it it seemeth that the goodnesse of the Act doth altogether depend on the goodness of the Intention that adaequately so that what power an evil intention hath to corrupt an Act although otherwise good the same power a good intention hath to approve and to render an Act good which otherwise is evil for a good or a single eye is as efficatious to inlighten the whole body as an evil eye is to infuse darkness on it To adde more strength to this opinion much may be alledged from the Fathers and other Divines of this nature is that in the Glosse As much good as you do intend so much you do perform And that verse in the mouth of every Scool-boy Quicquid agunt homines Intentio judicat illud It is th' Intention judgeth true Of whatsoever things we do XI But in the way of answer as to that place in the 6 of St. Mat. I am not ignorant in the first place that some learned men of this age do give an interpretation to it far different from that of the antient Fathers and not consonant to that we have now in hand But in reverence to those antient Doctors be it granted that those words of our Saviour had a proper relation to the Intentions of men I make answer that the intention when it is a motion of the Will tending to some ends by certain mediums is taken into a twofold consideration first whether it be for the intention of that good into which the Will is finally and precisely carryed being taken from all consideration of the mediums to attain it As if a man should say he intends the glory of God or his own profit and pleasure or secondly whether it be for an entire ordination of the whole progresse of the work from the beginning of the work unto the end including also the mediums or the means to attain it As if a man should say that he intends the glory of God by building a Temple or staining an Idolater or that he intends his own profit by getting riches by his honest labour or by theft and plunder And as he may be said that he intends a journey to Rome who only thinks of going thither and hath not yet resolved with himself which way or upon what accounts he will go as well as he who hath resolved with himself when to go which way and upon what occasions We speak in this whole discourse of the Intention taken the first way viz. on the intention which looks altogether upon the end and not on the means which is so taken in the common use of speaking but those words of the Fathers and other Divines which seem by the intention alone to measure the goodness or the badnesse of mens actions and which are grounded on those words of our Saviour in relation to a single eye and to an eye that is evil do receive their intention in the latter signification as they include the means with the end observable is that of St Bernard That the eye saith he be single two things are necessary viz. that truth be in the election and Charity in the intention That is that our intention be absolutely right both are required that so we may not propound unto our selves such an end which is averse unto the love of God and of our neighbour and that we make not choice of any means that are not joyned with honesty righteousness In every work therefore we must not only look to propound unto our selves a good end but we must withall endeavour to the end so propounded by apt lawful honest means for seeing that the election of the means or the mediums do arise from the intention of the end is so necessarily joyned to it that in the respect thereof it hath the place of an accident inseperable or a necessary circumstance Animum laudô Consilium reprehendâ—â— Cic. 9. ad Attic 11. the School-men do almost all of them conclude that an evil election doth corrupt an intention that is otherwise good by rendring that evil which before was good in the very same manner as evil circumstances do corrupt those Actions to which they are retayners XII The fourth argument is taken from the perfection and obligation of the Law of God For there is a Law propounded from God to men a most perfect Law which commandeth things to be done and forbiddeth those things which are not to be done It hath shewed unto thee O man what is good what the Lord requireth of thee Mich. 6. 8. This is the Law which we must obey if we will fulfil our duties by this Law we are commanded as the Scriptures every where do declare to do good and to eschew evil But if we on the contrary without the least regard to the law of God shall measure out unto our selves things to be avoyded or performed according to our own profit and as we shall think good and shall either omit those good things which God commandeth to be done for the fear of some following evil or shall commit those evil things which God forbiddeth for the vain hope of some good to come what is this but worms as we are to preferre our own Counsels above the expresse will of Almighty God and the wisdome of the flesh above the Authority of the most holy Spirit Farre otherwise did that holy man David By thy precepts saith he have I gotten understanding therefore have I hated all unjust wayes Psal 119. 104. As if he should say being instructed by thy Law which both night and day is in my heart my mouth before mine eyes I do plainly understand what I have to do and what I have to eschew wherefore I do not only decline but hate every way which is not consentaneous to thy Law whither soever it may seem to lead me Therefore since every sin is forbidden by the Law of God and that Law of his containeth not the least exception of any good Intention or Event and we ought not to distinguish where the Law maketh no distinction nor to except where the Law maketh no exception it is most manifest that he whosoever he is who for what Intention or what cause soever it be doth knowingly and willingly do that which is evil he doth sin against the Law of God XIII The fifth argument followeth drawn from the examples of those who under the pretence of a good end being so bold as to disobey the express Commandment of God have satisfied his anger by the just punishment of their rashness and disobedience The Prophet Samuel being sent to Saul the King of Israel who saved some of the cattle of the Amalekites which God had commanded should be totally destroyed for no other end as he pretended than by the bulk and fatness of his sacrifice to make it the more acceptable the said Prophet did lay before his eyes the grievousness of his sin and for the punishment of so great a disobedience did prophesy
same Gesture at the Sacred Table Can a Custom changed without any publick Authority sensibly so prevail that what before was not un-decent or un-lawful must now no longer be decent and no longer lawful Cannot a Law inacted by Publick Authority and established by an expresse consent of the people and allowed of by dayly use prevail that what upon no lawful reasons was ever found to be ever unlawful should be esteemed lawful again for the time to come Indeed where these two things Law and Conscience do fight between themselves as hardly they do in this case there is no man of a sober understanding but will acknowledge that Custome should give place to Law and not Law to Custome In the third place I demand of them do they seriously believe or do they not believe that he sinneth immediately in that Act who receiveth the Communion with bended knees If they shall say that he Sinneth seeing that every Sin is a transgression of the Law of God let them shew me some precept in that Law against which he that so doth Sinneth If they shall acknowledge that it may be done without Sin then by their own confession they will level their own Rise and overthrow all the force of their Arguments In the fourth place suppose that the said tricliniary gesture had been abolished before the first institution of the Holy Supper and that Sitting or Standing did succeed it so that Christ and his Apostles must have eaten either Standing or Sitting both of which could not be used at one time I demand if they had eaten Standing whether it were so necessary for us to stand also that we should have sinned if we had sate and on the contrary or whether we might have been free to have used which we would If they should say that we are free for both the Argument taken from the Example of Christ will be of no power and will fall to the Ground for he used only but one of the said Gestures and not both of them If they shall say again that we are precisely bound up to the observation of that posture which is supposed was used by our Saviour wherefore do these so severe Dictators and Controulers of the Liberty of every Church admit unto them an Indulgence of Standing or Sitting at the Holy Supper but not of kneeling or of that posture which it is most probable that our Saviour used In the fifth place I demand If the Example of Christ doth oblige us to the Imitation of it why is this obligation precisely determined in that posture which is but a subalternate Species and hath no reference to some higher Genus or why doth it not fall lower to some more inferiour Species To make it more obvious to your understandings seeing those three things are to be considered The gesture or Posture it self as a superior Genus the Posture at the Table as a Species subalternate to it And the Posture of lying along and leaning as the lowest Species And it is probable that Christ used the last according to the custom and practice of those Times and Climates why must the posture only at the Table which is but an intermedial and a subalternate Species be accounted necessary and sufficient to the true Imitation of Christ and not any other posture sufficient in the Genus of it or why may not the posture of Leaning and lying along be as necessary in the Species Lastly I demand Is the posture of leaning and lying along practised by our Saviour and the Apostles at the first institution of the Holy Supper to be