he will not cause cannot be And this is the beautiful variety and harmony in the Universe In God himself is nothing but perfection but the Greature being the shadowy Image of God defectibility and imperfection is essential to it so that he reduceth Morality to the frame and necessity of physical motion and maketh Moral Good and evil to be indeed as much natural good and evil and of the same kind except as in another subject as Summer and Winter heat and cold day and night health and sickness life and death animate and inanimate the unavoâ—dable diversifications of the will and work of God And that every permission of his will is accompanied with a positive volition of the thing permitted And yet that Will is not properly in God but so called after the manner of man That sin is considered as related to the Principle of action which is God and so it is good or as in the terminus Man and so it is horrid devilish odious evil as blindness death darkness caused all by Gods desertion or not operating otherwise than he doth § 7. To the quieting of the mind that cannot digest this but thinketh God is thus dishonoured being made more than Satan the cause of sin and misery for sin which the Scripture contradicteth and that man is excusable at the barr of Justice that could no more in innocency forbear to sin than to make a world To them that think it hard that no one in all the world could ever possibly do more or less Good or Evil than they do but that is all done by physical motion as in an Engine c. he hath a great deal to say and more than ever I elsewhere met with and with great modesty proposed § 8. As to the Law whose transgression is sin he supposeth that Whatsoever imposeth on us any thing to be done by us as an antecedent condition to any consequent good is the Law opposed to the Gospel Pag. 173. Yea that the proposal or pressing of any Truth or Goodness on us in a literal or moral way only or the word as written in Letters is the Law and the spirit operating the thing it self on the soul is the Gospel the first is the old Covenant and the second the New That the proper and next ends of the Law or letter are sin condemnation death and the Divine wrath To let in sin and heighten it that it might abound and to bring on us spiritual death These flow not from the Law of it self but by accident from the weakness of the flesh and creaâ—ure But both Law and sin are brought in ultimately for good viz. God having a design which he intended to enrich with the fullest the highest glories of his Godhead brings forth in the course of this design a dark scene of all evils sin death wrath The evil in this scene is carryed on to its utmost extent and height Thus the variety becomes more full in the whole design and the chief design is heightned in its greatest Glory God in his Infinite wisdom so bringeth in this scene of sin and evil that himself is perfectly pure and good in the contrivance and conduct of it He setteth up a Law good holy and spiritual but such that sin inevitably may take occasion from it through the frailty of the flesh and of the creature to spring up as an overflowing flood to display it self over all things in its fullest foulest birth This Law is to convince us of the frailty and mutability in mans primitive state c. viz. that he is a creature For Pag. 175 176. man is composed of the light of God and his own proper darkness These two the Schools call the Act and Potentiality the form and the matter being and not being which constitute every Creature The darkness or nothingness which is the Creatures own is the proper ground of sin The Law comes and distinguisheth the Light from the Darkness Pag. 177. so that to see sin is to see that we are Creatures God withholds his Pag. 178. Divine presence appearances and influences from man and so the darkness discovereth it self in man and predominateth and captivateth him entirely and becomes his choice and Lord. so that sin is but an Imperfect Creature and the Law to cause and shew it § 9. Pag. 113 114 c. He saith The Immediate cause of the first change made in the understanding at the fall was the Divine Glory withdrawing or withholding it self Darkness is the privation of Light Privations have no proper Causes but accidental only Thus the Divine Glory retiring from the understanding or ceasing to shine in it is by accident the cause of the darkness there as the Setting or departing of the Sun is the cause of Night which is not a blemish to the Sun but its glory that in its presence are all the beauties and joyes of light in its absence all the disagreeableness and melancholies of night and darkness Pag. 115. All evil is from the absence of God c. P. 117. The fault in man is the deficiency which ariseth from the defectibility or nothingness of the Creature in its shadowy state in the purity of its first Creation Pag. 122. The fall springs from the Harmony of the eternal design in the Divine mind being comprehended in it as a part of it § 10. And yet he makes man Guilty and unexcuseâ—ble and God just iâ— this because Guilt is but our being really bad And he that cannot deny himself to be bad is unexcuseable And the opening of this causeth shame And Justice is to Judge and use all creatures as they are § 11. To be short he maintaineth that man can have no freedom from necessitating predetermination If he should it would cross the nature of God of the creature of the soul and the unity and harmony of all things But that God causeth all sin negatively as necessarily as he causeth darkness or any natural privation But then he doth with a torrent of Rhetorick so Praise Gods design in it and the beauty and harmony of all things made up of good and evil unities varieties diversities and contrarieties and sheweth so largely the glory that cometh to God by sin and the good to the Universe and that it 's but our narrowness and weakness of sight that maketh us take it to be any other than a part of the glory of the universe though bad in and to the person that sinneth that I confess I never found my self more tempted to Love sin or to cease my hatred of it than by his florid Oratory § 12. And withall as he resolveth all the rest of Morality into Physical conceptions so he seemeth to judge suitably of Hell and of Redemption supposing that all this darkness that God brings on sinners is but to prepare for their resurrection to a life of unity and glory and that it shall go well with them in the end § 13. And as
no Power used to produce it which is not given by God 160. An Act as such hath no Morality in it but is quid naturale And so it is from God as he is fons naturae But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it referred to Gods Governing Will or Law and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is mans End And Materially it is not the Act as such but the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one or to an undue End rather than a due End or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object which is the sin and the fundamentum of the sinfulness and so è contra 161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such In Omissions of Loving Trusting Fearing Serving God there is no Natural Act but a privation of it In committed sins to Love this Object rather than that hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such A modus Entis is not Ens But this Comparative choice is but the Modus Modi entis For an Action is but Modus Entis and this is but a modus actionis 162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans that Man should be a Causa prima and so be God if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such 163. If any will litigate de nomine entis let them call it Being or no-being as they please but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that under Divine Universal Influx without Divine pre-determining pre-motion on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it is bolder against God than I shall be And if God can do it we have no reason to doubt whether it be done 164. Men seem not in denying this to consider the signification of the word * * * It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twisse who oft saith that God denyed to Adam no grace ad posse but he denyed him grace necessary ad agere For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is necessary to the act Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art 1. pag. 457. POWER when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it without the said pre-motion If so It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it He that hath a proper Power to Choose is Able to Choose and Can Choose by that Power 165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-agents and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions by all that he doth by his Laws Providence and Grace to make them good But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil 166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis * * * Bellarmin's Universal Cause seemeth the same wiâ—â— what Durandus meaneth And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion saith l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia Multi enim Philosophi ut Plato Aristot â—gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium essâ— causam immediatam omnium esseâ—luum Causarum secâ—ndarum the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction A Cause is called Universal 1. In praedicando Logically And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis Statuarius est Causa particularis Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae 2. In causande as to the effect And so that is an Universal Cause whose causality extendeth to many effects And this is two-fold 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects but not of all that is proper to each unless its causality be otherwise as by the dispositio recipientis determined And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose and the stink of the Dunghill c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae by his common sustaining and moving Influx of all sinful actions 2. When it is the Cause of those actions not only as to that which is common to them all but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another and that of it self and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis or by any other cause And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is meerly physical in all beings and actions As in Generation c. which is properly to say that he is at once both Cause universalis particularis singularis And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause but only a meer Universal as aforesaid 167. They that denying our self-determining power do make Volition and free-Volition to signifie the same and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act do seem rather to jeast than seriously dispute And to define Free-will to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem is no other For Velle juxta rationem is no more than Velle the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one why do we blind the World with words and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will and not whether his Will be free And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition or not the Volition of another thing the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous If the will be not forced as long as it willeth or willeth juxta rationem then to question whether it can will by constraint is to question whether it can at once will and not will †††Of this see Ie Blanks excellent Theses de lib. arbitrio absolut The definition of Alvarâ—â— of Free-will is lib. arbitrium est facultas voluntatis
Will or Power as if he could do no more But it is his Delight thus to govern the creature according to the nature and rank which he hath made it in and his non-volitions and non-operations of a higher sort are agreeable to his Perfection Wisdom and Liberty Higher action being used on higher creatures 3. Yet hath God placed and kept these free Agents not only under his Moral Government but also under his Dominion and disposal so that he will do with them as his own what he lift and none shall frustrate his disposing Will. 4. It pleased him first to make man perfect under a Law of Perfection making innocency or perfection the only condition of Life and the contrary of Death 5. When Man had sufficient Grace to have kept this Law not sufficient to ascertain the event but sufficient Power to have stood that is as much Grace as was necessary to his standing sine qua non esse potuit cum qua esse potuit he broke it and sinned against that sufficient Grace before God either denyed him any thing necessary or withdrew any from him 6. From whence it is clear that the Nature of Man's Will is such as that it is made to use a Power which doth not necessitate or determine it self or is determined necessarily but freely And that it is no Deifying of the Will nor extolling it above its Nature to say that it can act or determine it self without Gods pre-determinating premotion or by that same measure of help which at another time doth not determine it Though its Nature and its Act as such be of God yet so is its Liberty too and therefore by the Power and Liberty given by God the Will can act or not act or turn it self to this object or to that without more help than the said natural support and Concurse And this Power and Liberty is its Nature and Gods Image 7. From hence also it is evident that there is such a thing or operation of God as Grace Necessary called sufficient which is not effectual For God took no Grace away from Adam before he sinned nor let out any temptation upon him which he was not able to resist nor did he sin for want of necessary Grace but by that same degree of help might have overcome 8. God passing Sentence on faln Man for sin would not forgive him the temporal death nor common calamities of this life but cursed the creatures which he was to use as part of his penalty 9. But the Great evil which sin brought on man was the loss of Gods approbation and complacency and of his Spirits saving Communion and help and of Gods Image on man's Soul and of Communion with God herein and also his right to life eternal All which man 's own sin cast away and man was both the Deserver and Executioner without any change in God 10. Yet was all this privation penal in that God made Man such a creature as that his own sin should become his punishment or ruine if he committed it so that all Punishment is not determinatively of God though Gods Antecedent Will did make that which by man is made a Cause As in argument God saith antecedently If thou sin thy own sin shall be thy torment and misery and man saith I will sin Therefore it is Man that is the determining Cause of the Conclusion My own sâ—â— shall be my torment and misery So it is in Causation God antecedently to man's sin doth resolve I will make Man such a Creature with such a Mind Conscience and Will as that his Holiness shall be his Health and Joy and his immediate Receptive capacity of my favour and of his Communion with me and of his title to my spirit and Glory And that if he forsake me and his Holiness in the very Nature of the thing he shall lose all this Life Light and Love Joy and Communion and title to my Grace and shall feel the torments of his own Conscience telling him of his sin and loss This is Gods Antecedent Law Nay this is Gods Antecedent Creation to make man such a Creature Now if man sin his owâ— sin doth ipso facto become his misery and yet is not caused at all by Gods But yet that his Nature was made such as sin should prove a misery to was Gods Work And from that Antecedent Creation or Constitution the Relative form of a Punishment resulteth to the Sinner Even as God saith If thou Murder it shall be thy sin or Thou shalt not Murder And man doth Murder Here the Act that is sin is of man but that the Relation of sin belongeth to that act resulteth partly from the Law which forbiddeth it and yet God is not the Cause of sin though he Antecedently decreed Murder shall be sin if thou commit it So is it also with this sort of Punishment which is either sin it self or the effect or result oâ— sin immediately By which we see that when sin and punishment are found in one thing God is the Cause Antecedently of the formal Relation of a Punishment without being a Cause of the sin yea antecedently is some cause of the formal relation of the sin by his Law without causing any of the sin it self as the author of it As if God make man of such a temper as that surfetting drunkenness lust will make him sick and hazard his life Here God did no otherwise punish him than by making him such a man which he turned to his own destruction by his sin If a man make a thorn Hedge about his Garden that men may not steal his fruit and those that will shall â—rick themselves it is they that prick and punish themselves If God say He that will leap into the fire shall be burnt or into the water shall be drown'd it is they that do it that cause the evil and yet some formal relation of penalty may result to it from Gods conditional antecedent Law I say not that God executeth no other kind of punishment But these are the most common 11. Man having thus cast away Gods Image and his Innocency could beget a Child no purer holier or better than himself For he could not communicate that which he had lost So that our Nature is vitiated with Original sin and unhappy in the miserable effects Bradwardine hath a shift which serveth them that say man could do no good in Innocency without supernatural Help viz. Making that Help to be Gods Will that it shall be done But is not Gods Will called our natural Help when it is the foundation of Nature working by natural means It 's true that free will without Gods Will could do nothing 12. The promisory part of the Covenant or Law of Innocency became null or ceased with man's first sin cessante subditorum capacitate and so the Condition which is its modus So that no man ever since was under the Obligation of that Law as a Covenant of life
received but by degrees and upon certain terms And with pardon a free gift of Life Spiritual and Eternal and so of the Spirit and Communion with God on the said conditions 15. The Promise Gen. 3. 15. is plain as to Mercy and Salvation and darker as to the promised seed and his mediation and dark as to the Condition on man's part But by Sacrifices c. it is like that Adam had it more explained to him than those short words make it to us But this is clear that by this new Covenant God becometh man's Merciful Redeemer and Pardoner and Ruler on terms of Grace in order to recovery and Salvation And that man was to Believe in God as such and accorâ—ingly to devote himself in Covenant to him 16. This Law or Covenant was made with all Mankind in Adam For all were in his loins and God hath given us no more proof that the first Covenant was made with Adam as the Father of Mankind than that the second was so made 17. Gods dealings with Mankind are a certain confirmation of this truth and an exposition and promulgation of this Law and Covenant of Grace as extended to all Mankind For God doth not use them according to the rigor of the violated Law of Innocency but giveth them abundant merâ—ies and means which tend to their Repentance and recovery and obligeth them all to Believe that he is merciful and their case is not desperate and to Repent and use his means and mercies in order to their return to God and their Salvation There are no Nations in the world that even to this day are not under such mercies means and obâ—â—gations and therefore none that are left as the Devils in Despair under the unremedyed Covenant of Innocency alone 18. But though the Law of Grace made to Adam be it which the world was then put under and to be Ruled by and the tenor of it extended to all Mankind yet those that would partake of the Blessingâ— of it were to consent to it as Covenanters with God and to Belieâ—â— in and obey God their Redeemer pardoner and restorer in the thankful sence of all this mercy which because the ungodly did not they and their posterity fell under a double guilt and curse both as violateâ—â—s of the Law of Innocency and of Grace and therefore incurred a specâ—â—â— penalty Cain and his off-spring being first thrust out further from the believing obedient people of God and at last the whole world except eight persons perishing in the deluge 19. Noah with his house being saved to be the Root of all Mankind that should succeed him God renewed with him and Mankind in him the same Law or Covenant of Grace which he had made with us in Adam with some additionals To shew us that though the wicked and their seed had forfeited the benefits yet the Covenant was not altered but stood in its first sence in force to all and would pardon and save all true Consenters 20. C ham for his transgression brought a new Curse on himself and his posterity besides the meer fruit of Adam's Sin So that thougâ— God altered not his Law of Grace yet they became a cursed Generation 21. By multiplyed transgressions the Sons of men did still more degenerate and revolt from God till Nimrod and others by wickedneâ—â— and presumptions brought down the new and grievous penalty of confounded tongues the great hinderance of the propagation of the truth to thâ—â— day And at last the most fell to odious Idolatry not knowing the true God but given up to sensuality and wickedness 22. Abraham being faithful and escaping the Idolatry and wickednest of the world was eminently favoured and beloved of God and beâ—â—â—ving Abraham's Promise and trusting God in his promises and in the great tryal of his Sâ—â— is honoured with the name of the Father of the Faithful And God renewed with him the Covenant of Grace which he had made to all men in Adam and Noah with special application to his comfort and addedâ— special peculiar Promise to him that his Seed should be a holy Nation chosen out of all the world to God and that of him the Messiah should come of both which Promises the common and the special Circumcision was a Seal 23. Yet this was no repealing of the Law of Grace which had been made to all the world nor was it an excommunicating or rejecting of all others or a confining of Gods Grace and Church to him and his posterity alone but only an exalting them above all others in these peculiar dignities and priviledges For at that time holy Sem was living and long after who in all likelyhood was a King and its like that the Posterity of him and Japhet were not all faln away from God and Melcâ—â—zedek was such a King of Righteousness and Peace and Priest of the most high God as was a great type of Christ's own Heavenly Priesthood and therefore it 's like had some Subjects that feared and worshipped God The Scripture giving us the History of the Jewish Nation and affairs â—â— the principal and of the rest of the world but a little on the by we cannot know by it the full state of all other Nations nor what Religion and Worshippers of God were there But the History of Job and his Friends the probability that all the Children of Ismael of Keturah of Esau forsook not God for they were circumcised and therefore were Covenanters with the Case of Nineve after and Abraham's thoughts that even a Sodom had at least had fifty righteous persons in it c. assureth us that the Jews were not God's only Church but a peculiar people and a Nation holy above the rest And as the Covenant of Grace was still the Governing Law to the rest of the world though most rejected it by rebellion so it is not to be thought that none consonted to it and were faithful 24. The special promise to Abraham of the Messiah to be his seed which was more than was made to Adam and Noah as it belonged not to Mankind in general so was it not promulgate or known to them but only to the Jews and the few that conversed with them Therefore the rest of the world were not obliged to know and believe it who never heard of it 25. What Conditions of pardon and life were necessary to all Mankind The terms of the Universal Covenant then in general is most probably gathered out of these Texts of Scripture Exod. 34. 6 7. And the Lord-proclaimed the Name of the Lord The Lord the Lord God Merciful and Gracious long suffering and abundant in Goodness and Truth keeping Mercy for thousands forgiving iniquity transgression and sin and that will by no means clear the guilty visiting the iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children and to the Childrens Children unto the third and to the fourth Generation This is the description of God given by his own mouth as he is to
in his Gospel to have a Law The case is sad that any in opposition to others should run into such an Antinomian extream They are unlike to be good Preachers of Christ's Law who maintain that he hath no Law And there can be no sin against it nor expectation of being judged by it if he have none And he is no King and Ruler if he have no Law But yet let the Papists forbear iâ—â—â—ing and remember that the true meaning of most of them is no more than to assert what Suarez himself propugneth viz. that besides Revelations and the Duties thence naturally resulting by natural Law and the Sacraments Christ hath no other Laws And both Suarez and they are here to blame for the Papists that are by some accused for calling the Gospel a Law do also give too little honour to Christ's Laws It beseemeth none of them to use such ill Language what-ever they mean If they should say that the King is no Law-Giver and hath no Laws they would wrong him by that Language as denying his Royalty how well soever they should interpret it For the Legislative-Power is the principal essential part of Soveraignty But if any really deny Christ to be a Law-Giver and when he hath done reproacheth the Papists and Arminians for contradicting it it is but as the blind reproaching the purblind for seeing when they that give most to the Laws of Christ among these Contenders do give too little The Baptismal-Covenant is a Law as imposed and as imposing the Covenant-Duties and as determining the conditions of Life and Death according to which men must live and shall be judged yea it is the most famous Law which Conscience hath to do with Though it be a Covenant as consented to in the contract That Sinners have terms of Life and Death and offered Remedies against all their Guilt and greatest Punishments and Means prescribed and Duties commanded in order to their recovery when the Law of Innocency condemneth them especially the obeying of the Ministry and Word and Holy Spirit of Christ prescribing them his way of cure as their Physician all this is a Law of Grace even the Law of Liberty and the Law of the Spirit of Life which freeth us from the Law of Sin and Death Christ's Law consisteth of two parts as is said 1. The Law of Nature called by many moral as commanding the love of God and its attendent Duties not now to an innocent man but to a condemned-recovering Sinner as the health to which his Physician doth restore him 2. And the remedying Law which is more proper to the Redeemer called the Law of Faith which appointeth us the terms and means of our recovery which is 1. Supernatural as to the Revelation of the matter and reasons of it and the foundation of all in Christ's Work of Redemption and his Legislation 2. But as to the obligation or efficiency of mans duty it is both natural and supernatural at once that is when it is presupposed that Christ hath done suffered and offered to our acceptance all that is so asserted of him in the Gospel 1. Nature obligeth us to believe it upon evidence of credibility and to accept it and thankfully improve it 2. Christ as the Fathers Administrator and our King hath positively commanded us the same Were it not for wearying the Reader and my self I would here answer all that Suarez saith de Legib. li. 10. c. 2. to prove that no praeceptum positivum morale is added by Christ And I would easily prove that as some parts of Nature are unalterable and accordingly natural Duty so some things of Nature are mutable and so is that natural Duty which is founded on them And Christ hath by supernatural Performances and Revelations made such changes in the nature of things as inferreth new natural Obligations Were the Devils redeemed and Grace now offered them nature would make it their duty to accept it In sum it is a sufficient confutation of all Suarez's Reasons to say that they run upon this false supposition that Nature and supernatural Precept may not both oblige man to the same duty and that God cannot lay two Obligations on us to the same action For all that he laboureth is to prove that supposing the Revelation Nature bindeth us to believe all the Christian Articles to preach and hear and pray to God by Christ to love our Redeemer and be thankful c. and that the Gospel is thus fitted to lapsed Nature as the first Law was to innocent Nature All which I like very well and take it for a great honour to Christ and the Gospel that it is so suited to the natural necessity and state of fallen and miserable man and may be called the Law of sinful Nature But Suarez himself had before proved that Moses's Decalogue was both a Declaration of what Nature bound men to and yet also the matter of a new Precept of God And why could he not see the same of the Gospel it being so evident that it containeth Christ's Commands And the very sum of our Ministry is 1. To disciple and baptize all Nations c. 2. And then to teach them to observe all that Christ commanded And indeed Suarez confesseth p. 816. That Christ did by new commanding add new Obligations to the duties of Nature though he deny that Christ added any positive Precept as to the moral matter commanded by the Law of Nature And by this instance you may see how near some men agree that seem much to differ But as to them that insist on it that the Gospel and New Covenant are no Laws and that we have none from Christ but the Decalogue and Old Testament were I to write against them to purpose I would plentifully prove them Subverters of Christianity it self and give full evidence against them to any that believe the holy Scriptures And contrarily I would prove that there are no Divine Laws but what are truly the Laws of our Redeemer now in the world and that all Infidels are ruled and shall be judged by a Law of Grace though not of the last evangelical Edition and that he that feareth not breaking the Laws of Christ shall hear at last Those mine Enemies that would not that I should Reign over them bring them hither and slay them before me Luk. 19. 27. a a a That Christ is truly a King and so a Law-Giver and hath proper Laws and not only Doctrine and how great an injury some Protestants have doâ—e the Church by denying besides the Antinomians See Suarâ—z de Leg. l. 10. c. 1. whose proofs of the thing are unanswerable And I have long ago proved it in other Writings But Suarâ—z asserting that Christ's Law is only Moral and Ceremonial in the Sacraments and not judicial doth plainly confess that God never instituted the Papacy and their Discipline Yea he saith c. 2. p. 812. Christus in sua lâ—ge nihil de praecâ—ptis judicialibus statuit etiam
think a good thought by any help that God can give him unless he physically predetermine him to it then the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously to be resolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it as the reason why he doth it into his predetermination and as it is night because the Sun shineth not XVII But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin because he is under no prohibiting Law Though it be true 1. That his nature or perfection the root of all Laws is more than a Law 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of man but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it which is none of the question XVIII And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning is not at all caused by God e. g. that we hate him not nor his truth and wayes and servants that we murder not commit not adultery steal not lye not covet not blaspheme not wrong none do no evil c. we need no help of God for this Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them it is impossible for us to do them at all XIX And though we say that God willeth sin to be by his permission only and not by his efficience yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause is the principal efficiency And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum and therefore permitteth not And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin and not because he meerly permitteth it For permission is not de impossibilibus XX. God willeth not sin because he willeth it not as sin in its formale which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not XXI And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future but as he willeth or decreeth them we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale was such as it is quid futurum if it was but futura privatio And therefore this would inferr that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also XXII Gods Will is his Love and what he Willeth he Loveth XXIII God willeth the futurity and existence of sin not only of the materiale but the formale even of all the sin that ever is done XXIV The existence of sin is Good and Amiable not only by accident but per se as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God XXV It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth and Loveth and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid the circumstantiated act and so the resultancy of the relative form And he willeth and Loveth the existence of all and the thing existing so far as he causeth it XXVI God Willeth Loveth and Causeth sin incomparably more than wicked men do For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable dependent will but God with a Divine primary immutable will Man causeth the forbidden act whence the relation resulteth with a Will that is irresistibly moved so to do by God as the pen writeth only sâ—o modo with Volition But God causeth it as the first omnipotent unresistible cause of all that the Creature doth in sinning XXVII The same must be said of God and the Devil who can no more commit one sinful act till God unavoidably predetermine his will to it by his premotion than sinful man can XXVIII God by his Law doth strictly forbid all those sinful acts which he principally and unavoidably causeth And he strictly commandeth all those good acts whose contraries he thus causeth us to do XXIX Though there is nothing in sin which can have a cause of which God is not the Principal cause and though he Willeth and Loveth all that he causeth yet the Scripture saith that God hateth sin and cannot behold it and hateth all the workers of iniquity and that it is abomination to him that he is as one laden with it and wearied provoked and offended by it And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holiness when he will not cause them but doth cause and will the contrary XXX Pardon and salvation is promised and earnestly offered by God to the Reprobate themselves on condition that they will believe and repent when God doth unavoidably as the first cause determine their wills to the contrary acts even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God and holiness XXXI The Law of God is that all the Reprobates shall be damned to hell fire if they will not believe and repent when his omnipotence doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impenitence and if they will not give over those acts of sin to which God doth thus unavoidably move and determine them XXXII Gods executions are answerable to these Laws and all save Christians and all professed Christians saving the sanctified are to be punished in hell fire for ever only for not doing the acts of Faith Love and obedience when God as the first cause predetermined them to the contrary and for doing the acts of sin when God unavoidably moved them to it and made them do it so that consequently all that are damned suffer in hell for not being Gods even the first sufficient causes of their own acts and for not being above God or stronger than he that is for not overcoming or avoiding his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts XXXIII The same must be said of the Devils who sin and suffer on the same terms XXXIV Q. What kind of torment then will there be in Hell Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to that is for not overcoming God when they know the case Or must we not more congruously say that the state of Hell torments lyeth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them and a justifying of themselves Or will every mouth be thus stopt in judgement XXXV Q. Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice and the exemplar of all humane Justice allowing for disparities And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course And how then would they be esteemed XXXVI Q Is not that best which is most agreeable to Gods Will and Love And therefore sin better than
as necessary by predetermination as the motions in a Clock yet a certain Religion is consistent with it and the Atheist that hence would nullifie all Religion absolutely would raise false inferences from this principle Much more perswaded am I that many that hold it are very worthy holy persons much better than I am or can hope here to be as not discerning the inconsistency of their opinions as I said L. The Religionâ—consistent with it I conceive must be such as this 1. There is a God who moveth all things by physical necessitation even mans Volitions as well as any natural actions 2. This God doth all that he doth himself by necessity viz. of perfection not of co-action And there is no contingency in rerum natura 3. This God hath made his Creatures of various ranks and degrees of excellency And man a more knowing Creature than the Bruits 4. Among men he maketh some wise some foolish some good and Godly and some vitious and ungodly And as he maketh the difference of men and beasts of a Horse and a Toad of the Sick and the sound of Prince and people rich and poor so doth he of godly and ungodly chast and unchaste c. 5. Yet man being Intellectual God will move him by means and second causes and therefore hath made him Laws obliging him de jure and commanding his utmost diligence to keep them promising and threatning Life and death hereafter for the keeping or the breaking of them and appointing Ministers and Magistrates to perswade and drive him on 6. And it 's likely though not certain that God will do according to these Laws in some considerable degree 7. Man by his Nature and by Scripture which may be true is bound to Love and serve his God above all other as the Cause of all the being and good that is in the world whatever he do by us and of all our good 8. There is another life of Reward for the good and punishment for the bad which must be our hope and fear 9. Gods Laws are called moral means but Cause only as physical engines or tacklings to move mans will by the said necessitation 10. Gods hatred of sin is no true hatred or nolition where sin is but only his prohibiting it to us and his punishing men for it 11. If God did send Christ and the Apostles and Miracles c. it was only to be tacklings or parts in this engine of physical operations 12. God causeth and Loveth sin as much as obedience but he maketh it not so Good and Lovely to us it being our disease and misery 13. As God no otherwise hateth sin than sickness and sinners than the sick and looketh on good and bad but as modal physical differences caused by himself so must we do also and hate that most that hurteth us most 14. To mourn for sin and confess it and strive against it or talk of Christs suffering or satisfying for it any otherwise than as a Voluntary disease and misery of man or to avoid any sin any otherwise than as a misery to our selves or others is but the errour of superstitious men 15. Men should do all that ever they can to cure their sins and live holily so far as increaseth not their misery and no further and this only as a physical Voluntary perfection and as the avoiding of a natural misery to themselves and others 16. God will punish man not out of any hatred of sin which he willeth and causeth but out of a differencing will as he maketh Toads and Serpents and causeth Cattle and Fowl to be killed by us and Horses laboured in pain Therefore we have no reason to fear any other misery in Hell than Gods arbitrary disposal bringeth on the more wretched sort of his Creatures without any sinful commerit or provocation and perhaps little more than we voluntarily here choose and bring upon our selves or of the same kind our sin it self being our punishment though it pleaseth us As scratching is to him that hath the itch 17. Therefore the end of a mans life is the publick good and his natural felicity besides and above which to make God our End as he is holy and to be pleased by Holiness is an errour for all that cometh to pass whether sin or holiness do equally please and fulfil his will as they are equally caused by him according to their several natures I Have delineated this hypothesis with its consectaries as truly as I can If any expect that I should have given you their own words for all that I have said 1. Remember that I charge not all these words on them but mention their judgement with the consequents 2. That I charge not these consequents to be owned by the men but upon their doctrine And let any man discharge or justifie them that can 3. But I desire no more to prove that I wrong them not than that the Reader be acquainted with their own writings and not to impose too many on him particularly with Bradwardine Bannes Holkot and Alvarez and with Piscator Maccovius Dr. Twisse and Rutherford de provid And I desire him first but to read the words which I have before cited and confuted of theirs in this Treatise and the words of Alvarez and Twisse which I have cited and answered in my Disput contr Praedeterm in Methodo Theolog. And I must profess that the Religion here described in the end is all that I can prove consistent with their opinion truly understood in it self and its consectaries and that if I held their doctrine I think I could have no other faith Which I have annexed lest the Hobbists should think that their principle were it proved would justifie all Immorality and Irreligion For this much they might be obliged to notwithstanding it But he that can see so great eyidence for the Dominican predetermination above the other three wayes and what I have here farther added as for the sake of it to admit so great a change of his Religion or so great a degree of the forsaking of true Religion he seeth not with my eyes and I hope I shall never see with his though I am not a stranger to the pretences for their way that make it seem plausible to them that do respicere ad pauca And if any think that I deal too harshly in clogging their opinion with such odious consequents Let them prove them inconsequent and I will recant it But if they cannot civility shall not make me hide and favour so great Impiety and as little in Doctrine as in manners as Adultery perjury blasphemy c. because he that thinketh he doth well will not Repent and an erring mind will justifie sin and fight against God and his truth in his own name and it 's more to Teach men to break a com-mand than to do it and confess the sin They think it is for God that they erre And I think it is for God that I detect it
the moderatest that he * Vid. Episcopii Resp ad qu. 64. qu. 33. pag. 32. â—bi dicit Deum decrevisse ut Judaei Christum e medio tolleren ex praescientia quod id liberâ— voluntate facturi essent atque inde praedictiones certas natas esse decreed the event that Sin should come to pass ipso permittente quamvis non efficiente or at least that he decreed his permission of it B. I. The first sort are those few whom I in the beginning renounced of whom the Dominicans and good Dr. Twisse and Rutherford his Follower de providentia are the chief I easily confess to you that God made the Law and God made man and God maketh the Objects and God causeth the Act as a natural Act in genere by a natural general concourse And if it could be also proved that God were the chief efficient Determiner of the Will and that by necessitation to this Act or Object comparatively rather than to that e. g. that David willed the Acts which were Murder and Adultery I could never deny that God is the chief Author of the Sin For the formal reason of Sin is Relative viz. Its disconformity to the Law of God And the Relation resulteth without any new Act or Agent Posito fundamento omni absoluto And neither God nor Man do or can do more to cause the Relation And Dr. Twisse and Rutherford so far saw this that the up-shot of all their Vindication is 1. That God causeth not sin as sin but as a means to his Glory 2. That God is under no Law as we are and therefore can be no Author of Sin But to the first I answer It 's one thing to will Sin as Sin and another thing to cause Sin as Sin We charge them not with inferring that God willeth Sin as Sin but Nullus est Catholicus qui ignoret peccatum non esse effectum praedestinationis etiam si praedestinatus occasionem ex eo saepius capiat suae salutis Nam cum Deus causa peccati esse nequeat efficitur ut Deus peccatum nulla ratione praedestinare possit Neque actus ipse peccati secundum esse naturale non est effectus praedestinationis quamvis sit hoc modo effectus divinae voluntatis Vasquez in Tho. 1. q. 23. cap. 2. disp 93. if he will it and cause it for another end he causeth the formal nature of Sin that we may not play with the ambiguity of Quatenus and that 's as much as man doth For Sinners do not all if any will sin as sin under this formal notion as it is a breach of the Law of God and displeaseth him but as it bringeth them some seeming good And by doing evil for that good they are Sinners To the second we do not charge the Dominicans with making God a Sinner But with making him the chief cause of the sin of man even in its form II. But this is nothing to the Calvinists in general Therefore I say that your selves hold the same that they do in this point Q. 1. Do not all the Jesuites and Arminius hold That God is the Decreer of what he is the Author of And that God is the Author of the Act as an Act natural in the general See but Rob. Baronius his Metaphysicks and Bellarmine whom he followeth A. That is nothing to the moral specification of the Act. B. And Dr. Twisse hath oft enough told you where Arminius saith That God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his Sin A. That is not that he willed the sin but that Ahab having made himself wicked God decreed not to stop him but let him go on B. Either you mean that the Object of Gods Decree was but his own permission as the Arminians use to say or else that it was the Sin it self matter and form permitted not because it is sin or evil for so man oft willeth it not at least but as an occasion of Gods Glory Arminius his words import the latter And then you go as high as Dr. Twisse or Rutherford But if you say that it was but a rash word of Arminius which you stand not to to make plain and short work with you I am so far from being liable to your charge that I charge you as presumptuous if not erroneous in saying that God decreeth or willeth to permit Sin And I assert 1. That God doth not Decree the form of Sin as Sin 2. Nor yet the event of that form for any good end For Ut peccatum eveniat is but peccatum futurum and what is it to decree Sin but to decree that it shall be Nor 3. Hath he decreed that this Act which is the Sin shall come to pass in its comparative circumstantiated state from whence it is that Sin in its form resulteth And so Augustines saying so much decantate by Dr. Twisse and others * As Bradwardine who also tells us That if God damn the Innocent his Will is the rule of justice and equity But I think they that so describe his Justice do rather think that none are damned than that the Innocent are or may be as an act of Justice whatever a meer Proprietor may do is not found that nothing cometh to pass but what God willeth either effecting it or permitting it It cometh to pass without Gods willing it or decreeing it so that he permitteth it but decreeth not that it shall come to pass Not that it is against his contrary absolute Decree but as Lombard from other places in Austin telleth you plainly God neither willeth that it shall be because it is sin nor properly and simply willeth that it shall not be for his Will is not overcome 4. Yea he cannot be proved to decree his own permission Because to permit is but not to hinder which is nothing but a negation And we have no ground to feign that God hath Volitions or Decrees of nothing or of negations So that I say that Sin cometh to pass without Gods Decree of the event or of his permission Though not without his Decree of the good which cometh by it of which more when I speak to the other extream And of this also more anon The third Crimination A. III. You make God necessitate mens sin and damnation by your negative decrees as well as others by their positive For you hold That no man can believe and repent but such as God decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to And no man can do any more good than God decreeth that he shall do And some say that God decreeth Not to give men any more Grace than he giveth them which is a Decree objectively negative de non dando And you and others say That he doth not Decree to give them more And so as a stone is not culpable for not flying no more are Sinners not elected for not believing and obeying God * Note what Vasquez granteth in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5.
