Officers to be excused from doing it made them a sort of libellati although their names were never entred in the Heathen Rolls and they were forced to undergo severe penance before they were restored to the communion of the Church So much simplicity and singleness of heart was then supposed necessary to the Christian profession No directing the intention no secret reservation no absolution either before committing the fact or immediately upon confession of it were ever heard of or allowed in those days of Christian innocency and simplicity If the Heathen Officers sought after Christians they neither lied to them nor betrayed their Brethren but would rather endure torments themselves than expose others to them for which reason S. Augustin highly commends the resolution of Firmus an African Bishop who rather chose to be tortured himself than discover a Christian committed to his care who was sought after for no other reason but because he was a Christian and the Heathen Emperour himself was so pleased with it that for his sake he forgave the other person and suffered him to enjoy his liberty When the Christians were summoned before the Heathen Tribunals they used no shifting tricks or evasions they concealed no part in their minds of what was necessary to make what they spake to be true they did not first peremptorily deny what they knew to be true and then back such a denial with horrid oaths and dreadful imprecations upon themselves and after all think to justifie the doing so by vertue of some secret reservation in their own minds Is this becoming the simplicity and ingenuity of Christians Such may possibly think themselves Wise as Serpents in so doing but I am sure they are far from being innocent as Doves But are there any who go under the name of Christians who own and defend such practices I think indeed scarce any who went under the name of honest Heathens ever did it For they did not only require constancy and fidelity in oaths and promises but simplicity anâ— sincerity both in the making and keeping 〈◊〉 them They condemned the Romans wh 〈…〉 t to avoid their oath by a trick and 〈…〉 ck to the Carthaginians they mig 〈…〉 e constancy of Regulus in observing the words of his oath as to his return although very capable of a mental reservation and if he did not promise the Carthaginians to perswade the Roman Senate to the Peace he behaved himself with great sincerity as well as constancy When the King of Persia thought by a trick to avoid the oath he had made to one of his Neighbour Princes viz. That he would not pass such a stone which was set up as a Boundary between them and he took up the stone and caused it to be carried before his Army his Counsellours told him they feared such deceit would never prosper with him because as the Prince sent him word Covenants are to be understood according to the plain meaning of the words and not according to any secret reservation Since then the very Heathens disallowed such artifices and frauds are there any worse than Heathens that justifie and maintain them Is not this rather an artifice and fraud of their Adversaries to render them odious But even in this respect we ought to be harmless as Doves and therein lies a necessary part of Christian Ingenuity in not charging on others more than they are guilty of I shall therefore fairly represent the doctrine held in the Church of Rome about these matters and leave you to judge how far it is consistent with Christian Simplicity There are some things wherein the Divines of the Roman Church are agreed and some things wherein they differ The things wherein they are agreed are these 1. That an Officious lie is but a venial sin This they do not stick to declare to be the common opinion of all their Divines Ex communi-omnium sententiâ saith Azorius A lie that hurts no-body but is intended for the good of others is no mortal sin and herein all are agreed saith Reginaldus because say they where there is no other fault but the meer falsity it is not of its own nature and kind any mortal sin for a lye of it self is a harmless thing or at least saith Lessius the hurt is not great that it doth and it is no great matter whether men be deceived or not if they do not suffer much by it and from hence he concludes it to be venial in its own nature It is true they say an officious lie may become a mortal sin by accident when it is confirmed by an oath when it is too publick and scandalous and used by those from whom the people expects Truth as Bishops and Preachers and Religious men saith Sayr Not even in them saith Navarr unless the scandal be great or their consciences tell them they are mortal sins or some other circumstances make it so If it be in matter of judicature although the thing be small yet I think a lie a mortal sin saith Cajetan because men are then bound to speak truth That reason is of no force at all say Soto and Navarr for that circumstance alone doth not alter the nature of the sin So that if a man tells never so many lyes provided he intend to hurt no body by them they do not make one mortal sin For that is a fixed Rule among the Casicists that an infinite number of venial sins do not amount to one mortal and consequently though they have obliquity in them yet they do not put a man out of the Favour of God But upon these principles what security have men to invent and spread abroad lyes provided they are intended for a good end in their own opinion What sincerity is to be expected when the confessing a truth may do them injury and the telling a lye may do them good For even Cajetan himself makes that only a pernicious lye when a man designs to do mischief by it They cry out upon it as a great scandal for any of us to say they think it lawful to lye for the Catholick cause and in truth they do not say so in words for they still say a lye is unlawful for any end whatsoever but here lyes the subtilty of it They grant it in general to be a fault but such a venial such an inconsiderable fault if it be for a good end and they have so many wayes to expiate the guilt of venial sins that the difference is very little as to the practice of it from making it no sin at all And some think they had better own downright lying than make use of such absurd wayes of evading it by mental reservations by which men may be truly said to affirm that which they do deny and to deny that which they do affirm But notwithstanding this 2. They are agreed that in some cases thâ—… which otherwise would be a lye is none by
