nolition of it or the volition of its absence and instead thereof the volition of the universal Good may be called Charity or if there be any fitter Name 3 The third Object causing delight to us is power to do what one pleaseth to make any thing consequent upon ones will of which three degrees Liberty Equality Superiority Now to have pleasure arising from hence the onely Object of our volition is an action of pride the onely Object of our habitual inclination the vice thereof To refuse it as before or will its absence is Humility 4 Mere Activity and Life and that exerted in all the operations of our Souls such as is for example mere Contemplation and Knowledge Sense Imagination strong Passions intense Volitions or Resolutions And because Knowledge may be indefinitely divided according to its Objects here alone may be almost an infinite number of particular Vices and Virtues This Vice and contrary Virtue have no names some kinds of it may 5 Some certain agreeable corporeal Motions or Motions of our Bodies to which our Souls are united suaves Corporis Commotiones as some have called them which I know no common name to signifie them by unless Titillation may be allowed These as Cartes thinks create pleasure to the mind as a natural sign of the health or good constitution of the Body and the pleasures arising in the Soul from them Plato calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasures which are conveyed to the Soul by the Body Of this sort are all Sensations amongst which are those of Health Calmness and Serenity other bodily tempers many corporeal passions such as Love Joy Hope Acquiescence c. Nay I may say all perhaps for it may be that some Souls may be delighted with the corporeal passions of Sadness and Grief though in these not onely the Mechanical or Corporeal Vibrations and motions of Fibres Nerves and Spirits delight and please but also the Sense Perception Life and some kind of action of the Soul So that this pleasure is mixed from two very different Objects one Corporeal t'other Intellectual and indeed most of our pleasure or delight ariseth from several Objects mixed and blended together Now to have the pleasure or delight arising from such motions of our Bodies the entire Object of our Volition is an act of Sensuality and to be habitually enclined thereto the Vice But to refuse this Self-pleasure or to will its absence is Sobriety or Temperance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 6 The perfection of a mans nature of all his Faculties which may be referred to the first and amongst the rest the Rectitude Honesty Probity of his Actions and Inclinations or his Virtue may be and is the cause of great pleasure and delight to him Now even to have this delight usually called the satisfaction of a good Conscience nay let me adde that pleasure which ariseth from hopes and assurance of a reward and from the possession of it too I say to have this the entire Object of our Volition Intention Inclination or in greater proportion to other parts of the Universal Good than it ought is a sin and vice which wants a name as doth its opposite Virtue Finally not to insist upon this distribution I have made which I brought onely for example of some general Heads as many as there are Objects which may please or delight us and consequently correspondent Appetites which are numberless So many sorts of sins or vices may there be they all may be reduced to some general heads and those heads divided and these again subdivided c. 27. Many other distributions of Virtue and Vice may be made as from the parts of the Universal Good distinguished by its Subjects usually comprehended under three viz. God All created or finite Beings besides our selves under the name of our Neighbour though we know little of any other or what we can do to or for them besides Mankind and lastly our selves The Volition of the Universal Good our last end therefore may be resolved into three parts viz. The love of God The love of â—ur Neighbour The love of our selves Or Piety Charity and prudent and sober care of our own greatest concerns And by Love I mean not Gratitude but a Volition of the good of the Object beloved whether the good be an absent or present good To will an absent good and desire it for the person we love can onely take place with respect to our Neighbour and our selves not to God who we know cannot want any thing But to will a present good may be to God also We may will approve rejoyce delight in the infinite perfection and happiness of his nature which he always doth and cannot but possess 28. But these three parts of the Universal Good are always to be intended together actually or habitually although but one of them may be first regarded As when we actually will any good to our Neighbour we ought at least habitually to will it not onely because thereby we do good to him but also because it pleaseth God and it is our own perfection and will be for our own greater good so to do although that we first looked at was our Neighbours good And these three parts are so necessarily and inseparably conjoyned that we may and ought always habitually to believe when we endeavour to effect the one the other will necessarily follow Thus for example to love God the Volition of good to him or the rejoycing in the perfection and happiness of his Nature hath necessarily consequent