less a cause in man least of all in man when he is no man 5. The word Condition either respecteth 1. The thing or event willed 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with respect to that event 3. Or that Will radically consider'd in it self I opened this before but think of it again for the reason of the distinction is very plain And 1. God damneth no man but for sin nor privatively denieth any necessary Grace but for sin Therefore the event no doubt is before-hand conditional that is dependeth on a condition God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently and not else 2. The Act of Gods Will as denominated from the said Effect or Object particularly may be called A conditional Act or Will But if any think otherwise it is but de nomine 3. The radical essential Will or Act of God as in himself can have no cause or condition * Though sin be acknowledged to be the cause of the Will of God in Reprobation quoad res volitas that is in respect of the punishment willed thereby this hindreth not the absoluteness of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis And unless we understand the Fathers thus we must charge them with an Opinion which Aquinas is bold to profess that never any man was so mad as to affirm c. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 49. But 1. The actus reprobantis as really distinct from the effect is nothing but Gods Essence And who saith that sin causeth Gods Essence 2. And the effect of Reprobation as it is said to be a Decree not to give Faith or Grace is nothing and therefore that nothing cannot aptly so much as extrinsically denominate Gods Will or Essence as an Act. Is not here then a fair agreement Ruiz de praedef d. 9. p. 150. Quantum ad negationem electionis quantum ad permissionem peccati finalis praedâ—finitus suit reproborum numerus Dr. Twisse denieth none of this 6. That God willeth or decreeth not sin formally all the Christian world almost confess And what loveliness is there in that only odious thing that should tempt good people to father it on God or attribute the being of it to his Will or to be zealous Reproachers of those that say otherwise 7. And if God will and decree the Act not only as an Act in general but with all its modes and circumstances he undeniably willeth or decreeth the form of sin or the immediate necessary cause of it which in the case of efficiency will more evidently appear C. God willeth not the Form that is sin as sin and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumstances B. I have told you before that a wicked man may will sin in matter and form and yet not will it as sin To will it as sin is to take the form of sin as such to be good and so to be the ratio volendi which few if any Sinners ever do But to will both matter and form in one not as the formal reason of Volition but making total sin the matter chosen as a means to some other desired end this is possible for a very wicked man to do But I think the ordinary case of Sinners is not at all to will the form of sin but cast that by and to will the matter of it for the carnal pleasure or inferior good which it seemeth to tend to Now this excuseth not their will from wickedness that they will not malum sub ratione mali or sin because it is sin but for another end And shall we charge God of willing sin as the wicked do C. God willeth it to a good end and they to an evil end B. As evil must not be done that good may come by it so neither must it be willed to that end Man may need such a * Sure Arminius granteth enough and that which â—theâ—us and many School-men deny and for my parâ— I cannot grant when he saith At per accidens bonum est ut malum siat propter Det saptentiam bonitatem potentiam secundum quam Deus expeccato materiam gloriae suaeillustrandae sumit Est ergo peccatum isto respectâ— non medium per se illustrandae Gloriae Divinae sed occasio tantum non data in hunc finem neque natura sua ad illum accommodata sed a Deo arrepta horsum mira arte landabili abusu usurpata Armin. exam Perkins pag. 508. An occasion it is indeed but I will not grant that ex peccato God setcheth matter for his Glory nor that by accident it is good ut fiat Caeterum peccata etiam secundum rationem malitiae moralis objecta sunt seu materia circa quam divina praedestinatio versatur â—o modo quo versatur poenitentia Vasqu in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. dâ—sp 93. c. 2. means to his ends but so cannot God Yea men have oft good ends for evil Acts Many lye to glorifie God and sin for his Cause and Church and for their own and other mens Salvation Much of the Blood and Cruelties and Superstitions in the World have had good ends which yet excused not the things from sinfulness C. God is under no Law and therefore cannot sin But man is B. 1. That proveth God no Sinner but not that he causeth or willeth not the sin of man 2. Gods natural essential Perfection is his Law and more than a Law to him And from that Perfection all Laws in the world that are just and good have their Original that is Gods own Laws are the expressions of his holy perfect Will and Nature and Mans Laws are authorized by and subservient to and derived from the Laws of God in Nature and Scripture So that when the Apostle would describe a man best and likest unto God he saith That the Law is not made for the Righteous 3. If Gods Holiness and Wisdom make man a Law forbidding sin on pain of Hell the same Wisdom and Holiness with his Justice and Mercy will not will the sin so forbidden nor cause it nor consist with so doing C. It is not the form or essence of sins that God willeth but the existence and futurity or event not sin but that sin be B. I many a year studied thinking to prove that true But I doubt it is but a game at words and groundless distinguishing for a false conclusion For 1. Sin is a Relation formally even a disconformity of an Act or disposition and so of the person to Gods Law It can no otherwise be caused but by making the Law and causing the Act in the circumstances disconform God maketh the Law and God maketh man and his faculties and God causeth the Object and God permitteth the tempter If God also cause the Act in the prohibited circumstances he doth all that can be done in the causation of sin And so of his Volitions or Decrees As for the essence of sin in notion without the existence more
5. What maketh you call it by the name of Liberty to be impotent or if you will to be able not to love God not to live to God not to know God not to trust God not to repent of Sin not to be heavenly-minded what Liberty is this yea or to be able to hate God and Sin and damn your selves A. * Arnold Corv. describeth it to be that without which we are not men It is not Liberty specifically as it is for sin or against God and so not Libertas moralis but it is only Libertas naturalis or the indetermination of the Will with a self-determining power which is the natural seat of morality and may be used to good or evil Formalis Libertas arbitrii creati non consistit formaliter in indifferentia objectiva neque in indifferentia passiva sed in indifferentia Activa ipsiuâ— facultatis liberae quae indifferenter se habet ad opposita quamvis adjunctam habeat vel praesupponat aliquam indifferentiam passivam ipsius potentia indifferentiam objecti Alvar. de Aux l. 12. d. 116. p. 473. c. 2. B. Now you say somewhat and come into the Light Therefore having thus prepared the way I add that there is Libertas à malo and Libertas ad bonum both properly But it is improper to say Libertas à bono naturali vel morali vel Libertas ad malum qua tale 2. As there may be a three-fold Restraint or Compulsion Physical Ethical or Civil So there is a three-fold Liberty 1. Natural which is a Liberty from natural necessitation from God or our own faculties or things extrinsick unto any evil 2. Ethical which is a Liberty from vicious inclination or necessitation by it at least 3. Civil which is a Liberty from the restraining or constraining Laws of any that would or might draw us to evil or keep us from good and so of penalties by those Laws To which is reducible Liberty from the ill commands and punishments of Parents and Masters and from the violence of enemies or wicked men And Liberty is either from sin or from misery But the distinctions about Liberty are so many that I have given them you in a Table in the Second Book and refer you thither that we may agree on the state of the question What Liberty it is that you mean But first I shall ask you a few more questions Quest 1. Do you think that Liberty consisteth in the greatest indifferency of the Will when it is meerly in aequilibrio A. No For then every virtuous or vicious habit should take away Liberty B. I pray you think on it then Whether if strong habits which do tantum non necessitare do not at all abate or take away any part of Liberty it be like that if such a habit were so strong as per eundem inclinandi modum to necessitate it would not yet consist with Liberty of Will Quest 2. Do you think that a man is not necessitated to will his own felicity by a simple Volition Is he free to desire misery as such A. No This is not an act of Election and therefore not of Liberty B. Do you think that this certain constant necessary act of the Will is not a more perfect or excellent act than that which you call free which sometime is done and sometime not done and is before uncertain * Posse male agere non est aliquid quod ad Libertatis perfectionem pertineat sed potius quaedam est imperfectio libertatem comitans in persona creata quae Libertati accidentaria est Nam Deus c. Blank de lib. in genere n. 33. Or is it not a more excellent state of the Will to be constantly and certainly well determined than to be undetermined and defectible I would know as we go on whether the Liberty which we plead for be good and desirable or evil A. I cannot deny but it is incomparably more desireable to be certainly and necessarily determined to good than not But it is better to be free and left to our own choice uncertainly than to be determined to evil or to be so determined to inferior good as shall keep down the Soul from the superior I do not take this indetermination and free power for our best state but for a middle condition fit for a Viator that is tried here in order to his end Beasts are necessarily determined to things inferior The glorified Angels and Saints its thought and hoped are necessarily determined to things superior and so was Christ But our undetermined state of Liberty is better than one and worse than the other and fit for our trying life on Earth B. You say well Therefore remember that our Liberty is no further good than as it is a Liberty to good and from evil * Posse peccare non pertinet ad rationem formalem liberi arbitrii sed potius est quaedam imperâ—ectio arbitrii creati competens illi â—o quod factum est ex nibilo Alvar. ib. d. 115. p. 470. Et hanc rationem assignat S Augustinus l. 2. de vitiis concup c. 28. l. 12. de civit Dei c. 1. Unde Thom. 1. p. q. 62. art 8. ad 3. ait quod Liberum arb diversa eligere possit servato ordine sinis ut hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis ejus sed quod eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine finis quod est peccare hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis Idem dicit de ver q. 24. art 3. ad 2. Voluntas nostra vere libera est comparatione volitionis aut nolitionis quam elicit quolibet momento non solum quia prius natura quam se determinaâ—et ad alteram partem poterat seipsam non determinare ad eandem partem sed ad oppositam nec solum quia potest continuare vel acâ—istere ab operatione quam producit in instanti praesentis temporis sed etiam quia in instanti temporis quo elicit suam operationem veram retinet potestatem facultatem qua possit eam non elicere si velit aut etiam elicere contrariam operationem Alvar. disp 116. p. 476. Here is a power Volendi si velit But 1. Is it per candem volitionem vel aliam 2. Hath he qui non vult Potentiam volendi pro hoc instanti not from all determination but that the nearer we draw to necessary love to God and goodness the better we are Q. 3. I further ask you Do we not necessarily will also bonum sensibile sensible good as such with a simple Volition and so are not at Liberty in that point A. What mean you by a simple Volition B. That by which we will a thing by simple complacence considered as simply good before the understanding compare it with any other good and call the Will to an Election A. No doubt but we have an Appetite to sensible good but whether it be only the sensitive Appetite or
contrary to a strong and rooted habit so that so far they necessarily incline A. It sufficeth that no inclination necessitateth to every act of Sin nor from every Duty For by one good act they may be prepared for more B. 1. It is true that you say as to your conclusion But 2. You mistake the Antecedent There is an inclinatio naturalis antecedent to adventitious habits which is inseparable and necessitating yea essential to the Soul which I am not now to handle But Quest. 6. I further ask Do you think that any man is free from Gods Government and subjection to his Laws and Judgments A. No His Service is perfect freedom B. Quest. 7. Is it freedom to be from under the over-coming power of heart-melting Love and infinite attractive Goodness A. It is only an unhappy Imperfection not to be over come by Love B. Quest. 8. Is any Creature free from Gods Propriety or Dominion and from his disposing Will by which he doth as he list with his own A. No But God as a Governour hath told us what he will do with us B. Quest 9. Is the Will free from the directing power of the Understanding A. No Yhat were no freedom but bruitishness But it is not determined necessarily by the Understanding B. I will not now dispute that Quoad specificationem actus in many cases at least it cannot go against it But supposing the Understanding well informed Is not that the most perfect and happy Will that never goeth against it A. Yes For to go against it is to sin B. Quest 10. Are we at Liberty from under the over-sight of Angels A. No That were an unhappy Liberty But they necessitate not our Wills B. Quest 11. Are we at liberty from the rule and doctrinal Education Admonition Reproofs and Corrections of Parents Masters and Tutors A. No All this is our Good which we are not free from B. Quest. 12. Are we at liberty from the Laws and Judgment and Punishments of Kings and their subordinate Magistrates A. No This is Gods Order and they are His Ministers for our good B. Quest. 13. Is any Child of Adam free from Original Sin and pravity inclining them to evil and making them averse to holy good A. What ever Episcopius and Bishop Jer. Taylor say I must say No For I will not side with Pelagius against the Universal Church B. Quest 14. Is any unsanctified man free from the Dominion of this Original pravity together with contracted habits of sin A. No For that is the very state of an unsanctified person B. Quest 15. Is any regenerate person perfectly free from these sinful Dispositions and Inclinations last mentioned A Not till he attain to Perfection which is not in this life B. Quest. 16. Is any man free from all actual sin A. There is no man that hath not committed actual sin heretofore And no man that will not commit it again if he live long in the world And no man that is free from the Reatus culpae nor yet from the Reatus poenae till remitted But 1. There are many that live not in any mortal reigning sin 2. And there are some hours in which a man doth not actually sin at all As in a deep and dreamless sleep c. B. Quest. 17. Is any man or all at least wholly free from the crafty and violent Temptations of Satan A. No but they necessitate us not to sin B. Q. 18. Are we wholly free from the temptations of false Teachers Flatterers Tyrants Persecutors Enemies and other wicked men A. No But they cannot necessitate us to sin B. Q. 19. Are we wholly free from a multitude of objective snares of Prosperity and Adversity even in every Creature and way A. No but neither do they necessitate us to sin B. Q. 20. Are we any further freed from the strong temptations of our own senses appetites and fleshly Concupisconce than Orace delivereth us A. No But neither do these necessitate each particular sin B. Very good Let us come to the Application * Quod spectat naturam libertatis non minor est in utraque schola sententiarum varietas Quidam docent libertatem arbiâ—rii oppositam non esse necessitati sed coactioni tantum Verum quae hic est controversia aut mere verbalis est aut non magni momenti Hi enim concedunt ad libertatem non sufficere immunitatem a coactione nec libertatem in ea proprie consistere sed in â—o quod agens liberum seipsum movet agit ratione agenti intellectuali propia Et agnoscunt agentia libera in plerisque suis actibus non solum immunia esse a coactione sed neque esse ad unum necessitate quadam determinata Adeoque ex eorum sensu nonnulli eorum actuum necessarii sunt sed Plerique tamen contingentes Quum autem Libertas extenditur ad actus necessarios et immutabiles fatentur illam latiori significatione sumi Libertatem vero strictius acceptam versari tantum circa contingentia Qui contra pretendunt libertatem opponi non coactioni solum sed etiam necessitati concedunt voluntatem suorum quorundam actnum ratione babere sâ— necessario quamvis plerorumque respectu contingenter Et in illis actibus ad quos voluntas immutabiliter necessario determinata est esse quandam libentiam complacentiam unde patâ—t contentionem esse verbalem non realem Nempe utrique consentiunt quomodo res se habeat Quaestio solum remanet Aâ— actus necessarii Liberi dicendi fuit Blank de Lib. absol Thes 8. 9 10 11 12. And Th. 14. he citeth Estius his words confessing the same of Bonaventure that taking Voluntarium for Liberum it is but a difference de nomine Libertatis And Strangius de Vol. Dei l. 3. c. 14. p. 687. Neque nobis videtur hac de re litigandum quia alioqui tantum esset 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Non â—â—iâ— negamus sic vocem liberi arbitrii recte usurpari quamquam in alio sensu illas actiones diximus esse liberas See Blank ibid. n. 17 c. proving also that the quarrel among Protestants herein is but about the Names of necessity and liberty and that they are agreed of the matter And Thes 22 c. That their difference about necessity and indifferency in the matter of Liberty is but about the name and easily reconcilable And the same Th. 25. he saith of the Positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis posse agere vel non agere And de Lib. arb in genere Thes â—5 he saith the same with Strangius that it is a meer Logomachy between them that say All voluntary acts are free and those that deny it while they take Liberty in several senses one pro libentia secundum rationâ—m the other pro indeterminatione indifferentia c. That Liberty is consistent with necessity in many Cases many of the chief School-men-hold For which let the learned Reader
15. 58. And they work out their salvation with fear and trembling laying up a treasure in Heaven Matth. 6. 20. and laying up a good foundation for the time to come and pressing forward for the prize Phil. 3. 8 9. and laying hold upon eternal life Lib. All this leadeth us to our own works and sets up the Law and taketh down Christ and his righteousness and is meer Popery for humane Merits P. If this be Gods Word and Christs own Law and Doctrine then you inferr that Christ taketh down himself and his own righteousness and sets up man and humane merits But give me leave to tell you that if you deny the Reward of Evangelical duty and the Rewardableness or Worthiness or Merit of such duty as it is but our Merit or Worthiness of the free Gift of Christ and Life given by Paternal Love and Justice to believing Penitent accepters according to the tenour of the Covenant of Grace 1. You do contradict so much of the most express Texts of Scripture as alloweth us to suspect that really you believe not the Scripture to be true or that it is not it but your own contradicting fancy that is the measure of your belief and you may on such terms hold the vilest absurdities even what you list as in despight of Scripture while you pretend that it is for you 2. You will deny the honour of Gods Image on man and the work of the Holy Ghost and the design of Christ who came to destroy the works of the Devil and save his people from their sins and purifie to himself a peculiar people zealous of good works 3. You will disgrace the Church of God which Christ washeth and sanctifieth and render it too like to the unsanctified world 4. You will leave man no ground for true assurance of Justification or Salvation while the difference between the worthy and unworthy is taken away 5. You will harden the wicked in their false presumptuous hopes and teach them to say We are but unworthy and so are all 6. You will destroy the comfort of well doing by denying the reward and making it seem to be in vain 7. Hereby you will take down all holy diligence in our Christian race and warfare while you deny the prize and recompence of reward Heb. 11. 26. We run for an incorruptible Crown 1 Cor. 9. 25. Phil. 3. 14. 8. You will strengthen all Temptations while you take down that which should be set against them See Luke 12. 4. Heb. 4. 1. 12. 28 29. Matth. 6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 19 20 c. Matth. 5. 10 11 12. 9. You will disgrace the Word and Ministry and all Means if after all we are never the more accepted 10. In a word you deny Gods Government in denying his Governing Justice and Judgements and that is to deny God to be our God Yea you deny all Religion all the Kingdom of Christ all Law all Judgement all Retribution Heaven and Hell all the true difference between Good and Evil Holiness and Sin all Praise and Dispraise while you deny the Reward and Rewardableness of holy obedience by the Paternal Government of the Law of Grace and that glory honour and peace is to every one that doth good both Jew and Gentile Rom. 2. 7 10. Lib. You would perswade us that holiness is good for nothing if it be not Rewardable as if you knew of no other use of it so ignorant are natural men of the things of God which are spiritually disâ—erned I will tell you that which your carnal mind cannot understand 1. Holiness Faith Love Obedience c. are Gods free Gifts excellent in themselves without a Reward 2. They are Fruits of the Spirit and marks and signs of our future felicity though they deserve it not 3. I told you that they are Rewards to Christ and Gifts to us P. 1. That they are Gods Gifts we doubt not But are not Faith Love and Obedience also the Acts of man by that Grace which is the gift of God Lib. Yes they are mans acts but it is God that worketh them in us P. And tell me if you can 1. Why God cannot Reward those acts which are done by his own Grace Cannot God make the Promise of a Reward to be a fit Moral Means for his Spirit to work by Nay doth not the scope of the Scripture tell you that he doth so 2. Is there ever the less worthiness in it because God causeth it Tell me without shifting Is an honest man no more worthy of a Princes favour than a Thief If you are no more worthy of liberty and protection and life than Atheists and Rebels why do you call men Persecutors for using you as if you were such Why call you men Malignants for hating deriding and opposing godly men if they deserve no better than the worst Lib. They deserve better from men but not from God P. Do you deny Rulers to be Gods Officers and that they are to make this difference by his appointment and therefore it is done by God 3. But without shifting tell me Doth not every good action or inclination deserve praise from God and man Doth it not deserve to be accounted and called just as it is Lib. All our Righteousnesses are as menstruous rags and what praise then do they deserve Can that deserve praise which deserveth Hell P. 1. Come on then let Conscience be a while unmuzzled Why do you so much praise those of your own Church or Opinion Why praise you so much the Ministers and people that are of your way Why do you make a difference between them and such as are against you 2. Why do you so aggravate the sin of those that vilifie deride and persecute you Why call you the Saints the precious ones on earth Gods treasure and peculiar people 3. Why were you lately so angry with the Ecclesiastical Politician the Debate-maker and other such Books which vilifie men whom you and I have better thoughts of if they deserve no more praise than the vilest men 4. Why were you so angry lately when you heard of one that reproached you and so pleased with one that proclaimed your wisdom and goodness and took your part 5. And if good actions deserve not praise from God himself why doth he praise them so greatly in his Word Why will he say before all the world Well done good and faithful servant c. 1. Dare you call God Ignorant Legalist or charge him with mistakes 2. Doth not every thing and person deserve to be thought and called just as it is Else lying or silence must be the virtue and Truth the Vice 3. Is there no more good in a Saint than in a Devil If there be doth it not deserve to be called just as it is 4. May not he who deserveth Hell by the Law of Works or Innocency be yet Morally fit for that is Worthy of Heaven according to the Law of Grace which pardoneth his sins
promised as if he had been surprized into a promise not suited to the nature of the thing this would be abhorred by the same professours who in other words as it seemeth to be against Popery will applaud it But in all this you must remember that it is presupposed that mans soul is before made Immortal by God as Creator and that he might anniâ—â—â—late the most holy Creature if he will But he hath declared that he will not partly by the Nature of his soul and partly by his natural and positive revelations so that it is presupposed that God will continue us men and then Holiness will be a proportionable Happiness L. But I pray you give me further proof that the Papists mean so well and near us â—s you describe the case Cite me the Authors R. 1. You must take nothing for their Religion but what is in their Councils And you must charge no errour on them but what you can prove For the Accuser is the prover And I before cited to you the words of the Trent Council But I justifie not all that they there say And one passage as it soundeth I greatly abhorr which is that a Just man doth not venially sin much less deserve hell in every good work Can. 11. de Justif whereas I doubt not but the very culpable defect of Love to God and other holy qualifications defileth our best works with sin and every sin deserveth some degree of a hell according to the Law of Innocency But if they mean 1. That Good works as such are not sin 2. Or that our infirmities are not such as to which the Law of Grace threatneth hell and will condemn us we are then of their mind but we much mislike their words For were there not an antecedent desert of hell and a sinfulness so deserving though not by an unremediable guilt there would be no need of pardon But to speak freely the Council Doctors seemed not well studied in the doctrine of the Covenants even Suarez de Legibus one of the best is herein short and so to speak confusedly of these matters But they seem mostly to take notice only of the Law of Grace and because that accepteth sincerity and condemneth none for meer Infirmities therefore they thence measure both fault and guilt which they should not do For I find that they still presuppose Redemption and Pardon of sin in the present case But to proceed to their Doctors Vega q. 4. defineth Merit thus Meritum est actio libera acceptata ad aliquod praemium And de re do you deny this Davenport thus amendeth it Meritum de condignâ— est actio libera ab homine in gratia elicita qua ex Justitia acceptatur ad praemium c. meaning Justitia promissoris Scotus 1. d. 17. q. 1. c. will not have it meritorious because is done by grace but by Divine decree promise and acceptance And this he calleth Justice ex suppositione decreti promissi Non igitur ex natura actus oritur obligatio ad praemium saith S. Clara factâ autem pactione est debitum ex justitia And thus say the generality of the Scotists Yet some will not yield that God is so much as a Promiser lest he be obliged but only an Assertor as S. Clara noteth Tho. Waldensis and some others deny all merit fitly so called De sacram tit 1. Eckius Marsilius and Bellarmine saith S. Clara deny all merit of congruity Greg. Arim. 1. d. 17. q. 1. a 2. saith that there is no merit of blessedness by condignity Durandus 1. d. 27. q. 2. saith there is no merit of condignity with God nisi largo modo So Marsilius in 2. d. 27. Brugensis in Psal 35. Eckius in Cent. de Pradest Cusanus Stapleton and others of whom S. Clara referreth you to Suarez in 3 Tho. disp 10. sect 7. q. 3. Bradwardine c. 39. fol. 338. laboureth to prove that the increase of Grace or Glory is not merited de condigno but de congrâ—o and that all Catholicks so hold And next denyeth merit de congruo and all by reasons which S. Clara taketh to be valid Soto a Thomist denyeth all merit de congruo and saith the Fathers held it not 4. d. 14. q. 2. a. 5. l. 2. de nat Grat. c. 4. Bonaventure 2. d. 28. a. 2. saith Pelagius erred 1. In holding that the first grace was merited 2. That by the strength of Free-will we can dispose or prepare our selves for grace S. Clara saith Aestimo esse omnium Scholasticorum non dari ex parte peccatoris ullam causam meritoriam dispositionem aut conditionem ad primam gratiam For which he citeth August P. Innoc. 1. ad Concil Carth. Concil Arausic 2. can 3 4 5. Concil Trident. Sess 6. c. 5. concluding Et sine dubio hoc est de fide apud omnes Catholicos Doctores nec ullus unquam oppositum tenuit Et Bradward optimus divinae Gratiae propugnator dicit expresse esse Pelagianismum licet intelligeretur solùm de merito de congruo Yea Aquinas denyeth all merit de congruo as to Justifying grace 1. 2. q. 14. a. 7. in Rom. c. 4. Vega's judgement is commonly known See Carthusian in Jac. 2. c. I may conclude then with S. Clara that Cassander spake not unreasonably when he said Quo sensu hoc vocabulo Meriti Merendi usi sunt Patres Catholici obscurum non est nempe ut per illud gratiae Dei ex qua merita omnia oriuntur nihil detrahatur Quare nil est cur aut Ecclesiastici à loquendi forma sententia in Ecclesia jam olim usitata discedant aut Protestantes eam tam odiosè repudient aut condemnent And that Bucer said well colloq Ratisb Si sancti patres aut alii intelligunt Promereri facere ex fide gratiae dei bona opera quibus Deus mercedem promisit hoc sensu usurpare illud verbum minimè damnabimus L. Thus you seem to like the very word merit which in your confession you do not R. 1. I like the Scripture word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And they that translate it worthy and account condignity the highest notion of merit seem to allow that it may be translated Meriting 2. I would fain find a word to serve instead of merit answering Reward and I cannot What word can you find Premiability and Rewardableness are long and unhandsome and I remember no other without using many words 3. Yet I wish it disused to avoid abuse and offence L. But when Cassander saith It is used as not encroaching on grace I take all merit to encroach upon it and injure it R. I ask you Quest 1. If you preach that a Holy Lover of God is fitter for Heaven and Happiness in Gods love than a wicked man and hath a promise of it and another preach that the Saints are no fitter for Gods love and happiness than the wicked but only it 's promised
more are Godly vulgar people ignorant and consequently erre in many things Even they that cry out against the vulgar Ignorance and insufficient Teachers know far less than they are Ignorant of themselves 5. He that mistakingly thinks any thing is Good or Bad Duty or Sin which is not so will be zealous in pursuit of his mistake if he be serious for God A good principle will hasten him on in a wrong way whatever it cost him 6. Ignorance and timerousness cause superstition which is a conceit that God is pleased by overdoing in external things and observances and laws of their own making and so they that make part of their own Religion superstitiously as most good people do in some things through ignorance will censure all others as Good or Bad by the measure of their own mistakes 7. He that thus mistakingly thinks that men sin when they do not will have a proportionable dislike of them and aversation from them And will be ready to speak as he thinks of them and so will be guilty of calumny and calling Evil Good and Good Evil. 8. The World will abound still with real evil and scandals And all parties will be faulty And usually the greater part of the Clergie in the Christian World will be guilty of so much Ignorance pride contentiousness worldliness and sensuality as will greatly grieve and offend good people And this will occasion alienation and separations even with Godly persons The sacrifice of the Lord was abhorred through the sins of Eli's sons The case of the Clergie at this day in the Greek Church in Moscovie Armenia Syria Abassia c. yea among too many of the German Churches is very lamentable by Ignorance and scandal And the corruption of the Roman Clergie was it that facilitated the revolt from the Papacy at Luther's reformation He that readeth Cornel. Mus Ferus Espencaeus Erasmus Alvan Pelagius Clemangis and such others describing their own Clergie and Jos Acosta of them in India c. will see much of the Cause of the Divisions in the World And all the old Writers that write against the Waldenses do make us understand that the ignorance and wickedness of the Clergie then was it that drove them from the Roman Church Saith Wicelius Meth. Concord c. 11. p. 39. Quum tales ad nullum honestius vitae institutum idonei sunt mirum sit si bonos sacerdotes praestabunt sic itaque procedente tempore regetur Ecclesia ab asinis praedicabunt imperitissimi misero populo quod nunquam didicerunt ipsi Adolescentes optimi quique abhorrent propterea ab instituto illo quod nolint suam libertatem sibi eripi c. I have oft said what caused St. Martin to separate during life from the Synodical Bishops about him And what Gildas saith of such that no excellent Christian will call them Ministers And it 's very observable not only as Dr. James in the Margin of Wicelius hath cited that there are many Canons against wicked Priests celebrating and Massing but Wicelius himself saith p. 17. Non admittantur sacra concubinariorum quos Deus pejus odit atque manifestarios incestus Meminerimus in Decretis Pontificum piè caveri Ne quis Missam ejus Presbyteri audiat quem scit indubitanter concubinam habere aut subintroductam mulierem And yet there are now men pretending to piety among Protestants that speak of and use those Godly persons more hatefully who refuse to hear such wicked Priests than they do those Priests themselves Light and Darkness have no Communion And the Church will alwayes have bad Ministers and Members And many good people through Ignorance will think that they should go further from them than they ought And will not distinguish between that private familiarity which is in their own power and that publick Church Communion which the Church Pastors are the guides and judges of And so the honesty and the ignorance of these good men meeting with the vulgar wickedness will be as the congress of fire and water and will occasion ruptures and parties in the Churches 9. The carnal Clergie will usually hate and persecute Godly zealous Preachers As even the case of Ph. Nerius and Baronius at Rome sheweth which had almost made disturbance And then sufferings will be a stronger temptation to hard thoughts and too much alienation than most are able well to overcome 10. And the Godly people will adhere to their Godly suffering Teachers and run further in bitterness against the carnal and persecuting party than their suffering Leaders do desire 11. Yet interest and temptations will prevail with too many of the sufferers to connive at the bitterness and alienation of the people if not to countenance it which they do not justifie And so the rupture will grow still greater 12. And all men have some Pride And Godliness being the best thing may become the object of Pride as well as Knowledge and Power And so many will affect to have their Piety Conspicuous and therefore to be singular or of some small party that is eminent and so by separation to stand at a more conspicuous distance from the vulgar sort of Christians than Christ would have them And so many a good man hath more of Pride in his profession and separation than he is aware of 13. And because Gods word and his last judgement and Heaven and Hell do make so great a difference between the Godly and ungodly it occasioneth many to think that they must difference men by their own censures and separations farther than indeed they ought 14. And it greatly promoteth Schisms that good people are unacquainted with Church-history and know not how just such Opinions and Schisms as their own have in former ages risen and how they have miscarryed and dyed and what have been their fruits 15. And few men have that humble sense as they ought of their own Ignorance and badness which would keep their suspicions and Censures more at home and make them more compassionate to others 16. And few love their Neighbours as themselves nor consider while they hate mens sin what is lovely in their Natures and Capacities of grace 17. And the Piety of almost all Sects of Christians on Earth is already corrupted with so many humane superstitious additions that few can escape the temptation of Censuring accordingly 18. And the Church will alwayes have many hypocrites who quiet their Consciences by adhering to the strictest Ministers and Churches instead of a mortified holy and heavenly heart and conversation 19. And lastly Persecution and hatred from others and the due Love of Godly persons tempteth too many Ministers to over-run their own judgements and follow the more censorious sort of persons further than they ought at least by connivence and to be ruled by those whom they should rule And thus Divisions are occasioned even by Piety it self II. But yet were the Principles of Division never so many and pernicious Interest might have led
him But it followeth not necessarily that this will be done because it 's possible no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done 150. * * * Ruiâ— de praedet Tr. 2. diâ—p 12. §. 1 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed viz. Increatam permissionem Deus non praedâ—finit Creata permissio simul complecâ—itur quâ—rundam rerum productionem aliarum rerum negationem quibus positis peccatum permittitur And if by permission they will mean quid positivum it must have a positive Will and Cause but what 's that to the Negative or meer non impedire Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguoâ—s words His reason §. 2. is Permission of sin is good 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum And he said that permissio increata is not decreed 2. Negatio motivorum c. 3. Prodâ—ctio Constitutio circumstantlarum 4. Generalis concursus Ans 1. Nothing is not Good meer Negations are Nothing 2. Moral Negations or Logical that is Denyal and restraints are something and have a Cause 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause but so is not a meâ—r non-impedition which is proper permission But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent and an indifferent agent and a contrarily disposed agent To permit a stone to ascend will not make it ascend To permit the Air to move will not make it move But to permit a stone in the Air to fall I think with Durandus is enough to make it fall supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin 151. But yet here we must distinguish 1. Between a necessary and a free agent 2. Between Adams sinning and ours 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly or that hath many disswasions or but few 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general that is of not living innocently yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth nor is it a valid consequence He is a bad man Ergo he will do this and that and the other Sin Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin than to the contrary So that bare permission will not inferr the Certainty of all sin atleast and therefore will not here serve turn 152. But saith Rada it is not common permission but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin Answ 1. God did not so by Adam at first 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn as well as effectual If so then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin as to live without God But if not so then while Necessary Grace called sufficient is continued the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him till Adam cast it away It is therefore no good Illation Deus permittit aliquem peccare ergo peccat unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help which is more than proper permission 153. And it must be remembred that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin He alwayes hindereth it so far as to forbid it to threaten damnation to affright men from it to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it Only by doing no more nor effectually changing or restraining sinners but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means he permitteth sin 154. But it is also confessed that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited some of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given And so some are without that Teaching those mercies or those corrections which others have But yet they are still under a Law of Grace 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity Truth and Goodness which is Natural doth continue Otherwise it is confessed that Permission would inferr sin materially but no sin formally if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason Free-will or executive power 156. But I easily confess that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * * * Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass in sinful actions could be proved that would certainly inferr the event of sin And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will sin may be fore known in that decree And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind they had never omitted that easie solution of the Case How God fore-knoweth sin But this I have elsewhere confuted and shall add a little here 157. But first having disproved all these presumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future sin I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfie us which is That Gods Understanding is Infinite and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible But How his understanding reacheth them what Idea's he hath of them how they are Intelligible to him with such like are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men who know not their own ignorance And no manner of understanding is properly Divine which mortals can comprehend SECT IX Of Predestination and Free-will of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford 158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution and be after his Volitions in order yet because I am now only to speak of it as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin and as quid decretum I shall touch it here It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of besides himself Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties and a Power to Act or not act at this time or to choose this or that and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency So that when ever any Act is done as an Act in genere God is the first Cause of it For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth and by his Vital Influx And there is
getteth a right to any benefit by his fault What then Why the Precept to that man is past into a Virtual Judiciary Sentence condemning him as disobedient even as it is with those in Hell 239. Therefore since the fall the Law of Innocency in it self is the same which once said Thou shalt continue perfectly Innocent but it doth not properly oblige us as a Law to that Innocency or perfection which we were born without because we are become uncapable subjects Much less is that Innocency now the Condition of any Promise or Covenant of God as if he still said Be personally and perpetually Innocent and thou shalt live and that thou maist live But the Law being still the same we that are uncapable of the duty are not uncapable of the guilt and condemnation Vid. Bellarmin de Grat. lib. aâ—b li. 5. per totum c. 30. de dist necessitates And therefore the Law and Covenant are now become a Virtual Sentence of Condemnation for not obeying personally perfectly and perpetually to the death For he that hath once made Innocency Naturally Impossible to him is Virtually in the case of one that hath persevered to the death in sin 240. But if the contracted Impossibility be not Physical but Moral the case is quite different For then the thing is a threefold sin in it self as aforesaid 1. The disabling sin 2. The vicious Disability or Malignity of the Will 3. And the after sin thereby committed and omission of duty More of Physical and Moral Impotency 241. 1. No righteous Law forbiddeth Physical Impotency as such nor commandeth men Physical Impossibilities as is said But Gods Laws primarily forbid the malignity of the Will which is its Moral Impotency Bradwaâ—dine plainly saith li. 3. c. 9. p. 675. that Nullus actus noster est simpliciter in nostra potestate we grant not absolutely and independently sed tantum secâ—ndum quid respectu Caâ—sarum secundarum Nihil est in nostra potestate nisi subactiva subexecâ—tiva subservienâ—e necessariâ— necessitate naturalitâ—r praecedente respectu â—oluntatis divinae Quod ideo in nostra dicitur potestate quia cum volumus iliud facimus voluntarie non inâ—iti So that by him no creature was ever able to do more or less than it doth except you call him able to do it that can do it when God makes him do it but that is not to be able before or when he is not caused to do it 242. 2. Rulers use not to make Punishments for Physical Impotency But for the Wills Malignity God doth 243. 3. Rulers use not to propound Rewards for Physical Impossibilities But for the fruits of Moral Sanctity or Habits and for themselves God doth 244. 4. No just Judge condemneth men for Physical Impotency But for Moral God and man do 245. 5. No Good man hateth another for Physical Impotency But for Moral malignity God and man do 246. 6. An inlightned Conscience accuseth and tormenteth no man for meer Physical Impotency and Impossibilities But for the Wills Malignity Conscience will torment men So that it is evident that one sort of Impotency maketh an act no sin in its degree and the other maketh it a greater sin For Nature and common notices teach men to judge that the More Willingness the more culpability But he that hath Actual and Habitual Wilfulness and is as some Adulterers drunkards revengeful persons proud covetous c. who are so bad that they say I cannot choose are the worst of all the sorts of sinners by such disability 247. It is most probable that God overcometh Moral Impotency and giveth Moral Power by Moral Means and Operations For though God can give it by a proper Creation without Moral Means and we cannot say that he never doth so nor how oft he doth or doth not yet it is most probable that his special Grace doth by his Trine Influx of Power Wisdom and Goodness Life Light and Love suscitate the natural faculties of the soul to the first special Act and by it cause a holy Habit which he radicateth by degrees And this is Metaphorically a Creation 248. This is certain that since the sall we have the same essential faculties that Original sin is not as Illyricus so long and obstinately maintained though an excellently good and Learned man a Substance though it be the Pravity of a substance And that sin changed not the humane species Nor doth Grace change our species It is certain that the Acts of these same natural faculties are commanded to all men even the unregenerate under the names of Faith and Repentance And so these are their duties And it is certain that a Course of Moral means preaching reading meditating conference threatnings promises mercies afflictions are appointed and used to the procuring the said faculties to perform these commanded acts It is certain that these Means have an Aptitude to their end And that God worketh by his own means And appointeth not man to use them in vain And that in working Grace God preserveth and reformeth Nature and worketh on Man as Man and according to the Nature of his means 249. And I think none dare deny but that God is Able by his Spirits powerful operation without any Antecedent new Habit or disposition to set home these same means so effectually on the Natural powers of the soul as shall excite them to the first Acts of Faith and Repentance And by them imprint a Habit as is said and shall be said again in Part 3. And if he Can do so and Can do otherwise which then is likest to be his ordinary way I leave to the observers of Scripture and Experience 450. This is the Common sense of Divines who place Vocation exciting the first act of Faith and Repentance before Union with Christ and before Sanctification which giveth the habit till Mr. Pemble Vind. Grat. taught otherwise whom Bishop G. Downame confuted in the Appendix to his Treatise of Perseverance 251. As to the question How this Grace is called Infused and not Natural I answer It is called Infused and Supernatural because 1. It is not wrought by any Natural-moral means only but by Supernatural-moral means viz. Revelation in and by the Gospel of Christ 2. And this supernatural Revelation cannot work it without the special extraordinary operation and impression by the Holy Ghost above the common concurse of God with all his Creatures as he is fons naturae This the Schools have Metaphorically called Infusion 252. But it may be called Natural 1. In that mans Natural faculties receive Gods Influx 2. And perform the act 3. And are perfected by it as the Natural body is by Health 253. And what the difference is ex parte Dei agentis ex parte effectus between Gods Natural and Gracious operations I shall after open in the third Part. 254. The Schoolmen especially the Scotists and Ockam and many Franciscans Benedictines and other Fryers yea such Oratorians as Gibieuf