fineness For they allow the same words to be said either in oaths or Testimonies i. e. a plain denial of what they know to be true but only differ from the other as to the way of excusing such a denial from being a lie which say they depends on the circumstances of denying and not upon the reservation of the mind So Malderus himself grants that a guilty person being examined upon a capital Offence may deny the fact with this reservation so as to be bound to tell it but then he saith the circumstances give that sense and not the reservation in his mind But saith Emonerius or rather a famous Iesuite under that name these circumstances only limit the words to such a sense which they cannot otherwise bear because in such circumstances a man is not bound to declare what he knows therefore saith he whereever there is a reasonable cause of concealing what a man knows such mental reservations are to be understood and so there is the same liberty allowed in practice Among the late Casuists none hath seemed to have written with more pomp and vanity against mental Restrictions than Caramuel yet he not only allows a Confessour to deny upon oath what he heard in Confession but in case of secret Murder that a man may with a good conscience deny the Fact though the Judge be competent and proceed according to due form of Law What way can this be excused from a lye since he saith a mental reservation will not do it He hath a fetch beyond this A Iudge is only to proceed upon evidence if there be no sufficient evidence against him he may persist in denying it because it cannot be fully proved and therefore his denyal saith he is of such a fact which he can proceed upon and what cannot be proved is none in Law These are the shifts of those who seem most to oppose the Iesuitical art of Equivocation and inveigh bitterly against it as a thing wholly repugnant to the Truth of our words and the sincerity of our minds and that Candour and Simplicity which ought to be in Christians But in my apprehension they had altogether as good take up with the dull way of lying or with the common artifice of equivocation and mental reservation as make use of such refinings as these But however we gain this considerable advantage by them that they do assure us that mental reservations are so far from excusing the words spoken from being a lye that they contain a premeditated lye and so the sin is the more aggravated by them that all such propositions are in themselves false and designed only to deceive others and so all the effect and consequence of lying follow them that there is nothing so false but may be made true nothing so true but may be made false by this means Caramuel gives a remarkable instance of this kind in some of the Articles of the Creed for by this way of mental reservation a man might truly say Christ was not born understanding it secretly at Constantinople He did not suffer viz. at Paris He was not buried viz. in Persia. He did not rise again viz. in Japan Nor ascended into Heaven viz. from America so that by this blessed Art the most abominable Heresies may be true doctrine and the most cursed lyes prove precious Truths Besides they confess that it takes away all confidence in mens words and destroys all sincerity of conversation and the very inclination to speak Truth For as Malderus well observes there is no reason men should not have the same liberty in private conversation which is allowed them before an incompetent Iudge and some Iesuites themselves grant that if the common use of it be allowed there can be no security as to mens words there being nothing so false but it may be made true in this way And no man can be charged with a lye till they know his heart nor the Devil himself in all his lying Oracles who surely had wit enough to make some secret reservation and a very little will serve for that according to Suarez who saith it is enough in the general that a man intend to affirm or deny in some true sense although he know not what Since from their own Authors we thus far understand the mischievous consequence of these practices it will not be amiss to set down briefly the cases wherein they are commonly allowed 1. In general Whereever there is a just and reasonable Cause for concealing of Truth For that is the most general rule they give in this case where a man is not bound to speak his whole mind he may utter one half and reserve the other half of one entire proposition Now a just and reasonable Cause with them is declining of danger or obtaining any advantage to themselves either as to body honour or estate In all such cases they allow that a man may speak what is simply false and swear to it too provided that he hold something in his mind which makes it true But if a man happen to do it without just cause what then doth he lye doth he forswear himself by no means But he is guilty of Indiscretion and is that all then they tell him for his comfort that an oath that wants only discretion is no mortal sin 2. If a man be barred the use of Equivocation or mental reservation that doth not hinder the using it even in renouncing equivocation Even Soto himself saith that if a Magistrate requires from a person to speak simply all he knows of such a matter i. e. without any reservation a man may still answer he knows nothing of it i. e. with this reservation to tell him But what if in particular saith he he asks about a secret Murder whether Peter killed John which he alone saw doth it not seem to be a lye for him to say he knows nothing of it No saith he for still the meaning is so as he is bound to tell F. Parson speaks home to this point Suppose saith he a Iudge asks a man whether he doth equivocate or not He may answer Not but with another equivocation But if he still suspects he equivocates what then is to be done he may deny it with another equivocation and so toties quoties as often as he asks the other may deny and still with a farther equivocation Suppose a Priest saith Iacob à Graffiis be asked a thing he heard in confession may he deny that he knew it Yes saith he and swear it too because he knew it not as man But suppose he be asked whether he knew it not as man but as God He may deny it still with another equivocation i. e. not as God himself but as his Minister What if a Iudge saith Bonacina be so unreasonable to bar all equivocation yet the respondent may equivocate still And he cites several others of theirs who defended this