others and our own Good Because all the happiness of Creatures depends thereon and flows therefrom from his Being and from his most perfect Nature and because it is and will be our greatest Perfection Comfort Reward So again if we sincerely love and do good to our Neighbour we may be sure it pleaseth God and is best for our selves And so Lastly our own greatest good truly as to Intension Extension and Duration or our greatest perfection and happiness is in and by loving of God and doing all the good we can to our Neighbour 29. It may be further observed that all actions and correspondent habits of the Will whatsoever which do effect the Universal good have been used to be called Virtues without any consideration of the end of the Action or the ultimate Object thereof and for distinction-sake may be called instrumental or eventual vertues The other sort of Volitions which have their due end or due ultimate Object considered as such having the name of principal or inherent Virtues So for example to apply the mind to attention and consideration pursuit after or love of the Truth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are accounted Virtues because they usually are the causes of good effects in the world more than hurtful ones Such again are to judge rightly and truly especially concerning other men i.e. always onely according to what really appears to us from things themselves not because we imagine so Although the end of
to be preferred before a meer subtle though most successful Speculator which talks as high as Heaven whose Law is such love as is hereafter described but lives as low as earth where according to the Jewish Adage 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All friendship is governed by self-interest or rather nothing is beloved but Self and what ministers to its pleasure or advantage Though it is not to be denied neither that naked discourse and true reasoning is of very great use here too For there are some men who believe all the various inclinations affections and tempers of Mankind to be the effect only of divers bodily tempers and examples not at all of Reason and Understanding and that those to Vice so called as they are more general so they are more necessary natural and reasonable too than that to what we term Virtue which say they is against Nature and so far from being reasonable that it is impossible Now these men are to be convinced if they be capable of it or at least silenced and confuted Others again there are and that of the best sort of Men who are great lovers of truth where they can discern it who are strangely affected and transported with distinct and clear understanding who desire to see why they should be more carried to one thing than another who do not care to be born away blindly with great and swelling passions without the guidance of calm Reason seem they never so natural and even Divinely inspired or impressed who finally are very uneasie slow and dissatisfied while they act ignorantly and blindly In such persons their approbation of and consent to Virtue will be more sincere and hearty their bent and tendency to it more uniform firm and constant their love more deeply rooted and embowelled when they shall see its nature and practice demonstrated and deduced from the most plain and evident truths Nor are we finally to think that the principle or end of all our actions the Vniversal Good so much insisted on in the following Essay is such a high-flown wide notion and so much out of the view of the generality of men as to be of no use or application in humane life amongst them For contrariwise every one may and we see that plain honest men of all ranks and sorts do propound and pursue it in their little sphere of action and comprehension as God himself doth in the immense revolution of his providence He that knows no more than a Neighbors Cottage or two may have the same general end namely the greatest good he understands with him who is able to comprehend the interest of a whole Nation or of the whole World if it were possible The poorest Vicar may understand as well as the pretended Pastor of the Universal Church and perhaps better practice accordingly that the only end of his Function and all his Actions is not his own personal interest only but the honour of God the Salvation of Souls or the good of his Church and how easie is it to extend his Notion to the whole world the faithful discharge of his duty and his reward altogether and so the meanest Mechanique or dullest Plowman may be easily taught to desire by all his life and particularly in his honest Calling to please and serve God to support himself and Family to supply and benefit his Neighbours in hopes of Gods general blessing upon himself here both in Soul and Body and of his reward hereafter Set but a man entirely free from himself and he will have no other bounds than the most comprehensive good he can reach Nor indeed is there any thing which lies nearer the Mind of Man and which he hath a more natural inclination to believe than that a publick good is to be preferred before a personal supposing them both equal in respect of intension or degree and why not then the most publick of all viz. the good of the whole Universe as it were one Corporation or Society But I am going to prevent my self and forget the bounds and design of a