Maskew which I confess is a full authority for this that they need not joyn The Case was thus The Testator recovers a Iudgment and dies making his Will thus Also I devise the residue of my Estate to my two Daughters and my Wife whom I make my Executrix I confess I cannot tell why but the Spiritual Court did judge them all both the two Daughters as well as the Wife to be Executrices and therefore we the Iudges must take them to be so The Wife alone proves the Will with a reservata potestate to the Daughters when they should come in But this makes nothing at all in this Case I think this is according to their usual form The Wife alone sues a Scire facias upon this Iudgment and therein sets forth this whole matter viz. that there were two other Executrices which were under seventeen c. It was adjudged for the Plaintiff and affirmed in a Writ of Errour in Cam. Scacc̄ that the Scire facias was well brought by her alone But first I cannot see how a Writ of Errour should lie in that Case in Cam. Scacc̄ For it is not a Cause within 27 Eliz. 2. What reason is there for Iudgment a reason may be given that before an Executor comes to seventeen he is no Executor But I say he is quoad esse though not quoad Excecutionem A Wife Administratrix under seventeen shall joyn with her Husband in an Action and why shall not the Infants as well in our Case Yelv. 130. is express that the Infant must joyn and be named It is clear that no Administration durante minore aetate can be committed in this Case For all the Executors make but one person and therefore why may not all joyn 2. Admitting they may joyn whether the Infants may sue by Attorney I hold that in no Case an Infant shall sue or be sued either in his own or auter droit by Attorney There are but four ways by which any man can sue In propria persona per Attornatum per Guardianum and per Prochein amy 1 Ro. 747. aut 340. 400. post 747. An Infant cannot sue in propria persona That was adjudged in Dawkes versus Peyton It was an excellent Case and there were many notable Points in it First It was Resolved That a Writ of Errour might be brought in this Court upon an Errour in Fact in the Petty Bagg 2. That the Entry being general venit such a one it shall he intended to be in propia persona 3. That it was Error for the Infant in that Case to appear otherwise than by a Guardian 4. That the Errour was not helped by the Statute of Jeoffails In a Case between Colt Sherwood Mich. 1649. an Infant Administrator sued and appeared per Guardianum and it appeared upon the Record that he was above seventeen years of age I was of Council in it and we insisted it was Errour but it was adjudged That he appeared as he ought to appear and that he ought not to appear by Attorney And the Reasons given were First Because an Infant cannot make an Attorney by reason of his inability Secondly Because by this means an Infant might be amerced pro falso Clamore For when he appears by Attorney non constat unless it happen to be specially set forth that he is an Infant and so he is amerced at all adventures and to relieve himself against this he has no remedy but by a Writ of Errour For Errour in Fact cannot be assignd ore tenus And it were well worth the Cost to bring a Writ of Errour to take off an amercement But it is said That the Infants may appear by Attorney in this Case because they are coupled and joyned in company with those of full age I think that makes no difference for that reason would make such appearance good in case that they were all Defendants But it is agreed That if an Infant be Defendant with others who are of full age he cannot appear by Attorney The reason is the same in both Cases If an Infant and two men of full age joyn in a Feoffment and make a Letter of Attorney c. this is not good nor can in any sort take away the imbecility which the Law makes in an Infant I conclude I think the Plaintiffs ought to joyn but the Infants ought to appear by Guardian But since my two Brothers are of another mind as to the last Point there must be Iudgment that the Defendant respondeat ouster Nota Coleman argued for the Defendant his Argument which ought to have been inserted above was to this effect First These five cannot joyn had there been but one Executor and he under seventeen years the Administrator durant̄ minor̄ c. ought to have brought the Action 5 Co. 29. a. But since there are several Executors and some of them of full age there can be no Administration durant ' minor̄ Those of full age must Administer for themselves and the Infants to But the course is that Executors of full age prove the Will and the other that is under age shall not come in till his age of seventeen years But now the question is How this Action should have beén brought I say according to the President of Hatton versus Maskew which was in Cam. Scacc̄ Mich. 15 Car. 2. Rot. 703. wherein the Executor who was of full age brougt the Scire fac̄ but set forth that there were other two Executors who were under age and therefore they which were of full age pray Iudgment It was resolved the Scire fac̄ was well brought and they agreed That the Cases in Yelverton 