indued with Reason to bee delivered by Repentance from the accusation and guiltinesse of all those things wherein he hath formerly transgressed Yea this Grace is given to MAN onely to all men and ever to man during the continuance of his life in this world and no longer for after Death there is no more Forgivenesse Some there bee who give a reason why the Angels could no more obtaine pardon by repentance after they had fallen and it is this that followes The Fall of Angels was as they affirme a kind of Death unto them and God vouchsafed them the tender of a pardon before their utter falling away when like account was to bee made of them as is made of Men during this life But because they accepted not the grace offered they received afterward as a just reward punishment everlasting without pardon And hereby it plainly appeares that such as refuse Repentance doe reject that which is a speciall good gift of God and peculiar to MAN This also is one of the things proper and peculiar unto MAN that of all other living creatures only the body of MAN should arise againe after Death and aspire to Immortalitie This priviledge the body gaineth in respect of the immortalitie of the soule as likewise the soule obtaineth the other that is to say pardon after Repentance in respect that the Body is weake and troubled with many passions It is a thing proper also to MAN only to learn Arts and Sciences and to worke according unto such Arts For which cause they who define him say thus MAN is a living Creature induced with Reason mortall capable of Consideration and Science He is tearmed a living-creature in that he is a substance having life indued with sense for that is the definition of a living-creature He is said to be indued with Reason that hee may be distinguished from unreasonable-creatures He is called mortall to make a difference betwixt him and the Reasonable-creatures that are immortall And this clause capable of Consideration Science is added thereunto because wee come to Arts and Sciences by learning of them having in us naturally a certaine potentiall ability to receive both understanding and Arts but not actually attaining them save by study and practise There be some who say that this last clause was lately added to the Definition and that it had beene good enough without the same were it not that some bring in their Nymphes and other petty Deities of those kinds who are said to live long and yet not to be immortall And to distinguish MAN from those these words Capable of consideration and science were judged needfull because none of that sort are thought to learne any thing but to know naturally whatsoever they are said to know The Iewes are of opinion on that the whole World was made for MAN even immediately for his sake as Oxen with other beasts for tillage or to bear burthens and as grasse was made for the Beasts For some things were made for their owne sakes and some for the sakes of others All reasonable-creatures were made for their owne sakes Vnreasonable-creatures and things without life were ordained for others not for themselves Now if such things were made in respect of others let us consider for whom they were indeed created Shall wee think they were made for the Angels Doubtlesse no wise man will say that they were made for their sakes because the things made for the respect or sake of another must concern either the making or the continuance or the recreation of those things for which they were made For they are made either in respect of the propagation and succession of their kinde or of their nourishment or to cover them or to cure them or for their better welfare and rest Now the Angels need no such things for they neither have any succession of their kind neither want clothing bodily nourishment nor any thing else And if Angels have no need of such things it is then evident that no other nature having place above the Angels can have need of them because by how much higher the place of it is so much the lesse need hath it of supply or assistance from another This being so we must seek out a Nature which is indued with Reason and yet needeth such things as are aforementioned and what other nature can be found of that sort if MAN be passed over Surely none And if no other can be discovered it followeth by good reason that both things void of life and unreasonable-creatures were made for the sake of MAN and if they were ordained for him as it is evident they were then that was likewise the cause why he was constituted the Governor also of those creatures Now it is the duty of a Governour to use those things which are put under his government in such manner and measure as need and conveniencie shall require and not to abuse them untemperately or to serve voluptuously his owne delicate Appetite Neither ought he to bear himself tyrannously or ungently towards those whom he governes For they that so doe yea and they that use not mercifully their unreasonable-cattell are therein great Offenders neither performing the part of a Governour nor of a just man according to that which is written The just man hath compassion upon the life of his Beast SECT 5. I. It is here proved that neither things without-life nor the unreasonable creatures were made for themselves First by arguments taken from the consideratiō of the nature and use of things without life II. It is proved also by considering those creatures which are void of reason and which are for the most part very serviceable to MAN III. And lastly it is proved by considering those things which seeme to be rather harmfull then profitable to Mankind BUt some perhaps will say that nothing was made inrespect of another but every thing in respect of it selfe Therefore distinguishing first between things inanimate and those that have life let us observe whether things void of life are likely to have beene created onely for their owne sake For if those things were made in respect of themselves how or upon what should living-creatures feed wee see that Nature out of the earth produceth food both of fruits and of plants to every living-creature some few excepted whose feeding is upon flesh yea and those creatures which are nourished by eating flesh doe feed on such beasts as are sustained by eating the fruits of the earth For Lions and Wolves feed on Lambes Goats Harts and Swine Aegles also and all sorts of Hawkes devoure Partridges Doves Hares and such like which are fed with what springeth out of the ground Moreover the nature of those Fishes which devoure one another doth not so extend it self to all fishes that they do generally devoure the flesh of one another but it breaketh off in such as eate weeds and such other things as grow in the water For if all sorts of fishes had
maintaine the like opinion is here likewise answered and his Fallacies discovered III. A confutation of their Tenet also who affirme that the SOUL is an Harmony SEeing certaine reasons of some account are divulged by Cleanthes the Stoick and by Chrysippus to prove the SOUL a corporeall substance wee will here deliver somewhat in answer of them and it shall be the same which the Platonists have thereunto replyed heretofore Cleanthes composeth a syllogisme in this manner There is saith hee a likenesse betweene us and our parents not in respect of the Body onely but in regard also of the SOVL as in Passions Manners and Affections now it pertaineth to a body to have in it likenesse and unlikenesse and likenesse and unlikenesse cannot belong to things void of Bodie Therefore the Soul is a bodily-thing It is here to be observed first that he proveth things universall by things particular which is not allowable by the Rules of Logick Next whereas he saith that likenesse and unlikenesse cannot pertaine to any thing void of bodie it is false For wee know that Numbers which have their side-numbers answering in proportion are like one to another as the side-numbers to sixe and to foure and twentie The side-numbers to sixe are two and three The side numbers to foure and twenty are foure and sixe Now there is like proportion of two in respect of four and of three in respect of sixe For they have a double proportion each in respect of other foure being twice as much as two and sixe twice as much as three Thus it appears that Nūbers are like unto Nūbers yet Numbers are no bodily thing Likewise Figures in Geometrie are like unto Figures so many of them as have both their corners equall their sides which inclose their equall-corners answering one another in proportion and even the Platonists themselves will confesse that such Figures are no Bodily-things Moreover as it is a propriety in the predicament of Quantity that a thing should be equall or unequall So also it is a propriety in the predicament of Quality that things should be like or unlike Now the predicament of Quality is an Incorporeall thing Therefore a thing incorporeall may be like unto another thing that is incorporeall Cleanthes thus frameth another Argument No Incorporeall thing saith he can suffer together with a thing corporeall neither can a bodily-thing suffer with such a thing as hath no body but things corporeall only may suffer one with another Now it is evident that if the body be diseased and wounded the SOVL suffereth grief with it The Bodie suffereth also with the SOVL for when the mind is afflicted by shame the Bodie blusheth and when the minde feareth the body looketh pale Therefore the SOVL is a corporeall thing One of his Assumptions is false and he taketh unto himself that which no man granteth For whereas he saith that no Incorporeal thing can suffer with a thing having a bodie what if this be true onely in the SOVL This is as if we should argue thus No living-creature moves the upper jaw But a Crocodile moves the upper jaw Therefore a Crocodile is no living-creature The major of this proposition is false because in saying No living-creature moves the upper-jaw hee taketh as granted that which is denied for behold the Crocodile both moveth his upper-jaw and is also a living-creature The like arguing useth he who saith that Nothing void of body suffereth together with a bodily-thing for he taketh unto himself in his negation that which lieth in question But if we should grant for argument sake that no Incorporeall-thing doth suffer together with a thing-corporeall yet that which is inferred thereupon is not fully confessed to wit that the Soul suffereth with the Body if it be sick or wounded For it is yet in controversie whether it be the Body onely that suffereth pain which having taken sense from the Soul leaves the same insensible of sufferings or whether the Soul be grieved together with the Bodie The former opinion hath hitherto been most generally received among learned men and therefore Cleanthes ought not to have made his propositions of things in question but of such onely as are quite out of doubt for in doing otherwise he in vaine laboureth to demonstrate that for which he contendeth And yet to make the fashood of his Assumption more evident it might be proved that some things void of body doe suffer together with such things as have body For Qualities being things-incorporeall doe suffer with corporeall-things when they are altered yea both in the corruption of the body and in the Generation of the same the Quality thereof suffers change and alteration therewith Chrysippus thus argueth Death is a separation of the Soul from the Bodie Now nothing void of body is separated from a body because a thing incorporeall cannot be touched or laid even along by a corporeall-thing But the Soul toucheth and is equally touched by the body and is also separated from the same Therefore the Soul is a corporeall-essence Among these propositions this is true that death is a separation of the soul from the body But this that a thing void of body cannot touch a body is false if it be generally spoken and true if it be affirmed of the soul It is false because a Line which is an incorporeall-thing doth evenly touch a corporeall-essence and is also separated from the same as also whitenesse Yet in the Soul it is true by reason the Soul doth not so touch the Bodie For if the Soul should so touch the body it must needs follow that it must be laid as it were along by it And if that be so then it lieth along by the whole bodie that is by every part of the same which is impossible For how can a wholebody lie along by every part of another body Or if it should be that the Soul so touched the Bodie then the whole Creature should not have life For if it so touched the same it would indeed consequently follow that the Soul were a corporeall-essence but then the thing made alive should not have life in it throughout every part of the same And contrariwise if the whole living-creature hath life in it then the Soul neither touches the Bodie neither is it a bodily-thing But the whole living-creature hath life in it therefore neither doth the Soul touch it neither is the Soul a bodily-thing and being a thing void of body is neverthelesse separated from the bodie contrary to the proposition of Chrysippus It is manifest by what hath been hitherto said that the Soul is no corpreall-substance it now remaines that we prove the same to be a substance And because Dinarchus defines the Soul to be an Harmonie And Simmias contradicting Socrates affirmes the same comparing the Soul to an harmonie and the body to a Harp we will here set downe the same confutations of them which we finde in Plato's Dialogue called Phaedon One of them
giveth any token of Reason the Reasonable-soule would bee superfluous because the force of Reason would bee altogether and at all times uselesse unto him All men have agreed unanimously that God made no superfluous creature which being true it cannot be that a Reasonable-soule should be so superfluously bestowed as to be placed in cattle and wilde beasts which cannot exercise the same lest it might bee objected as a fault in the Creator to give an unfit SOUL to the Body For it is not the part of a good workeman or of one who knowes the order and method of working so to doe Now if any shall object that there is in beasts a certaine hidden habit of reason whereby they are moved and that their shape makes them uncapable of artificiall workes as the want of a mans fingers depriveth him of meanes to practise many Arts wherein he is experienced it makes nothing to the matter For the same absurdity still remaines implying that God applyeth SOULS unto some BODIES which are so unfit and superfluous that they are hindered throughout all the ages of those creatures from their operations Beside they confirme their propositions by things unknowne and such as are not confessed For who allowes this fancy that beasts have in them a motion according to an hidden habit of Reason It is therefore better to hold that a SOUL convenient for every Body is fitly applyed thereunto That beasts also have nothing more according to any hidden habit of reason then doth outwardly appeare in their naturall and simple actions That every sort of unreasonable-creatures is moved likwise according to a proper instinct of their owne to such uses and to such workes as they were ordained unto from the beginning and that the shapes of their Bodies are likewise very fitly accommodated for such purposes Moreover the CREATOR because hee would not leave them utterly void of help in their necessities hath placed in every one of them such an understanding as is naturall though not reasonable In some he hath placed a wilinesse representing Art and having a shadow of Reason partly for their better avoiding of snares and dangers which may betide them and partly to make all creatures to be the more naturally knit one to another as hath beene said before Now that the brute-creatures have not the use of reasō in doing these things is evident in this that every living-creature of one kinde doth the same things and all of them in one and the same manner Their practices differ not in multitude but in this onely that some use them perhaps more and some lesse for all the whole kinde of them practise the same wiles Every Hare doth use the same subtleties every Foxe is alike crafty and every Ape imitates alike But it is not so with Man For his actions are infinitely various because Reason being a certaine thing which is free and men having also many things in their power their workings are not one and the same as it is in every kinde of irrationall creature For beasts have their motion onely by nature and such things as are in a creature naturally are in all of the same kinde But the actions proceeding from Reason are after one sort in one man after another sort in another and not necessarily the same in all men But if they should say that mans SOVL is driven into the Bodies of beasts for a punishment of those faults which i◠had committed when it was formerly in man while he lived This demonstration of theirs contrary to the rules of Logick proveth former things by such as come after For why should reasonable SOULS bee cast into the Bodies of beasts which were made before man can you say they had offended in the Body of man before they had entred at all into mans body Galen that admirable Physitian seemeth to bee of the former opinion to suppose that in every severall kinde of living-creature there is a sundry kind of soul For in the beginning of the first booke of that Tract which he wrote Of the use of the parts hee sayes thus Though there be many parts of a living-creature some greater some lesse and some that cannot be divided into any other kinde every one of them is usefull some way to the SOUL For the Body is the instrument of the soul and the parts of living-creatures differ much from one another because there is difference in their SOULS Againe somewhat after that in the same book he addes these words speaking of an Ape Oh thou that art so witty in finding faults I Nature can tell thee that it was convenient a ridiculous shape of Body should be given to that beast whose SOUL was ridiculous By this it may sufficiently be declared that Galen thought a diversitie of SOULS was planted in those creatures which were of divers kindes Thus much of these matters Seeing wee have now proved even by their owne arguments who have held the contrary that the SOUL is neither a corporeall essence nor a harmony nor a Temperature nor any other quality it will necessarily follow that it is a substance incorporeall All confesse there is a SOUL and if it be neither a Body nor an accident it is mannest that it is a substance without a body and no such thing as cannot stand by it selfe without a subject For such things may without the destruction of the subject be either in the same or absent but if the SOUL be separated from the body that body must of necessity be destroyed We may use the same reasons to prove the Soul immortall For if it bee neither a body whose nature is subject to dissolution and destruction as is aforesaid nor a quality nor a quantity nor any thing subject to corruption then it must needs bee immortall There bee many other demonstrations both in Plato and others illustrating the immortality of the SOUL but they are full of obseurity and can hardly be understood or borne away by those who have beene trained up in the same sciences To us the doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient to prove the SOULS immortality beare a ful credit in themselves because they were inspired by God But against those who embrace not the Scriptures as wee Christians doe wee must prove by demonstration that the SOUL is no such thing as is subject to corruption If it bee no corruptible thing it must needs bee incorruptible and consequently immortall And therefore to that purpose let this be sufficient CAP. 3. SECT 1. I. Of the uniting of the SOUL and BODY and whether their Natures be altered or confounded by their union II. The mystery of the SOUL and BODIE' 's union illustrated by considering things conceivable in understanding and by a similitude taken from the Sun III. Of the admirable proprieties of the SOUL and how it is properly or improperly said to be in the BODY or in Place c. OUr purpose is now to enquire how between the SOUL and a