imitated or not I am confident they will not deny that it is to be imitated for indeed they cannot deny it because from thence they do derive the chiefest ground and foundation of their Cause For thus they do propound the examples of Christ of necessity to be imitated by us that is to say not every example simply in it self but every example that may be practised by us I Only therefore in this argumentation take that which they of their own accord do grant which is 1st the proposition That every imitable example of Christ doth oblige a Christian to the imitation of it And 2ly the assumption that the posture in the Species of it which Christ used in the holy Supper whatsoever it was is imitable From these premises I infer this conclusion By the force therfore of this example say I Christians of the next age unto our Saviour were obliged to the same posture in the same Species which he used And in the same manner were Christians of the second and third age ever since unto these present times And it must accordingly be acknowledged that the Church of Christ even at this time also is obliged to the practice of the tricliniary or leaning posture if indeed Christ did use it or at least it must be shown at what time and on what account and by what Author and Authority the force of this obligation is made void XXII By these things which have been spoken it is manifest that all the force of their Argument which with so much pompe is dressed and held forth by them doth come to no more than this that it cannot more rightly or more commodiously be propounded for their own purpose than under this form The example of Christ and his Apostles doth so farre oblige as we think it expedient that it shall oblige but we think it expedient that it shall oblige to the not bending of the knee in the receiving of the Sacrament no further therefore so farre only and not a jot further is the extent of the obligation I am ashamed I confesse to furre your ears with the repetition of these vanities for it becomes not this place nor my age or manners to provoke to laughter in so serious a Subject But what shall we do with these men A bad cause indeed doth need such a Patronage and it cannot but come to pass that oftentimes they are enforced to speak many vain and incongruous things and if throughly they be examined very absurd ones whosoever they are who like unto those men do suffer themselves to be governed by affectation rather than truth I do speak from my heart and as indeed it is although in their writings we do meet with many things not solidly argued and sometimes not sincerely yet I do not remember that I have any where observed meer trifles to be carryed on with so much animosity and contention or the swelling Hills to bring forth a more miserable and ridiculous production than when the bare examples of good men in the holy Scriptures are so importunately urged either to excuse those acts which by the law of God do seem to be prohibited or to induce an obligation upon the Consciences of men for the observation of those things which do not appeare by any law of God to be commanded But I return from whence I have digressed if have transgress'd at all
person his Conscience doth passe its judgment on every one of them by the light of Reason which is infused and imprinted into his mind And seeing the Rule is the same concerning Acts to come as well as concerning Acts past it followeth that the Conscience as well in those Acts determined to be done as in those which are already done doth make use of the same light of examining judging and dictating as the Rule measure of those Acts. I here shall willingly take no notice of that Text in the fourth Psalm and sixth verse which is commonly produced by the Latin Fathers especially of the latter times and by the Schoolmen for a proof of this Conclusion the words are Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine Thy light O Lord is signed over us because that interpretation of the words are grounded on a bad translation seemeth not to appertain to the mind and scope of the Prophet XIII This is proved again by our common custom and manner of speech for we usually say that the man who acteth according to the light of his mind doth use a good Conscience although peradventure he hath committed or omitted that which was not to be omitted or committed by him and again that he who hath not obeyed those dictates of his mind but hath acted contrary to them hath used a bad Conscience St. Paul the Apostle Acts 2â— 1 doth professe that In all things he served God with a good Conscience even unto that day which words if they are to be extended to the former part of his life before he was made a Christian which interpretation hath been complacent to many and seemeth probable unto me we may conclude by them that although he was an open and a dangerous enemy to Christianity 1 Tim. 1. 13. and as he himself confesseth a persecutor and a blasphemer yet it may be said that even then in all good Conscience he served God because in all that time he acted nothing but what his Conscience according to the measure of that light with which it was then endued did prescribe unto him For indeed he then thought as he himself doth openly and sincerely professe in his Apology before King Agrippa that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he thought in himself Act. 26. 9. that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth But whatsoever may be determined of Paul and of his Conscience at that time most certain it is that God himself gave a testimony to Abimeleck Gen. 20. 6. who ignorantly sent for the wife of Abraham that he did it integritate cordis in the integrity of his heart that is with a good Conscience and for no other reason but for this only by which he did excuse himself for had he known her to have been the wife of another man he would not have sent for her unto his house The Conscience therefore by an ignorance of it self not much to be blamed peradventure erronious may be said to be good and right God himself being Judge not simply and absolutely but as but so far secundum quid as they speak it in the Schooles by reason of the conformity which it hath with the light of the mind thereof as its next and immediate Rule But that the Conscience may be said to be right 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is fully and in every respect there must another and a further Conformity be of necessity added unto it which is it must be conformable to its first and supreme Rule which what it is shall most diligently be now discussed XIV This therefore shall be our third Conclusion The holy Scripture or the written word of God is not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience Which in the first place is thus proved Beyond the Adaequate Rule of any thing whatsoever it is not necessary that for the same thing there should be any other Rule to be added to it for Adaequation doth exclude the necessity of any Supplement But it is necessary that there should be another Rule of Conscience besides the holy Scripture for otherwise the Gentiles who have not the Scripture should have no Rule for their Conscience which comes quite crosse to reason experience and the expresse testimony of the Apostle in the Text above mentioned Most certain it is that there is a Conscience in all men and that it is under a Law which is a rule to direct it For as the Apostle maketh mention and it is every where extant in History and confirmed by daily experience from whence do proceed those grievous accusations of Conscience those whips those pangs and torments of the Soul those furies expressed by the Tragedians but from the violated Law of Conscience of which if there were no Law at all those people that are most barbarous should be so much the more happy as they are the more far remote from the voice and sound of the Gospel because that then no crime of sin could justly be imputed to them For where there is no Law there is no transgression Rom. 4. 15. Sin being nothing else but the transgression of the Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Joh. 3. 4. That the power of Conscience is strong in both regards to fear every thing when it is guilty and to be in dread of nothing when it is innocent is not only cryed up by the Schools but by the Theaters of the Heathens who notwithstanding knew nothing of Moses or of Christ nor of the Law or the Prophets and never heard of the Gospel or the Apostles The Scripture therefore is not the sole and Adaequate Rule of Conscience XV. It is confirmed again in the second place from the proper end of the holy Scripture which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 3. 15. To make us wise to everlastâ—â—g Salvation by faith in Jesus Christ For when the light of natural reason could not raise us high enough to those things which do tend to a supernatural end both because of our natural light too much obscured and ecclipsed by the fall of Adam and because we must have supernatural helps to arrive to supernatural ends it pleased Almighty God in pity of our infirmities in his own word to open his own will unto us according to that measure which he himself thought good insomuch that by this gracious and saving Counsel not only those things by divine revelation may be made known unto us which properly do concern our faith and cannot be known by the light of nature but that more perfectly and more savingly we may be instructed in those things also which by nature are known unto us that so those works which nature enjoyneth to be performed taking their rise from a nobler principle which is the love of God and ordained to more noble ends to wit the Glory of God and the salvation of our souls may from moral become spiritual and be grateful and acceptable to God by