have fled so high in making Grace supernatural feigning a state of pure Naturals that had none and talk so phanatically of the Deification of the soul as I think hath ensnared some Sectaries among us to imitate them seigning that the first Covenant is Moral as a Law and the second Covenant is the very in-being of a Divine Nature which they though obscurely seem to describe as somewhat above all Habits and Inclinations put into our own nature like another form or soul Which over-doing tendeth to tempt men to Infidelity by doubting whether mans Nature was made by the Creator to enjoy God in Heaven or not when it must be made another thing to attain it SECT XII Of Scientia Media 255. AFter this Digression about our Will and Powers as the objects of Gods Knowledge and Decrees I return to the Doctrine de Scientia Media And that God knoweth from Eternity the truth of all conditional propositions that are true is past all doubt If we may suppose that God had eternal propositions No doubt but he knoweth now that such propositions are true If such Causes be put they will or will not produce this or that as the effect 256. But if it be an Imperfection to have mental propositions to know by and God knoweth not by them but only knoweth them as the instruments and way of humane knowledge For no doubt but he knoweth all that 's ours Then it must be said that he had from eternity but the foreknowledge of the Creatures conditional propositions And who can well determine this 257. And this will lead the arrogant disputers to other enquiries no less difficult Whether it be only or primarily the Proposition it self as ens rationis humanae or as the Thought of mans mind which God knoweth or the res ab homine cognita that is futurition it self And if the former How God knoweth them to be True If the latter How he knoweth futurition 258. And here inextricable difficulties will still arise before them Whether to have the notion of futurity be not a part of the Creatures imperfection Whether God know not all things as present Whether Nothing be properly Intelligible in it self Whether it be not only Propositions de nihilo that are known and not the ipsum nihil such as futurition is Whether to ascribe such knowledge of Nothing and such notions or propositions to God be to ascribe perfection or Imperfection to him 259. If we may or must say that God from eternity fore-knew our Propositions of future contingents which are Conditional yet we must not say or think that his knowledge quoad actum is conditional so as that the Creatures * Nic. D'Orbellis saith Communiter distinguitur triplex cognitio Dei viz. approbationis visionis intelligentiae Cognitio approbationis est tantum Bonorum Cognitio Visionis est corum quae sunt fuerunt vel crunt Cognitio intelligentiae seu simplicis notitiae est omnium quae possunt esse Hujusmodi autem cognitiones non differunt secundum se sed secundum distinctionem connotatorum Et Bonavent 1. d. 38. dub 3. Dicendum quod in nobis notitia simplex notitia beneplaciti dicunt diversas cognitiones diversos modos cognoscendi A Deo autem una tantum cognitio est Sed illa una facit Deus quod homines multis Et â—â—â—o illa una dupliciter significat state is the condition of Gods Knowledge in it self But only that the object is a conditional proposition speaking the Condition of the event fore-known From which Gods Act is denominated conditional only denominatione extrinsecâ not as an Act but as This act 260. We deny not but God may be said as truly to know the truth of hypothetical as of absolute propositions If one be the object of his Knowledge the other is Which proveth the hypothetical proposition to be less perfect than an absolute but not Gods knowledge of it to be less perfect 261. Nor doth Gods fore-knowledge that Adam will sin in such circumstances make his understanding depend on the Creature but only to be terminated on the Creature as an object And so it doth in all Acts where the Creature is the object This objection therefore belongeth also to the dispute Whether God know any thing but himself or out of himself 262. The seigning God to have in himself so many acts of knowledge really distinct and to lye in such an order is intolerable seeing God is most simple But by extrinsecal denomination his Knowledge may by us through our weakness and necessity be distinguished according to its respect to diversity of objects by inadequate conceptions But on that pretence to feign many needless distributions is profane 263. They that think it a good confutation of scientia mediae that Non decreta non sunt futura therefore no futurition can be known but as Decreed do err much in the antecedent For it is false that sin is Decreed and are either erroneous or uncertain in the conclusion For God fore-knoweth sin so far as it is intelligible 264. The sense of the question de Scientiae Media is not de conditionatis Vide Pet. à Sanct. Jos Disp. 4. Sect. 1. p. 465. de Scient Med. necessariâ—s as If the Sun set it will be night Nor yet of such conditionals as are meerly disparate and have no kind of dependence or connexion as If Peter dye quickly John will live long But of such conditionals as have some reason of the Connexion and yet leave the will in an undetermined power to act or not But we know no difference between these ex parte Dei Scientis but only denominatione extrinseca ex parte objecti 265. Much less dare we conclude with them that Gods knowledge See all this modestly and judiciously handled by Fr. Zumel Disput. in Tho. p. 1. especially his Conclus 6. p. 127. And Ockam 1. d. 38. q. 1. Et. Greg. Arim. ib. q. 2. a. 2. Et Gabr. Biel ib. qu. 1. a. 1. Et Ant. Cordub quaest q. 55. dub 10. of Conditionals is in God before his will to concurr or that they exist For we are not acquainted with such priorities and posteriorities in God except by such denomination 266. Methinks it is but sumbling to say with Pet. à S. Joseph Suav Concord Disp 4. p. 484. A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum sub conditione necessarium sit aliquo modo decretum divinum cum nâ—hil possit esse futurum sive absolute sive sub conditione nisi Deus ut prima Causa dut absolute aut sub conditione velit ad ista concurrere At See the short answer in Pet. à S. Joseph Suav Concord p. 576. the first look this seemeth to be spoken of the cause of futurition or of the knowledge of it And if not the Decree seemeth mentioned to no purpose For futurum tantum sub conditione is not as such futurum For the condition suspendeth the
futurition A conditional proposition de futuro is as true of that which will never come to pass as of that which will And if they mean that God Decreeth e. g. that Judas shall sin if he be so and so tempted it will lay the cause of Judas sin more on God in their own apprehension than their Cause or the Truth will bear For if God Decree that unnecessary Causes shall certainly effect the thing sin let them take heed of the consequence 267. I could never see how the Doctrine de scientia media doth at all Pennot l. 4. c. 23. saith 1. Scientiam Mediam maxima cum probabilitate defendi posse 2. Hunc modum reconciliationis decretorum cum Libertate principaliter immediate non inniti Scientiae mediae sed solum remote quia principaliter illa non ponitur in Deo ad conciliandam arb libertatem cum Div. decretis sed ut Deus provide sapientissime omnes actus maxime liberos disponere possit dirigere ad opt fines serve their turn seeing they use it to shew how God knoweth that Determinately which he foreseeth but in Conditionibus sine quibus non or in unnecessary and not determining causes And their own answer signifieth nothing more to the purpose but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his understanding which is most true But that he knoweth them ever the more for the supposition of circumstances they never prove Therefore the doctrine of Gods knowledge of such Conditional propositions and contingents as so circumstantiated seemeth True materially that They are the Objects of Gods knowledge but false efficiently as if they were any Causes of his knowledge which hath no Cause but only extrinsecal denominaters of it in that act And it seemeth useless and needless to their purpose 268. For I confess I think that we need no more and are capable of no more to satisfie us how God knoweth any thing Intelligible than to say By his Infinite perfection Man knoweth by Reception ab extra but so doth not God And if the Quest How doth God know this suppose extrinsick efficiency or reception it is blasphemous And I confess I hear men dispute How God knoweth with horrour as I hear men curse and swear and blaspheme knowing how uncapable such Moles as we Mortals are of understanding the intrinsick manner of Gods knowledge And I detest the very question and am but perswading others to detest it thus understood 269. Much more do I think it arrogant presumption in those that dispute pro scientia media to say that God Can no otherwise know future contingents As Annatus de scient med p. 85. contr Ab omiibus conâ—â—sâ—â—â— est nullam veritatem fugere intellectum Diâ—inum ac proinde propositiones de fuâ—â—ris contingentibus c. Blank de Concord lib. cum Decretis 1. Thes 49 50 51 Twiss D. 1. c. Seclusa Scientia Mediâ— non remanere in Deo praescientiam absolutam futurorum contingentium Et cap. 6. Seclusa Scientia Media non posse praedefiniri à Deo liberas creatae voluntatis actiones O Man O Worm Who art thou that in cases so unsearchable darest assert a non posse upon the Almighty God thus in the dark 270. And it is no less arrogant in the adversaries of Scientia Media such as some of our own and the Scotists who dare say that God Rada â—â—i â—â—pr who was one of the Congregation where it was disputed before P. Clem. 8. and was against it as Pet. à S. Josiph and others tell us cannot know future contingents but in the predefinition and decrees of his own will As if we had seen into all his Powers and Acts who dwelleth in the unaccessible light Whereas we know little of the smallest of his works 271. And as audaciously do the Dominicans plead that God cannot otherwise know our future free acts but by decreeing by immediate identificate premotion to predetermine them as the total first efficient cause Nothing can be more certain than that we know not How God knoweth who scarce know How we know our selves 272. He that hath read but one half what is said upon this subject by Zumel Ripa Gonzal Fasol Arrub. Aluiz Alarcon Alvarez Tanner Ruiz Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin Cantarel Navar. Curiel Cabrera Mascaren Verdu Fonseca Mendoz. Lessius Diotalev Moncaeus Theophil in Theolog. Natur. Aegidius Conink Pennottus Petr. à S. Joseph Annatus Twisse c. yea or but any two Contenders and is not convinced that they talk presumptuously of things which are unknown above their reach Non dâ—sunt ex nostris qui scientiam mediam aliquateâ—us agnosâ—unt inquit Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p. 675. naming even Gomarrus Walaeus and Lud. â—â—ocius as also Jacob. Martinius and other Lutherans and are we further from Arminius than Gomarrus was doth not think reverently enough of God nor knowingly and humbly enough of man And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which Durandus his third opinion casteth in the way and doth but try to solve well all Lud. à Dola's Questions Part 1. cap. 9. p. 96 97 c. and to answer well all his arguments against the usefulness of Scientia Media Part 2. and against the truth of immediate physical Predetermination Part. 3. and against Identificate Concurse as to evil actions Part 4. may soon find that much of these matters are so far above us as to be nothing to us and unfit to be thought necessary to our Peace and Concord 273. The old doctrine of Gods Prevision and this de Scientia Media in all that is within our reach come all to one And they erre that hold it to run pari passu equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not evil Acts because he willeth them or the futurity of them nor because he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act in specie which is sin But he willeth to effect that which is Good and may so far know it SECT XIII Of Gods Will and Decrees in General 274. GOds Decrees de futuris and his Will de praesentibus are in themselves the same save as to the extrinsick denomination from the divers state of the connoted objects 275. Gods Decrees are not his works in themselves considered but only That Gods Decrees are not to be taken for a thing past and ceased but as a thing still doing Pennot li. 4. c. 24. thinketh is the best notion to reconcile them with liberty But ab extrinseco Connotative they must be denominated past though without change in God Of this Dr. Twisse hath animadverted when with his executive power they operate ad extra and then his knowledge and will are his working being productive of the effects 276. As in point of simplicity Gods Acts are all One and yet many that is One ex parte agentis as his Acts are but his Essence and yet many ex parte effecti objecti inde
side and rejecting hating forsaking on the other side And electing implyeth that some are not elect 458. About the object of that which many call Reprobation be sure to distinguish between a true object of any Act circa quod versatur and which is subjectum inhaesionis and a meer object of speech or subjectum praedicationis Else you will with many be ensnared to think that every subject or object of a predication which in the series of Gods judgements you meet with is the object of some positive act of God 459. And though we would quarrel with no man about meer words yet lest words deceive you I add that as the word Reprobation seemeth to signifie a positive Act and yet a great part of the desertion of the Reprobates is by Gods preteritions and not-acting and privations therefore it is not the whole series that the word Reprobation aptly expresseth but only some particular Acts. 460. The word Predestinate used Rom. 8. 29 30. and Ephes 1. 5. The presumption of the Schoolmen in defining the Act of predestination is tremendous See Ruiz de provid disp 3. sect 9. ad 11. who concludeth that Predestination is an Act of Gods Intellect and a Practical act and is Actus affirmans Dâ—i volitionem libere decernâ—ntâ—m de finibus rerum mediis c. q. d. Volo Petrum beatificare per talia media c. It is not this will but the knowledge of it 1 Cor. 2. 5. it 's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 though not spoken of persons Act. 4. 28. translated fore-determined when applyed to persons is ever taken in Scripture as an act of mercy And the ancients Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius use the words Praedestinati Praesoiti the predestinate and the fore-known as of late men use among us the words Elect and Reprobate 461. Though men differ as their opinions lead them in the exposition of such texts as * * * Vid. Bezam in Rom. 8. 28. de proposito Rom. 8. 28 29 30. Ephes 1. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11. and some take them to speak of predestinating Individuals and others only of species that is of believers sufferers Lovers of God c. yet as to the matter it self none that is judicious can or doth deny but that God eternally Predestinateth Individuals The Jesuits commonly confess it though they differ on the question how far it is on fore-sight of faith But that foreseen Believers individually are eternally elected to salvation thev cannot deny And the Learnedst Jesuits maintain that God giveth faith in time and electeth Individuals to faith it self from eternity That is eternally decreed to give them faith or to give them that Grace by which he fore-knew that in the advantagious circumstances in which he decreed to put them they would freely and he deereed should infallibly believe 462. The conceit and supposition of many that Election and Reprobation are such perfect contraries as that they run pari passu and that God willeth in the one just as he doth in the other End and means for matter and order is a gross mistake Augustine Prosper Eulgentius and Davenant of late with many more have shewed that God predestinateth Leg. Dauen Dissert de Praed Reprobat copiose haeâ— probantâ—m Et Zumel Disput 5. §. 5. p. 335. â—â—â—â— objecâ—o elect pag. 367 c. men to Faith and perseverance and to Glory and not only to Glory upon the foresight of faith and perseverance But that he pâ—edestinateth or decreeth men to damnation only on the foresight of final impenitence and infidelity but not to Impenitence or Infidelity it self 463. The Grand difficulty that occasioneth all our Controversies herein is How to discern that God is the Author of all our Good and yet not the Author of Sin nor of Damnation saving for sin And both parties are very desirous to hold and see that both these are true Nay both believe them But they differ only in the way and method of manifesting it 464. There are three opinions about Reprobation 1. One is that â—od Positively decreed from eternity to glorifie his Justice in the damnation of the most and to that end to occasion and permit their hardning and unbelief so that Reprobation is Positive both as to the Act and Object 2. The other is the opinion of the Synod of Dort as expressed defended at large by Davenant and many others that Reprobation is Gods Positive Decree not to give saith and and repentance to the same men and to damn them for impenitence and infidelity and so is Positive quoad Actum but Negative quoad Objectum as to the first part not giving faith 3. The third is the Opinion of subtile Scotus and his followers that in primo instanti Reprobation is Negative quoad Actum Objectum So Albertine before cited that is It is no Act of God at all but only a Non-election or preterition which is I suppose the meaning of Dr. Sterne of Dublin Coâ—ledge who hath written a Latin Tractate maintaining that God Reprobateth none that is by any Act. 465. The method laid down by Scotus is this Offertur Voluntati sâ—â— hunc peccaturum vel peccare Primo voluntas ejus circa hunc non habet Scot. 1. d. 47. Vid. Signa Mayronis in fine Against Scotus his foundation that God knoweth future contingents only ut Volita saith Alliacâ—in 1. q. 11. N. Sed ista propositio non est intelligibilâ—s 1. Quia talia instantia prioritatem posterioritatem esse in Deo noâ— est verum 2. Quia impossibile est quod pro aliquo instanti talis complexio de futuro sit neutra Alias pro tune daretur medium in contradiâ—â—ione 3. Quia ponâ—â— aliquid esse medium rationem cogâ—oscendi in Divino intellâ—â—lu Velle Velle â—nim ipsum habere peccatum non potest 2. Potest intelligere Voluntatem suam non volentem hoc tunc potest velle Voluntâ—tem suam non velle hoc ita dicâ—â—ur Volens sinere vâ—luntarie permittere sicut ex alia parte praesentato sibi Juda primo Deuâ— habet non Velle sibi Gloriam non primo Nolle potest tunâ— secundo reflectere super istam negationem actus Velle eam ita Vâ—lens sive voluntarie non eligit Judam finaliter peccaturum non nolitioneâ— gloriae sed non-volitionem gloriae 466. It is notable that both Dr. Twisse and Bishop Davenant do disclaim this opinion of Scotus without offering us any one argument against it which is so unusual a course with one of them as would perswade one to think that they had not much to say against it but what they intimate the harsh sound of the words that God should be here a non-agent 467. The truth seemeth to me that as Davenant saith Scotus was the first artifex of this ordering of various Acts in the mind of God So here he saith too much and is
noxious evils we must not ascribe such Imperfections to God but only such Nolitions as his Actions as Rector per Leges Judicia have made to signifie no imperfection as being not contra nocumenta but only contra injurias as against himself contra nocumenta as against his creatures i. e. contra peccatum And now I may answer the solitary argument of Vasquez mentioned in the Margin that non entia non dare gratiam non impedire peccatum c. may have aliquam rationem boni amabilitatis and so may be Willed Loved or Decreed Answ 1. In meer Naturals Negations are not properly any way good or evil but Privations are Natural Evils and not good 2. To be occasio sinè qua non of good as sickness is of the Physicions honour and sin of Gods is not any true ratio boni vel amabilis The bonum amabile is only the good that on that occasion is done The occasion is neither efficient constitutive or final cause of any good nor any causal proper medium 3. In Morals meer Negations are neither good nor evil nor have any Morality but only Positives and Privations 4. In morals God judicially doth that whence Penal privations follow and he may penally non agere non dare gratiam to execute his Law and demonstrate his truth and Justice on sinners and occasion the perception of his mercy to others And here the non-agere non-dare permittere being loco materiae volitae may after our mode be said to be Volita seu decreta bona But properly it is not the non-entity that is bonum or Volitum but the positive Law and Judgement and the relatio debiti pâ—nae and the ratio poenae in the privation and the demonstration of truth justice holiness c. therein 5. But sinful privations that is sinful Volitions nolitions or non-Vâ—litions of the Creature are not properly per se or per accidens propter se vel propter aliud good or amiable or willed or decreed of God And they that prove that God cannot be the Author of sin because he cannot be Causa deficiens must mean as much or speak impertinently and deceitfully It is not impertinent which Judicious Strangius saith Lib. 3. c. 13. p. 677 678. If Scientia Media be an useless conceit how much more cum extenditur ad ejusmodi infinitas vanissimas connexiones rerum disparatarum quae nunquam futurae sunt He instanceth in many and addeth De hac re Ariaga disp to 1. d. 21. sect 7. dicit non sibi videri in Deo esse scientiam harum quia talis scientia videtur plane impertinens Ad quid enim nosceret Deus quid Chimaera esset factura sub tali conditione impossibili c. Et ipse D. Twissus de Scient Med. p. 472. Si plures Angelos Deus condidisset certe decrevisset ut etiam illi agerent aliquid in Gloriam Dei Nec tamen decretum aliquod hujusmodi Deo decenter tribui potest c. I know the case is not just the same with that before us but the reason is the same for both But still I profess that If it be not an injurious imputing imperfection to God to assign him positive Volitions of every negative I shall concurr with them that do and extend Gods Volitions as far as ever the object and his perfection will allow And say of them as Judicious Blank doth of Gods knowledge De Concord lib. cum decret 1. n. 64. Saltem ille minus periculose errat qui putat Deum scire ea quae forte scibilia non sunt quam qui negat Deum scire quae revera scit quae intra Divinae omniscientiae objectum continentur So here so be it that God be not feigned to will sin I contend the less against them that say He positively willeth Infinite numerical Nothings and his own non-acting ††††††Bradward l. 1. c. 13. Cor. 10 11. brings in too profoundly like one of Thom. Anglus his Ergo's that God is the Causa prima of every nothing non esse because he is so of negations As if Nothing could be an effect and have a Cause or as if a negative conception or proposition were not something viz. a Thought or a Word as well as an affirmative Such workmen make the world with words 509. BEing afraid of wearying the Reader I pass by other School-controversies here and only propound to each mans Conscience whether 1. He that is the affirmer of unproved acts of God 2. And that about his secret unsearchable Volitions 3. And of such acts as make the difficulties inextricable about Gods being the Cause of sin be not on the far unsafer side than he that only saith Quae supra nos nihil ad nos If these be not certainly false they are certainly unproved and therefore not to be here received 510. And I say here as Buridane saith about the forementioned nature of Liberty Ethic. li. 3. qu. 1. p. 152. Simpliciter firmiter credere volo quod Voluntas caeteris omnibus eodem modo se habentibuâ— potest in actus oppositos Et nullus debet de via communi recedere propter rationes sibi insolubiles specialiter in his quae fidem tangere possunt aut mores Qui enim credit se omnia scire in nulla opinionum suarum decipi fatuus est De festuca enim tibi sensibiliter praesentata formabuntur centum rationes vel quaestiones de quibus contraris sapientissimi doctores opinabuntur propter quod in qualibet harum deceptus erit alter ipforum vel ambo Ideo non miror si in hac altissima materia non possum per rationes solutiones satisfacere mihi ipst 511. To proceed in the application * * * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 1. Sunt non-nulli Thomistae qui tam severe hanc sequuntur opinionem ut affirment â—undem ordinem servasse Deum in reprobatione quem in praedestinatione tenuit scil ut ante praevisa peccata sola sua Voluntate decreverit quosdam à regno Coelorum excludere licet non ad poenam sensus destinaverit Deinde quos voluit excludere permiserit labi in peccatum ea intentione ut eos excluderet à regno sicut decreverat Et c. 2. Parum ab hac sententia dissert Scotus qui qu. 1. d. 41. asserit in Deo duplicem esse Reprobationem alteram vocat Punitivam alteram permissivam Et punitivae dari causam ex praevisis peccatis factam fuisse Permissivae non dari causam quia quod homo permittatur labi in primum peccatum nulla ex parte illius datur causa hujus enim solum nititur Scotus causam negare Hinc ordinem hune in mente Divina assignat c. ut alibi Scotum sequuntur Bassolis Corduba c. Objicit Bradward Privationes ut eclipses mors c. habent
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
the soul is a secondary part of the man so are our exterior acts of sin 554. The conceit that making sin a meer nothing doth seem to justifie God as not Causing it is a meer vanity For 1. It justifieth the sinner more who no more is the Cause of nothing than God 2. Either man is able to do that Something or Act which sin is the privation of without any other Power than he hath or not If he be then even the Act of sin is not imputable to God If he be not then every sin is like our not making of a Sun or Moon or World which if it be a culpable defect they make God the first deficient 555. He that would see more of this question of the essence of sin may read Rada lib. 2. contr 16. who first ingenuously confesseth that Tho. and Scotus differ but in words and not in sense and then layeth down eleven conclusions of little use And Marius Scribonius Cosmo disp 18. Scotus in 2. d. 37. Bonavent in 2. d. 35. dub 6. Henric. Quodl 1. qu. 25. Almâ—in Moral tract 3. cap. 17. Richard in 2. d. 34. ar 1. qu. 7. Alex. Aleâ—s 2. q. 94. memb 2. Durand 2. dis 31. q. 2. Medin 12. q. 71. ar 6. Specially Vasquez 12. disp 95. cap. 9. Guil. Camerar Scot. Disput Philos Part. 1. Mor. q. 3. pag. 162 c. Argent in 1. d. 35. q. 1. ar 2. Gabriel Biel 2. d. 36. q. unica Valent. 1. 2. d. 2. q. 14. p. 3 c. Suarez 1. 2. tract de act hum d. 2. sect 2. Azor. li. 4. c. 24. Tanner 1. 2. disp 2. q. 5. dub 2. 3. disp 4. q. 1. dub 1. Vega in Trident. 6. c. 39. li. 14. c. 13. Cordub l. 3. q. 10. Cajet Zumel Curiel alios in 1. 2. q. 19. ar 4. q. 71. ar 6. And who is usually sounder than most of them Lombard himself Dist 35. Ripalda opening him and citing others dist 34 35. But the ordinary Christian that understandeth but what Disobedience signifieth needeth none of them all 556. * * * It is not only Dr. Twisse after confuted that supposeth sin to be willed of God as conducible to the perfection of the World but even Ruiz the Jesuite de Provid dis 2. secâ— 4. p. 27. maintaineth that Minus perfectus evasisset Mundus si nulla permitterentur peccata nune autem â—â—asit perfectior occasione peccatorum and citeth Aquin. Alexand. Albert. Bonav Richard Agid. Caiet Ferrar. Marsil for the same But 1. An occasion is no cause nor medium as such and therefore never the more willed if that were true 2. But I have before briefly confuted the Schoolmen on both sides about this question viz. Particular Creatures would be to themselves better were there no sin but whatever possible alterations were made by God the Universe would be neither worse nor better than it is as to that proper Goodness which must absolutely denominate it For the Goodness of all Creatures is to be conform to the Creators Will which is the denominating measure of fundamentum And so they are and so they would be were they altered But sin is disform to his Commanding Will and not conform to his Complacence or Efficient Will He argueth Had there been no sin there had been no such exercise of Liberty no Saviour c. Answ And are tâ—e Angels worse than man And had not all this been as good if God had willed it Though the five acts of God forementioned about sin are as far as we need to go to the common Ends which we agree in yet many objections are made against this much as not sufficient but God must have a greater hand in sin And 1. They object that to make God but an Universal Cause is to put something in being viz. the Act in specie morali which God is not the Cause of And so 1. To make Him idle and unactive as to that 2. To deifie man by making him a first Cause of that moral species To which I shall lay down such answers as I think will satisfie the considerate to this Objection which is indeed their All But I am sorry that the subject occasioneth me to repeat what I said before 557. 1. Remember that even an Act in genere is not a substance And that the moral specification is less as to natural entity than it indeed making no addition of Entity to it as was shewed And Dr. Twiss asserteth that this moral specification is not a proper specification of acts 558. 2. Note that few dare say that God is not Able to make a free agent with Power to choose or refuse without Gods further predetermining premotion And if God can do it we have no reason to debase his work and think he did not 559. 3. Note that for God to make a self determining agent that shall act without his predetermination is but to put forth his own Active Power with limitation or suspension that is To Will and Act or Operate so far and no further 560. 4. And note that this restriction of the Divine operation is not from any finiteness of his power as if he could do no more but from the freedom of his Will and the Conduct of his Wisdom who seeth it good to do no more 561. 5. Above all note that as all Divines agree that God doth not Act ad ultimum posse as natural agents do so the truth is most evident in the finiteness of the World and the effects of his Power For God doth not make as many men or other creatures as he could do He doth not make every man as strong or wise or good or long-lived as he could do He doth not make every Stone or Clod or Tree as Active as he could do nor move every thing as swiftly as he could do Now all that is undone which God could do all possibles which are not existent or future do tell us plainly that God doth freely suspend the action or operation of his Power totally as to them which is much more than to suspend it but in part with free agents and to give them a Natural self-determining power without further pre-moving predetermination of them If all the World tell us that he hath the far greater suspension why should we think the less absurd 562. 6. And Reason telleth us what the Schoolmen oft say that God who sheweth us that he delighteth in wonderful variety of his creatures doth very fitly thus beautifie the Universe by a middle rank of creatures that stand between Confirmed Angels and the Brutes viz. Intellectual-free-agents left to a natural Power of free choosing or refusing without necessitation in the midst of various objects to prepare them by tryal for a better state 563. 7. And note too that we say not that Gods predetermination of mans will destroyeth its best Liberty God can predetermine the will to Good as he doth the Angels as a great
just so here the question is Whether Gods Causation and Mans be more than Gods alone And I will not say that Gods is a Part nor yet that Mans is none nor that it is the same with Gods But that Gods acting and concurse are quite above the reach of Mortals 568. But here again note what I said even now 1. That it is no more sign of finiteness in God nor dishonour to him to be a limited or Partial Cause than to be no Cause and limited totally by suspension of the whole act And yet so he is as to all Possibles which he doth not make or move 2. And that it is his own free will only that thus limiteth him As it doth from giving all men more grace c. So that really here is matter of satisfaction 569. Though he offend me by making God the Cause of sin I will here cite the words of our Countrey-man Holkot Quodl lib. 2. qu. 1. Est sententia omnium Theologorum quod Deus est Causa immediata omnis rei productae sic quod omni creaturae agenti sive sit Natura sive Voluntas Deus coagit sic imaginandum est quod in omni actione creaturae qua aliquid producit Deus Creatura sunt duae causae Partiales illius producti Non sic imaginando quod Deus producit unam partem effectus creatura aliam ob hoc dicatur Causa partialis sed ideo quia concurrunt in agendo vel causando Unde tam causa universalis quam particularis dicitur communiter causa partialis ideo etiam Sol Homâ— sunt duae causae partiales hominis generandi similiter Vir Mulier Quia ad hoc quod aliquid dicitur causa partialis sufficit quod sit tale quod propter ipsum quoddam aliud vel quaedam alia res ponatur in esse sit quod illis positis res est aliquo istorum ablato res non fiet 570. Further I desire that it may be specially noted that God is our Creator in order of Nature before he is our Ruler And that Nature is before Morality obedience or sin And that God as Creator first setled the order of Nature so as that the Alteration of that Law or setled Order should not be ordinarily expected by us though he can alter it And therefore that man is man and hath a Natural Power of Self-determination and that God upholdeth him and concurreth as an Universal Cause belongeth to this fore-setled natural order and is presupposed to moral determinations and specifications either as from God or man 571. And note that to Good Acts we have need of more Help from God than this meer Natural Causality and Concurse And therefore God affordeth us more accordingly but not to all alike 572. It is further objected against this way that our making Reprobation to Infidelity Permission of sin not-giving faith c. to be no Acts of God cometh all to one as to mens sin and damnation because man cannot believe nor avoid sin without those Acts of Grace which God withholdeth Answ I confess it were all one if the supposition were true as it is not For we have proved after that man hath power without those acts of Grace which God suspendeth by that Common Grace which he giveth to do more good and forbear more evil than they do Of which in due place 573. It is objected also that while we make Gods Providence to fill the World with occasions of sin which he fore-knoweth men will take to their damnation yea as long as God could prevent all sin and save all souls and yet will not it cometh all to one which way soever you go in these Controversies I answer 1. Undoubtedly Gods Judgements are unsearchable But when we come into his Light we shall be perfectly reconciled to them all 2. And undoubtedly God doth whatsoever he will and all that he thought meet to Decree or Will shall come to pass in despight of sin 3. And when we have said all flesh and blood will be unsatisfied till faith and the will of God do satisfie us 4. But yet be it known to you that there is a great difference between Gods permitting sin after great means against it and his causing it Between the making of a free agent and putting life or death in his choice and his causing men unavoidably to sin and then to damn them for it The Holiness of Gods Nature will stand with the Being of sin by mans causing but not with Gods causing it And the Truth of Gods Word must be considered 574. If this were all one to Damn men unavoidably and to give them their free choice of Heaven or Hell in the means it is strange that so many Learned men as among the Jesuits Arminians Lutherans and Greeks do hold no other Grace at all but what leaveth man to such a free Choice could ever be so satisfied when others hold that the Elect have more SECT XVIII A Confutation of Dr. Twisse 's Digr 5. l. 2. sect 1. Vind. Grat. 575. I Come now to consider of what is said by them that go further about Gods will or Causality as to sin And because Dr. Twisse hath a peculiar Digression Vindic. Grat. li. 2. p. 1. Digr 4. I will somewhat animadvert upon it He beginneth Sententia nostra haec est Deum hactenus dici posse Velle peccatum quatenus vult ut peccatum â—iat viz. ipso permittente And so he maketh the question An Dens Velit ut peccatum eveniat ipso permittente Arminius thought God willed only his own Permission of the sin Twisse saith that he willed that sin should come to pass God permitting it Arminius his concession cannot be proved as I have shewed But Twisses must be disproved And 1. I will give you our Reasons against it Bonavent in 1. d. 46. q. 3. resolveth this question very plainly and truly Mala â—ieri nullatenus bonum esse potest sed bene occasio boni And shewing the difference between Causa Casus Occasio he saith that Causa est procedens intendens Casus pâ—ivat Intentionem sed non operationem Occasio privat utrumque And he distinguisheth Occasion into that which hath ratioâ—â—m Actiâ—i excitat agentem and that which hath but rationem passivi as one by anothers evil exciteth himself to do good And also between the evil and the ordinability to good And saith the evil is but the occasio passiva of the good and the ratio boni quod substernitur is occasio aliquo modo activa Vide locum 576. Let the Reader remember that what the Author saith of Gods Willing he also in the point of Predetermination saith of his working viz. that he Causeth as much as he willeth But I pass that by now because I have largely confuted it elsewhere And to speak to One is to speak to both 577. 1. All sober Christians are agreed on what side
soever that God is not the Cause of sin except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia whom the Synod of Dort rejected Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod Beza himself in Rom. 8. 28. passim abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin Yea more very much more than wicked men or Devils are which is not true 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved predetermined Cause of the Act of Volition and Execution whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin His saying Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin when they are committed which they would not be without the Law 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat and is the first predetermining Cause even the total Cause of all that is in the act and all its circumstances without which predetermination it could not be So that man doth but will what God first willeth and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act as the pen in my hand 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result and hath no other cause 579. And note here what Estius before cited after Aquinas saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat is all that the Sinner himself doth when he willeth sin And therefore it 's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin and willing the event futurity and existence of it ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction For he willeth sin who willeth the existence of it or that it be or come to pass 580. And note that it is both matter and form Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat For it is sin And forma dat nomen It is not sin but by the form of sin But if they had said otherwise it had been all one For he that willeth the fundamentum relate and correlate Saith Twisse Vindic. Graâ— li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. Posito quod velit perâ—ectiones istas manifestare necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati sed permittat 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws and Illuminating men to know them without execution by the occasion of sin 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical should not give so much to sin which were it a means as it is not but a Passive and opposite occasion is but a moral means And himself saith page 136. Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi â—inem à Deo praefixum At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae sive justitiae Media enim ejus sunt naturae ut ad ea facienda movâ—atur quis ex intentione finis Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium as stone and Timber to an House And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae it is not so to Christs Rather if a beggar Want a house is that Want the Materia domus no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propriâ— dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordiâ— sive iâ—stitiâ— potiâ—s quam medium Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this 2. Permission it self is nothing being but non-impedire And is nothing or non-agere a proper means But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed that it is the Permission of sin and not the sin that is the Divine medium only one saith Praedestinationis and the other providentia And yet they will differ while they agree And I that differ from both would agree with both willeth the Relation 581. There is nothing left to be said then but that God willeth that sin be done but not as sin or because it is sin But this is nothing For 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination or for seeming good 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God so doing is but one of their sins which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it and predetermined them to it so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice and so do not wicked men but for wicked ends or in enmity to God I answer That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente non faciente Answ The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law And why then do they put in the word permittente Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do but only permit when they mean no such thing For that is my second reason against them 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin which is false For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause he cannot be said to Permit To do a thing and
move another to do it will not stand with proper permission 585. Obj. But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting Answ 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingness as such that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the same act Which is but to say that God causeth me to Will sin and not to Will-nill-it 2. If you mean more I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and phâ—sical premoving predetermination of the first cause 3. But if all this were so it 's nothing to the present case and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin but only that man is a Cause also caused by the first Cause and that God Willeth and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely 586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cause our Holiness and our sin For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness than to Will it and to predetermine the will of man to it besides commanding it which is a moral act and we speak only of proper efficiency He doth but will that Holiness be and cause all that hath any entity in it And so they say he doth about sin 587. Obj. He loveth our Holiness for it self and so he doth not sin Answ The first is denyed by themselves if you speak of Gods end For they confess that God only is his own end for which he loveth all things 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition 1. The efficient which is all that is now in question they must confess is equal to both if he equally will the existence of both Object But he hath a Complacence in Good only Answ 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient Therefore if sin be the fulfilling of his Will he hath a complacency in it The formal reason of a pleasing object to God is as it is the fulfilling of his own Will And to break his Law they make to be such ergo pleasing 2. But if it were not so that 's nothing to our Case of the efficient Will 588. 4. To avoid tediousness in sum This opinion seemeth to me to leave very little or no place for the Christian Religion For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei which is Veracitas Divina and leaveth no certainty of any word of God For if he do will and predetermine by premotion ut fiat omne mendacium quod fit then we have no way to know that he did not so by the Prophets and Apostles 2. It maketh the Scripture false which saith so much of Gods hatred and unwillingness of sin 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holiness which is made the great reason of our holiness 4. It maketh mans Holiness to be no Holiness but a common or indifferent thing 5. It maketh sin so little odious as being a Divine off-spring as will destroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly sorrow repenting confession and all practice of means against any sin 7. It will hardly let men believe that Christ came into the world and did and suffered so much to save men from sin and to destroy it 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctifie souls and mortifie sin 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell and that God will damn men for ever for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination unavoidably 10. It seemeth to give Satans description to God and more For Satan can but tempt us to sin but they make God absolutely to will that it be and physically to predetermine us to it And so Christ that came to destroy the work of the Devil the father of lies malice and murder should come to destroy the work of God 11. It taketh away the reason of Church discipline and purity and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedness 12. It would tempt Magistrates accordingly to judge of vice and vertue good and bad in the Common-wealth 589. Now to their arguments 1. Rev. 17. 17. God put it into their hearts to do his will and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beast Answ 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome with the effects will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark as not to be fit to found such a doctrine on 2. It was the effect of the sin that God willed and not the sin 3. He is not said to put the sin into their hearts whether pride covetousness cruelty c. but only to do his pleasure and agree or make one decree to give up c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts which with their own sins would have that effect which he willed If a thief have a will to rob God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way 590. But for brevity besides what is said I shall farther direct the â—mpartial Reader how to answer all such objections And withall let the â—onfounding cavillers against distinguishing see what blasphemy and subversion of Religion may enter for want of one or two distinctions which â—onfused heads regard not 1. Be sure to distinguish the name of sin from the nature 2. And â—emember that no outward act is sin any further than it is Voluntary by privation or position of Volitions 3. Distinguish between the Act as it â—s Agentis and as it is in Passo 4. And between the Act and the effect 5. Between the effect of a single cause and of divers causes making a compound effect 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the â—ontrary and one forbidden object compared with another 591. And then all this satisfying Truth will lye naked before you 1. That the same name usually signifieth the sin and the effect of sin or the Act as Acted and as Received Adultery Murder Theft usually signifie the Acts of the Adulterer Murderer Thief as done and as received â—n Passo and as effecting 2. That the former only is the sin viz. first the Volition Nolition or Non-Volition and secondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will And no more The reception of this act in Passo is not sin as such nor the most immediate effect of this act It is but the effect of sin 3. And you will see that the same effect may have several causes a Good and bad And so God may be a cause of that effect which mans sin also concurreth to cause And God doth not therefore Will or Cause the sin 4. And you will see that God may morally cause the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden though both make the act sinful and yet