Beasts to Beasts and from men to men and in so saying hee hath not only conjectured very well of Platoes opinion but of the Truth it selfe By these last words Nemesius hath seemed to justifie the opinion both of Iamblicus Plato touching Transmigration of Soules Now this clause I have understood as if it said thus rather And in so saying hee hath not only well guessed but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Platoes opinion Let the learned judge whether the Greek words will not well enough beare this Version though not in a strict Grammaticall sense especially since the context proves his opinion concerning the Soule to be the same which is generally beleeved among Christians for my part till I see more cause to suspect the contrary I shall alway so conceive of it That which is mentioned by another concerning his opinion touching the Soules preexistence before the Bodie is not a matter of faith or so precisely decided as that he or we are for ought I know obliged to be peremptorily for it or against it and therefore I my self have not yet so much thought upon it as to resolve which way to encline or what to answer for him If any man can assure me whether part is without errour that will I embrace and I am perswaded so would Nemesius have done if any man could have proved unto him that his opinion was erroneous in that point which if others beleeve of him as they have no just cause to the contrary no more needes to be spoken of this matter If any be offended that hee argues philosophically rather then by proofs of Scripture and citeth Moses not as a Divine Prophet but a Wiseman Let them consider that hee had such to contest withall as neither beleeved the Scriptures nor ascribed more unto Moses or any other then the Reasonablenesse of their affections seemed to deserve The alledging of Scripture therefore to such men had been to cast pearles to swine and more to the derision then to the honour of his cause This course was practiced by the Apostles themselves To the Iewes and beleeving Gentiles they brought the testimony of the Prophets but to Unbeleevers they cited their owne Poets or convinced them by Reason Had our Author argued with Christians the holy Scriptures onely should have been Judges of their Controversies For he himselfe saith Cap. 2. Sect. 7. To us the Doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient c. but against those who embrace not the Scriptures as wee Christians doe we must prove by Demonstration c. In these times there be many who though they deny not the letter of the Scriptures yet they doe as bad or worse rather for they deny the true sense of them and make interpretations according to their owne lusts and fancies To these also the holy Scriptures are impertinent proofs till by some reasonable Demonstrations we can make them understand and confesse their true meaning And some of these have so long and so violently professed against Reason as unusefull in the consideration of the Divine mysteries that there is little hope either to work upon them by a rationall dispute or to convince them by divine Authority till GOD shall forgive their deniall and abuse of his common graces upon true repentance for the same and restore the Vnderstanding which is worthily darkned by that sinne and for enlightning whereof this Treatise may perhaps become helpfull Other things might bee here declared to prevent prejudice and to shew forth the use and profitablenesse of this Booke but lest they make this Preface over-large I wil here conclude and commit all to Gods blessing Geo Wither PErcurri Librum bunc Denaturâ hominis in quo nihil reperio sanae fidei aut bonis moribus contrarium THO WEEKES R. P. Episc Lond. Cap. domest NEMESIVS of the Nature of MAN CAP. 1. SECT 1. I. The Definition of MAN A quaere touching the Understanding and the opinions of Plotinus Apollinarius Aristotle Plato concerning the SOVL BODY of MAN II. MAN partaking in somewhat with every Creature is a medium knitting together the whole Creation a manifestation of the Unity of the CREATOR of all things III. The Agreement and comely order of GOD'S Works of all which MAN is the true Epitome GOod men and of those not a few have defined Man to consist of an Vnderstanding Soul and a Body and so true is this Definition that it may seeme he could not otherwise be well defined Yet when wee terme him an Vnderstanding soul it may appeare doubtfull to some whether the Vnderstanding comming to the soul as one distinct thing comes to another did beget Vnderstanding in the Soul Or whether the Soul doth naturally contain in it self this understanding as the most excellent part thereof and as being the same to the Soul which the Eie is to the Body There be some and of this opinion is Plotinus who thinking the Soul to be one thing and the Body another doe therfore affirme that MAN is composed of these three a Soul a Body and Vnderstanding Of this mind also was Apollinarius Bishop of Laodicea For having laid this as the Foundation of his own opinion he made the rest of his Building agreeable to the same Groundwork Others there are who divide not the Vnderstanding from the Soul in this manner but suppose rather that the Vnderstanding is a principall of the Soules essence Aristotle conjectures that a certain potentiall understanding was made together with MAN which might become actuall in time and that the understanding which commeth to us from without and whereby we acquire an actuall knowledge pertains not to the naturall Essence of the Soul but assisteth in the knowledge and speculation of things By which means it comes to passe that very few or none but men addicted to the study of wisdome are thought capable of this Actuall understanding PLATO seems to affirm that MAN consists not of a double essence that is to say joyntly of a Soul and a Body but rather that he is a soul using as it were Instrumentally such a Body and perhaps by fixing the mind upon that only which is the most excellent part of Man he seeks to draw us to such a serious consideration of our selves and of the divine nature as might win us the better to pursue vertue godlinesse and such good things as are in the Soul or else by perswading that we are essentially nothing else but soul hee would peradventure allure us to renounce the desires of the Body as things not primarily pertinent to MAN as MAN but chiefely belonging to him as he is a living creature and so by consequence appertaining to him as he is a Man in regard Man is a living-creature And it is indeed confessed not much otherwise of all men that the soul is far more to be esteemed then the body and that the body is but as it were an Instrument moved by the soul as is evident
in death For if thereby the soul be divided from the body it is immediately as much without motion as a Workmans Tools when hee hath cast them aside This is manifest that MAN in some things participates with creatures void of life and that he is partaker also of life as those living-creatures be which are unreasonable and that he is indowed likewise with understanding as are Creatures reasonable With inanimate creatures Man partakes in this that he hath a Body and in his mixture of the foure Elements He agrees with Plants not onely in that which is afore-mentioned but in having also both a nourishing and a feeding-power His coherence with unreasonable Creatures over and above all the former particulars is in having a certaine voluntary motion appetite anger and a power enabling him to feele and breathe for all these are common both to Men and unreasonable creatures Furthermore he communicates with Intelligent incorporeall Natures in reasoning understanding judging and in pursuing vertue and a good life which is the chief end of all vertues These things considered MAN standeth in such a Being as comprehends the sensible and intelligible Nature In respect of his Bodily powers and of his Bodily substance which is subject unto sense hee agrees both with living-creatures and with things void of life In respect of his Reasonable part he communicates with Substances which are bodilesse or spirituall as hath been said before For GOD the Creator of all things hath seemed by little and little so to collect and knit together sundry differing natures that all created things should become ONE And indeed it will be a manifest proofe unto us that there is but One Creator of all things if we well consider how fitly he hath united the substance of individuall things by their particular parts and all the severall species thorowout the world by an excellent sympathie For as in every living creature hee hath joyned the parts insensible with such as have sense in them as bones fatt haire and other insensible parts to the flesh and sinewes which are sensible compounding the Living-creature both of sensible and insensible portions and declaring that all these together make but one living-creature Even so he hath joyned one to another every particular species which was created by ordering and compounding that agreement and disagreement which is in their natures In so much that things inanimate doe not greatly differ from Plants which have in them a vegitative and nourishing life neither are Plants wholy differing from sensible living creatures void of reason nor are those unreasonable creatures so alienated in all things from creatures indowed with reason as that they have no naturall allyance or similitude whereby they may be linked one to another For even in stones which are inanimate creatures not having in them for the most part so much as a vegitative life there is otherwise a certaine power making them to differ from each other even in their stony properties but the Loadstone seemeth very far to exceed the nature and vertue of other stones in that it both attracts Iron thereunto and also detaineth it being so attracted as if it would be nourished thereby Neither doth it exercise this vertue upō one peece of Iron alone but by that one peece linketh fast another and imparteth his owne power to all other peeces which are contiguous thereunto yea Iron draweth Iron when it is touched by the Loadstone Moreover when the CREATOR passed from Plants to living-creatures he rushed not as we may say all at once into things whose nature is to remove from place to place and to such as are indowed with sense but he proceeded rather by degrees and by a naturall and most comely progression For the Shell-fishes called Pinnae and Vrticae are so made as if they were certain Plants having sense in them For he fastned them in the Sea with roots and covered them also with shells as with bark And as therein he made them to participate with Plants so he gave them likewise in some measure the feelingsense which is common to living-creatures They agree with Plants in being rooted and fixed and they communicate with living-creatures in their feeling In like manner the Sponge though it be rooted in the Rocks is of it self opened and contracted according as the passenger approcheth toward it or departeth frō it And therefore Wise men have anciently termed such things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in English Life-plants if by a new word I may so name that which is partly a living-creature and partly a Plant. After the Fishes called Pinnae he proceeded unto those which being unable to passe far from their station doe move onely to and fro within some certaine space such as are the most part of those which have shells and are called the bowels of the earth He went further and added in the like maner something to every thing in particular as to some things more senses and to some other more ability to remove themselves from place to place and came next to those unreasonable-creatures which are more-perfect Those I call more-perfect-creatures which have obtained all the senses and can also remove themselves to places far distant And when GOD passed from unreasonable-creatures to MAN a Creature indowed with Reason he did not perfect him in himself and as it were all at once but first ingraffed into some other living-creatures certain naturall wiles sleights and devises for the saving of themselves which make them seeme to be almost reasonable-creatures And having done all this he then brought forth MAN which is indeed the true Reasonable-Creature The same Order if it bee well considered will appeare in the Voice which from the noise of Horses Oxen is brought by little and little from one plaine simple sound unto the voices of Crowes and Nightingales whose voices consisting of many notes can imitate what they are taught and so by degrees it is terminated in the Articulate voice of MAN which is distinct and perfect Furthermore hee made the various expressions of the Tongue to depend upon the Minde and upon Reason ordaining the speech to publish forth the motions of the Minde And in this wise by a sweet Musicall proportion hee collecting all things together incorporated all into ONE aswell things Intelligible as things visible and made MAN as a meanes thereunto SECT 2. I. Why MAN was first made and why he hath in him somewhat of the Nature of all Creatures II. MAN is the Bounder between visible and Intellectuall things and becomes either an Earthly or Spirituall MAN according as he is inclined to Good or Evill A distinction between the Goods of the Mind and Body and betweene the life of MAN as he is Man and as he is meerly a living creature III. The opinion of the Hebrews touching the mortality and immortality of MAN THese things considered Moses in expressing the Creation of the World did very properly affirme that MAN was last made Not only
because all things being made for MAN it was most convenient that all such things ought first to bee provided which were necessarily pertinent to his use and that he who was to have the use of them should afterward be created But in respect both intellectuall and visible substances were created it seemed also convenient that One should be made by whom those two Natures should be so united together that the whole World might become ONE and be in it owne selfe so agreeable that the same might not bee at variance or estranged from it selfe Even to this end was MAN made such a living-creature as might joyne together both Natures and to summe up all in a word therein was manifested the admirable wisdome of the universall CREATOR Now MAN being placed as it were in the Bounds betweene the Reasonable-nature and that which is Irrationall if he incline to the Bodie setling the maine part of his affectioÌ„ upon corporal things he chuseth and embraceth the life of unreasonable-creatures and for that cause shall be numbred among them and be called as Saint Paul terms him An earthly MAN to whom it shall be thus said Earth thou art and to Earth thou shalt returne yea by this meanes he becomes as the Psalmist affirms like the Beast which hath no understanding But if he incline rather to the Reasonable part and contemning Bodily lusts and pleasures shall make choice to follow that blessed and divine life which is most agreeable unto MAN he shall then be accounted a Heavenly MAN according to that saying Such as the earth is such are they that are earthly such as the heavenly are such are they that are heavenly and indeed that which principally pertaineth unto the Reasonable-Nature is to avoid and oppose Evill and love and follow that which is Good Of Good things some are common both to the Soul and to the Body of which sort the Vertues are and these have a relation unto the Soul in respect of the use which it maketh of the Body being joyned thereunto Some good things pertaine to the soul only by it self so that it should not need the help of the body as godlinesse and the Contemplation of the nature of things and therefore so many as are desirous to live the life of MAN as he is a MAN and not onely in that he is a living creature do apply themselves to Vertue and Piety But we will anon shew distinctly what things pertain to Vertue and what to Piety when we come to discourse of the Soul and of the Body For seeing wee doe not yet know what our Soul is in respect of the substance thereof it is not yet convenient for us to treat here of those things that are wrought by it The Hebrewes affirme that MAN was made from the beginning neither altogether mortall neither wholly immortall but as it were in a state betweene both those natures to the end that if he did follow the affections of the body he should be liable to such alterations as belong to the bodie But if he did prefer such good things as pertaine to the soul he should then be honoured with Immortalitie For if GOD had made MAN absolutely mortall from the beginning he would not have condemned him to die after he had offended because it had beene a thing needlesse to make him mortall by condemnation who was mortall before And on the other side if he had made Man absolutely immortall hee would not have caused him to stand in need of nourishment for nothing that is immortall needeth bodily nourishment Moreover it is not to be beleeved that God would so hastily have repented himself and made Him to be forthwith mortall who was created absolutely immortall For it is evident that he did not so in the Angels that sinned but according to the nature which they obtained from the beginning they remained immortall undergoing for their offences not the penalty of Death but of some other punishment It is better therefore either to be of the first mentioned opinion touching this matter or else thus to think that MAN was indeed created mortall but yet in such wise that if hee were perfected by a vertuous and pious progression he might become immortall that is to say he was made such a One as had in him a potentiall abilitie to become immortall SECT 3. I. Our Author sheweth why the Tree of Knowledge of good and evill was forbidden that it was at first expedient for MAN to be ignorant of his owne Nature II. MAN by the Transgression attained that knowledge of himselfe which diverted him from the way of perfection and Immortalitie III. The Elementarie câ—mposition and nourishment of Mans bodie The reasons also why it needed feeding clothing curing c. and why MAN was made a Creature sensible and capable of Arts and Sciences c. IT being inexpedient rather then any way helpful for MAN to know his own nature before he came to his perfection GOD forbad him to taste the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill For there were and doubtlesse as yet there are very great vertues in Plants but at the first in respect it was in the beginning of the worlds Creation their vertues being before the curse pure and void of all mixture had in them a strong operation and it is not therefore strange that there should be by Gods providence the taste of a certain Tree that should have a power given to ingender in our first parents the knowledge of their own nature The cause why God would not have MAN to know his owne nature before hee had attained to perfection was this lest he knowing himself to stand in need of many things should as by the sequell we find it manifest labour only to supply the wants of his Body and utterly cast away the care of his Soul and for this cause did God forbid him to tast of the fruit of knowledge of good and evill By disobeying this Commandement MAN attained to the knowledge of Himself but thereby fell from the state of growing to perfection and busied himself in taking care for such things as the body needed For according to the words of Moses as soone as he had eaten He knew that he was naked and immediately sought about to get a covering for his nakednesse whereas till then God kept him as it were in a Traunce and in such case that hee knew not himself When hee fell away from the state of growing to perfection hee fell also from his immortalitie which by the mercy of his Creator he shall recover againe at the last In the meane time it was granted him that hee should eat flesh whereas before his fall God willed him to bee content with such things only as grew out of the earth all which hee had provided for him in Paradise yea the first meanes of growing to perfection being become desperate it was permitted him to feed as hee would Now seeing Man consisteth of a Bodie as of
one of his parts and seeing every inferiour compound bodie is composed of the foure Elements it is necessary that such things should happen unto him as the Elements are subject unto That is to say Cutting mutation and flowing By mutation I mean mutation in Qualitie and I terme it Flowing when he is emptied or purged of such things as are in him For a living creature hath alway his evacuations both by such pores as are manifestly seene and by such also as we see not whereof I shall speake hereafter It is necessary therefore that so much should be taken in again as was evacuated seeing else the living creature would perish through defect of what should re-enter to supply the want And if the things evacuated be either dry or moist or spirits it is as necessary that the living creature should have a continuall supply of dry and moist nourishments and of spirits The meats and drinks which wee receive are made of those Elements whereof we also are composed for every thing is nourished with what is agreeable and like unto it and in diseases we are cured with what is contrary to the disease There he some of the Elements which we sometime receive into our Bodies immediately of thēselves and sometime use means unto the receiving of them as for example we somtime receive water of it self sometime wee use Wine and Oyle and all those that are called moist fruits as means to the receiving of water For wine is nothing else but a certain water comming from the Vine and so or so qualified In like manner we partake of Fire sometime immediately as when we are warmed by it sometime also by the means of such things as we eate and drink for all things containe in them some portion of Fire more or lesse We are in like case partakers of Aire either immediately when we breathe it and have it spread round about us or draw it in by our eating and drinking or else by meanes of such other things as we receive into us But as for the Earth we seldome or never receive it immediately but by certain meanes For we eate the corn which commeth of the earth Larks Doves and Partridges feed oftentimes upon the earth but Man usually feedeth on the earth by the means of feeds fruits berries and by the flesh which proceedeth from things nourished by the Earth And forasmuch as God respecting not onely a decencie but also the furnishing of us with a very quick sense of feeling in which man exceedeth all other living creatures he hath clothed us neither with a tough skin as Oxen and other beasts that have a thicke hide neither with large thicke set haire as goats hares and sheepe neither with scales as fishes and serpents neither with hard shells as Tortoises and Oysters neither with a more fleshie bark as Lobsters neither with feathers as birds and therefore wanting these coverings it is necessary wee should have Raiment to supply that in us which nature hath bestowed on other living creatures These are the causes why wee stand in need of nourishment and clothing And not onely for the same ends are our houses become necessary but also that wee may escape the violence of wilde beasts which is none of their least commodities Moreover by reason of the distemperature of qualities in the humane body Physitians and their art are likewise needfull that thereby as often as occasion requires those things which are rent asunder may be fastned againe together for the preservation of health And whereas the alteration consisteth in the quality it is necessary that wee bring the state of the body to a just temperature by the contrary Quality For it is not the Physitians purpose as some think to coole the Bodie which hath beene in a heat but to change it into a temperate estate seeing if they should coole it the disease turneth not to health but to the contrary sicknesse Now in regard of Arts and Sciences and by the necessarie use which we have of such things as they accomplish it so commeth to passe that we need the mutuall assistance one of another and by that need which wee have each of other many of us assembling together in common doe thereby the more conveniently bargaine and contract for such things as may serve to supply the necessities of life This meeting and dwelling together was anciently termed by the name of a Citie by the neere neighbourhood whereof men received aid and profit by each others arts labours without the discommodities of long and far Travaile For Man was naturally made to be such a living creature as should be sociable delighted in neighbourhood And forasmuch as men could not otherwise be so conveniently provided of useful things it is evident that the study of Arts and the necessity of traffick were the first occasions of erecting Cities SECT 4. I. Of the two Priviledges which MAN hath obtained above all other Creatures viz. to be capable of the Forgivenes of sinnes and Immortalitie the Justice and Mercy of GOD in vouchsafing the pardon of sinne of MAN and denying the same to Angels II Man only is a creature capable of learning Arts and Sciences A Definition of Man and Reasons justifying every branch of that Definition III. The World was not made for the Angels nor for any other but MAN onely To him was committed the government of the Vniverse with a limitation to use not abuse the Creatures THere are also two Priviledges which Man hath specially gotten above all other One is to obtaine pardon by Repentance the other is that his body being mortall should be brought to immortalitie This priviledge of the body he getteth by meanes of the soul and the priviledge of the soul by reason of the bodie Yea among Reasonable creatures Man only hath obtained this Peculiar that God vouchsafeth him the pardon of sin upon repentance For neither the Devils nor the Angels are vouchsafed pardon though they doe repent Hereby the most exact Iustice and admirable mercy of GOD is both fully proved and evidently declared For good cause is there why pardon should not bee granted to Angels though they doe repent because there is nothing in them which naturally allures or draws them to sin and in regard also that they of their own nature are free from all passions wants and pleasures of the body But MAN though hee be indowed with Reason yet hee is also a bodily living creature and therefore his wants in that hee is such a living creature together with his passions do often blinde and captivate his reason And therefore when he returnes againe by repentance and applies himselfe unto vertue he obtaineth mercy and forgivenesse For as it is proper to the Essence of MAN to have the ability of laughing because it agreeth to man only to all men and ever to man so in respect of those things which proceed from the grace of God it is proper unto Man above all Creatures