130. was good Law because in that Case it was not set forth specially in the Declaration that there was another Executor under age So that they Resolved That the Executor of full age could not bring the Action without naming the others 2. However the Infants ought to sue by Guardian and where Rolls and other Books say that where some are of age and some under they may all sue by Artorney It is to be understood of such as are indeed under 21 but above 17. Respondeas ouster After this the Suit was Compounded Term. Pasch 22 Car. II. Regis The great Case in Cancellaria between Charles Fry and Ann his Wife against George Porter Resolved That there is no Relief in Equity against the Forfeiture of Land limited over by Devise in Marrying without consent c. Many particulars concerning Equity THe Case was Montjoy Earl of Newport was seized of an house called Newport-house c. in the County of Middlesex and had three Sons who were then living and two Daughters Isabel married to the Earl of Banbury with her Fathers consent who had issue A. the Plaintiff and Ann married to Mr. Porter without her Fathers Consent who had issue D. both these Daughters dyed The Earl of Newport made his Will in this manner I give and bequeath to my dear wife
persons who were all capable that there was no difference betwixt that case and this Ellis said that in Floyd Gregories case reported in Jones it was made a point and that Jones in his argument denied the case of Hunt Singleton he said that himself and Sir Rowland Wainscott reported it and that nothing was said of that point but that my Lord Coke followed the Report of Serjeant Bridgeman who was three or four years their puisne and that he mistook the case Milword Ingram THe Plaintiff declares in an Action of the case upon a quantum meruit for 40 shillings and upon an Indebitat Assumpsit for 40 shillings likewise The Defendant acknowledged the promises but further says that the Plaintiff and he accounted together for divers sums of money and that upon the foot of the Account the Defendant was found to be endebted to the Plaintiff in 3 shillings and that the Plaintiff in consideration that the Defendant promised to pay him those 3 shillings discharged him of all demands The Plaintiff demurred The Court gave Iudgment against the demurrer 1. They held that if two men being mutually endebted to each other do account together and the one is found in arrear so much and there be an express agréement to pay the sum found to be in arrear and each to stand discharged of all other demands that this is a good discharge in Law and the parties cannot resort to the original Contracts But North Ch. Just said if there were but one Debt betwixt them entring into an account for that would not determine the Contract 2. They held also that any promise might well be discharged by paroll but not after it is broken for then it is a Debt Jones Wait. SHrewsbury Cotton are Towns adjoining Sir Samuel Jones is Tenant in Tail of Lands in both Towns Shrewsbury Cotton are both within the Liberties of the Town of Shrewsbury Sir Samuel Jones suffers a Common Recovery of all his Lands in both Vills but the Praecipe was of two Messuages and Closes thereunto belonging these were in Shrewsbury and of c. mentioning those in Cotton lying and being in the Ville of Shrewsbury in the Liberties thereof And whether by this Recovery the Lands lying in Cotton which is a distinct Ville of it self not named in the Recovery pass or not was the question Serjeant Jones argued against the Recovery He cited Cr. Jac. 575. in Monk Butler's case Cr. Car. 269 270. 276. he said the Writ of Covenant upon which a Fine is levied is a personal Action but a Common Recovery is a real Action and the Land it self demanded in the Praecipe There is no President he said of such a Recovery He cited a case Hill 22 23 Car. 2. Rot. 223. Hutton 106. Marche's Reports one Johnson Baker's case which he said was the case in point and resolved for him But the Court were all of Opinion that the Lands in Cotton passed And gave Iudgment accordingly Ellis said if the Recovery were erroneous at least they ought to allo 〈…〉 t till it were reversed Lepping Kedgewin AN Action in the nature of a Conspiracy was brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant in which the Declaration was insufficient The Defendant pleaded an ill plea but Iudgment was given against the Plaintiff upon the insufficiency of the Declaration Which ought to have been entred Quod Defendens eat inde sine die but by mistake or out of design it was entred Quia placitum praedictum in forma praedicta superius placitat ' materiaque in eodem contenta bonum sufficiens in lege existit c. ideo consideratum est per Cur ' quod Quer ' nil capiat per billam The Plaintiff brings a new Action and declares aright The Defendant pleads the Iudgment in the former Action and recites the Record verbatim as it was To which the Plaintiff demurred And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff nisi causa c. North Chief Justice There is no question but that if a man mistakes his Declaration and the Defendant demurs the Plaintiff may set it