not Cause it as it is exercised on either of those objects compared with such as are not forbidden 592. And you will here plainly see that God hath many wayes to Cause the effect without willing or Causing the sin As for instance 1. He can do it by adding as I said before a good act to the sinners bad one As when Caiaphas is willing to kill Christ God can put into Caiaphas's De hoc vid. Ockam ubi supra thoughts the jealousie of the Romans over the Jews and the visible danger they are in if they should be thought to have another King which thoughts in themselves are true and good So he can put into Pharaoh's thoughts the loss of the Israelites service which was not sinful of it self The wise Reader that can impartially receive truth without respect of persons may find much in Episcopii Institut Theol. li. 4. sect 4. de provident in his answering all these Texts of Scripture as mis-expounded by some And his moderate opinion expressed in Conclus 2. in the end of that Section how far doctrines are or are not damning which subvert the foundation is laudable and his reason very good and clear viz. so far as they actually prevail with the will and practice Even as our faith is saving as effectual and practical and not as a dead opinion so is error damning I think as he doth 593. And 2. God can set that object before a sinner which he is most inclined to abuse Which is not to Will his sin But may proceed from Gods Willing the Effect As if Absalom be by Pride and Lust enclined to Adultery his Fathers Wives may be in his eye and way And God may will to punish David by their passive pollution without willing his act of sin at all interior or exterior 594. 3. And God can remove other objects out of the way so that this object shall be solitary or most obvious to the sinner As if a drunken man were resolved to kill the next he met God can keep Peter John c. out of his way and so Judas shall be the next 595. 4. Yea God can suspend his own intrinsick concurse as to some one sinful act by which it will follow that it will fall upon another object Many other such wayes God hath which are unknown to us 596. And if you suppose a man so inclined to Murder or Adultery as that he will exercise it on the next most provoking object if God now did Cause the Act as exercised on a forbidden object compared with another it were to Cause the sin But if he only be the moral Cause that he e. g. kill Judas rather than Peter this is not to Cause sin For to choose Judas rather than Peter for the object is no sin For as I said God câ—â— do it only by removing Peter and Willing that he shall be preserved 597. Suppose a King that hath made Laws against Murder foreknoâ— that a Robber is waiting in such a Road for a prey and that a Traytor broke out of Prison will go that way and so will be rob'd and kill'd He may will or desire the Death of the Traytor as a punishment He may restraâ—â— some that would travail that way before him and may restrain some that would lay hold on the Robber or drive him away that so this Traytor may be killed And yet only Permit and not Will at all the Robbers Will or Acâ— as it is Agentis but punish him for it and hate it and Will only the effect 598. The next Text cited is 1 Pet. 2. 8. Whereunto also they were appointed viz. to stumble on the rock of offence Resp 1. This hath respect to Luke 2. 34. he is set for the fall of many c. and of Christs own words that he that falleth on this stone shall be broken in pieces And no more can hence be gathered but that God hath decreed that as a Punishing Judge 1. He will leave the rejecters of Christ to go on iâ— their own sinful way 2. And that their opposition to him shall be theâ—â— ruine So that 1. He doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ that deserved it 2. He speaketh not at all as willing their sin but only as one that penally denyeth them further grace 3. But the thing that he is said to Ordain them to is not sin but Ruine the consequent of their sin The word stumbling and falling signifying their destraction 599. The next Text is 2 Thes 2. God shall send them strong delusions or the acting of deceit that they should believe a lye Answ Here is nothing signified but 1. That God shall permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits 2. And permit wicked men to believe them which is mentioned as a permitted consequent and not as an end intended by God And the word sending is used because the permission was Penal for their sin And his punishing-providence might morally cause the deceivers rather to go towards these men than towards others 600. The next is Rom. 1. 24 26 28. God gave them up to uncleâ—â—ness to vile affections to a reprobate mind c. Resp Here is nothing at all said but a Penal desertion and permission and no Will or Cause of sin in God 601. The next is Act. 4. 28. To do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done Answ Here is nothing said of sin at all but of the effect of it All that was done on Christ even all the effect in passo God fore-determined should be done But the Act ut volentis agentis he neither willed nor caused as on this forbidden object And though elsewhere the Doctor deride this answer that God decreed Christ should dye or be sacrificed and yet decreed not that the Jews or any one else should do it It is a great and necessary truth He that willed the effect and did much himself to cause it willed not the murderers sinful act And permitting and foreseeing it was enough 602. The next is Isa 10. 6. and so Amos 16. 17. Prov. 22. 14. 2 Sam. 12. 11. 1 King 11. 31. 12. 24. God sends the Assyrian as his rod. Thy Wife shall commit Adultery and thy Children fall by the sword They that are hated of God shall fall therein David was foretold his Wives should be vitiated The ten Tribes fell from Rehoboam It was of God that he took not good counsel Pharaohs heart was hardened by God Answ The first is only a Prophesie and a penal effect of sin and nothing of Gods Willing or Causing sin And so is the second Though God can send afflicters by the wayes before mentioned without willing their sin The third speaketh only of a penal permission of sin And the rest all speak only of Gods penal permission of the sin and his decreeing and foretelling the effects of it and his occasioning the sinner to take one sinful object not as such
but rather than another 603. As the Wind hath its natural course and so hath the Water and the Miller Causeth neither of them but supposing them doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient they shall fulfil his will and he is the Cause of the effect viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn so is it easie for God to use mens sins permitted to his ends without willing them * * * Even Vasq in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of mens non respondere vocationi God is Causa per accidens ut removens prohibens dum negat auxilium efficax congruum But this is but a Controversie about a Logical name causa per accidens which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applicable to God as to mans sin 604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons And the first is because †††Pet. Alliac Cam. 1. q. 14. A. Secundum Bradward alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle nec habet solum non velle Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri sed ideo secundum hunc modum dicitur permittere quia non approbat ea neâ— impedit ea fieri cum possâ—t sed secundum Magistrum Deus permittit ea quia nec vult ea fieri nec vult ea non fieri quia si nollet non fierent sed solum non vult per consequens non habet actum voluntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri Saith Bonaventure that plain and honest Schoolman li. 1. dis 47. dub 2. Diâ—â—ndâ—m quod non est sigâ—um quod Deâ—â— velit illud quod â—â—â—â—â—iâ—â—itur sed quod velit illud quod ex â—o elicitur Alliâ—co â—â— q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec prâ—cipit nec â—â—â—â— nec consulit sed indulâ—â—t talis Permissio est signum Voluntatis Dei quia aliquem actum significat in siâ— permittente ita Deuâ— non permittit mala culpae â—â— Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle nec habet nolle sed solum non Velle ut flat Et talis Permissio non est signum Divinâ— Voluntatis quia â—ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command And what is permitted and that for good infallibly cometh to pass Answ All this is before confuted * * * If he really holâ— with Bradward li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale seeing he permitteth it But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my self obliged to regard nor do I coâ—sent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardinâ— than in him See Alliaco before of Bradward It 's false that non impedire efficaciter is a sign that one wills the thing The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties could also lock up or guard some men and effectually keep them from the sin And doth he Will it because he doth not so And it 's false that all cometh to pass that is not hindered 605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grosly viz. Both sides confess that the substrate act is done God not only willing it but effecting it v. g. Absalom 's congress with his Fathers Concubines Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act but that the Volition of congress the internal elicite act was efficiently and Principally of God why then should it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done God willing it though not effecting it or any way failing of his duty Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessarily follow the substrate act in respect of the Creature though not of God Answ Hobbes could desire little more But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified that is as it is exercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalom to Will that Congress with his Fathers Concubines nor to Act it The nature of the Wind and Water and God as the Cause of Nature cause the wind and water to act and to act as they do on their own part But that they turn this wheel and milstone and run in this Channel rather than another is long of the Miller Absalom's Motus qua motus and qua cupido ordinata was natural from God but not as acted hic nunc towards this object And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action might be morally and penally from God 606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head and tell me that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature and so dependent I confidently answer you for God 1. No man is injurious to himself And God did not wrong himself when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power he resolved so far partially to suspend his own operation so as not to necessitate the will no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension in making no more Worlds or Creatures 2. You quite mistake We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx nor determine it but terminate it and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes God and Man and cannot be ordinarily by one alone because God hath otherwise appointed And again I beseech the adversaries to note How great and innumerable changes are made in the world by the various Disposition of Recipients The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill do not at all Change the Action of the Sun but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause that its Act hath such various effects And it is the Millers work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel Wheels c. which causeth the variety of effects And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx 607. His third Argument is God giveth not that effectual Grace without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided ergo he is willing that it be done Answ I deny the Consequent It only followeth that he doth not Absolutely and effectually Nill it If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poyson And his Children he effectually keepeth from it one he locketh up another he committeth to a Keeper another he keepeth the poison from But to a Traytor he saith I once forgave thee and saved thy life and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison and if thou do not it will torment and kill thee but if thou wilt take
no warning take what thou gettest by it Can you prove that it is his Will that this man eat the poyson prohibited 608. Next he citeth Augustines thred-bare sayings and blameth Aquinas and Arminius for denying his Authority and commendeth the greater reverence of Bellarmine And so Anselm Hugo c. Answ 1. We stick not on one mans Authority God holdeth not his Holiness and the Church its Religion on Augustines authority 2. Augustine hath ten times more plain enough for what I hold See the places cited in Paul Eiren. Triad Patrum 3. He knew it's like that Estius and many more expound Augustines words as terminating Gods Volition on his own permission and not on the sin or fieri 4. I think plainly that Augustine there spake not of inward Volitions but outward Acts and that not as Agentis but in passo or the effects And so it is true that no murder theft treason or other effect is produced in the world but what God positively decreeth shall be produced either by doing some effects himself as drowning the world or permitting sinners to do them while he causeth not their act but the Receptivity of the Passum and so the effect c. 609. Pag. 194. Retorting on Aquin. he thus argueth Because God doth will his own Goodness therefore it is necessary that God will that sin be done he permitting it For it is not to will his essential Goodness which needeth no acquisition but he willeth to manifest his Goodness But the evil of sin is not opposite to the manifesting of Gods Goodness Yea nothing is more * * * So Twiss contr Armin. pro Junio pag. 91. dissenteth from Jâ—niuâ— that saith peceatum ad rationem universi facere per accidens and saith Mibi vero dicendum videtur Peceatum conducibile esse per se ad bonum universi quatenus conducit ad illustrandos tales divinae majestatis radios And if so it must per se be Loved of God as Good Yet contr Corvin he saith that No sober man saith that sin is a medium of the execution of Reprobation but only the Permission of sin Reconcile them that can conducible to it than this I say to the manifesting of Gods Goodness by way of mercy in sparing or by way of Justice in punishing Answ Horresco recitans 1. Gods Volition of his Essential Goodness is his Necessary Volition 2. God hath no End to acquire but alwayes hath his end and is never without it 3. If God had necessarily willed the particular way of manifesting his Goodness then he doth all things necessarily and could do no otherwise and it seems by you could not manifest it without sin 4. Doth he not manifest his Goodness as much to the Innumerable Glorious Angels who never sinned And would it not have been as much manifested to us if we had been as they 5. The very indetermination of the will and its mediate Liberty is not the highest excellency of his Creatures It is better than the sensitive Necessity of Bruits and lower than the confirmed Necessity of the blessed It is our defectibility And the excellentest or Best of his works most honour Gods Goodness 6. Is it not the strongest temptation that men have in this world to doubt of or dishonour the Goodness of God to think how he permitteth the world to be drowned in wickedness and be so like to hell 7. Doth not Christ turn the Prayers of all Christians against your doctrine viz. that Gods name may be hallowed his Kingdom come and his will done on earth as it is in Heaven which is not by any sin 8. Do not your words tempt men to be indifferent to sin if not to love it if nothing be more conducible to honour Gods Goodness 9. Is not that conclusion a great wrong to Christ Scripture Ministry and Holiness as being no more conducible to manifest Gods Goodness than sin is 10. It is not true that sin is any Cause or true Means at all of glorifying God or doing any good It is but a presupposed Evil by delivering us from which God is glorified As your eating poyson may occasion the honour of an Antidote and Physicion It is no Cause or proper medium of it but only an occasion and mischief sine quo non But if God had not saved us from sin committed he could have glorified himself in saving us from committing it God loveth and is glorified most in that which is most like him as his Image which is the Holiest sinless soul To be a medium to Gods glory is to be good To be as conducible to it as any thing is to be as good as any thing save God and his glory But sin hath no Good much less such good Why else doth not God equally delight in sin and in the death of the wicked as in holiness repentance and our life seeing all things are for himself and that which glorifieth him most is best 11. Here also confusion causeth mischief one distinction might have scattered this mist viz. Between sin indeed and sin in notion Sin indeed or essence and existence never did good nor honoured God Sin in notion or in esse objectivo is no sin but the Matter of Vertue and 80 Joh. Ã Combis compend Theol. l. 3. c. 1. tells us that sin is profitable three wayes 1. Ut bene ordinatur ut fur in patibulo 2. Propter co-actionem amaritudinem 3. Propter mall considerationem And many popular Books say the like But this is but abusive language tending to deceive As if sin did good because punishing sin and repenting of it and hating it do good As if hating sin were sin Thus unhappily is the world troubled by abused words Holiness and doth much good When you say God knoweth sin from eternity you 'l say with Scotus that in esse cognito sin was in God from Eternity But so sin is not sin David saith My sin is ever before me Psal 51. And we daily Repent of it and confess it But this is but to have the Idea or conception of it in the mind and so it is not sin indeed but the notion of it which is in esse objectivo Else it would defile us to think of it and repent of it whereas thus sin objectively is the matter of the grace and duty of Repentance Hatred fear watchfulness prayer confession c. And so sin in esse objectivo as a grace may glorifie God 610. To Aquin. that saith Malum non est appetibile he saith that Malum moris quod opponitur bono est proprium uniuscujusque meum malum bono meo Though the sin of a man willing that which is forbidden him be his sin yet it followeth not that God may not will this Evil of another The Reason is because it is not forbidden to God to will it wherefore though it be evil and dishonest in man to will it to whom it is forbidden yet not to God And seeing
that Moral Evil or sin is summè conducibile chiefly or most conducible to make way to represent Gods Goodness this abundantly sufficeth to prove it desirable to God We say that this evil which we affirm to be willed of God is not at all evil as it is objected to the will of God but as to the will of the creature being forbidden the creature but not forbidden God Answ Shall we preach thus to the people Will this Doctrine convert souls to repentance or faith in Christ 1. The question is not Whether to will sin be sin in God But Whether he will and cause the sin of man which you sadly assert 2. Gods Glory is our End and to forbear things prohibited is but the means If sin conduce as much as Christ and Holiness to Gods Glory why may we not desire it sub ratione medii though not as praeceptum We must desire that which is most conducible to Gods Glory 3. Though God be under no Law his Perfection of Nature and Will is the fountain of all Laws and instead of a Law to him And we must be Holy because our God is Holy 4. It is still false that sin is any Medium to Gods Glory or desirable or hath any good 5. God is Good and delighteth to do good And he is the Just Ruler Of which vid. Gibieus at laâ—ge of the World And I would not have Kings take such Justice for a pattern as you describe as if God vehemently forbad sin and sent his Son and Spirit and Ministers as an Army against it into the World and will daâ—â— men for it for ever and yet willeth and causeth it as summè conducibils August de Nat. Grat. c. 25. fol. 314. Non hoc eis dicimus quod sibi iste Pelagius opposuit ut esset Causa Misericordiae Dei necessarium fuisse peccatum Utinam non fuisset miseria ne ista esset misericordia necessaria Id. ibid. cap. 31. Et altius Dei consilium fateor me ignorare cur etiam ipsam superbiam quae in reâ—â—e factis animo insidiatur humano non cito Deus sanet pro qua sananda illi piae animae cum lacrymis magnis gemitibus supplicant ut ad â—am superandam quodammodo calcandam obterendam dextram conantibus porrigat Even Vasquez the Jesuite saith of Gods denying men grace and of non-entities that God willeth them thus Non-esse alicujus rei secundum se quatâ—nus malum quoddam ipsius rei est non placet Deo Sed sub alia ratione placere potest nec enim in eo est omnis ratio mali Nam in non-esse alicujus rei potest comparatione ad reliquum universum vel ad justitiam vel ad potenâ—iam Dâ—ialiqua ratio boni apparere ob quaÌ„ non tantum potest placere Deo simplici complacentia sed etiam efficaci voluntaâ—â— qua discernat rem illam non facere Similiter cum Deus alicui negat gratiam suam auâ— gloriam non placet ut maluÌ„ quoddam ipsâ—â—s est â— Quia sicut non dispâ—â—cet persona sic nec malum illius ut ilâ—ius est placet â—â— sed placet sub alio respectâ— sub quo etiam non potest non placere quiâ— sciliâ—â—t oâ—tenditur in eo potentia Dei miserâ—cordia in elcctos c. By this he will teach men to say so of sin But 1. He confesseth that this controversie is not of any thing real in God as if he had distinct real acts but only of the extrinsecal denomination of Gods Essence 2. He can give no reason why the malum poenae of a â—reature as such may not â—e willed of God as much as non-entity though not finally for it self 3. Non-entity hath not omnem rationem mali but it is enough that it hath nullam rationem boni 4. It is the imperfect conception of man that taketh Nothing to be any way Good A nâ—gatione subjecti ad negationem modi valet argumentâ—m Non-entities are no true modes of the Universe It is improper to say that Gods Power Wisdom or Mercy is glorified by any nothing or non-entity It is by some being that God is glorified 5. It 's a contradiction to say Voluntate efficaci vult aliquid non esse How is that efficax quae nihil efficit But God doth efficaciously hinder many inclined agents to act according to their inclination And that impedition may be a Positive act So disp 95. c. 9. he saith that the end of Gods Permitting sin is oftendere divitias gratiae suae liberalitatem quâ— usus fuit erga praedestinatâ—s denegans congruas vocationes reprobis ostendit praedestinatis easdem vocatiâ—nes quibuâ— fuâ—runt ad gloriam praeparati gratâ—â— omnino ipsis fuisse donatas But 1. Mans act comparing himself with another is quid reale vâ—lltum à Deo And the proposition that the other hath no grace is quid reale or â—ns rationiâ— But nothing declareth nothing â— If Gods will be his simple essence only diversly denominated from effects and objects how can nothing denominate it but as non-efficient or not-willing Indeed it might denominate a Nolition existentiae if an Act of Gods were necessary to hinder existence but not where non-efficere is enough Antonine better saith l. 1. §. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Ut quantum ad Deos attinet ac suggestiones adjutationes inspirationes ab ipsis profectas nihil obstet omnino quo minus juxta naturae praescriptum confestim vivam nisi ipse tandem in culpa sim qui Deorum submonitiones tantum non claras praeceptiones neutiquam observem I marvel the Doctor insisteth not on his own great Reason viz. Futurity is eternal and therefore hath an eternal cause which is God And he that willeth the futurity of sin willeth the sin that is that sin shall be This seemeth stronger than all the rest if the antecedent were true And so he might prove that the futurity of the very form of sin is God For nothing is eternal but God But the futurity of the form of sin according to these men is eternal or ab aeternâ— Ergo it is God But saith excellent Le Blank de Concord lib. cum decret 1. n. 55 56. Praesertim nullo modo probare possum quod Gu. Twisâ—us pluribus locis asserit Decretum Dei ejus Voluntatem esse solam unicam Causam futuritionis cujuslibet eventus e. g. inobedientiae Adami c. At inquit doctus ille vir Futuritionis quae ab aeterno fuit nulla Causa dari potest quae ab aeterno non fuit Resp Hoc supponit futuritionem esse aliquid reale à re ipsa distinctum quod causam aliam habeat quam res ipsa futura At hoc falsissimum Nam futuritio nil aliud est quam respectus quidam rationis extrinâ—eca denominatio rei futurae Recte ponitur argâ—mentum Ab aeterno nihil fuit praetâ—r Deum Ac
it 's clear 1. That in the first case the Motion will be if it be not hindered But that it is not caused by not-hindering it but by its proper moving causes In the second case the consequence of futurity is false And where the inclinations to good and evil that is to superiour and inferiour prohibited good are equal yea though antecedently somewhat unequal Yet bare permission ascertaineth not futurity 3. Much less in the third case where the soul must have positive help or provocation Sure he did not think that all or any ungodly men would infallibly Love God if God did but Permit them But Gods Permitting or not hindering sin may respect divers acts 1. Iâ— God continue not his natural support man will be no man but be aâ—â—â—â—lated and so will neither do good nor evil 2. If God uphold mans nâ—ture in its Integrity as it was in Adam and give him not Moral means and helps of Grace and his natural concurse Adams sin would have necessarily followed 3. If God give Adam both such support and means to stand and do no more Gods permission would not have inferred the certainty of Adams sin when he fell any more than before For God withdrew no grace from him which was necessary to his standing 4. Iâ— God give a lapsed sinful man Nature and common grace it followeth not necessarily because God doth no more that he will commit every sin that he is not further hindered from but it 's certain that he will not do the works to which special grace is necessary 5. If God give to the faithful the Holy Spirit and continue his influx necessary to the continuation of the Power and Habits of holy actions with necessary means and do no more this man will do some good and some evil and though he may be equally said to be Permitted to do this sin as another yet he may do one and not another 6. God totally permitteth no man to sin but hindereth them many wayes though he hinder not all alike 7. It 's possible for two men to have equal helps to duty and equal hinderances to sin or the same man at several times and yet for one to do the duty and forbear the sin and the other to commit the sin and omit the duty As many Schoolmen have copiously proved Yet in this case Permission would be the same thing to both But if you use the word Permission as connoting the Event then indeed you may say that the event from another cause will follow And Gods non-impedition will ab eventu actionis be extrinsecally denominated Permission in the one case and not in the other But this is but from your arbitrary use of the word 615. Next the Doctor assaulteth Durandus who thus argueth Gods will followeth only his approving Knowledge But he knoweth not sin approvingly being of purer eyes c. He answereth 1. God approveth that sin be though he approve not sin 2. God willeth the manifestation of his mercy and justice Ergo he willeth the existence of sin as that which is necessarily required to it To which I reply 1. The first answer is unproved and false God approveth not that sin be If he did few wicked men do more as Estiâ—s saith For it is not sin as sin or evil that they will but that it be for other ends which seem good 2. He phraseth it with his ad quâ—d necessario c. as if God first willed this manifestation of his Justice c. as the end and then sins existence as the means yea the necessary means But this is false as I have fully shewed 1. And his own opinion should confute it that maketh one Decree only de mediis And this particular Manifestation being some Acts of God and not God himself â—or the Complacency of his Will must needs be part of the media ad finem â—â—timum 2. And indeed sins existence is not a necessary means willed for â—ods glory but it is a presupposed mischief our Deliverance from which â—â— punishment for it is willed for his glory It is indeed necessary but â—â—ly necessitate existentiae in esse praecognito as a foreseen evil and so preâ—pposed to those acts of God which are the Means of his glory Therefore his assertion of a Notitia approbationis rei tanquam Bonae in â—nere Conducibilis etsi non honesti is detestable 616. Ibid. p. 196. He again saith that Though it be dishonest in the â—eature to sin because forbidden it is not dishonest in God to will that he â—â— it by his permission it being unice conducibile to his glory â—nsw 1. Fie upon this conducibile and unicè too 2. Fie upon this oft â—peated permittente non efficiente It is utterly lusory or immodest â—or a man that maintaineth that no sinner doth any thing in sinning but â—hat God as the first total cause predetermined his will to even as to all â—e entity in act and circumstances imaginable and that in all omissions â— was a natural Impossibility to have done one omitted act without this â—edetermining premotion And for the man that in the next saith that â—alum non est Objectum Volentis aut facientis but ipsa effectio rei I â—y for this man yet to say that the creature effecteth sin and God effecteth â— not is too too gross The common evasion is that sin is not any â—â—ing and therefore not effectible But why then do they say that the â—eature effecteth it when they have said and defended that the creaâ—re doth nothing but what God doth and what he unavoidably maketh â—â—m do 617. Durandus argueth that Sin cannot be judged convenient by a â—â—ght understanding Ergo not by God The Doctor answereth That â—es own sin cannot be judged convenient but anothers may He inâ—anceth 1. When a man willeth that an Usurer lend him money on usury â— When a Christian Prince willeth a Turk to swear to a League by Maâ—â—met 3. When God willed that Absalom should defile his Fathers Concuâ—nes And he addeth that for us to sin is contrary to our right reaâ—â—n because it is forbidden and hurtful to us But for God to will that â—e sin is not contrary to his right reason as not forbidden or hurtful â— him Repl. 1. No man should will unlawful usury He that willeth to Borâ—â—w though he cannot have it without usury doth not will the usury â—ut the money non-obstante usura As he that chooseth to travell with Blasphemer rather than to go alone in danger he doth not will his â—lasphemy but his company non obstante blasphemia 2. The same is to â—e said of swearing by Mahomet It is only the Oath as an Oath that is â—â— be willed and not as by Mahomet that is not willed but unwillingly â—â—dured 3. Absaloms instance is answered before God willed only â—avids punishment and the Passive Constupration as an effect of sin â—n a foresight of Absaloms active Volition and sin and not as
willing â—is at all And we have hitherto thought that Gods holy Wisdom and will is the Cause of his holy Law and much more against sin than mans is And that God willeth not and causeth not the sin of man And is it now come to â—his that sin is contrary indeed to our right reason but not to Gods because â—e is no subject You may next say that Holiness is meet for man but not â—or God 618. Pag. 197. Again he is at it Bonum esse ut sint mala Quia bonum est ut Deus finem sibi praefixum assequatur At hoc sine interventâ— mali peccati nullo modo potest Repl. 1. It is not per peccatum ut medium though not sine peccatâ— 2. Interventus therefore implyeth a falshood For in esse cognito sin is antecedent or presupposed to the way of glorifying Justice and Mercy upon sinners sinners are the object And consequently you must take it as before proved for antecedent to the Volition or simultaneous 619. He urgeth Oportet haereses esse ut qui probati sunt manifesti fiant Answ That neither meaneth that men ought to be Hereticks nor yet that God loveth willeth or approveth that there be heresies But only 1. God decreeth to manifest the difference between the sound Christians and the rest 2. And he foreseeth that there will be heresies 3. Therefore he decreeth to try them by the occasion of those heresies which he foreseeth and hateth The same is the case of all tryal by persecutions And God willeth not the sin of active perâ—ecution but only the effect or passive part So that the oportet by your own confession of it signifieth no more than a Logical necessitas consequentiae which â—ore-knowledge without Volition will inferr 620. He addeth Obj. It sufficeth that God permit sin and not will it Resp But either the existency of sin infallibly followeth the Permission of it or not If not Gods Intention may be frustrate If yea What matter is it whether God will that sin shall be he permitting or sâ— permit it as that infallibly it will be so we obtain either of these it 's all one to our cause of predestination Repl. 1. If it be all one take up with that agreement and make â—â— further difference with them that grant you enough 2. In case of veâ—â—ment Inclination to a sin it would follow upon Gods total permission but God never totally permitteth sin But in other cases it will not follow that is It is not a good consequence that This or that sin will be done because God doth no more to hinder it than that which sometime hindereth it not And yet Gods Intention is not frustrate For â—â— will infallibly come to pass from its proper cause which God foreknoweth And the consequence is good from his fore-knowledge And is not that all one as to the certainty of Gods intentions 3. You phrase it as if sin followed Gods permission as a deficient cause or as that which cannot be otherwise unless God do more to hinder it and so weâ—â— necessary thence necessitate consequentis or as others call it necessitate â—â—tecedente which is false and oft denyed by your self 4. The very truth is Permission is a word of so great ambiguity and laxity as relating to so many sorts of Impedition that it is but delusory withâ—â— much distinguishing to say sin will or will not follow it If you restraâ— it to a non efficaciter impedire as is usual it taketh not away the ambâ—guity much For still the question is What must make it effectual unless you call any impedition effectual meerly ab eventu whatsoever it be â—â— it self 621. He saith that the Universe would not be perfect if there werâ— perfect holiness and no sin and so no pardon or punishment But â—â— giveth us no proof but confident assertion at all I need not say thâ— It would be more perfect if there were no sin It sufficeth me to say thaâ— It would be as perfect And so that it is not Necessary to the World perfection that there be sin or Hell God could have freely willed the contrary And Gods Goodness could have been as fully manifested if iâ— had so pleased him and his Holiness too without sin or Hell It 's unpleasing to me that this good man pleadeth so hard against a necessity of Christs satisfaction for sin in another digression and yet pleadeth as hard for a necessity of sin As if it were more necessary to Gods Glory than Christ 622. It is very observable in all this controversie that he asserteth pag. 198. That it 's past all controversie that neither God nor the most sinful creature do will any thing but as Good And that no man can be instigated to malice or evil but only to the Act which is evil because he that is instigated is instigated to do something But to the evil of an act no efficiency is necessary but deficience only How far this is true or false I have opened before I here only note that he confesseth that he that causeth the Act of sin which he saith God doth more than man causeth all that is causable 623. Yet p. 199. he saith Sin is of man only as the cause when he professeth that man doth nothing but what God doth to cause it yea as the first total cause and that as to Deficiency man can do no more than he doth without predetermination which if God withhold man can no more help it than make a World So that all the mysterie of his language is this that because man is under a Law and God is not therefore man doing the same act as moved by God must be called the only cause of sin because it is no sin in God But if we spake as plain men ought to do should it not rather be thus exprest by you God is the chief cause of sin in man but not in himself 624. Pag. 200 201. he hath the same over and over again that Non abhorret à recta ratione Dei velle peccatum fieri ab hominibus Quod ex se habet quod conducibile est ad â—onum tanquam Materia scilicet non tantum idonea sed necessaria exercendae divinae justitiae misericordiae and that this manifestation conjunct with sin is Deo multò appetibilius than that Good which sin depriveth us of that is Holiness Because this Holiness is only the Creatures Good and the other is the Creators Good Answ But as the assertion is all false so the reason is vain For if he distinguish the Creator and Creature as subjects he is quite mistaken For both is the Creatures good and neither the Creators For to manifest Justice and Mercy is not Gods Essence as in it self but his Work of Punishment and Mercy And the glory of this is but the resplendent excellency of it as it is the appearance or Image of God And all this is in the Creatures
of the effects and consequents of them But doth this signifie God willed your malice or your act God did bruise Christ which signifieth that he was a concause of his death but not that he willed or Caused the Jews to will or act his death And so of the rest 629. The rest of his instances are such as I have answered before or as the former answers fully invalidate And therefore I will not weary my self and the Reader with them 630. Cap. 18. p. 230. he asserteth that Sin is a Medium to Gods Glory and that not per accidens but per se Because sin by how much the worse it is in genere mali inhonesti by so much the better and fitter means it is in genere boni utilis conducibilis to Gods glory c. All which I have before confuted and think not his defence of it worth repeating 631. Many assertions he hath cap. 18. which all depend on the false supposition that Sin is a medium per se of Gods glory and the unproved supposition that God positively willeth the Permission of it which is nothing whence he inferreth that God Intendeth it in this and that order and much other vanity And still they confound sin in esse reali which is no medium with sin in esse objectivo which may be a part of holiness and no sin at all 632. Cap. 19. he argueth God useth men and devils in the very act of sinning as his instruments viz. to punish to try to humble c. ergo he willeth the event that they sin Resp Here is deceitful ambiguity in the words instruments and useth Properly an Instrument is an efficient cause moved by the principal to an effect above its proper virtue And so a sinner in and by the Act of sinning is no Instrument of God For God moveth him not to that Act as specified or circumstantiated so as is prohibited And being not at all so moved by him as David to murder Urias and to vitiate his Wife he is not properly thus his Instrument But sometimes the word Instrument signifieth a presupposed Agent whose Action another can improve to his own ends As the wind and water are improperly called the Millers Instruments of turning his Mill and the spring and poise are the Clock-makers Instruments of moving his Clock or Watch and a Mastiff Dog is my Instrument to keep away Thieves and a Greyhound is my Instrument to kill a Hare and a Ferret to catch a Rabbet and a Hawke to catch a Partridge c. And yet we cause not at all the Nature or Motion of the Wind or Water but we can hinder the Water nor the nisus of the spring nor the gravitation of the poise but set the recipients so as that the effect shall be done as we would have it nor cause we the fierceness of the Mastiff the inclination or motion of the greyhound ferret hawk c. but only tye them up and let them loose as our ends require But zeal maketh some men deride that God should be said to be no more the cause of sinning and they cannot allow him the skill of every dull Artificer or at least a will to use it without willing and causing the thing which he forbiddeth 2. And the word using signifieth sometime using by motion as I do my pen and sometime by ordination and adjoyning some concause or fitting the receptivity of the patient to the effect as aforesaid as we use wind water dogs hawks Thus only sinners by sinning are Gods used instruments supposing his natural concurse and support And they are not his Instruments thus neither in the same sence as these creatures are ours For their fierceness craft inclination action is good and we do and may will it for our ends But sin is not good And therefore God willeth not it at all but only the consequent of it or effect And that Effect is not Good as it is the effect of sin but as God setteth in and causeth the same effect which a sinner causeth as in generation per concubitum illicitum But when God willeth and causeth the effect and foreseeth and permitteth the sinful Volition and act which concurreth to that effect such a sin is improperly called his used instrument or medium but properly is none 633. To Gibieuf and others saying that God acteth not by sin as an instrument and willeth it not but the effects he answereth that It 's absurd because the sin it self is castigatory and hath such like effects and therefore God need not will that effect as after it But all this is from the fore-noted confusion It is not only the distant effect but the very immediate effect which is the Act it self ut recipitur in passo which God sometime is said to Will As he willed that Jobs Cattle were taken away and that Christ were killed and that Malchus eare be cut off and that Paul be scourged and smitten on the mouth and that the Apostles were oft imprisoned c. And yet God only foreseeth but willeth not that will and act of the agent which he forbiddeth 634. And here note that when the name of the Effect or Passion connoteth the sinfulness of the Act then it is less meet to say that God willeth it As to say that he willeth that we be persecuted murdered slandered belyed c. But if any will so speak they must mean only the Passion as distinct from the action And then the difference is but in nudo loquendi 635. To those that object that thus he maketh God the chief author of sin the effect being more to be ascribed to the Principal Cause than to the instrument he first ill-applyeth some frivolous distinctions and instanceth thus The hangman as the Judges instrument hangeth a man in malice or revenge Ergo the Judge much more in revenge Non sequitur Putting in Revenge which is but a Cause as if it had been the Effect which was in question And thus The Sword that killeth a man is not culpable ergo nor the striker Non sequitur As if the question had been of the Negation of an effect and not of the position of it And thus If two servants role a stone one being commanded and one forbidden one being father to the other The Son forbidden roleth it unlawfully ergo the father commanded much more non sequitur Resp 1. As if the act of the Father and the Son were the same act because the effect is the same which is notoriously false unless de specie 2. Whose Instrument do you suppose the Son to be If the Fathers it is because the Father commanded him contrary to the Master And if so the argument is good The Sons act was a fault who obeyed ergo the fathers more who commanded him saving that commanding maketh another no necessary Instrument because he can disobey But Gods premotion is supposed by you unavoidably to predetermine us 636. But pag. 255. he giveth the true
what they are All created Justice and Holiness is such that is Good for Goodness is their essence because Gods efficient will made them so And then Gods final will taketh complacency in them or Loveth them because they are so But if they talk of Goodness or Justice c. as it is in God there is in him no effect and so no cause of himself or any thing in himself 642. But some things God maketh moral duties by the very work of Creation and Ordination of the World without any other Law And these are called Duties by the Law of Nature because the very Natura rerum is a Law that is a signification of Gods will constituting mans duty It is mans essence to be an Intellectual-free-agent It is impossible that such an agent Created of God should not be Gods Creature and Gods own and dispositively a Moral governable agent and that he should not owe God all that he is and hath and can do and that God should not have the Jus Dominii Imperii over him and Jus ad summum ejus Amorem * * * Deus non posset obligare nos ad hoc quod teneatur sibi non obedire Quaero enim an tenetur obedire an non si sic habetur propositum quia tenetur non tenetur quod est impossibile Consequentia patet Quia teneri non obedire est teneri ad aliquid Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. T. Yet after he thinketh it possible for God to have made a Reasonable creature not obliged As if his very nature were not obligatory His instance of the Mad is vain for they are not actually Reasonable Ockam presumptuously concludeth that God could command a man to hate God and make it meritorious it being no contradiction His follower Greg. Arim. confuteth him And Cameracensis invalidateth the confutation and leaveth it doubtful But it is a contradiction to be a man and not obliged by Nature to Love God And a contradiction to be bound by nature to Love him and yet stante natura bound to hate him And a contradiction to hate God and be good or happy It is a contradiction to be a Created Man and not Gods Own and his obliged Subject and Beneficiary Therefore it is a contradiction that submission obedience and Love should not be his Moral duty and good and that self-alienation rebellion or disobedience and hatred should be no sins 643. To dispute then as he doth with Camero and his followers Whether it be good ex natura rei or by Gods meer free-will is a strange dispute and of most easie resolution Either they speak of Gods creating will or of some other subsequent Volition Man is made man by Gods free creating will And the foresaid Relations and duties are made such by making him Man And the duties of Love and Justice to others are made such by his Creators placing him in a world where his Neighbours are about him who are due objects as a part of the society This he himself confesseth pag. 329 330. like a Wheel in a Clock The Creators will is before Nature and therefore before natural duty as the Cause before the effect God could have made beasts instead of men who had owed him no more than beasts can do But from the Nature of a Man coexistent with God his said duties to God so necessarily result that it could not be otherwise nor did there need any subsequent act of Gods will to make that duty 644. But those that are not Duties by Nature must have moreover a Vid. Durand 1. d. 38. qi 4. n. 9 10 11. Scot. 3. d. 37. q. 1. Gabr. 3. d. 37. a. 2. Suarez de Legib. l. 2. c. 15. Aquin. 1 2. q. 94. a. 5. q. 100. a. 4. further act of Gods will as signified to make them so As the Mosaical Ceremonies our Sacraments c. 645. And many Natural Laws and duties are mutable towards one another because the very Nature and Natural Location or Order of the Things from which they did result are mutable And a word of God can make a change when yet before such antecedent mutation the duty must be duty still 646. As to Mr. Rutherfords oft saying that Omnis actus entitativus simplex est moraliter de se indifferens neque bonus neque malus And then that per actum simplicem he meaneth such as include not the object It is ludicrous or vain talk There is no such Act as hath not an object any more than physical form without matter Quicunque movet aliquid movet Quicunque intelligit aut vult aliquid intelligit aut vult vel seipsum vel aliud An Act without its object is but a partial or inadequate Generical conceptus of that Act which hath an object or an abstract partial notion of an act Why then doth he talk of that which is not Had he said that every act is in the first instant rationis or abstract-partial conception an Act in genere before it be intelligible as this or that act about this or that object he had spoken intelligibly as other men do 647. Such another question many called Arminians much use Whether Whether Justice c. be eternally good or have rationem boni aeternam Justice c. be eternally good Or An dentur rationes boni mali aeternae indispensabiles which needs no other solution than this last There is no such thing as an Universal existent per se and not in some Individual And so no such thing as Love Justice c. Bonum Malum which is not alicujus Justitia Bonum c. There was no Creature from Eternity being Just or unjust good or bad But Gods perfect Nature But that Gods own eternal perfection hath in it that root of humane virtue truth justice c. which therefore analogically have the same name our holiness being Gods Image I would prove to the Reader by this weighty reason Because else we have no certainty that Gods word is true For all our certainty is hence that God cannot lye But if Veracity be not in God we cannot prove that And if he have not that which is eminenter Justice mercy c. how can we prove that he hath Veracity might be called Eternally Just in that he must necessarily be Just if he had been a governour And necessarily was Just when he freely became a governour And also this proposition was Eternally true if there were eternally propositions Si Homines existerent Justitia in ipsis debita foret quandocunque Homines fuerint Justitia in ipsis debita fuerit But when all the sense of these questions is no more but what Duties are natural and what superadded called Positive and what natural duties are immutable and what mutable it 's an unhappiness that the world must be troubled with such uncouth forms of speech as make the question unintelligible till unravelled 648. As to