Duty so from a double Duty there ariseth a double Obligation for every Duty doth infer an Obligation and every Obligation doth suppose a Duty Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws is that by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it self and the other by which they are bound to submit themselves to the power of the Law-giver one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience the other unto that Obedience which is called passive and to which we give the Name of Submission III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Consciences of the Subject It is to be said in the first place that all Laws made by one invested by a lawful Power do oblige to Subjection so that it is not lawful for a Subject to resist the Supreme Power by force of Arms whether things just or unjust be commanded This wâ—â— evermore the mind and practice of the Christians in the first Age of the Church living under the most grievâ—us Tyranny of the greatest Enemies to the name of Christ to make no mention herein of the Conduct and the instinct of Nature and the light of right Reason this is most manifest by the Doctrine of the two chiefest of the Apostles For so Peter the Apostle of Circumcision doth diligently instruct the Jews And so Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles doth as carefully instruct the Gentiles St. Peter in the first book and second chapter commands Servants to be subject to their Masters not only good and gentle Masters but those severer ones who would punish them with Scourges when they had not deserved it Saint Paul Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the necessity of Subjection but granteth unto none the Liberty of Resistance be their case or their pretence never so good In the second place I say That although this Subjection is simply necessary yet it is not satisfactory as to Duty unlesse the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conscience in all things that are lawful and honest Hence it is that this word be Obedient is so often and so expressely inculcated by the Apostle Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places In the third place I say Where the precept of the Law cannot be observed without sin if the Subject shall patiently submit himself to the Power of the Law-giver he hath satisfied his Duty and is not obliged in Conscience to perform that which the Law commandeth nay he is obliged not to do it for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful It is alwayes necessary therefore to be subject but not alwayes necessary to obey IV. Furthermore seeing both are certain that the Consciences of Men are free Servitus in totum hominem uon descendit Sen. de Bencf 20. and ought to be so which Liberty no Humane Power can or may infringe And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond and doth induce a necessity which seemeth to be opposite and to fight with just Liberty for neither is he any wayes free who is bound neither can he be free to both who by some necessity is bound to either that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conscience of which we now do treat may consist with the just Liberty of Conscience we must necessarily in this place give you another distinction which is that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes either formally for the Act it self of giving the precepts or materially for the thing precepted If the Law-giver therefore should intend an Obligation or impose on the Subject a necessity of obeying from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially that is from the necessity of the thing it self which is precepted which notwithstanding in the truth of the thing was not necessary before that Law was made he in that very fact should lay a force upon the Conscience of the Subject which should be repugnant to the Liberty of it But if he should derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally thâ—â— is from the legitimate Authority with w ch he himself is invested that gives it a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining and in the same state in which it was before the Law was made although the obligation followeth which imposeth on the Conscience a necessity of obeying yet the inward Liberty of the Conscience remaineth uninjuried and intire V. If this seems obscure to any I will illustrate it unto him by an Example A Civil Law being made that no man should eat flesh during all the time of Lent if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law should signify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects because it were ungodly and unlawful for them in that time to eat flesh This were to throw a Snare on the Consciences of his Subjects as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty But if expressely he should signify that the thing being otherwise free in it self he did so ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church should thereby take an occasion to exercise a more abstemious and severer Discipline or if by the words of the Law it self or elsewhere it might appear that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to fasten any opinion of necessity on the thing so commanded there would on this account no injury be done to the Consciences of the Subjects and the liberty thereof For there is a great difference when one thing is commanded by the Magistrate because it is thought to be necessary oris prohibited because it is conceived to be unlawful And when another thing begins then only to be thought necessary and lawful after that it is commanded by the Magistrate and unlawful because it is forbidden by him The first Necessity which anteceded the Law and is supposed by it to be some cause of it is contrary to the liberty of the Conscience but the other which followeth the Law and proceedeth from it as an essect thereof is not repugnant to it The reason of this difference is because the antecedent necessity which the Law supposeth doth necessarily require some assent of the practical judgement but to the following necessity which proceedeth from the Law the consent of the will is sufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience as an Act of the judgment doth for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience as the effect followeth its cause but the Act of the Judgment doth precede those Dictates as the Cause goeth before its effect VI. These distinctions being premised I proceed unto the Doubts where in the first place those which we meet with concerning the material Cause
the duties of Divine worship but at what hour the people shall meet and in what place what form of words are to be used and what must be the gesture of the body the several parts of the service and other things of the same nature are all of them to be determined by Humane constitutions In the same manner the Law of God forbiddeth Theft to be commited but what kind of Theft is to be animadvertised against with such a punishment and what with another punishment is from the Laws of man From this determination of a general thing and undetermined by the Law of God the Law of man hath this privilege that it can induce a new obligation on the Conscience of the Subject not only different from the first obligation in number and in respect of the Term because it is of another dependency but also diverse in the Species and in respect of the matter because it is exercised on another object for the first obligation which ariseth from the Law of God is to the thing it self as it is a substance but this obligation which the Lawes of men do super-induce is to the manner of the thing or to the circumstance of it X. The fourth Doubt is of a thing that is foul and unlawful which is indeed a Doubt of great moment and containeth many cases for almost all the Conditions which are required to the right Constitution of Lawes a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 5. Ethic. 3 are reduced to Justice alone And not only for that reason that universal Justice doth in her Circle comprehend all Vertues but especially for this reason that particular Justice and more specifically that Justice which is called Legal Justice is above all other Vertues the chief and the only Pillar of Common-wealths and all humane Societies Concerning this Doubt In the first place it is questioned Whether an unjust Law ought to be made for the publick profit Of which opinion was Nicho. Machiavel who affirmed that the due matter of Laws whether just or unjust was that which was most commodious for the preserving the encreasing of a politick State for when in his opinion the end of Civil Power is the preservation of it self and the encrease of Soveraignty which Power cannot vigorously be preserved much less the Soveraignty enlarged if all the Lawes and Councils of Princes were examined according to the exact Rule of Justice and Honesty It concerned those who sate at the Helm so to bend as occasion should require the Rule of Honesty as to make it subservient to the publick advantage for the end in all things is to know how best to measure those things that are of a middle nature what so ever was the opinion of Machiavel this was certainly the Judgment of a personage of great account amongst the Lacaedemonians who openly pronounced that was most honest to the Spartans which was most profitable to them To confirm this opinion that of Horace is alleged Ipsa utilitas justi propè mater et aequi Hor. 1 â—aâ—yr 3. Profit almost the very mother of Justice and Equity And how thriving a Principle this is may be proved by the Example and successe of the Turks who relying on this Foundation most happily have far and near extended the bounds of their Empire throughout Asia Africa and Europe And to speak the truth had not some men who above all others do professe themselves to be Christians nay the only Christians and delight to be called the Reformers and the Restorers oâ— the purer Religion made a great use of this most wicked principle the Christian World had not every where groaned under so many Sacrileges Perjuries Seditions Warrs Tumults and Tyrannies XI But on the other side Princes on earth ought not to abuse that power which they have received from God against his will or otherwise than he intended for this power is not given them so much as to Lords as it is intrusted to them by God as his Ministers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 4 6. It is intrusted to them upon that account that they should work righteousnesse and not exercise Tyranny and an unjust Domination And this is manifest by the very words of the Text By me Kings Reign and Princes decree just things As if to Reign and truly to be a Prince were nothing else but to decree those things which are just and righteous And the Prophets do every where denounce the most severe anger Esai 10. 