of Hatred there is to be observed Horror and Antipathy By Devotion we are taught as by a lo● Exhortation of Nature to believe that ther● is something which ought to be more dear 〈◊〉 us than our selves and for which we should not scruple to lay down our Lives The Us● therefore of this Passion refers chiefly to P● lity and Religion neither of which can b● without Virtue So that for the true Use o● this Passion we are accountable to our Prince our Country and to our Religion That i● to say unto God and true Virtue Whence it follows that those who place the highe●… Wisdom in Self preservation and as preferable at all times to all other things do sin against the Light of Nature II. BY Complacency and by Horror we are admonished that there are some things Bea●tiful and some Deformed much contrary to the sordid Opinion of those who laugh at all Distinctions Nay their Raillery extends to the placing of this Indifferency even in Vice and Virtue Whereas Virtue for the most part is but a mere Symmetry of the Passions in reference to their Degrees and Objects Just as Beauty it self is made up from a due proportion in the external Parts and then animated by a Decorum in the Motion and Direction of the whole Which in a manner is the same thing that Tully noted in the Fourth Book of his Tusculane Questions Lib. 4. For as in the Body says he there is a certain apt Figuration of the Members with a sweetness of Color All which we call Beauty so in the Mind an equability and constancy in our Opinions and Judgments joyned to such a firmity and settledness in them as we make to be the consequence of or even the substance of Virtue this also is declared beautiful Wherefore this Natural Complacency and Natural Horror ought to spur us on to the Love of Virtue and an Aversation to Vice For one is the most charming as the othe the most deformed thing in the World III. BUT the more peculiar Intent of that Complacency which is commonly called Love refers to the Propagation of Children Which Passion if it be more importunate than the rest it shews the Care and Anxiety of Nature to preserve and continue the Race of Mankind And Nature is herein so solicitous so artificial and useth such clandestine Feats of Negromancy and Prearication as if she would rather pass for an Inchantress or even a Mountebank than want sufficient Allurements to that end But forasmuch as the Intention of this Ardor is made so conspicuous as before we are thereby admonished how far to restrain it and with what Circumspection to put all due Boundaries thereunto IV. WHEREFORE as this Love has reference to Propagation so Storge or Natural Tendirness referreth chiefly to Children that are begot And if more of the Storge appear in Parents than what is reciprocal it shews this Passion is implanted by Nature a others to a greater Degree or a less suitable to the Use or Want there may be thereo● For there is greater Utility and Need of th● Parents Affection
either things dishonest or even the most honest ones if the Means be dishonorable For nothing of this sort can happen but where Passion and Appetite carry all before them IV. EQUAL Determination is very close of kin to Prudence and is as the sentence given upon Pleadings of Right Ethic. Nicom l. 6. c. 11. For who can better be qualified to determine about what is Right and what is Good than he who is not only above Passion but superior to every Impression and to every Custom how inveterate soever that were but capable to misguide him For what concerns Rectitude of Conjecture 't is plain that since Aristotle makes Moral Vertue nothing else but A fit Habit of pointing or aiming at that just Medium which in acting and in suffering Ethic. Nicom 1. l. 2. c. 9. is to be wish'd for Who but the prudent can rightly calculate that Point For he is Lord of his Passions and his Spirits are so pruged and defecated from the Lee Eudem l. 5. c. 9. as he not only gets Presence of Mind thereby but even a sort of Divination 'T is the same Philosopher notes that Right Conjecture is such an Eruption of the Wit and flies so suddenly to the Mark as there is neither Deliberation or Reason imploy'd therein But where any gross Passions happen to intervene they make a perfect Gulph between the Mind and Truth And therefore this Pitch of Sagacity is not attainable but by the prudent Man 'T is likewise as true of those who are imprudent that for what concerns the Sense of Discrimination they have it not V. THE Philosopher speaking about the Rectitude of Conjecture styles it Sense Inasmuch as whatever Judgment we make Ethic. Nicom l. 2. c. 9. 't is collected from Particulars and from Sense As he asserts in the Case of Anger Grief and the rest The same he also repeats in his Great Morals which before was hinted saying L. 1. c. 2. § 9. That if you have not within your self a Sense and Feeling of these Matters all your Labor after them is but in vain Iamblici protrept c. 2. This the Pythagorea● also called quick and perfect Sensation saying There was a sort of Feeling in our practical Intellect by which it came to pass that we were neither deceived in the sense of what we suffered nor impos'd on by ill reasoning in what we were to act Thus therefore by subjecting of our Passions and the purifying of our Bodies and Souls there springs up to us as it were a new Sensibility in the Mind or Spirit which is only the Portion of the prudent Man For in the Power thereof he finds out and ascertains that Golden Mean which we have hitherto so recommended That which in every Action is so valuable and whereof the indiscreet or the impure Man can never have any Feeling VI. LASTLY the limiting and defining of Right Reason is every where left by Aristotle to the prudent Man's Determination For whenever the Question is started by him what this Right Reason should be he ever refers it thus Prout vir prudens definiverit 'T is even what a prudent Man shall judge fit And surely this is not said in vain if but applied to the Man we speak of For how can there be Right Reason at all if not found within the reach of that Prudence which already we have defin'd And therefore if neither the Pythagoreans the Platonists or Aristotle himself have taken much care in the defining of Right Reason 't is because they finally referr'd it to the Arbitrement of this our Rectified and Prudent Man For they all presum'd that the Mind of Man when effectually purg'd from the Stains of Prejudice and Passion did as naturally discern of things which were just and true as an unblemish'd Eye does rightfully distinguish of Colors So that Aristotle was well advised in pronouncing Right Reason to be that which was conformable to Prudence Ethic. Eudem l. 5. c. 13. taking Prudence in that Latitude we have already set forth VII FROM all that is now said two things deserve Observation First how haughtily and yet very impertinently do some Men carry it who while they are destitute of all Capacity to judge as being unacquainted with this Moral Prudence yet are they so far from subscribing to what the wise and prudent Men of all Ages and of every Nation have established for true and just that they impudently contend there is nothing in its own Nature is either the one or the other nothing right and nothing wrong But surely this is not less absurd than if a blind Man should deny all distinction of Colors when he ought rather to enquire before all other things what were good for his Eyes VIII NEXT we may note that Prudence is not any particular Science of external things but rather somewhat above all Science 'T is a Skill or Sagacity in the Soul whereby she steers so clear from those Rocks which corporeal Passions and Impressions throw commonly in the way as never to fail of making a true and substantial Judgment in all things And this is the Gift and Excellency which is peculiar unto Prudence and which attends her in all her ways But as to the knowledge and sense of things all this and what appertains thereto we derive it from other Fountains as either from Experience or Natural Philosophy or from Skill in War or in the Laws and the like And hereunto Aristotle somewhere refers in saying Ethic. Eudem l. 5. c. 5. Ad Nicom l. 6. c. 