Rutherfords charge of Camero and his followers in France Amyraldus c. with Semipelagianism and Arminianism and filthy opinions it is but the effect of the good mans overweening and conceitedness of his own apprehensions which must be allowed or endured in most of these contenders And the fruits of such disputes is like to be little better But the worthy praises of Blondel Dallaeus Placeus Capellus Amyraldus Testardus c. shall survive such reproach And a thousand pitties it is to read a good man Voluminously proving God to be a Willer of sins existence and a prime-predetermining Cause of all prohibited Volitions and acts and reproaching the Jesuits Lutherans Arminians and Socinians as the great enemies of Gods Providence for denying this As if he would tempt the World to think that Socinians were in the right and that Jesuites Lutherans and Arminians were the only defenders of the Holiness of God whilst Calvinists made him the Lover of all the sin in the World as the most appetible conducible Medium to his Glory 649. But to proceed his next Argument is cap. 23. Sin conferreth something to the splendor ornament and plenitude of the Universe Eâ—go See Bonavent well confuting this in 1. d. 46. q. 3. Malum fieri nullatenus bonum esse sed bene occasio boni God willeth its existence This is answered before The antecedent is utterly unproved Sin addeth nothing to the ornament or perfection of the World His word is no proof 650. Afterwards he heapeth up many frivolous arguments against that which he calleth reproachingly The Idle Permission of sin and saith that it frustrateth the prayers of the Saints and their patience their gratitude trust hope fear joy alloweth the arrogance of the persecuters fighteth with Gods Wisdom Clemency Justice Providence with the Ministry of the Word the Promises Threatnings with Ministers confirming â—â—â— against sufferings and it is blasphemously injurious to God and contrary to the order of things in the world that he should permit sin and not will the being of it Resp What is it that a man yea a pious man in a blind zeal of God and self-conceit may not pour out confident words for What a case is the poor Church in when the unlearned people must be on both sides charged by their Teachers with blasphemy what way ever they go This man will tell them that they are * * * Pag. 370. blasphemous and overthrow all reason and Religion if they say that God only Permitteth sin and doth not himself will the being of it and move unavoidably all wills and tongues and hands to all the blasphemies persecutions and murders that are done and damn men for it when he hath done And others will as confideâ—â—ly say that he is a Blasphemer for charging God to be much more the cause of all forbidden acts of wickedness than Devils and men are and theâ— damning them for it and for putting God into the shape of the Devil and painting him odious to humane nature that man may not love him What shall poor people think when they are thus torn and tormented by their holy Guides But all his arguments are before answered when I shewed him how many wayes God hath to secure the Effects and Events in the world and attain all his Ends and yet only Permit and neither Will nor Love nor Cause the sin 651. Cap. 26. he cometh to plead for Predetermination and saith p. 385. God predetermineth us to the Act of hating God in linea meâ—â— physica non morali Meer delusory words He maketh it by the Law of Nature a sin to hate him and then he maketh men hate him â—â— linea physica non morali as if the moral sinfulness resulted not from the Law and act that is here from Nature it self viz. of the Man and act both which God made 652. Pag. 386. he saith that Directa expressa efficax Dei Vâ—litio qua Vult ut sit seu fiat actus Dei odii non facit Deum Malitia qâ—â— I confess Gab. Biel in 2. d. 37. speaketh too like these several atheological assertions as do many others per accidens sequitur actum authorem Resp But that per accidens is no reason of the denyal if God cause that accident also as the first cause If he make a Law and make the forbidden act the relation of sinfulness is an Accident indeed but ariseth from the said fundamentum so necessarily that it cannot be otherwise But it should have made a holy Divine to tremble to have said that God directly expresly and effectually willeth mens Act of hating God viz. that it exist or be 653. And it is false that he saith that God is equally the Cause that men hate him if he will the Act hypothetically ineffectually and determiâ—ably by anothers will as if he willed it efficaciously And so when he maketh the Doctrine of Universal Concurse and Causation as guilty as â—is predetermining pre-motion As if God could not make man a free-â—iller and agent and as the spring of Nature enable him and concurr â—o his Act as an Act in genere without causing it to terminate on the forbidden object in specie As if it were impossible for the Sun to be â—n universal cause of the stinking of a Dunghill and Weed without being â—he special or as if God must be made the cause of every blasphemy unless â—e will make the blasphemer speechless and of every villany unless he will strike men dead to prevent it This is not reverent and holy judging of the most holy God the Judge of all 654. The summ of all his Vindication of God from being the chief Author of all sin pag. 387. passim is but this one reason God is under no Law But if this be all why do you not speak out what you mean but hold that which you dare not name viz. That God is the chief So Bannes in 1. q. 23. â— 3. p. 270 271. Voluntas hominis malâ— est quia exercet actum odii Dei sine regula rationis immo contra legem Dei Deus autem bona vol untate vult fieri illum actum permittens defectum Causâ— secundâ— in ipso ut inde aliquod majus bonum faciat which is true of the act in genere but not as it is Odium Dei. For so if he will it and cause it he doth more than permit and the defectus Causae secundae is that very odium as against God And doth God cause the greatest sin that he may do good by it He can do as much good without causing the evil â—nsuperable cause of all the sin of Devils and men for which he damneth â—hem and that both as to the matter and form but yet thus to do is no sin in God himself because he is under no Law This is your most â—lain undoubted sense or else your Book is non-sense What need we then any further enquiry what you hold It is
case 661. I intreat the Reader that is inclining to any extreams but to read â—over first those short answers of Prosper ad Capitulâ— Gallorum and ad Objectiones Vincent And most of the Sententiae de Capit. I shall think it worthy my labour to recite to force them on the Readers observation and let him see the highest old Doctrine of Gods Decrees Sent. 1. Whoever saith that by Gods Predestination as by fatal necessity men compelled into sins are constrained to death is not a Catholick For Gods Predestination doth by no means make men bad nor is the cause of any mans sin Sent. sup 2. He that saith that the Grace of Baptism received doth not take away Original sin from them that are not predestinated to life is not a Catholick For the Sacrament of Baptism by which all sins He meaneth that those that sincerely covenanted with God in Baptism were truly pardoned though he thought some of them fell away and perished are blotted out is true even in them who will not remain in the truth and for them that are not predestinated unto life Sent. sup 3. He that saith that they that are not predestinated to life though they were in Christ regenerated by Baptism and have lived piously and justly it profitteth them nothing but they are so long reserved till they fall to ruine and they are not taken out of this life till this happen to them as if the ruine of such men were to be referred to Gods constitution is not a Catholick For God doth not therefore prolong the time of any mans age that by long living he should fall to ruine and in his long living fall from the right â—aith seeing long life is to be numbered with the gifts of God by which a man should be better and not worse Sent. sup 4. He that saith that all are not called to Grace if he speak of such as Christ is not declared to is not to be reprehended Sent. sup 5. He that saith that they that are called are not equally called but some that they might believe and some that they might not believe as if to any man the Vocation were the cause of his not believing saith not right For though faith be not but by Gods Gift and Mans Will yet Infidelity is by mans will alone Sent. 6. He that saith that Pree-will in Man is Nothing but it 's Gods predestination which worketh in men whether it be to good or to evil is not a Catholick For Gods Grace doth not abolish mans choice or free-will but perfecteth it and revoketh and reduceth it into the way from error that that which was bad by its own liberty may by the operation of Gods Spirit be made right And Gods predestination is alwayes in Good which knoweth how either to pardon with the praise of mercy or punish with the praise of Justice the sin which is committed by mans will alone Sent. 7. He that saith that God for this cause giveth not Perseverance to some of his Children whom he regenerated in Christ to whom he gave faith hope and Love because by Gods fore-knowledge and predestination they were not differenced from the mass of perdition If he mean that God endowed these men in Goodness but would not have them remain in it and that he was the cause of their tâ—rning away he judgeth contrary to the Justice of God For though Gods Omnipotence could have given the grace of standing to them that will fall yet his grace doth not first forsake them before they have forsaken it And because he foresaw that they would do this by a Voluntary desertion therefore he had them not in the Election of Predestination Sent. 8. He that saith that God would not have all men saved but a certain number that are predestinate speaketh hardlier of the altitude of Gods unsearchable grace than he should speak Who would have all men to be saved and to come to the acknowledgement of the truth and fulfilleth the purpose of his will on them whom being foreknown he predestinated and being predestinate he called being called he justified and being justified he glorified Losing nothing of the fulness of the Gentiles and of all the seed of Israel for whom the eternal Kingdom was prepared in Christ before the foundation of the World For all the World is chosen out of all the World And out of all men all men are adopted So that they that are saved are therefore saved because God would have them saved and they that perish do perish because they deserve to perish Sent. 9. He that saith that our Saviour was not Crucified for the Redemption of the whole World looketh not to the Virtue of the Sacrament that is Sacrifice but to the part or participation of the unbelievers When as the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ is the Price of the whole World From which Price they are Aliens who being either delighted in their Captivity will not be redeemed or when they are redeemed return again to the same Captivity For the Word of the Lord falleth not nor is the redemption of the World evacuated For though the World in the vessels of wrath knew not God yet the World in the vessels of mercy knew him Which God without their preceding Merits took out of the power of darkness and translated into the Kingdom of the Son of his Love Sent. 10. He that saith that God substracteth from some the preaching of the Gospel lest perceiving the preaching of the Gospel they should be saved may decline the envy of the objection by the paâ—â—onage of our Saviour himself who would not work Miracles with some that he saith would have believed had they seen them And he forbad his Apostles to preach to some people and now suffereth some Nations to live without his Grace Sent. 11. He that saith that God by his Power compelleth men to sin is deservedly reprehended For God who is the Author of Justice and Goodness and all whose Statutes and Commands are against sin is not to be thought to compell any to sin and precipitate them from innocency into crimes But if there be any of so profound impiety as that they are reckoned to be beyond the remedy of correction they receive not an increase of their iniquity from God but are made â—â—â—â— by themselves because they deserved to be left of God and given up to themselves and to deceivers for their former sins that so their sin should be a punishment of their sin Sent. 12. He that saith that obedience is withdrawn from some that are called and live piously and righteously that they may cease to obey doth think ill of Gods Goodness and Justice as seeming to constrain the godly to ungodliness and to take away good mens innocency from them When as He is the Giver and Keeper of godliness and innocency He therefore that adhereth to God is acted by the Spirit of God but he that departeth from God doth fall from his obedience
or cease it by his own will Sent. 13. He that saith that some men are not made by God to this end that they might obtain eternal life but that they might be the ornaments of their times and for the good of others would speak better if he said that God who is the Creator of all men maketh not them in vain who he foreseeth will not be partakers of life eternal Because even in bad men nature is Gods good work and Justice in their damnation is laudable But he cannot well be blamed that saith that even by the condition of such the World is adorned * * * But not by their sin i◠self and that those that hurt themselves by their own iniquity are born for the good of others For the multitude of the ungodly though innumerable is not disgraceful or a deformity to the World or unprofitable to the Kingdom of God seeing that by their propagation cometh the generation that is to be regenerate and by tolerating and loving them Gods people become the more illustrious Sent. 14. He that saith that they that believe not the preaching of the Gospel are unbelievers by Gods predestination and that God so decreed that they that believe not be unbelievers by his appointment or decree is not a Catholick For as Faith which worketh by Love is Gods gift so unbelief is none of Gods constitution Because God knoweth how to ordain Punishment for sin but not sin it self And it followeth not that what he remitteth not he committeth The predestinate therefore liveth by the faith which is given him The non-predestinate perish by Voluntary and not constrained infidelity Sent. 15. He that saith that Foreknowledge is the same with predestination doubtless in our good works conjoyneth or mixeth those two For what we have of Gods gift and is said to be foreknown must needs be predestinate And what is said to be predestinate must needs be foreknown But in our evil works only the foreknowledge of God must be understood Because as he foreknew and predestinated the things which he doth himself and giveth us to do so he FOREKNEW ONLY and DID NOT PREDESTINATE the things which he neither doth himself nor requireth us to do SECT XXI Prosper 's answers ad Object Vincent 662. I Will crave the Readers patience while I add the summ of hi◠Answers also to some of the Objections of Vincentius Obj. 1. That Christ died not for all Resp His death is a remedy in it self sufficient to profit all but if it be not taken it will not heal Obj. 2. That God would not have all saved though they would Resp We must sincerely believe and profess that God would have all saved That many perish is by the merit of them that perish That many are saved is the gift of him that saved them For that the guilty are damned is Gods inculpable justice that the guilty are justified is Gods unspeakable grace Obj. 3. That God made most of mankind that they might perish for ever Resp God is the Creator of all men but No man is made by him that he might perish For the cause of being born is one and the cause of perishing is another That men are born is Gods gift that they perish is the sinners desert He maketh men that they may be men Obj. 4. That the most of men are made of God not to do Gods will but the Devils Resp It is madness and against reason to say that it is by Gods will that Gods will is not done and that the damner of the Devil and his servants would have the Devil served Obj. 5. That God is the author of our sin in that he maketh mens wills evil and maketh a substance which by natural motion cannot but sin Resp This objection they make because we hold original sin and misery But we hold that whatever is of Nature is of God and none of that which is contrary to Nature But sin is contrary to nature from whence cometh death and all that is of death God is the author of no mans sin but the Creator of his Nature which voluntarily sinned when it had Power not to sin and by his own will man subjected himself to the deceiver And it is not by Natural but by Captive Motion that he liveth in sin till he die to sin and live to God which without grace he cannot do Obj. 6. That God maketh in men such a will as is in Devils that of its own motion can and will do nothing but evil Resp The whole world lyeth in wickedness But even very bad men may be reconciled and Devils cannot And God put not evil affections in men Obj. 7. That it is Gods will that a great part of Christians neither will nor can be saved Resp If you speak of them who forsaking the Godliness of a Christian conversation and faith do irrevocably pass over into prophane errours and damnable manners it 's doubtless that having such a will they will not be saved and as long as they will not be saved they cannot be saved But it is by no means to be believed that such men fell into this desperate case by the will of God when rather God lifteth up all that fall For no man is raised or established but by his Grace It is therefore Gods will that they continue in a good will And he forsaketh no man before that man forsake him and converteth many that do forsake him Obj. 8. That God will not have all Catholicks to persevere in the Catholick faith but will have a great part of them to apostatize from it Resp The same answer serveth to this blasphemy as to the former Obj. 9. That God would have a great part of the Saints to fall from the purpose of holiness * * * The Reader must note that their common opinion then was that some true Saints do fall away and perish Resp This madness also needeth no other answer Obj. 10. That Adulteries and corrupting consecrate Virgins do come to pass because God predestinated them to fall Resp It is a detestable and abominable opinion which believeth God to be the author of any mans evil will or evil action whose predestination or decree is never without Goodness and Justice †††That is of nothing but good and just For all the wayes of God are mercy and truth Adulteries and Corruptions of Virgins God knoweth not how to institute but to damn not to dispose * * * That is ut sint but to punish Which evils when men commit they serve their own lusts Gods predestination neither exciteth perswadeth or impelleth the fall malignity or lusts of sinners but plainly predestinateth his own Judgement by which he will reward every one according to what he hath done whether good or evil which Judgement would never be if men sinned by the will of God But be it will And every man whom the discerning of Gods knowledge shall set
at his left hand shall be damned because he executed not Gods will but his own Obj. 11. When incest is committed between Fathers and their Daughters Mothers and their Sons it is therefore done because so God fore-decreed that it should be done or come to pass Resp †††Let the Dominicans not◠this If it were objected to the Devil himself that he is the author and incenter of such villanies I think that with some reason he might discharge himself of the envy and overcome the committer of such wickedness by his own willing of them Because though he be delighted with the madness of sinners he can yet prove that he forced them not to sin With what folly and madness then is that ascribed to God which may not be wholly ascribed to the Devil who is but the adjutor of the baits of sin and not the Causer Generater of the Will God then fore-decreed not that any such businesses should be done nor prepared that soul to any such end who will live wickedly and filthily But he was not ignorant that it would be such and he fore-knew that he would justly judge of such So that to his fore-decree nothing else can be referred but either 1. That which belongeth to the due retribution of Justice 2. Or to the not due bestowing of grace Obj. 12. That by Gods fore-decree men are made of Children of God to be Children of the Devil and of Temples of the Holy Ghost the Temples of Devils and of members of Christ members of a Harlot Resp Gods Predestination though to us while we are in the perils of this life it be uncertain with him is unchangeable But those of whom it is said They went out from us because they were not of us did willingly go out and willingly fall away And because they were foreknown to be such as would fall away they were not predestinate But they had been Predestinated if they had been such as would have returned and remained in holiness and truth So that Gods fore-decree is to many a cause of standing and to none a cause of falling Obj. 13. That all those faithful and Saints who are fore-decreed to eternal death when they return to their vomit seem indeed to do it by their own vice but the cause of that vice is the fore-decree of God which secretly withdraweth from them good wills Resp Indeed to all that relapse from faith to infidelity from Holiness to filthiness and are not purged by emendation before the end of their lives nothing but eternal death is due But it is wickedness to ascribe the cause of such ruines to God who though he foreknow by his eternal knowledge what reward he will give to every mans deserts yet this his Impossibility of being deceived doth not bring into any man either a necessity or a will * * * Note this you that are for his first predetermining all forbidden Volitions and acts of sinning If therefore any man fall from Godliness he is carryed headlong by his own will he is drawn by his own concupiscence he is deceived by his own perswasion There the Father doth nothing the Son doth nothing the Holy Ghost doth nothing nor doth any thing of the will of God intervene in such a business by whose help we know many are kept from falling but none impelled to fall Obj. 14. That this great part of Christian faithful Catholicks and Saints who are fore-decreed to ruine and perdition if they beg of God perseverance in Holiness shall not obtain it Because Gods decree cannot be changed by which he fore-ordained prepared and fitted them to fall away Resp To the breach of the Law to the neglect of Religion to the corrupting of discipline to the forsaking of the faith to the perpetrating of any sin whatever there is no predestination or fore-decree of God at all Nor can it be that men should fall into such evils by him by whom men rise out of such If therefore men live in holiness if they profit in virtue if they remain in good studies it is the manifest gift of God without whom the fruit of no good work is acquired But if men fall away from these and pass over to vice and sin God there sendeth them no evil temptation nor doth he forsake him that will fall away before he be forsaken by him And for the most part he keepeth men from forsaking him or if they depart doth cause them to return But why he upholdeth one and not another it is neither possible to comprehend †††N. B. nor lawful to search seeing it may suffice to know both that it is of him that men stand and it is not of him that they fall away Obj. 15. That all the faithful and Saints who are predestinated to eternal death when they fall are so disposed of by God that they neither can nor will be delivered by repentance Resp Falsly said and foolishly For they that fall away from faith and holiness as they fell by their Wills so by their Wills they rise not But God taketh the way of amendment from none not depriveth any of the possibility of good For he that turneth himself from God taketh from himself both the will and the power of good It 's no good consequence as the Objecters think that God taketh away repentance from men because he giveth it them not and that he casteth down those that he taketh not up For it is one thing to act the innocent into a crime which God cannot do and another not to pardon the Criminal which is the desert of sin Obj. 16. That this great part of the faithful and holy which is fore-decreed to eternal death when they pray to God in the Lords prayer Let thy will be done do only pray against themselves viz. that they may fall and be ruined because it is the will of God that they perish by eternal death Resp The Truth saith not this that it is the will of God that the faithful and Saints do fall from faith and innocency and perish But Truth saith This is the will of the Father that sent me that of all that he hath given me I should lose none But if by the generality of Vocation and the abundance of Gods goodness even those that will not persevere are mixt with the persevering when these fall away from Godliness they fall not or are not forsaken of Gods help but of their own wills nor are impelled to fall nor cast off that they may forsake but yet are fore-known to fall away by Him that cannot be deceived And when they pray Thy will be done they pray not that they may fall Which God will not do or Cause any way by any means For this by their own naughtiness their own liberty will do But this they pray against themselves which doubtless is Gods will that when the Son of man shall come in his Majesty c. they that will not
do Gods will and yet pray Let thy will be done are heard in that which is Gods will that the imitaters of the Devil be judged with the Devil For they that have despised Gods inviting will shall feel his revenging will SECT XXII The words of Fulgentius to the same sence 663. I Must crave of the Reader that he remember that my reciting the Judgement of these Fathers for the falling away and perishing of many that were in a state of Life is not at all as declaring my own judgement but Theirs none then that I read of thinking otherwise * * * Except Jovinian be truly accused by Hierome the brevity and obscurity of whose accusation and confutation leaveth us very uncertain what it was that Jovinian held But we are sure that the spirit oâ— uncharitableness and concention though in a good â—â—â—â— learnâ—d man had no â—â—all hand in the stigmâ—â—zing of him and Vigilantius as Hereticks I shall for the End sake be yet a little more â—edious in citing some of the sayings of Fulgentius Fulg. l. 1. de Verit. praedest cap. 6. To good men God giveth what good they have and keepeth it But to the wicked and ungodly God neither ever could prepare or give evil works which they should damnably serve nor did he ever put into them evil wills by which they should culpably will things unjust but he prepared for them the punishment of Hell that they might feel revenging justice in endless fire An evil will is not of God And therefore the just Judge doth punish it in men because the good Creator findeth not in it the order of his Creation And perseverance and contumacy in sin and pride because it is not of Gods giving is condemned by God revenging Et l. 1. ad Monim c. 26. He will punish in the wicked that they are bad which he gave not nor did he predestinate them to any iniquity and that they willed unjustly was none of his gift And because the persevering iniquity of an evil will ought not to remain unpunished he predestinated such to destruction because he prepared just punishment for them Observe that God predestinated wicked and ungodly men to just punishment not to any unjuâ—â— work to the penalty not to the fault to the punishment nâ—â— to the transgression to the destruction which the anger of a just judge requiteth sinners with not to that destruction or death by which the iniquity of sinners provoketh Gods wrath against them The Apostle calls them Vessels of wrath not Vessels of sin Cap. 27. The wicked are not predestinated to the first death of the soul but to the second death they are That which followeth the sentence of a just Judge not that which preceded in the evil concupiscence of the sinner Ibid. c. 23. It beseemeth believers to confess that the good and just God fore-knew indeed that men would sin for all things to come are known to him For they were not future if they were not in his fore-knowledge But not that he predestinated any to sin For if he predestinated man to any sin he would not punish man for sin For Gods predestination prepareth for men either the godly remission of their sins or the just punishment of them God therefore could never predestinate man to that which he had resolved both to forbid by his precept and to wash away by his mercy and punish by his justice God therefore predestinated to eternal punishment the wicked who he foreknew would persevere to the death in sin Wherein as his fore-knowledge of mans iniquity is not to be blamed so his predestinatioâ— of just revenge is to be praised That we may acknowledge that he predestinated not man to any sin whom he predestinated to be punished deservedly for sin And ad Monimum li. 1. pag. edit Basil 68. reciting Augustiâ—â—â— words he saith He taught that only pride was the cause of mans iniquity and that God predestinated not men to sin but to damnation and that they are not helped by God the cause is in themselves and not in God The same he reciteth again ex lib. 2. Aug. de baptis parvul that their wills be not helpt by grace the cause is in themselves and not in God The same he again repeateth pag. 69. 70 71 72. and that Augustine's mind was that good works God both fore-knew and predestinated But evil works that is sin he foreknew indeed but did not predestinate or decree For there is not Gods work but his judgement Therefore in sin Gods work is not because that sin should be done was not decreed by him But therefore there is his judgement because it is not left unrevenged that an evil man worketh without God working And ib. li. 1. pag. 15. That which is not in his work never was in predestination Therefore men are not predestinated to sin So p. 29. And p. 31. and forward And p. 29. No man justly sinneth though God justly permit him to sin For he is justly forsaken of God who forsaketh God And because man forsaking God sinneth God forsaking man keepeth justice 664. I am loth to weary the Reader with more Should I do the like by Augustines words it would be too wearisome His judgement is the very same as theirs I will only cite one passage out of him about mans Power to believe Tract 53. in Johan having shewed that God only foreknoweth mens sin and foretelleth it as the Jews but causeth it not he cometh to answer John 12. 39. They could not believe c. If they could not how was it their sin saying You hear the question brethren and see how deep it is But we answer as we can Why could they not believe If you ask me I quickly answer Because they would not For God foresaw their evil will and foretold it by the Prophet He blinded their eyes c. And I answer that their own wills deserved this also For God blindeth and hardeneth by forsaking and not helping which he may do by a judgement secret but not unjust This all religious piety ought to hold unshaken Far be it from us then to say that there is iniquity with God If he help he doth it mercifully if he help not he doth justly 665. By all this the Reader may see past all doubt that Augustine and his two disciples than whom none known to us in the whole world then went higher for Predestination and Grace did plainly take up with this that 1. GOD NEITHER CAUSED OR WILLED SIN no not ITS BEING or the forbidden ACT. 2. That OUR SIN was of OUR SELVES 3. That ALL GRACE and perserverance was OF GOD. 4. That ELECTION was ABSOLUTE of GOD's meer will and not upon his foreknowledge of any merits of mans 5. That God predestinated none to sin but predestinated men to Punishment ONLY ON THE FORESIGHT of their wilful sin 6. That he hardened men but by deserting them 7. That he never forsook them till they forsook him first
ipsius Voluntatis rectitudinem Sic dicit Scotus quod licet non videatur aliqua ratio praedestinationis à parte praedestinati aliquo modo prior praedestinatione Reprobationis tamen est aliqua ratio propter quam scilicet ista actio terminatur ad hoc objectum non ad illud Cum Reprobare sit Velle Damnare Reprobatio habet ex parte objecti rationem scilicet peccatum finale praevisum Non videtur autem dicendum conformiter de Praedestinatione Reprobatione Quia Bona Deo principaliter attribuuntur Mala autem nobis Quia tamen Apostolus videtur totum hoâ— imperscrutabile relinquere Rom. 9. O altitudo c. ideo dicit Scotus quod eligatur opinio quae magis placet Dum tamen servetur Libertas Divina absque injustitia Hoc autem debet fieri absque assertione pertinaci Rationes namque particulares propter quas ex parte diversorum Divina inferuntur judicia sunt imperscrutabiles But note that as to the first part of Reprobation non velle dare gratiam Scotus Mayro c. hold it to be nothing or no act at all 702. And what D'Orbellis next addeth of Bonaventure setteth us at no further odds Bonav dicit quod licet non sit aliqua ratio Causalis seu meritoria praedestinationis à parte praedestinati quia siquis posset de condigno mereri primam gratiam tunc Gratia non esset Gratia Potest tamen esse aliqua ratio congruitatis condeoentiae praedestinationis Non quantum ad significatum quod est Volitio Divina sed quantum ad Connotatum quod est Gratia Gloria Potest enim dici quod Deus praedestinat istum proper praevisionem bonorum operum ut aliquo modo sunt à libero arbitrio Licet enim Gratificatio vel Justificatio sit principaliter à Divina Voluntate hoc tamen est cum cooperatione praeparatione liberi arbitrii quia ut Aug. Qui fecit te sine te non justificabit te sine te Unde cum peccator facit quod in se est meretur de congruo justificari seu secundum quid ex condecentia Divinae liberalitatis But the true meaning of this is no more than Protestants commonly hold that God giveth special Grace usually to such only as are prepared for it by more common Grace and so this preparation is quid praevisum in Gods decree but no Cause of his Act of Volition or decree 703. And in the next words he granteth that even this Preparation to special grace is not alwayes necessary Deus tamen sine aliqua praeparatione cooperatione aliquos justificat ut patet de sanctificatis in utero de parvulis post baptismum ad coelum evolantibus aliis sine baptismo decedentibus c. 704. And though they oft say that God would have all men saved quantum in se they mean not that God doth all to it that he can but that he maketh all capable of salvation and so far helpeth them that the failing shall not be on his part For so Bonavent ubi supra in 1. d. 47. a. 1. q. 1. explaineth it plainly adding that here Gods will connoteth not salvation it self but only the said Capacity and helps 705. Obj. But many say that Predestination doth not necessitate the eveâ— Answ Twisse told you before that we are agreed all in this It inferreth a Logical Necessity Consequentiae though not a physical Consequentis As Bonavent 1. d. 40. q. 2. Ex parte rei evenientis nullam ex parte Deâ— praescientis aliquam scilicet immutabilitatis certitudinem Yea as to grace and salvation it is certainly Causal as they confess 706. Obj. Many say that a predestinate person may be damned Answ Even as D'Orbellis in 1. d. 40. a. 2. Ista propositio Pradestinatus potest damnari est falsa in sensu composito vera in sensu divise Vide explicat It is unchristian and unmanly to revile men that say the same that we do meerly through distaste or because we will not be at the labour to understand them 707. Obj. We cannot be reconciled to them that give so much to mans free-will Ans How much do you mean It 's a dreadful thing to hear some good men ignorantly blaspheme God as the chief cause of every villany in the World meerly â—poh a factious prejudice and partial opposition to other men whom they never understood Would it please you to hear that God draggeth men into sin as by the hair of the heaâ— when the Devil himself can but allure them I know it would not Dâ— but make it plain as a granted thing that God doth not Will or Love sin and do more to Cause it than the Devil or the wickedest sinner himself doth and you can scarce tell how to differ from the greater part of the Schoolmen themselves or sober moderate Lutherans that are thought to be dissenters Let it be the Devils work and no good Christians to paint God in the shape of the Father of lies and all iniquity Our God is Holy and Holiness becometh all that draw near him and is the mark of all that shall see his face Dear Brethren let not us that daily and justly condemn our selves for sin and take such odious titles to our selves make our selves yet Holier than God and make God a far greater Lover and Causeâ— of sin than we are I will add one description of Free-will out of the last named Schoolman D'Orbellis a Scotist in 2. sent d. 25. dub 2. And tell me what the most rigid opposer of Free-will can desire more Q. Whether Free-will be equally in all that have it Ans Free-will may be compared 1. To that which it is free from 2. And to that which it is free to 1. In the first sense there is a threefold Liberty 1. From constraint 2. From sin 3. From misery Liberty from sin is not equally in good and bad nor in man on earth and in Heaven As Aug. Enchir. That 's the freest will that cannot at all serve sin And Liberty from misery is not equally in all But Liberty from constraint is equally in all because the will cannot be forced Though in God and the blessed there be a Necessity of Immutability yet not of Co-action And necessity of Immutability repugneth not Liberty For the will is called Free simply not because it so willeth this as that it can will the contrary but because that whatever it willeth it desireth it by its own Empire Because it so willeth any thing that it willeth to will it And therefore in the act of willing it moveth it self and useth dominion on it self And so far it is called Free though it be immutably ordained to it * * * But it were not so if it were immutably ordained and moved to sin 2. But if free-will be compared to that to which it is free viz. To do right for as Anselm saith It is a faculty or
power to keep rectitude so it is not equally in all For this Power is in God of Himself and in the Creatures received from God And it is more in the confirmed than the nonconfirmed and in the good than in the bad And seeing to be able to sin is a diminution of Liberty therefore according to Anselm to be able to sin is no Liberty nor part of liberty taking Free-will according to the Common Reason of it But to have power as to the Act which deformity is annext to may well be a part of Liberty not simply but of Created Liberty And so the deformity in the Act more agreeth with free-will as it is a Creature or as it is of Nothing than as it is Free. Dub. 3. Can free-will be compelled Answ God can destroy it but not force it for that is a Contradiction But he can well effectually incline it and make it move it self freely to which part God will * * * But to sin he will not so incline it I think this is as high as you can desire And yet there is nothing in all this but what both parties may well bear with and it hath indeed much soundness in it But here he treateth only about equality of Liberty but how much of it the unsanctified have he elsewhere sheweth and I have oft told you how much the most are agreed in it 708. To conclude The heart and summ of all our differences is how to make God the total first Cause of all Good and not to make him the Cause of sin and the damner of man for that which he himself insuperably causeth I hope both sides hold fast both the conclusions that our sin and destruction is chiefly of our selves but in God is our help and our good and happiness is all from Him And if they both hold this it is not the difficulty of joyning them together and opening Gods unsearchable methods that must disjoynt us and draw us to withdraw our Love or contemn each other or disturb the Churches peace and unity 709. Gregory Ariminensis and Gabr. Biel have come so near the rigid Dominicans that the Reader may think that they plainly say the same of Gods Causing all the Act of sin as Alvarez Twisse and Rutherford say But let the Learned Reader note these things 1. That over and over they affirm that though God Cause all the Act of sin yet he is but the Causa partialis I like not the phrase my self for the reasons before given but by this they do greatly differ from the aforesaid Authors see Greg. 2. d. 34 35. ar 3. frequently saying that God is Causa partialis And in answering Aureolus ad nonum he thus fully explaineth it Dicendum quod Causa dupliciter potest accipi Totalis Uno modo Totalis totalitate relata ad Causam id est sufficiens Causare effectum absque concursu alterius Causae praecise causando sicut Causat sic neganda est ista Consequentia Quoniam nec Deus nec Creatura est sic Totalis Causa actus mali Nunquam enim talis actus fieret si Deâ—s non Causaret â—um Neque etiam si Creatura non causaret Deus non aliter causaret quam nunc de facto causat concurrendo cum Creatura Alio modo Totalis totulitate relata ad effectum id est totum effectum causaus Et ejusdem possâ—nt esse plures totales Causae ejusdem enim Volitionis secundum totum est Causa Notitia etiam Voluntas Here note that 1. He taketh not Causa totalis for the same with Solitaria 2. That he asserteth only that God causeth the Totum of the Act but not by a total Causation of it And that Gods way or sort of Causation is not sufficient to cause it if man concurred not which they say he freely doth and could do otherwise 710. So that these mens way of freeing God from being the cause of sin is like Scotus his As if as I before made the similitude a Father to try his Childs obedience bids him lift up a Stone which he cannot do of himself and the Father holdeth his hand and joyneth his strength yet not ad ultimum posse but with a purposed restraint so far that if the Child will not put forth his degree of strength it shall not be done But who can comprehend the wayes of Divinè concurse 711. And it is to be noted that when Aureolus argueth that if God immediately concurr either he determineth mans act or man determineth Gods act or neither which are all absurd here Biel citeth Scotus as holding the third and answering Neither as no absurdity But Greg. Arim. that seemeth to go higher yet saith * * * Ubi suprae ad 8. Juxta modum loquendi arguentis dico quod Deus sequitur determinationem Voluntatis non quâ—â— determinatio Voluntatis fit aliqua Entitas distincta à Voluntate actâ— ejus quia primo fiat à voluntate nec intelligendo quod prius natura Viluntas agat actum quam Deus proprie loquendo de priori natura Quoniam tunc sequeretur quod posset illum agere Deo non coagente Sed ad hunc sensum dico Deum sequi Determinationem Voluntatis Quoniam ideo Deus agit illum actum quia †††I think it should be Eum. cum Voluntas agit Et non ideo quâ—â— Deus agit ideo Voluntas agit ideo magis proprie dicitur Deus coagerâ— Voluntati in talem actum causandi quam Voluntas dicatur coagere Deâ— You see that these Nominals do toto coelo differ from Alvarez Tâ—isse and Rutherford And yet Alvarez would fain be moderate in that one Disputation which Dr. Twisse in a peculiar Digression oppugneth 712. And note that the thing which moved Gregory to go so far as he doth is Lest God should be denyed to be the Cause of all Natural Entity But if you set before the will the Creator or Chief Good and the Creature or sensual pleasure the Act in genere as a Volition is an Entity or modus entis But who can prove that comparatively as it is terminated on the Creature rather than on the Creator it hath any Natural Entity more than the act in genere or any modality which God is not able to give a Creature power to cause or not cause withoâ—â— predetermination from God or any other 713. Yea Ariminensis seemeth to mean this himself when ibid. d. 34 35. a. 2. ad 5. he saith Deus â—potest solus actum illum causare actâ—â— odiendi id est qui est odium Dei mendacium etiam potest causare Non tamen potest causare actum odiendi Deum seu odium Dei neqâ—â— potest Causare Mendacium vel mentiri neque potest causare actum â—â—lum Quare quemcunque actum causaret solus licet ille nunc sit Odiâ—â— Dei vel mendacium vel aliquis actus malus