could the Lions finde power to seife the one nor the Viper to fasten upon the other These things considered who is able to commend sufficiently the nobility of this living-creature Behold he bindeth together in himself things mortall and immortall and knitteth up in One things reasonable and unreasonable In his owne nature hee beareth the image of all creatures and from thence is rightly called A little world He is a creature of whom God hath vouchsafed to take so much regard that all created-things both present and to come were for him created He is that creature also for whose sake GOD became MAN and who shaking off his corruption finisheth it in a never-ending immortality Yea he is that creature who being made after the image and likenesse of GOD raigneth above the heavens living and becomming cōversant with CHRIST the sonne of GOD who sitteth above all power and authority and no eloquence may worthily publish forth the manifold preheminences and advantages which are bestowed on this creature He passeth over the vast Seas he rangeth about the wide heavens by his contemplation and conceives the motions and the magnitudes of the stars He enjoyes the commodities both of sea and land He contemns the furie of wild-beasts the strength of the greatest fishes He is learned in every science and skilfull in Artificiall workings Hee communicates by writing with whomsoever he pleaseth though they be far distant and is nothing hindred therein by the absence of his Bodie He foretelleth things to come he ruleth all subdueth all and enjoyeth all things He talketh with Angels yea and with GOD himself He hath all the Creatures within his Dominion and keeps the Devils in subjectiō He searcheth out the nature of every thing and is diligently studious in the knowledge of GOD. He was borne to be the house and Temple of the Holy-ghost and he acquires the fruition of all these priviledges by Vertue and Piety But lest it may be thought of some that we proceed unskilfully in setting forth so largely the praises of Man whereas wee should rather have contented our selves to proceed with a Discourse touching the nature of MAN according to our first purpose wee will break off our speech in this place though we are not ignorant that by setting forth his preheminence and priviledges we have not improperly prosecuted our intention to declare the Nature of MAN And now seeing it is manifested unto us of how great nobility we are partakers and that we are a heavenly plant let us not deface or shame our Nature neither let it be truely said that we are unworthy of such gifts nor let us foolishly deprive our selves of so great Power and Glory and Blessednes by casting away the fruition of Ioyes that shall be everlasting for the seeming possession of imperfect pleasures which will endure but a while But let us preserve rather this nobility of ours by doing good by abstaining from evill works and by a good-zeal intent or purpose For to such endeavours if we seek it by prayer God alwaies lendeth his assisting hand Thus much concerning these matters And now seeing it is the received opinion that MAN consisteth of Body and Soul we will follow the same Division treating first of the Soul and therein passe by those questions which being over subtile and difficultly understood cannot be intelligibly expressed to many capacities CAP. 2. SECT 1. I. The severall and different Opinions of the Ancients concerning the SOVL as whether it be a Substance whether corporeall or incorporeall whether mortall or immortall c. II. The confutation of those who affirme in generall that the SOVL is a corporeall-substance III. Confutations of their particular Arguments who affirme that the SOVL is Bloud Water or Aire EXceeding great variance is discovered among the old Philosophers in their discourses of the SOUL insomuch that almost all of them differ one from another in that matter Democritus and Epicurus and the whole sect of the Stoicks doe peremptorily affirme that the SOVL is a Bodie and those very men who affirme the SOVL to be a Bodie dissent one from another in declaring the Essence of it The Stoicks affirm that it is a certain Blast hot and fiery Critias holds that it is bloud Hippon the Philosopher will have it to be water Democritus thinks it is fire and his opinion is that the round Formes of indivisible-indivisible-bodies or Atomes being incorporated by ayre and fire do make up the Soul Heraclitus conceives that the Soul of the whole frame of the World is a certaine breathing out of the vapours from moist things and that the Soul which is in living-creatures doth proceed both from exhalations without themselves and from exhalations also within them and being of the same kind of which they themselves are Againe on the contrary part there are almost innumerable disagreements among them who say that the SOUL is not a Body or Bodily-substance Some of them affirm that the SOUL is a substance and immortall Some that it is without a Bodie and neither a substance nor immortall Thales who was the first of that opinion held that the SOUL was alwaies in motion and had that motion from it selfe Pythagoras thought that it was a NUMBER moving it selfe Plato affirmed that it was a substance to be conceived in mind that received motion from it self according to NUMBER and HARMONY Aristotle taught that it was the first continuall-motion of a BODIE-NATURALL having in it those Instrumentall parts wherein was possibility of life Dinarchus took it to be an Harmony of the foure Elements not a Harmony made of sounds but as it were a tunable temperature and agreement of hot cold moist dry things in the Bodie But it is without doubt that all the best of these doe agree in this that the SOUL is a substance Aristotle and Dinarchus excepted who affirme that it is no substance at all Besides all these some were of opiniō that there was but one and the same SOUL belonging to all things which was by smal portions distributed to all particular things and then gathered into it self againe of which opinion were the Manichees and certain others Some likewise imagined the Soules were many and of differing sorts Some affirmed that there was both one universall and many particular SOULS and therefore it cannot be but that my Discourse must be drawne to a great length seeing I am to disprove so many opinions Therefore to confute in generall all those together who affirme that the Soul is a corporeall essence it shall be sufficient to alledge that which hath been heretofore delivered to that purpose by Numinius the Pythagorist and by Amonius the Master of Plotinus who thus affirme All Bodies being by their proper nature mutable and such as may be utterly dispersed and divided into innumerable parts and having nothing remaining in them which may not be changed and dispersed have need of something to close them in to bring them together to knit them
into one and as it were to hold them fast united And this we say is done by the SOUL Now if the SOUL be corporeall let it be what Body you please yea though it be a body consisting of the most thin and subtile parts what will you say holds that together as that knitteth the Bodie in One For as we declared before every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together yea the Bodie of this SOUL that knits together our visible BODIE if we should grant the same to be a corporeall SOUL and the next to that also infinitely it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together untill an incorporeall-essence were found out If they answer as the Stoicks doe that there is a certaine motion pertaining unto Bodies extending both to the inward and outward parts of the Body That the motion tending outward effects the quantity and the qualities of the Body and that the motion tending inward is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof wee will then aske them seeing every motion doth proceed from some power what kinde of power it is which that motion hath in what consisteth it and what gives essence thereunto If this power bee a certaine matter which the Greekes call Hylen wee will use the same reasons against them which wee objected before If they say it is not matter but a materiall thing for matter and materiall things thus differ That which hath matter in it is called a materiall thing wee then aske them whether that which hath matter in it be likewise matter or void of matter If they say it is matter we demand how it can be both materiall and matter If they answer that it is not matter then they must grant it to be void of matter and if it be void of matter wee will easily prove it to be no Body because every body hath matter in it If they alleage that Bodies have the three Dimensions in them and that the SOUL extending it selfe through the whole Body hath in it also the three Dimensions and therefore must necessarily be a Body wee will then thus answer them It is true that all BODIE' 's have in them the three Dimensions but every thing having the three Dimensions is not a BODY For place and Quality which in themselves have no Body have accidentally a Quantity if they bee in such things as have magnitude In like maner the SOUL in respect of it selfe is utterly void of the Dimensions but accidentally it hath Dimensions because the Body in which it is having in it the three Dimensions wee so conceive it together with the Body as though the Soule also had in it the three Dimensions We argue further and say thus Every Body hath his motion either from without it selfe or from within If the motion bee from without it selfe it must then be void of life if it be from within it selfe it must be indued with life now it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either indued with life or without life one of which must necessarily be affirmed if the Soule bee a corporeall substance therefore the soule cannot be a corporeal Essence Againe the SOUL if it be nourished it is nourished by that which is void of Body for knowledge is the nourishment thereof but no corporeal essence is norished by things bodiless therefore the SOUL cannot be a Body Xenocrates thus concluded this argument If said hee the SOUL be not nourished it cannot be a corporeal-substance because the Body of every living-creature must be nourished Thus much in generall in confutation of all those who generally affirm that the SOUL is a bodily thing Now we will treate particularly against them who are of opinion that the SOUL is either Blood or Breath because when either Blood or Breath is taken away the living-creature dyeth Wee will not say as some well accounted of have written that part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth if the SOUL be the Blood for that were but a slender answer In those things which have every part of like nature with the whole the part remaining is the same with the whole Whether the water bee much or little it is every way perfect water In like maner gold silver and every other thing whose parts do not essentially differ from each other are still the same as is afore said And even so that part of blood which remaineth of what quantity soever may be called the SOUL aswell as the whole quantity if the blood be the SOUL We therfore will rather answer them thus If that be rightly accounted the SOUL upon whose taking away the death of the living creature ensues then should it needs bee that flegme and the two choller 's must be also the SOUL seeing if any one of these faileth it brings the living-creature to his death The like falleth out in the Liver in the Braine in the Heart in the Stomach the Reines the Entrails and in many other parts whereof if you bereave a living-creature it will immediatly perish Moreover there are many things without blood which have life in them neverthelesse as some smooth and gristly fishes some also of a softer kind to wit Sepiae Teuthides and Smyli as the Greekes call them and Lobsters Crabs Oysters and all shel-fish whether they have hard or soft shells Now if these things have a living-Soule in them as we know they have and yet are void of blood then it plainely followes that blood cannot bee the SOUL Against those who say that water is the Soule many things may bee said to disprove their opinion though water helps to quicken and nourish all things and though it bee as they say impossible to live without water Wee cannot live without nourishment and therefore if their assertion bee true wee may aswell affirme that all nourishment in generall and every particular nourishment is the SOUL And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water wee finde the contrary to bee probable for it is written of some Aegles and of Partridges that they live without drinke And why should water be the SOUL rather then ayre Seeing it is possible to abstaine from water very long whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the Aire And yet neither is Aire the SOUL For there are many creatures which live without breathing the Aire as all Insectae riveted creatures such as Bees Wasps and Ants as also all bloodlesse creatures all those which live in the waters and such as have no Lungs For none of those things that are without Lungs can breath Aire The proposition is true also if it be converted There is no creature having Lungs which doth not breath aire SECT 2. I. The arguments of Cleanthes the Stoick affirming the SOUL to bee corporeall are here confuted logically and by demonstration II. Chrysippus intending to
is taken from what Plato had proved by things granted For he had demonstrated that when we doe learne we doe but call to minde things that were ingraffed formerly in us And therefore taking this unto him as a thing granted hee thereupon confirmes his Argument in this maner If saith hee the learning of things be nothing else but the recalling of them to minde then our soule had a being before it was in the forme of MAN Now if it were a Harmony it was not before the body but came after it when the body was harmoniously joyned together Such of necessity must the composition bee as the things are whereof the composition is made For composition is a certaine common joyning together of those things which are compounded having a harmony in the same and it cannot bee otherwise in reason but that the Harmony must follow and not precede those things whereof it is compounded These matters considered this saying That the SOUL is an Harmony is contrary to this other saying That the learning of things is the recordation of things But the opinion concerning recordation as is aforesaid is true even in their judgement who affirme the SOUL to bee an HARMONIE therefore the SOUL is not a Harmony according to their owne Principle Againe the SOUL is a part repugnant to the body and is in stead of a Ruler exercising a government over the same But Harmony neither exerciseth any government over the Body neither is any way repugnant thereunto therefore the SOUL is not an Harmony Moreover one Harmony may bee more or lesse Harmony then another according as it is slackned or stretched forth wee meane not to bee understood as if we spoke of the very nature of Harmony seeing it is impossible there should be intension and remission in the very nature thereof but wee meane Harmony as it consisteth in joyning together of the notes For if a shrill and a base-sound being matched together shall afterward bee made more slack there will bee a diversitie in the Harmony by reason of joyning together of the notes more or lesse reached forth though they retain the same nature in the greatnesse of the sounds But one SOUL is not more or lesse SOUL then another therefore the SOUL cannot be a Harmony Futhermore the SOUL in that it receives contraries succeeding one another is a substance and a subject But Harmony is a Quality and in the subject Now the predicament of substance is one thing and the predicament of Quality is another therefore the SOUL and Harmony are two distinct things It is indeed no absurdity to say that the SOUL hath Harmony in it howsoever it followeth not that the SOUL is therefore an Harmony Because though the SOUL hath vertues in the same it cannot bee thereupon inferred that the SOUL is vertue SECT 3. I. It is here declared that the SOUL is not as Galen implicitly affirmeth a Temperature in generall II. It is here proved also that the SOUL is no particular temperature or quality III. And it is likewise demonstrated that the SOUL is rather governesse of the temperatures of the Body both ordering them and subduing the Vices which arise from the bodily-tempers GAlen hath determined nothing peremptorily of the SOUL yea hee himselfe affirmeth plainly in his writings of demonstration that hee hath delivered nothing precisely of the same But it may bee collected by some of his expressions that he could be best pleased to affirme that the SOUL is a temperature For he saith that the diversitie of manners followes the temperature of the Body and confirmeth his opinion by certaine collections out of Hippocrates Wherein if hee delivered that which hee truly thinketh then doubtlesse hee beleeveth also that the SOUL is mortall not the whole SOUL but that onely which is irrationall for hee maketh a doubt concerning the reasonable soul as his words declare Now that the temperature of the Body cannot be the SOUL it may be made evident by these reasons First every body aswell that which hath life in it as that which is void of life is made of the temperature of the foure Elements for the temperature of these Elements make all Bodies And if the SOUL bee the temperature of the body there can be no body with out life For if the Soul be the temperature then every body hath life in it because every body hath his temperatures And if every Body hath life in it then there is no body void of life So consequently neither stone nor timber nor iron nor any other thing can be without life But he did not meane perhaps to affirme in generall that every temperature of the body was the SOUL but rather that some such or such a temperature Wee then demand what temperature it is which maketh a living-creature and standeth instead of the SOUL For let him name what temperature soever hee can devise we will finde him out the like in things without life There are as hee himselfe hath declared in his Booke intituled OF THE TEMPERAMENTS nine temperatures eight distempered and one in good temper by which as he likewise affirmeth every man is tempered whose temperature keepeth a meane But by the other distemperatures other living-creatures are composed every one according to the severall kinde thereof with a certaine intension and remission to the more and to the lesse Yea and all the nine temperatures are found also more or lesse in things void of life as he himselfe hath taught in his booke of simple-medicaments Moreover if the SOUL be a temperature then is the SOUL subject to alteration for the temperatures are altered according to the diversitie of Ages Seasons and Dyets And if the SOUL be altered then wee have not at all times the same SOUL but a Soule varied according to our temperatures sometime the soule of a Lion sometime of a Sheepe and sometime of other creatures which were absurdly affirmed Againe our temperature doth not oppose it selfe against any lusts of our bodies but rather helps to provoke them or effect them for it is that which stirreth up the desires But the SOUL bendeth it selfe against those desires therefore our temperature is not the SOUL Furthermore the temperature is a quality and a qualitie may be in the subject or absent from it without the destruction of the same subject Now if our temperature bee our soule it will then follow by the reason afore-mentioned that the soule may be separated from the body which is the subject thereof without the destruction of the same But this is universally knowne to be false therefore the SOUL can be neither temperature nor qualitie None will imagine it more possible to change that which is of the essence of a living-creature into the contrary thereof and yet preserve the living-creature then in fire to change the nature of heat into coldnesse and yet still continue the fire But it appeareth plainly that our temperature doth alter into the contrary that such as Galen
