c. 4. n. 28. p. 441. Is it lawfull to let ones house to a Whore or an Vsurer After he had testified that Mendoza made some difficulty therein he answers Å¿ Valentia tom 3. disp 5. qu. 21. part 4. docet locari posse etiamsi alteri commode posset locari Ibid. n. 28. That Valentia holds that he may let them it though he might easily let it to some other that is to say provided a person find any Temporal advantage therein it concerns him not though God be offended in his house and that to offend God is also an indifferent thing with him as well as the letting of his house to persons whom he knowes do hire it to offend God therein There is no son so unnatural who dares so much as think of letting a house which he holds of his father to persons whom he knowes to require it for no other end than therein to offend his own father and to abuse his own sister or his mother and if any son were capable of this excesse there is no father who could suffer this affront and who would not think himself in this more injured even by his son than by his enemies and those who attempted to dishonour him in this sort and yet according to the Divinity of the Jesuites God is not offended by such unworthy usage and he will not take it ill that a man who is related to him by so many titles of Son Servant and Creature who holds all he hath of him and who depends absolutely upon him le ts out his house to offend him and to commit crimes and abominations against him It is hard to have such thoughts of God without renouncing faith and even reason it self and without representing God as an Idol of wood or stone to beleeve that he is unsensible of such outrages and infamous actions as these and to imagine that he would not take it ill that a person who makes profession to be his and to serve him faithfully not only suffers these in his house but gives them his house to commit them in without other reason than his interest and even without reason and without necessity as some Jesuits maintain So it is that Sanchez who is the Master in this subject after he had said that Navarre was therein too exact and too scrupulous satis scrupuloâ—è locutus commends Valentia and Azor for having been more bold and for having surpassed all others in the defence of so good a cause a Sed ultra alies optime Valentia 2.2 disp 5. q. 20. puncto 5. col 5. vers Ex hoc autens Et melius q. 21. puncto 4. col penult Azor Tom. 2. Instit Moral l. 12. c. ult q 3. censent etiam nulla causa justae excusante licere locare domum meretrici Sanchez op mor. l. 1. c. 7. n. 20. p. 23. But Valentia saith he speaks in this better than all the rest And in another place he saith that he hath surpassed himself and that Azor and he held that one might let out his house to a Whore though he had no just reason to do it These are three Jesuites who speak together after this manner and these three the most famous of their Society Azor Valentia and Sanchez who reports the opinions of the former to confirm his own It is with the same spirit that Sanchez doth all he can to excuse those who take such infamous persons into their protection who retain them who pay them money who furnish them with garments who keep them in their houses and walk with them to defend them when they go abroad For though at first he confesses that he finds some difficulty in giving absolution to these persons yet for all that he afterwards facilitates the things in such manner that a Confessor who hath but a little contrivance and is well entred in his opinions shall have therein no trouble at all He builds alwayes upon the same foundation and draws from the same principles all the conclusions which he advances upon this matter b Duodecimo deducitur patronos meretricum difficillimo negotio posse absolvi Ibid. n. 32. p. 25. It is very hard saith he to absolve them who make themselves the protectors of Common Women See here a formed difficulty but he weakens and dissipates it in the same moment saying c Quamvis enim id munus obire liceat quando non ut meretricio faveant id obeunt sed ut incolumes meretrices servent Ibid. 3. It is lawfull to perform this office to them when there is no design to favour their debauchery but only to hinder that any wrong be done them He would say that it is not lawfull to entertain nor protect debauchery but only debauched women As if it were as easie to separate these things in effect as in the distinctions of the Schools and as if this were not to protect debauchery to hinder those who would take from them the liberty and license without which it could not subsist The Whore may take the same excuse for her self which is alledged for her protector and say that she loves not the debauch but the profit that she her self hath the same aversion from these disorders but necessity hath therein engaged her having not whereupon to live without prostituting her self It is sufficiently clear that this answer justifies her no lesse than her protector and the same gives us well to perceive that subtilties of spirit and metaphysical abstractions are bad rules for the conduct of mens manners and conscience I will relate one conclusion more of Sanchez before I return to the rest d Undecimo deducitur licere alicui dare mutuo nummos alteri aut cubiculum accommodare petenti ad fornicandum quando absque gravi detrimento proprio proportionato denegare nequit Ibid. n. 31. It followes saith he that it is lawfull to lend mony yea or a Chamber to sin with women when it cannot be refused without great damage which hath some proportion to this evil There needs only a promise of some notable summe and presently this money and the danger of losing it will blot out all the crime of this infamous action according to these Casuists or it would be good to hire out the Chamber instead of lending it both the one and the other being lawfull according to the Divinity of Valentia cited and approved by Sanchez e Etiam nulla justa causa excusante although you have no just reason which may serve you for an excuse Escobar speaks of the same case in the same sense and almost in the same words For having supposed it as a thing altogether certain and manifest f Scio co-operari peccato alterius peccatum esse qui concurrit ut causa remota à peccato excusari Rogo an quis dicatur proxime peccato co operasse dum commodat v.g. cubiculum amico sornicaturo ut magnum incommodum vitari possit Negative respondeo
because he favours him not Here is the case to which he answers precisely and without hesitation in these words If you desire only or receive with joy the effect of this death to wit the Inheritance of a Father the Charge of a Prelate the deliverance from some trouble he procured you the answer is easie that you may desire all these things lawfully and that because you rejoyce not in the evil of another but in your own proper good Dicastillus durst not at first determine upon this question because it seemed to him uncertain the Authority and Example of Castropalao having made him more bold he approves and propounds it as probable and Tambourin makes thereof a Maxime in which there is no difficulty at all facilis responsio Thus it comes to pass that these Doctors who make profession of a complacent Theology go on still advancing not to the better but to the worse as S. Paul speaks and labour to stretch or rather to corrupt mens consciences by stretching and corrupting the most holy and inviolable Rules of Faith and Morality and making those things probable which in themselves are incredible If to desire the death of ones father be of itself a crime as none can question it the crime is yet greater when he is carried thereto by some wicked motive as that of having his estate which comes from covetousness and injustice and contains in it also a notorious ingratitude and it is in the sight of God a kind of theft and usurpation to desire to have the estate of another and which is more of ones father against his will the appointment of God and all the Laws of Reason and Nature So that to justifie the desire a child hath of the death of his father by that which he hath of his goods is to justifie one crime by another wherein many more are also contained This injustice and disorder may appear yet more visible in the other Example brought by Tambourin of an Inferior who desires the death of his Superior A Monk for Example or a Clerk of his Abbot or Bishop that he might enter upon his Office For the desire alone of a Charge of this nature even under pretence of a good motive as to be serviceable unto Souls is a kind of ambition and presumption which renders a man unworthy of that Office which he desires in that manner as S. Thomas after the Scripture and Fathers doth expresly teach us he who hath not this good motive and desires to enter by a way so odious and criminal as is the death of his Superior is not only unworthy of the Office which he so desires but also deferves to be excluded from the Clergy and even to be chased out of the Church as a rebellious and unnatural child from the house of his father who desires to see his death though he dares not kill him himself How then can one of these desires justifie the other How can we say that an Inferior may lawfully desire the death of his Superior if we pretend not that one may be a murderer because he is an Usurper and desire the death of a man because we would have his goods without having either right or capacity but only an unjust and unreasonable pretence unto the one or the other This yet sufficeth not this barbarous and murthering Theology to permit children to desire the death of their father and mother they permit them also to be willing to kill them themselves to attempt their lives and effectually to kill them in some cases It is from this Principle that Dicastillus saith 2 Colligitur ulterius â—…citum esse fillis contra parentes servis contra dominos vassallis contra principes vi vim repellere quando actu invaduntur injuste cum praedictis conditionibus idemque de Monachis aut subditis contra Abbates Superiores Dicastill lib. 2. de just tr 1. d. 10. dub 3. num 30. An in casibus praecedentis dubitationis liceat directe velle intendere mortem injusti aggressoris ad defendendam propriam vitam Negat S. Thomaâ— His tamen non obstantibus asserendum est tanquam verissimum sicut honestum est in executione repeilere aggressorem illum occidendo pari raâ—lone honestum est directe illum velle