Prefatory Epistle For the rest of your Questions you were pleased to make out a score and I doubt you may have more in your Budget I must intreat you to stay your stomach a while with this Morsel and to respite an answer to them If what I now send you be acceptable to such a diligent I had almost said troublesome enquirer whom as I have observed nothing less will satisfie than the utmost a man can know and say you may hereafter command the like Essay upon some one or more of them which I know your friendship and goodness will permit me to obey when I find my self best able to serve you 1. FIrst then be pleased to observe That all that is in the Soul of Man may be reduced according to Des-Cartes to two general things 1. Passion 2. Action The first contains all sorts of Perceptions viz. Sense Memory Imagination Intellection Passions or Affections although there seems to be somewhat of Action too in the Souls Perceptions 2. And as for Action there hath seem'd to be of it in the Soul these four kinds 1. Dubitation 2. Suspension 3. Assent 4. Volition But I rather now think only two 1. Assent 2. Volition For as for Dubitation it seems to be nothing but Suspension and Suspension seems only an act of Volition not to assent and Nolition is but Volition of the absence of a thing 3. To say nothing at this time of Assent in Volition may be considered four things 1. The faculty of Volition usually called Appetite which is but one in Man distinguished by its several Objects as when it hath for its Object sensible and corporeal good or certain agreeable motions of the Body which cause the perception of pleasure in the Soul it is called the Sensitive Appetite But when it hath for its Object that which can be apprehended only by the rational faculty of the Soul or that faculty whereby the Soul perceives Spiritual Objects which are but of two sorts either absolute as Spiritual Substances and their Attributes such as Perception and Volition Knowledge Power and Goodness or Relative as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 habitudes and relations of things such as Means End Likeness and Difference and consequently Equality and Inequality I say then it may be called the Rational Appetite Though indeed that only hath been used to be so termed which hath for its object Bonum honestum the honesty probity rectitude of a mans actions the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which ought to be done or is according to true reason The second thing to be observed in Volition is the Action the third An actual Inclination or Propension in the Soul and the fourth An Habitual Inclination Of the first and second none doubts and for the third experience teacheth that there is often this which I call an Actual Inclination of the Soul to a certain object others a Propension Velleity
to the least part thereof in respect again of Extension Intension Duration for example to the smallest momentany pleasure of any one single being which is usually if not always ones self 12. Nor is it less manifest that this is a perfection as it is the common sense of all men for otherwise to illustrate rather than to prove it God would have been equally perfect if he had not as if he had determined to make the Universe and that in such a degree happy as it is nay if his nature had been such as to have been the most delighted with the eternal misery of all his Creatures it would have been equally his perfection to have effected it for his own pleasure as to have made it happy Again the Devil or the most malicious proud revengeful finally the most wicked of all Natures is therefore the most imperfect because he is the most pleased with others evil 13. It hath indeed been taught by some of those who have deduced all our Offices and duties from self-love and interest that this perfection is not competible to any being whatsoever at least not to men that every nature is necessarily carried to its own proper good only that it cannot be in the least moved with the good of another But I contrariwise affirm in the first place that this perfection is a thing possible to a reasonable Nature Next that there is in all men among other innate appetites this also of Universal Beneficence And finally that there is a Capacity in our Souls of being more pleased and delighted therewith than any single Object in the world and consequently it is improveable to a higher degree of strength and force which may be called generosity than any other appetite whatsoever All which because it is of greatest consequence is thus proved 1. That it is a thing possible if it be not it is either because we cannot will anothers good or we cannot apprehend it Not the first of these for the Object of Volition is precisely good or bonum not propriety so that if we separate them two we shall find propriety to have nothing of Eligibility in it if there were then there would be something of Eligibility too in our proper and personal evil as well as good Nor is the second true that we cannot apprehend anothers good For it is most plain that we can in our conception conjoyn pain or pleasure good or evil with any other Soul or Mind as well as our own or we can suppose the same evil we suffer in another person Who is there who hath himself felt the torment of the Stone that doth not well understand the same in another and pity him too when he