was are they who change our temperatures by their art of Physick Therefore the soule which is the essence of a living-creature cannot be the temperature Neither is the Soule a quality of the body For the qualities of every body are subject to sense But the soule is not subject to sense but to understanding onely and therefore it is not a Quality Wee know that this good temper of blood and spirits accompanied with flesh and sinewes and such other things is strength And that the good temperature of hot and cold dry and moist things is health And that the measurable proportion of the members with a fresh colour is cause of the beauty which is in the Body Now if the soul be a certaine harmony of health and strength and beauty It must needs follow that Man as long as he hath a Soule in him can neither be sick nor weake nor deformed But wee see by often experience that even while the living-soule continueth in them many men are deprived not only of one but of all these good temperatures insomuch that the very same man is deformed and weak and sick all at once Therefore the soule is not the good temperature of the Bodie Some will aske perhaps how it comes to passe if the soule be not the temperature of the body that men are vitious or vertuous according to their naturall constitutions and complexions and they may demand also whether these things proceed not frō the tēperature We answer that they doe indeed proceed from the bodily temperature For as there bee some naturally healthfull or sickly by reason of their constitution So othersome naturally abounding in bitter choller are froward and some other cowardly or leacherous more or lesse according to their complexions But there bee some who overcome these naturall inclinations and by getting the victory over them doe evidently manifest that these temperatures may bee suppressed Now that which overcommeth is one thing and that which is overcome is another thing Therefore the temperature is also one thing and the soule which is the vanquisher and orderer of inclinations proceeding from the temperature is another thing and not the same The body being an instrument which the soule useth if it bee well fitted for the same is a helper unto the soule and she the better useth it to her own contentment But if it be not every way framed and tempered for the soule 's use it becommeth her hinderance and much adoe hath she to strive against the unfitnesse of her instrument Yea so much that if shee bee not very wary and diligent in rectifying the same she her selfe is perverted aswell as the instrument even as a musitian misseth of true musick when his harp is out of tune The soule therefore must be carefull of the body and make it a fit instrument for her selfe which may be done by ordering it according to Reason and by accustoming the same to good manners as in Harmony otherwhile slackning and sometime winding up according as necessity requires By the neglect whereof shee her selfe may else as it often happeneth become as faultie and as perverse as her Instrument SECT 4. I. The SOVL is not a perpetuall motion as Aristotle affirmes Hee shewes what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is and the defects of Aristoles judgement concerning the SOVL. II. The Body hath not in it selfe a possibility to live before the SOVL commeth unto it as Aristole hath also affirmed III. The SOVL is neither unmovable of it selfe nor accidentally moved nor bred in the Body as the fore said Philosopher hath delivered ARistotle affirming that the Soule is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perpetuall motion is neverthelesse to bee accounted among them who say that the SOUL is a quality But first let me make it appeare what Aristotle meaneth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is to say a perpetuall motion He divideth a substance into three parts The first is matter which is as it were the subject and this matter is in it selfe nothing but a generating power out of which another thing may bee formed The second part of the Essence is forme or speciall kinde by which the matter is brought unto a certaine forme The third part consisteth both of matter and forme united together and endued with life The matter being a thing in possibility only and the forme an actuall thing considerable two wayes That is to say either as you consider of a science or of a contemplation according to the science as a habit or as working by that habit It is considerable as a science because in the very substance of the Soule there is a kinde as wee may call it both of sleepe and of waking This waking is analogically answerable unto contemplation and sleepe represents the having of this habit without any working thereby The Science is before working according to that science and Aristotle calls the forme it selfe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is the first continued motion The working according to this forme he names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second continued motion As for example The eye consisteth of a materiall subject and of a certaine forme This materiall subject is in the eye it selfe even that which containeth the sight I meane the matter of the eye and this matter is equivocally called the eye But the forme and continuall motion of the eye is the operation wherby it seeth A whelp before he can see though he hath neither of the two motions aforementioned hath yet an aptnesse to receive such a motion Even in such maner we must conceive of it in the SOUL When sight commeth to the welp it perfects the eye and when the SOUL commeth unto the Body it perfects the living-creature So then in a perfect living-creature neither can the SOUL bee at any time without the Bodie neither the Body without the Soul For the SOUL is not the Body it selfe but it is the SOUL of the BODY and therefore it is in the Body yea and in such a kinde of body for it hath not an existence by it self Aristotle first calls the possible inferiour part of the soul by the Name of the soul severing the Reasonable-part from it wheras hee should have taken the whole soul of Man together and not have given his judgement of the whole by a part much lesse by the weakest part there of Aristotle hath affirmed also that the body hath an aptnesse to live even before the soul commeth unto it For he saith that the body hath in it selfe a possibility to live Now the body which hath in it self a possibility to live must first be actually a body before it receives that form For such a body is a matter void of all qualities Therefore it is impossible that the thing which is not actually it self should have in it an aptnesse whereby another thing may be made of it If it be a bodie and hath in it self no other being but in possibility only how can that which
is a bodie but in possibility have a possibility of life in it self Though in other things it is possible that a man should have somewhat which he never useth yet in the soul it is impossible For the soul doth not cease to worke even in them that are asleep but a man even in sleeping is nourished groweth and seeth visions and breathes which is the chiefest symptome of life It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the possibility to live but it must needs have life actually in it For indeed it is nothing else but life which doth principally form the Soul it is planted together with the Soul and it is in the bodie by participation If therefore any man shall affirme that Health answereth proportionably to Life we will reply that in saying so he tal keth not of the life of the SOUL but of the body and so useth a sophisticall reasoning For the corporeall-substance doth receive contraries one after another but in the substance which is the forme that cannot be possible Because if the difference which is the Form should be altered the living creature would be altered also It is not therefore the substantiall forme which receiveth contraries but the substance which is the subject that is to say the bodily-substance And therefore also the Soul cannot be by any means the continued motion of the bodie but must be a substance all perfect within it selfe and incorporeall for that it receiveth contraries one after another as vice and vertue whereof the very Forme by it self is not capable Furthermore Aristotle saith that the Soul being a continued-motion unmoveable of it self is moved accidentally and that it is not unlikely wee should be moved by an immoveable thing because we see by common experience that beautie being a thing unmoveable doth neverthelesse move us But though Beautie which is unmoveable in it self may move us as hee saith yet the Beautie so moving us is a thing by nature apt enough to be moved not such a thing as is altogether unmoveable Therefore if the body had any selfe-motion it had not been any absurdity to say it should be moved of that which was immoveable But it is impossible that a thing of it self immoveable should be moved of that which is also immoveable How then should the body attain unto motion except it receive it from the soul seeing it cannot have any motion from it self It appeares therefore that when Aristotle went about to declare the first breeding of Motion hee shewed us not the first but the second For if he had moved that which of it self is not moved he had then made the first-motion But if otherwise he move that which is moved of it self hee discourseth how the second-motion commeth From whence then is the first motion procured to the bodie If he say the Elements are moved of themselvess in regard some of them are naturally light some heavy It is not so For if levity weightinesse were kinds of motion then light and heavy things would never leave moving But they cease from moving when they have attained their proper place Therefore lightnesse and heavinesse are not causes of the first-motion but qualities of the Elements If it were granted that lightnesse and heavinesse were causes of the first-motion how can the Qualities of Reasoning of Judging and of holding Opinion be wrought by heavinesse and lightnesse If they be not effects of these neither are they effects of the Elements and if not of the Elements then also not of the Bodies Beside if the soul be moved accidentally and the bodie of it self then should the bodie be moved of it self although it had no soul and if that were possible then it might be a living-creature without a soul But these things are absurd and absurd therefore is the former opinion Moreover it is likewise untruely affirmed that every thing which is moved naturally is moved also violently and that whatsoever is moved violently is moved by nature For the World being moved naturally is not moved violently Neither is it true that such things as are moved naturally doe rest naturally also For the World and the Sunne and the Moone are naturally moved and yet cannot rest naturally In like manner being naturally inclined to a perpetuall motion they cannot rest naturally For Rest is the destruction of the Soul of every thing which is given to perpetuall-motion It is herewith considerable also that there is as yet no solution made unto that which was objected in the beginning of this Chapter viz. how the bodie whose nature is to be easily dispersed can be knit together if it be not by an Incorporeall-substance SECT 5. I. The SOUL is not a Number according to the opinion of Pythagoras nor as Xenocrates understands it II. The error of Eunomius in adding to his definition of the Soul these words created or ingendred in the Bodie and the absurdity thereupon insuing III. The difference betweene the Workes of Creation Providence c. and the error of Apollinarius touching the generation of Soules PYthagoras whose custome it was by a certaine kind of Comparison to liken God and all other things to NUMBERS defined the soul also to be a number moving it self Him Xenocrates imitated not as though the soul were number but for that it is in things numbred and in such as are multiplyed and for that it is the soul which discernes things and because likewise it putteth as it were upon every thing certaine formes and distinctions For it is the SOVLE that separates one form from another and shewes how they differ both by the diversity of their Formes and by the multitude of their number thereby causing things to be contained in number And therefore betweene the soul and numbers there is some affinity He himselfe hath born witnesse of the soule that it is moved of it selfe And that it is not a number wee may thus prove Number is in the predicament of quantity But the soul is not in the predicament of quantity but in the predicament of substance Therfore the soul is not a number Yea though they would never so faine that number should bee a substance accounted among things comprehended in understanding it will bee proved otherwise as it shall hereafter bee declared Againe the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another but so hath not number Therefore the SOUL is not a Number Againe a number is increased by putting more and more unto it but the Soul taketh no such increase Againe a number is either even or odd but the SOUL can neither bee termed even nor odd Againe the SOUL hath motion of it selfe but a number is undoubtedly unmoveable Againe a number remaining one and the same in nature is able to alter no quality that belongeth unto numbers But the Soul remaining one and the same in substance doth change his qualities altering from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to vertue therefore all these
particulars considered the SOVL is not a number These were the ancient Philosophers opinions concerning the SOUL But Eunomius defined it to be a SVBSTANCE void of body and created in the body agreeing therein both with Plato and Aristotle For he took these words a substance void of body out of Plato and these created in the body from Aristotle not considering though hee was otherwise very quick witted that he endeavours to knit those things into One which can by no meanes be united together For every thing that is engendred both bodily and in time is corruptible and mortall To this the doctrine and judgement of Moses is agreeable For in describing the Creation of things subject unto sense hee did not therein deliver in expresse words that the nature of things intelligible were then made But some though othersome are not of their opinion insisting upon conjectures are of that minde Now if any man suppose that the SOUL was made after the body because it was put into the body after the same was fashioned he erreth wide from the truth For neither doth Moses say that the SOUL was at the same time created when it was brought into the body neither doth any reason perswade thereunto Eunomius therefore might aswell have said that the Soul is mortall as doth Aristotle and the Stoicks as affirme it is engendred in the body For if he will say the soul is an incorporeall Essence hee should have refused to say that it was created in the body lest hee give men occasion to thinke the soule mortall and utterly void of Reason Beside it seemes by his opinion that the World is not yet replenished but is at this present as it were no more then halfe perfected and stands every day in want of some additions For there are every day added unto it at the least five times ten thousand intelligible substances And which is most unreasonable hee seemeth to beleeve that when the number of soules is finished then the whole world shall bee dissolved and the last not come to light before the day of the generall resurrection What can be more contrary to reason then to imagine that the world shall be destroyed assoone as it is fully furnished It were like the play-games of little children so to do For when they have made any workes or devises upon the sands they usually tread them out againe as soone as they have done them Now if any shall hereunto reply that the soules are now made by Providence and not by Creation and that there is no new substance brought into the world whensoever any body is replenished with a soule nor any other Essence but the same multiplyed by Providence which was before doubtlesse they know not the difference between Creation and Providence For it is the speciall worke of Providence to preserve the substance of corruptible living creatures by breeding them one of another I meane here all such corruptible living-creatures as are bred by generation and excepting those which are generated by some rotten-matter for the succession of such is preserved by the same providence by generating them of some other putrifaction But the chiefe operation of Creation is to make things of nothing If therfore the SOULS bee made one of another It will also follow that they are corruptible like those other creatures which are made successively one of another according to their kindes If contrariwise the SOULS be made of nothing then their making commeth by Creation and in so affirming we deny that place of Moses God ceased from all his workes But both of these opinions are absurd Therefore the Soules are not now made For that saving of the Scripture My Father worketh c. by the judgement even of Eunomius himselfe is to be understood not of the workes of Creation but of Providence Apollinarius held opinion that Soules were engendred one of another as Bodies are and that the SOUL proceeds by succession from the first Man unto all men descending from him according to the bodily succession therein dissenting both from those who conceive them to have beene from the beginning as it were stored up and from those also who thinke they are daily created For in contradiction to these tenets they affirme that by them God is set on work with Adulterers when they beget children And they further say that these words of Moses God ceased from all his works c. should be untrue if God continueth to create Souls In answer hereunto we have already shewed that all things are mortall which have a successive generation one of another For therefore onely they generate and are generated that the race of corruptible things might be preserved And therefore Apollinarius must either deny the successive generation of Souls or by holding such a generation he must consequently at least necessarily affirme that the Soul is mortall Whereas hee mentions children borne in Adultery let us leave that unto the Divine Providence whereof we are ignorant But if we may presume to conjecture ought of the Divine Providence it may be conceived that God very well knowing a child so begotten may be some way profitable permitteth such a bodie also to be furnished with a Soul as hath been testified unto us by the child which was begotten of David on the wife of Vrias SECT 6. I. The opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL and the absurdity and contradictions thereof II. The judgement of Plato touching one generall SOUL and many particular SOULS The office of the SOUL and the difference betweene things that live and Living-creatures is here also declared III. Of the Transmigration of SOULS according to the various fancies of the Grecian Philosophers NOw it followes that we examine the opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL For they say truely that the SOUL is a substance both immortall and incorporeall But they adde also that there is but one onely Soul for all things and that it is parted and as it were peecemeal distributed unto all particular bodies as well to bodies inanimate as to those which are indued with life They affirme likewise that some bodies receive the same in more ample sort and some in a lesse measure Things indued with life in a larger proportion Things void of life in the lesse And heavenly things in the most abundant manner and that the particular soules are portions of that soul which is universall Now if they had affirmed the soul to have been so divided as that it had not been divided into parts but after some such sort as one voice is divided to the eares of many hearers the error had been the more tolerable But their opinion is that the very substance of the soul is divided into parts and which is most harsh they will have it to be accounted properly among the Elements and to be distributed together with the Elements in the making up of bodily-things and for the collecting of them againe into one when they are dissolved as
water is divided into certain portions and then mingled again all together They are of opinion likewise that after the dissolution of their bodies the pure soules being light doe ascend unto the light and that souls which have been defiled by the materiall substance in which they resided doe passe into the Elements and from the Elements depart againe into Plants and living-creatures And though they do thus mangle the substance of the soul by their fancies making it in effect both corporeall and subject to perturbations they say neverthelesse that it is immortall But in these things they contradict themselves For first they say that the souls which have been defiled doe returne back to the Elements and are mingled and tempered one with another and contrariwise in the passing of soules from body to body they say that punishments are inflicted on them according to their offences joyning and separating again the nature of them as occasion serves They hold likewise that when it is light shadowes are dispersed and when all is covered with clouds that the shadowes are gathered together which cannot possibly come to passe in an intelligible Nature For if a Man should grant that shadowes are dispersed and gathered againe we must then count shadowes among things subject unto sense Plato is of opinion that there is both one generall soul and many particular soules One soule for the whole world altogether and other soules for particular things In such manner that the whole world is indued with a proper soul of its owne even with that soul which belongeth unto the whole world and so also that particular things are indued with their proper soules even with the soul which is peculiar unto every one of them The soul saith hee which pertaineth to the Vniverse is stretched forth from the center of the Earth to the uttermost limits of the Heavens not as though he conceived such a stretching forth as is inclosed in Place but such an extension rather as is conceived in our understanding And hee saith that this is the SOUL which turneth about the whole Globe and which holdeth in and bindeth together all such things as have bodily shape For as hath been already declared all corporeall substances have need of somewhat to hold them together and that is done by the SOUL which giveth unto every thing the forme For every thing that liveth hath a proper life of his owne and every thing that is corrupted hath his proper corruption say the Platonists So long as it is held and knit together they terme it a Bodie and when it is dissolved they say it is corrupted or destroyed They affirme also that all things live but say not that all things are living-creatures For they distinguish Plants from things inanimate for that they increase and are nourished by a nourishing and vegitative power They distinguish the living-creatures void of reason from plants by sense And the rationall from the irrationall by reason Thus though they affirme generally that all things live yet they distinguish the nature of every living-thing Such things as are utterly void of a sensible life doe live say they an habituall life and are held together by the generall Soul of the World which keeps them in their proper Being and undissolved This they hold also to be the Soul which governs the world and that it sends into every particular thing such particular Souls as were before made for them by the CREATOR Yea and they say to that the Creator gave unto it certaine Lawes whereby it should order this whole world which Lawes they call DESTINIE and that the same Creator vouchsafed thereunto a sufficient power to supply such things as are necessary for Man whereof wee shall treat more at large in our discourse of Destinie All the Greek Philosophers who affirme the Soul to be immortall are of opinion that the SOUL passeth from bodie to bodie But they differ in setting down of what sort of souls they meane it Some understand it of one sort onely that is to say of the Reasonable-soul affirming that it passeth into Plants and into the bodies of irrationall-creatures Some of these think this transmigration was but at certaine appointed Revolutions of Time and some of them imagined the time to be casuall and uncertaine Some other understand it not of one sort of souls onely but of the Irrationall as well as of the Rationall and some again understand it of many sorts of soules even of so many as there are divers kinds of living-creatures The Schollers of Plato have been somewhat singular in this opinion For considering Plato said that the soules of such as were furious and angry and given to rapine were clothed with the bodies of Wolves and Lions and that their souls who spent their lives in wantonnesse tooke upon them the bodies of Asses and such like beasts Some understand him as though hee had meant Lions and Wolves Asses as the bare words doe signifie Some perceived that he spake figuratively and by the names of those beasts understood the conditions or qualities of those creatures For Cronius in his booke intituled Of the renewed generation for so he termes the transmigration of SOULS from Bodie to Body will have it understood of none but reasonable-Soules Yea and Theodorus one professing the doctrines of Plato in his book which affirmeth that one SOUL comprehends all the species is likewise of the same minde And so is Porphyrie SECT 7. I. The singular opinion of Iamblicus touching the Trāsmigration of Souls II. Every BODIE hath a SOUL convenient for the same III. The brute creatures doe nothing according to Reason but by-naturall instinct IV. The judgement of Galen concerning diversitie of Soules and a recapitulation of the severall things proved and disproved in this Chapter concluding the Soule to be both immortall and incorporeall BUt Iamblicus running a contrary race to these men sayes that wee must understand that the soul is of the same sort that the living-creature is and that there be divers kinds of SOULS He hath affirmed in his booke called MONOBIBLON that the changing of SOULS never hapneth from Men to unreasonable-creatures neither from unreasonable-creatures to Men but from beasts to beasts and from Men to Men. And in so saying he hath not only well guessed but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Plato's opinion As by many other of his Arguments may be shewed but especially by these that follow No one of the motions of reason saith he manifests it selfe in unreasonable creatures For neither Arts nor Learning nor Consultations nor Vertues nor any other thing belonging to an intelligible nature can bee found in them And therefore it is plaine that they have no part of the reasonable-Soul Though in Infants which are very young there is altogether an unreasonable-motion yet wee say they have a Reasonable-Soule because when they come to yeares they shew forth the workes of reason But in the unreasonable-creature which at no age