intendere occidere Dub. 4. num 4. That a child who defends himself against his father who assaults him unjustly may kill him as also Servants their Masters Vassals their Princes Monks their Abbots and their Superiors Which he understands not only in such manner that a Son may kill his Father by accident and besides his intention in his own defence but so as he may have a design to kill him voluntarily For after he had proposed this case which I have now related and many others he concludes that in this case it is lawful to desire to kill him who assails us As for what concerns the respect due unto Fathers and Mothers Tambourin declares confidently 1 That a Son is to be excused from mortal sin who will not acknowledge his Father if he do it not of contempt but to avoid some inconvenience or that he might not be put to the blush in acknowledging him It is manifest that according to Scripture this is to renounce ones father as it is to renounce Jesus Christ to be ashamed to acknowledge and confess him and yet this is a small fault in the Jesuits Divinity Neither is he more religious about their obedience concerning which he demands 2 Filius si recognoscere nolit patrem non ex contemptu sed ad vitandum aliquod incommodum aut crubescentiam à mortali culpa sic puto esset excusand us Tambur lib. 5. decal cap. 2. sect 2. num 17. Whether children may lawfully contract Marriage with persons unworthy of their alliance against the will of their fathers and mothers He answers Though some believe they cannot without mortal sin which is very probable yet he avouches that it is probable and safe in conscience that they may ..... and that Sanchez hath reason to say that a daughter is so free as to Marriage that though she have not yet attained so much as twenty five years of age she may marry her self unto a person unworthy of her without her fathers consent Whence it follows according to this Author that Isaac exceeded his power when he so expresly forbad his Son Jacob to marry in the family of Chanaan which was unworthy of his alliance If the disobedience of a Daughter towards her Father in these circumstances be not criminal it seems it never can be so since it cannot be in a more important matter than this same wherein Marriage is concerned which imports an engagement for the whole time of life and a Marriage with an unworthy person and which proves a disadvantage and dishonour not only to the Daughter who enters it but also to her kindred and whole family But if we object to this Father that
subditus contra Superiorem silius contra patrem parens contra filium Clericus aut Religiosus contra secularem contra absque ulla irregularitat is contractione Amicus de just jure disp 36. sect 5. n. 76. p. 407. This right saith he of thus defending ones life doth not appertain only to one private man against another private man but to a private man against a publique person to a Subject against his Superiour and to a Son against his Father to a Father against his Son to an Ecclesiastique or Monk against a Secular and to a Secular against an Ecclesiastique or a Monk without incurring any irregularity therefore It is true that this Jesuit seems not here to give power to kill a Father Mother Superiour and any one whosoever but onely to defend ones life against their enterprizes and wicked designs but he expounds himself more clearly afterwards speaking of honour and goods for defence whereof he gives liberty indifferently to kill all sorts of persons as well as for the defence of ones life e Conveniunt supradicti fas esse ad propulsandam ignominiam quam mihi aliquis inferre conatur illum praeveniens occidere siâ—ut fas est ad declinandam mortem quam mihi injustus invaser molitur illum occidere antequam mibi mortem vel mutilationem inferat Ibid. sect 7. n. 106. p. 410. The Authors of whom I have already spoken saith he are all agreed in this point that to defend our selves from some affront that would be put upon us it is permitted to prevent the aggressour by killing him as well as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjustly of our life or of any member we may kill him before he be able to execute his mischievous design It is not needful according to this Author to stay untill your Father or Master smites you maims you or makes you lose your honour For if he attempt onely to do it and you know his evil design he permits you to prevent and kill him Potes illum praeveniendo occidere And a little after speaking concerning goods a Sicut mihi licet pro tutela vitae meae honoris ita pro bonorum meorum quae ad vitam vitaque statum honorem conservandum necessaria sunt aggressorem si alia via illa desendere non possum interimere Ibid. sect 8. n. 127. p. 413. As I may saith he slay him who assaults me in the defence of my life and my honour so is it also lawful for me to do the same for defence of my goods which are necessary for the preservation of my life my estate and my honour if I cannot preserve them otherwise But if this crime appear too horrible to be undertaken upon the word of this Casuist I will make it appear in that which follow in this work that his opinion is the common sense of the Society In the mean while this charitable man and lover of the peace of consciences to remove from them all scruple about this point makes no difficulty to testifie that he is ready incase of necessity to do the same himself first of all which he advizeth unto others b Licet mihi pro tutela vitae meae honoris c. aggressorem interimere c. It is lawful for me saith he as well as any other whosoever he be for the defence of my life and my honour c. to kill any one without exception whosoever assails me So that a Monk himself ought not to make any difficulty upon this point unless he will be so presumptuous as to think himself a man of better abilities or more honest than a Jesuit who assures him that he is permitted to kill all those in general who would attempt any thing against his honour against his estate or against that of his Society For he doth not attribute this unto his Company as a particular priviledge but he assures us that it is a common right to all the Religions of what Order or reformation soever they be c Licebit Clerico vel Religioso calumniatorem gravia crimina de se vel de sua Religione spargere minantem occidere quando alius defendendi modus non suppetit uti non suppetere videtur si calumniator sit paratus ea velipst Religioso vel ejus Religioni publice coram gravissimis viris impingere nisi occidatur Amicus ibid. sect 7. n. 118. p. 544. It shall be lawful saith he for an Ecclesiastique or a Monk to kill a slanderer who threatens to produce great crimes against him or against his Order of Religion if he have no other way to defend them there-from as indeed it seems that he hath no other when the slanderer is ready to reproach him or his Order of Religion with those crimes publiquely or before some person of great Authority if he be not slain before To kill such a man it is not needful to stay till he attempts it is enough that he be ready to produce the crimes si calumniator sit paratus c. it is enough that he threatens to defame and to speak much evil gravia crimina spargere minantem And to assure the Monks yet more in an enterprise of this consequence these Divines declare that herein they do not onely nothing against Justice but also that it may so happen that Justice it self charity and the affection which they owe unto themselves and their Society may oblige them to use this remedy so sweet and so charitable It is Amicus who urges this discourse also for the rest d Hunc honorem poterunt Clerici ac Religiosi cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae etiam cum morte invasoris defendere Quin etiam interdum legâ— saltem châ—…itatis videntar ad illum defendendum teneri si ex violatione propriae famae integra Religio infamaretur Amicus ibid. The Ecclesiastiques and Monks may also defend their honours even at the cost of their lives who attempt to deprive them thereof provided they passe no farther then to what is simply necessary to defend themselves and they may be even obliged at least by the Law of Charity thus to maintain their reputation if your Infamy should redound to the disgrace of their whole Order This is a very strange charity since it hath the effects of the most violent hatred and rather it is a most monstrous hatred which brings one to kill in cold blood and to take away life in charity from him for whom he ought to lay down his own since our Saviour hath said that charity obliges us to lay down our life for our friends and that it requires us not onely to love our friends but our nenemies also and those who wish or do us hurt There remains now as it seems onely one difficulty in this important subject which is that possibly every one knows not how to kill men and have not hearts hard enough to embrue their hands in
