Selected quad for the lemma: sin_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
sin_n	good_a	law_n	transgression_n	4,529	5	10.4346	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A52414	The charge of schism continued being a justification of the author of Christian blessedness for his charging the separatists with schism, not withstanding the toleration : in a letter to a city-friend.	Norris, John, 1657-1711.	1691 (1691)	Wing N1245; ESTC R40651	37,244	145

That any Law would Oblige let the Matter of it be never so wicked and unjust or the Authority whereby 't is made never so incompetent provided it were arm'd with a sufficient Sanction For the Sanction being supposed to be the only Fountain of Obligation that being present and in such measure as is requisite the Obligation must needs follow as every Effect does upon the Being of its intire and adequate Cause Secondly It would also follow that no Law could oblige constantly unless it were backt with the greatest Penalty that is absolutely possible For since the Law is supposed to have all its Obligation from the Penalty then where there is the greater Penalty there will be the greater Obligation and consequently if the Case should so happen that a Man should threaten me if I do not transgress the Law with a greater Punishment than the Law does in case I do I am then discharged from the Obligation of the Law as being under a greater Obligation and may innocently transgress it though it were the Law even of God himself Which at one blow would strike off the constant Obligation of the whole Jewish Law For the Law of the Jews being ratify'd and confirm'd to them only by Temporal Penalties and those not always the greatest even of the same Kind and Order if a Jew should happen to be tempted to transgress the Law as he easily might by a greater Punishment than the Law would inflict upon him for transgressing it upon this supposition that the Law receives its Obligation from the Penalty it would follow that he would be released from the Obligation of his Law which I think is Absurd enough But to this I further add Thirdly If the Law be to receive its Obligation from the Sanction then we must suppose it therefore to Oblige because it makes it Reasonable or Eligible for a Man to do so or so that he may avoid such a Punishment for that is all the engagement to action that the Sanction can be supposed to add But if this be all this is not to Oblige in Duty but only in Point of Prudence which indeed is not properly to Oblige at all since otherwise all rational Inducements would be Laws Indeed the Proposal of a Penalty may be a good Ground of Perswasion why a Man should do so as the Law directs But it can be no more it cannot lay an Obligation upon the Conscience or make it Sin to do otherwise It may move determine and in some Cases secure the Choice but it cannot Oblige the Will To say therefore that the Law Obliges by and from the Sanction is in effect to say that it does not Oblige at all since then it could Oblige only by way of Persuasion and rational Inducement which indeed is not strictly and properly to Oblige The truth is upon this Supposition the most Excellent Law of the most Sacred Authority in the World would Oblige no otherwise than the Demand of a Thief upon the High-way The Thief bids me Deliver or he 'll Pistol me The Law bids me do thus or I shall be Punish'd I yield up my Money to the Thief to avoid being Pistol'd and I yield my Obedience to the Law to avoid being Punish'd 'T is possible here that the Motive of Action in both Cases may be the same viz. the avoiding of Evil. But I hope no-body will be so Gross as to say that the Obligation in both Cases is alike too that the Law Obliges no otherwise than the Command of a Thief when he comes to Rob me And yet this must be said if it be true that the Law has its Obligation from the Sanction for then 't is plain that all its Obligation comes to this That it makes it reasonable and eligible for me to do such an Action to avoid such an Evil and so does the Thief Fourthly If the Law Obliges purely in Vertue of the Sanction then 't will follow that the Law will Oblige no further than the Sanction reaches Consequently it will not Oblige the Supreme Magistrate who is acknowledged not to be subject to the Sanction of the Law But this is more than the greatest Sticklers for Prerogative will allow and indeed is against the general Sense of the greatest Masters of Law whether Common or Civil who generally yield the Supreme Magistrate to be under the Directive though not under the Coercive Power of the Law And if so then the Preceptive does not Oblige by Vertue of the Coercive since 't is allow'd to Oblige where the Coercive does not reach Fifthly This Hypothesis of the Law 's receiving its Obligation from the Sanction will in the Consequence of it make all Laws purely Penal that is such as do not oblige Absolutely to the Fact but only Conditionally either to the Fact or to the Penalty and which therefore are equally satisfy'd either by doing what is Express'd or by suffering what is Intail'd upon the Omission of it For if the Law be supposed to Oblige by Vertue of the Penalty which it proposes then its Obligation comes to this That I must do such a thing because otherwise I must suffer such a Punishment which is as much as to say that if I do not such a thing I must suffer such a Punishment which will again at last be resolv'd into this that either I must do so or suffer so which though it Obliges me Disjunctively leaves me at full Liberty as to the Determination of my Choice Which expresses the true Form and Nature of a pure Penal Law But I suppose it will not be said that all Laws are purely Penal For then there would be no Sin but only where the Penalty is declined or resisted the Consequence of which again would be that all the Sin that is in the World would only be against Human Laws and that there would be no such thing as Sinning against God because the Divine Justice can neither be evaded nor resisted Which is a Consequence that would make strange Alterations and introduce as strange Confusions in the System of the Moral and Intellectual World Sixthly and Lastly If the Obligation of the Law proceeded from the Sanction then 't would follow that I am therefore Obliged to do because I must Suffer for not doing But this is so far from being true that the Reverse of it is so For I must therefore Suffer for not doing because I was Obliged to do For I must Suffer because I Sinn'd otherwise my Suffering would be unjust And I could not Sin if I were not under an Obligation which being thus Pre-supposed and Antecedent to the Necessity of undergoing the Penalty which is what I call the Sanction cannot possibly be founded upon it or proceed from it This last Argument proves not only that the Law does not derive its whole Obligation from the Sanction but also that no Part or Degree of it is thence derived For if the whole Obligation be as is supposed Antecedent to the