lifelesse-body there may bee a perfect union For the possibility of this thing appeareth somewhat doubtfull and it is much the more doubtfull it Man consist not of these two parts onely but of understanding also as a distinct thing which is the opinion of some But the greatest doubt of all ariseth in this respect that all those things which concurre unto the making of one essence are joyned all together in the making of that one seeing all such things as are united to the making up of another thing are usually so altered that they remaine not the same they were before as it shall plainly be declared in our Treatie of the four Elements How then can the BODIE being united unto the SOUL remaine still a Bodie or how can the SOUL being incorporeall and having a substance of his owne be united with the BODIE and become a part of the Living-creature preserving still his owne proper substance without corruption and confusion It seemes to be no way else possible but that the Soul and the Body must by their union one with other either become altered one with the other or corrupted with each other as the Elements are or else to avoid those absurdities that they should not be truly united but be so joyned onely as Dauncers are in their daunce or lie one by the other as Counters in a summe or at best be so mixed as wine and water But we have already declared in my Treatise upon the SOUL that the Soul cannot be laid as it were along by the Bodie because if it should be so that part onely of the body should have life in it which joyneth neare unto the soule and that the part which the soule toucheth not should be without life Moreover wee cannot say that two sundry things placed one beside the other as two pieces of timber two iron wedges or such like are one and the same thing And as for such a mixture as is made of wine and water wee know it corrupts both the one and the other for there doth remaine neither pure water nor pure wine after such a mixture Yet this mixture of wine and water is but as it were a laying of them one beside another though our senses be not able to apprehend the same because they are hindred from perceiving it by the thinnesse of the parts of those things which are mixed For the wine and water may be separated againe the one from the other by a sponge dipped in oyle or by paper either of which will suck away the pare water from the wine But indeed it is utterly impossible to separate sensibly one frō the other those things which are exactly united If therefore the parts of MAN be neither united nor placed one beside the other nor mixed together as aforesaid what reason should move us to say that one Living creature is made of these two parts a Soul and a bodie It was the consideration hereof which partly moved Plato to imagine that this living-creature did not consist of Soule and Body but that he was a Soule having the use of the Body and to whom the Body served as a garment But even in affirming that he occasioned as much doubting for how can the Soul bee one with what is but his garment seeing a Coat is not all one with him that wears it But Amonius who was master to Plotinus thus dissolved this question even by affirming that intelligible things have such a nature as may both bee united unto such things as are capable of them and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting and yet remaine as truly without confusion or corruption when they bee united as those things do which are but laid along one by another It is true that Bodily-things being perfectly united together must of necessity suffer alterations by their union and be changed in every one of those parts which concurre thereunto because they are thereby changed into other Bodies as are the Elements making compound bodies or as nourishment being changed into blood or as the blood when it is converted into Flesh and other parts of the Bodie But things intelligible may bee united and yet no alteration of the substance thereupon ensue For it is not agreeable to the nature of intelligible-things to bee altered in substance but either it departeth away or is brought to nothing and so can admit no alteration The SOUL is immortall and therefore cannot bee corrupted or brought to nothing for then it could not be immortall It is also life it selfe and therefore cannot be changed in the mixture For if it should be changed in the union it should be altered from being life any more and what should the SOUL profit the Body if it gave not life thereunto All these arguments considered it must be concluded that the soul is not altered by being united unto the Body Having thus proved that the substance of intelligible-things cannot be altered it followes necessarily therupon that as they are not corrupted by their union with other things so likewise the things whereunto they are united remaine uncorrupted and that in the union of the SOVL and Body there is neither any corruption or confusion of the one or of the other That they are neverthelesse perfectly united is manifested by this that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole living-creature For the whole man grieveth as one creature if any cause of griefe happen to the one part or the other to the SOUL or to the Body And it is as plaine that they remaine united without confusion in that the soule being separated after a sort from the Body when wee bee asleepe and leaving the body lying in maner of a dead Corps and only breathing into the same as it were certaine vapours of life least it should utterly perish doth worke by it selfe in dreames whilest the Body sleepeth foreseeing things to come and exercising it selfe meerely in things intelligible The like hapneth when the minde is very seriously occupied in cōtēplation enters into the consideration of intellectuall-things For even then the soule endeavours by all possible meanes to bee separated from the body and to bee alone by it selfe that it may thereby ascend to the knowledge of things For being without body it separates it self from the whole body as things which are therewithall corrupted and yet remaineth uncorrupted as those things also doe wherein there is no confusion And keeping it selfe one and alone changeth that wherein it abideth by the life which is contained in it selfe and yet is not changed by the same For as the Sun so soon as it appeareth changes the ayre into light so making it light some and so diffusing it selfe with the ayre that it is united with the same and yet not confoūded therewith Even so the soul being united with the Body remaines without confusion therwith differing in this onely that the Sunne being a Body and circumscribed within
the compasse of Place is not himselfe in every place where his light is but as fire in the wood or as the flame in a candle is confined to a certaine place It is not so with the soul For being void of all Body and not contained within the limits of any place it passeth all and whole through it own whole light and through the whole Body wherein it is neither is any part of it illuminated thereby wherein it is not fully and wholly present Neither is it in the body as in some bottle or other vessell nor compassed in by the same but the Body is rather in the soule and is thereby held in and fastned together For intelligible things such as the soul is are not hindred by bodily things but enter and pierce and passe through every corporeall thing and cannot possibly bee contained within the circumference of a bodily-place Things intellectuall have their being in places also intelligible yea they are either in themselves or else in such intellectuall things as are above themselves The soul is otherwhile in it selfe as when it reasoneth or considereth of things and otherwhile in the understanding as when it conceiveth any thing And when it is said to bee in the body it is not said to be there as in place but to be as it were in a certaine relation to the body and to bee present with it in such a sense as God is said to be in us For wee say that the soul is bound as it were by a certaine disposition and inclination as the lover is to his beloved not bound in place or as bodies are bound but by the habituall bands of affection And indeed seeing it hath neither magnitude nor massinesse nor parts how can it be enclosed by a speciall place Or within what place can that bee contained which hath no parts Where place is there must needs bee a massinesse because place is the Bound which compasseth another thing and hath it being in respect of that which it encloseth Now if any man shall thereupon conclude that his soule is in Alexandria and in Rome and in every place let him know that even in so saying hee includeth a Place For to be in Alexandria or generally to be here or there or any where pertaineth unto a place whereas the soul is no where no not in the body as in a place but habitually because as is aforesaid it cannot be contained within a place For this cause when things intellectuall have any habituall inclination to a place or to such things as are in place wee turne the word from his proper use and say abusively that such a thing is there or there by reason of the operation which it there hath taking the name of place for the inclination or working in a place And whereas we should rather say it there worketh we say There it is SECT 2. I. Of the union of the Godhead with the Man-hood how far forth it hath any similitude with the union of the Soule and Body and wherein it is unlike thereunto II. Arguments taken from Porphyrie confuting himselfe and others who deny the possibility of an union betweene the Godhead and the Man-hood and a disproofe of the opinion of the Eunomians concerning that union III. He proceeds to treat of the union of the soule and body and shewes that as it was meerely of Gods good pleasure to unite the Godhead to the Man-hood So it was also agreeable to the Nature of God that this union should be without mixture or confusion THat which is last aforesaid agrees more plainly and in more speciall manner to that union which is betweene GOD the WORD and the Man-hood by which union the two Natures being united remained neverthelesse without confusion and so also that the divinity was not comprehended by the Humanity And yet this uniting is not altogether such as is betweene the soul and the body For the soul being in the number of multiplied things suffers after a sort with the Body in such things as happen thereunto and by reason of their mutuall necessities and conversation together both holds it in and is also held in by the same But GOD the Word being himselfe nothing altered by that union which unites the divinity and humanity together nor by that communion which the soule and body have with each other imparts his God-head unto them without participating of their frailties and becommeth one with them still remaining in himselfe the same thing which hee was before such an uniting This is a strange and mysterious temperature uniting For Hee is tempered with them and yet he himselfe continues utterly without mixion without confusion without corruption and without change Neither suffering any thing with them but only helping and furthering them nor being corrupted nor altered by them but greatly encreasing them without any diminution in himselfe because hee is altogether without mutation without confusion and without possibility of changing Hereof may Porphyrie himselfe beare witnesse who hath moved his tongue against CHRIST for the testimonies of our Adversaries are the most undeniable proofes which may be brought against themselves This Porphyrie in the second Booke of his mixt questions uses these words It is not then saith he to be judged a thing impossible that some ESSENCE should be assumed to the perfiting of another ESSENCE and be part of that ESSENCE perfecting also the same and yet remaine still in it owne NATVRE both being ONE with that other thing and yet preserving the VNITY of it selfe yea and which is more then this changing those things wherein it is by the presence thereof and making it so to worke as it selfe worketh and yet nothing altered in it SELFE Now Porphyrie spake these things of the uniting of the SOUL and body and if his reason hold good in the SOUL in regard it is an incorporeall substance it holds true much rather in GOD the Word who is verily without bodie and also utterly void of composition And this doth mafestly shut the mouthes of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the God-head and the Man-hood as many of the Grecians have done Jeasting and deriding at it as impossible improbable and absurd that the Divine-nature should be joyned in a temperature and an unity with our mortall-nature for it is here discovered that they may be opposed in this argument by the testimony of such as are in most esteeme among themselves The opinion of some especially of the Eunomians is this that GOD the Word is united to the body not in substance but by the powers of either Nature For it is not say these their substances which are united and tempered together but the powers of the BODY are tempered with the Divine powers Now they affirme according to Aristotle that the Senses are the powers of the body meaning of all the body as it containes the instruments thereof and therefore in their judgement the Divine powers being tempered with the
Senses is cause of that uniting But wee shall never be perswaded to grant unto them that the Senses are certaine powers of the body For wee have already manifestly declared what things belong properly to the Body what things to the SOUL only and what to the SOUL and body both together And we therupon concluded that the Senses which worke by the instruments of the Body are to bee reckoned among those things which are proper to the SOUL and bodie joyned in One These things confidered it is most agreeable to reason wee should affirme according to the nature of incorporeall-things and as is aforesaid that these Essences of the soule and Body are united without confusion and in such maner that the more Divine nature is nothing impaired by the inferiour nature but that onely the inferiour nature is profited by that which is Divine For a nature which is purely incorporeall can passe without stop thorow all things whereas nothing hath passage thorow that By passing through all things it is united and in regard nothing passes through the same it remaines void of mixture and without confusion It is not rightly affirmed therefore though many excellent men be of this opinion that no reason else can be given why the union whereof wee have treated should bee after such a manner but onely because it pleased God it should so be For the very nature of the things is cause thereof We may justly say that it came to passe meerely by GOD's good pleasure and choise that the SON should take a Bodie unto himselfe But it commeth not meerely of the good pleasure of GOD though it be also his good pleasure it should be so but of the proper nature of the Godhead that when it is united it should not bee confounded with the Man-hood Wee will speake nothing of the degrees of soules nor of their ascending and descending mentioned by Origen For we finde in holy Scriptures nothing warranting the same neither are they agreeable to the doctrines commonly received among Christians CAP. 4. SECT 1. I. Of the Body and of the mediate and immediate composition thereof II. Of those parts of a living-creature every portion wherof taketh the name of the whole and of those parts which take not the name of the whole III. MAN only hath every part belonging to the Body of a perfect LIVING-CREATVRE whereas all others are defective in some of the parts and many in the Situation of them RIghtly may we affirme that every corporeall Essence is a composition proceeding from the foure Elements and made up of them The bodies of living-creatures having blood in them are cōpacted immediatly of the four humors Blood flegm Choller Melancholy But the Bodies of such as are without blood are made of the other three humours and of somewhat in them answering proportionably unto blood We call that immediately when any thing is made of the selfe-same things without any other thing comming between them As the foure humours are made of the foure Elements and those things are compounded of the foure humours which consist of like parts and are parts also of the body that is things having such parts every part of which parts may bee called by the same name which is given unto the whole as when every part of the flesh is called flesh Melancholy is likned to Earth Flegme to water Blood to Ayre Choller to Fire and every thing which is compounded of the Elements is either a Masse or Moisture or Spirits Aristotle thought that the bodies of living-creatures were made immediately of Blood onely because the seed is ingendred of blood and all the parts of a living-creature nourished thereby But because it seemed somewhat absurd to imagine that both hardest bones and the tenderest flesh and fatnesse should proceed all of one thing It pleased Hippocrates to affirme that the bodies of living-creatures were immediately compacted of the foure Elements the thicke and sollid parts of the more earthly Elements and the soft parts of such Elements as are softest Oftentimes all the foure humours are found in the blood whereof wee have experience in Phlebotomy For sometime a certaine flegme like whey doth abound in it otherwhile Melancholy and sometime againe Choller Whereupon it commeth to passe that all men seem in some sort to agree with one another Now of the parts of living-creatures some parts there be every portion of which parts hath the same name which is given unto the whole part Othersome there are which cannot bee called by the same name whereby the whole is called As for example Every part of the Braine is called Braine In like maner of the sinewes of the marrow of the bones of the teeth of the grissells of the nayles of the thin muscles that binde the Ioynts together of all the skins throughout the body of the strings which are in the bloody flesh of the haires of the flesh of the veines of the arteries of the pores of the fat and of those foure which are in maner of Elemēts yeelding matter out of which the things aforesaid are immediately made pure Blood Flegme Melancholy and Choller Except from these the Muscle which is compounded of those thinner Muscles which knit our joynts together and of the strings which are of the nature of sinewes The parts of the body consisting of portions whereof every one taketh not the name of the whole are these that follow viz. the head the breast the hands the feet and such other members of Mans body For if you divide the head into severall parts every part of it is not called a Head but if you divide a sinew into severall portions every portion of it shall have the denomination of a sinew and so shall it be likewise if you divide or subdivide a veine or flesh Every whole thing whose severall parts have not the same name with the whole is made of such things as impart the name of the whole to the parts when they are compounded together as the head is made of sinewes and flesh and bone and such like which are called the instrumentall parts The definition therefore of such things as the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is things which consist of like parts is thus made They are things whose parts are like both to the whole and to each other as flesh braine c. and by the word like in this place we meane the same with the whole for a piece of a mans flesh is as truly flesh as the whole masse Now every living-creature hath not all the parts of a body but some of them are defective in one part and some in others for some lack feet as fishes and Serpents Some have no head as Crabs and Lobsters and certaine other water-creatures and because they want a head the seat of their sense is in the breast Some living-creatures have no Lungs namely all such as breath no Ayre some are without a bladder as birds and all such as