comitari januam aperire eis lectum sternere non tamen potest eam invitare ad actum ipsum inhonestum cum hero Gaspar Hurtado apud Dian. part 5. p. 435. in addendis atque emend and is in par 5. resp mor. in tr 7. de Leand. That a servant might watch a woman whither she went or where she abode if his Master command him and carry her little presents and accompany his Master whether it be to honour him or to defend him when he goes to see her hold him by the foot when he goes in to her through the window buy for him the pourtraiture of his Mistresse go to tell her that his Master prayes her to come to meet him accompany her and conduct her to the place where he is open the door for her make the bed but not incite her to sin with him After all this I say he adds k Et eadem omnia potest filius ad mandatum patris praesertim si ex omissione indignationem patris timeat Et eadem omnia quae possunt famulus filius etiam potest quilibet alius titulo alicujus considerabilis utilitat is sibi accrescentis multo melius titulo vitandi aliquod grave incommodum aut damnum Ibid. That a son may do all the same things if his father command him especially if he fear he shall draw on him his indignation if he refuse What a servant or a son may do in these occurrents any other may do as well as they if he hopes that thereby there may some considerable benefit come to him and much more for avoiding some great losse or some great evil It remains only that we affirm the same thing of a daughter towards her father and a wife towards her husband For it is not worse for a wife to do these dishonest offices for her husband than for a son or a daughter to perform them for a father or mother and the reasons of this Casuist prove it equally or they prove nothing at all And although shame as it seems kept him back from this yet he hath notwithstanding sufficiently discovered his thoughts by these general terms etiam potest quilibet alius also any other may do it shews plainly that what he speaks expresly of a son in regard of his father ought also to be extended to a wife towards her husband and he condemns not it may be these good offices even in a Monk or Priest since he excepts no person at all etiam potest quilibet alius As for carrying of presents to dishonest persons Sanchez makes no difficulty thereof for servants And he drawes this also from his principles l Nono deducitur licere famulis jussu heri poitare aliqua munuscula aut esculenta ad concubinam cum haec sint indifferentia Sanchez l. 1. c. 7. n. 29. p. 25. It followes saith he that it is lawfull for a servant to carry at his Masters commandment to a woman whom he keeps little presents and things to eat and the reason of his principle alwayes returns because these things are indifferent He is a little more troubled to permit servants to deliver messages and to appoint meetings and to carry them Love-letters but that which hinders him principally is that this opinion is not commonly received and that there are some who condemn this traffique as a thing that is evil in it self m Quidam hoc tanquam intrinsece malum damnant Ibid. n. 26. Some saith he do condemn this as a thing evil in it self and not only as evil but also as shamefull saying that those who meddle with this commerce are decried and noted with an infamous name which is at this day of so little credit in France that we must content our selves to rehearse it in Latine as Sanchez also hath set it quod communis existimatio testatur hos lenones appellans which the common opinion testifies whilst these are called panders and bauds But there is cause to beleeve that it is rather the name than the thing which displeaseth him For after he had cited some Authors who condemned justly these infamous servants he adds in their favour that n Alii vero excusant à peccato famulos qui ratione famulatus haec internuntia aut scripta deferunt in quibus herus petit à concubina ut ea nocte ad se veniâ—t â—tsi norint velle ut veniat ad sornicandum Ibid. n. 26. Others exempt from sin these servants who because of the service they owe their Masters do these messages and carry these Letters by which their Master commands a woman to come meet him in the night although they know that he causes her not to come in the night but that he may sin with her And to make us perceive that this is his opinion though he dares not say it openly he applyes his principle to it o Quod haec rem indifferentem contineant cum non ad sornicationem sed ad adventum inducanâ— Ibid. Because saith he these letters and these messages are indifferent things inducing the person only to come without speaking of the sin He beleeves that this mental distinction and restriction is sufficient to shelter this crime and any other how great soever they may be Molina saith that in places where Whores are tolerated p Peccatum non est locare eis demum modo locator non intendat fornicationem earum ibi sed locare solum domum ad habitationem illarum sciens eas abusuras ea habitatione ad peccata Molina de just tom 2. tr 2. disp 500. p. 1122. It is no sin to let them a house provided that he who sets it have only an intention to let it them to lodge in and not to prostitute themselves therein though he knows that they will abuse his house to sin in it According to this resolution it is lawfull to lend or sell a sword to a man who is known to demand it for no other reason than to kill himself or some other provided only there be no expresse intention to co-operate with his sin Escobar makes Valentiae to say the same thing For demanding q Licet ne ex justa causa locare domum meretrici vel alicui peteuti ad fornicandum Valentia docet licere quia locare domum est res per se indifferens quae ex sola pravâ— abutentis intentione ad malum ordinatur Escobar tract 1. Exam. 8. n. 98. p. 155. If it be lawfull to let ones house to Common Women or to any who desires it to keep such therein He answers That Valentia holds that this is lawfull because to set ones house is a thing in it self indifferent which is not evil but through the evil intention of these who abuse it And because the question is important he puts it again the second time in these terms r Num liceat locare meretrici aut usurario domum Escobar tract 3. Exam. 9.
design to commit if he could all venial sins sinneth onely venially Escobar makes thereof a probleme proposing it in this manner l Habens voluntatem peccata omnia venialia perpetrandi peccat non peccat mortaliter Escobar Theol. Mor. l. 3. pag. 83. It may be held that he who hath a will to commit all venial sins sinneth mortally and it may also be said that he doth not sin mortally The reason for this second part of this probleme is the very principle that we now speak of m Non peccat quia malitia interni actus voluntat is desumitur ab objecto prout propenitur à ratione Sed objectum hujus internae voluntat is sunt omnia venialia nulla major malitia proponitur à ratione praeter venialem Ergo interna volunt as perpetrandi omnia peccata venialia non potest esse culpa lethalis Because that saith he the malice of an inward action of the will is taken from the object towards which it warps according as it is represented to it by the understanding But the object of this will are all venial sin and the malice which the understanding represents unto it is but venial and for that cause a will to commit all venial sins can be but a venial sin So that a man may have a will to commit all the venial sins which he can commit in the matter of theft and all those which can be committed by intemperance and by all other vices without sinning otherwise then venially that is to say that without mortal sin we may have a will to steal all the goods of the world if we could taking it at many times and every time in small quantity which according to this rule of these Casuists could not be matter sufficient for a mortal sin and so in the other vices and sins The same Escobar in the abridgement which he made of moral Divinity in one sole Book proposeth the same question but not any longer as a probleme but as a resolution and an opinion constantly assented to by the Society For he professes to relate no others and to advance nothing of himself no more then from strange Authors n Rogo auex numero venialium exurgat moâ—ta'e Unde v. g. per impossibile quie omnia peccata venialia committeret culpam levem non excederet Escobar tract 2. exam 1. c. 12. n. 57. p. 385. It is demanded saith he whether of many venial sins one mortal may be made and by consequent if one committed all venial sins which is impossible if the fault were more then a sleight one He confesses himself that this case is so extravagant that it is impossible Yet he forbears not to propose and resolve it in this sort o Negative respondeo cum Granado 1.2 cont 6. tract 2. d. 2. sect 7. docente volentem uno actu omnia peccata venialia perpetrare solum venialiter delinquere Then with Granades who holds that he who hath a will to commit all at once and by one sole act all venial sins sins onely venially There is some cause to doubt whether the question be more strange or the answer For if it be a thing altogether unsufferable and which would have been grievously punished in the Church heretofore to propose a case and an excesse so extraordinary which no man could not onely not commit but which even could not come possibly into the heart of the most forlorn in vice it is not less strange to endeavour to make it be believed that he who would commit this excesse which passeth the corruption of all men that is to say who would commit more wickedness then either he or any other could possibly act and would do this deliberately and out of more malice should commit onely a small sin Who can perswade himself that a person can be in favour with God who is resolved to offend him as much as he can so that he may not be damned and doing all the evil that he is able against him with resolution to do yet also more if he could do it without destroying himself If a child should deal thus with his Father or a friend with his friend or a servant with his Master he would make himself an object of publick hate and an abomination to the whole world and there would be no person who would not judge them entirely unworthy of the quality and name of a Son friend or servant And neverthelesse these Jesuits pretend that he who demeans himself thus towards God ceases not to be in truth his servant his friend and his son and that he doth nothing which deserves displeasure and that he may not be taxed of mortal sin Sanchez proposes a case which is not far from that of Escobar He speaks of a man who entring into a Religious Order had made a resolution not to observe any rule or constitution of that Order nor of all the counsels or commands of his Superiours but those things onely which he could not neglect without mortal sin and for all the rest whereto he thought not himself obliged under the pain of mortal sin as vigils silence abstinence Justes of the Order and other such like Religious observations and mortifications of the spirit of the body he would not trouble himself at all and would dispense with himself as much as he could He asks what judgement ought to be made of a Frier who should be in such an estate whether his resolution and will which he hath absolutely to violate all the points of his rule and all the duties of his profession wherein he believed he should not sin at all or but venially should be a mortal sin whether this would hinder him from being a good Monk and whether this would be a great fault against the obligation which he had to move towards perfection The answer of this Doctor is that such a man ceased not for all that to be in a good estate before God and that he should be a good Frier though not perfect and that he sinned not at least not mortally against the obligation he had in the quality of a Religious person to pursue after perfection One of his reasons is that because he sins but venially as he supposes in violating severally every one of the points of his rule and the regular observations which he is resolved not to observe the will which he hath to transgresse them all is but a will to sin venially and which hath for its object venial sins onely and which by consequence it self could be no other then a venial sin We shall consider more particularly this case of Sauchez and his answer in handling the duties of Friers and perhaps elsewhere speaking of mortal and venial sin I was willing onely to mark this here by the by as a dependence and conclusion of the principle which is the subject of this Chapter that the greatness of the sin ought to estimated from and according to