promulgated To this I answer First That the Fate of the present Cause is not concern'd in the issue of this Question our Laws being sufficiently promulgated But suppose it were concern'd it need fear no danger from it For the Question proceeds upon a contradictory Supposition It supposes the Law to be promulgated and not promulgated at the same time For if the Sanction be necessary as a Sign then it must make the first discovery of the Law which till then must not be supposed to be known And yet it must too and that before the Sanction can pretend to be a Sign For the Sanction cannot pretend to that Office till 't is known and it cannot be known till after the Law is known For to know the Sanction is to know that such a Penalty is by the Law annexed to such an Action which presupposes the Law to be known And how then can the Sanction be necessary as a Sign where the Law is not promulgated The very Supposition implies a Contradiction Whence I further conclude That 't is impossible that a Sanction should ever be necessary as a Sign to the Obligation of the Law which as it receiv'd not its Obligation from it so it may and will oblige without it since from what has been discours'd it clearly appears that it is no way necessary to the Obligation of the Law either as a Cause or as a Condition I say to the Obligation of it For I do not deny but that a Sanction is very necessary to the Inforcement and better Success of the Law and that therefore 't is very expedient that all Laws should have their Sanctions partly that by them the greatness of the Obligation may be rated and estimated it being the general Prudence of Law-givers to annex greater Penalties to more concerning and important Precepts and partly that by them Men might be the more easily and securely contain'd within the Limits of their Duty which without some Penal Restraint every little appearance of Interest would tempt them to transgress And yet even this is only an Accidental Necessity introduc'd by the badness of the World For were Men as they shou'd be Wise and Good which till the Millennium I despair to see they would discern and be satisfy'd of the Reason and Equity of the Law and that alone would be a sufficient motive to Order and Obedience But when they are either so stupid as not to see the good end of the Law or so profligate as not to regard it then comes in this Expedient of the Sanction arming the Laws with Penalties whereby they may be inabled to revenge themselves upon those unconsidering disingenuous Persons that do them violence And indeed considering the great and general Bruitishness and Degeneracy of Men how very alienated they are not only from the Life of God but even from that of Natural Reason too 't is very fit it should always be thus and that all Laws as well as those of Mount Sinai should have their Thundrings and Lightnings to awake and alarm the Passions of such Men who having lost their Reasons have now nothing else to be taken hold by But this I say only proves a Sanction necessary to the better Inforcement and not to the Obligation of the Law To which if any one shall yet think it necessary I shall only further press him with one sensible Absurdity which perhaps may signifie more with some Apprehensions than an abstracter way of reasoning It is this That upon this Supposition it would follow that if God himself shou'd impose any Command upon a Creature without annexing a Penalty in case of Disobedience he would not be able with all his Authority and Divine Supremacy to oblige that Creature And will any Man can any Man have the Impudence or Impiety to say so Suppose that when God gave that Command to Adam concerning the not eating of the Tree of Knowledge he had not added that other Clause which was the Sanction of the Law In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die Will any Man presume to say that Adam would not have been obliged by that Divine Command but might have tasted of the forbidden Fruit without Sin He must have but very little reverence for the Majesty of God and as little sense of the sacredness of his Authority who would adventure to say so And yet thus he must say if it be true what is contended for by some that the Sanction is necessary to the Obligation of the Law For whatever is necessary to the Law as such is necessary to every Law whether Human or Divine He therefore that holds the necessity of the Sanction to the Obligation of the Law must say if he will be consistent with himself that the Command of the Great God would not have obliged Adam in case there had not been a Penalty annex'd to it If he does not say so I should smile at his Inconsistency and if he does I should tremble for his Impudence and Irreverence But from a Supposition to descend to a Matter of Fact what will such a one say to the Tenth Commandment to which as the Author of the Christian Blessedness has rightly observ'd there was no Sanction annex'd Will he say that this Precept stood as a Cypher in the Decalogue without passing any Obligation upon the Jews This indeed wou'd make much to the honour of the Divine Wisdom and represent God as a very notable Law-giver to Usher in a Law with so great Solemnity and afterwards write it with his own fingers upon Tables of Stone when it could signifie nothing but only the filling up of a Number And yet this as absurd as it is he must say that will make the Sanction necessary to the Obligation of the Law If this be true then the Tenth Commandment did not oblige But it seems the great Apostle was of another Judgment when he said I had not known Sin but by the Law For I had not known Lust except the Law had said Thou shalt not Covet It seems then that Lust was a Sin and that by vertue of the Tenth Commandment which is here alledged by the Apostle to prove it so which therefore did oblige since without Obligation as well as where there is no Law there can be no Transgression If it be said that although the Tenth Commandment had no Temporal Sanction or Civil Penalty annex'd to it like the other Nine yet it had an Eternal Sanction namely the Rewards and Punishments of a future Life and that 't was by vertue of that Sanction that it became Obligatory I answer that this could not be any Sanction to the Jews to whom it was not plainly reveal'd though it be now to us Christians who have a full and express Revelation of it A Sanction not Publish'd is no Sanction as much as a Law not published is no Law that is to any real Effect or Purpose of Government Indeed of the two Publication seems