in the threatning And that we cannot say that Justice made it necessary to God to punish the least vain thought or remissness with the greatest punishment or damnation But as to the uncertainties 1. With what degree of punishment God in Justice must or would have punished a vain thought or any sin consistent with his habitual prevalent love 2. Or whether a vain ☞ thought must needs have separated Soul and Body or caused that which we call Hell 3. Or whether God could in Justice have pardoned that vain thought upon less satisfaction than the sufferings of Christ These with many others are questions too hard for me what ever they may be to wiser men But I am satisfied that God would never have damned in Hell any Soul that had the habitual predominant love of God though culpably remiss and otherwise sinful while he remained such yea that Hell and such love of God are inconsistent And therefore if any such sin would have damned Adam it must be by further quenching and expelling the Spirit of Grace or forfeiting and losing Divine assistance and so first losing that habit of love The rest I leave to the more illuminated II. Now as to the M. S. said to be written by a young man of New England deceased M. W. it hath so much accurateness that in reading it I greatly lament the Authors death before maturity and converse had rectified some of his notions and he had longer improved his excellent understanding for the Church And because my Doctrine is particularly opposed in it I shall stay to animadvert on the substance of the Book And it may be reduced to these Propositions 1. The great fundamental point of it is That man was made to glorifie Gods Justice for ever Animad This is a great truth not well considered by many But it is but a part of the truth which is That man was made to glorifie Gods Vitâ—â— Power Wisdom and Love and is governed eminently by Wisdom making ORDER and justly keeping it together with mercy because the glory of Holiness and Love also is the end Which I have more carefully opened hereafter § 2. M. S. The reason of special government is That man is causa consilip Though as he desireth and seeketh good in general he is but a natural Agent And therefore Twisse erreth in saying that God â—iay punish an innocent man because he may afflict a beast Ans 1. By causa consilio he meaneth a rational free Agent having an Intellect and Free-will This indeed maketh and proveth man a subject made to be morally governed But when he had laid all his stress on this Free-will under the name of causa consilio he went too far in seeming with Gibieuf whom he citeth and followeth as his great Light to confine the name of true liberty to the Amplitude and Holiness of the Will which is another kind of Liberty And as Armatus truly saith Gibieuf was fitter for a scraphick pious Discourse in a Platonick strain than for such Controversies 2. As Rada and other Scotists well prove there is no Act of the Will even to good in general which is not free though some be necessary and the inclination is natural and not free 3. Yea he proveth that there is no such thing as a Volition of any good ingenere saving as the generical nature of good is found in some particular in esse cognito 4. Twisse was not so weak as to call that pâ—nishment which is not for sin but calleth it Affliction or Cruciatum only And he speaketh not what God may do by his ordinate Will But I think that you are in the right and he in the wrong because the very making us men and so governed Subjects is a declaration of Gods ordinate Will not to make us miserable but for sin 3. M. S. Adam's whole man was sanctified and so fitted to obey and to glorifie Justice His free-will was not an indifferency but as Gib that noble virtue of his Soul by which he could go above all created good so that Liberty and Eupraxy or Obedience are all one But we cannot stir an inch to God above the Creature Liberty is to imitate God whose Will closeth with himself and resteth in himself for ever And mutability is but an adjunct of our Liberty An. I have better opened and distinguished Liberty before Lib. 1. Natural Liberty is to be distinguished from moral which you describe and vehemently assert the former under the name of causa consilio that cannot be forced But meer indifferency or mutability is no Liberty it self 4. M. S. Adam was not made with notions in his Mind no more than with colours in his Eyes but he was made able and fit to see God in the frame of Nature especially in his own Will as inclined to universal good An. Scaliger and others think that Idea's are born in us which maketh the Chicken fly at the shadow of the Kite c. But I rather say as you that it is but a Disposition which will so easily act that some call it an Idea and it is the same thing that they mean while they differ about the name § 5. M. S. Do this and live is the way that Justice will be glorified in And that doing would merit life Adam either knew by nature or supernaturally at least was confirmed in it by supernatural revelation An. This is all true § 6. M. S. Do this and live as the only terms of life are a Catholick and Theological axiom Not the words but Energetick Wisdom printed on the frame And the meaning is close with the last end or with the true Universal God as such which is the sum of the Decalogue Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart c. The Wills closing with God And Obedience is in the subordinate faculties executing the pleasure of the Will An. 1. Obedience is first in the Will it self 2. Tou do not intelligibly acquaint us whether by Do this you mean any sincere closing with God as God and our End above all Creatures as the godly now do though with culpable remissness and imperfections or only the most perfect Love and Obedience without any imperfection or remissness or vain irregular thought that is culpable But by Do this I perceive you mean Take God for thy God and love adore and trust him § 7. M. S. This was to be expressed by eating of the Tree of Life and not of that of Good and Evil sacramentally to acknowledge also the Soveraignty of God An. 1. All Obedience formally respecteth Gods Soveraignty 2. No doubt the Trees were symbolical and the remembrance of them should yet teach us to prefer living to God before a selfish disturstful needless knowledge the increase of which increaseth sorrow 3. But that Adam was commanded to eat of the Tree of Life I cannot prove unless the general obligation to choose the best was as a Command § 8. M. S. To be
a Liberty and not Gibieufs Amplitude It is not possible for a Creature to have any thing that 's good but of God nor any good from God but by meer free Gift as to the Good or Value though it be by rewarding Justice quoad ordinem conferendi and comparatively why this man hath it rather than that § 24. M. S. There is no stinting or determining unless you stop here at the first act An. I deny it There are three Opinions more that are all more probable The first which supposeth the Reward of life eternal due upon the over coming of the Devils first temptation which would have drawn from the Love of God And so Love and Conquer once was the Condition The second which supposeth that the Condition was the Conquest of this particular Temptation to eat of the forbidden Fruit and the after eating of the Tree of Life The third which supposeth the only Condition of life eternal to the personal perfect perpetual Obedience or perseverance till God of his own pleasure should translate Adam and end his life of trial I take this last to have far most probability for all the Reasons before given I am sure that the tenor of the Law of Nature made it Adam's Duty still to love God and obey him and resist all that was against it And I find no Promise that his Nature or the Law of Nature should be changed for this or that act or for conquering some one temptation I find that Christ's own Covenant-Condition was more than one act And the Condition of our Glory is overcoming and being faithful to the death and continuing in Christ And I will not add to the Covenant of God § 25. M. S. Arg. 4. From the nature of an obediental act which includeth the approving of the whole Law An. 1. Approving the things that are excellent is made consistent with wickedness Rom. 2. But I will suppose you to mean a full consent to the Covenant of Innocency But 2. How prove you that such consent was the whole condition of life and that it might not be fallen from and that Adam never did consent before his Fall and yet not sin 3. All the godly approve of Gods Law and consent to it and love it and yet merit not as keepers of it for they break it Rom. 7. 4. Yea Covenant-keeping to the last as well as Covenant-consent the first moment is now to us the condition of immutable Glory § 26. M. S. Adam would not obey at first but suspend while he looked about the World to see if there were any good sufficient for him below God Therefore he sinned not then An. This is before confuted He could not in that Integrity and after such divine Revelation be unresolved one hour whether he must first love and obey his Maker without sin § 27. God cannot freely give eternal life to a Creature without Reward for doing because the reasonable Creature was made for the Glory of Justice An. 1. You may say that God will not to man but not that he cannot nor that he doth not to any Angel For man was not made only for the Glory of Justice but of Power and Love or Goodness also 2. It 's certain that God as a free Benefactor giveth many good things freely and â—â— as a Reward for doing As 1. He so freely made all things good in the Creation and gave man all his antecedent good He so gave Adâ—â— his primitive Holiness and Helps and Paradise and all the Creatureâ— 2. He so gave Christ to the World without desert and so far pardoned the first sin as that cometh to 3. He so far gave man the Covenant of Grace 4. He so gave all Christ's Miracles Resurrection Doctrine the Scripture c. 5. He so gave Apostles and Ministry to the World 6. He so sendeth the Gospel to some Nations and Persons above others 7. He so giveth to many the first special Grace as he did to Paul 8. He so giveth to many Kingdoms and Persons Wealth and Health and Strength and such other mercies above others 9. He so giveth greater measures of Grace to some than to others 10. And it seemeth that he so in part giveth the same Glory to some that came in but at the last hour of the day It is certain that all in quantum tale is from God only as a free Benefactor or as the Amor primus And the order of distributing it is two-fold Some antecedent to mans merit or acts and independent on it And this is no Reward though sometime it is an antecedent act of Justice such as is the making of a good Law or Promise And some consequent juxta morman legis And these are Rewards And though God hath assured us now that no man shall have Heaven but by rewarding Justice yet that may be because he thought meet to place man first on Earth in a life of trial and undetermined Liberty But that he hath no Angel that was made Immutable or that Christ was not made immutably holy let them say that can prove it for I cannot § 28. M. S. It 's like that the Angels that stood and they that fell had unequal help for unequal Effects are of an unequal Cause But Adam and the Devils had sufficient Grace and God forsook them not till they forsook him An. 1. This last I accept as true and more than some will grant 2. The first is above our reach only we can say both that God giveth more Grace to some than to others freely 3. And yet he himself is simple and immutable in causing of various and mutable Effects § 29. M. S. By Christs passive Obedience imputed we are pardoned and â—ustified and by his active imputed we deserve the Reward and are under Gods approving Will. An. 1. By the merit of his habitual active and passive that is of his performing all his mediatorial Covenant with the Father we are pardoned and justified and adopted to eternal life principally as a Reward to Christ not to us as meriting by him and subordinately according to Gospel-Justice or Order as a Reward to Believers for their Faith and Obedience by him who will Reward every man according to his Works and will be glorified in his Saints and admired in Believers because they believed 2 Thess 1. 6 to 12. We are under Gods approving Will principally as united to Christ reconciled justified adopted and subordinately as sanctified and obedient For the Father loveth us because we have loved Christ and believed Joh. 16. 27. And it is life eternal to know the Father and the Son Joh. 17. 3. And because we do those things that are pleasing in his sight what-ever we ask we receive 1 Joh. 3. 22. § 30. M. S. By Christs imputed suffering we are but where we were For the Law to have nothing against us will not justifie us unless it have something for us An. This great question needeth distincter handling Adam's Law doth not
If in any of these points men of less accurateness use not the same words take not therefore the old way of proclaiming them Hereticks till you have tryed how far they erre indeed Most of our lower Divines of all parties would be made Hereticks for want of Skill in the denominations allowable or not allowable by the Communication of idioms if the Schoolmens accurateness must be the test e. g. If the question were whether the Humanity be part of Christ or Christ be compounded of a Divine Nature and Humane c. â—â—â—â— would affirm it that mean well But saith Alliac Camerar 3. q. Neque persona neque natura divina est composita nec â—â—â—â— est compositus ex duabus naâ—â—â—is divina scilicet humana sive ex tribus rebus Corpore scilicet anima divinitate sed â—â—â—â— ex duabus secundum humanitatem scilicet corpore anima essentialiter ex infinitis partibus quantitativis integraliter â—â— non est concedendum quod humanitas sit Pars Christâ— Nam ficut homo non est compositus ex albidine substantia 〈…〉 est Compositus ex humanitate persona divina How many have gone for Hereticks for want of the Language of â—â—â—â— and the Schoolmen his Soul the deep sense of Gods displeasure with Sinners and of his â—â—â—â— of sin though no sence of Gods hatred to himself For it is conceiveable how Christ being the Lover and surety or Sponsor for Sinners and undertaking to suffer as a Sacrifice for their sins and in their stead might have on his own Soul the sorrowful sense of Gods hatred of sin and wrath against Sinners though not properly terminated on himself and so he bore the sorrow of our transgressions and was so far forsaken of God for that time and not further 52. The true Reason of the satisfactoriness of Christ's sufferings was that they were a most apt means for the demonstration of the Governing Justice Holiness Wisdom and Mercy of God by which God could attain the ends of the Law and Government better than by executing the Law on the world in its destruction as in general was before intimated 53. The measure of the satisfaction made by Christ was that it was a full salvo to Gods Justice and demonstration of it that he might give Pardon and Life to Sinners upon the new terms of the Covenant of Grace and give what he after gave 54. The matter of Christ's meritorious Righteousness was his perfect fulfilling the Law given him as Mediator or the performance of the Conditions of his mediatorial Covenant From which resulted the Merit so the Dueness of all the Benefits which God had promised in that Covenant as to Christ though mostly for men This was the Righteousness of Christ for man and hence arose his Merit for us 55. The matter of his Law of Redemption required of him was threefold 1. That he should by habitual and actual perfect Holiness fulfil the first Law of Nature or Innocency which Adam broke not just as it obliged Adam in every point but as it was common to man and belonged to Christ as Man 2. That he should fulfil all the Law of Moses given only to the Jews 3. That he should perform the great things peculiar to himself as Mediator which were to be a Sacrifice for Sin to do his Miracles to teach the Church as its Head to Rule it and to appoint Orders and Officers for it to rise again to conquer Satan Death and Sin c. 56. That Christ did not fulfil all the Law in our persons so as that we did it in and by himself and are thereby justified is further evident in that he did not all the Duties which the Law bound us to perform and for not doing of which we are truly Sinners He did not do any of the proper Offices of a Husband to a Wife or of a Wife to a Husband of a Father to Children of a Servant or a hired day-labourer to a Master of a Magistrate King Judge c. to Subjects of a Captain to Souldiers or Souldiers to their Captain of a Landlord to Tenants of such as have great riches towards the poor of the sick the imprisoned and abundance such like Besides the personal Laws given to Adam in the Garden to Noah to Abraham to David â—â—â—â—â—olomon the Prophets and such others Christ did not these same â—â—â—â— for us nor we fulfilled not these particular Laws in him 57. The Disputes whether it be Christ's Divine his habitual his active or his passive Righteousness that is made ours to our Justification seemeth to be but the Off-spring of the error of the undue sense of Christ's personating or representing us in his Righteousness And the parcelling out the uses and effects that one is imputed to us instead of habitual Righteousness another instead of actual and the third pardoneth our Sins is from the same false supposition It 's well that they suppose not that his Divine Righteousness is imputed to our deification But the case is plain 1. That Christ's whole Humane Righteousness habitual active and passive are meritorious for us not as being the very same things all which we should have done and suffered and had as if we had did and suffered them our selves by one that had did and suffered them in our persons in a Law-sense But as being the parts of that one Righteousness of Christ as Mediator which consisteth in the full performance of the Law of Redemption or of his own Covenant with his Father undertaken for our sakes Having been and done and suffered what he promised he is Righteous 2. And his Divine Righteousness by virtue of the hypostatical Union dignifieth his Humane to its meritorious value 58. By his Satisfaction or Sacrifice and this Merit Christ did procure all that Pardon Life and Benefits whatsoever that consequently are given us of God And so is the true meritorious cause of all 59. That Sacrifice and Obedience Righteousness and Merit which was directly given to God for man by performance of Christ's undertaking may yet be consequently said to be given unto man In that it was given to God for man and in that the Benefits merited are given to man and so relatively as to those Benefits the Sacrifice Obedience Righteousness and Merit may be said to be given us As the Ransom is given to the Captive which is given for him because the liberty purchased by it is given him Of which more after SECT IV. Of the New Covenant or the Law of Grace in the Second Edition 60. The New Covenant is Christs Law of Grace his Instrument by which he giveth Title or Right to the Benefits promised and conveyeth Right to the Fruits of his Sacrifice and Merits And his Law by which he governeth the Church as a Saviour in order to Recovery and Salvation It hath greatly scandalized the Papists against us to find some old Prâ—testants deny Christ to be a Law-Giver and
him or that iâ— any part of righteousness but it is all out of us in Christ and therefore they are as justifiable as any But Conscience will not let them believe it as they desire 185. It is arrogant folly to divide the praise of any good act between God and Man and to say God is to have so many parts and Man so many For the whole is due to God and yet some is due to Man For man holdeth his honour only in subordination to God and not dividedly in co-ordination And therefore all is due to God For that which is Mans is Gods because we have nothing but what we have received But he that arrogateth any of the honour due to God or Christ offendeth 186. If all had been taken from Gods honour which had been given to the Creature God would have made nothing or made nothing Good Heaven and Earth and all the World would derrogate from his honour and none of his Works should be praised And the better any man is the more he would dishonour God and the wickeder the lesâ— But he made all Good and is Glorious in the Glory and honourable in the honour of all And to justifie the holiness of his Servants is to justifie him 187. If these Teachers mean that no man hath any power freely to specifie the Acts of his own will by any other help of God besides necessitating predetermining premotion and so that every man doth all that he can do and no man can do more than he doth They dishonour God by denying him to be the Creator of that Free-power which is essential to man and which God himself accounteth it his honour to create And they feign God to damn and blame all that are damned and blamed for as great Impossibilities as if they were damned and blamed for not making a world or for not being Angels 188. Thus also such men teach that Christ strippeth a Christian of two things His Sins and his Righteousness Or that Two things must be That all that are saved have inherent Righteousness or Holiness none of us all deny nor yet that in tantum we are Righteous by it Nor that a man accused as being an Infidel Atheist Impenitent ungodly an Hypocrite c. must be justified by pleading all the contraries in himself or else perish And all agree that this inherent Righteousness is imperfect and in us found with sin and therefore that no man can be justified by it without pardon of sin nor at all against the charge of being a sinner and condemnable by the Law of Innocency And what remaineth then but to trouble the world with contending de nomine whether this imperfect Righteousness shall be called Righteousness and the giving of it called Justifying or making us righteous so far cast away for Christ Sins and Righteousness But they should speak better if they would not deceive nothing is to be cast away as evil but Sin Righteousness truly such is Good and never to be cast away If it be no Righteousness why do they falsly say that we must cast away our Righteousness To cast away a false conceit of Righteousness is not to cast away Righteousness but Sin only Indeed besides Sin we are said justly to cast away that which would be the Object and Matter of Sin And the phrase is fitlyer applyed to a thing Indifferent than to a thing necessary least it seduce There is nothing so Good which may not be made the object of Sin not Christ or his Righteousness or God himself excepted But we must not therefore say that we must cast away God or Christ because we must not thus objectively abuse them So Holiness and true Righteousness Inherent or imputed may be objects of sinful pride and boasting But it is not edifying Doctrine therefore to say that we must cast away Inherent and Imputed Righteousness But yet true self-denyal requireth that we deny our Righteousness Inherent or Imputed to be that which indeed it is not And so when men accounted the Jewish observations to be a Justifying Righteousness in competition with and in opposition to Christ Paul counteth it as loss and dung and nothing in that respect when yet elsewhere he saith I have lived in all good Conscience to this day And Christ himself fulfilled that Law and Righteousness So if a man will conceit that his common Grace will justifie him without Holiness or his Holiness without Pardon and the Righteousness of Christ he must deny this Righteousness that is he must deny it to be what it is not and must cast away not it but the false conceits of it And so if any Libertine will say that Christs Righteousness imputed to him will justifie him without faith or be instead of Holiness to him he must deny Imputed Righteousness thus to be what indeed it is not 189. When we tell them that If we had fulfilled all the Law reputatively More against the wrong sence of Imputation confuting many Sophisms by Christ as our Legal person we could not be bound to further obedience to it They answer that we are not bound to obey to the same ends as Chhist that is for Righteousness or Justification or merit but in Gratitude But this is but to give us the cause and ignorantly to destroy At quis unquam e nostris nos per justitiam Christi imputatam formaliter justificari asseruit Prideaux Lect. 5 de Just cap. 4. their own For 1. This is but to say that when a man is reputed to have fulfilled all the Law yet it is to be reputed unfulfilled as to certain ends As if he fulfilled all the Law that fulfilled it not to all due ends 2. Or as if the Law obliged one man to fulfill it twice over for the same lifes time once simply and in all its obligations and another time for other ends 3. Or as if the Law required any more than absolute perfection 4. Or that absolute perfection had not been in Christ's holy The Papists concur with them that feign a middle state between Just and privatively unjust viz. not just negatively so Brianson in 4. q. 8. Cor. 3. fol. 145. at large But they can give us no instance but in a stone or other incapable creature that is not obliged And we confess that if a man can be found that is not obliged to be Just he is neither just nor Privatively but Negatively unjust But what 's this to our case And the Papists commonly joyn with them that say that God remitteth not only the Reatum vel Obligationem ad poenam but also the Reatum culpae in se But when they come to open it they mean but that God is not displeased with or hath not a punishing Will against the Sinner As if they knew not that as Gods Love is our chief reward so his displeasure is our chief punishment And that Remission doth make no change in God but by taking away Guilt of Gods
may be called 1. A Receiving Cause 2. And a mediâ—â— or dispositive Cause of the effect Justification as Received but not as Given As I said Dr. Twisse chooseth to call it But this causa Dispositiva is pâ—â— of the causa Materialis viz. Qua disposita A cause or more properly a condition why I receive Justification and by receiving it am Justified which is their meaning who call it A Passive Instrument that is A â—â—ceiving Instrument 199. The plain easie truth is that Faiths Nature which is to be â—â—lieving Acceptance of Christ and Life offered on that Condition being â—â— very essence is but its Aptitude to the office it hath to our Justification by which the Question is answered why did God promise us Christ and Life â—â— the Condition of faith rather than another Because of the congruity of its Nature to that office But the formal Reason of its office as to our Justification is Its Being the performed Condition of the Covenant And if God had chosen another condition a condition it would have been Now the true notion in Law being a Condition Logicians would call this improperly a Receiving cause and more properly A Receptive Disposition of the matter reducing it to Physical notions But the most proper term is the plainest We are justified by that faith which is the Believing Practical Acceptance of God the Father Son and Holy Ghost as Given us on that condition in the Baptismal Covenant because or as it is made by God the condition of his Gift thereby Understand this plain doctrine and you have the plain truth 200. They that say contrarily that Faith justifieth proximately as it is an Instrument or a Receiving Accepting act and not as a Condition of the Covenant do evidently choose that which they vehemently oppose viz. that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere justifieth For the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere or the â—â—â—â— of Faith is to be an Acceptance of Christ given But if they will to avoid this say that By Faith they mean Christ believed in then they say that by Receiving Christ they mean not the receiving of him but Christ himself And why then do they not say so but trouble the world with such unintelligible phrases But to open the senselessness and coâ—sequents of that Doctrine would but offend All know that Chriâ—â—â—â— the object is connoted as essential to the act of Faith SECT XII How Repentance is joyned with Faith 201. Repentance is a Dispositio materiae recipientis too and a part of the condition of the Covenant And so far a Material or dispositive Receiving Cause But not an Acceptance of the Gift formally in its averting act 202. Faith and Repentance are words used in Scripture in divers significations Saith Malderus Gu. Amesius a parte recedit ab antiquo Calvinismo quiae requirit ad justitiam bonae operâ— tanquam conditionem praerequisitam quod â—tiam extendit ad ipsam â—lectionem See here how little the Papists understand us As Faith is sometimes taken for bare Assent as Jam. 2. and usually for Affiance or Trust and always when it denominateth a Christian or Justified Believer as such it essentially includeth all the three parts Assent Consent and Affiance but yet denominateth the whole by a word which principally signifieth One act which commonly is Affiance as including the other two so Repentance is sometime taken comprehensively for the whole Conversion of a Sinner to God the Father Son and Holy Ghost and so it includeth Faith in the narrower sence and is the same thing as Faith in the larger sence but express'd under another formal notion Sometimes it is taken more narrowly and that 1. As to the Act. 2. As to the Object 1. As to the Act and so the word Repentance signifieth only the Aversion of the Soul from evil by sorrow and change of mind And this is the strict formal notion of the word though usually it be taken more largely as including also the Conversion of the Soul to Good which is the usual Scripture and Theological sense though the word it self do chiefly signifie the Averting act 2. As to the Object 1. Repentance sometime signifieth the Turning of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God And so Repentance towards God is distinguished from Faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ 2. And sometimes it signifieth only the turning of the Soul and life from some particular Sin 203. Repentance as it is the turning of the Soul from sin and Idols * The Papists take Repentance it self to be part of the Remission of Sins And let the Reader note for the fuller opening of what I have said of their darkness thereabouts that Jansenius Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p. 126. maketh four things to be inseparably conteined in Remission though distinguishable 1. The Conversion of the Soul to God 2. The abstersion of the Macula or filth 3. Reconciliation or the remission of Gods offence 4. The relaxation of the aeternal punishment That all these are then at once given us we are all agreed But whether the name Remission or Pardon of sin â—e meet for them all we disagree Is it not visible then how unhappily we strive about words wheâ— we talk like men of several Languages But all is but removation and remitting the penalty of which Gods offense is the first part And Macula is either the sin it self or the relative consequents to God is the same with Faith in God in the large Covenant-sence and includeth Faith in God in the narrower sence Repentance as it is our Turning from Infidelity to Christianity is the same with Faith in Christ in the large Covenant-saving-sence and includeth Faith in Christ in the narrower sence as it is meer Assent Repentance as it is a Turning from the Flesh to the Holy Ghost as our Sanctifyer is the same thing as our Faith in the Holy Ghost in the large Covenant sence and includeth Faith in the Holy Ghost in the narrower sence But when they are the same thing the ratio nominis or formal notion is not the same As man's mind is not so happy as to conceive of all things that are one by one entire single Conception so we are not so happy in our language as to have words enough to express things entirely by one name but we must have several words to express our inadequate conceptions by And so that is called Repentance as the Souls motion from the Terminus a quo which is called sometimes Faith or Affiance and sometimes Love from the motion of the Soul to the Terminus ad quem though the Motus be the same But when Faith and Repentance are distinguished as several parts of the Condition of the new Covenant the common sence is that Repentance signifieth the Conversion of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God which is or includeth Faith in God And Faith signifieth specially Faith in Christ as the Mediator and way
efficaciter volens omnia seipsum alia quum Deo placcbit perdere ut impleatur Sancta voluntas Dei Quod etiam nulli creaturae nec ipsâ—sibi libero aliquo amore adhaeret in se in Deo propter Deum Quae volunt as multo est purior laudabilior quam volunt as perferendi pro Christo Martyrium pro spe assequendi vitam aeternam Et certe longe aliud est optare aut Velle quam sic Deum amare de facto sic affectum esse sic efficaciter velle sicut opto desidero efficax Velle Scientiae seu ad scientiam Sed ubi efficaciter id vellem manum ad aratrum mittens labori vigiliis id genus operis non parcerem Si ponatur per Revelationem certiorari non nego sic certum fieri posse Nec expedit hominem nisi valde sciens doct us fuerit de his multum se tentare quoniam difficilimum est proprias affectiones metiri But sure these fruits grow not on any common stock and the Heirs of Heaven and Hell are not so like as to be undiscernable nor Gods promises such as no man can be sure that he hath a right to them It is enough that these things do prove assurance difficult and rare SECT XX. What Repentance for particular Sins is necessary to pardon 292. But the very Act of Repentance hath such various degrees that those also here deserve our consideration For he that hath the habit of holiness no doubt hath some degree of Repentance secretly stirring in him before it cometh to deep repentance and open confession I do not think that David was without all remorse and repentance till Nathan spake to him though his Repentance was not such as the quality of his sin required And it is not every remorse nor every degree of Repentance which is sufficient to prove a Soul sanctified that is habitually possessed with that love of God and the hatred of Sin And such at least the act must be 293. In gross known Sin Repentance is not true unless it contain a Resolution presently to forsake it He that is unresolved though he have much remorse and trouble of mind is not truly penitent Nor he that is resolved only to forsake it sometime hereafter or when he hath sinned once more but not at the present 294. And as this is true of actual Repentance so a true Habit must be such as is the Habit of such acts even a habitual love to present holiness and a habitual hatred to present Sin which in the course of our lives doth actually resolve us and preserve us however a violent temptation do interrupt that course 295. But whether every known Sin of the smallest sort in it self have always such Resolutions of present forsaking it in all that are truly penitent is a harder question Many a godly man is frequently angry sinfully and sluggish sinfully and daily useth some idle words and ungoverned and idle thoughts and is sinfully remiss in the degrees of every duty and knoweth all this to be Sin And if he resolved presently to do so no more he would not do so again so frequently as he doth In such a case it is exceeding hard to judge of a man's repentance And yet When Petavius out of Aquin. Elench Ther. Vincent c. 29. p. 109 c. Distinguisheth Peccatum a Culpa and saith that all Sin is not Culpa it is but a trifling with an equivocal or analogical sence of Peccatum And his citation of Augustine there is upon a misinterpretation which the Reader may easily perceive alas whose case is it not we have a dislike of the Sin and a wish that we were delivered from it But that is but a desire that we loved it less and hated it more and proveth not that our hatred is sufficient For many a man that liveth in gross Sin doth wish that his heart were turned from it and did not love it when it is not so turned And why will the same wish then serve about lesser Sins And yet if present Resolution against every small Sin be necessary to pardon even of known Sins alas who is pardoned 296. And if the case must be resolved by the material magnitude or smallness of the Sin what bounds shall we ever be able to assign and what understanding is able to distinguish between the Sin so great which must be presently resolved against ex necessitate medii to pardon and the Sin so small as may be pardoned without such Resolution whether in speech every idle word be such If not whether every idle jeast or every lascivious word or passionate word or backbiting word the ordinary Sin of many strict Professors or every sinful Oath or Curse or Slander who can say it is this and not that And so in all commissions and omissions 297. And it will still remain exceeding difficult what Resolutions against Sin will prove true Repentance For as many a child under correction so many an adult Sinner on his Sick bed or under a terrifying Sermon or conviction not only seemeth but doubtless is as passionately resolved at the present to forsake his Sin as a Godly man is if not more and yet quickly loseth all that Resolution and liveth in the Sin which he resolved to forsake 298. By this it would seem that it is not true Resolution which causeth not the ordinary forsaking of the Sin For to Resolve to day and Sin to morrow is but to play with Sin and not to repent or mortifie it And yet if actual forsaking be necessary of All Sin who then is penitent or can be saved For there is no man that doth good and sinneth Jam. 3. 2. not And in many things we offend all Who leaveth all the idle thoughts and words and negligence c. which he knoweth to be Sin And the most understanding men then would be very hardly saved who know almost all Sin in comparison of the ignorant who know it not 299. And yet no doubt those Sins which are materially small may have such circumstances as may make them more malignant than some greater in the matter As when they are committed through malignant contrivances and ends or in gross contempt or negligence So that this also maketh the decision of the case more difficult 300. And it will be hard not only to know which and how great the Sins must be which are unpardoned if lived in without forsaking or without resolving to forsake them presently if known but also how great and what Sins unknown may stand with saving Grace For surely if men should ignorantly reproach or reject God or Christ or the Holy Ghost or live in Murder Adultery Perjury c. not knowing them to be Sins this would not stand with saving Grace And yet to live in some unknown Sin may 301. And it is as hard to know how oft a gross Sin may be committed in consistence with true habitual
d. 17. q. 1. â— 2. Gabr. ibid. Radâ— 2. p. Cont. 19. Suarez in 3. p. To. 4. Disp 9. Sect. 3. n. 8. all for this opinion And against it Aureol in 1. d. 1â— Ruard a. Sect. 5. That a man cannot be just sine Justitia inhaerente por potentiam Dei absolutam Pet. de Lorâ—a saith in 2. 2. q. 24. a. 12. d. 22. as the Protestants do that Peocatum Mortalâ— actuale meaning some one act of a heinous Sin may consist with Grace and the Habit of Charity but not the Habit of such a Sin that is in predominancy See Malderus opinion 1. 2. q. 113. a. 2. 8. p. 574 c. who saith that Dâ—us remitâ—endo offersam delet peccati maculam and that Macula is but the privation of Grace quatenus facit hominem Dâ—o gratum that is of Acceptability or Loveliness And accordingly he expoundeth the nature of Remission of Sin as I said before And Brianson in 4. q. 8. fol. 115. C. D. diligently enquiring what it is that remaineth after the Sin committed can find nothing but 1. The Habit or privation of a good habit 2. And the Guilt which he calleth Reatum culpae quae est qâ—â—dam obligatio ad poenam debitam illi culpae Illa n obligatio est quâ—dam Relatio realis non fundata super actum culpae sed super essentiam aâ—imâ— non nisi ut culpae actualis est praevia which is just the Protestant opinion who say that the Guilt is done away by forgiveness and the Habit by Renovation calling one Justification and the other Sanctification But we better distinguish Reatum câ—spae in sâ— Reatum pâ—â—ae sâ—u culpae ut ad poenam One is the Reality of my being a Sinner or one that did Sin This is never done away The other is the obligation to punishment for that Sin This is remitted and virtually containing all good actions and being the operation of the Spirit by which he is said to dwell in believers 306. 2. That this Rectitude or Holy Nature is first and radically active in our Complacency or Displicency Love or Hatred And that what a man Habitually loveth that his Will is habitually inclined to And against that which he habitually hateth 307. 3. That yet in acting this inclination worketh freely and always is specified by the conduct of the Intellect which must tell us what is Good and Evil Amiable and Hateful 308. 4. That Love and Hatred being practical Habits do ever engage the will in such Practical Resolutions as are answerable to their nature and degree 309. 5. That no Resolution will prove Holy Love and Inclination but that which is fixed as proceeding from a fixed principle which is like a new Nature in us 310. 6. That this Resolution is first de fine The Soul loving God and its own felicity in his eternal Love and Glory is first firmly Resolved to adhere to God and that felicity and to prosecute it to the last in all necessary means 311. 7. That next the Soul firmly resolved of the use of means in general is resolved also to choose and cleave to Jesus Christ as the Head and Summary of all means as the Physician is as to Physick And â—o resolveth to adhere to all the Essentials of Godliness and Christianity 312. 8. That all this is done by the Intellects discerning of those solid Reasons which prove to us the excellency necessity and possibility of all the foresaid ends and objects And he that knoweth not fixing and â—olding Reasons for his Resolutions cannot be expected to have fixed Resolutions 313. 9. That these general Inclinations Love and Resolutions for God for Means in general for Christ and all the Essentials of Godliness and Christianity are constant in the Godly and virtually contain a Love of and Resolution for every known duty and against every known Sin but not actually And these continue to shew themselves in adhering practically to these Objects and in the Practice of a Godly Life 314. 10. That therefore Sin as Sin is hateful to every true Christian and Godliness as such lovely And that in respect of this radical general Habit every true Christians love to God and Good is more than his averseness and his hatred to Sin more than his love or Inclination to the created Good for which it is loved For no man loveth Sin as Evil 315. 11. That the Inferior sort of Means and Good appear not always in their worth or necessity to the believer Besides his Ignorance the remnants of Concupiscence may pervert his Judgment so far as to doubt of some means whether they are absolutely necessary or at least mihi hic nunc And this failing of the Intellect may embolden the Will to some degrees of negligence even of known duties And so we may doubt of some Sins whether they are Sins and of others whether they are so great as to be inconsistent with Gods love and our Salvation and by that failing of the Intellect to be emboldened to commit them while yet we adhere to God and holiness in the main as such And so small Sins are ofter committed and with less reluctancy than greater because we think that their badness and danger is not so great And though at other times we be more sensible of both yet in the time of Temptation that apprehension may be altered For the mind of a Godly man is more mutable about the Means than about the End and about the smaller sort of Means and Sins than about the greater And when the opinion changeth not yet the practical judgment may change or when it is not turned it may be suspended Or truth may be apprehended with less quickening lively feeling and then it will not sufficiently work As a loud call doth suscitate us to action when a negligent whisper is neglected And upon some of these accounts known sins when small may more stand with Grace and be ofter committed and more dully repented of than greater 316. 12. And as we must distinguish of Sins as more or less dreadful and dangerous and of duty as more or less necessary at least in our apprehension so also of Sins which are more or less within the power of a willing mind to leave them Some Sins are such as that the forsaking of them requireth little more than a willing mind As to forsake lewd Company Taverns Play-houses Harlots Drunkenness Theft Oppression Persecution Perjury Deceit c. Meer will though instigated by lust committeth them And a will that is but truly bent against them may easily as to power cast them off Whoever committeth them doth it because he will do it And to live in the frequent committing of these is a greater sign of want of Holy habits or Grace than of others For there are other Sins which besides willingness require great power and care and labour to forsake them As to keep a just order in our Thoughts to keep them from vain objects to keep
is less than a good habit 10. That every man hath a moral proper power to do more good than he doth and forbear more evil 11. That every man is commanded to use some means in order to his salvation which he is morally able to use 12. That God useth to bear long with the abusers of their Power before he forsake them 13. That many have many perswasions and helps to use their power that abuse it 14. That it 's just with God to forsake such 1â— And great mercy to the elect not to be so forsaken All â—â—â—â— will be made cleareâ— in their due â—â—â—â— which I shall now here offer you § 2. AS for the five Articles I. The Article of Predestination II. And the Article of Redemption contain no difference between the parties but only as they relate to the Articles of Free-will and effectual Grace as is aforesaid For all must agree that God Decreed and Christ procured all that Grace or Mercy for men which he giveth them Of which the Conditional gift of the Love of the Father the Grace of the Son and the Communion of the Holy Spirit in the Covenant of Grace with a Commission to his Ministers freely to offer it to all Believing Consenters and to seal it and deliver it by Baptism is a great part And many mercies teachings perswasions and motions tending to draw them to Consent is another part God decreed not to deny men that which he giveth them and Christs Death procured them all that he giveth them To which add what elsewhere I have opened that there is no necessity of ascribing to God any Positive Decrees of Negations or nothings Else there must be a Decree against the existence of all the myriads of possible animals atomes names words c. And remember that to Permit is not-to hinder and so is a meer negation or a doing nothing and that not-to-give faith repentance grace the Gospel c. is a negation or a nothing and so need no Decree seeing a not-decreeing to give c. is sufficient so that the whole of the Controversie about these two Articles is clearly devolved to the Controversies of Grace and Free-will III. And concerning Free-will it cannot be denyed but that Natural Free-will is part of that excellency or Image of God by which man is differenced from bruits and that it is such a faculty by which man can in some instances determine his own will to this rather than that without Divine predetermination which is certain in the â—ase of sin yea and of some good For Adam's will could without any other grace than he had have forborn his sin Or else still all is but resolved into Gods meer will And it is agreed on as is said before that all men can do more good than they do and forbear more evil than they forbear and that without any more grace or help than they have when they use it not so that it is not abhorrent from the nature of Free-will for a man to make a good use or an ill of the same measure of grace at several times or for several men to make several uses of the same measure Therefore it is no unjust answer to the question Why did he forbear this sin to day and not yesterday or Why did this man forbear sin and not that supposing them to have the same measure of assisting grace to say Because this man at this time used that power which God had given him in stirring up his own will to concurt with grace and the other man or this at another time did not what he could Not that this answer is good in all cases where more grace is necessary to the effect but in this forementioned So that it is no Deifying of the will of a Rational free-Agent to say that it is essentially a self-determining faculty made by God in the Image of his Liberty and depending on him and not able to Act without him as the first Cause but yet on supposition of his Natural preservation and universal concurse and of his directions and Laws it is able to make choice hic nunc to will or not will to will this rather than that without Divine necessitating predetermination and without any more Grace or help than sometime it hath when it doth the contrary All which shewing the natural power of mans will and its liberty must be readily acknowledged by all sides that will not say that Adams first sin and every sin of all men else are all resolved into Gods causation in case of commissions and Gods non-causation in case of omissions and into Gods will in both and that man can no more do any thing but what he doth than he can be God or overcome God or live and act without God And as we must thus agree that natural Liberty consisteth in a self-determining power peculiar to Rational free agents so we are all agreed except the Pelagians that mans nature is vitiated by Original sin and therefore that the will which is naturally free from force and necessitation except from God who never necessitateth it to evil is yet in servitude to our own concupiscence and is not free either from the enticements of sense or the erroneous conduct of a blinded mind or from its own vicious habits averseness to God and holy things and proneness to things sensual and seeming good And therefore that this Holy or Moral Liberty of the will must have the Medicinal Grace of Christ to heal it of which next IV. And as to the Article of Effectual Grace it is agreed on and cannot I speak not of Grace as it is Gods favour but the effect â—e gratia data non de gratia dantâ— with sobriety be gainsayed without subverting the main doctrine of the Scriptures that whereas besides the Preparatory or Promeriting Grace of Christs own performance there is yet a three-fold Grace necessary for the application or conveyance of the Benefits purchased by Christ in the measure hereafter mentioned all this is common I. The first sort of Grace lyeth in the enacting of a new Law of Grace called also in several respects The new Testament the new Covenant and the Promise And as to this it is agreed 1. That God made this Law Covenant or promise in the first Edition with Adam and Eve after the fall Gen. 3. 15. the seed of the woman shall break the Serpents head and did by Actual Remission of their sin and not-punishing them as the first Law threatned yet more plainly manifest to them the pardoning Grace of this Covenant And that he made this new Law or Covenant to all mankind in and by them And that he again renewed the same Covenant of Grace with all mankind in Noah after the deluge Those few inconsiderate persons that deny this are not so valuable as to be an exception to our Concord It is an intolerable conceit of any to think that the tenour or sence of the