sapiant quia minores vocantur Lactant. lib. 2 divin instit c. 8. These deprive themselves of wisdom who suffer themselves to be led by others like Beasts receiving without discerning all that which the ancients have invented That Which deceives them is the name of Ancestors Imagining that they cannot be Wiser then they because they come after them and because these are called neoteriques And in the same place l Deus dedit omnibus pro virili portionem sapientiae nec quia nos illi temporibus sapientia quoque antecesserunt Quia si omnibus aequaliter datur occupari ab antecedentibus non potest Ibid. God hath given wisdom to every man according to his capacity and those who precede us in time do not therefore exceed us in wisdom For being it is given indifferently to all men they who came first cannot by their possession eject others from it He considered not when he alledged these passages that what these Authors say is for reproof of those who suffer themselves to be carried with humane customs and traditions to the prejudice of manifest truth or who are too credulous and timorous in the inquiry after natural things which depend on reason and that they speak not of matters of Faith and Religion such as those are which he handles in his Book But if he have perceived this truth he abuses the authority of these great personages applying it against their sence and using it without reason to justifie a thing quite remote from their thoughts and contrary to their judgements and from that of all antiquity which were easie to be made appear if it were not a thing too remote from my subject He alledges also these words which he attributes to the Council of Constantinople m Beatus qui prosert verbum inauditum id est novum Syn. Const art 1. Happy is that man who produces an unheard word that is a now one Finally he cites those words of the holy Scripture n Omnis scriba doctus similis est patrifamilias qui profert de thesauro suo nova vettra Matth. 13. ver 53. every learned Doctor is like unto a Father of a Family who brings out of his treasure things new and old I passe by this last passage of the Gospel of Saint Matthew which he abuseth manifestly against the sence of the Son of God and that of all interpreters But I cannot passe over the remarkable falsity and visible corruption of the pretended words of the Council of Constantinople For the true words of the Council are Beatus qui profert verbum in auditum obedientium Blessed is he who utters a word into obedient ears From which he first cuts off the word obedientium obedient Afterwards he joins two words into one and instead of in auditum in to the hearing which were the Councils words he makes it say inauditum unheard In the third place adding corruption of sence unto falsification of words he saith that this word inauditum signifies new But there is no cause to marvel that the desire of novelty leads to falsity and consequently to errours and heresies Azor and after him Filliutius who doth nothing in effect but follow him speak also very advantagiously for novelty saying generally that the Apostolical Traditions are of humane right and that by consequence they may be changed o Ex quo officitur ut traditiones divinae ad â—us divinum specteat ac proinde sunt immutabiles Apostolicae vero ad jus humanum propterea Ecclesiae authoritate mut abiles Azor Instit mor. l. 8. c. 4. q. 4. pag. 743. Filliutius tom 2. tr 22. c. 1. n. 11. p. 65. Divine Traditions saith Azor appertain to Divine right and by consequence they are immutable but the Traditions of the Apostles are humane Laws and for that cause the Churoh may change them He expounds a little above what he means by Divine and Apostolical Traditions in these terms p Divinae traditiones sunt quaâ— ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli acceperunt vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante vel gubernante vel Christo Domino imperante promulgarunt Apostolicae sunt qu as ipsi Apostoli tanquam Ecclesiae Praelati Doctores magistri recto es instituerunt Azor. Ibid. Divine Traditions are those which the Apostles have learned from the mouth of Jesus Christ or which the Holy Ghost hath dictated and they have written by his Command or by that of Jesus Christ The Traditions of the Apostles are those which the Apostles have instituted in the quality of Prelats Doctors Tutors and Governours of the Church In such manner that according to them the Traditions of the Apostles are no other then the Inventions of the Apostles which they ordained of themselves and of their own proper motion without having learned them of Jesus Christ or the Holy Spirit This is no more then his words clearly signifie and the division he makes suffers not any other sence to be given them since he opposes those Traditions which the Apostles have instituted of themselves quas ipsi Apostoli instituerunt to those which they have received from the mouth of Jesus Christ and from those which the Holy Ghost taught them and which he established by their Ministry quas ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli receperunt vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante jubente vel Christo Domino imperante promulgarunt He makes then of these two sorts of Traditions as it were two opposite members dividing Traditions into Divine and Humane or Apostolical He calls the first Divine because they draw their original from God and his Spirit who hath instituted them the Apostles having onely published them by his motion and order he affirms that the other are humane and of humane right ad jus humanum spectant because according to him they proceed from an humane spirit and not from Gods and that the Apostles who were men instituted them and are become their Fathers and Authors If it be true as he faith that the Apostles have made these rules in the Church whether concerning faith or manners and that they have not received them from Jesus Christ nor the Holy Ghost he hath reason to say that the constitutions and traditions which he terms Apostolical are onely of humane right because they take their original and their authority from the spirit of man and which by consequence may be changed by men and it may follow also from the same principle that they are subject unto errour the spirit of a man how holy soever it be may always deceive him when he is the Author and original of his thoughts and actions It will follow thence also that the Apostles have governed the Church as Princes and Politicians govern their estates and their common wealths by their wit and reason It would follow likewise that the Church is not governed by the Spirit of Jesus Christ being they who first governed it and
according to Scripture There have been Hereticks that have maintained that Jesus Christ was not God and others that he was a man of the same nature as we but there was never any that acknowledging that he was God and Man both at once imagined that he was capable of sinning and falling under the power of the Devil as the Jesuits affirm and testifie by attributing to him a next and natural power of sinning of being in errour and even of that which proceeds from a wicked disposition and deordination error pravae dispositionis to retain and keep wicked habits of being subject unto vices of being obliged to temporal punishments and even of eternal for his own sins as we have now seen in their own proper words 1. If Jesus Christ might have sinned he could not have been the Saviour of men nor delivered them from sin because hereunto it was necessary that he should be himself uncapable of sin according to the Doctrine of the Church and of the holy Fathers 2. If sin might have been in Jesus Christ then sin is no more sin because sin being no otherwise sin then as it is against the will of God if Jesus Christ who is the Son of God and God as well as his Father could sin sin would be voluntary unto him not only according to his humanity which did or should commit it but also in regard of his Divinity and divine person who should permit it or take it unto him voluntarily in the Humanity which should be personally united unto him as well as the other qualities and actions of this humanity which are proper to him and appertain unto him in some sort more than unto the humanity it self 3. But if God could will sin or be partaker thereof by assuming it or permitting it voluntarily in a nature which should be united unto him God should be no more God because he should be no longer the supream Truth which is more inconsistent with sin which is nothing else but errour injustice and malice then light is with darkness 4. This is not the way to withdraw men from sin to attribute it unto Jesus Christ But to move them unto horror and detestation of so strange an opinion it is sufficient to consider that it tends to destroy both the Incarnation of Jesus Christ and even his Divinity it self For as in dying voluntarily in his humanity he did put sin to death and destroyed the Empire of the Devil who was the Author of his death because he suffered this death unjustly being innocent and having no sin at all this opinion on the contrary attributing sin unto him makes him dye at once both in his Humanity and Divinity and subjects him to the power of the Devil to favour and revive sin CHAPTER II. Of Repentance REpentance is a remorse and sorrow for offending God and herein is it the proper and natural Remedy of Sin since as it is committed by pleasure so it must be blotted out by sorrow This sorrow is a vertue which appertains to Religion and it is also one part of the Sacrament of Penance so necessary and so