1. and vengeance of God against those Kings Princes who had decreed unjust Judgements Psal 94. 20. and had meditated iniquity as a Law Neither is the inlargement of Empire the â—nd of Civil Power as the Politicians of this world do affirm but the preservation of the people in Tranquillity and peace with all Godlinesse and Honesty 1 Tim. 2. 2. For Justice if there be any other is the best preserver of the publick peace And as the Righteousness of Faith doth procure and conserve the inward peace of the Conscience so legal Justice doth preserve the outward peace of the Common-wealth Esai 32. 17. the fruit of Justice saith the Prophet Pindaâ— shall be Peace and the Theban Poet calleth Quietnesse the Daughter of Justice Neither is that the meaning of Horace as if Honesty were meerly to be measured by profit the scope of his sense is far otherwise to wit that men wild at first and wandring by the observation of the publick profit and the common good were brought at the last to draw together into one Body and maintain Societies and by just Laws and Punishments to restrain injuries and wickednesse The Arguments drawn from the Turks whom it appears that God especially had raised up and made them as his Scourge to correct the great perfidiousnesse and other Sins of the Christians or from any others to maintain a bad Cause by the prosperous successe that did attend it do favour rather of the Alcoran of some abhominable miscreant than of the Purity of the Gospel of our Saviour Christ XII The second Question is Whether an unjust Law though it ought not to be made yet being made may oblige the Conscience of the Subject so far as to be bound to observe it For many things there are which ought not to be done yet being done are valid And it may so come to passe that what could not without sin be commanded yet without sin may be performed as abundantly we have confirmed in our fore-going Lectures The reason of this doubt is Because that true obedience is no Disputresse for the practice of obedience doth properly consist in this to subject ones self to the will of another without the least murmur or dispute Nimis delicata est obedientia saith Bernard quae transit in genus causae deliberativum That Obedience is too delicate when it comes once to be so deliberate as to inquire after the Cause thereof But I answer briefly the Conscience of the
the material Cause of which we do now discourse if the Law doth command any thing that is base dishonest or any wayes unlawful the said Law is unjust for the defect of that Justice which is called Universal which requireth a due rectitude in every Action And this alone is so far from obliging the Subject to obedience that it doth altogether oblige him to render no obedience to it XV. It is demanded in the fifth place What Justice is required and how much of it will suffice as to this that a Law may be said to be just and esteemed obligatory For answer I say in the first place It is not necessarily required that what by the Law is commanded should be just positively which the Philosophers call Honest that is that it may be an Act of some Virtue but it doth suffice if it be just negatively that is if it be not unjust or shameful as are the Acts of all Vices Otherwise there could no Laws be made of things of a middle nature or of things indifferent which notwithstanding as by and by shall be manifest are the most apt matter of Laws I say in the second place Grant that some Law be unjust in regard of the Cause efficient or the final or the formal Cause in any of those respects newly mentioned yet if there be no defect of Justice in respect of the material Cause that is If by the force power of the Law the Act to be performed by the Subject be such that he may put it in Execution without any sin of his own that Justice of it is sufficient to induce the obligation XXVI But lest the Subject too licentiously to withdraw himself from the yoak of the Law should give some pretence for his disobedience as it is a wonder to see how many men do suffer themselves to be deceived by this paralogism and should allege that the Law doth seem too unjust unto him and which with a good Conscience he cannot obey therefore ought not to obey for this they say were to obey with a doubting Conscience which cannot be without Sin as the Apostle teacheth Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin It is necessary therefore in the sixth place to inquire farther and to demand What certainty is required to know whether any Law be unjust or not that so a Subject may be secure in his Conscience whether he be bound or not bound to the observation of it I answer in the first place If the Law be manifestly notoriously unjust it is certain that the Subject is not bound to the observation of it which is also to be affirmed if by any moral certainty after some due diligence in searching out the Truth he judgeth it to be simply unjust I say in the second place If out of any confirmed Error of his Judgement which it is not easy for him to leave he thinks the Law to be unjust when indeed it is not yet for all that Error in his mind the obligation of the Law doth still remain insomuch that he is guilty of Sin if he doth not obey it but should Sin more grievously if that Error not yet left off he should obey it Of this Case we shall have a greater opportunity to speak when if God shall permit we shall come to the Comparison of both the sorts of obligations I say in the third place If out of some light doubt or scruple he suspects it may be so that the Law is unjust that scruple is to be contemned the Law altogether to be obeyed And no man under the pretence of his tender Conscience is to excuse him self from the necessity of giving obedience to it XVII I say in the fourth place And I would to God that those whose Custom it is to defend their grosse disobedience under the pretence of their tender Consciences would give due attention to it If because of some probable Reasons appearing on both sides the Subject cannot easily determine with himself whether the Law be right or not insomuch that his mind is in a great incertainty and knows not which way to incline he is bound in this case actually to obey it so that he sinneth if he obeyeth it not and doth not sin if he obeyeth it My reason is First Becaâ—se by the Rule of Equity In dubiis potior est conditioâ—â—ossidentis In doubtful things the Condition of the Possessor is the better Therefore when there is a Case at Law betwixt the Law-maker and the Citizen unlesse there be some apparent reason to the contrary it is presumed alwayes to be on the side of the Law-maker against the Citizen as being in the Possession of Right But if there appears any sound reason to the contrary the Case is altered because it is against the supposition of Reason for we then suppose that they contend in Law one having as much Right as the other The second Reason ariseth from another Rule of Law In re dubia tutior pars est eligenda In a doubtful Case the safer part is to be chosen And its safer to obey the Conscience doubting than the Conscience doubting not to obey Because it is safer in the honor due unto Superiors to exceed in the mode that is due unto them than to be defective in it The third Reason proceedeth from the same Rule for generally it is safer for a Man to suppose himself to be obliged when he is free than to suppose himself free when he is indeed obliged For seeing by the inbred depravation of the Heart of Man we sin oftner by too much Boldnesse than by too much Fear and are more prone than it becomes us to the licentiousnesse of the Flesh and lesse patient to bear the burthen unlesse we were throughly before hand resolved to obey those Laws which are not apparently unjust the Wisdom of the flesh the Craft of the old Serpent would suggest unto us excuses enough which would retard and hinder us from the performance of our Duties And so much of the fourth doubt XVIII The fifth followeth Of the permissive Law of Evil Wether it be lawful and how far lawful And whether it be obligatory and how far obliging Where in the first place we are to observe That an evil thing may three wayes be admitted by the Law that is to say privatively negatively and positively Privatively to be permitted is the very same which is pretermitted by the Lawgiver And in this sense all those things are permitted concerning the forbidding of which or the Punishing of which the Laws do determine nothing That negatively is permitted the excercise whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain bounds within which those are safe and without fault who do contain themselves but those who do exceed them are to be punished by the Law And in this sense the Laws of most Nations do permit of Usury Thirdly that is permitted positively the excercise whereof is tolerated under a