right in a second Action But here it is objected that the Iudgment is given upon the Defendants plea. Suppose a Declaration be faulty and the Defendant take no advantage of it but pleads a plea in bar and the Plaintiff takes issue and the right of the matter is found for the Defendant I hold that in this case the Plaintiff shall never bring his Action about again for he is estopped by the Verdict Or suppose such a Plaintiff demur to the plea in bar there by his demurrer he confesseth the fact if well pleaded and this estops him as much as a Verdict would But if the plea were not good then there is no Estoppel And we must take notice of the Defendants plea for upon the matter as that falls out to be good or otherwise the second Action will be maintainable or not The other Iudges agreed with him in omnibus Atkinson Rawson THe Plaintiff declares against the Defendant as Executor The Defendant pleads that the Testator made his Will and that he the Defendant suscepto super se onere Testamenti praedict c. did pay divers sums of money due upon specialties and that there was a Debt owing by the Testator to the Defendants Wife and that he retained so much of the Testators Goods as to satisfie that Debt and that he had no other Assets The Plaintiff demurred because for ought appears the Defendant is an Executor de son tort and then he cannot retain for his own debt The Plaintiffs naming him in his Declaration Executor of the Testament of c. will not make for him for that he does of necessity he cannot declare against him any other way and of that Opinion was all the Court viz. that he ought to entitle himself to the Executorship that it may appear to the Court that he is such a person as may retain And accordingly Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Term. Hill 27 28 Car. II. in Com. Banco Smith's Case A Man dies leaving Issue by two several Venters viz. by the first three Sons and by the second two Daughters One of the Sons dies intestate the elder of the two surviving Brothers takes out Administration and Sir Lionel Jenkins Iudge of the Prerogative Court would compell the Administrator to make distribution to the Sisters of the half-blood He prayed a Prohibition but it was denied upon advice by all the Iudges for that the Sisters of the half-blood being a kin to the Intestate and not in remotiori gradu then the Brother of the whole blood must be accounted in equal degree Anonymus AN Action was brought against four men viz. two Attornies and two Solicitors for being Attornies and Solicitors in a cause against the Plaintiff in an inferiour Court falso malitiose knowing that there was no cause of Action against him and
pleaded A special Verdict that the Lands are Copyhold Lands and surrendred to the use of one for eleven years the Remainder for five years to the Daughter the Remainder to the right heirs of the Tenant for eleven years The eleven years expire the Daughter is admitted the five years expire And there being a Son and Daughter by one Venter and a Son by another Venter the Son of the first Venter dies before admittance and the Daughter of the first Venter and her Husband bring Trover for cutting down of Trees And the question was if the admittance of Tenant for years was the admittance of the Son in Remainder Levings I conceive it is and then the Son is seized and the Daughter of the whole blood is his heir and he cited 4 Rep. 23. 3 Cro. 503. Bunny's case Wyld The Estate is bound by the Surrender Hales If a man doth surrender to the use of John Styles till admitted there is no Estate in him but remains in the Surrenderor but he hath a right to have an admittance If a surrender be to J. S. and his heirs his heir is in without admittance if J. S. dies About this hath indeed been diversity of Opinion but the better Opinion hath been according to the Lord Coke's Opinion I do not see any inconvenience why the admission of Tenant for life or years should not be the admittance of all in Remainder for Fines are to be paid notwithstanding by the particular Remainders and so the Books say it shall be no prejudice to the Lord. Twisd I think it is strong that the admission of Lessee for years is the admission of him in Remainder for as in a case of possessio fratris the Estate is bound so that the Sister shall be heir so here the Estate is bound and goes to him in Remainder Hales I shall not prejudice the Lord for if a Fine be assessed for the whole Estate there is an end of the business but if a Fine be assessed only for a particular Estate the Lord ought to have another If a surrender be to the use of A. for life the Remainder to his eldest Son c. or to the use of A. and his heirs and then A. dies the Estate is in the Son without admittance whether he takes by purchase or descent And Iudgment was given accordingly Draper versus Bridwell Rot. 320. ALL the Court held that an Action of Debt would lye upon a Iudgment after a Writ of Error brought Twisden They in the Spiritual Court will give Sentence for Tythes for rakings though they be never so unvoluntarily left which our Law will not allow of Wyld said that Actions personal transitory though