considerable that it hath given even its name thereunto We separate not here these two considerations and that we may treat more largely of Penance we will consider it as a Sacrament and because that in this quality besides grief for sin it contains also Confession Absolution and Satisfaction we will treat here of every one of these by way of preocupation of what should have been said in the Chapter of the Sacraments distributing them into so many Articles ARTICLE I. Of Sorrow for Sin That according to the Jesuits we may be justified by the Sacrament of Penance by a natural sorrow and even without any true sorrow for sin THe first step of a Soul that returns unto God is the knowledge and remorse it hath for offending God 1 Surgam ibo ad patrem meum dicam ei Pater peccavi in coelum coram te Luc. 5.18 I will arise and go unto my father and say unto him Father I have sinned against Heaven and before thy face saith this child after he had departed from the obedience and guidance of his father when he began to resolve himself to return unto him The Jesuits consent well unto this Catholick Truth they do truly affirm that we cannot absolutely obtain pardon of sins without acknowledging with sorrow that we have committed them but when they would expound what sorrow this ought to be they speak of it in such manner as destroys it in effect For they are not content to say that the least degree of sorrow is sufficient to blot out all the sins in the world but they do also maintain that this sorrow ought not of necessity to be supernatural and some proceed so far as to say that without any true sorrow for offending God we may be reconciled unto him by being only grieved that we have not the sorrow which we ought to have Filliutius demands 2 Quaeroâ—n requiratur certa intentio ad contritionem Tom. 1. tract 6. cap. 9. n. 231. If there be any particular degree of sorrow necessary unto contrition And he answereth 3 Dico 3. non requiri certum gradum intentionis Ibid. 234. That there is no certain particular degree which is necessary His reason is 4 Tum quia Scripturae Sancti Patres conversioni in Deum promittunt remissionem peccati absque limitatione intentionis ergo neque nos limitare debemus Filliut mor. qq to 1. tr 6. c. 9. n 234. Because that the Scriptures and holy Fathers allow remission of sins to him that is truly converted unto God without limiting the degree Whence it follows that we ought not to limit it God wills and demands oft in Scripture that for obtaining pardon of sins we should be converted unto him with all our hearts Whence the holy Fathers have taken occasion to say that we ought not to limit or bound the grief of a sinner who is converted since it ought to be with all the affection of his heart and that it cannot be too great nor equal the demerit and indignity of sin And this Jesuit on the contrary saith it must not be limited because it cannot be too little and that it is always great enough to blot out sin See the conformity of his spirit with that of the holy Fathers and Scripture It seems that he would correct his errour in the answer which he makes a little after to this question 5 An contritio debeat esse intentior Whether the sorrow of contrition ought in degree to surpass all other sorrow For he answers 6 Respondeo dico 1. debere esse intentiorem saltem quoad appretiationem Ibid. n. 237. Yes as to appretiation at least But he doth only hide his errour under the obscurity of his words as will appear by the explication he gives himself to this word Appretiation For
he saith that 7 Dico 2. ejusmodi appretiatio five existimatio non sumitur ex intentione graduali charitatis vel dilectionis Ibid. This appretiation or estimation proceeds not from any high degree of charity or love That is to say that this sorrow needs not be great in it self nor arise from any great charity but it is said to be great by reason the cause of it is great since it is God or which is the same thing because of the excellency of the Motive thereof propter excellentiam motivi or in more clear terms because God who is the Object and Motive thereof is great though it be in it self very weak and small as is also the Charity from whence it proceeds And when he saith that the sorrow for offending God ought to be appretiatively greater than all other grief which we can have for any temporal loss he intends to say no other thing then that it ought to be greater in the thought and esteem of the sinner in such manner that he judge and acknowledge that God is greater than all other things and that by consequence the loss of God is more considerable than all other losses though indeed this sorrow be much less and more feeble in his heart than that which he hath for other losses and evils Whence he draws this consequence which clears up his thoughts yet more 8 Quare poterit dolere magis de mor te parentis aut filii Ib. n 238. This is the reason why he may have more trouble and grief of mind for the loss of his father or of his son then for having offended God For this hinders not but that he may believe that God deserves to be more loved than a father or a son and by consequence to be more resented when he is lost by sin though in effect he have more affection for his father or for his son and he be more moved by the loss of them than by offending God and yet in this disposition according to this Jesuit he ceases not to be in a good estate and to obtain the pardon of his sins how great and in how great number soever they be provided he have the least displeasure that he hath committed them 1 Quia minima gratia est sufficiens ad remissionem omnium peccatorum ad minimam gratiam sufficiens minima contritio tanquam dispositio Because saith he the least grace is sufficient for the remission of all sins and the least contrition is a sufficient disposition for the least grace He demands also concerning the sorrow which is necessary to obtain pardon of sin in the Sacrament of Penance 2 Quaero an hic dolor debeat esse verus realis Respondeo probabile esse dolorem existimatum sufficere Tr. 7. de Confess cap. 6. n. 150. Whether this sorrow ought to be true and real or it be sufficient we are perswaded that it is though it be not at all His Answer is That it is probable that it is sufficient that we believe it to be such That is to say that to obtain pardon of God in Penance it is not necessary to have a true sorrow for offending him so that we believe we have this sorrow Escobar also demands in the same matter 3 Num necessarius sit dolor supernaturalis Sufficit naturalis qui tamen supernaturalis existimetur Escobar tr 7. exam 4. n. 39. p. 805. If it be needful that sorrow be supernatural And he answers That it suffices to be natural so we believe it to be supernatural As if a Creditor were obliged to discharge his Debtor when he had given him Brass money for Gold provided he imagined that he gave him good Gold He speaks yet more clearly upon this Point a little after saying 4 Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in poenam illius malum temporale immisit sufficit si autem doleat sine ullo respectu ad Deum non sufficit Ibid. c. 7. n. 91. p. 813. That if a man be touched with remorse for his sin because God to punish him for it hath brouâ—ht on him some temporal evil this remorse is sufficient but if it have no respect unto God it is not sufficient It is clear that this grief is altogether natural and common to good and bad or rather proper unto them that love the world who are so much more touched with regret and displeasure when God takes from them their temporal goods as they love them more whereas good men have little or no resentment thereof because they love them not if their vertue be solid as appears by the Example of Job and many others So that this grief comes properly from the love of the world and the adherence we have to the goods of this world and yet according to the opinion of Hurtado the Jesuit reported by Escobar it is sufficient to blot out sins though it be it self a disorder and a sin But if any object unto him what Amicus doth to himself 5 Qui peccatum detestatur propter poenam plus actu detestatur poenam quam culpam cum poena sit ratio detestandi culpam Amicus tom 8. disp 3. sect 1. n. 5. That he who detesteth sin because of punishment doth indeed detest the punishment more than the sin the punishment being the motive and reason that incites him to detest the sin which is to love himself more than God and to prefer his own interest before the honour of God since he is touched more by the loss which he makes or the temporal punishment that he suffers than the sin which displeaseth and dishonoreth God He will answer without doubt as the same Amicus 6 Nego hujusmodi actum non esse honestum quia non te nemur semper actu plus detestari culpam quam poenam Ibid. That he cannot agree that this act is not good and honest and he will serve himself of this reason That we are not always obliged to detest actually the fault more than the punishment From whence he will conclude as he hath done already 7 Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in poenam illius malum temporale immisit sufficit That if a man be touched with remorse for his sin because God to punish him for it hath brought on him some temporal evil this remorse suffices to blot out his sin if it be true as the same Amicus pretends that we are not always obliged to do otherwise and this sorrow be good honest and regular This being so we must say that the world is at this day filled with persons of great vertue and true Penitents since amongst so frequent and common miseries there are hardly any that are not afflicted with loss of their goods their happiness and their repose and who will not easily confess that their sins are the cause So that according to the Rule of these