hears him making grievous outcries or giving other such signs as he did himself when he was under the same pain Nay though he was never in the same condition yet he understands him to be affected with some great evil It is true ordinarily we do not apprehend one anothers evil so clearly as our own but the reason is because the one is a matter of Sense the other of Memory or Imagination the one is usually a present Object the other an absent and even our own absent evil we apprehend not so well as our present Finally all the pity and compassion and friendship we see in the world confutes both these pretences especially where our love to any person is great which makes us to unite it to our selves the first and essential property of love And consider it but as a part of our selves and sometimes much the better as it is in Wives and Children and very dear friends and consequently to be the most truly and inwardly affected with the evil or good they suffer or enjoy And those happy Souls who have had clear and true apprehensions of the most perfect and amiable Nature of God have experienced I doubt not that they have infinitely preferred the felicity of the Divine Nature before their own his Will before theirs and have thought and esteemed themselves not worthy of the least regard in compare with him and which is still most of all could have been content to sacrifice all Being and Happiness to his pleasure if it were absolutely necessary And we see the same frequently amongst Men one toward another when a common Souldier under an apprehension of the greater worth and bravery of his Commander exposeth his own life to certain danger and destruction too to save the others In the next place that there is an innate appetite in all men after this perfection of beneficence and doing good without any self-respect I appeal to Universal Experience Nor is there any man who after he hath performed any such act is not pleased therewith and ready to brag of it It is true the gratification of this Natural Appetite or the possession of such a good cannot but be delightful but even this delight springing therefrom may not be any thing of the End or Object foreseen or proposed but only consequent upon the action as it is true it also may be The pleasure of doing good may be one distinct part of the End and Effect of ones beneficence as well as the good done to others when one takes a view of some particular good things which constitute the whole End and Object Lastly That this delight and pleasure from this perfection of our Volition or from Universal Benevolence and in part consequent Beneficence may be greater than from any other Object and that there is a Capacity in our Souls to be more delighted therewith than any other particular good methinks is hence most evidently proved viz. Because it is certainly the greatest good we can possibly possess greater than our own happiness as much as the whole Universe is greater than ourselves and because we are capable of seeing it to be so Now certainly the Sense and Perception of our actual possession of the greatest good we are capable of and that there neither is nor can be any greater must needs fill the Soul with the most complete intense satisfying delight It cannot be the Nature of the Soul to be pleased as much with thep osse ssion of any other good as with that which only she sees clearly to be absolutely the greatest she or any other Being can obtain It is plain therefore that our duty and our interest our perfection and our happiness are inseparable so long as God continues and preserves our nature such as he hath made it nor can we easily conceive it if at all to be other than it is 14. After this I scarcely need mention so plain a consequence as that if Volition hath any less good for its Object than absolutely the greatest it is a defect therein of which there are indefinite degrees till we come to the lowest which is mentioned before 15. And it is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation of Volition actual and habitual inclination to their Object which
where there is no Law there is no transgression because God himself and his Volition of what is right and just are eternal or the Apostle may mean by Law not strictly an act of some Will concerning anothers Action and Will but an obligation to will or do any thing a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such there always is whenever any will exist being a relation betwen the Will and its due Object the Universal good Besides St. Paul may mean comparatively the Transgression or Sin is much less where there is no express known Law 23. Nor doth the nature of Sin or Virtue depend upon liberum arbitrium or Free-will for whether any Will hath power to determine its own Volition to the greatest or any lesser good or no which I do not deny yet most certainly whenever there is a direction thereof to a lesser good there is a defect in that Volition come it from what cause it will though it should be the effect of some other Being without it which by his power was able so to determine it or suppose any Nature should be eternally and necessarily so constituted 24. It follows likewise that supposing it possible for any Being to have for the Object of his Volition the rectitude the perfection thereof and should not place it in the willing the greatest good but