5. That the prudent Man had not regard to this or that particular thing but to those which in a more general way appertain'd to the Good of Life So that Prudence is a sort of general Perfection of the rational part of the Soul even as Sincerity is of the Appetitive which from the Pythagorean Fragments we had noted before CHAP. III. Of the other two Primitive Virtues Sincerity and Patience I. SINCERITY is a Virtue of the Soul by which the Will is intirely and sincerely carried on to that which the Mind judgeth to be absolutely and simply the best When I say intirely and sincerely I mean perfectly and adequately For what is done perfectly is according to Antoninus done with the whole Soul Lib. 12. § 29. as well in acting justly as in speaking of truth And the Meaning of Adequate is that no By-consideration whether of Profit or of Fame must ever incline us For the Soul ought so to be temper'd and inflam'd to that which is simply the best as neither from Hurt or Ignominy to be diverted from it For to be oppress'd in a good Cause is better than base Exemption As Tully does assert The Nature of this Virtue is explain'd in Noema the third fourth fifth and so on to the thirteenth But the true Beauty and Perfection thereof can hardly enter into the Imagination of any Man who is not already affected and acquainted with it
over to Falshood and Imposture XVII GENEROSITY differs herein from Magnanimity that it seems to be a more common Virtue and is not only restrained to great Honors or to great Enterprises but consists in this That a Man exercise his own freedom and liberty of Thinking in the best manner he can that he rest contented herein and as to Fortune and the World's Opinion to look on them as things of indifferency yet still to regard all Men with Civility and to suppose them what they ought to be till the contrary be made manifest XVIII CONSTANCY is a Virtue 〈◊〉 which we are taught to be just and confo●… able to our selves in all things we do or 〈◊〉 Diligence is a Virtue by which we prose cute indefatigably whatever we had good cause to undertake Vivacity is defin'd by Andronicus Lib. de Passionibus To he a firm and lively Aptitude in the Soul to perfect whatever is begun But Presence of Mind seems to intimate a certain Promptitude of the Soul to undertake what it ought and therein to persist So that it seems to differ but little from Diligen●s He names also Strenuousness which he makes to be an Habit that enables us to hold out in the laborious Searches of Virtue Lastly Manhood or Virility is by him defin'd to be A Vertue by which a Man carri● himself stoutly and with Circumspection through publick Affairs And he makes the principal Functions hereof to consist in being Intrepid as to Death Bold in all Dangers and to prefer an Honorable Exit before Shameful Living These indeed are the Parts of Fatitude also XIX THERE now only remain those Vertues which appertain to Temperance or if you will to Continence Such as Frugality that is a Virtue by which a Man consulting both Temperances and his own Condition becomes more sparing in his Expence yet so as not to be quite Parsimonious From which Definitio●… 〈◊〉 plain that Frugality is fitly referr'd unto Temperance as is Liberality unto Justice For this latter appertains to the Benefit of others whereas the former has referenc to our selves XX. HUMILITY is a Vertue by which we easily suppress and extinguish all inordinate Desires of Honor Rule and the Splendo● of Riches that so we may be able to fix our Minds upon better things This conforms to the Mind of Marcus the Emperor Marcus l. 12. §. 27. who advises a Man In every Occasion that presents to demonstrate himself just prudent and a plain follower of God XXI AUSTERITY is defin'd by Andronkus Rhodius to be An Habit of the Soul that cannot bear any Lewdness either in Speech or Pleasures Modesty seems nearly ally'd as being a Vertue in the Soul which chaseth early away all the Preparations to Sin nay it cannot easily bear any thing that looks but suspiciously naught XXII As to the Slenderness of Diet in point of Quantity and the plainness of it in reference to Cost this seems something stricter than Frugality it self Andronicus calls this latter De Passionibus An habit of being content with any thing And the first An habit void of Desire to see Charge or Preparation in any thing For the Inoffensiveness of Gesture it does consist in Ordering the Figure and Motion of the Body according to Decorum and this makes it to be a part of Modesty Contentment of Mind is an habit of being ●…sily satisfied with the common Conveniencies of Life For according to the old Observation Nature is content with a very little XXIII THUS have we treated of the Redactive Vertues with what Brevity we could But as we dwelt not long upon them so we judge it less needful to enumerate every Vice since their Natures are known enough from the Doctrine of those Vertues which they contradict However as we still resolve not to go far or meddle with every Vice which some suppose to be as so many Extremes to Vertue yet we shall presume to examin that Meducrity which Aristotle treats of and in which the Nature of Vertue is made to consist Much Contention is made herein yet we shall venture to speak our Sense in the Chapter following CHAP. IX Of that Mediocrity in which Vertue does consist And of the true measure of such Mediocrity I. THAT Vertue lies in a Mediocrity is not quite untrue L. 2. c. 8. §. 7. if rightly understood Yet as some introduce Vertue attended on each hand with opposite Vices and just as it were a Rose placed between two Nettles This we do confess were a pretty Show but it cannot possibly hold in every Case II. FOR in the Case of Justice where a Man takes no more than what is of right his due this is plainly opposite to that part which is vicious and where a Man takes more than what is his due But here if a Man takes less this surely seems no Vice but rather a sort of Generosity or Modesty So again in the Conferring of Rewards to bestow less than was agreed for hath as much of Injustice as to give according to Proportion is just Yet to bestow more largely than was agreed for is not on the other hand Injustice but rather Liberality So also in the way of Buying and Selling the over-weight that is thrown in to get a Customer's good Will altho either in Weight or Measure it exceed the Bargain yet surely this has nothing of Injustice in it III. MOREOVER unto Prudence which doubtless is a Moral Vertue there is only Imprudence to be oppos'd which is the Defect of Prudence So to Sincerity is nothing opposite but Insincerity or at large Hypocrisie which exceeds or falls short of the Perfection of Sincerity So Patience Continence and Suffering do only go lame as we say on the one side as namely by Impatience Incontinence and by Effeminacy So Temperance by Intemperance And therefore to put which some do a sort of Insensibility to answer as an opposite Vice on the other side is quite without Reason F●… as Andronicus notes from Aristotle 't is scarce within Reach of Human Nature to be Insersible to such a Pitch Lib. 3. Cap. 12. And if any Man were so this would look much more like a Disease of the Body than a Vice of the Soul BUT should it happen that the Power of the Soul could be so far extended as to be able to weigh down and even extinguish the sense of every Corporeal Pain and Pleasure this certainly were so far from being a Defect in the Soul that it would rather amount to a wonderful Vertue and Perfection And to abuse such Perfection would argue either Insincerity or Imprudence However if any Man will needs call it an Intemperate sort of Temperance I will not much contend in the Matter IV. As to Fortitude it seems properly enough placed between Boldness and Timerousness Liberality between Niggardize and Pr●digality Truth between Arrogance and Dissimulation Nor do we deny but that somewhat like to this Equality may happen in some few