practice and therefore Barns saith it is so slippery a thing that the faster you think to hold it the sooner it gets from you 3. If a man be charged with a secret crime which cannot be sufficiently proved by Testimonies beyond all exception he may safely deny it though he were guilty of it If a man saith Lessius can make any exception against the Witnesses or shew that it was a report spread abroad by men that bore ill will to him or that there was some mistake in it he is not bound to confess the truth and consequently he may deny it with a reservation Nay as long as the thing is so secret that a man may probably defend himself and hope to escape he may persist in denying the fact although the Iudge do proceed according to due Form of Law saith the same Lessius It is no mortal sin to deny it saith Filliucius Not though others be like to suffer for it saith Em. Sà especially if the punishment be capital saith Filliucius and others in him But if a man doth suspect whether the Judge doth proceed according to due form of Law which depends upon his opinion of the proofs and Witnesses brought against him they make no question then but he may deny the fact by help of an easie reservation in his mind 4. If a man hath denyed the Fact when he was bound to confess it in Court according to their rules yet they will not allow that he is bound to confess it before execution Because saith Navarr confession to a Priest and absolution by him is sufficient for salvation His Confessour ought not to put him upon it saith Diana Not unless it be clearer than Noon-day that the Law compels them to it say others i. e. that they have no kind of exceptions again the judicial proceedings Some thought they ought then to do it for the reputation of the Judges who otherwise might suffer in the esteem of the People as condemning innocent persons but this is over-ruled by the generality of the later Casuists because the presumption is alwayes on the side of the Judges when they proceed according to Law But one of the latest Casuists hath given an excellent Reason against publick Confession because they are accounted Cowards and Fools that make it 5. Where the Judge is supposed incompetent they make no question of the use of Equivocation and mental reservation in denying the crimes they are guilty of An incompetent Iudge is one that wants lawful jurisdiction over the person as if a Lay-man pretend to judge one in Orders according to their doctrine of exemption or if a Heretick or excommunicated person take upon him to judge good Catholicks And thus they look on all our Iudges as incompetent of which besides the general charge of Heresie we have this particular evidence When the unquietness of the Iesuites gave just occasion to those severe Laws which were made after the Bull of Pius 5. several cases were proposed at Rome for Resolution in order to the better conduct of their affairs here and among the rest this Suppose an oath be required in an Heretical Court before incompetent Iudges quales sunt omnes nunc in Anglia as all are now in England how far doth such an oath bind The Answer is no farther than the Person that swears did intend it should and he may either refuse the oath or he may Sophisticè juâ— are Sophisticè respondre he may swear and answer with juggling and equivocation and he that discovers any by vertue of his oath commits a double sin And in the Answers approved by Pius 5. our Iudges are declared incompetent and our Courts of Iudicature unlawful Courts and therefore no man by his oath is bound to confâ—ss any thing to the prejudice of the Catholick Cause nor to answer according to the intention of the Iudge but in some true sense of his own So that we not only see the doctrine and practice of equivocation approved by the Holy Sec but all legal Authority among us utterly rejected as having no jurisdiction over them And all who allow this practice do thereby discover that what they call Heresie doth take away the civil Rights and Properties of men For if Heresie makes out Iudges incompetent by necessary consequence it must deprive the King of the right to his Throne it must take away all the obligation of our Laws and the title every man hath to his estate Such pernicious consequences do follow the wisdom of the Serpent where it is not joyned with the innocence and simplicity of the Dove and not only pernicious to Government but to themselves too when these arts are understood and discovered for what security can there be from the most solemn oaths the most deep and serious protestations of those persons who at the same time believe that none of these things do bind them but by some secret reserve they may turn the sense quite another way than we imagined and when they pretend the greatest simplicity and seem to renounce all equivocation may then equivocate the most of all If men had invented ways to fill the world with perpetual jealousies and suspicions of their practices and intentions they could never have thought of any more effectual than these two that Heresie or differing in opinion from them deprives them of their civil rights and that they may deny what is true and swear to what is false and promise what they never mean to perform by vertue of some secret reservation in their minds How can they live as fellow-subjects with others who do not own the same Authority the same Laws the same Magistrates who look on all Hereticks in a State of Usurpation and all judicial proceedings against them as meer force and violence and parallel the case of answering in our Courts with that of oaths and promises to Thieves and Robbers for upon these grounds all the bonds of Society are dissolved where what they call Heresie prevails and no obligation can lie upon them by vertue of any Laws or oaths or promises I do not say that particular persons may not upon common principles of honesty make conscience of these things but I speak of what follows from these allowed principles and practices among them and what may be justly expected by vertue of them How can we be sure that any man means what he saith when he holds it lawful to reserve a meaning quite different from his words What can oaths signifie to the satisfaction of others when it is impossible to understand in what sense they swear and when they pretend the greatest simplicity in renouncing all arts may then by allowance of their Casuists use them the most of all But can men upon sober reflections think it any part of true Wisdom to lose all the force of their oaths and promises with those among whom they live Will they never stand in need of being believed or