can do no more than this nor this but by the Power given him of God § 7. Vainly therefore do the Dominicans pretend that it is a Deifying of the Will of man to say that God can enable it to Cause the various ORDER of mans Actions by meer moral helps without Gods predetermining premotion to that order For this is to cause no Real being And he that is moved to the Act in genere needeth no more premotion from God to the disorder and sinfulness of the Act. § 8. And they that will call the production of faith a Creation in the strict and proper sense do not understand that Creatio est Rerum non ORDINIS rerum jam creatarum vel existentium An Act is of it self improperly said to be created in a pre-existent Agent That is not called created which is educed è potentia materiae nor that which is produced by the Potentia Activa prae-existentis forma Faith is an Act of the same Natural Power or faculty which we had before And Grace or rather Nature usually suscitateth that faculty to the Act as an Act in genere And Grace doth cause us to ORDER that act aright as to the due object and other circumstances But if any will call it a Creation I contend not about the name § 9. But the whole state of the Man Habitual Relative and Practical set together is called in Scripture a New Creature and the New Man tropically but not unfitly Partly because we are really new though not by another Humanity or Species of Natural Essence yet by many Accidents And partly because those Accidents are so great and make so great a change of our state as that they emulate a natural Essence and we use to say in common things that when an unlearned man is made learned and a poor man a Prince and a dying man healthful he is another man § 10. Though God be one and the same and Christ the same and the Law and Word and many Antecedent means the same to many on whom they have different effects This difference may be caused many wayes The Causes of difference As 1. By the diversity of other inferiour or concomitant second causes 2. By the diverse Disposition of the Receivers a common cause of varieties in the World 3. By the diversity of Impediments and temptations And many other wayes § 11. * * * I know that Bradwardine li. 2. c. 32. Cor. p. 612. saith that Deum non dare scientiam eratiam aut perseverantiam seu quodlibet munus suum creaturâ— capaci est causa quare ipsa non accipit non habet non è contra Et p. 614. Quicquid obex dicatur potest illa respâ—nsio corripi cum nullus possit hunc obicem tollere nisi Deus vel per Deum prius praetollentem si ipse cum voluerit tollere irresistibiliter tollitur Auferam cor lapideum c. The great question is How far the diversity of Receptive Dispositions is from God Answ 1. God made all equal at first in Adam 2. All were equal in sin by his fall 3. Cain and Abel differed from several causes and not one alone Abel differed from Cain in faith and obedience by Gods grace as the chief cause and his own will and agency as the second cause Cain differed from Abel by unbelief and sin by his own will and Satans temptations 4. The sins of later parents as of Cain Cham Esau Achan Gehezi c. make a further difference by depriving their posterity of some means helps or grace which else they had been equally capable of with others 5. It is certain that man hath much to do about his own heart by which he is to be the second cause of his own Receptive disposition and if he fail is the only cause of his indisposition § 12. Difference is but Dissimilitude And an alteration of one of the subjects which soever will make it dissimile or to differ from the other When the good Angels stood and the evil fell if you ask Who made the difference It was the Devils by forsaking their first estate Though Constitutively both their sin and the Angels obedience made the dissimilitude If you suppose Cain and Abel equally under grace at first and ask Who made the difference I answer Constitutively Cains sin and Abels righteousness maketh or is the difference But as to Reputative efficiency Cain made the difference by rejecting grace So if you should suppose two equally qualified with common grace and one of them to lose it the efficience of the difference is Imputable to him But if you suppose two equally lost in sin and one converted and not the other the Constitutive Causes of the difference are ones sin and the others repentance But the Imputable efficiency is Gods grace and mans repentance or will that is recovered § 13. But when Paul doth ask Who made thee to differ he meaneth Who gave thee that good by which thou differest and expoundeth it by What hast thou which thou hast not received And no doubt but all good is received from God And this would have held true if God had by equal operation done as much on the other which had been uneffectual by his indisposition or rejection § 14. Nature and Scripture perswade us that the same measure of help or influx is not enough to make one repent or believe which is enough to make another For the difference of souls and temptations and impediments plainly prove it The same strength will not move a Mountain which will move a Feather nor the same Teaching make an ignorant Sot to understand which serveth a prepared person § 15. Bodily aptitude or ineptitude do much to vary receptivities which are usually Gods punishments or rewards for Parents actions And oft-times for mens own Some by fornication gluttony drunkenness sports and idleness make themselves even next to Brutes § 16. But we have great Reason from Scripture to believe that though Gods Laws be equal and his Judgements where men do not make an inequality yet as a free Lord and Benefactor he dealeth not equally with all that are of equal merit Though he do no man wrong nor deny any what he promised in his Word but keep perfect Justice as a Governour yet he may do with his own as he list and he will be specially good to some though others see it with an evil eye § 17. Whether all that are elect have at first a greater measure of the Divine help and impress than any that are not converted no man can say of which more anon But certainly all the elect were fore-decreed by Gods will to that certain conversion which others were not so decreed to SECT VI. Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul § 1. THat which sticks in the minds of many is that God being Omnipotent all his operations must be equally unresistible and efficacious because none can conquer God But they must
permissor sed effector â—jus mali Prorsus invalida consequentia Apparet enim non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis N. B. Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non sit alicui conducibile Neque necessâ— est ut Deus sit author omnis boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati Nam certissimum est extra omnem controversiae alâ—am positum peccatum esse bonum in genere jucundi etiam in genere conducibilis potest enim peccatum nobis cedere in salutem Vind. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. p. 133. But whereas the Doctor upbraideth Arminius for confusion in not distinguishing the three sorts of Good in this controversie An â—â—li existentia bonum sit viz. the bonum honestum utile jucundum I must desire the Reader to avoid also the Doctors confusion and to be so much more accurate than he as to remember that this distinction is but de Bono Creaturae whose pleasure profit and honesty are distinguishable But that above these God Himself is the absolute and simple Good and that things are first Good as related to him the Prime and Ultimate Good And that the highest formal notion of Goodness in the â—creature is none of those three but the conformity of things to the Will of God the absolute Rule of Goodness And therefore when we ask An bonum sit ut sit malum we mean not an sit bonum hominis secundum quid but an sit bonum simpliciter viz. conforme Voluntati Divinae And if they can prove that Deus velit â—â—â—â— fieri we will confess it to be Good But 3. Yet I deny it to be bonum utile seeing it doth the sinner no good For Bonum jucundum in genere is not sin God would have men have more Pleasure than sin bringeth and not less But it is hoc minus jucundum sensibile preferred before hoc magis jucundum spirituale which is sin Now the prelation of a Less Pleasure to a Greater is no Pleasure So that sin is neither utile nor jucundum And the Doctor is quite out in calling â—ccasio a medium conducibile and confesseth that sin is no otherwise conducible to Gods Glory but as occasio Whereas occasio as such is no medium at all no more than possibilitas est ens unless you take Medium very largely Their chief argument is that the moral specification of an Action is an Entity and to say that any thing can cause any Entity without Gods first causing it is to deifie that creature making it a first cause Answ 1. The comparative Order of Actions as the terminating them on this object rather than that and at this time rather than that c. is but the modus modi entis and so is no proper entity 2. Or if the Name be the quarrell it is no other Entity than what God is Able to make a creature Able to cause without his predetermining Causality 3. This power is the excellency of the creature and the honour of its Creator § 5. As for their argument that there is no effect without a cause nor difference in effects without a difference in the causes and that an undetermined cause cannot produce a determinate effect I answer 1. God is the cause of all differences without any diversity in himself And he is the Free cause of all things necessary in the World 2. The soul is Gods Image 3. The Will when undetermined hath a self-determining power Therefore this is but petere principium 4. But there are many sub causes that are a reason of the determination As objects opportunity knowledge the removing of competitors c. § 6. Therefore Gibieufs Guil. Camerarius c. way of predetermination by the Causa finalis is nothing to our question that being no efficient but a Material objective or Moral Causation § 7. When they say that else God dependeth on the creature and is determined by it as to his Concurse I answer 1. How can Gods free upholding the power of a free agent be his dependence on it when it expresly speaketh its dependence on him without whom it cannot be nor act 2. No creature determineth Gods Immanent acts nor his transient as to the meer Impress and first effect and so not Gods Act at all unless Terminating be Determining It is only its own Act which the creature determineth which is a secondary effect of Gods act as proceeding from the second cause Gods Influx maketh all that Impress on the soul which God intendeth absolutely But whether by that Impress the sinner will consent the will determineth and is the chief determiner in Evil. § 8. Saith Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 2. Digres 9. The second cause non agit in primam c. Hoc faceret vel volendo vel aliâ—d agendo c. Answ It 's granted God is not passive nor doth any second cause act on him as passive Who is his Adversary in this § 9. He addeth Neither on the Influx of God do we act for an Act is not the subject of an act Answ 1. If by Gods Act and Influx he mean not the Effect on the soul it is a false supposition that Gods Influx or Act is any other than his Essence But if the said effect be meant I have shewed you that both Indisposition in the Recipient and a contrary Act may resist it § 10. Against our Passive determination of the effect he saith that God is denyed to act by physical action on mans will which if he did he would rather determine it than be determined by it because it cannot resist him c. Ans 1. The will doth not resist by reaction on and against God but by Indisposition and by its own not acting when it can c. 2. Who dare deny all Physical Action of God on mans will when it is quaedam natura 3. The will doth not Determine Gods will nor reject his Impress but only determine its own Act. 4. If God would act ad ultimum posse the will would never disobey or fail of the due effect § 11. He saith ib. Doth God move only to the Act in genere or also to this species of action The first cannot be said For Suarez Hurtado say that God determineth the Agent to this Individual act And the creature hath as much need of help to the species of motion which is perfecter than the genus as to the genus And Gods Influx is singular and not determined to Generical nature c. Answ Gods universal motion as the Suns doth necessarily make its Impress on the creature and giveth him sufficient help ex parte sui to Act yea necessarily continueth the soul in some Action And that Action is singular and not a non existent universal But it is only the General Nature of a singular Act which Gods Natural Influx necessarily causeth And the Moral species what need soever we
true that to know quid possibile is not to know it to be existent nor any more than to know what God e. g. can do and so to denominate Nothing quid possibile as relating to Power And so Ariminens saith Nothing may be Related But the like must be said of futurity And it holdeth equally of the species and de numero possibilium futurorum so that here we have confitentem reum about the dance and dream of notions and nothings which I have before shewed they beguile mens understandings with And hence also my former doctrine is confirmed of the non-necessity of a causal decree of Negatives or Nothings or of a Positive Volition of them § 10. The truth is an Act of mans soul is such a thing that de existentibus it's hard for any of their subtilties to make known the difference of species accidents or individuals ab objectis And to know what interruptions they must be that go to cut one Immanent act into two or hinder unity SECT XIII Of mans Power Natural and Moral § 1. I Have said so much of this also in the other parts of this Book that a little here may serve 1. Man hath no Power whatsoever but from God and therefore doth not act as a prime Cause properly because but by a derived power § 2. That which is a Power but hypothetically on Condition of something not existent especially not in our power it self is no power properly and univocally but equivocally only As to say I am able to leap to Heaven if God will Cause it I am able to lift a thousand pound with sufficient help which I have not I am able to see if I had light or to see a Phoenix if there were such a thing or I am able to will or move with Gods necessary predetermining premotion say some which I have not None of this is a true Power ad hoc But to constitute a formal Power it is necessary that I have all things without which I cannot do the act § 3. It is a contradiction to say that when a man hath the true Power to believe yet he cannot do the Act * * * As Jansenius and Dr. Twisse do in making more absolutely necessary to it without further premotion which is to say He that can believe cannot believe The Power connoteth the Possibile § 4. †††Potentia rationalis naturae humanae non potest minui extrinsicè entitativè per destructionem alicujus gradus ejusdem potentiae potest tamen minui per appositionem impedimenti quale est peccatum vel per inclinationem contrariam ad peccata quae inclinatio generatur per actus males Necesse est enim ex hoc quod aliquid inclinatur ad â—num contrariorum quod diminuatur inclinatio ejus ad aliud Cum ergo peccatum sit contrarium virtuti ex hoc ipso quod homo peccat diminuitur bonum naturae quod est inclinatio ad virtutem Alvarez de Aux li. 6. disp 45. p. â—10 Ita Thom. 1. 2. q. 85. ar 1. in corp The true Natural Power of Intellection and Volition every man hath as a man And when God Christ Heaven are brought to us with all the Conditions necessary to Objects of Intellect and Will we have formal power to understand and will them in this Natural sence What is necessary to the Being of an Object and Revelation I desire the Reader to see distinctly opened by me in a small tract called The Certainty of Christianity without Popery § 5. But the soul it self hath a vicious Indisposition to the spiritual exercise of these faculties or powers And this is the morbus facultatum And this Indisposition is called a Moral Impotency because the soul is unfitted by it to the exercise of its natural Power § 6. When this Indisposition is so great as that no man in that case doth do the act we say he is morally unable And when it is not so great but that under that Indisposition some men do the act in that state of help we say that such a man is morally able Therefore he that is yet more disposed is so More able and it hath various degrees § 7. But if a man have so great a disposition skill and will as that he is ready to the facile and frequent performance of the act that Promptitude is called a Habit and is more than a meer moral power though a power also § 8. It is certain that men can do more than they do not only that they could do more if God would predetermine them or give them more grace but that properly they can The worst hath Power to do more good and forbear more evil than he doth And so have the best § 9. Adam had true proper Power natural and Moral to have stood when he fell He sinned not for want of necessary Power to have forborn it § 10. They that deny this and resolve all sin into Gods unresistible necessitating operation or denying of power absolutely and antecedently necessary I think do make way for Hobbes his Theologie or subversion of Religion § 11. Moral Power and Impotency are primarily such in the will the first seat of morality and derivatively or secondarily in the Intellect and executive Power And therefore it is not originally and radically of physical necessity but Free as the will which is free is the Cause of it § 12. * * * Jansen de Grat. Christ l. 3. c. 15. denyeth that without effectual Grace men have a compleat power to the Acts but saith yet They have power 1. Remotissime in that they have free-will 2. By faith not joyned with Love as being the beginning c. 3. Yet more by Love as the root c. And he noteth a double Impotency Una est ex defeâ—tu alicujus quod non potest quantumlibet magna voluâ—tate vel fortiter volendo suppleri Talis est Impotentia illius qui caret rebus temporalibus ad largiendum c. This is natural Impotency De tali Impotentia verissimum est quod Dâ—us non jubet impossibilia Nam hoc ipso quo talis oritur impossibilitas vel praeceptum extinguitur vel certe ad illud implendum is cui praecipitur non amplius obligatus est Non est enim culpae Voluntatis quod non â—iat c. Altera ex defectu ipsius Voluntatis seâ— Volitionis oritur quae si adesset quanta adesse debet praeceptum facillimâ— impleretur Tantummodo enim fortiter volendo impletur Haec Impotentia nullo modo excusat cum qui non implâ—t quod praecipitur Posset enim implere si vellet Quod si nolâ—erit ideo non potuerit quis non cum dixerit pro ipsa tam perversa obdurataque voluntate culpandum Velâ—nt plenâ—que velint mox ut voluerint impleâ—untur si autem nolint ideoque non possint quis nolentibus vitio non vertat c Nam revera
returning Israelites 2. And especially that he would have such in the Christian Church as should be sanctified to him by his Spirit and have a new and tender â—eart And Predestination is well proved from the Text. But there is not a word to prove this to be the first Grace nor that Gods promise gave any man right to it but upon condition of believing For if Gods Decree Prophecy or general Promise saying absolutely I will do it did prove it to be the first Grace it would prove perserance such which is false The words prove no more but that God will do it § 7. And as this is no personal promise giving any man a right to the thing promised which he may claim but only foretelling what God will do or give to some so he hath other promises which are part of his Law of Grace and do give men Right to these same Benefits And so the Spirit of Sanctification and a new heart is promised on Condition of believing which therefore is the former special Grace § 8. If any therefore will prove that faith is given Absolutely they must not do it by those Texts which speak of Sanctification which faith is a condition of § 9. But as to the question it self Whether Faith be given absolutely or conditionally I answer 1. There is no absolute promise of faith made to any persons but only promissory predictions of some indeterminate unnamed persons that God will draw them and give them to Christ and they shall believe and live 2. All men have means and duty appointed them for the seeking of that Grace which may convert them 3. They are hereby bound to believe that if they so do they shall not lose their labour For God setteth men on no unprofitable work 4. Those that do this most faithfully and have most preparing grace are the likest to become believers and the ordinary receivers of special grace 5. Whether de nomine this encouragement shall be called a promise or equipollent let them contend that list 6. God can and doth suddenly convert some without such preparations or else give them both sorts of Grace immediately as once SECT XIX How God may be said to Cause the Acts of sin I Have said of this also so much before as that this Breviate here must serve It is ill said Profiteâ— mur incunctanter prorsus impeditum iri quod universi simpliciter Bonum est si impeditetur peccatum quoniam hâ—â— pactâ— impediretur patesactio Divinâ— misericordiâ— parcentis justitia vindicant is Quâ— quidem patesactio non minus universi Bonum censenda est quam qâ—â—libet alia câ—jusâ—ibet Del proprietatis in ipso tanquam in speculo relâ—cent is Twiss Vindic Grat. li. 1. p. 1. pag. 133. It is dangerous to talk so boldly of these mysteries Here seem to me many errors and confusions 1. It is false that God could not make known to the world that merciful nature which now pardoneth sin and that Justice which now punisheth if there had been no sin His Laws Promises and Threats do antecedently make them known And God could cause blessed Spirits to know all his perfections before there was any sin 2. Gods Holiness and Goodness is called Mercy and Justice by extrinsick denomination and connotation of sin and misery And if his Holiness and Goodness had been known as preventing all sin and misery men will think that he hath not proved that this had been Evil in the Universe or less Good 3. Posita Divina Volitione as the rule of Good it followeth I confess that it were evil not to have that will fulfilled But I deny that God willeth sin or its existence Therefore it is not Good because not Volitum à Deo It is sufficient that it is not so far evil as to be Absolutè Nolitum but only evil 1. As prohibitum 2. As hurtful to the sinner and to others Methinks they that maintain that sin is Privatio should not say that it is Positivè Volitum à Deo 4. All this dependeth on that curious question Could not God have made the World better than it is or at least as good with many alterations from what it is They that hold the first say that God freely made things no better than they are But had there been no Devils no Sin no Toads no disorder the world had been better that is a perfecter demonstration of Gods perfection But they that are more modest arâ— content with the latter and say that God freely made things as they are and not necessarily But it had been necessarily if no other way had been as good And that if God had pleased to shew his Goodness by preventing all sin it had been as Good and no loss or disparagement to the Universe 5. And he doth through all his Books beg the question Whether a meer occasion be a conducibâ—e medium and so good If he will stretch the word Medium so wide as to extend it to a meer evil sinâ— quo non or presupposed which hath not the least causality efficient material formal or final I will not strive for a word But conducibile noteth some kind and degree of Causality which sin hath not to the glorifying of God It is the destroying of sin that God is glorified by Where the malum amovendum is not the bonum conducibile but the ill state of the matter without which God had not glorified himself by this Act but by some other as well § 1. It must be well considered that God made mans Nature before he made any positive Laws for him And that the Law of Nature it self is in order of Nature after Nature though not in Time Man being first considerable as Man before he be considerable as obliged to duty And also that the Law both Natural and Positive is before mans obedience and sin So that as man is first in order of Nature Man and then Gods Governable Subject and then in order of Time obedient or disâ—bedient so God is first his Creator and then Naturâ— Motor and then his Governour by Legislation and then his Gracious Helper and lastly his Judge and Rewarder § 2. Therefore as Natural Being substance and faculties and Natural Motion are antecedent to Morality so Gods causation of both these is antecedent and therefore to be Creator Preserver and Motor is not to be the Cause of sin or of Virtuous acts as such § 3. God as Creator was not pleased to make all his creatures of one kind nor of one degree of excellence but in such variety as is wonderful to our observation Besides the innumerable species of beings and the innumerable parts of every compound being the dissimilitude of indviduals of the same species is admirable so that no two faces are perfectly like no nor no two Stones in the Street no two Trees Birds Beasts c. And therefore it is but consonant to the rest of his works that MAN is neither perfectly like
cause Moral Good and hinder Moral Evil and by which as our Lover and End he will draw mans soul to himself in Love § 20. God as Rector though he vary his Laws in some things to several ages and places and promulgate the same Gospel with inequality on several accounts yet according to the respective Laws that they are under dealeth with all men in a certain equality which is called Justice that is His Laws antecedently to mans acts make not difference and as Judge he maketh none but what mans different actions require according to the said Laws and Justice But yet as Owner and as Benefactor he is free not against but above his Laws to make many inequalities which are no injustice they being not acts of formal Government and so he may do with his own as he list And thus though God give all their due according to his Law of Grace yet he giveth to his Elect such proportions of Grace as he gave them no antecedent Right to by his Law or at least to many of them passing by the controversie now whether he do so to them all § 21. God could cure and sanctifie all men if it were his Absolute will but he doth not and will not being no way obliged And he will be no loser nor sufferer by the creatures sin § 22. Gods absolute will is as fully accomplished by mans free acts as if they were all necessitated and Natural And mans actions are as free as if God had made no Absolute Decree of their futurity as in Good he hath done if we may so ascribe futurity to his Decrees § 23. It seemeth that all sin beginneth in the wills omission of what it was able to have done Even when Adams appetite was to the forbidden fruit and some think that this was the first part of the sin it seemeth that it was rather in the Wills not restraining that appetite when it could have done it And then positive sins do follow thereupon § 24. There is more Brutishness in sin and consequently more privative and less positive faultiness of the Reason and Will than many do consider which Paul partly meaneth Rom. 7. For it is certain 1. That a passion e. g. anger or fear may be forced on a man suddenly as â—n a Brute without Reason As if you come behind one and affright him or strike him suddenly no Reason raised that passion and consequently no Rational Will 2. It is certain that this passion without Reason can cause despotically a corporal motion as the fearful will start and run and the angry strike without any reason or rational will but as a Beast doth 3. It is certain that it is the office of the Will to Rule this passion and these motions 4. And that it must have due information from the understanding that so to do is good and best 5. If this information of the understanding did never miss of determining the Will then man would never sin but when the understanding failed of its necessary office before the will which would resolve all sin into the will of God as much as if he directly moved the will to it by necessitating unresistible predetermination For the Intellect as such hath no Liberty but is necessitated by objects further than it is under the Empire of the Will And the Objects and Intellect are made by God 6. Therefore it followeth that there is a certain measure of Intellecâ—â—â—l true apprehension according to which the will can excite and determine it self without â—â—y thing which it hath not and yet can forbear And that this not-willing what and when it should is the beginning of all sin § 25. God is no Efficient or Desicient cause of this first Omission of the will For efficient it hath none And deficient God is not who gave man power to have done it But man is the deficient Cause § 26. Man 's not believing not knowing not loving not obeying not desiring trusting fearing c. being the far greatest part of the sins of his life * * * Which made the worthy Bishop Usher dye with these words as his last But Lord in special forgive my â—â—â— of omission we see by this are not at all of God § 27. Though multitudes of positive Acts of sin do follow such omissions and go before some of them yet they being not sinful as Acts but as Disordered against the Rule and End and upon undue objects and especially comparatively preserring the wrong object before the right it seemeth that in their first instances they are all Omissive and Positive in the second only which maketh the Schoolmen so commonly say that sin is a Privation § 28. Yet the Moral formal Relation of sin is not only Privative but a Positive Disobedience or Disconformity And so as Quid Morale formaliter sin hath as much Relative being as Duty hath viz. 1. As contra Legem significantem 2. Contra Voluntatem Dei significatam 3. Et contra Jâ—â— Divini Dominii Imperii Amoris § 29. If any be unsatisfied in this it is certain that in the Velle hoc prohibitum potius quam hoc imperatâ—m there is no more physical entity than in the Velle imperatum no nor than there is in the Velle indefinitely considered as on any object Or if any deny that it is certain that there is no such addition of Entity it being but ordo modi in any such sinful Act from which as such the formal obliquity or sin resulteth but what man can do and doth without Gods causing the Act as so ordered and terminated So that God is no way the cause of formal sin § 30. †††Bradwardiâ— dealeth more plainly and maketh Gods effectual Volition to be the total immediate cause that man sinneth though it be no sin in God to do so and saith that God willeth it for good uses as the sinner doth or if he do not it is because God maketh him unavoidably do otherwise They that say He causeth all that man causeth and that as the first necesâ—itating or insuperable cause but yet is not the cause of the form of sin contradict themselves seeing that form is but a Relation which resulteth ipso facto from its fundamentam and terminus and nè per divinam potentiam cannot but do so And hath no other cause but what causeth them § 31. And they that say that yet God is not the Author of sin because he is under no Law do but sport with dreadful things And they mean that God is the chief Cause of all mens sins in the world but not of any sin of his own which is none of the question § 32. God doth neither Cause the sin nor the futurity or existence of it as some vainly distinguishing maintain especially Dr. Twisse and Rutherford For as Estius and others truly say to cause the sin is nothing but to cause the existence of it And sin as sin Dr. Twisse often
10. And 1. It is evident that the Reatus culpae is either the sin it self or its inseparable effect He that hath once sinned is Related to God as a sinner And an infamous Relation such as of a Rebel a Rogue a Murderer c. is no small evil in all sound mens esteem § 11. 2. Sin is the Deformity disorder and disease of the soul and its Habits are a kind of Vicious Nature It is the Nature of Devils to be exceeding malignant rebellious and at enmity with God and spiritual Goodness To have a Nature or Disposition which is averse to that which should be its own end delight and happiness And a wise man would rather be annihilated than turned into a Toad a Snake or Adder though their nature be not offensive to themselves How much more would he rather be annihilated than become a Devil Wicked men are liker to Devils than they are aware of They Love not God and Holiness nay they have a malignant enmity to him which maketh them so averse to all that is Holy in their lives and to be such persecutors and haters of good men So that the Scripture calleth their wisdom Devilish yea and themselves flat Devils in plain words and the Children of the Devil Jam. 3. 15. Joh. 8. 44. Joh. 6. 70. One of you is a Devil And 13. 2. Act. 13. 10. Thou Child of the Devil and enemy of all righteousness 1 Joh. 3. 8 10. He that commits sin is of the Devil Therefore they are adjudged to suffer with the Devil and his Angels as the Saints shall be equal with the Angels of God For the truth is a Saint and an Angel and a wicked man and a Devil do differ less than is commonly thought on Now what sober man would not rather be Nothing than be a Devil To have a venemous malignant malicious restless rebellious nature at enmity to Good and in love with evil And who is it that maketh men to be such Not God but themselves 1. Is it not a great calamity to be mad Wicked men are far worse and they made themselves such 2. Were it not a great misery to have a nature that had no Love to or delight in health cleanliness dwelling food friends c. but hated all of them and set against them How much more to have such an enmity to God and holiness and our own salvation 3. Were it not a misery to have a nature distrustful of all our truest I eg Bradwardine l. 1. c. 1. cor 31. contra effraenes dlcentes omnia bonis malis aequaliter evâ—nire malum aliquod impunitum vel bonum aliquod irremuneratum manere fingentes quoque divinae pietati misericordiae infinitae nusquam congruere punire quodcunque delictum sed totum semper dimittere misericorditer impunitum Nonne inquit omnis peccans to ipso fit malus culpabilis vel pejor c. amittitque pristinam libertatem innocentiam fit Dâ—o dissimilior remotior ab â—o nonne hoc est poena poena quam magna unde hoc nisi à prima justitia à primo retributore omnium qui est Deâ—s See also his Corol. 38 39. Lege Jansen August de stat pur nat l. 3. c. 2. p. 358. Quod peccatum non potest non puniri à Deo c. 3. Quaenam sint illae poenae quae tam arctè cum peccato cohaerent Et c. 4. Quod peccator in peccato manens non potest beatus fieri Ubi itiam Augustini sensum de hisce videre est friends afraid of poison in all that we eat and drink and still thinking that our own parents seek our death How much more to have a distrustfulness of God 4. Were it not a misery to be deceived with a thousand errours and to take evil for good and good for evil and to spend ones dayes in bewildring perplexities or falâ—e conceits How much more to be mistaken about God and things of greatest excellency and consequence 5. Were it not a misery to have a Will that is perversely set against the wills of all our Governours and dearest friends That must needs have and do whatsoever is forbidden us by the greatest wisest and best of men How much more to have a Will that is thus set against the will of God 6. It is a misery to have a violent Appetite after that which cannot be had or cannot satisfie To have vehement hunger and thirst without meat or drink c. Wicked men have such a diseased appetite after things that God told them would neither be satisfactory nor continuing All this and more is in sin it self in the Habits or Nature which God never made § 12. The exercise of this diseased vitiated Inclination is an actual torment As it is more Joyful to use Grace than meerly to Have it so is it as to sin more calamitous And 1. Mens wilful blindness and neglect of God depriveth them of all the excellency and delights of holy knowledge 2. Their Disaffection and malignity depriveth them of all that holy Joy and unvaluable sweetness which cometh in by the exercise of the Love of God And of all the pleasures of a holy life As a sick stomach doth loath a feast and a malicious man hath not the pleasures of friendship so how can that soul delight in God that Loveth him not 3. Unbelief and distrust deprive the soul of all that quietness and content which followeth faith and confidence in God 4. A Rebellious will doth lose all that Rest which the obedient find in pleasing God and in his blessed will 5. Luxury and carnality and all sin deprive the soul of the pleasures of temperance chastity innocency and a good and quiet conscience 6. Wickedness and sloth deprive the soul of the pleasure of doing good to others by works of charity which is very great Abundance such privations are in sin § 13. And sin it self brings the contrary torments 1. Sinful malignity against God and Good men maketh the wicked eat their flesh as it were with envy and vex themselves with persecution and revenge 2. Sinful anger is a sinners rage and pain And though he have pleasure in revenge it is a painful pleasure like a troublesome itch 3. Self-willedness maketh a man continual vexation and disappointment while he must needs have that which he cannot have or which will torment him when he hath it 4. Carnal Love is the root of misery while it Tantalizeth the soul or longeth for its own vexation 5. Sinful fear is a tormenting distraction 6. Sinful grief is a continual sickness and self-vexation 7. Sinful Desires engage men in self-afflicting labours 8. Sinful cares are as thorns in a mans heart 9. Sinful Impatience and discontent is torment it self 10. Sinful confused unruly thoughts are the annoyance and the shame of the soul And all these are mens own sins not Caused by God but by themselves § 14. Next Sin it self there
charge them not to say all the words which I here lay down but only that the reason why I my self do above all others shun their principles is because I take this following to be the true sense and complexion of them which I must also believe if I do believe them And I suppose the Reader to be acquainted with their own words and to have their Books at hand * * * At least that he have read Bradwardine and Alvarez and Dr. Twisse and Rutherford de Prov. Better saith Joh. Racon in 1. sent d 40. art 2. Deâ—s aliqua futura non vult vâ—lie efficaci sed soluâ— permissive respectu sic productorum voluntas divina est Causa per Generalem trâ—buens agenti particularâ— facultatem agendt sic vel sit non tamen determinat agens ad aliquam neque efficienter vult banc vel illam istâ— modo Voluntas divina est causa actuum nostrorum quantumcunque deformium Talium actuum est causa determinans Voluntas humana praesuppositâ influentiâ generali Del Unde ideo pecco quia volâ— pèccáre ità quod actus voluntatis mâ—ae est jam determinans me ad peccandum And Gab. Biel post Scotum Ità est caâ—sa effectiva rectitâ—dinis quod quantum est de se daret illam actâ—â— sâ— voluntas cooperaretur Universaliter enim quicquid Dâ—us dedit antecedenter daret etâ—am consequenter qâ—antum est ex sâ— si non esset impedimentum Vcluntas autem quantum est ex sâ— non dat rectitudinem actul Gal. in 2. d. 37. a. 3. q. 1. dub 1. Ità Okam in 1. d. 46. 38. ferâ— iisdem verbiâ— Orbellis m. 2. d. 37. ita Fr. Mayro 1. d. 37. q. 1. ad 4. q. 2. ad 4. q. 3. concl 4. Greg. Arim. 2. d. 37. q. 1. a. 3. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 12. alil quamplurimi â— Bradwardine l. 1. c. 34. p. 300 301 c. speaketh too plainly to this purpose with Hugâ— 1. de Sacâ— 4. part 1â— being more careful to make people think well of his Deus vult malum than to deny it Non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur sâ—d quia quod bâ—ne dicitur non recte iâ—telligitur And his mollification is that God willeth sin only secundum quid for Gods Velle simplicâ—ter as it 's commonly taken is to Love and approve it as good and to reward it And because the Vulgar so take it we must not before them say that God wiâ—â— leth sin because they too much abhorr it No act is unjust simply but all just and all the consequents of it just in respect of God the Author Therefore simply in the Universe there is no sin or deordination God willeth sin as a Physicion doth poyson in his medicine for the exercise of the good the punishment of the evil the contemplation of the beauty of the world He is not the author of evil as he is of good for of that he is the sole giver of faith charity c. creating it And God constraineth not men to sin against their wills nor doth he cause it unjustly and culpably c. Is not this meer Hobbs 1. Doth God will any thing but good Is not sin good then if he will it 2. Is Gods not Rewarding it a not willing it What if he rewarded not men for loving him You feign God to will and cause all sin and then damn men for it and then prove that he is not culpable or did not properly will it because he damned men for it 3. Do you not make God as much the cause of evil habits and acts as of good when you make him the total cause of all that is in them 4. Do you not say that the sinner doth evil for good ends and not for evil as well as God 5. Is not man an agent in Loving God as well as in hating him 6. Is it any better to make a man sinful and miserable by making him willing than to make him so by force against his will Nay could a man be made a sinner by force without making him willing Is it not a contradiction 7. Why call you it poyson which God maketh a medicine of You mean not that there is any evil in it which God caused not as you say more immediately than man and so that God first made it poyson and then put it into his medicine 8. And why are you afraid of speaking your opinion to the world Is it not because you are conscious that you speak against the common principles of nature in which the vulgar are founder than your self 9. And much of this is because you cannot tell how God punisheth sin with sin unless he cause sin What if by the Law of nature in Creation he ordain that he that is a glutton shall be sick and that Arsenick shall corrode his bowels that eateth it c. and drinking too much Wine shall breed the Gout c. Doth he therefore cause men to eat and drink too much or is not the excess from them and yet the penal relation and consequents from God And suitably to all this he defineth Grace and Free-will viz. Grace effectual without which no one sin can be avoided is Gods will that it shall be done And so no man can any more do any thing than what he doth than he can make a world And free-will li. 2. c. 1. is Potentia rationalis rationaliter judicandi voluntarit exeâ—quendi so that to will and freely to will is all one And so man is moved to every sin by necessitating premotion to do it freely that is he is made willing that is sinful So c. 32. In omni nonactione Deo creaturae communi prius naturaliter est Deum non-agere quam ipsam quia Deus certam actionem per creaturam non agit ideo creatura illam non agit non è contra So that all omissions of faith repentance obedience c. are fully resolved into Gods first non-agency p. 611. Quis nesciat quod quia Deus non fecit unum Angelum aliam Stellam coelum majus ideo non facta sunt Ità quioquid non fit à causa secunda Deus vult non fieri non vult positivé Scilicet habet nollâ— illud fieri ab ta Prius ergo naturaliter causaliter est Deum nolle positive quare non vâ—lle non facere causam secundam agere quam ipsam non agere This is plain dealing All men that Love not God and all that hate him are such because God will have it so and make them do as they do It would save many tedious volumes and intricate disputes if all would speak as plainly But what is the Christian Religion then I. Their fundamental Principle is that It is naturally Impossible for any agent Natural or free to do any act or vary any comparatively or