in willing some particular or which is most common some personal good as self-preservation this very Volition would have that defect in it we call Sin and would not be capable of any reward i. e. any thing which should maintain or encourage such an action If it were possible for a man unfeignedly in his Conscience to judge it his bounden duty to desire and pursue always as his ultimate end his own greatest personal good without regard to God or others and accordingly should Will and Act this would be a vitious man And whether God may not by way of punishment for pride c. permit a man so to err is not here to be determined and there have been two pernicious and foolish mistakes if not wilful Errors that men might securely indulge their lusts of some late new Modellers of Morality to which a great part of the ill-nature and debauchery of the Age is to be imputed the one the advancing of their personal good to the place and dignity of the last end of all their actions the other the pitching upon no better than the preservation of life and limb or to enlarge their own Sence the greatest measures of the Conveniencies Comforts and Pleasures proper to this bodily life In these Opinions they have quite perverted the nature of things and made Vice to be Virtue Or because according to the same mens Doctrine every one is necessarily carried to his own greatest good or happiness in general only through ignorance is oft out of the way they have made no Vice at all substituting in its room Folly and Imprudence 25. What hath been said of Volition may be said of Actual and Habitual Inclination and because Volition and Actual Inclination are but sometimes existent in men but Habitual Inclinations constant and perpetual 't is according to this a man is chiefly to be estimated viz. by three things 1. It s direction to its right Object the Universal Good 2. The force and strength thereof 3. It s constancy or frequency in the Soul each of which hath degrees so that it is easie to set down certain rules for the judgment of the goodness or badness of any man For example sake only He is the worst man in the first respect who is habitually inclined to and in love with the meanest or least delectable good in the second respect who is the most vehemently inclined thereto in the third respect who is perpetually or constantly so Contrariwise he is the best who hath the greatest good absolutely or the Eternal Felicity for by Felicity I mean the greatest degree of delight or pleasure as to intension of the Vniverse or all Beings existent for the Object of his Habitual Inclination or who is habitually inclined thereto and that with the greatest force and strength of his nature and then constantly and perpetually It is easie to see what an indefinite number of degrees there are between these two extremes in all the three respects The greatest difficulty is not to know these Rules of our Judgment but to know our selves and consequently to apply them And since Denominatio fit à Majore he only is to be called a good man who hath a stronger and more constant Habitual Inclination to the Universal good than to any one or more particulars And this was or might have been the reason why Martyrdome was so highly esteemed and magnified in the Primitiue Church A Martyr by his suffering for his Faith even though he was not actually Baptized was thought to expiate all former bad life and to be undoubtedly saved or to obtain a most glorious and blissful condition in Heaven because such his suffering death or parting with life itself deemed the greatest personal good amongst men rather than to deny that Truth which they supposed God had commanded to believe and profess and consequently to disobey God was a certain sign and argument of a stronger actual and habitual inclination at that time of his death to obey God and consequently to that which was right just and good than to any other thing in the world besides Nor may it be here amiss to hint how easie it is to understand it possible for this Habitual Inclination Bent and Propension to any certain Object to be so forcible and strong as to be inconsistent with an act of Free Will or choice about that Object nor may a man be able to divert suspend or withhold his actual Volition consent or embrace from it when it is proposed Though by prudent contrivance these Habitual Inclinations generally I do not say all may also by degrees be weakned and at last quite extinguished and destroyed 26. 'T is as easie hence to deduce all particular virtues and vices of which we shall find many to have as yet no Names For one way and the most common is by distinguishing particular delectable Good or Pleasure whether that particular Good be in a mans self or in another as the Subject whether it be mine or anothers but it is usually if not always a mans own from its various Causes or Objects And it seems there may be six general ones I do but now suggest not determine 1 The possession of any Good in general so esteemed many things thus onely please 2 The pain mischief evil suffering of another Whether any Being is of such a temper as to be delighted therewith let others consider but I see no reason why it is not possible Now to will ones delight or pleasure from this Object or Cause is called Malice to be habitually inclined thereto Maliciousness but the renouncing of this or the