gaudio delectatione non quidem habitâ— de morte ipsa secundum se quatenus est malum patris immo ad finem haereditatis obtinendae aut similem optare ut licita via scilicet à Deo non quatenus malum patris est sed quatenus inde filio bonum provenit non putarem esse mortale Dicastill lib. 2. tom 2. disp 12. a. 1. dub 6. num 546. That it is not altogether certain that a child can lawfully desire the death of his father or rejoyce in it because of inheritance which might come to him thereby but he believes that he sins not mortally in rejoycing not in his death considered as an evil unto his father but as a lawful means appointed of God for him to obtain the succession not because some evil befel the father but some good the son See here a man exceedingly confounded He would gladly justifie a child who desires the death of his father that he may enjoy his estate but he dares not do it absolutely because this appears not to him to be altogether certain He contents himself to exempt him from mortal sin by the rule of directing the intention which teaches him to look on his fathers death not as ill to his father but as good for himself because of the inheritance that comes to him thereby 1 An possit filius mortem patris optare vel de illa gaudere non ut est malum patris hoc enim esset odium execrandum sed ur ipse filius patris haereditate fruatur facilis est responsio Licite enim haec optas vel amplecteris quia non gaudes de alterius malo sed de proprio bono Tambur lib. 5. decal cap. 1. sect 3. num 29. Tambourin who wrote since Dicastillus is more hardy he makes no difficulty of exempting this desire from sin on condition the intention be directed according as Dicastillus discourseth And that he might render this more probable and more intelligible he distinguisheth of two sorts of desires whereof the one is absolute and the other conditional 2 Si desideres sub conditione facilis item responsio licite posse Si quis enim hunc actum eliciat Si meus pater moreretur ego haereditate potirer gâ—uderet tunc ille non de patris morte sed de haereditate n. 30. If you desire the death of your father upon some condition saith he the answer is easie that you may lawfully For if one say in himself if my father should dye I should enjoy his estate in this case he should not rejoyce in his fathers death but in his inheritance Behold the Example of a conditional desire in which he finds no difficulty He proposes and expounds the other desire which he calls absolute in these terms 3 Cupio mortem patris non ut malum patrâ—s est sed ut bonum meum seu ut causa mei boni nimitum quia ex il ius morte ego ejus haereditatem adibo Si inquam sic defideras major est difficultas resolvendi c. Nihilom inus Castropalaus ...... ex quibus vides opinionem Castropalai esse satis probabilem num 31 32 33. I desire the death of my father not because it is an evil to him but because it is good for me or because it is the cause of good unto me and because by this his death I enter into the possession of my paternal inheritance This is the same thing that he had already said in the former passage and this repetition makes us see more clearly the perplexity he is in through the desire he hath to justifie this unnatural child in his desire of his fathers death that he may enjoy his estate He finds therein some difficulty but after he had reported the opinion of Castropalao who approves this sort of desires he concludes that this opinion is probable enough that is to say that a child may lawfully and without sin love his fathers inheritance better than his father himself For if he loved his father better than the inheritance that he hopes from him he could not rejoyce in the death of his father as in some good thing since it would procure him more hurt than good by taking from him his father whom he loves more than all the estate he should receive thereby I know not how without horrour any can I will not say approve but produce and publish such thoughts and desires so opposite to the most common notions of reason and of Christian and natural piety to exempt that from sin in children which were horrible and criminal in the remotest kindred friends or domesticks and finally to pretend to prove this overthrow of Nature and Reason by the most brutish and inhumane Principle that can be imagined saying that a man may desire evil to any person whomsoever and even death it self unto his own father provided he consider this evil as his own proper good and not barely as an evil unto him to whom he wisheth it It is thus that Lyons Bears and Tygers devour men not simply to kill them and to do them hurt but for their own proper good that they may feed themselves with their flesh yet they spare beasts of their own kind and in this they are less cruel and inhumane than men who are so blind and unnatural as to believe and follow a Doctrine so pernicious and which teaches men to kill eat and devour one another through a desire of any the least temporal interest If this were lawful as the Jesuits pretend there would be no more any true Christian or humane Society It would be lawful for every private man to desire publick Calamities not considering them as the destruction of Families Towns and the Common-wealth but as his particular benefit There should be no more Charity nor Religion since we might without sin according to this Divinity not only wish all sorts of mischief to our Neighbour but desire also the profanation of the most Holy things and the out-throw of the Laws of God and the Church provided only we say that it is not any hurt or offence to God or our Neighbour that we desire but only the good and profit that thereby we pretend unto Now Tambourin as he speaks more absolutely and boldly than Dicastillus because he wrote after him so he adds also the resolution of many like questions 1 An possiâ— subditus mottem cupere sui Praelati ut Praelaturae ipse succedaâ— vel ut ab eo Praelato sibi infenso liberetur Si solum desideres vel cum gaudio exciplas ejusmodi effectus haereditaâ—em molestiae carentiam pâ—aelaturam facilis est responsio Lici è enim haec optas vel amplecteris quia non gaudes de alterius malo sed'de proprio bâ—no May an inferior desire the death of his superior in the Church or Common-wealth that he may succeed in his Office or that he may be delivered from him
Scripture Fathers Popes condemn the disobedience of these Children in terms capable to terrifie the most resolute and to ashame the most impudent He answers that this proves indeed that it is very commendable for Children to do otherwise but not that they sin mortally if they fail therein 3 Difficultas ergo sola superest an cum indignis possint filii licite contraâ—cre patre vel genitrice diffentientibus Et quidem l'cet aliquibus videatur non posse idque sub mortali quod certe valde probabile est ..... fattor tamen probabile item esse ac tutum quod possint ..... Et recte docet Sanchez filiam adeo liberam esse ut ante vigesimum quintum annum nubere valeat etiam indigno sine patris consensu Tambur decal lib. 5. cap. 2. sect 3. num 5. Vocavit itaque Jacob Isaac benedixit eum praecipitque ei dicens Noli accipere conjugem de genere Ghanaam Genes 28. Though the Pope Evaristus saith he have ordained that a daughter should not be held for a married wife if her father himself agreed not to the Marriage Though the Pope S. Leo and S. Ambrose say that it is not becoming the modesty of a Virgin to chuse an Husband but that she ought to attend on her Fathers judgment Though in the holy Scriptures this charge be laid upon Fathers Though S. Paul teach expresly that daughters ought to be given in marriage by their fathers Though many Examples of the Saints shew this manifestly I answer with Sanchez that these things and such like prove well that it is very commendable for them to demand their fathers advice but not that they in not doing so fall into the horrible disorder of mortal sin 4 Si statuit Evaristus Papa ut pronupta nequaquam habeatur puella quam pater ipse non desponsat si Leo Pontisex Ambrosius aiunt non esse virginalis pudoris maritum eligere sed judicium parentum esse expectandum si in sacris Sâ—riptutis parentibus tribuitur hoc munus si S. Paulus expresse docet à parentibus tradendas esse filias nuptui si multa Sanctarum Scriprurarum exemplaid manifeste demonstrant Respondeo cum codem Sanchez haec similia probare quod esset valde honestum ejusmodi consilium à patre exquirere diram peccati mortalis necessitatem non probare Tambur lib. 5. dâ—…al cap. 9. sect 3. num 6. This discourse is proper for nothing but to countenance disobedience and impudence in Children and to favour Rapes and clandestine Marriages and this is very insolently and Jesuitically to clude the holy Scripture the Authority of the Church Councils and Fathers and the Examples of the Saints by taking only for simple exhortations and counsels of Decency and Civility what they ordain under so great penalties saying such Marriage should be null and that a daughter should not be held for a married wife if her father himself agreed not to her Marriage See here another case wherein the liberty of Children that is their licentiousness is sufficiently established 1 Filius in ludo illicito non est subditus patri atque adeo lucrum ex illo habitum absque controversia sibi adquiâ—ere noâ—at Rebellius Tambur lib. 5. decal cap. 4. sect 1. num 7. A Son saith the same Author is not subject to his Father in what concerns unlawful games and by consequence he may without wronging him retain unto himself the gain he makes thereby He will have it that because a Son commits two sins one in playing at an unlawful game and the other in gaming contrary to his Fathers prohibition that which he hath gained is therefore justly acquired to his own use If he had not been disobedient in gaming contrary to his Fathers will he had had nothing of that he gained but because he was disobedient that which he hath gained appertains to himself though he have contemned his Father and plaid only with his money So he receives benefit not only of the money which is his Fathers but of his contempt of his Father also and this contempt gives him a right which he could not have had if he had not abused both his Father and his money So marvellous and gainful too is the Divinity of these Doctors Finally Tambourin speaking of the temporal assistance which Children owe unto their Father shews us how far this obligation may go He proposes the case of a Father taken by Thieves who threaten to kill him if a certain sum of money be not given them he demands whether the Son were obliged to give this money 2 Quod si iste paâ—… in sâ—mili â—…ae discrimiâ—e â—…saretur pecuniaque à divite filio exposceretur difficilior est resâ—…urâ—o Equidem hac uterer distinctione Si ea summa demi potest ex supeâ—fluis vel solum statui convenientibus obligarem patrem filiumque si debeat demi ex necessariis ita ut vel omnino depauperandi vel admodum notabiliter à suo statu dimovendi