all of them may by a due and unerring Analysis be resolv'd For as all Numbers arise from Unity and by Unites are all measur'd so we affirm that by this Intellectual Love as from a Principle the most pure and most abstracted of all others all the Modes and Kind of Justice Fortitude and even of Temperance it self are to be measur'd for nothing is so detrimental to lessen and extinguish this Love as is the Exercise and Infection of sensual Delights XVII Now in the last place if any shall object that we have done amiss and that all this splendid Fabrick of the Virtues is by us laid on a weak and tottering Foundation As namely in Passion such as they may suppose this our Love to be Let them for their better Information know that this Love is not more a Passion than is Intellection it self which surely they cannot but believe to be very valuable and very Divine 'T is very true we may as to this point with Des Cartes allow that all Intellection has so much of Passion as it is the Perception of something imprinted from without However as this Perception which is made by Intellection is not from the Body but rather from the Soul exerting and exciting her self into such Action So neither is this Love from the Body but either from the Soul it self or else from God above who calls and quickens the Soul to such a Divine Effort And tho this Perception may if they please be termed a sort of Passion yet 't will derogate no more from the Dignity and Excellency of it than from Intellection it self Which because 't is an Act of Perception may on that account be also termed a Passion XVIII YET when all is said perhaps this Love which we insist upon may not so truly be termed a Passion as acknowledg'd to be the Peace and Tranquillity of the Mind nay a state of such Serenity as hath no other Motions than those of Benignity and Beneficence So that this Love may rather be thought a firm and unshaken Benignity or Bounty of the Soul such as has nothing more perfect or more approaching to the immortal Gods I mean hereby that State of the Blessed Spirits unto which we ought all to aspire and surely without this Love those very Spirits would not be as Gods but as a Race of Devils And therefore we may conclude this Love to be the most perfect and the most Angelick Thing of all others far excelling even Intellection it self And in truth more aptly deserving those lofty Words which Aristotle bestows upon the Speculative Intellect where he says Ethic. Nicom l. 10. c. 7. That according to some Doctors we are not to converse with human things altho we are Men nor with things transitory altho we are mere Mortals but as much as is possible we should affect to live as do the immortal Gods And this by performing every thing in such sort as conforms to that Principle which is the most excellent thing within us L. 10. c. 9. Now Andronicus his Paraphrast declares This most excellent thing within us to be the Intellect But I beg leave to call it rather by the Name of Intellectual Love Thus I end a Point on which some may think I have insisted too long But the whole will shew our Sense of Virtue and of its kinds and how it may be said to consist in a Mediocrity and what also is the Norma or Measure of such Mediocrity The next Step will be touching Good that is external CHAP. X. Of Good Things which are External I. 'T IS not only such Things as are placed without a Man that we call External Goods but whatever is placed without in respect to Virtue I mean without which Virtue may consist in its Perfection altho such things may indeed pass as Ornaments to her and as necessary Complements unto Happiness And these are threefold either in respect of the Soul of the Body or of both We will touch upon some particulars herein and see how far they help or how short they fall as to the compleating of Happiness II. THINGS which relate to the Soul are the Dexterity or Subtilty of the Wit a vast and faithful Memory Also Science Art and Sapience To the Body Strength Agility Comliness and Health To both these as they constitute Man Wealth Liberty Nobility Authority And lastly the Friendship and Favor of many Of all these we may say in short that they are Good and more to be desired than the things that are contrary to them And yet that several of them are of such slender Account that their Absence does no more obstruct the Perfection and Integrity of Happiness than Mountains and Valleys do spoil the Roundness of the Earth whose Magnitude makes those small Inequalities of no consideration Scarce do those things add unto Happiness while present or retrench from it when absent inasmuch as they hold no Proportion with complete and perfect Virtue III. I would fain know what great matter is gotten by Subtilty of Wit if a Man be otherwise prudent if his Mind be firm and unshaken if he have Love towards his Neighbor and Good Will for Mankind I find Antoninus the Emperor when he blamed his Parts for want of sufficient Activity could yet console himself with this Reflection L. 7. § 67. That a happy Life was made up of very few things and that altho a Man were neither Logician nor Philosopher he might yet be generous modest a Lover of his Country and obedient to God On the other hand to hear one lament his Unhappiness for want of such high Subtilty or Dexterity of Wit is little other than if a Man shou'd complain he was not able to walk because not able as some Juglers to dance upon a Rope IV. As to a strong and retentive Memory which holds all fast how many an honest Man is there that has it not For as Antoninus said before so Aristotle also says That those Noble and Divine Things wherein Happiness did consist were very few Nay rather that it was but one certain thing by which the Discrimination was made of things honest or vile even as all Variety of Colors are judg'd of by the Eye And hereto may refer that of Plato That Truth was contain'd in a very narrow space For the good and perfect Man is not so much actuated by a List of Precepts gotten without Book as by living inwardly and printing in his Mind a single and sincere Sense of Things From this alone he will be able to know whatever Duty lies incumbent on him just as by one Candle a Man may see all the variety of Objects before him And as all Colors of the Rainbow do arise from the Sun so indeed the Distinction of all Duties have but the same single Source But for exterior things and such as are not reducible into this Diviner Sense Let it suffice if your Memory be as that of an old Man who as
and become Masters of the Divine Sense there is a certain Power above all that is Human that associates with us and gets into us But as when Men yield themselves to Animal-Complacencies and are dipt in the Impurities of Nature L. 1. c. 6. §. 8. they afterwards run headlong to every pernitious thing and seem satally ty'd down by some Chains that are Invisible so as when Remorse prompts them to return they cannot arise So on the other side those who with Sincere Affections do even pant and thirst after Virtue They on the sudden are caught up by that Intellectual Spirit which replenishes every Thing Marcus Antoninus They are animated and supported by it and finally therewith join'd in the strictest aslociation of Love So that to conclude in the Words of Plato They are as Men rapt up and inspir'd by some Divinity and they are easily and spontaneously led on to every Good Work XI THIS also is the Sense of what we quoted before out of Antonine Namely That we stood bound not onely to conspire with the very Air that surrounds us but to concur with that Intellectual Power which comprehends All. L. 8. §. 