be thought of the whole earth and this is not a changing but a dissevering of such things as were mingled together Plato affirmes that the earth is also severed by the sharpnesse of the fire and being so dissolved is elevated and carryed away in the fire So likewise in the masse of the Aire when Aire dissolves it and in the water when it is dissolved in the water Moreover Plato mentioneth another division of the Elements affirming every one of them to have three Qualities The fire to have sharpnesse rarenesse and motion The Element which is directly in the extreame thereunto that is to say the earth to have dulnesse thicknesse and rest So in respect of these Qualities the earth and the fire be cleane contrary to each other whereas they were not so by those two qualities whereof we had formerly spoken He holdeth likewise that by qualities taken from the two extreames those Elements were made which are in the middle betweene these two For saith he two qualities to wit rarenesse and motion being taken from the fire and one that is to say dulnesse being assumed from the Earth Aire is thereof composed whose effecting Qualities are rarenesse motion and dulnesse In like manner two Qualities are taken from the earth namely dulnesse and thicknesse and one from the fire to wit motion whereof proceeds water which getteth also his forme by thicknesse dulnesse and motion Therefore the same that sharpnesse is in respect of dulnesse the same is fire in respect of aire such as rarenesse is in respect of thicknesse such is aire in respect of water That which motion is in respect of rest that water is in respect of earth Look what fire is in respect of aire the like is aire in respect of water And as aire is in respect of water so is water in respect of earth For it is the nature of things having a plaine thin ground to bee held together by one medium that is to say by a proportion betweene them whereas firme and sollid Bodies are not kept fast together but by two mediums There are yet other qualities ascribed unto the Elements Namely to the earth and water WEIGHTINESSE whereby they doe naturally incline downeward and to aire and fire LIGHTNESSE whereby they are naturally given to mount upward The Stoicks have moreover another way of dividing the Elements for some they affirme to be active and some passive By active they meane the more stirring Elements such as are the fire and the aire By passive they understand the duller Elements that is to say the earth and water But Aristotle besides these Elements bringeth in a Fifth BODIE which he tearmes Aethereall and this bee fancies to bee a BODIE having in it a circular motion because it pleaseth him not to say that the heavens are composed of the foure Elements And he calls the Fifth a Body moved circularly because it is as he imagines caried circularly round about the earth Plato is of another opinion and affirmes directly that the heavens are made of fire and of earth His words are these Every bodily shape which is made must be visible and subject unto touching but nothing can bee visible without some fire in it not subject unto touching without some firmenesse nor can any thing be firm without earth And therupon in the beginning God caused the body of the whole world to bee composed of earth and fire Now it is not possible that two things alone should bee made to unite and agree well together without a third which must be as it were a band betweene them to bring them both together and of all bands that is the chief which can most perfectly bring into an unity both it selfe and such things as are united by the same And this the nature of proportion doth best performe By the band here mentioned hee intends the two middle-Elements taken according to the proportion whereof we spake before SECT 3. I. The opinion of the Hebrewes and of Apollinarius touching the making of the heavens and of the earth II. Arguments out of Hippocrates against Thales Anaximenes and Heraclitus who say that there is but one onely Element III. The body being an instrument for the soul is made fit for the operations thereof THe Hebrewes in their opinions concerning the making of the heavens and the earth differ so much from all others that but few have conceived thereof as they doe For they affirme that they were created of no fore existing matter according to Moses who said In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth But Apollinarius thinks that God made the heaven and the earth of the depth of waters For Moses in his description of the worlds creation doth not so make mention of the depth of waters as if it had beene created but in Iob these words are to bee found He made the depth of waters Therefore hee affirmed that all other things were made out of that as out of a matter common to all Hee doth not say that this depth of waters was never made but that it was laid downe by the Creator as a foundation before any other bodily-thing was made that other things might bee made thereof For the very name of depth declares the infinitenesse of the matter And indeed whether it bee this or that way taken it is not much materiall For even by this opinion also God is confessed the sole Creator of all things and that hee made every thing of nothing Now there bee some who say that there is but one onely Element either Fire or Aire or Water For Thales affirmes that fire only Anaximenes that aire onely and Heraclitus with Hipparchus Metapontinus that water onely is an Element against whom it shall be sufficient to alleage what Hippocrates hath said in that behalfe If saith he MAN were composed but of one onely thing hee could never feele any griefe For hee being but One thing nothing could procure paine unto him or if hee should feele any griefe there could be but one thing which might heale him For that which feeleth griefe must needs bee in a mutation with some sense And if there bee but one Element there can then bee nothing whereinto the living-creature should be changed And if it were not altered but continued setled in the same state it could not possibly feele paine though it were never so sensible He saith further It is necessary that the thing which any body suffereth should proceed from some other thing but if there bee but one onely Element there can be no quality beside the quality of one Element whereby the living-creature may be afflicted And if neither can bee changed nor suffer any thing how can it bee grieved After hee had thus declared the impossibility thereof he supposeth neverthelesse the same to be granted and thereupon thus inferreth Grant saith hee it could suffer griefe and then it will follow that there is but one thing onely which can cure the same but experience
hath taught us that there is not one thing only but many things to cure every disease and therefore Man cannot be one onely intire thing It may be further proved that there are foure Elements by the reason wherewith every one of them endeavoureth to confirme his owne opinion who affirme that there is but one onely Element For when Thales affirmed that water onely was to bee accounted an Element hee endeavoured to shew that all the other three were made of it saying that the faeces of it become earth the thin parts become aire and that the thinnest parts of that aire are turned into fire Anaximenes holding opinion that aire onely is an Element goes about to prove likewise that all the rest of the Elements are made of aire Heraclitus and Hipparchus Metapontinus affirming that there is no Element but fire use likewise the very same demonstration to make their argument seeme reasonable Now it will become evident by the reasons which these men give to justifie their assertion that every one of them is an Element For by some it is demonstrated that all other Elements are made of the fire by another that all the rest are made of water and by a third that they are all of aire which make it plaine that all the Elements are changed one into another by their generall consent who otherwise disagree And if they can all bee changed one into another it will necessarily follow that they must all be Elements because which of the foure soever shall bee taken it will appeare that even that is made of some other The Body which is composed of these Elements being an instrument for the SOUL is divided together with the powers of the same For it was framed to be convenient and fit for them in such maner that no power of the SOUL should be hindered through the Bodies defect And therefore to every power of the SOUL there are proper parts of the Body assigned for his operation as I will more particularly declare in the following Chapters The SOUL exercises the part of an Artificer the BODIE is as it were his instrument It is also the matter wherein the actions are conversant and the effect which is wroght thereby is the action it selfe The matter is as the woman the act is that which is conversant about her either whoredome incest or lawfull copulation The powers of the Soul are divided into these three phantasie judgement and memory CAP. 6. I. Of the phantasie or imagination what it is by what Names expressed and by what instruments it worketh II. Of the seats and nature of the senses and why being but foure Elements there are five senses III. The definitions of sense according to Plato and others and distinctions betweene such faculties in the Soul as are appointed to beare rule and to obey EXpresse we will in the next place such things as concerne the phantasie or imagination The faculty of imagining is a power of that part of the soule which is void of Reason and worketh by those instruments wherein the senses are placed The thing subject to imagination is that whereabout our imagination is conversant and may bee called imaginable as that which is felt is termed sensible Imagination it selfe called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a passion of that part of the soul which is irrationall procured by something which is subject to our imagination A vaine imagination called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a void passion in the parts of the soule which are destitute of reason being procured of no certaine thing whereof an imagination should arise But the Stoick Philosophers doe set downe those foure in this maner The imagination it selfe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The thing wherby the imagination is moved 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A voide drawing away of our imagination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And that which moveth our imagination to bee vainely drawne away 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Imagination is a passion representing unto us both it selfe and the thing moving our Imagination For when we see some white thing there is ingendred some passion in the Soule by the reception thereof Even as there is some passion begotten in the seats of the Sense when it feeleth any thing So there is then something engendred in the Soule when it conceiveth any thing it receiveth an Image or impression of the thing understood The fancie or the thing wherby Imaginatiō is moved is any sensible-thing which hath caused the Imagination as it may bee some white thing or any other object which may move the SOVL. The Fantastick or void drawing away of our Imagination is a needles or causuall seducing or distracting of the Imagination without any certaine thing which may move the same The Fantasme or thing it selfe whereby wee are idely drawne away is the very attraction whereby wee are attracted according to our vain Imagination which falleth out in those that are Mad or Melancholy Betweene these Opinions there is no difference but only in the alteration of some Names The Instruments of the Imagination are the former Panns of the braine The Vitall spirits which are in them The sinewes proceeding from the braine The nerves moistned by the Vitall spirits and the very frame of the places wherein the Senses are seated There are five seats for the senses but all are properly but one sense which is the SOUL it self who by the seats of the senses discernes all such things as fall out in them It discernes or taketh knowledge of an Earthy nature by that sense which is most Earthie and Bodily namely the Touching It perceiveth perspicuous or bright shining things by that sense which is most perspicuous that is to say the sight It judgeth such things as are pertinent to aire by that seat which is ordained for the aire for the very substance of the voice is aire or the smiting of the aire and it receiveth every tast by a certaine quality of the instrument of the sense of tasting which attracts by its waterish and spongy nature For it is the nature of every sensible thing to be discerned by some thing which hath a nature like unto it and by this reason it should seeme that there being onely foure Elements there should bee no more but foure senses But because there is a kinde of vapour and certaine smells which have a middle-nature betweene aire and water the parts whereof are somewhat thicker then aire thinner then water which appeares by them who are sick of a heavinesse in the head by rhumes and stoppings for they drawing the aire by respiration have no feeling of the vapour by reason the fatnesse of the odour is hindered by obstructions from approaching the sense therefore a fifth-seat of the sense namely smelling was provided by nature that no such thing as may bee brought unto our knowledge should be hidden from the sense Yet the sense is not an alteration but the discerning of alterations Indeed the seats of the sense are
altered and the sense discernes this alteration Now many times the name of the sense and of the seats of the sense are confounded But sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense Yet this seemeth not to bee the definition of sense it selfe but of the workings of the sense And therefore some define it thus Sense is a certaine intellectual spirit extended from the principall part of the minde unto the bodily instruments It is thus also defined Sense is a power of the soule which taketh hold of sensible things and the seat of the sense is the instrument whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible Plato sayes thus Sense is that wherein the Soule and the body communicate together concerning outward things For the very power it selfe belongs unto the soule but the instrument pertaines to the body and both together take hold of such outward things as may bee offered to imagination Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded othersome to rule and bear sway The part which hath in it understanding and knowledge was ordained to rule Those which appertaine to sense and to the motions by appetite as also our ability of speaking are made to serve and bee at command For our voice and our motion by appetite are obedient to reaon most speedily and almost in a momēt of time For wee Will and are moved together and at once so that we need no time to come betweene our Will and our motion as we may see in the moving of our fingers Some naturall things are placed under the command of Reason as those which wee call perturbations CAP. 7. SECT 1. I. Of the sense of sight and the opinions of Hipparchus of the Geometricians of Epicurus and Aristotle concerning the same II. The opinions of Plato and of Galen touching the same sense and of the cause of seeing III. The opinion of Porphyrie also touching that sense WE finde that this word fight hath a divers signification for sometime it signifieth the seat of the sight and some time the power of the sense it selfe Hipparchus affirmes that the beams being shot forth from the eyes take hold as it were of outward things with the farthest ends of them even as if a man should lay his hand on them and presents or yeelds those things whereof they have so taken hold to our sight But the Geometricians describe unto us Figures which are called Cones broad at the first and growing to a narrow top made by the meeting of the eye-beames in one point And they hold opinion that the beames of the right-eye being darted forth to the left-side and the beames of the left-eye toward the right-side the Figure CONOS is made by the uniting of them in one and that thereby it comes to passe that the sight comprehends many visible things together at one view and then more exactly perceives them when the beames are met closely one with another And this is the cause that oftentimes when we looke upon the pavement we see not a piece of money lying plainly visible thereupon though wee settle our eyes upon the same with diligence For untill it so fall out that the beames meet in that very place where the money lyeth wee still overlooke the same but then wee presently attaine the sight of it as if that had beene the beginning of our looking for it in that place The Epicures think that the shapes of such things as appeare unto us are brought to our eyes Aristotle is of opinion that it is not a bodily shape which appeares but a certaine quality rather conveyed from things visible unto the sight by an alteration of the aire which is round about Plato sayes that the sight is caused by the meeting of all the severall brightnesses together that is to say partly by the light of the eyes which flowing out some part of the way into the aire which is of like nature with it selfe partly by that which is retorted back againe from the bodies which are seene and partly by the force of that which is extended out together with the fierynesse of the eye affecting the aire which comes betweene them and easily spreading every way or turning to any side Galen agreeing with Plato speaketh of the sight here and there in some places of his seventh booke of the agreement of parts much to this purpose If saith hee any part or power or quality of bodies that are visible should come unto the eye wee could not know the quantity of the thing seen For if a very great mountaine were the object it were quite contrary to reason to imagine that the shape of so huge a thing should enter wholly into our eyes yea and the spirit belonging to the sight being darted forth could not bee able to collect together so much vigour as would bee requisite to comprehend the whole visible object It remaines therefore that the aire wherewith we are encompassed is after a sort such an instrument unto us when we see as the nerve which belongeth unto the sight is to the body and some such thing seemeth to happen to the aire which encloseth us round For the bright shining Sun having touched the upper limits of the aire distributes his power into the whole aire And the splendor which is caried through the sinewes called the optick nerves which belong unto the sight hath his essence of the nature of the spirits This falling into the aire which is dilated round about us makes an alteration even at the very first injection and shootes forth very farre yet so that it containes it self undispersed untill it happen upon a reflecting body For the aire is such an instrument unto the eye to discerne visible objects as the sinew is unto the braine and look in what case the braine is in respect of his sinew in like case is the eye in respect of the aire after it is quickned by the bright shining of the Sun Now that it is the nature of the aire to become like unto those things which enter into it appeares manifest by this that whensoever any bright thing be it red or blew or of the colour of silver shall bee conveyed through the aire when it is light the colour of the aire will bee changed according to that thing which is caried through the same But Porphyrie in his book which hee wrote of the senses affirms that neither the making of the Figure Conos neither any shape nor any other thing is cause of our seeing but only this that the soul her selfe meeting with such objects as are visible doth perceive and know that all those things which are seene be contained in her selfe because it is she only which holds them together to their preservation For as he saith whatsoever is in the world is nothing else but the soul holding together divers bodies And it were not untruly said that the soul commeth to the knowledge of it selfe by
thereof HEre is one division of the powers of the soul together with which there are some parts of the body likewise divided whereunto is added another division and after another maner For the reasonable-part of the soule is divided into reason which is unexpressed in us and that which is uttered by our speech The reason unexpressed or setled in us is a motion of the soule engendred in that part of the minde wherein consisteth our discourse of reason without any utterance by voice Thereby oftentimes although wee say nothing wee throughly resolve and set downe with our selves the whole reason of a thing and otherwhile discourse in our dreames And it is chiefly in respect thereof that we are called reasonable-creatures yea much rather in this respect then for that which is uttered by our speech For albeit some are deafe and dumbe from their births or lose their voices by sicknesse and diseases yet reasonable-creatures they are neverthelesse The utterance of reason is by the voice in the variety of tongues and the instruments used in the voice are many namely the muscles which are in the middle of the sides the breast it selfe the lungs the winde-pipe the throat and in all these those parts especially which are grisly the returning sinews the cover of the wind-pipe yea and all the muscles which move these parts are instruments of our speech The instruments of our various utterance are the mouth for therein the speech is moulded and fashioned and the tongue and the wesil-pipe which are there in stead of that wherewith wee smite the strings of a Lute or such like instrument the roofe of the mouth also which is as the belly of the Lute that receives and gives back the sound The teeth and the various openings of the mouth doe stand in stead of strings yea and the nose also doth somewhat further the plainenesse and the pleasingness of speech as appeares in those that sing CAP. 15. I. Another division of the soule being threefold II. An eightfold division thereof according to Zeno. III. A fivefold and twofold division of the soul also according to Aristotle VNto those aforegoing there is added yet another division of the soule into the powers the kindes and parts thereof namely into a vegitative power which is the same wherby plants and such like doe grow and this is called also a nourishing or passive power secondly into a sensible power and thirdly into that whereby it exerciseth reason Zeno the Stoick assignes unto the soule eight parts the reasonable part is the first and principall the five senses make up sixe the faculty of speech the seaventh and the eighth hee affirmes to bee that power whereby things are ingendred one of another But Panetine the philosopher contradicting this opinion affirmes that the uttering of our speech is a part of the motion which is in our appetite and that the power of ingendring is a part of nature not of the soule wherein hee hath said very truly Aristotle in his Physicks hath divided the Soule into to five parts namely that which is vegitative sensitive movable in place that which belongs to appetite and that which is intellective He calls that vegitative which nourisheth encreaseth breedeth maketh and formeth bodies for under the name of vegitative he comprehends the intire faculty of growing calling the whole after the name of that part thereof which is the chiefest therein and from whence all the other parts of the growing power have their essence This is Aristotles opinion in his Physicks but in his Ethicks he makes but a twofold division of the Soule that is to say into parts rationall and irrationall Of the reasonable-part I have already treated now therfore I will speak of that which is unreasonable CAP. 16. I. Of that unreasonable part of the soule which containes the appetite of concupiscence also of anger and of their severall instruments II. Of the divers acceptations of this word affection and the definition of an affection and of an operation or act III. The difference betweene an operation and an affection or passion c. SOme hold opinion that irrationality or to be voide of reason is an intire thing by it self as though there were a soule void of reason which were not a part of the rationall soule and for these causes they thinke so First for that it is found alone by it selfe in unreasonable living creatures For thereby it seemes unto them to be perfect of it selfe and no part of the reasonable soule Secondly they so imagine because it appeares unto them one of the greatest absurdities which may be to affirme that a power void of reason should be part of a Soule indued with reason However Aristotle affirmes it to be both a part and a faculty of the reasonable soule dividing it in to two parts as I said before and calls those two by this one cōmon name the appetitive-faculty To which belongs also the motion of our appetite for appetite is the beginning of motion as appeares in every living creature having a desire to something for their desire causes them to move forward according to their appetite This unreasonable part of the soule doth either disobey or obey reason And that part which is obedient unto reason is divided into two parts concupiscence and anger The instrument of the concupiscence by which it commeth into sense is the Liver But the instrument of anger is the heart which being a hard part receives a strong motion and is ordained for a hard service and for great resistances whereas the Liver being a tender entrail is made the instrument of tender concupiscence These things are said to be obedient unto reason because nature hath ordained them to obey reason and to bee moved as reason commandeth in all such men as live answerable to that which nature originally requires And these are certaine affections which constitute our Essence as it hath life in it For life cannot bee maintained without these But whereas this word affection hath divers acceptations wee must first distinguish the variety of significations which it hath for either it pertaineth to the body as when it is sick or ulcerated in which cases we say it is so or so affected or else it belongs to the soul of which we now speake and wherunto concupiscence and anger doe pertaine But universally and generally in respect of the intire living creature consisting of both parts it is called an affection and followeth either in griefe or pleasure For griefe doth follow our affection but the very passion or affection it selfe is not griefe for if that were true then wheresoever passion were found there should be griefe also but things void of life may be patients and suffer yet feele no griefe Therefore it is not necessarily consequent that whensoever wee are affected unto a thing we should also bee grieved but then onely when wee feele the thing which hapneth unto us Yea and that which falleth unto us must bee a thing