the party doth live in Chester yet they may be brought in the Kings Courts Hales Shew a President where a man can wage his Law in an Action brought upon a Prescription for a duty as in an Action of Debt for Toll by Prescription you cannot wage your Law Pybus versus Mitford Postea THe Chief Iustice delivered his Opinion Wyld Rainsford and Twisden having first delivered theirs Hales I think Iudgment ought to be given for the Defendant whether the Son take by descent or purchase I shall divide the case 1 Whether the Son doth take by descent 2 Admitting he doth not whether he can take by purchase We must make a great difference betweén Conveyances of Estates by way of use and at Common Law A man cannot convey to himself an Estate by a Conveyance at Common Law but by way of Vse he may But now in our case here doth doth retorn by operation of Law an Estate to Michael for his life which is conjoyned with the Limitation to his heirs The reason is because a Limitation to the heirs of his body is in effect to himself this is perfectly according to the intention of the parties Objection The use being never out of Michael he hath the old use and so it must be a Contingent use to the heirs of his body But I say we are not here to raise a new Estate in the Covenantor but to qualifie the Estate in Fee in himself for the old Estate is to be made an Estate for life to serve the Limitation Further Objection It shall be the old Estate in Fee as if a man deviseth his Lands to his heirs the heir is in of the old Estate But I answer if he qualifie the Estate the Son must take it so as in Hutton fo So in this case is a new qualification Roll 789. 15 Jac. If a man makes a Feoffment to the use of the heirs of the body of the Feoffor the Feoffor hath an Estate Tail in him Pannel versus Fenne Moor 349. Englefield and Englefield 2 I conceive if it were not possible to take by descent this would be a Contingent use to the heirs of the body Objection It is limited to the heir when no heir in being Why I say it would have come to the heir at Common Law if no express Limitation had been and it cannot be intended that he did mean an heir at Common Law because he did specially limit it Fitz. tit Entayle 23. An Assise for the Serjeant at Mace's place in the House of Commons The Plaintiff had his Patent read The Court asked if they could prove Seisin They answered that they had recovered in an Action upon the case for the mean profits and had Execution Court For ought we know that will amount to a seisin Twisden Vpon your grant since you could not get seisin you should have gone into Chancery and they would have compelled him to give you seisin Hales A man may bring an Action upon the case for the profits of an Office though he never had seisin So the Record was read of his Recovery in an Action upon the case for the profits Hales This is but a seisin in Law not a seisin in Fact The Counsel for the Plaintiff much urged that the Recovery and Execution had of the profits was a sufficient seisin to entitle them to an Assise It was objected that the Plaintiff was never invested into the Office Hales said That an investiture did not make an Officer when he is created by Patent as this is but he is an Officer presently But if he were created an Herald at Arms as in Segars case he must be invested before he can be an Officer a person is an Officer before he is sworn Hales You are the Pernor of the profits and they have recovered them is not this a Seisin against you They shall find it specially but they chose rather to be Non-suit because of the delay by a special Verdict And the Court told them they could not withdraw a Iuror in an Assise for then the Assise would be depending The Roll of the Action sur le case fuit 19 Car. 2. Mich. Rot. 557. Term. Trin. 15 Car. II. 1663. Judge Hide 's Argument in the Exchequer-Chamber Manby versus Scott A Feme Covert departs
Husband as those persons should approve and this marriage is so approved I rely upon this matter but especially upon the word of Notice Serjeant Ellis There was a Case of a Proviso not to marry but with the consent of certain persons first had in writing Consent was had but not in writing and yet you rul'd it good Had this been a Condition in Law as 't is in fact the Law would have helped her If the Estate had been in her there might have been some reason that she should have 〈◊〉 taken notice how it came to her and of the Limitation c. Had the Earl been alive and consented to the Marriage after it was solemnized he would have continued his affection and the Plaintiffs have had the Estate still Why now the consent of the Lords and Countess is as much as his consent he had tranferred his consent to them This is a Ratihabitio you cannot have a Case of more Circumstances of Equity 1. An Infant 2. No notice 3. Consent after 4. Their Declaration that they thought my Lord meant it in terrorem c. What if two of the Trusteés had died should she never have married surely you would have relieved her Serjeant Baldwin Here is as full a consent to the Marriage as could well be in this Case For since the Plaintiff had no notice of the