54. For says he this Intellectual Power was no less dispers'd and even extended to every Man who was prepar'd to Imbibe it than was the open AIr to him who had Lungs and a Desire to Breath it 'T is plain we want nothing for attracting this Power unto us but that Sincere Love by which we are taught the true Relish of Virtuous Things For 't is thus alone we can grow upwards and have Conjunction with God himself Since Virtue being the Divinest of all Things has most Power to assimilate us unto Him Thus Hierocles pronounces in his said Commentary on the Verses of Pythagoras That if an Inspir'd Sense be but sufficiently fix'd and establish'd it gives us a Conjunction with God For it was necessary that a Like Thing should be carry'd unto its Like I wou'd therefore now ask Whether any thing in the Duties of Virtue can be too hard for us if we are but United to so Great and Potent an Ally Or how can we doubt of God and his Holy Providence while his Grace his Life his Energy are felt sensibly in us For it is God's Life rather than our ●…n if by putting off our Selves that is 〈◊〉 Animal Affections we contend and ●…nt after that alone which is eminently Good and which onely belongs to God who equally consults the Benefit of the whole Universe Wherefore we are not to distrust 〈◊〉 that being assisted by so strong a Principie and so prevailing a Guide we may in the End attain unto the Perfection of Virtue XII WE must not in the last place here omit That there are some Methods for the more easie accomplishing of this Work Such as Seriusly and frequently to Meditate of our Dissolution the certain End of this Frail Body And also of the Immortality of our Souls For 't is impossible that this should not in a large Measure extinguish all those Desires and Appetites which center in the Body If we but think how soon the Visible Man and this Corporeal Shape we carry about us must ●umble and be shatter'd into Atoms how all the present Furniture of this Fabrick such as Wealth and Honor and all the Luxuries they attract must ever and for ever be snatch'd away and rifled from it Who then would not in due time consider how to place a very moderate and indifferent Value on such perishable Things and strive to wean himself by degrees from the Dominion and Insolence of this Flesh This is the onely Way to bring the Soul to those Operations that are Pure and to those Pleasures that are Divine having no Reference or Dependence at all on Carnal Things And this indeed was the Top of all Plato's Philosophy which made him therefore style it The Meditation of Death XIII Hist Nat. l. 7. c. 50. 'T IS true Pliny perversly enough intimates as if this were To Die by Wisdom But that which is the most perfect Wisdom must not be call'd a Disease For who is the Wiser Man He that forecasts what may hereafter happen Or he that by plunging into Luxury and the Train of Evils attending it shall first submit and then be Oppress'd Let Virtue therefore be that Mark which is evermore in our Sight Since she alone is Immortal even as the Soul nor indeed has the Soul any other proper Ornament or Perfection but Virtue Nay such is the Affinity between her and the Soul's Immortality that for the most part there is a kind of Sense and Perception of Immortality engendred in us as soon as the Soul grows vittuous XIV IN the Second Place let us consider How consummate and even ineffable that Pleasure is that fills and possesses the Soul in Virtue For seeing the Distemper and Lapse of the Soul is from a state of Virtue into that of Vice it cannot otherwise be but that when she is call'd back to her Primitive Condition there must be Raptures of Joy at such Restitution For the Philosophers make Pleasure in its very Definition to be The Restitution to a Natural State But surely the most Natural State of that which partakes of Reason must be Virtue inasmuch as Virtue is nothing else but a constant Aptitude and Propensity to the Dictates of Right Reason To which we may add what is noted by Aristotle Andronicus l. 10. c. 9. Aristot cap. 7. That this Pleasure is ours by a sort of Propriety and therefore it must be both Joyful and Excelling For that which is most appropriate to the Nature of every Thing is the truest and most Natural Delight But unto Man there is nothing more proper than Right Reason And therefore that Pleasure which ariseth from a constant Dedication of the Mind thereto must in many Considerations excel the rest XV. IN the third Place we may here superadd That this Life of Virtue and this Pleasure resulting from it is the most Divine of all other Things For a Soul that is got thus far has nothing farther to wish unless out of Vanity to aim at something which is more persect than even the Deity it self But alas that which is a Creature cannot be God For all that he can have must be by Participation and through the help of Virtue which as all confess is a sort of Divine Nature and God-like Life For the Creature as he is Animal can onely follow what is grateful to the Appetite 'T is as he is the Image of God that he prosecutes that which is simply and emimently the Best Wherefore as to this Point Hierocles while he owns both Life and Pleasure arising from Virtue to be perfectly Divine does dexterously play the Philosopher in saying In Aurea Pytagorae Carmina Since therefore Life which conforms to Virtue and so carries a Divine Similitude must needs be Divine and that which abides in Vice must needs
and not onely indure Terment on such account but even immediate Death Wherefore there is no Argument that more helps a Man to study Fortitude and how to acquire it than to consider how miserable we are without it 't is else in the power of every insolent Superior either by Threats or by Oppression to make the timorous Man as vile and as obsequious as he pleases And what greater torment or servitude can there happen to an ingenuous Mind than with Guilt and Confusion to own that as soon as the terror of any great mischief looks towards him he shall not onely shrink from Truth and Virtue but even contribute to betray them both VII As for Intemperance the very Discredit of that Pleasure were enough to deter us from it He that considers the Dignity of Man and the great things he is born to must be astonish'd to see at how mean a rate he often sells them all The poor Fly is not more easily taken in the Cobweb or the Fish deluded by the Bait or any other Beast fetter'd in a Toil than is poor Man whom lusts and passions have subdu'd Every Libertine calls him away and every impure Rascal leads him about till at last he grows abject and more contemptible than a Beast For Pleasure which feeds and vitiates the Sense does also by degrees prey upon the Mind It puts out the Light and breaks the force it had Nay when at last nothing but Fortitude is left him that Sentinel or Out-guard without whose vigor and fidelity no virtue can be safe even here Pleasure attacks him and like a raging Strumpet that has had success comes on with Impudence and will not quit her Hold till she drives us into utter destruction So that what Cicero said is no less true than common De Senectute That in the Region of Pleasure it was impossible for Men to hold any Commerce with Virtue VIII NOR does Intemperance onely benumb and bewitch the Mind but the Body also is miserably shaken and obnoxious to many cruel Diseases by it So that Abstinence even on Health's account deserves our highest Care 'T is not that here we should assign the Weights and Measures of Temperance but onely speak of what is relative to Health and to the good state of the Body and the Mind Since we know that in robust Bodies which are over-fed the faculties of the Mind are very often incumbred and opprest IX L. 2. c. 2. §. 3. WHEREFORE Temperance is so to be cultivated as more to intend the plenty and purity of the Animal Spirits than the extension of the Body Thus that Oracle of Zoroaster advis'd Let not the Spirit be defiled nor the superficies be made gross Which refers to that of Hierocles In Aurea Pytagorae Carmina who calls this Spirit by the name of a Thin-Vehicle and a Body Immaterial Adding also this That we take a vigilant Care of our Organ and skilfully fit it to Philosophical purposes X. THIS then is true and Philosophical Temperance if we so far subdue the bulk and powers of the Body as that they may not be able to stifle or extenuate the Sense of excellent Things And above all That the Internal Spirit be not pamper'd and incrassated which is what Hierocles calls the Spiritual Vehicle His Opinion being That our Internal Man is compos'd and made up as well of this Vehicle as of the Soul Wherefore the Pythagoreans made great work about the purifying of the Spirit or Vehicle as by the following words of Hierocles appears In Aurea Pythagorae Carmina We must says he by the exercise of Virtue and the recovery of Truth and Purity take care of those things which appertain to the Luciform Body which is what the Oracles declare