effent neuâ—rum obligatem ...... Et nihilomi nus priorem dicti partem non ranquam omnino certam affirmo Tambur lib. 5. decal o. 1. sect 1. num 11. If a father saith he be in peril of his life and money be demanded to save him of his Son who is rich the question is more difficult As for me I would make use of this distinction If the sum demanded may be taken out of goods superfluous or only becoming the condition of the Son I would oblige him to give it But if it ought to be taken out of what is necessary unto him in such sort that it would wholly impoverish him or cause him to fall notably below his condition I would not oblige him at all ..... Notwithstanding I say not that it is altogether certain that this Son is obliged to give on this occasion such goods as are superfluous or convenient for his condition Behold a decision very favourable to those Children of whom he spoke before who innocently desired the death of their Fathers He would be far enough from obliging a Son to expose his life to save his Fathers since he would not that he should be obliged so far only as to give for it a part of his goods which he may absolutely spare And if you represent unto him that which our Saviour recommends unto us to love one another as he loved us and what S. John saith that we ought to lay down our life for our Brethren and by stronger reason for our Fathers and Mothers I see not what he can answer but what he hath already said before cluding the Authority of the Scripture and the Saints that these Commands though so express repeated and solemnly confirmed by the whole Church are wholesom advices and counsels of Decency and Civility which oblige no farther than we please to follow them ARTICLE IV. Of the Command of God THOU SHALT NOT KILL That
and goods as Lessius hath now said but a Fryar may also kill to preserve his worldly honour according to the Jesuits Divinity This Doctrine at this day is very common in their Schools notwithstanding because it is ordinarily attributed to Amicus in particular and he himself makes no difficulty to declare himself the first Author thereof at least of many points which he propounds himself and which he saith he found neither cleared handled nor so much as propounded by any Author we will afford him the honour of being treated as the Father of a new opinion and we will represent apart his opinions upon this point since they are singular or at least were so when he first produced them For they have since made a marvellous progress as we shall see in the sequel of this Article He saith first as Lessius that to eschew the danger of losing life a Monk hath the same right as a secular person to kill him that assaults him whoever he be 1 Hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam non solum habet privatâ— persona contra privatam sed etiam privata contra publicam subditus contra Superiorem filius contra patrem pareâ—s contra filium Clericus aut Religiosus contra secularem contra absque ulla irregulatitatis contractione Amicus tom 5. de just jure disp 36. sect 4. num 76. pag. 537. This right saith he of defending his life belongs not only to one private person against another but also to a private against a publick person to a Subject against his Superiour a Son against his Father a Father against his Son an Ecclesiastick or Monk against a Secular a Secular against an Ecclesiastick or Monk without any irregularity thereby incurred But he stays not there he pretends that they may make use of this right of killing for the preservation of their repute in the world as well as their lives 2 Conveniunt suptadicti fas esse ad propulsandam ignominiam quam mihi aliquis inferre conatur illum praeveniendo occldere sicut fas est ad declinandam mortem quam mihi injustus invasor molitur illum occidere antequam mihi mortem vel mutilationem inserat Ibid. sect 7. num 106. pag. 542. The Authors of whom I speak saith he agree in this point that to defend our selves from an affront which would be given us it is lawful to prevent the aggressor by killing him in the same manner as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjustly of life or member it is lawful to kill him before he can execute his wicked design It seems at first sight that this general Proposition is to be extended only to the Laity But besides that he gives in all things which concern the right of killing the same liberty to the Monks as to the Laity as we shall see hereafter he declares it also here very manifestly For after he hath demanded whether that he now said 3 Sed adhuc superest difficultas an omnibus perfonis licitum sit in tutelam honoris invasorem occidere Negant id concessum esse Clericis Religiofis ut cum glossa in Clement Si furiosus de homicidio glossa in caput Suscepimus sub eodem titulo docent communiter Doctores Ibid. pag. 544. That it is lawful to kill in defence of honour ought to be extended to all sorts of persons And said that according to Law and the common opinion 〈◊〉 the Doctors it is forbidden the Religious he forbears not to say afterward 4 Negari tamen non potest honorem famamque illam quae ex virtute so sapientia nascitur quique verus honor est juste defendere Clerici aut Religiosi valeant ac saepe debcant cum hic sit proprius professionis corum Quem si amittant maximum bonum ac decus amittunt Ibid. num 118. pag. 544. That we cannot at least deny that Clergie-men and Fryars may and even are obliged to defend their honour and reputation which proceeds from vertue and prudence because this honour doth properly appertain to their profession and that if they lose it they lose a very great benefit and advantage The point of honour then according to the Principles of this Jesuits Divinity ought to be accounted amongst Church-men and Monks as well as amongst the most ambitious men of the world for one of their greatest blessings 1 Ergo saltem hunc honorem poterunt Clericiâ—c Religiosi cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae etiam cum morte invasoris defendere Ibid. Maximum bonum ac decus Whereupon he concludes and saith in the second place That the Clergie and Religious may at least defend their honour and in doing all which is necessary thereto may even kill him who would deprive them of it And to encourage and incline them to commit this Murder with greater confidence he represents it to them as an action of vertue and contents not himself to say that they may but declares that sometimes they ought to do it so that they should sin against Charity if they failed therein Quin interdum lege saltem charitatis videntur ad illum defendendum teneri Ibid. Yea and sometimes at least by the Law of Charity they seem obliged to defend it What kind of Religious Charity is this that obliges to commit Murders for fear of suffering some loss or diminution in worldly honour If it be Jesuitical Charity it is not that of S. Paul which he recommends unto Christians when he saith 2 Charitas non inflatur non est ambitiosa non quaerit quae sua sunt 1 Cor. 13. v. 4. That Charity is not puffed up is not ambitious and that it seeks no its own private interests Amicâ—s doth not content himself to have said once or twice very clearly that it is lawful for a Monk to kill for the point of honour he repeats it again as a thing very important drawing this conclusion from his Principle 3 Unde licebit Clerico vel Religioso calumniatorem gravia crimina de se vel de sua Religione spargere minâ—ntem occidere quando alius desendendi modus non supperat Ibid. It follows that it will be lawful for a Clergie-man or a Monk to kill a slanderer who threatens to publish some great crimes against him or his Order if he have no other means to defend himself therefrom It is not needful therefore according to him that a Monk attend until a slanderer speak evil of him or his Order that he may kill him it is sufficient that he threats to disgrace him and even without expecting this if he believes that he hath a will thereto and that he is disposed and ready to do it For in that case this Jesuit gives him the same right to kill him 4 Si calumniator fit paratus ea vel ipsi Religioso vel ejus Religioni publice ac coram gravissiâ—is viris impingere nisi occidatur Ibid. If
of a Thief 5 Juxta hanc doctrinam dicendum est fas esse furi qui ad furandum est ingressus interficere cum qui taliâ—de causa vult talem surem interficere quando aliter non potest evadere cam mortem Ibid. pag. 1766. num 2. According to this Doctrine we must say that a Thief being entred into a house to steal may in conscience kill him that would kill him for his Theft if he cannot otherwise escape death We must no more be so much astonished that they assure us that he from whom one would take life honour or goods may kill in his own defence and prevent the Assailant since they pretend that he who unjustly invadeth the honour or goods of another hath the same right and power He also maintains that in these occurrents wherein it is lawful to kill according to him it is lawful to defire it to lay a design for it and to do all we can to effect it See his words 1 Dicendum posse aggressum Intendere mortem aggressoris petendo ictu cor aut jugulum aggressoris animo cum prosternendi ac necandi quando videt sibl ita esse necessarium ad tute evadendum manus ejus Ib. disp 11. num 4. pag. 1755. We must say that he who is assaulted may form a design to kill the Assailant and direct his blow at his heart or throat that he may overthrow and killhim when he sees that it is necessary for him that so he may certainly escape out of his hands Tambourin permits us to have this determinate will of killing in our own defence all sorts of persons 2 Ut vitam meam defendam non vero ut vindictam sumam communis est doctrina posse à me occidi cum qui me injuste aggreditur etiam intendendo ejus mortem ut medium meae vitae licet is sit meus pater filius frater dominus conjux Sacerdos Religiosus sine periculo excommunicationis vel irregularitatis Hurtado Dicastillus alii apud Dianam Tambur lib. 6. Decal c. 1. sect 1. n. 1. It is saith he the common Doctrine without doubt amongst the Jesuits that to defend my life but not to revenge my self I may kill him who assaults me unjustly even with an intention to kill him his death being as a means to save my life yea though it were my Father Son Brother Master Wife a Priest or Monk without incurring any peril of Excommunication or irregularity He