by a Law which when it is committed we are not able to punish And thirdly seeing the external operation of good works and the external declination of evil ones doth suffice to the outward felicity of a Republick it followeth that a Legislator or a Law-maker neither wisely can nor rightly ought either to command or to forbid the internal actions of Virtues or Vices In which regard as in many others the Law of God and Christ which requireth Truth Purity Sincerity in the inward parts and restraineth and checketh the highest and first inordinate motions of the Will and punisheth as well Sins thought on as Sins committed doth most infinitely excell the most excellent Laws of men And therefore David in the 19 Psalm saith that the Law of God is perfect and undefiled and the Law of Christ is as the maker of it is described to be in the fourth of Hebrews A word lively and mighty in operation and sharper than a two-edged Sword and entreth through even to the dividing asunder of of the heart and Spirit and of the Joynts and Marrow and is a Discerner of the thoughts and intention of the hearts VII I say in the third place that Humane Laws may de Jure or by Right command all the outward Acts of all Vertues and forbid all the outward works of sin but they cannot do it de facto The Reason of the first member is because there is no external Act of Vertue or of Vice in the whole Nature and in every Species of it so disposed but that the commanding or the forbidding of it according to the Condition of Affairs and Times may be ordinated to the publiek good Therefore not only the Acts of Justice properly so called as some will have it but the acts also of all other Vertues whatsoever may become the due object and matter of the Law And this I remember to be the observation also of Aristotle and if I be not much mistaken he giveth Instances of it in the Acts of Fortitude and Temperance As if by a military Law it were ordained that none of the Souldiers should run from his Colours or from his ingaging with the Enemy or throw away his Arms or as if by another a Law of frugality or moderation the excess in banquetting were prohibited or as if there were a Command that none should exceed in the bravery of his habit or in the greatness of his retinue or in the Ornaments of his House The Reason of the latter member is because there is so great a variety even of the Species themselves much more of the Degrees both of the Offices of Vertues and the Acts of Sin that if the Law-makers should provide a Caution for every one of them the very multitude of the Laws would be a burthen to the Common-wealth not to be endured VIII I say in the fourth place that a Law-maker is not obliged to this viz. To forbid all the evil that he can forbid or to command all the good It will suffice that the greatest and most remarkable of both kinds are to be contained in the Laws and which are so conjoyned with some extraordinary publick profit that unless somthing were determined of them there must necessarily follow some great and grievous Evil which would prove extremely incommodious to the Common-wealth for amongst the lusts of the Flesh the Allurements of the world the temptations of the Devil and the diâ—positions of men so fruitful of all manner of Iniquities may we so much as dream of a Platonick or an Eutopian Commonwealth we are to think we have done well enough if we stick not too deep in the mire For it is necessary that in every Common-wealth some evils should not be prohibited but tolerated and many good things not commanded but left to every mans discretion and that many things of both kinds should be passed by by the Laws lest being too unseasonably active to remove one evil we peradventure make way for more and greater to arise IX The third Doubt is concerning the Intention of the Law-giver whether and how far it is required to the effect of obliging Which is to demand If a Prince out of no foresight or intent to Justice or to the publick good at all being either carryed away by hatred or ambition and the meer lust or ruling or by avarice or any other depraved desire of an impotent mind should give a Law to his Subjects whether they are bound in Conscience to obey it The answer is easy they are obliged to obey it if there be no other impediment that is if he who made the Law hath a lawful Power and the Law it self be otherwise just and according to the Law of the Nations duely debated and sufficiently promulgated I say therefore in the first place that as in Artificials the End of the work and of the person wotking is not always the same as in the building of a House the End of the work that is of the House is that it may be a commodious habitation for the master of it but the End of the Carpenter is that he may get some gain thereby Just so in a Common-wealth it may come to passe that the Law-maker may intend his own advantage and yet the Law it self may tend to the publick Good X. Peradventure you will object that an indirect End or Intention doth always corrupt the work and therefore the evil Intention of the Law-maker doth vitiate the Law which was his work To answer this objection I say in the second place that an evil intention doth always blemish the work as the work speaketh the action of the person working but it doth not always blemish the work as it is the effect of the operation These two therefore the Action it self and the Perfection of it differ not a little amongst themselves although they are commonly called by the same Name In the same manner as the Effecting and the Effect it self The building of the House and the House builded are both of them called the work of the Carpenter although the one of them is but an action transient and the other after the house is finished an action permanent A bad Intention therefore doth corrupt the work of the Lawmaker that is his own Act which makes the Law and which for the defect of a good end is not without fault but it corrupts not the work of the Legislator that is the Law made by him if that which is commanded by the Law is reducible to the Common good So for all the evil intention of the Judge a Sentence pronounced by him either for favour or for hatred is firm and valid if the said sentence in it self considered appeareth not to be unjust For as rightly St. Augustine hath it potest ex libidine imperantis sine libidine obtemperari We may without any lust obey the lust of the Commander XI I say in the third place Suppose that a Law be not only made with an evil
be the better or the worse As if a man should partake of the Supper of the Lord to that end to put himself in remembrance of the death of Christ the more entirely that he applyes the mind to the remembrance of his death the better he performes the duty of a true Communicant Again if a man should slander his neighbour intending the ruine of him by how much the more violently he intends it by so much the worse is his Act of Calumnation The quantity therefore of a good or an evil Act is correspondent to the quantity of the goodnesse or the evilnesse of the Intention and is commensurate with it if the Intention be understood according to the Act of intending and not as to the thing intended But the intention taken either way doth not suffice to prove this that any Act which otherwise is evil should be made good V. This conclusion is proved by many and most strong arguments first by the words of the sacred Text in the third Chapter of the Romans where the Apostle not without indignation doth detest that grievous slander by which it was said to be taught That evil may be done that good should come thereof That the sence the scope and the force of this place may be the better understood that St. Paul amongst all the Apostles was abundantly the most copious in asserting every where the mercy of God by Grace making a Covenant of grace with sinfull men and faithfully fulfilling the Evangellical promises notwithstanding all that unrighteousnesse and unbelief of men which lyeth within their hearts and openly and abundantly doth declare it self in their dayly lives and conversations which he professeth to be so far from making these promises of God by Grace to be in vain that on the contrary they do render the glory of his grace and truth to be far more illustrious Rom. 5. 2. for where that the offence abounded there it is manifest that Grace superabounded From hence the Sophisters and Imposters took on one side to themselves an advantage to slander and to diminish if they could the authority of the Apostle On the other side the Hypocrites and profane did take an occasion to live more licentiously and to sin more securely For if that be true said they which is preached by Paul that the sins of men do redound to the greater glory of God there is no reason that God should punish sins or be angry with sinners There is no reason that a man or woman should abstain from sinning nay they should sin more abundantly that God might receive the more abundant glory and evil things are altogether to be done that good things may come thereby The other objections the Apostle confuteth but to this let us do evil that good may come of it he doth not vouchsafe any answer at all he only cryeth out that it is a manifest slander and near of kin unto blasphemy and unless they repent the just judgment of God is threatened to such importunate slanderers as if this Sophism was of that kind of arguments which Aristotle adjudged not to deserve an answer but rather a reproof It is hence manifest and all Interpreters do acknowledge it that the Apostle most constantly denyeth that any evil ought to be done for any intention be it never so good It much availeth saith St. Augustine to consider what Aug. contra meudaciam what end what intention such a thing is done but those things which are manifest sins ought not to be done under any pretence of a good cause or a good end or of a good Intention