to be the Tender or Aerial Vehicle of the Soul But the care of this Purification must extend even to Meats and Drinks and whatever else concerns these our Mortal Bodies For the Luciform Spirit resides therein it was that which gave Life to this when it was inanimate and is the Conservator of its present Frame This indeed is that Immaterial Body which is Life it self and which gives and ingenerates material Life 'T is by this that our Mortal Bodies which consist of Life Irrational and Body Material are made up And thus an Image is compos'd of the Internal Man who is built out of Rational Substance and Body Immaterial XI IN all which High Words he intimates that in our care concerning the External Man which is our Corporeal Frame or Bulk we must be sure to bring no Detriment or Contagion to the Internal But that the regulation and measures of our Diet as to meat and drink and what else concerns this Mortal Body must refer to the health or safety of the Inward Man The End being that this Thin and Lucid covering of the Soul which must surely be some Aerial or Ethereal Vestment be kept free from all servile Commixtures with our polluted Carcase And hereto the same Hierocles adds That forasmuch as to this our Luciform Body there is another Mortal Body congenerate and affix'd We are to preserve the former in all Purity and to discharge it as much as is possible from all Intercommoning or Combinations with the Latter XII THE truth is that all this Doctrine about Cleansing and Purgation even of the Soul it self and so the whole Business and Import of Virtue points but at this that there be Cleanliness in the Inward Man and that the vigor of it be sustain'd For so the same great Interpreter of the Pythagorean Wisdom does a while after explain the Matter saying That the purification of the rational Soul was done with concern and had reference to the Luciform Vehicle Meaning that the Vehicle was thereby to be render'd more Lightsom and Elastic so as it might not afterwards retard the superiou● flight of the Soul That the said Purification was best effected by divorcing our Thoughts and Meditations from Terrene Objects and lifting them by degrees unto things Immaterial That all Turpitude was to be suppress'd and that we should prohibit all sordid Intercourse of the Body Material for fear the Luciform Body should be Tarnish'd and contaminated by it That if there were a Vigilance in these Particulars then might this Spiritual Vehicle acquire new Life and Vigor it might be endow'd with Celestial Vivacity and at length enter into a Conjugation with the Intellectual Perfections of the Soul All this can Purification do when but steer'd and conducted by Virtue It can Recollect Resuscitate and even inspire with heavenly Energy that subtile and attenuated Chariot of our Mind that inward Organ which will afterwards remain its Habitacle and a Consort inseparable to all Eternity XIII I confess these things sound as lofty Flights and yet they are the Documents of the famous Hierocles by which we are taught that the greatest pitch of Philosophical Temperance is To preserve this Vehicle in a congruous temper to the
purity of the Soul that the Inward Man be not defil'd by the Sense of Gross Contentments Not impotently hurry'd on to concur with Flesh and Blood nor anxious for Joys that have no manner of Foundation We are rather admonish'd by such Temperance how this Luciform Vehicle this inhabitable Lightning which is also a Body distinct may be preserved Free Vigorous and Immaculate XIV THIS is the very Doctrine which the same Author mentions from that Golden Verse of Pythagoras Tum singula pensa Aurigam mentem statuens ex parte supernâ Which he thus explains That Pythagoras speaks here first of the Mind as being a Rational Power Next he calls it the Driver of the Chariot as it directs and governs not only the Corporeal Body but the Luciform That this Driver which is indeed the Soul does not onely with a sharp Eye look out to distinguish the way and keep within the paths of Virtue but it holds the Reins with steddiness both to embrace and to restrain her dear and Luciform Companion and all with Intention to direct its Prospect wholly towards Heaven and to make it thereby grow into a Similitude of the Deity This is an apt and close Allusion to the most perfect and Philosophical Temperance or Continence which allows not that any Corporeal Pleasures should pierce into the Inward Man For it represents the Soul as holding a strict Rein against all Commerce that might obstruct the Diviner Joys which arise from a Sense of God and Virtue And this doubtless is the perfect Scope the truest Measure and the highest Improvement of Temperance XV. BUT how far distant from this Perfection such Men are who wallow in Glut●ony Drunkenness and the impurities of Lust let them consider and compare their Cases who are accountable herein Let this ●e their sad Memento that while it was in their power to resemble the Gods they rather those basely to degenerate into Beasts How much Happier had they been under any Se●erity of Life even that ancient Discipline that afforded Nature but a bare Rescue or Support than by delicious Hours in Chambering and Luxury to blunt the Sense of all Su●limer Things How will they Mourn at last that by the treachery of Vice they have andermin'd the very Platform of their Souls and betray'd that faithful Out-guard I mean Fertitude Which in all Events should have been the bold Champion and Conservator of all their Virtues Let thus much serve in Brief as to the acquisition of the Primitive Virtues and those also which are the Principal of the Derivative CHAP. VI. Of Acquiring the Reductive Virtues And first of those which refer to Justice I. AMong the Virtues call'd Reductive those more especially shine out which have reference to Justice As Liberality Magnificence Veracity Gratitude Candor Urbanity Fidelity Modesty Humanity Hospitality Friendship Civility Affability Officiousness Liberality is not to be neglected Since on the one Hand we shew thereby that our Souls are not contracted to the bare admiration of Wealth Nor our Minds on the other hand so stupid as not to understand the true Use and Ends thereof Magnificence is prais'd by its own works since these bring Benefit to the Publick Ornament to the World and Variety to the Histories of the Time II. VERACITY must be our constant Inmate and Companion For 't is the worst of Characters to be a noted Lyar. There is no Quicksand or infected Air more frightful to the Traveller nor any Wizzard more dangerous to be met withal than an accomplish'd Lyar. He will lead you like a Ghost into dangerous Paths and when you are wandring quite out of your Way he will be sure to leave you in the Dark However 't is strange to see how the Masters in this Talent will yet set up for Men of Prudence They are indeed wise enough to know that every Vice must bear a virtuous Name and that Fraud and Cunning will never stand alone 'T is as with Strumpets who affect to be seen at Church among the Matrons but as they are the more abhorr'd herein for their Impudence as well as Vice so ought it be with these plausible Circumventors There is even a Sect of these who also set up for Wits they think there can be no greater Excellency than in the way call'd Bantering Surely the Man must be very dull that cannot Deceive if he but resolve to Lye Yet as he that will deceive when he can shews a Mind that is vile and abject So the truly prudent and generous Man is he that will be Honest in the dark He that will be as just when 't is in his power to be otherwise as if it were not But whoever notes the Events of things shall see that Knaves and Hypocrites are expos'd to shame and end their Lives obscurely whereas the just and vertuous sort endure and their Reputation still shines forth as at the Noon-day Every counterfeit thing must be short-liv'd Fidelity is much to be cultivated and how could Human Society consist without it since to keep Promises and to restore what is deposited with us are the Top-branches and conspicuous parts of Justice Hence also we may be convinc'd how much it imports us to consider well of Gratitude For every good