of such moment likewise as may bee perceived by our sense But this is the definition of such affections as are in the soul An affection is the motion of our power of appetite subject unto sense provoked by the appearance of some good or evill Or else it may bee defined thus An affection is a motion of the soule void of reason supposing either some good or some evill thing Affection in generall is by some thus defined Affection is a motion in one thing by the commotion of another The operation or action is a motion working that which is wrought And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soule wherein anger is but it is an affection of both parts of the soule and beside that of all our body when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn thereby to any furious act for this motion chanced in one thing by the commotion of another thing which was the definition of an affection An operation or action after another sort is called an affection when it disagreeth from nature for the operation is a motion according to nature but the affection is repugnant unto nature And therefore an operation when it is not moved according to nature is called an affection whether it bee moved of it selfe or of some other As for example the motion which is from the heart in the pulses is an operation but that unseasonable appetite subject unto sense provoked by the appearance of some good or evill Or else it may bee defined thus An affection is a motion of the soule void of reason supposing either some good or some evill thing Affection in generall is by some thus defined Affection is a motion in one thing by the commotion of another The operation or action is a motion working that which is wrought And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soule wherein anger is but it is an affection of both parts of the soule and beside that of all our body when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn thereby to any furious act for this motion chanced in one thing by the commotion of another thing which was the definition of an affection An operation or action after another sort is called an affection when it disagreeth from nature for the operation is a motion according to nature but the affection is repugnant unto nature And therefore an operation when it is not moved according to nature is called an affection whether it bee moved of it selfe or of some other As for example the motion which is from the heart in the pulses is an operation but that unseasonable motion which commeth by feares or feavers is an affection or passion For that great panting proceedeth from the heart it selfe unnaturally and from thence also commeth naturally the moderate beating of the pulses Therefore it is no marvaile if one and the same thing bee called both an affection and an operation For in respect they bee certaine motions proceeding from the passible part of the soule they be a kinde of operations but in this respect that they passe measure and are not agreeable to nature they are not operations but affections Thus you see the motion of that part of the soule which is irrationall to bee an affection in both significations and that neverthelesse every motion of the passible part is not called a passion or affection but those which are most vehement or which at least proceed so far that they may bee felt For those which are small and which cannot be felt are not to be called affections or passions while they are in that degree because there must bee a convenient quantity or magnitude to make it a passion And for this reason that clause whose motion is perceived by sense is annexed to the definition of an affection even because small motions wherunto the sense is not privy doe not make an affection as I said before CAP. 17. I. Of the concupiscence and of pleasure and griefe which are the two parts whereinto the same is divided and of another fourfold division thereof II. Of the meanes wherby evill affections are ingendred and the meanes also how they might bee cured THat part of the soule which as we have said before is irrationall and yet obeyeth reason is divided into these two namely the concupiscible and irascible part The coNcupiscence is againe divided into pleasure and griefe For if our concupiscence attaines to that which is desired it breedeth a pleasure and if it misseth of the same it engendreth griefe This desire may another way be divided into four parts the cōcupiscence it selfe being one of the foure For of those things which are some be good some evill some present and some expected and after this maner if two bee multiplied the parts in the division of the concupiscence will be foure For you shall there find things good things bad things present and things expected Now good expected is this desire Good when it is present is pleasure Evill when it is looked for begetteth feare when it is present it bringeth griefe If therefore you have respect to good things therein consisteth pleasure and desire but if you respect evill things of them proceed feare and griefe And for these considerations some have divided affection into these foure parts desire pleasure feare grief We call those things good and bad that are either so indeed or else reputed to be such Evill affections are ingendred in our minde by these three things Evill education unskilfulnesse or ignorance and by an evill constitution of Body For if wee be not well educated even from our childhood so that wee may learne to master our passions in the beginning wee soone fall into an immoderation almost incurable By reason of ignorance also a certaine perverse judgement is fostered in the reasonable part of our soule which makes us think evill things to be good and good things to be evill And by meanes of an ill complexion or constitution of body somewhat is likewise occasioned to our harme For they in whom choller abound are inclined to fretfulnesse and they who exceed in heat and moisture are prone to lasciviousnesse Wee must endeavour therefore to cure an evill custome by enuring our selves to good customes we must remove ignorance by learning knowledge we must labour to rectifie the evill constitution of our bodies by such bodily things as may so much as is possible help to bring it into a meane temperature which may be effected by a good dyet by exercise and by physick if need be CAP. 18. SECT 1. I. Of the pleasures both of minde and body their variety and different natures II. Of such pleasures as are to be pursued by good men and which are properly accounted pleasures III. What pleasures according to the opinion of Plato are true or false pleasures how good pleasures are named how defined by some Philosophers and what defects are in their definition RIghtwell may
pleasure be divided into corpereall and mentall-pleasures For some belong onely to the minde as to be delighted in knowledge or in the contemplation of things Others are called corporeall-pleasures because they proceed from the conjunction of soul and body and they are the pleasures which wee have in eating drinking carnall-copulation and the like There is no pleasure proper to the body alone For they that seem to be such are passions rather then pleasures as certaine cuttings and flawings qualities pertinent to the temperature of the body For all pleasure hath sense joyned with it and as we have shewed before all sense belongeth to the soule There be divers kindes of pleasure Some are good some naught some false some true some pertaine to the minde only some depend upon knowledge some belong to the body and are judged by the sense Among pleasures tryed by sense some be naturall and some not so To that pleasure which is in drinking the griefe which commeth by thirst is opposed but to the pleasure which ariseth from contemplation there is nothing opposite And by these things it is manifest that the name of pleasure hath many significations Among those which we call bodily or corporeall pleasures some are both necessary and naturall and without them it is impossible to live such are the pleasures which we take in eating and drinking what is competent and in necessary clothing Some are naturall but not necessary pleasures as naturall and legitimate copulation For though this bee necessary for the preservation of the whole kinde yet it is not so necessary to the life of any one man but that he may live in his virginity without it but some pleasures are neither necessary nor naturall as drunkennesse lasciviousnesse and feeding in excesse For these neither assist in propagating the succession of our kinde as lawfull copulation neither become profitable for the maintenance of our life but are on the contrary harmefull unto us Hee therefore that would live according to the law of God must pursue those pleasures onely which are both necessary and naturall But he that will content himself in the second order of vertues may take in hand both the forementioned pleasures and therewith such also as are naturall but not necessary observing a conveniency in measure manner time and place the rest hee must by all meanes eschew Those pleasures are generally to be accounted good which are neither intangled with griefe nor occasion repentance nor procure other harme nor depart from the mean nor draw us from good workes nor bring us into bondage But those are properly pleasures w ch are in some sort exercised in the consideration of God and of knowledge and vertue And these are to bee placed amōg those pleasures which ought earnestly to be pursued above all the rest which are profitable unto us not because they are pertinent unto our being or for the continuation of our kinde but for that they constitute our well-being and make us to bee honest to bee lovers and beloved of God and to have the utmost perfection of man which perfection consisteth in the soule and Vnderstanding These pleasures are neither the remedies to avoid diseases as eating drinking and those other which doe supply our wants neither have they any griefe at all preceding them following them or contrary unto them but are pure immixt and free from every material composition because they pertaine onely to the soule For according to plato's opinion of pleasures there bee some of them false and some true Those are false unto the procuring whereof sense and a false opinion is needfull and such also as have grief annexed unto them True pleasure is that which pertaines to the soule onely even the soule by it selfe together with science understanding and prudence and such pleasure as is pure without any mixture of griefe or subsequent repentance at any time Some call such pleasures as ensue upon contemplation and good actions not passions but sweetnesses and others call them Ioy as by a proper name They define pleasure to be a generation into a nature subject unto sense But this definition seemeth to agree onely to corporeall pleasure Seeing by that pleasure the wants of our body are supplyed and cured together with such griefes as we sustained by those wants For when we be cold or thirsty wee are delighted in the warmth and in the drinke whereby that griefe is cured which proceeded from cold and thirst Therefore these pleasures are not good naturally or of themselves but accidentally for as to be in health is good naturally and by it selfe whereas to be healed is but an accidentall good so these pleasures are onely accidentally good because they are but remedies for the curing of other things But the pleasure taken in contemplation is good naturally and of it selfe because it is not used in respect of any want Hereby it is plain that all pleasure is not ordained to supply wants and if this be true that cannot bee a good definition which defines pleasure to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense for it comprehendeth not all pleasure but leaveth out the best even the pleasure that is in contemplation SECT 2. I. A definition of pleasure according to Epicurus and another definition equivolent thereunto II. A definition of pleasure according to Aristotle III. Of the sundry sorts of pleasures of their operations of such as are proper to man as hee is man and of such as are common to him with other living-creatures EPicurus the Philosopher defines pleasure to be The taking away of every thing which may grieve a man and in so defining it he sayes the same thing with him who affirms it to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense For hee sayes that our deliverance from that which grieveth us is pleasure But seeing no generation consists of the same proprieties with those things which proceed thereof we must not thinke that the generation of pleasure is pleasure but some other thing beside pleasure For the generation it selfe is conversant about ingendring but of all things which are begotten there is nothing which is at once in begetting and perfectly begotten seeing it is evident that the acting and the finishing of an act are distinct things perfected by degrees But that which taketh pleasure is delighted all at once therefore pleasure cannot be a generation Furthermore every generation is a making of things which are not formerly in being but pleasure cōcerneth such things as have their being already therefore pleasure cannot be a generation Again generation may bee said to be speedy or slow but so is not pleasure said to be Moreover of good things some be the habit some the operation and some the instruments The habit as vertues the operation as the action agreeable to vertue Again the habit is as the faculty of seeing the operation as the seeing it selfe and the instruments whereby wee worke as the eye riches and such like Now all
their lust and prosecute the same contrary to their owne choice and judgements For even the incontinent mans judgement disliketh his lust maketh choice of better things whereas if his choice and appetite were all one neither of them would bee contrary unto the other That choice and will are not all one may bee proved by this that our Will doth not agree unto all things whereunto our choice or judgement doth assent For we have a will to be in health or to be rich but to be in health or to bee rich is not in our choice Our will hath place even in things impossible but our choice coÌ„sisteth in those only w ch are in our power We may say that we would be immortall but we cannot say that to bee immortall is at our choice For our will extendeth unto the end it selfe but our choice can reach no further then to the means which are in possibility to attaine that end and there is betweene them the same proportion which there is betweene the thing subject unto our will and that thing wherabout we enter into consultation for the subject of our will is the end of that which wee would have and our consultation is about the meanes whereby wee may accomplish that end Wee chuse those things onely which may be effected by us but our will extendeth unto such things as are not in our power to accomplish as when would that such or such a Commander should obtain the victory It is then well enough proved that our choice is neither the concupiscible nor the irascible appetite nor our will and aswell by the same arguments as by other also it may bee made manifest that it is not opinion For opinion extendeth not onely to things which are in our power but to things eternall Moreover we say that an opinion is either true or false but to say our choice is either true or false is an absurd saying Opinion concerneth likewise universall things but our choice is conversant in particulars For our choice is of things to be undergone enjoyed or done which are particular things Neither is our choice all one with our consultation For consultation is an advising about such things as are to be done suffered or enjoyed and that thing is to bee chosen which in consultation is preferred yea our consultation debates of things yet in question whereas our choice reacheth to that which is already concluded most worthy Wee have hitherto declared what this choice is not and we will now shew you what it is Doubtlesse choice is a thing mixt of consultation judgement and appetite being neither the one nor the other but a certaine compound of these For as wee say that a living-creature is a compound of soul and body and neither a body by it selfe nor a soule alone but a thing made up of both together even so say wee also of this our choice It is plaine by the very Etymologie therof that it is a certaine counselling or consultation with an approbation of some one thing before the rest and that it is not altogether the same with consultation For we are then onely accounted to have made choice when one thing is taken before another And no man preferreth any thing in choice before he hath consulted neither accepteth before hee hath judged And seeing we are not willing to execute or admit of all these things which wee well approve of then that which is preferred after consultation is in choice and contained under our choice when it taketh an appetite thereunto Hereupon it necessarily followes also that our choice is conversant in the same thing about which our consultation is imployed Out of all which it may be concluded that our Choice is an appetite consulting of such things as are in our power or a Consultation with an appetite unto those things which are in our power For when wee chuse we desire that which was preferred after our consultation But seeing wee have said that choice and consultation are conversant about the self-same things we will declare next what it is about which this consultation is occupied and about what things wee consult CAP. 34. I. Of consultation and wherein it differs from a question II. The definition of consultation and as illustration thereof by shewing what things are not proper subjects of consultation III. Of the proper objects of consultation and of such other things as are pertinent thereunto KEeping close unto our chiefe purpose wee thinke it best before we declare about what things wee consult to determine wherein a consultation differs from a question For a consultation and a question is not all one though he that consults calls things into question by his consultation but they differ very much For wee seeke and aske whether or no the Sunne be greater than the earth but no man saith I consult whether the Sun bee greater than the Earth A question is more generall and as it were genus to consultation and the nature of it extends further For every consultation is a kinde of questioning but every question is not a consultation as hath been formerly declared Our consideration is conversant sometime in consultation as when I consider whether I should goe to Sea or not and sometime it is conversant in debating things in the mind as when I consider the liberall sciences for it is not proper to say wee consult of the Sciences But the use of these words without distinction hath made many to â—â—re and to conceive thoâ— things to bee the same which are very different Which difference being now discovered wee will proceed to declare what the things are whereof we consult We consult then of those things which are in our power even of such as may bee brought to passe by us and whose event is not manifest That is such as may fall out divers wayes We define it to bee of those things which are in our power because our consultation is onely of those things which are to be undertakeÌ„ by us which things are in our power For we doe not consult of that kinde of Philosophy which is called contemplative neither of GOD nor of things which fall out of necessity by necessity I meane those things which fall out alwayes after one maner as the Circuit of the yeare Neither doe we consult of those things which are not alwayes permanent and yet fall out to bee alwayes alike as of the rising and setting of the Sunne Neither of those things which fall out naturally yet not alwayes alike but so for the most part onely as that a man of sixty should have gray haires or that a man of twenty should begin to have a beard Neither consult wee of those things which chance naturally but sometimes thus and sometimes otherwaies and not after any certaine time or measure as of showers and droughts and haile Neither is consultation of those things which doe fall out by chance and seldome one while more and another while lesse