This is the first argument VI. The second it is taken from the nature of evil or of sin which of its own nature is not first to be chosen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hiercl pag. 78. neither is it secondly ordinate to a good end neither is it thirdly apt of it self to produce any good first it is not eligible or it is not to be chosen by reason of its own nature qua tale as it is of such a nature for there is nothing eligible which is not also Expitible and all things that are desired are desired under the account of good Neither is evil of its own nature ordinable to any good end for if it were it were also to be desired for the appetite in Philosophy is not only carryed to the end propounded by the Agent but to those things also which seem to conduce for the obtaining of that end If you object God doth dispose of our evils into a good end of his own and therefore it is not against the nature of evil to be ordinated to a good end I answer in the first place that the ways of Almighty God who is the Lord of Nature and according to his good pleasure can produce good out of evil are farre different from ours who have not the same right or the same power neither is it for us either too curiously to enquire or too magisterially to pronounce any thing of the Providence of God concerning evil In the second place I answer that God indeed is able and accustomed to make use of our sins to serve his Glory Grace and Providence and that it is lawfull for us also as opportunity shall serve to follow his example and to make use of the sins of other men for our spirituall or temporall advantage Notwithstanding as God although he maketh use of the evil of others and produceth Good out of it yet he never doth evil himself that from thence he might abstract good so neither is it lawfull for us to do evil that good might proceed from it It is one thing to make use of the evil of others and turn it into good and another thing to do evil with an intent of good Thirdly I answer a thing may be said to be ordinated in a twofold respect either improperly in the same manner as a thing which way soever it is made use of by the Agent doth notwithstanding tend to its end being so done by the wisdome and power of the supremer Agent contrary to the will and intention of him that did it or it is taken more restrictly and properly and so that only is said to be ordinated to its end which antecedently is chosen by the Agent as a medium that by the nature of it is convenient and conducible to such an end In the first sence that is to be understood when we say that God doth ordinate and dispose of evil to a good end that is when God Non coâ—venire homo viro Vitiis uti Quint 6. Instit 1. out of his infinite mercy and power either abstracts good from evil or turneth evil into good But we must above all things take heed that these expressions be not understood in the latter and proper sence as if God antecedently did well approve or make choice of any evil as a medium convenient by the nature of it to the assecution of
any good end VIII Moreover it is opposite to the nature of sin to produce of it self any good effect as an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit Mat 7. 18. nor darknesse produce light of it self 2 Cor. 4. 6. but the same great and glorious God who out of his omnipotence brought forth light out of darknesse can also out of our sins take an occasion to illustrate his infinite wisdome his righteousnesse and his goodnesse But these are the effects of a divine power as of a cause working properly and of it self to the production whereof there needs no assistance nor strength from our sins which as to those effects are but meerly contingent and but by accident Those words therefore of David Psalm 5. which St. Paul alleageth Rom. 3. 4. I have sinned against thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that thou mayest be justified when thou speakest are not so to be understood that David for that end committed murder and adultery or that it was lawfull for him so to do that God might be justified in his words but the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and some other Greek particles of the same signification in many places of Scripture are to be understood according to the interpretation of St. Chrysostome not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to denote and inferre the event only and not the true cause of the thing For as he who is in a serious argumentation can inferr a true conclusion from the false praemises which before were granted by another and yet the same Disputant would show himself ridiculous if to prove a true conclusion should willingly make use of some salse assumptions for Truth doth not stand in need of the patronage of Falshood so Almighty God and we also in some respect may do the like can dispose of things that are ill done into good but it is neither congruous to the divine Justice and Goodness neither is it any ways lawfull for us to will and to do evil that good may come thereby IX The third argument is taken a naturâ boni Actus from the nature of a good Act to the complement whereof the concurse of all requisite conditions is so necessary that if one be but absent amongst so many of them although all the other be present and subservient yet that Act shall not be morally good Most remarkable is that Axiom Bonum ex causa integra malum ex quolibet defectu Good proceeds from an upright and an entire cause but evil from any defect And it is besides manifest in all kind of things that there are more required to raise up than to throw down or to destroy The defect of a good Intention is enough to prove any Action evil for that the end whereof is evil must of necessity be evil it self but it is not enough it is not sufficient that a good end or a good Intention should prove the Action good unless all the other requisite conditions be conjoyned Now that any Action whether the internall of the will or the externall of the work may approve themselves to be good we are to understand that there are three distinct goodnesses viz. the goodness of the object the goodnesse of the end and the goodness of the circumstances The quality of every Act doth first of all and principally depend on the quality of the object or of the matter about which it is conversant so that from thence every Act may indefinitely and according to the whole species of it be denominated either good or evil in this respect we affirm that Theft and Adultery are evil in the whole Species of them and that Prayer and the giving of Alms are good in all their severall respects and the acceptations of them but with this difference that things which in themselves are simply evil are so evil that neither upon the account of the end although good nor yet on the account of their circumstances although never so promising they can ever be made truly good But things which are good in their own nature may yet be so corrupted by the end or by undue circumstances that they may leave off to be good and become evil The pravity therefore of the object being presupposed we are altogether to abstain from the Acts of Theft or of adultery as being simply evil in themselves But the goodnesse of the object being presupposed it is not safe for any one at the first either to undertake to do it or to approve it being done unless he hath diligently weighed before hand the end to which it is directed and the severall circumstances with which it is attended and cloathed In these things therefore in which it is said that the Goodness of the Act doth depend on the end and that the end doth discriminate and crown the actions they may be said so for to be true if the Acts be good in consideration to the object or the matter or at the last if they be of a middle nature and indifferent but not if they are evil For the goodness of the object being supposed the Act doth chiefly take its goodness or its evilnesse from the end For examples sake the Act of giving a poor man an alms though it be a good Act in respect of the matter or the object yet if it be done for vain-glory it is morally an evil Act because it is not ordinated to a good end The same Act if it be to relieve the necessities of a neighbour is an Act so far good that it hath a lawfull matter and a right Intention and so partaketh of both the goodnesses above mentioned to wit of the object and the end but it cannot yet be affirmed to be simply good unlesse it be moreover duely circumstanced for to this complement of a good work besides that goodness of the object and the end there is required the goodnesse of circumstances And from hence it is that commonly it is spoken that the goodnesse of the Act doth depend upon its circumstances not primarily and principally but ultimately and for the accomplishment of it the goodness of the object and the end being first laid down seeing therefore these three things are required to the goodness of every moral Act and they are all to be conjoyned to wit the matter lawfull the intention right and the circumstances due it is most manifest that a right intention cannot alone suffice by it self and by consequent that nothing can be performed out of a good Conscience whatsoever the Intention be that is either unlawfull in the object or defective in the circumstances X. But some there are who peradventure will object unto this those words of our Saviour Mat. 6. 22. If thy eye be single thy whole body shall be full of light but if thy eye be evil thy whole body shall be full of darkness Where if the intention be undesstood by the eye which is the judgment of almost all the Interpreters upon