turn done us is as it were a Pledg deposited in our trust and keeping And surely he that repays it not back as soon as he can is guilty of Infidelity Nay Gratitude is so remarkable a part of Justice that whoever has the heart to violate this Bond is thought capable might he do it with Impunity of trampling on all the Laws of the World Now who would incur this Character or draw himself under so dismal a Guilt There is certainly no Monster that a Man should more abhor than this Monster of Ingratitude III. As to the shew and expression of Candor in our Converse with Men there are great Motives for it First Because the Errors of most Men are Errors of Ignorance and yet even among these Errors their Minds often labour to bring forth Truth and good Works a Birth which indeed we ought kindly to assist by interpreting favourably all their Actions and affording them the very best appearances we can For we do by this soft Temper help on Peace and the cementing of Men's Minds towards a bond of Unity which is so worthy a part that all Men ought to endeavour it IV. FOR Urbanity we must not be so Morose as not to hear and bear the Jests of others and sometimes tart ones too altho we are not good at Jesting our selves In truth he that is dexterous in Raillery has found a Remedy to laugh away his Labour and a very good Sauce against the fatigues of Life For tho it was not Nature's Intention to fit us onely for Sport and Pastime Yet these doubtless are lawful in their seasons just as sleep and other Refreshments to the Body and the Mind provided always that things of Moment are not obstructed by them
more enjoy than others who having Fortune enough yet chuse to employ but what alone is useful and of Necessity Do the Rich or Powerful eat or drink with better Relish than even that Man that labours the whole Day and mixes Temperance with his Sweat Is their Sleep more sound or Health of Mind or Body more robust If this commonly be otherwise why may we not suspect that such Potentates and Men of Wealth are also as much troubled with vain Imaginations as Men that are deroted to Virtue and the Sciences If these must be accus'd for catching at the Air and feeding on refin'd things What get those others from their Heaps and Luxuries but even Fogs or Vapors that attend them But whether a thick Air or a thin do most conduce to Health is a Question we may put off for the present In the mean time take what Herace sings in short Si ventri bene si lateri est pedibusque tuis nil Divitiae possunt Regales addere majus Is your body sound and clean From the Colick Gout and Spleen You may be happy tho you 're poor Greatest Wealth can give no more Now if the Rich who abound and the Poor who have no want are hitherto equal a what concerns the Functions of the Body 'T is plain they only differ in things of Fancy and Conceit Horace's Epist l. 1. Epist 12. Wherefore if the Dispute ●hall be which of the two Fancies or Conceits are best Whether of those who gape after Wealth and Honours which are superfluous or of those who adhere to Virtue and true Wisdom let the By-standers determine and give the Prize VIII LASTLY That this Exhortation may not be defective in any part let us above all things L. 2. c. 9. §. 14. recommend the Divine and Intellectual Love as being the Rule or Measure of all other Virtues Let us as we hope to copy aright and to keep proportion in our Ways and Actions never fail to have this Divine Original before our Eyes And as Humility and Temperance are the two Powers of our Soul that most contribute to procure and preserve this heavenly Perfection So on the other side 't is bodily Pleasures and an unbridled Passion for Wealth and Honour that extinguishes the Sense and Appetition thereof For the Soul in her own native Constitution would resemble a bright and Celestial Flame but these terrene and sordid Ardors do utterly contract and suffocate her Light So that while she rushes forwards in paths of Darkness and of worldly Temptations 't is not possible but Offences will come and that she must have much to answer for both in reference to Honour and to Justice He therefore that will keep alive this Vestal Fire of the Divine Love in the Temple of his Heart let him be Humble and Temperate IX As for those who with Sorrow bewail that as yet they cannot feel any thing of this Ethereal Heat let them address to God with Prayers and Ardor for that he is the Giver of all things However as bare words and wishes have but cold Effect unless we testifie by Life and Conversation the dignity of that Internal Life which we pant after and aspire to So the better to accomplish our Wishes herein let us observe the following Helps Let us be watchful to fly from all the Traps and temptations of Pleasure Never to hurt any Man out of Hatred or Malice That we help and administer to the Poor as we are able To suppress our Anger when Men either injure or revile us To despise no Man for being of low Fortune or Degree but where Honesty and Poverty meet there even to shew Respect To requite Evil with Good and to turn off sharp and bitter Sayings with others that are more Benign To take no Revenge of our Enemies even then when we may securely do it That no Mans Friendship be so rated by us at to forsake Truth and Virtue for it or to prefer it to the Publick Good That is That we be not drawn to that which may please our selves or the dearest Friends whatever on any sensual Account but to consult our Conscience Whether the matter in Question be laudable and just and then to pursue it with Faith and Perseverance X. THUS you have what we judg'd necessary for acquiring of Virtue as well in particular as in the general Wherefore let us close all with that short Document of Pythagoras who advises thus That we fervently embrace and wed these Things That we frequently meditate upon them That we diligently put them into practice For these will at length so establish our Feet in the paths of Divine Virtue as never to slide or stumble and never to deviate or be ejected from them And surely to attain this Perfection in Virtue is to attain the most perfect Happiness that Man's Nature is capable of It now onely remains that we speak of Acquiring that Part which consisteth in External Good CHAP. IX Of the Acquisition of External Good I. WE have already explain'd how very small a proportion of External Blessings are absolutely needful to Man's Happiness It now remains to inquire If Happiness can in any sort appear more perfect and exalted by the addition of all that we have styled External Blessings Inasmuch as Moral Virtues may not a little contribute to the Acquisition of them all II. WE shall first repeat the chief of them and then shew how some Virtues if not all do help to compass either the very Blessings themselves Lib. 1. Cap. 1. Sect. 3. or at least Things Equivalent to them and such as perhaps we ought justly to value beyond them III. AS for the first two great Branches herein namely the advantages of the Soul and of the Body 'T is manifest that Virtue bids fair even to their particular Acquisition or at least to their augmenting and conservation This appears first in reference to the Soul as in the Subtilty and Dexterity of Wit Fidelity and Vastness of the Memory Also in Science Art and Sapience For is there any thing in Nature can more contribute to these Blessings than that Philosophical Temperance we have already describ'd When on the other side 't is as plain that the sharpest Wit in the World grows blunt and is made even stupid by Luxury and Excess IV. LOOK upon Memory and observe how strangely 't is fortify'd by Sobriety and Temperance How 't is extended by Exercise which is the fruit of Diligence But by Drunkenness or by Lust or Drowsiness or Neglect it withers and comes to nothing V. 'T IS true that neither Virtue nor Morals do promote us in Mechanical Arts or indeed in Natural Philosophy or the Mathematicks But consider I pray how far these contribute towards Wit and Memory How great the Power of Diligence is towards every Attempt And 't is manifest that for getting the Mathematicks there must be a certain Gentleness and Patience of the Mind to adapt a Man to that Study VI.