might have said moreover and added with merit and even with pretension to gain an Indulgence by this man-slaughter since according to his Brethren an action of this nature is good and honest and by consequence a matter capable of merit and indulgence Amicus saith in like manner 3 Infertur posse invasum in defensionem suae vitae intendere non quidem ut sinem sed ut medium necessarium mortem invadentis Amicus de just jur disp 36. num 78. pag. 538. That he who is assaulted may endeavour to kill the Assailant looking on his death not as his end but as a means to preserve his own life Dicastillus adds that this design of killing is honest 4 Asserendum est tanquam verissimum sicut honestum est in executione repellere aggressorem illum occidendo pari ratione honestum est ditecte illum velle intendere occidere ad repellendum illum conservandam proptiam vitam Dicastillus lib. 2. tr 1. disp 10. dub 4. num 41. We must say and maintain it as most true saith this Father that as it is an honest thing to repel him who assaults us by killing him so likewise it is honest directly to desire to kill him and to intend it for repelling him and defending our own life This is not simply to tolerate excuse or justifie murder this is highly to praise it and to stir up all people to commit it and to give themselves voluntarily to the practice of it as a good action to say as this Jesuit doth that the designment as well as the execution of it is commendable and honourable But if you have given occasion to this unjust Aggressor to invade you may you kill him You may according to the same Dicastillus 5 Non peccat peccato homicidil invalus qui occidir injustum invasorem etiamsi invasus dederit câ—usam invasionis Ibid. dub 5. num 25. He commits not a sin of man-slaughter who kills him that invades him unjustly though he gave him occasion to assault him That is to say that he who by any offence or injury done against a person hath given him occasion to assault him becomes just by taking up arms to maintain his injustice and may justly kill after he hath unjustly offended And herein he shall do also if you will believe this Doctor an honourable and commendable action Filliutius assures us also 6 in casu quo licet occidere invasorem etiam licitum est intendere ejus mortem tanquam medium necessarium ad sui defensionem Filliutius Moral qq tom 2. tr 29. cap. 3. num 37. pag. 358. That in occurrences wherein it is lawful to kill the Invader it is also lawful to desire his death as a means necessary for our defence Molina goes yet farther and saith that though in killing him who assaults unjustly we see that he will dye in an estate of eternal damnation yet nevertheless we may kill him without offending against that Charity which we owe unto our Neighbour 7 Tunc lege charitatis non est necesse praeponere viram illiuâ— spiritualem nostrae propriae corporali Imo vero nec honoriaut bonis externis quae ille velit injuste à nobis auferre Molina de just jure tr 3. disp 13. pag. 1751. Because in this case Charity obligeth not to prefer this mans spiritual before our own corporal life nor before our honour it self or our temporal goods which he would unjustly bereave us of That is to say that without violating the Laws of Charity and much less of Justice we may kill the body and soul of an enemy or thief and send him to Hell rather than suffer any loss in goods or honour or hazard our lives and if Charity should require any other thing of us in these occurrences its yoke would be according to this Jesuit unsupportable unreasonable and contrary to publick good and humane Society 1 Irrationabile autem importabile bonoque communi contrarium esset jugum praeceptum quo praeciptremur pati jâ—cturam injustam vitae bonorum omnium nostrorum externorum ne nos nostraque cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae defendendo interficeremus injuste aggressorem qui sua nequitia à tanta injustitia non vult desistere aut nicelle illa sua nequitia defistere â—olendo interitum incurrat aeternum Ibid. Otherwise saith he this would be a yoke and command unreasonable unsupportable and
to use the Pope in a base manner and unbecoming his Holiness and Greatness to will that he should pay his debts and acknowledge the Services done him at the charge of the Church and to the prejudice of the obedience which all the Faithful owe unto its Commands That which Escobar saith is no less extravagant 1 Dormire quis nequit nisi sumpâ—a coeâ—… teneturne jejunare Minime That no person who cannot sleep when he hath not supped is obliged to fast And he adds that which is more strange 2 Si sâ—fficit mane câ—liatiunculam sumere vespere coenare teneturne Non tenetur qula nemo tenetur pervertere ordinem refectionumâ— Escobar tract 1. exam 13. num 67. pag. 212. That if this person by making his Collation in the morning and reserving his supper till night could fast he would not be obliged thereunto because no person is obliged to pervert the order of his repast If he had been well informed of the order of Fasting and the manner wherein it was instituted in the Church he would have known that there was no order of repast in Fasting because the order of Fasting is that we take but one refection and that at supper as Bellarmin himself and many others acknowledge and so they that dine on Fast-days do pervert the order of Fasting rather than they who make their Collation in the morning and sup at night if the Church of its usual kindness did not tolerate dinners on these days and slight Collations at night 3 Potesâ—ne aliquis alio se conâ—eâ—re ut jâ—juâ—ium vitet Fagundus pesse respondet Ibid. num 64. p. 212. This same Jesuit gives us also another Expedient to exempt us from Fasting without necessity and dispensation which is to depart from the place where the Fast is and to go to another place where it is not observed And if any think that this is to deceive our selves whilst we think to deceive the Church Filliutius as we have already observed answers in a like case 4 Proprie loquendo non est ulla fraus si quis jure suo utatur potius est fugere obligationem praecepti Filliutius mor. qq tom 2. cap. 7. n. 116. pag. 261. That this is not to deceive the Church nor to elude its Command but only to avoid the obligation of the Commandment in pursuance of the right which every man hath to do it when he can that is to say that if the Church hath a right to command a Fast or Mass we have also a right to avoid them and to do all we can that we may not be obliged to obey it and after this we shall not cease in the Judgment of the Jesuits to be faithful and obedient Children of the Church because we neither offend nor deceive in making use of this right Non est ulla fraus si quis utatur jure suo The last question which I shall report here concerning the dispensing with Fasts and the use of meats on Fasting-days is Escobars also 5 Quid de pueris Ante septennium comedere carnes poslunt Ibid. num 10. p. 201. Darine possunt carnes pueris ante septennium si sunt deli capaces Possunt quia accidentale est quod in aliquo usus rationis acceleretur Ibid. n. 52. pag. 210. Quid de Paganis Etiam quia non tenentur legibus Christisnorum Quid de amentibus Cum pueris ante septennium computandi Ibid. n. 52. p. 210. He demands if we may on Fast-days give flesh to children under seven years old To which he answers that they may eat it before they attain that age He demands a little after whether in case they have the use of reason before that age we may make them cat flesh And his answer is that we may because it is by accident that the use of reason in any person prevents that age It behoves them therefore who would give flesh to these children not to seem to know that they have the use of reason and that they may eat with a safer conscience to present it to them without acquainting them that the Church forbids them to eat it That we may hold them in this ignorance and conceal from them their fault they must be hindered from learning the Commandments of the Church and must not be brought to Church where they are published every Lords-day He saith the same thing of Pagans and those that have lost their Wits consenting that we may make them eat flesh on Fast-days as well as children because the one sort have no use of reason and the other are not subject to the Commands of the Church By this same reason we may suffer Fools and Infants to blaspheme and tolerate them in all sorts of crimes because having no reason they sin not in committing them We may make them also to violate all the Laws of the Church who are Infidels because they acknowledge not the Church and are not subject unto it but rather are its declared enemies As if a Father who had forbid something to be done in his house under grievous penalties could take it well for his Son to cause it to be done by a stranger or a fool not daring to do it himself In the mean time they would have the Church to be well satisfied with a Christian who out of a Frolick causes its Laws to be violated in his house by his houshold-servants under pretence that they are Children Fools or Insidels They must be Fools or Infants that can believe so great a Paradox and worse than an Infidel to have so little care of their Houshold and to proceed to so gross and visible a contempt of the Church and Religion But may we not at least condemn those who induce others to violate the Fast Tambourin who hath had a care to secure Victuallers in this point saith 1 Quando probabiliter putantur accedentes non violatu ri jejunium possunt caupones vendentes cibos iis ministrare venders atque Invitare Std quid si sit dubium Adhuc poterunt quia nisi certo constet contrarium nemo est praesumendus malus At quando probabiliter vel certo sciunt violaturos concestu est difficilius Concedimus tamen satis probabiliter ...... quia ministratio illa imo ultronea invitatio non fit à caupone vel venditore directe alliciendo ad non jejunandum atque adeo ad peccandum sed ad lucrum expiscandum Tambur lib. 4. decal cap. 5. sect 6. num 4. 7. That when they probably believe that those who come to their houses break not their Fast it is evident that an Inn-keeper or Cook may give and sell them victuals And though they doubt whether or no they violate the Fast they yet may do it because we ought not presume that a man is wicked unless we know it And by consequence we must not presume that he will break his Fast But if