Barnabas and others also who followed him and did consent to the same dissimulation were to be noted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as men that did not tread with an upright foot nor walked according to the simplicity of the truth of Christ By which it is most evident that St. Paul being Judge it would render no great advantage unto uncertain Barnabas and halting as it were betwixt Judaism and Christianism to call into the patronage of his dissimulation the example of St. Peter although of the highest estimation amongst the Apostles but grant that Peter was worthy of a sharper reprehension because that by his example he became a stumbling block to another nevertheless Barnabas is not the more to be excused that he transgressed by following the example of another And this may suffice concerning our first argument taken from the Text of St. Paul VI. The second argument is derived from the difficulty of judging for seeing that all the deeds of the righteous are not to be imitated it is no obvious thing to understand what deeds of theirs are to be examplar and what not and that by reason of a twofold uncertainty that is in them For it may so come to passe both ways that what a righteous man hath done may not be well done and hath been well done by him is nevertheless not to be imitated by us In the first place most certain it is that those deeds of theirs which are ill done are not to be imitated and that the most holy of men have had their blemishes and infirmities it having pleased the most wise God to permit them to fall sometimes into the most grievous sins of murder adultery idolatry and the renouncing of their faiths that they might consider that they are but men and by their own experience that they as well do pertake with as they do pardon the mistreadings of another that so they might not trust in their own strengths against temptations but depend altogether on the assistance of God and if unconquered unshaken or unhurt they have sustayned the most violent assaults of temptations that they may acknowledge it to proceed wholy from the providence and the grace of God and it hath pleased him who worketh all in all according to the counsels of his own will that some of their foulest defects should punctually be expressed in the book of holy Writ that so illustrious and never dying examples should remain unto all ages on the one side of humane frailty and inconstancy and on the other of the Divine goodness and mercy VII Peradventure it will be here objected It is true indeed that those Examples of the Saints are not to be imitated which in the word of God are expressely noted to be ill done for what sober man will propound unto himself either the abnegation of St. Peter or the adultery of David as examples for him to imitate Neverthelesse it doth seem that we may safely take examples from those acts of theirs which are so recorded in the Scriptures that they are there as free from dispraise as from any tincture of guilt I make answer that this is not to be done for in the Scriptures as every where in other Histories the deeds of many men are only historically and nakedly related just as they were done are neither expressely commended or discommended by the Writers notwithstanding it is not to be doubted that some of them were unjust some of them dishonest and far from the duty of a godly man And many other things there are recorded of which we may not undeservedly doubt whether they were well done or ill done concerning which the Interpreters are accustomed to express themselves probably and liberally on both sides Of such a nature is that act of Lot offering the violation of his Daughters Virginities to the impure Citizens of Sodom and that act of Joseph swearing as it is thought by the life of Pharaoh Gen. 19. â— 42. 15. 16. and that act of Jacob craftily stealing from Esau his brother the benediction of his father and many other examples of the same nature which if any man shall adventure to follow on this presumption only that he hath read the same things to be acted by godly men and not to be condemned he shall object himself to a most certain danger of errour and of sin by subjecting his Conscience to a most uncertain Law VIII But you will say we may safely howsoever follow those examples which expressely are commended in the world of God I make answer that even this also is not simply to be granted for in the first place I say that whatsoever deeds of men are openly condemned in the word of God to be vitious they are simply to be eschewed for the strength and use of bad examples are more powerfull to argue negatively upon them than of good examples to argue affirmatively which manner of arguing out Apostle useth 1 Cor. 10 6. c. where having propounded out of the Hostory of the old Testament the examples of several sorts of sins as also of the judgments of God upon the prevaricators of his Law he doth admonish that all of us would look upon them as types and examples not to imitate but to eschew them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ut fugerem exemplis vitiâ—rum quaeque notaâ—do 1 Satyr 4. That we may not lust after evil things as some of them lusted nor worship Idols nor commit fornication nor tempt Christ nor murmur in afflictions as they have done Hoc quidem non bellè nunquid ego illi Imprudens olìm faciam simile Horat. ibid. This is not well but filly Elf Shall not I do the like my self IX In the second place I do affirm that what Deeds in the Scriptures are expressely praysed and are so praysed that they may seem to be propounded to us for Examples are notwithstanding not suddainly and headily to be followed by us neither must we imagine that the whole aggregate Action as it was at first performed is commended unto us to imitate But we must use choyce and caution to imitate those things which are commendable on that part only of them and intirely on that account for which they are commended The reason of this Caution is because that God oftentimes in a mixt Action according to his infinite goodnesse doth approve and look upon that only in it which is Good and doth passe by and as it were takes no notice of that in it which is Evil As in the 16 Luke 8. The Lord praysed the unjust Steward because he had done wisely although in the same Act he had hazarded the Reputation of his Trust The Wisdome therefore and not the Injustice of that Steward is to be imitated Again in that commended Example of the Egyptian Midvives preserving the new-born of the Iâ—raelites and by a Lye excusing their contempt of the Kings Commandement their Lye is not to be numbred with their humanity and their piety but carefulâ—y
propounded and he doth not violate the Law unless he doth neglect them both XXIV This which was to be spoken of the obligation of a Law purely penal being as I conceive sufficiently unfolded let us now passe to the consideration of a penal Law mixed Concerning which I make this my third conclusion A penal Law mixed to wit which openly commandeth something to be observed and that it more diligently may be performed which is commanded doth appoint a penalty to the transgressors doth oblige both to the fault and to the punishment insomuch that he neither satisfies the Law nor his Conscience who undergoes the punishment unless he doth perform that also which is commanded by the Law There is none can doubt that such a Law doth oblige to the punishment for otherwise of what use would the punishment be that is added to it And it is manifest that it obligeth to the fault because it containeth a manifest command And every command obligeth to the fault For a Fault or a Sin is nothing else but the transgression of some precept 1 Joh. 3. Neither can that be probably spoken which is said to be the opinion of Navarr that the Law-maker by inserting the punishment doth signify that he hath no intention of obliging but only to that punishment which is annexed Observe I pray you how perverse it is so to interpret the appointing of a punishment which it is certain is for that end annexed to the precept that the said precept by the fear of punishment might more diligently and more accurately be observed as to make weak and take-away the obligation of the said precept Numberlesse are the Laws which throughout the world are made against Thieves Murderers perjured Persons and other wicked and nefarious people God also gave a Law to our first Parents by which he forbad them to eat of the fruit of the Tree which was in the midst of Paradise having annexed to the prohibition the punishment of death if they should eat thereof Gen. 2. Can any man be found so dâ—stitute of reason as to think that Adam was obliged by this Divine Law and that others are obliged by Humane Laws to the punishment only and not unto the fault Who will affirm to omit humane Laws that Adam was not obliged in Conscience by that Divine Law to abstain from the forbidden fruit but to this only that if he did eat thereof he should be ready to undergoe the setence of death The opinion therefore of Navarre being exploded as dangerous and by all men confuted if indeed the opinion was his which I shall hardly believe he being a man of so reverend a fame we are to affirm that a penal Law mixed being both penal and preceptive doth oblige both to the punishment and to the Fault to the punishment as it is penal and to the Fault as it is preceptive XXV The third Doubt remaineth How and how far the transgressor of a penal Law is bound to undergoe the punishment in the fact it self that is appointed by the Law I must make haste I will therefore be as short as I can I say therefore in the first place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that it imposeth not any thing upon the transgressor to be either done or suffered by him but consisteth rather in an inability to do something which was commodious for him to do or in an incapacity of receiving somthing which would be profitable for him he is guilty of the Law so violated and is bound ipso facto to undergo the punishment There