it fairly comes in your way Whereas if Patience do but fortifie and corroborate your Mind it will embolden you to stand in defiance against those mighty Bugbears You may in scorn of them declare that the Soul of Man is not to be scorch'd by Fire nor choak'd by Water nor can the Butchers chop it into parcels That Virtue cannot even by Violence be torn from it or God himself be separated from Virtue and the Soul XV. BESIDES this also may be reflected on that our Life is but as a Thing deposited with us by God Now if God shall call for his own Pledge How can we with Sense or Honesty refuse so just and potent a Benefactor or be unwilling to restore back what he lent But this Pledge is always called for as often as any Conditions for Life are made us which cannot consist with that Observance which we owe to God and to Virtue XVI LASTLY Let us take Comfort in this That God is not usually wanting to his Children in their Extremities that if the Mind shall retain its Integrity and persevere to the last 't is scarce in the power of Torment to interrupt our Happiness L. 2. c. 10. §. 18. L. 3. c. 10. §. 8. L. 2. c. 10 §. 19. L. 3. c. 3. §. 10. For the Soul is then as it were absorp'd with God and in full prospect of a blessed Immortality She knows the Flames and Scourges of this World cannot disfigure her For when their worst is done 't is She finally shall Conquer That she as a long Exile is now solemnly recall'd to her Native Country that She is remounting to the Region of blessed Souls and even sees them as gazing upon her with joy and as shouting with Acclamations at her approach XVII O the Joys O the Triumphs O what Embraces from that Illustrious Assembly What Words and Welcome and Elogies will they bestow for what she so direfully suffer'd and so bravely overcame in the defence of Virtue and of Truth How will the Mansions above Eccho and Rebound with Hallelujah's of that Heavenly Quire Or how rather will this victorious Soul enter with Triumph into those Mansions where Felicity is never to end 'T is in this Happy Station where Love and Friendship are always Young still Unblemish'd and evermore Sincere Here Holy Angels and all those Resplendent Beings which are above do not onely behold the Beauties of each other but Communicate and even Discourse by some unspeakable Way But this is sure that Truth shines out in its utmost Purity and Virtue is bright and manifest in all they say Besides here are no Vicissitudes all is Peace all Security and all things are Stationary and fix'd In short here is a Consummation of the Soul 's bless'd Estate And it were impossible to find it elsewhere XVIII AND how could this otherwise be since the Mind of Man is as the Image of God drawn and descending from him And being drawn from God it covets Heaven as desirous to return from whence it came All Inclinations towards the Earth savour of the Body But as to the Soul her Habitation is above and her true Country is Heaven For as Cicero Discourses wisely of this Matter There can no Origination of the Soul be found upon Earth De Consolatione XIX WHEREFORE let us admire that Quickning Life which when freed from our Earthly Tabernable will touch and penetrate our Souls with Joy O that happy State of victorious Virtue attended and surrounded with Triumphs and Content And ever Happy be that Death and Torment which shall conduct the firm and unshaken Soul to Pleasures that are Ineffable XX. HERE we confess are great things spoken and so perhaps through this whole Work Yet we suppose they are not greater than what belongs to the true and genuine Description of Moral Philosophy They are not beyond the Compass and Meaning of Right Reason nor exceed the Professions and Memorials of the most Excellent of the Heathens XXI HOWEVER That Religion may not be defrauded of her due Honour I do here also profess testifie and declare that I think nothing is found in the Writings of the Philosophers or commemorated as the Deeds and Sayings of Renowned Heathens But all their Flights and Raptures whether about God or the Soul or Virtue are owing either to the very Doctrine or to the Ancient Cabala or Tradition of the most Primitive Church of God Or else to the Eternal Son that Logos or WORD of God Who has in all Ages past endow'd every Man with some Sense of Honesty Tho some Men have always been more Burning and more Shining Lights than the rest For this WORD is that True Light which Enlightneth all Men that come into this World even as the Scripture has it Now that Pythagoras drew his Knowledg from the Hebrew Fountains is what all Writers Sacred and Prophane do testifie and aver That Plato took from him the principal part of that Knowledg touching God the Soul's Immortality and the Conduct of Life and Good Manners has been doubted by no Man And that it went from him into the Schools of Aristotle and so deriv'd and diffus'd almost into the whole World is in like manner attested by all XXII WHEREFORE as the Virtue and Wisdom and Excellency of so many of the Old Heathens does not a little Illustrate the Power and Benignity of the Divine Providence and the extent of its Gifts So can these Men in no degree either obscure or derogate from the Glory of the Church For they as we said did but borrow their precious Things either from the Church of God or from the Divine Logos or WORD That Word which the old Church I mean that of the Jews did worship when it shined from the Tabernacle and which the New Church I mean that of the Christians still adores in the Human Nature of the Messias as in the glorious Temple of its Residence And may it be Worshipped and Adored for ever and ever Amen FINIS
partakers thereof VII WHEREFORE we think Happiness should be seated rather in that Boniform Faculty we have spoke of since it is the most elevated and most divine Faculty of the Soul and seems to supply the same place in it as the essential Good of the Platonicks is said to do in the Deity As also because the Study and Improvement of it is common to all men For it is not above the Talent of the meanest to love God and his Neigbour very heartily And if this be done with Prudence and Purity of Life it is the Completion of this Happiness and the very natural Fruit of this exalted Faculty And let no man think meanly thereof since we are free to aver that nothing of greater Benediction can betide us either in the present or in the future life than such a testimony of the Divine Love But we shall elsewhere speak more freely thereof VIII WE do therefore mention in our Definition of Happiness the pleasure which the mind enjoys from a sense of Virtue because there are some kinds of allowable pleasure such as Aristotle calls pure and generous Nicom lib. 10. c. 6. Magn. Moral lib. 2. c. 7. and laughs at those who think otherwise For such says he as will not allow that any Pleasure can be honest are like those Companions who not comprehending what Nectar is do fansie that the Gods drink Wine inasmuch as they themselves know nothing better IX NOW I affirm this pleasure to arise from a Sense of Virtue and it is erroneous to think the Fruit of Virtue should consist in such imaginary knowledge as is gotten by bare Definitions of Virtue for this amounts to no ●ore than if a man would pretend to know ●he Nature of Fire from the bare Picture of Fire which can afford no Heat All kind of Vital Goods as I may take the liberty to call ●hem are by our Life and Senses to be judged of and enjoyed And Virtue is in it self an ●nward life not an outward shape or to be discovered by the Eye According to that ●memorable Saying of Plotinus Vide in this Book L. 2. c. 2. § 5. c. 3. § 1. If you ever were the thing it self you may then be said to have seen it But being once transformed into this life of Virtue then indeed you behold the Beauties and taste the Pleasures thereof then you grow enamoured and your Soul is taken up with Joys that cannot be uttered However till you shall attain this State and while this Blessed Disposition of the Soul is not as yet awakened in you 't is fit you credit those who are in the Fruition of it Nor can that Saying of Aristotle be ever more opportunely urged than in this Case That Learners must believe For should you venture to make judgment of the Pleasure that is in Virtue being as yet void of all Experience it were to be feared you would prosecute it so faintly as never to obtain it but be left to expiate your incredulity in this Life by a too lasting punishment in the other X. AS to the preceding Words that are annexed to the Definition of Happiness Namely That it was made perfect by external Comforts How could this otherwise be For since Happiness consists in that Pleasure which good men take in the Sense of Virtue and a Conscience of Well-doing no man can possess this Happiness if any pain be so intense upon him as to distract the Mind and extinguish all present Sense of Pleasure Whence it plainly follows that we must not lie under acute Diseases or want the Food that is needful For the want of a Sufficiency for Nature or a State of Captivity or any Degree of Vassalage are able to depress as well as distract the Mind by Cares and Anxiety They hinder Happiness from being in its Perfection nor can Heroical Virtue produce so full a Crop Haud facilè emergunt quorum virtutibus obstat Res angusta domi XI Magn. Moral lib. 2. c. 8. WHEREFORE as