doe or possesse are therefore offended at this opinion and not without cause But some there be having more acutenesse who bringing this text of Scripture to refute us namely The wayes of man are not in his own hand say thus unto us Good friends how is the will of man free seeing his way is not in his owne hands and seeing the thoughts of men are so vaine that they cannot bring to effect those things which they have devised Many such like things they object not knowing in what sense wee speake of freewill For we affirm not that it is in our power to be rich or poore or alwayes in health or of a strong constitution of nature or to rule or generally to have those good things which wee count as instruments to worke things by or such as are called the gifts of fortune neither doe wee account those to be at our dispose which have their event from Providence But wee affirme those actions onely to be in our power which are according to vice or vertue as also our motions or choice of things or else such things whereof wee may doe the contrary aswell as the things themselves For a certaine will or choice goeth before every action and not onely the deed but the affection also is condemned as may plainly appeare in that place of the Gospell which saith He who lookes upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery already w th her in his heart And we read that Iob sacrificed unto God for such offēces as his children might commit in thought For indeed the beginning either of sin or of doing uprightly is in our will whereas the doing of the thing it selfe is otherwhile permitted by Providence and otherwhile hindered For seeing there are some things in our power and a Providence beside it is necessary that such things as are done should bee done by them both Because if they were done by either of them alone the other should be to no purpose Therefore in regard all actions are mixt it will sometime happen that they shall be in our power another while that they shall bee as providence alone directeth and sometimes againe both according to Providence and as wee would also And whereas likewise there is sometimes a generall and sometimes a particular Providence it is necessary that the same should fall out in particular things as it doth in things generall For if the aire about us bee dry our bodies are dryed also though not all alike And if a mother be given to riotous fare or a distempered dyet even thereby shall her children become distempered in body and perverse in such things as they attempt It is plaine therefore by what hath beene said that men may fall into a distempered estate of body either by the generall distēperature of the aire or by the dyet of parents or when they spoil themselves by their owne voluptuousnesse and that they may be distempered sometime by such occasions as take their beginnings from themselves in such maner that Providence shall not altogether bee the cause of such things If then the Soul shall yeeld her selfe to be overswayed by the temperature of the body and give place to wrath or lust or bee pressed downe by outward things as poverty or lifted up by riches or the like if any evill commeth to the same thereby it so hapned thereunto by the selfe-will of that Soul Seeing if shee had not voluntarily yeelded her selfe to those distemperatures she might have overcome them and beene in good case For through well ordering the affections of the minde by a convenient dyet and a good conversation she might have altered that temperature rather then have beene perverted thereby This is manifest by the example of such as are in a good condition and that all such as are not in a good estate doe sin voluntarily and not by constraint And that it is in our power either to consent and yeeld our selves unto our bodily distemperatures or to resist and overcome them Neverthelesse there be many who pretend these distemperatures to bee the cause why we doe such or such things and so impute their wickednesse not unto their owne will but to necessity And therefore they cōclude though very absurdly that the vertues also are not in our power CAP. 41. I. Of the cause why man was made with free will and that if it had been otherwise he had neither beene capable of the contemplative nor practike faculty nor been a reasonable creature II. Of the mutability of men and Angels and of the causes thereof and of some inferences thereupon proving freewill III. It is not through any naturall defect that men are vicious but by their owne will And it is here shewne also that man without freewill could neither have any vice nor vertue SOmewhat remaines to be declared wherby it may bee manifest why man had freewill bestowed upon him We affirme that immediately together with reason this freewill entered into us and that together with nature there is ingraffed into created things a mutability and alteration especially in those things which are a subject made of matter For there is a mutation even in the very beginning of every thing which is made and all making proceedeth from an alteration of the materiall subject This is evident to any man who considerately beholds the plants and living-creatures which have their abiding either in the earth in the water or in the aire For there is in all those a continuall mutability Moreover that our freewill enters into us together with reason hath beene made plain enough by those things which we have said to prove that some thing is in our power as will appeare to them who have heeded what was delivered to that purpose But because the sequell of this treatise doth for some respects require the same perhaps it will not be impertinent to repeat some part of that which was formerly declared Our reason is divided into contemplation and practise Contemplative reason is that which concerneth universally the nature of things as they bee really and active reason is that whereby wee deliberate of things and sets downe the right way of putting them into execution The contemplative part is called the minde or the principall part of the soule and the active part is termed reason The one is likewise called wisdome and the other prudence Now every one that deliberates doth for this cause deliberate even for that the choice of such things as are to be done is in his power and to the intent that hee might by deliberation make choice of that which is most worthy and that after he hath so chosen he might execute the same It is therefore necessary that he which deliberates should have power over his owne deeds for if he have not power over his owne actions his consultation will be fruitlesse also unto him And if these things be so it will follow by a necessary consequence that wheresoever reason is
preserved together If therfore particular things perish the universall will also perish And there is no reason why wee should imagine that all singular things could escape destruction if no care were taken of them from above Now whereas to avoid this objection they grant that GODS providence extendeth to this onely that individualls shall bee providently preserved so far forth as may conduce to the preservation of generall things they have said enough though they bee not aware thereof to prove that there is also some providence over individualls For as they themselves have said in effect GOD by preserving the species preserveth also the kindes SECT 3. I. Of the unreasonablenesse of their opinion who thinke that God despiseth to take care of particular things II. Of Gods undeniable ablenesse to governe individualls and of the capablenesse which particulars have of the divine providence III. Mans readinesse to call upon God in suddain extremities as it were by naturall instinct is an argument of providence SOme there be who although they confesse that GOD is not ignorant how to provide for particular things doe affirme that he will not assume the care of them Now every one that will not doe a thing either will not doe it because of sloth or else for that it is not comely for him so to doe No man will be so mad as to impute sloth to GOD For sloth is bred of these two pleasure and feare and every one that is slothfull is thereby drawn away by the love of some ease or pleasure or else discouraged by feare and to cōceive either of these to be in GOD were an impious absurdity If they that will not be so prophane to lay slothfulnesse to GODS charge shall say it is undecent for GOD and unworthy the majesty of so high a blessednesse to descend so low and unto such vile smal things or to be as it were prophaned by the absurdities and obscenities of those materiall things which depend upon the will of man and that therefore he will not take upon himselfe the government of such matters they not heeding it impute unto GOD in so saying two very faulty things pride and impurity For either the Creator despiseth to take on himselfe the government and administration of individualls through haughtiness which is most absurd to affirme or else through feare of being defiled as they speake And that is no lesse absurd then the other For if they know the nature of the Sunne-beams to be such that they can exhale naturally all moisture even from dung-hills when they shine upon them and that neither the Sunne nor his beames are any whit contaminated or defiled thereby but keepe neverthelesse their owne purity how can they conceive that GOD should be polluted by those things which are below Surely these cannot be the conjectures of men that have any knowledge of what is pertinent unto the nature of GOD. For the God-head is untouchable uncorruptible not possibly to be contaminated and above all alteration But pollution and such like things are the workes of change and betoken alteration And how can it bee counted other then most absurd that an artificer of what art soever and especially a Physitian taking care of generall things should heedlesly passe over things particular without caring to shew his art in them though things of the least consequence seeing hee cannot chuse but know that every part standeth in some stead unto the whole much more absurd were it for any man to be of opinion that God who is the Creator of all should be more unskilfull then an artificer and what else can be alleaged if he be willing but that hee cannot take the care of particulars And what can be affirmed more manifestly repugnant to the nature of GOD then to say he is weak and lacketh ability to doe well For two other causes GODS providence is by some judged not to be exercised in particular things The one is because the nature of God as they thinke serveth not thereunto the other is for that they conceive particular things to be incapable of his providence But that it is agreeable to the nature of GOD to governe by his providence they themselves who have denied it doe implicitly confesse when they affirme that his providence ruleth universall things especially seeing the inferiour things are not able to mount up unto such as are much above them whereas the power of those which are superiour descendeth even unto the lowest even to things insensible for their preservation yea all things depend upon the will of GOD and draw from thence their continuance and well-being And that the nature of individualls though infinitely multiplyed is capable of being governed by Providence it is plaine by those living creatures which are ordered by Rule and Authority For some of them as Bees and Ants and divers others which being assembled together are continued under certaine Captaines or guides whom they obediently follow But this is best perceived if we looke into the government of common-wealths and the conversation that is amongst men For it is plaine that it admits the administration and care both of Lawgivers and also of subordinate magistrates and how can that which is capable of such things be unfit to receive an orderly government from the providence of the Creator This also is no small argument that there is providence over particular things even that the knowledge thereof is naturally ingraffed in men which is evident when wee are brought to any great extremity for wee then slie immediately unto GOD by prayer as if without teaching it were naturally written in our hearts that help were to be sought of GOD. Nature except it have beene taught cannot of it selfe lead us unto that the doing whereof is not according to nature neither doth it move us to fly thither for assistance where none is to be had yet when any great affliction or feare suddenly oppresseth us we cry out unto GOD before we be aware and before we have had time to bethinke our selves what wee have to doe Now every naturall consequence is a forcible evidence admitting no contradiction SECT 4. I. Of the occasion and grounds of their error who thought there was no Providence ruling individualls II. How men ought to behave themselves in the search of Gods providence which is beyond their comprehension III. Of Divine permission and the manifold species thereof THe occasions ground of their error who say there is no providence over particular things are these First they conceived the soule to bee mortall and that it perished with the body And secondly because these men could not comprehend by their understanding and reason how there should bee any providence ruling individualls But that the soule is not mortall and that all things pertaining unto man are not shut up within the compasse of this life it appeareth even to heathen men both by the opinions of the wisest among the Grecians who taught the transmigration of
soules from body to body as also by the places which they affirmed to bee allotted out unto the Soules departed according to their good or evill course in this life and by those punishments wherwith soules are as they hold punished by themselves for the offences they have committed For these things although they be erroneous in other circumstances and respects yet in this they are true and their authors do all agree therein that the soule remaineth after this life and shall come to Iudgement But if wee cannot attaine unto the reason of that governance which providence hath over particular things which indeed we cannot as is implyed by this text How unsearchable are thy judgements and thy wayes past finding out Let us not therupon conclude there is no such providence For no man ought to affirme there is neither sea not sand because he is ignorant of the limits of the Sea and of the number of the sands seeing by the same rule they might aswell say that there is neither man nor any other living-creature because they know not the number either of the men or of the living-creatures Particular things are to us infinite Things which are unto us infinite and also unknowne unto us and therefore though universalls may be oftentimes comprehended by our understanding yet individualls are not possibly comprehensible thereby There is in every man a double difference one in respect of other men and another in respect of himselfe yea there is in every man great differences and alterations even in respect of himselfe Every day as in the maner of his life in his actions or affaires in his necessities in his desires and in all things which doe happen or pertaine unto him It is not much otherwise with an irrationall-creature for according to the manifold necessities and occasions thereof it is very speedily caried hither and thither and soon altered againe as other opportunities require These things considered that Providence which is able to keep a continuall course with every one of those infinite and incomprehensible particulars which are so differing also so changeable and of so many fashions must needs be such a Providence as is agreeable to all and every one of those individualls and extended more infinitely then those things are whereunto it should reach And if this Providence must be so fit and so infinite in regard of the infinite difference of individualls no doubt but the reason and method of this Providence is as infinite and if it be infinite it cannot possibly bee comprehended by us And it becomes not us to deny that gracious providence which governes all things because our ignorance is unable to comprehend it For those things which wee suppose to be amisse are knowne well enough unto the wisdome of the Creator to be well ordered Because wee are ignorant of their occasions we causelesly judge many things to be imprudently done and that which chanceth unto us in other things by reason of our ignorance falleth out also in the workes of providence for we doe after the same sort cōceive of those things which belong to providence receiving by obscure likelihoods and by conjectures certaine formes or shadowes of the workes thereof by such things as we have seene Wee say therefore that some things are done by Gods permission and this permission is of many sorts For he sometime permits that even the just man shall fall into misery to declare unto others that vertue which is concealed as in Iob. Hee doth also permit some absurd things that by the act which appeareth to bee absurd some great and wonderfull matter may bee brought to passe as the salvation of men by the Crosse Hee permits likewise the blessed Saints to be afflicted for another end as that they might not fall from a sincere conscience and that the loftinesse of the minde might be abated as when S t. Paul was buffetted by Satan Sometimes also one man is rejected and left as desolate for a time that others considering his case might be instructed and amended thereby As in the example of Lazarus and the rich man for when we see any man afflicted our hearts are naturally touched therewith according as Menander hath very well expressed By seeing others feele the Rod We tremble with a fear of GOD. Otherwhile again one man is afflicted for the glory of another and neither for his owne sin nor the sinne of his Parents as he that was blind from his birth for the glorifying of the Son of man It is permitted also that some should be persecuted to be a pattern of constancy unto others and that when their glory is exalted others might be incouraged to suffer in the like case in hope of the glory to come and for the blessednesse which is expected after this life as in the Martyrs and in those who have yeelded up their lives for their Country for their kinred or for their masters SECT 5. I. One may otherwhile be afflicted for the good of another without infringing the Justice of divine Providence Why holy men suffer bitter deaths and persecutions II. Death or sufferings are no disadvātages to good men neither are the unlawfull actions of the wicked justifiable though Providence convert thē to good ends NOw if any one thinke it against reason that one man should be afflicted for the amendment of another let him know that this life is not the perfection of mans happinesse but a place of wrestlings and of striving for mastery in respect of Vertue And the greater the labours and sufferings are the more glorious Crown of Glory shall be obtained because the recompence of Rewards is according to the measure of Patience Saint Paul was contented to undergoe the manifold afflictions and tribulations which he suffered that he might obtain the greater and more perfect Crown of a Conquerour which he himself confesseth to be more then all our sufferings can merit and therefore the works of Providence are justly and very decently performed A man may the better allow this to be so and conceive that GOD governs all things so well and so fitly that the nature of each thing cannot more desire if he doe but propose unto himself the beleeving of these two things which are generally confessed among men namely that GOD onely is good and wise For in that he is Good it is agreeable unto his goodnesse to employ his providence over all things and in that he is wise he hath a regard to performe them wisely and exactly because if he used not his Providence he could not be good and if he did not use it well hee could not be wise He therefore that gives his minde to consider discreetly of these matters will not misesteem of any thing which is wrought by divine providence neither speak evill thereof without due examination but rather accept of all things as exceeding well performed and marvaile at their admirable decency and perfection though the ignorant multitude judge according to a false appearance For in conceiving otherwise wee bring upon our heads besides the guilt of blasphemy great blame for our sottish presumption Now in that wee say all things are done well wee justifie not the naughtinesse of men or of such evill works as are in our power to doe or leave undone but we speak it of the works of Providence which are not in our power For if any man object and say How falls it out that holy men are put cruelly to death without desert why if they were unjustly condemned did not Gods just providence hinder those murthers and if they deserved to be so put to death why are not they without blame who caused them to bee slaine To this we answer that the murtherers of such men were injurious in slaying them and that they which were so slain were slain either for their desert or their profit Somtime deservingly for evills committed by them in secret and sometimes for their profit Gods providence thereby preventing either future sins or worse mischiefes to come and in those respects it was good for them that their life should be shortned Thus was it with Socrates and the Saints But they who slew these men did not slay them for any such cause neither was it lawfully done but out of the corruption of their owne minds and for gain and robbery For the Act is in mans power but what shall follow upon the Act as whether we shall be slain or no is not as he will neither is any death evill except for sinne onely as is manifest by the death of the Saints But wicked men although they die in their beds on a sudden and without pain doe neverthelesse die an evill death which brings them unto an evill buriall I meane to bee buried in their sinne yet whosoever killeth any man murtherously doth wickedly in so doing If hee killeth any one for that which deserveth death he is then to be accounted among hangmen and executioners If it be for the gaining of some profit by them that are slaine he is to be reputed among cruell and wicked murtherers The like may be said of them who murther their enemies or oppresse them by extreame servitude or use any manner of inhumane cruelty against them whom they have overcome They also are as little to be justified who seeke the inriching of themselves by extorting other mens goods for though it may be expedient for those from whom they were extorted that they should be deprived of them yet they which wrested away more then their owne were unjust in so so doing For they take them out of a covetous desire of those good and not for that it was expedient for them whō they dispossessed of such things Glory be to God FINIS