are many Laws which do forbid transgressors to do this or that as the Civil Laws for certain causes do forbid translationem Dominii the alteration of power or free-holds There are also many Laws which for such a certain time do make Delinquents incapable of such a place or dignity As if a Disturber of the peace by a statute of the University be prohibited to have his Grace propounded in the Congregation House for the space of two years after the fault committed In such the like cases where the punishment consisteth only in the Inability or the Inâ—â—pacity because to undergoe this punishment there is no Cooperation required of the person to be punished but rather a certain Cessation of operating He who hath violated the Law is obliged willingly to suffer the punishment although he be not required I say in the second place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that a cooperation of the person offending be necessarily required to the Execution of the Law that is that he who is to be punished is to act something himself in his own punishment he is not obliged ordinarily to undergoe the said punishment ipso facto before the Judge hath pronounced the sentence or which is the same before the punishment be exacted of him by a person to that purpose invested with lawful Authority The guilty person is bound indeed to suffer the punishment but if he called to it otherwise he is not bound I say in the third place that a guilty man after the sentence pronounced by the Judge or after he is required to it by a person invested with lawful Authority is obliged to a willing undergoing of the punishment yea and with some Cooperation of his own if this Cooperation be not against the Laws of humanity though otherwise very grievous and extremely painful For examples sake If an offendor be commanded to pay a great sum of money under the name of penalty or to depart the Kingdome he is bound by the power of the Law to the performance of it but if the punishment imposed be not only grievous but something also that is inhumane as if a malefactor be commanded to scourge himself to cut off his own hand to drinke poyson or the like in these cases the guilty person is obliged to undergoe the punishment passively but he is not obliged actively to cooperate in it w ch he knows to be ordained by the Law and which by his default he hath deserved And let this suffice to be spoken of the necessity of the Promulgation of Laws and of the Obligation of those penal Laws which may seem to have any reference with the Formal Cause of Laws THE NINTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in respect of the Final Cause thereof 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godlinesse and Honesty IN our former Lectures we have treated of the Obligation of Humane Laws as to their Material Efficient and formal Causes in some places peradventure more largely and in others again peradventure more concisely than was requisite It remaineth that we should proceed to the explication of those things which do pertain to the final Cause of Laws But before we do come to dissolve these doubts we are first to premise and pronounce as an undoubted Truth That the ultimate end
the Law of God that is particular determinations of the general Rules which the Law of Nature and the word of God have exhibited indeterminatly wisely accommodated to the Condition Utility of certain people according to the consideration of Times and Places For Examples sake The Law of Nature doth teach in general that we are to offer an Injury to no man and he who doth so is bound to make restitution but to descend to the specialty what injury he hath done unto his neighbour who hath broke down the Hedge and let in his Cattel into his Grounds and what is the restitution to be made for such an Injury is not determined by the Law of Nature but by the Civil Law And the Scripture doth openly hold forth that wicked men are to be punished by the Magistrate Rom. 13. 4. and in other places But what kind of wickednesse the Magistrate is to punish what punishment to afflict and after what proportion is no where defined in the Law of God Power being transmitted to Princes Law-makers by God to define of themselves by Laws well constituted what accordting to their wisdome they shall find most safe and profitable to the Common-wealth The Rights therefore and the Laws of God and of a Legislator and a Judge are distinct and proper to themselves and disposed in so excellent an order that the Precepts and Commandments of God which are general and indeterminate are by the Law-maker determined and accommodated to certain Species of persons and actions and being so determined by the Laws the Judge doth effectually apply them to the particular causes of persons actions so that if a Legislator should make a Law which is not complacent to the Law of God he is to be adjudged to have made an unrighteous Law and if a Judge in any particular Cause shall pronounce Sentence which is not congruous to the Law constituted by the Prince he is to be judged himself to have pronounced an unjust Sentence IV The second Doubt is whether a Law-maker be obliged if possibly he can effect it to command all the acts and offices of all Virtues and to forbid all Sins of whatsoever nature they are or if he cannot all whether he be bound to command and forbid as many of both kinds as possibly he can The Reason of the Doubt is because there is nothing more conducing to the proper end of the Law which is the common good than as much as possibly may be that all the Citizens may be good and none of them evil Therefore it is the part of a Law-maker who always is to have before his eys this end which is the common good to take all possible care he can to command the practice of all Acts of all Vertues that so all his Citizens may be good to forbid all Sins whatsoever that there be no unrighteousnesse amongst them and the two chief of the Apostles doe seem to require this of the political Magistrate Rom. 13. 3 4. St. Paul hath these words Do good and thou shalt have Praise but if thou dost evil fear for the Magistrate is a revenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil that is on him who doth any manner of evil And St. Peter in his first Epistle second Chapter and fourteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the punishment of evil doer◠but the Praise of them that do well that is of all well-doers and of all evil-doers For that which is pronounced indefinitely is equipollent to an universal it is consonant to the Rule of the Logicians in a necessary matter and to the will of God who forbiddeth the Magistrate the acceptation of Persons V. For answer I say first and generally that the Law-maker is bound to use his utmost Indeavour that his Citizens be all of them good men and none of them evil and by consequence to command all Acts of Vertues and to forbid all Vices so far as the Reason of the Beginning from whom and the End for which he worketh doth require but beyond that he hath no obligation at all For the Beginnining and the End in the operations of all work they naturally or work they freely are the adaequate measure of all Intermedial Acts so far as those Acts are proportionate conformable with the Beginning from whence they proceed with the End to which they tend The Acts therefore of Commanding and Forbidding and others in which the Exercise of the legislative Jurisdiction doth consist must be proportionated both to their Beginning in whose Vertue they are done to wit the Higher Powers granted by God and to their End for whose sake they are done to wit the Common Good A Law-maker therefore ought so far to command prohibit permit and to perform all other Dutyes as they are agreeable to the power granted to him by God and is expedient for the Commonalty which God hath committed to his change VI. But these considerations are general and indefinite To satisfie therefore the Doubt propounded we must descend to something which is more particular but which howsoever may rely on this general foundation I say therefore in the second place the acts of Virtues and Vices some of them being internal of which nature are the freer acts of the Will as to will and not to will and the movings of the affections to love to hate to grieve and if there be any other cogitations and intentions of the heart and mind and some of them being external of which sort are all the commanded acts of the will and the indeliberate motions of the affections which are exercised by bodily Organs as to see to speak to strike to plunder and innumerable others the Legislative power is only exercised on the outward acts but not on the inward A Law-maker may therefore command the payment of a debt the restitution of stollen goods and the outward worship of God He also may forbid Theft Adultery Manslaughter Blasphemy and the like But he cannot command the loving of his Neighbour the confidence to be had in God the contempt of the world nor prohibit the coveting of his Neighbours goods unchast cogitations the hate of his Neighbour and the Atheism of the heart The reason is because to determine of internal actions is neither proportionate to the beginning from which nor to the end for which the Legislator worketh For Almighty God hath only permitted to the Magistrate the Government of the external man and hath reserved to himself alone the knowledge and judgment of the inward actions and the inspection into the hearts of men for the Legislator and the Judge is the same as we have already proved by the testimony of St. James and the Legislative power would be altogether ineffectual to obtain its proposed end if it were only directive and coactive First therefore seeing an external Court cannot understand nor judge of inward actions And secondly seeing it were a vain thing to command or prohibit that