Aristotle saith while we are Men and carry about us the Frailties we are born to we shall ever be wanting of external Prosperity For complete Happiness cannot be without those two Ingredients which the Pythagoreans termed Praise and Comfort Moral Nicom lib. 10. c. 9. meaning Praise that results from Virtue and Comfort from good Fortune This we sufficiently noted before to be the Pythagoreans Doctrine Magn. Moral And Aristotle in his great Morals strikes again upon the same Note affirming That without external Comforts it was impossible to be happy XII HOWEVER he inclines much to a Mediocrity herein and quotes Solon for it That a Man may do all things that are fit for him out of a moderate Estate For as to Excess of Wealth it rather choaks up the Way to Virtue than mends the Path. Archytas compares Wealth unto Wine and to Light saying that one blinded the Eyes and the other turned the Brains of very good Men when they were in excess Whence Aristotle when he interprets the Answer of Anaxagoras does not make his happy Man to be either a Potentate or a Man of overgrown Riches Moral Eudem lib. 1. c. 4. But the Man that was full of Innocence free from Pain and who had some share of Divine Contemplation This was his happy Man CHAP. III. Of Virtue in general and of Right Reason I. VIRTUE is an intellectual Power of the Soul by which it over-rules the animal Impressions or bodily Passions so as in every Action it easily pursues what is absolutely and simply the best Here it seems fit in the Definition L. 3. c. 1. § 3. to call Virtue rather a Power than a Habit. First because the word Virtue implies as much and signifies the same thing as Fortitude And next because an Habit is not essential to Virtue For if a Man had this intellectual Power born in him he would doubtless be virtuous tho it came not to him in the way of repeated Actions such as constitute a Habit. For it is not the external Causes but the internal which make the essence of a thing Besides it is this Idea of Virtue which elevates and inclines the mind to love her and tread in her ways and which argues Virtue to be a quick and vigorous heat by which the mind is easily and irresistibly moved to do things which are good and honorable So that we esteem this very Notion of Virtue able to rowze up men from Sloth and Lethargy and make those ashamed who on a few moderate Performances think to set up for Men of Virtue II. WE term this a Power intellectual not only because of its situation which is in the intellectual part of the Soul and not in the animal part of it where that Power resides which governs the Members but also because it is always excited by some Principle which is intellectual or rational By animal Impressions we understand every motion of the Body which being
obtruded with any sort of Violence on the Soul brings danger of Sin and Error if not carefully watched Therefore all such Delusions and Imaginations as strongly assault the Mind may fitly be referred to this Head By Actions I mean all Motions made by the Soul upon deliberation which is to say all such as may properly be termed human Actions whether ●hey be such as the School-men call Elicitae or Imperatae that is whether they do imme●iately proceed from the Soul it self or whether they are occasioned from any outward Impressions made upon the Soul Under which Heads we may rightly compre●end the accepting or refusing any Philosophical Opinion whether Physical or Metaphysical And so of any thing else III. AS to the Pursuit of the Soul we spake of this was to set off and more openly express ●he intellectual Power for if it had not that ●orce to pursue it would not be Virtue but only a Disposition towards it So Thedges the Pythagorean hath it That Reason doth not beget in us a Continency and Forbearance but by putting a forcible Restraint upon Lust and Anger And that when the Passions do overcome and put the same forcible restraint upon Reason she then gives place to Incontinency and a softness of mind which receives all Impressions when as bare Dispositions without such a forcible restraint can only produce imperfect Virtues and imperfect Vices Wherefore the Philosopher makes these interchangeable Conflicts and Dispositions of the Soul to be but Virtues half perfect as also the Vices but half inveterate And whoreas we say the Soul pursues what was absolutely and simply the best this was to manifest that famous distinction of a twofold Good one General which was absolut● good or absolutely better The other Particul● and which in respect of some single Inclinati● of any particular person was good or better the is to say either grateful or more gratef● But what we hold to be the absolute Good 〈◊〉 better thing is that which proves grateful 〈◊〉 more grateful to the Boniform Faculty of 〈◊〉 Soul which we have already pronounced 〈◊〉 be a Thing Divine IV. Moral Nicom l. 6. c. 13. ARISTOTLE seems to me in his Ethic● to Nicomachus to point at this very Facul● saying That what is best in whatever Subject it be is not apparent but to a good Ma● By which he means that men do discov● that which is best in every Subject I me●… really and simply best not as they 〈◊〉 knowing but as they are Good So that m● thinks he had spoken more correctly had 〈◊〉 styled this Faculty The very Eye of the S●… than to call it that sort of Natural Industry which seems too much bordering upon Cros● But forasmuch as no man can feel the Mo●tives and Dictates of this Divine Faculty b● one who hath attained to it by diligent application we must have recourse to some middle Principle to serve as Mercury did of old an● be an Interpreter between God and Man● And for this we shall constitute that which we call Right Reason Wherefore that certainly is absolutely and simply the best which according to the Circumstances of the Case in question comes up closest to Right Reason or 〈◊〉 rather consentaneous with it V. FOR Right Reason which is in Man is a sort of Copy or Transcript of that Reason or Law eternal which is registred in the Mind Divine However this Law is not by Nature made otherwise known unto us than as 't is communicated and reflected on our Minds by the same Right Reason and so shines forth But by how much it shines forth by so much doth it oblige the Conscience even as a Law Divine inscribed in our Hearts To this very Sense the Pythagoreans pronounced of Virtue Tha it was the Habit of doing what ought to be done They did not barely intend The doing what was equal and in a Mean or doing what needed neither Addition nor Substraction as being already what it ought to be But the doing that which was obligatory and of Duty and according to a Law which was immutable And so also did Epictetus famously pronounce What ever appears to be best let that be your inviolable Law VI. THE heighth of Virtue is this constantly to pursue that which to Right Reason seems best For indeed she her self is even absolutely and simply that best not only as she is so consonant to Divine Reason which does nothing partially for the sake of this or that particular but as she generously dictates like to a common Parent such Laws as tend in their own Nature to the Happiness of all Mankind Hence Aristotle calls God the Law eternal as regarding every way with equal Benignity De Mundo cap. 6. So also as well among the Pythagoreans as th● Stoicks it was held That to follow God or 〈◊〉 follow Nature was just the same thing as 〈◊〉 follow Right Reason For this alone is tha● which constitutes our Nature and distinguishe● a Man from a Beast VII YET after all as Aristotle himself 〈◊〉 fain often to confess tho it be easie to agree this Best to be that which to Right Reason i● consonant yet what this Right Reason is 〈◊〉 what is the measure of it seems a most difficult matter truly to resolve Magn. Moral lib. 2. c. 10. The Philosophe having in his great Morals brought in one who demands what Right Reason was and where to be found The Answer is but darkly thus That unless a Man have within himself a Sense of things of this Nature there is nothing to be done It was indeed the Answer which a Physician gave to one who asked him how he should distinguish which was the paleness that argued a man to be ill of an Ague But the same Philosopher presently subjoins That it was the like Case as 〈◊〉 make 〈◊〉 Judgment of the Passions namely That by some Sense and Feeling of them the ●onjecture was to be made So that in short the final Judgment upon this matter is all referred to inward Sense which I confess I should rather have called Magn. Moral lib. 2. c. 8. The Boniform Faculty of the Soul However as Aristotle somewhere notes of Men who by a sort of Violence and without Reason L. 3. c. 1. §. 2. are hurried on to good I must own that whoever is so affected differs but little from them who are inspired And certainly this Principle which I call the Boniform Faculty is the most divine thing within us but hath nothing in it that favours of Fanaticism VIII THE Philosopher in another place defines Right Reason thus Moral Eudem l. 5. c. 13. That such Reason was right as was conformable to Prudence Now whereas Prudence it self is nothing but that natural Sagacity or well cultivated Diligence of the Mind which he elsewhere calls The very Eye of the Soul This only brings back the same answer as before resolving right Reason rather into an inward Sense or an inward