necessity of the Earls consent before the Marriage it had been the strangest and unexpectedest thing in the world that she should have gone about to have askt it The Heir should not have taken notice of such a Forfeiture and why should a man that is named by way of remainder In case of a personal Legacy this were a void Proviso by the Civil Law For I have informed my self of it It is a Maxim with them Matrimonium esse Liberum This amounts to as much as the Condition that the person should not marry at all For when 't is in the Trustées power they may propose the unagreeablest person in the World 't is a most unreasonable power and not to be favoured Sir Thomas Grimes setled his Land so that his Son should pay portions and if he did not he demised the Lands over and it was adjudged relieveable If I limit that my Daughter shall marry with the consent of two c. if each of them have a design for a different Friend if you will not relieve she can never marry Is it not more probable that if the Earl had lived he would rather have given her a Maintenance than have concluded her under perpetual misfortune and disherison Keeling Chief Justice I do not sée how an averment or proof can be received to make out a mans intention against the words of the Will 4 Co. 4. a. 5 Co. 68. Plo. 345. In Vernon's Case though it were a Case of as much Equity as could be it was denied to be received and so in my Lord Cheney's Case Here was a Case of Sir Thomas Hatton somewhat like this Case wherein no Relief could be had Vaughan Chief Justice I wonder to hear of citing of Presidents in matter of Equity For if there be equity in a Case that Equity is an universal Truth Vi. 1 In. 216. and there can be no President in it So that in any President that can be produced if it be the same with this Case the reason and equity is the same in it self And if the President be not the same Case with this it is not to be cited being not to that purpose Bridgman Lord-Keeper Certainly Presidents are very necessary and useful to us for in them we may find the reasons of the Equity to guide us and beside the authority of those who made them is much to be regarded We shall suppose they did it upon great Consideration and weighing of the matter and it would be very strange and very ill if we should disturb and set aside what has been the course for a long Series of time and ages Thereupon it was Ordered That they should be attended with Presidents and then they said they would give their Opinions Three weeks after they came into Chancery again and delivered their Opinions Seriatim in this manner viz. Hale Chief Baron The general question is whether this Decrée shall pass I shall divide what I have to say into these three questions or particulars First I shall consider whether this be a good Condition or Limitation or conditional Limitation For so I had rather call it It being a Condition to determine the Estate of the Plaintiff and a Limitation to let in the Defendant I think it is good both in Law and Equity and my reasons are first because it is a collateral Condition to the Land and not against the nature of the Estate and she is not thereby bound from Marriage Secondly it obliged her to no more then her duty she had no Mother and in case of Marriage she ought to make application to her Grandmother who was in loco Parentis and since the Estate moved from the Grandfather she was Mistris of the disposition and manner of it 'T is true by the Civil Ecclesiastical Law regularly such a Condition were void And therefore if the question were of a Legacy there might be a great deal of reason to question the validity of it because in those Courts wherein Legacies are properly handled it would have been void But this is a case of Land Devise Indeed it is agreed that this is a good Condition and not to be avoided in it self Secondly This being a good Condition and Limitation over The Question is whether there be relief against it in Equity admitting it were a wilful breach I think there ought not to be any I differ from the reasons pressed at the Bar as first That it was a devise by Will by virtue of the Statute c. but that doth not stick with me For if there may not be a relief against a breach of a Condition in a Will there would be a great shatter and confusion in mens Estates and some of those settled by great advice and there have been Presidents of relief in such cases 2 Car. Fitz versus Seymour And 10 Car. Salmon versus Bernard Secondly It has been urged there should be no relief because there is a Limitation over But that I shall not go upon neither There have been many reliefs in such Cases I will decline the latitude of the Objection for that would go a great deal further then we are aware But yet I think there ought to be no relief in this Case It is not like the case of payment of money because there the party may be answered his debt with damages at another day and so may be fully satisfied of all that is intended him But here my first reason is That it is a Condition to contain the party in that due Obedience which Law and nature require 2 'T is a voluntary settlement to the Grandaughter in