Holiness in all that have sin and not holiness and in the Godly so far as they sin because that it shall be so is more yea only willed by God and caused by his predetermination XXXVII Q. Whether this doctrine tend not to utter Infidelity as to the Christian faith by making it seem to men incredible Is it credible that God sent his Son so wonderfully to expiate those sins which he so loved and caused as aforesaid and to save his people from their sins which God thus unavoiâ—ably moved them to commit and to destroy the works of God under the name of destroying the works of the Devil Must Christ suffer bleed die and bear Gods wrath for that which God unavoidably made man do by his principal determination And is it easie for him that believeth one of these to believe the other XXXVIII Q. How will men preach and hear the Gospel if they do it in congruity with this doctrine Will they say God sent us to beseech and charge you not to do that sinful act which you cannot do unless he make you do it by predetermination and which you cannot avoid if he so make you do it He beseecheth and importuneth you to do all those commanded acts which you can no more do than make a world unless he predetermine you to do them nor can forbear them if he do XXXIX Q. How will men Repent confess resist temptations pray and use the means of Grace if they believe that all sinful acts in the world are thus unavoidably Caused and Willed and Loved of God as good for his Glory XL. Q. Whether they that teach as Dr. Twisse often that sin is not malum Dei sed nostri do not take it to be no injury to God nor displeasing to his will Or is not injury and displeasing evil in respect to God as the terminus though it be no hâ—rt to him nor his evil as the subject or agent And doth not the opinion that it 's Evil only to us and Good to God as conducible to his glory teach men to hate it only out of self-love and not out of love to the glory of God yea to Love it as conducible to Gods Glory more than to hate it as evil to our selves seeing Gods Glory must be preferred above our selves XLI Q. Is not sin thus made a coequal with Christ who is but a means to the glorifying of God to which faith Dr. Twisse sin is summè conductbile XLII Q. Doth not this doctrine make the sanctification of the Holy Ghost to be unnecessary when all that is to be done to save us from sin is for God not to make us sin by his premotion Or doth it not make sanctification to be nothing but this predetermination of God which is made as necessary to sin as to duty and so natural and gracious operations made the same and God to do as much to produce evil efficiently as good XLIII Q. Is it not much worse to man if God by predetermination make him first a sinner and wicked by sinful Habits and then damn him for it than if he should damn an innocent man for nothing For sin and pain is far worse than pain without sin And to compel the will unwillingly to sin were it possible is less than to make it willing XLIV Doth not he that affirmeth that the Devil doth but sin as efficiently predetermined by God and doth not force nor determine any mans will to any sinful act but that God predetermineth all men and Devils to every sinful act committed I say doth he not describe God as worse than Satan horresco quaerens if sin be the denominating evil and the causing of sin be more than tempting to it Had I not rather my will were resistibly tempted to sin than unresistibly made to sin by predetermining efficient premotion XLV Is not the objective Reason in Devils of mans implanted Enmity against them Gen. 3. 15. because they are Enemies to God and us as being themselves Lovers of sin and Tempters of us to sin and misery XLVI Doth not he take the directest course to root out the Love of God and all Religion from the World and to tempt men to hate God and so to begin a Hell on Earth who describeth God in Satans likeness and much worse as much as being the principal cause of all sin in men and Devils is worse than sinning when predetermined and tempting others to it XLVII I think that the Dominican Predetermination directly and necessarily overthroweth all certainty of Divine Revelation by man or Angel and consequently all certainty of the Christian faith even by overthrowing the very formal object the Divine Veracity For if God efficiently premove and predetermine all wills and tongues and pens to all the lies that ever are made in the world then 1. To do so is not inconsistent with his perfections or his will 2. And then we can never know when he doth not so unless by the event This is grounded on these suppositions 1. That Gods revelations to us are not Immediate only by himself but by some Creature Angel or Man or a created voice or sign 2. That the Ratio certitudinis of such Revelations by a Creature is because it is God that is the chief author of them 3. That it is not conceiveable how God can by any way of Revelation be more the author of it than by physical efficient immediate adequate predetermining both will and tongue to the act with all its circumstances Call it by what name you please Inspiration Vision Illumination Impulse c. it can speak nothing more of Gods Agent efficient Interest than this predetermination doth 4. If it did do more yet it would overthrow all certainty of our faith Because if God can efficiently cause and that as the total principal cause by predetermination all the lies that ever were told in the world we can never be sure that the other mode of his operation so far differeth from this as that he cannot be the chief cause of a lie in this way as well as of all lies by predetermination I have driven many to say their utmost and could never yet hear any such difference assigned as could prove any Inspiration whatsoever to have more of Divine Causality in it than physical predetermination doth signifie and import nor how this principle leaveth us any certainty that the tongues of all the Prophets and Apostles were not predetermined to speak falsly ab antecedente and so their pens XLVIII To say that God is not able to make a Creature with power to determine any one Volition of its own even as modified comparate or circumstantiate without his efficient physical predetermination aforesaid sayeth more against Gods Omnipotency though on pretence of a contradiction than I dare say or think XLIX Yet after all this I grant that if all proper free will and contingency be denyed and every act in the world as comparate and circumstantiate made
And who it is that erreth indeed the Light must discover and the studious impartial prepared Children of the Light must discern and the Father of Lights must finally judge Note that in the first part I speak as in the name of the Predeterminants till I come to the Questions and thence-forward I speak as in my own name which the Reader may easily perceive §. VII Of Jansenius his way of reconciling Grace and Free-will § 1. BUt after all these cometh Jansenius and justly blaming Philosophy as the great occasion of our heresies and errours which misled the Schoolmen Jesuites and others he goeth to Augustine alone as Lombard thought he had well done before him and disgraceth his cause by saying that Augustine first taught it to the Church as if Grace had been unknown by the former ages And because many will not be at the labour to know his mind by reading so big a volume I shall briefly select what concerneth the matter in hand and animadvert upon it 1. His first Tome describeth the Heresie of Pelagius wherein he proveth that Pelagius held all this that followeth concerning grace 1. The Remission of sins containing 1. Conversion to God 2. The abstersion of the blot and filth 3. Reconciliation or remission of Gods offence 4. And of the eternal punishment Jansenius Aug. To. 1. l. 5. c. 22. p. 126 127. 2. That Pelagius owned the Infusion of habitual grace And that God in Baptism did blot out all sins purge cleanse and expiate them save and renew the soul restore nature deliver from the body of this death and from the contracted custome of sinning He held that Grace doth Regenerate Illuminate cause Faith Justifie even Infants Sanctifie make us new Creatures incorporate us into Christ as his members give us the anointing of the Holy Ghost not only restoring us to the state that we were in in Adam but to a better and to be adopted sons of God and saved cap. 24. And 25. as to the Relative effects that Grace Reconcileth man to God maketh him an adopted Son of God and the Temple of the Holy Ghost an Heir of God and co-heir with Christ So that they acknowledge not only Habitual Infused Grace but more even in Baptism As also the Assisting motions of the spirit to good acts making them possible Also that after Pope Zozymus had condemned the Pelagians they went further and that their design was but to lay mens salvation or damnation on free-will lib. 6. c. 7. c. And when he cometh to characterize Pelagius he doth it as he doth elsewhere the Protestants and as Malignants do Religious persons by presumptions viz. that he was indeed as Augustine saith Temperate and of a good life but singular and very proud which he proveth by his opinion and because he was against Swearing and said that Gods servants mouths should vent no bitter thing but only that which is sweet and that Christians must be so patient as readily to let go what is taken from them and that gallantry and gay cloathing is contrary to God and that enemies must be loved as friends and yet not believed and that Riches must be forsaken c. as holding nothing mean and moderate that he affected novelty and yet his â—rrours were old coming from Origen â—uffinus Palladius Evagrius Jovinâ—an and the Philosophers that he affected fame admiration hypocrisie pretending to more holiness than others under the garb of poverty c. over-â—alued Reason Logick Syllogismes Philosophers c. All which I mention not to abate any mans dislike of any one errour of Pelagius but to shew that it is so usual for dissenters to make one another seem odious and to feign or aggravate faults and to vilifie or deny Gods grace in others that he that would not be tempted into malice uncharitableness and slander must take heed what he believeth even of men accounted most abominable hereticks Doubtless Pelagius his denying original sin and his laying too much on mans will and too little on grace are things to be detested II. Jansenius asserteth that the Angels and Adam had such Free-will as could obey or disobey and so could determine it self to good and persevere therein without any more grace than they had when they did it not And that by this Free-will some Angels stood and some fell and Adam fell when he might by it have stood and thereby fell from a nobler sort of Free-will which consisteth in a due subservience to God and fell to the Love of Himself not primarily of external things instead of God and to selfdependency and dominion De Grat. primi hom c. 6. p. 40 41 42. c. 7. Nos hic asserimus tanquam sine dubitatione verissimum juxta doctrinam sancti Augustini ecclesiae omnia hujusmodi opera adeoque ipsam fidem dilectionem Dei ab eo potuisse per arbitrii libertatem fieri sic ut ea non donaret ei gratia Dei vid. c. 7 8 c. The reason of this was sanitas Voluntatis Adami c. 9. III. Yet Grace was necessary to man and Angels both to perseverance and to every good act c. 10 11. And c. 12 13 c. this Grace necessary to all was not Habitual Grace for that they had nor general concurse which none denyed but it was Actual Adjuvant Roborating help But the Grace given to Angels and Adam was Adjutorium sine quo non giving the will power to determine it self but not Adjutorium quo which ever determineth it One giveth the Power and the other the Act. The same that is meant by the common distinction of Grace sufficient and effectual by the Dominicans Yet this Adjutorium sine quo non did with free will procure the Act in the standing Angels and Adam while he stood But that made it not Adjutorium quo because it is not so called efficax only ab eventu but because it so helpeth that illo praesente continuo fiat id propter quod datur illo absente nunquam fiat p. 63. c. 14 15. One is like Light and the visive faculty ad videndum the other ut ipsa visio such as all formal causes are and Gods simultaneous efficiency The difference is c. 15. that Adjutorium sine quo non doth but perfect the power and the chief honour belongeth to the will that useth it and could choose But contrarily the adjutorium quo is the principal cause of the Act and leaveth not the event to the will but useth it effectually to the act intended Therefore merit and perseverance in Innocency were no special gifts of God IV. That without or before faith no good work is done but lies and sins l. 3 4. c. 1. p. 223. no nor without true Godliness p. 261. passim To think that Infidels and ungodly have any true virtue is dotage c. 17. V. The first sin had no necessity being meer sin and no punishment and so easily avoidable and wholly voluntary Other sins
sinners find a good will to goodness and like it and many years perhaps are wishing and purposing to leave their sins for it and turn to God till at last Love prevaileth And this though imperfect is true sincere Love not from a perfect habit but from the excitation of the Holy Ghost It hath the same object as perfect Love that is Justice for Justice or God for God not loved on consideration of any other reward which proveth it sincere Love Such wish to live chastely temperately justly but cannot come to it Out of this imperfect love springs faith faith may be habitually many years before Justification Justification is the grace of perfect Love to God above all Hope and Perfect Love also come from this initial Love c. 7 8 9. XVIII As Hope so Reward and respect to it may stand with this grace of Love For the Reward is not desired ex amore concupiscentia for our selves only cum enim charitatis proprium sit unica voluptas diligere Deum non quia hoc sibi suave vel utile vel gloriosum est vel alia quacunque consideratione redundat in se sed quia ita est ordo creaturâ— sub creatore qui propter seipsum super omnia ex superexcellenti bonitate diligendus est ita unicum praemium est veritatem bonitatem Dei facie ad faciem contemplando ardentius amare lauaare Deum non quia utile est beatificum diligenti sed quid aeâ—â—rnae veritati congruum dilecto debitum c. Amoris hic inchoati Amor futurus consummatus unica merces Praemium Dei ipse Deus est Quisquis delabitur ab illa charitatis puritate ut amore concupiscentiae incipiat velle concupiscere sibi Deum totum dilectionis ordinem quem natura docet Lex aeterna praecipit diligendi perversitate perturbat Nam Deum ad se refert seipso fruitur quorum utrumque aeterna indispensabili lege proscriptum est c. 10. XIX The fear of punishment and attrition is good being fâ—gâ— mali an Antecedent of wisdom It is from a certain general grace but not that properly called the grace of Christ The Spirit of the Old Testament even of fear is Gods Spirit not that which Christ dyed to give men which is contrary delectation but another much inferiour grace which after the firm belief of Gods judgement and eternal punishment fortassis Gratiam peculiaris cujusdam providentiae operationis non excedit They that have but the Righteousness of fear by knowing the Law have not Gods righteousness but their own Indeed they have faith and that radicated but not Christs proper grace but that which may come ex proprii arbitrii viribus excited by providence or if you will inspired fear no sin can be avoided by it but by other sin c. 22 23 c. It is but of self-love It is Legal righteousness and our own c. 31 32. XX. Liberty of will is either meer Voluntariness whose contrary necessity is involuntarii coactio or that free state which is the Love of God consistent with simple necessity lib. 7. XXI Gratia Christi est Praedeterminatio voluntatis sed non Dominicanorum praedeterminatio 1. Praedeterminatio physica est motio nescio quae virtuosa habens esse incompletum ut colores in aâ—re impetus in impulso Gratia Christi est verissimus motus voluntatis ineffabilis viz. delectatio c. 2. Praed physica non est eis actus Vitalis animi sed aliquid cui voluntas tantum passive subjacet Gratia contra c. 3. Praedet physica in quibuscunque circumstantiis voluntas collocetur omnem superat resistentiam semper facit effectum contra delectatia victrix si alter ardâ—ntior est in solis inefficacibus desideriis haerebit animus 4. Praed physica est instar concursus cujusdam generalis Dei in ordine supernaturali Adjutorium Christi non ita 5. Praed physica necessaria statuitur omnibus agentibus ex vi causae secundae c. Christi adjutorium laesa tantum voluntati propter vulnus necessarium est 6. Praed physica propter naturalem indifferentiam voluntatis exigitur Gratia non ita 7. Praed physica statui innocentiae necessaria dicitur Gratia Christi non ita ergo hi Dominicani magis Aristotelici quam Augustiniani sunt Gratia tamen est Praed physica And grace and free-will are reconcilable as Predetermination and free-will are l. 8. c. 2 3 4. Summa est quod Gratia Amantem Volentem facit non tantum posse velle dat In conclusion he belyeth Calvin 1. As denying in man boni mali electionem and so in many â—ther points cap. 21. XXII His doctrine of Predestination as congruous to this I pass by â—nly adding that he denyeth Angels to be elected of grace or to perseveâ—ance which was but foreseen and they were made to differ not by â—race but by merits Man is elected to merits and glory but to glory â—efore the foresight of merits The Reprobation of Angels was after the â—urpose of giving them sufficient grace and the foresight of sin Permisâ—â—on of sin was no effect of it But the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute will of men in original sin and the effect of it excaecation and obduration but not the permission of the first sin lib. 10. This is the Epitome of Jansenius as far as concerneth our present business The Animadversions § 2. I. IT seems Augustine and Pelagius were both pious men that differed in the methodizing and wording those fundamental conceptions in which they agreed by which Pelagius ran into errors And I doubt he was not so innocent as Jansenius intimateth when he maketh Augustine to be the first true Teacher of grace and Pelagius his Opinion to have been so antient And if it were not too bold to say so against one that read over all Augustine ten times and all his writings against the Pelagians thirty times I would say that I think that Austin owned more universal grace and free-will than Jansenius supposeth him to have owned Of Prosper and Fulgentiuâ— it cannot modestly be denyed who I think were of Augustines mind II. He confesseth that self-determining free-will and sufficient Grace were the condition of the Angels and innocent man and so that it is not alien to Gods government or prerogatives for subjects to be so Ruled and Judged III. He seemeth to me to ascribe far too much to innocent man and Angels in using sufficient grace when he maketh their wills the chief laudable cause of the effect I rather think that no Angel ever did any good the chief praise of which was not due to God as the principal first cause God giveth them all the power liberty help means motives by which they do it Besides that they did nothing but what he fore-decreed and willed they should eventually do Therefore there is no good but of him as the first cause though not
as the sole cause IV. Whether the best actions of Infidels or ungodly men be properly to be called good is but a Logomachy Call them but a Less evil or the abatement of evil and actions that tend as Means to their repentance and salvation and I shall not disagree with you in this V. His concession that the first sin was not necessitated is of great moment But it is a great mistake that following sins are necessary because they are punishments It is not the existence of the sin that is a punishment but the hurtfulness of it supposing the existence If drunkenness or gluttony be themselves noxious and penal that is but a consequent of their existence which was not necessitated by God as punishing them that caused them VI. The sixth I think sound and the Schools pure nature as if Adams Love in the principle was not his necessary Sanity is unsound VII Here again 1. I think he giveth too much to free-will in innocency and too little to God For Gods Help did not then serve mans will so much as Gods and God fulfilled all his will while Angels used their power and liberty and they did no good but what God willed and caused as he saw best And while man and Angels used their liberty they fulfilled Gods will in all their duty as much as if they had been necessitated by natural predetermination 2. And it is not true that their sufficient grace gave not Merit to the will For it followeth not that because they could have omitted a duty therefore in doing it they did any thing of which God was not the prime cause He that gave them all their power disposition objects helps and motives did give them that which he calleth Merit 3. It is his grand error that Gift and Reward are repugnant and that Life would not have been to Adam and was not to the Angels of free gift though of Reward For it is impossible that any creature can merit of God as a Proprietor in point of Commutative Justice seeing God is the absolute Owner of us and all things and no creature can give him any thing but what is his own Therefore there is a natural impossibility that quoad valorem rei aut ipsum beneficium a creature can have any thing but of free gift But God who is an Owner and Benefactor is also a Rector and so the cause of Moral Order as well as of real Benefits And so that which as a Benefit is a meer gift yet quoad ordinem conferendi is given by God per modum praemii to those that will Accept the Gift according to its nature and denyed to those that will despise it and refuse it As a Father will give a purse of Gold to the Child that will thank him and humbly take it and not to the Child that will spit in his face Jâ—nsenius doth so weakly open the nature of Merit and Reward as that alone would shew that he was not meet for his great undertaking Though he excellently shew that God is our Reward himself yet the Ratâ—â—nes praemii he â—aith little to that can satisfie the judicious Of which more anon 4. Angels were differenced inter se by Gods will and their own And we confess that so far as sin made the difference it was by their own will and not by Gods But was he sure that no such difference is made since the fall among men He will confess that when Eve sinned before Adam it was she that made the difference And how can he prove that it was not Cain who by sin first differenced himself from Abel or the Prodigal Luke 15. that by forsaking his Father first differenced himself from his Brother According to his own principles who holdeth falling away from Grace and Justification doth not he that falleth away difference himself from him that standeth He can never prove that now two men may not have equal help from God to go to Church or read a good Book and one do it and the other go to the Tavern or read a Play-book VIII 1. God doth not so use man as his Instrument in good but that he giveth the Instrument its proper aptitude and action as to the effect And that which it is and doth may be spoken of it To say a thing is gud is to praise it and good must be called good And to say that you were the Actor of Good and that Voluntarily is to praise you Therefore the Actor of good ex natura rei deserveth praise seeing Truth must be spoken of all things 2. God himself doth so often praise his servants and promise to honour them that honour him that to say no praise is due to them is to charge God with error 3. To deny all Reward and Merit as it signifieth Rewardableness or Moral â—ptitude for Reward is to deny the greatest part of the Scripture to deny God to be our Rector and so to be our God to deny the whole frame of his Sapiential Government and his glory therein and so to deny his Laws Judgement and Execution Sin Duty Heaven and Hell Thâ—â— summ of all is this â— No man or Angel can merit of God in Commutative Justice as Proprietor But only as Rector All is as is before said of free gift from God as â—roprietor and Benefactor 2. The same God who is Omnipotent is also sapientissimus optimus And he that glorifieth his Power eminently as the Author of Nature as Creator Conservator and Motor doth also glorifie his Wisdom in rerum Ordine And he ordereth Moral Agents eminently per sapientâ—am â—t Rector per media moralia viz. Doctrinam Leges Judicia And he glorifieth his Goodness and Love partly Antecedently to mans Actions and as a free Benefactor partly consequently according to the order of his Laws So that as his Attributes are inseparable so are herein the operations of them And the same Benefit is ut quid productum the effect of Gods Omnipotency and Dominion and ut Bonum Beneficium the effect of the Benefactors Love and yet quoad ordinem conferendi it is Prâ—mium à Rectore adjudicatum And between all these there is no repugnancy 3. We grant that God Rewardeth no man now according to the Law of Innocency for that condemneth every sinner 4. Nor according to or for the works of the Mosaical Jewish Law 5. Nor for any sincere obedience to the Law of Nature or any other without Redemption by Christ 6. We are agreed that the Reward is now doubly and eminently a free gift and the reward of Christs merits It is not only free as all Benefits from God to man are as to commutation but also after forfeiture freely given to sinners and it is procured by the merits of Christ who was freely given to be the Saviour of the world and it is given us by Christ as free gifts are upon condition of Acceptance and an Accepting Will is Gods free gift and they that
have it not want it because they refused Preparatory grace which they were able to have better used oâ— submitted to So that the Reward is only such as a free gift which quoad ordinem conferendi rationes adjudicandi is given by God as a Father who at once useth Power Love and paternal Justice according to the tenour of his own Law of Grace which is founded in Christs perfect merits and is Christs own Law VIII and IX 1. That quoad eventum the good Angels grace was effectual and Adjutorium quo as well as sine quo non he granteth And Adams till he fell Let us find out the difference then To say that yet They could have sinned is a doubtful speech If could signifie Pâ—tâ—â—â—iam naturalem it is noâ— for want of Natural Power that Christ himself sinned not but because perfection caused the right use of that Power To be able to sin or not to believe or not to love God if it signifie any more than the Natural power which men abuse is an improper speech for sin is from moral impotency or indetermination and not an vaâ—t of other power But a Logical Possibility of any event but what â—ame to pass Gods very fore-knowledge will exclude and so his Decree And if the question be Whether Adam could not have stood when he fell it is agreed that he could It seemeth then that our Controversie lyeth plainly â—â— these two things 1. Whether any man now Holy or unholy have any help from God by Christ by which he is truly able to do any one good action more â—â—â—â— other than he doth or to forbear any more evil 2. Whether all Divine causation or operation â—e such as of it self alone will inferr the â—â—â—tainty of mans Volition as the Effect We gâ—ant that Divine prescieâ—â—â— doth inferr it eâ—â—â—oessitate infallibilitâ—â—â—â— Divine Volitions some think are ever efficient of all that is willed and that God hath no other operation but Volition as Bradwardine and others Others deny this 〈…〉 that God hath Power operative as much distinct from Volition aâ—â—â—tellection is and also that God willeth more than he operateth or totally causeth And of this opinion must Jansenius needs be because he held that the free-will of Adam before his fall and of the good Angels caused more obedience than God caused as to the totality of causation And yet â—ethinks he should be loth to say that it was more than God willed or decreed However the former is but a wordy strife For if God operate only Volendo yet his will as Immanent and a meer will as mans must be distinguished from his will as transient and efficient by operation So then the thing in question is Whether Gods power or will so far only as it is operative be so total a cause as that hac posita ex vi causandi necessario sequitur effectum viz. fidem charitatem humanam secuturum And we grant that as ex perfectione Intellectus it followeth Deus praescâ—t hoc futurum ergo futurum est so ex perfectione Voluntatis summo Imperio foelicitate Divina it followeth Deus vult hoc futurum esse ergo futurum est and that ex necessitate existentiae no doubt it is a good consequence Deus hoc fecit ergo factum est But Whether from his meer adjutorium or prime efficiency limited by his own will it be a good consequence God giveth as much help as is of necessity to mans volition ergo man will consent or will is the doubt He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed but he thinks that now it will We grant that God giveth not only the posse velle but the ipsum velle to those that have it His giving it being but a causing their faculties to Act And we grant that wherever God absolutely willeth that his Help shall be successful it is so And also that whereas all the effect cometh from our natural Power and Gods grace conjunct God is the cause of both And is ever the total cause quoad effectum that is totius effecti And we grant that Gods causing Impress on the will is such on some and perhaps on all in the act of special sanctification as ex vi causae will inferr the effect and is unresistible and doth not only determine the will but so determineth it as overcometh all moral power or disposition to the contrary But yet that there is a Grace or adjutorium of Christ which giveth a power either not necessitating the act or when the act followeth not such as he calleth sine quo non I think for these reasons 1. Because else no man can do any more good or less evil than he doth which I believe not 2. Because else All men that perish are damned only for original sin and its consequents which they had never power to avoid which is quite contrary to the tenour of the Scripture 3. And then God would judge them only by the Law of Innocency whereas he will judge them by Christ and by his Remedying Law for rejecting the remedying grace 4. And then the Conscience of the damned would have nothing to torment them with or accuse them for but original sin and its unavoidable consequents And it would give them this excuse and ease God never made it Possible for me to do otherwise 5. Because it teacheth men great ingratitude to say I never had any help of Christ 6. And so it teacheth them impenitently to extenuate their sin if they do but find themselves wicked and to say I never sinned against any Grace of Christ 7. And it feigneth God to give men all that reprival and mercy which the reprobate have from some other Cause and not by Christ And so to make a kind of grace common in the World which the Scripture knoweth not nor is according to the Covenant of Innocency or of Grace 8. Because God is Immutable and too gross mutations are not without proof to be imputed to his Laws and Government Therefore it seemeth to me an injurious fiction to say as Jansenius that God had such Laws as supposed mans self-determining will and governed so as to use sufficient Grace or adjutorium sine quo non to man and Angels at the first and thaâ— now he hath no such at all but only a moving efficiency I should sooner yield to the Dominicans and Hobbes that no other than necessitated Volitions are possible or ever were than to hold as he that there were other before the fall and none ever since For as to his great argument vitiated nature I answer it 1. Man is man still And therefore God ruleth him as man And that in via And if then man and Angels were supposed to have a self-determining free-will that could do this or not do it we have reason to think it is so still Why is not grace meerly sufficient as consistent with Lapsed as Innocent nature supposing that it is not the
same help that is now sufficient to salvation as then 2. Consider the great difference between perfect Innocency and some one commanded act And 3. Consider that the helps afforded by grace are very great and that Habitual Grace doth in some measure heal lapsed nature or else what is it He that is Habitually Prompt to Love and duty hath some cure and some ability For to be prompt is more than to be able And therefore it is an incredible thing and a reproach of habitual grace that Adam was more able to live and persevere without any sinful thought word or deed than a Holy soul is to think one good thought or speak one good word or restrain one blasphemy or other sin Therefore it is as credible that Christs repairing habitual Grace enableth godly men and his commoneâ— grace common men to think or do somewhat better than they do as that Angels and Adam had no other grace and could without other live without any sin Therefore I take Jansenius to do well in opening Original pravity and the power of Gods grace and his special intent to save his chosen But I think he so earnestly studied for that side alone that he injuriously overlooketh the whole frame of sapiential Government and the common grace which is presupposed to the special and greatly wrongeth Christ and his grace by denying him to give to men in common that which our experience assureth us they possess Ad X. When he maketh uneffectual Velleities to be Christs unresistible grace either he thinketh that men are saved with such only or not for he speaketh not his mind plainly in that that I can find If yea then he abaseth the grace of Christ to think that many are saved by it that love a Whore or any sin much better than God and Grace and Glory If not as I think he held then he holdeth that most that have the effectual grace of Christ are damned and had no possibility properly of escape And why doth he make so harsh a thing of mens asserting a sufficiency of some uneffectual grace and say to what purpose is it and yet assert that to most men the grace of Christ had not so much as any sufficiency to save them nor put them into any true possibility of life Ad XI I. It seemeth to me a contradiction to say as in the second branch of his distinction that Homo potest Velle and yet that aliud adhuc adjutorium necessarium est ut de facto velit For necessarium est sine quo res esse non potest Therefore the non potest is present wherever the necessarium is wanting But if they talk only of a passive or obediential power and say Man can believe because God can make him believe and so denominate man Able to do that which they mean God is able to make him do this is but to play with words II. His saying that now there is no sufficient grace is before disproved and by him not proved That it is the same with that of the state of Innocency is vainly said It is the same in general as man is the same and Intellect and will the same But to be able to live without sin and to be able to forbear one sin or to hear a Sermon or do one commanded act are not the same And to hold none but this with Pelagius is not all one as to hold this with a more special grace And that it is pernicious to the lapsed is rashly said For in the reprobate it doth them no harm but good and in the elect it tendeth to higher grace And he mistaketh in saying that it supposeth nature sound For if it were proved that nature without grace hath no good inclination yet why may not unsound nature receive grace ad posse Is not that grace some cure of its unsoundness and tends to more III. But as to his saying that the more men have of it the more miserable they are and the more damnable and that no man ever used sufficient grace or will do I answer 1. The good man it seemeth forgot that all the same may be said as truly of his special Grace both in them that come short of faith and Justification and them that apostatize from it as he holdeth many do 2. But it is not true that having it maketh them damnable any more than having life health and riches but it 's the abusing it 3. That never any used sufficient grace by his leave and the School-mens is unproved viz. that no man since the fall ever did any good or forbore any evil obediently by such grace as left him able to have done otherwise in the instant before the act or as inferred not his volition as necessary exviillius causae 4. And that all that which cometh short of the effect is none of the Grace of Christ is unproved unless he mean only the adequate immediate effect The Law doth make Duty and so hath its effect And Gods motions make their various Impressions on the soul and so have their effect But whether a Godly mans will could not by that same motion have produced a better effect in his will than was produced by it he must better prove Ad XII I. Whereas Paul opposeth the Law of works and the Grace of Christ he opposeth or too far distinguisheth the Law of Christ and the Graâ—e of Christ Just as Sir H. V. in his Meditations He taketh all spoken and written precepts or Laws to be the Law which is distinguished from Grace which is meer Alteration of the soul But this is confusion and subverteth true Theologie For the Law is the instrument of signifying Gods mind and the Spirit worketh with and by it on our minds And both go together both before the fall and under Christ And both are Grace now even as body and soul are one man The Gospel is oft called Grace in the New Testament It 's true that a Law meerly as a Law may be distinguished from the Spirits operations on the soul And so Paul and Augustine oft shew that the Jewish Law as a Law could not make men righteous without grace And we deny not but the Law of Christ meerly as a Law is insufficient without the Spiritâ— Grace But to conclude hence that this is the difference between the Old â—ovenant and the New and the Righteousness of each of them of men under them that one is obedience to a written Law and the other is the effect of the Spirit is not sound For under each Covenant there was both Law and Spirit though with difference Adam had Grace as Jansenius confusseth And the Fathers before the Flood had Law and Spirit And the Godly â—ews had Law and Spirit And all Christians are subject to Christ their King and obey his Laws though by the Grace of his Spirit And it is not two Righteousnesses that relate to Law and Spirit but one as an effect of two concauses The
doctrine of faith and Law and promises of Christaâ—e the Means which the Spirit useth in operating our Faith Love and Obedience And it is not two Covenants that give these two but as soul and body make one man so the Word of Christ and his Spirit make up one total cause of our sanctification The Spirit causeth us to believe that which the Word revealeth and to love the good which it proposeth and to obey the Precepts of the Word Therefore the Gospel is Grace and the Spirit is Grace that is a free gift of God to miserable sinners for their recovery and inward holiness is the effect of both And to feign that all obedience as it is performed to Christs Law upon its proper motives is therefore not of the Spirit or is our own Righteousness opposed to Christs because our own reason and free-will is exercised in it is Phanaticism and subverteth the Gospel and the Prophetical and Kingly Office of Christ II. God never gave a Law no not to the Jews only to convince them that they could not keep it but to be the Rule of their obedience And the Just did keep it in sincerity But the Law of Moses as separated by the ignorant Jews from the promise and grace of Christ could not be kept by any to Justification To say that Christs Laws now have no higher end than to tell us that we cannot keep them is Antichristianity Are we commanded to repent believe love God only to tell us that we cannot do it It 's true that without the Spirits help we cannot But it 's as true that the Command is the Rule of our duty and all the Gospel and Covenant of Grace is the means of exciting us to our duty by which the Spirit worketh in us faith repentance love and obedience But saith Jansenius the Law of Christ is to humble men in the sense of their disability and drive them to seek to Christ for his grace I answer 1. Is not humbling men and driving them to Christ a good effect If so then his Law is the means of all that good 2. Were the Gospel and all the Apostles Epistles written only to drive men to Christ and not to edifie them and make them perfect to salvation Were not the Precepts of Love and Holiness means of working Love and Holiness in men Is not the Word the seed that begetteth men to eternal life and is not the receiving of this seed into good and honest hearts made by Christ the cause of holiness and salvation Were not the Disciples clean by the word that Christ spake to them and doth he not say that his Word was spirit and life as being the concause of the Spirits vivification He that never received more benefit by Christs Doctrine Law and Gospel than to be convinced that he cannot believe repent obey or love God hath not yet the benefit which they are principally intended for But suppose that by Law he had meant the meer penal part or threatning as some words would make a man suspect 1. It 's a strange description of a Law to exclude the precept and premiant part and include only the penal part which is the last and least 2. As it is the same Man that hath Love and Hatred Hope and Fear so it is the same Law of Christ which hath precept and prohibition promise and penalty And it is the same Holiness or New Creature which is a conformity to all together Of which more anon III. He can never prove that all unbelievers have no Power to â—â—e any means which tendeth to â—aith by a preparatory grace nor that the use of all such means is Impossible to them XIII His distinction of Natural and Moral Impotency is good But then that Moral Impotency it self must not be made the same with the Natural else there will be the same reason for excusing sin by it If mans Will had been made by God such as could not possibly love him or holiness it would not have left a man unexcusable in judgement that his enmity was Voluntary It is reason enough for a man to kill a â—oad or Serpent as malum sibi naturale because it is a hurtful creature But this is no Moral Evil in them nor is their death their punishment nor yet in any ravenous creature which preyeth on the rest that are innocent And so would it be with bad men if God had made them bad Indeed if Adam have made them all bad and God have given no Saviour Grace or Remedy they are conâ—emnable and unexcusable as they were virtually in Adam if judged only by the Law of Innocency as made to Adam But they are excuseable if judged by Christ by the Law of grace which condemneth no man meerly as not innocent or a sinner but as a rejecter of grace These things are so plain and weighty that Jaâ—senius should not joyn with the Antinomians in opposing them XIV While he confesseth that Christ so far dyed for all as to procure them all the mercy which he giveth them I have no further quarrel with him but to prove that a Condition pardon of sin and grant of Life eternal with much means and help to make men perform the Condition which is but a suitable Acceptance is indeed mercy XVI That Christs grace is Love or Complacency in good is a truth which I highly value but with all these exceptions to his doctrine 1. It is the Heart of the new Creature and that which must communicate it self to all the rest or else they are lifeless and unacceptable For the will is the man in Gods account And complacency or love or appetite is the first act of the will which is it that he calleth with Augustine Delectation Grace lyeth principally in a Placet But the man hath more parts than his Heart And all other parts of sanctification are graces of Christ in their several places and not love only 2. Though no man is to love himself as God nor instead of God nor above God nor as the noblest ultimate object of his love yet all men are necessitated by nature to love themselves and therefore to desire their own felicity in loving God next to God as the final object of that love And so our end is finis amantis vel amicitiae which includeth mutual complacency and union though not in equality And to such an end grace causeth us to use the means And Christ is proposed to us as our Saviour and all his grace as for our good and all Gods commands as necessary for our happiness and sin is described to us to be hated as our oâ—â— evil and destruction and against our good as well as against Gods will and honour And with us this is denyed scarcely by the Antinoâ—ians themselves Much less by any judicious Christians 3. It is past the reach of any of us to prove that our actual love is the first effect of the sanctifying Spirit on the soul
I mean not only Whether some other acts as Intellectual perception and belief be not in order of nature before it and in time with it and real parts of the same new creature but also Whether aâ— Alvarez and others say there be not such a divine motion or Impulse on the soul tending to this love and antecedent to love it self in nature love being an effect of Gods will and mâ—â—s which Jâ—â—sâ—nius denyeth But 4. If it be not so but really love be the first effect of God on the soul then the controversies are all at an end about the difference of sufficiâ—â—t and effectual equal and unequal grace For then it would be as Jaâ—senius saith and there is no grace but the effect it self and so there would be no question but Whether all men love God and all alike But I yet believe that there is soe preparatory grace of Christ which tendeth to the love of God XVI I believe that the will is the prime seat of Morality and that love or complacency is as the spirit of all saving special grace But yet it is ill said that Christs grace is necessary only to love or delight For the soul of man hath three faculties which must be conjunctly sanctified viz. Vital active power Intellect and Will and sin is in all And the Spirit reneweth them by a threefold effect Vivification Illumination and Conversion or love And hatred of sin and fear of sinning and of God are graces of Christ also as are obedience patience c. though below love 2. There is an Analogical good that is done by self-love and fear which hath a tendency to mans recovery though not such good as is true holiness and hath a promise of salvation XVII I. Here we come to a difficult case 1. Whether indeed any ungodly man or Infidel do love God sincerely amore amicitiae propter se The doubt is because to love him less than sinful pleasures and the creature seemeth to be a loving him as less amiable or good And to love him as such is not to love him as God nor indeed to love God but an Idol of the imagination I think we must say 1. That no man loveth God adequately for no man hath an adequate conception of him 2. But yet that there are some essentials of such true love as is necessary and suitable to our dark and weak condition which all must have that will be saved either distinctly or confusedly As to know and love him as the Infinite Spirit the first cause and last end of all most powerful wise and good our Owner our Ruler and our Benefactor and chief good Father Word and Spirit the Creator Redeemer and Sanctifier the Author of Nature Grace Glory 3. That no wicked or unholy person truly loveth God thus viz. As his own Governour to make him holy and save him from the Flesh and World and as the Author of those holy Laws by which he governeth and a righteous Judge according to those Laws 4. Therefore Jansenius's little sincere Love in sensual men is but a love of aliquid Dei somewhat of God and not properly of God as God speaking of God as the object of love it self 5. Yet the same person may have all the â—orâ—said Notions of a Deity and may notionally call them all good and laudable but his Practical Judgement is not such of God as his holy Governour Judge and End as to bring him truly as such to love him 6. Yet this may be called a Love of God analogically as he is said to love the King who loveth him as great and good to the Common-wealth though not as a governing restrainer of his lusts By this I would have that explained which I have said of this subject in my Saints Rest II. But here I am at â— further loss Did he mean that this love called sincere is in none but those that are saved oâ— not As I said before If he did then a common Drunkard Adulterer c. may have this love and be saved But I suppose he meant Negatively And if so methinks hence all his opposition to sufficient Grace turneth back upon himself And to him it may better be said Why do you feign Christ and the Holy Ghost to give men such a Grace such a Love to God as no man ever was or will be saved by without more Is it any more dishonour to Christ to give men some such Power to do some more good â—han actually they do as Adâ—m had to have continued innocent than effectually to give so many persons sincere love which shall never save theâ— Whether these be they that he will adjudge to Purgatory I know â—â— If so he will stretch the rank of Venial sins to those that other men call Mortal III. But yet my greatest difficulty remaineth I am in doubt Whether he that denyeth common sufficient grace and extendeth the grace of Christ seemingly but to few do not really either make it the same thing with Nature or extend it to all For I suspect that all or almost all men on earth till they have sinned themselves into diabolical desperate malignity have this which he calleth Amor amicitiae and sincere imperfect love to God and Justice For Intellectus est Entis veri intellectus Voluntas est Boni Good apprehended such is the Wills necessary natural object And a simple complacency in apprehended good is the wills first necessary act Nature telleth man that there is created goodness and that the Creator who giveth it must needs have more than all his creatures And nature tells men that the World or millions are better than one person and their good to be preferred And how can it be then that he that taketh the World to be so much better than himself and God to be better that is more amiable than all the World should not have the least simple complacency in thinking of him All men take Wisdom and Goodness and Beneficence for amiable And they that believe that God hath most of these must needs have some Love to him not only as good to them but as most excellent in himself Insomuch that as Adrian the sixth before cited saith in some sort a bad man may love God better than himself and he is scarce worthy the name of a man that would not rather be annihilated or wish that he had never been born than that there were no World or no God if per impossibile he supposed he could live without them And if you tell every man that he hath that sincere love to God which is Gratia Christi who hath the least love to God and Justice propter se though he have more love to his fleshly interest and sinful pleasures I doubt you will not much differ from Pelagius and will have no way left but to say that it is not of Grace by Christ that Nature is reprieved and supported Or at least that this is of a common
work but a grace of some other Providence 4. Consequently that there are men yea most who are no subjects of Christ nor under any Law of grace by Christ and yet not under the meer Law of Innocency and therefore are under some other Law who knows what or lawless 5. His damning all that perish meerly for Original Sin and its necessitated consequents which no man had ever the least power to avoid 6. His asserting that Angels and Adam had sufficient Grace and Free-will by which the Angels did and Adam could have persevered in Innocency and never sinned And yet that since the fall no ungodly man hath such help and free-will to any one better act than he doth nor the holiest person to any better than he doth but the best Saint is less able to do one better act than Adam was to keep all the Law 7. And so his consequent that it is properly impossible for any man in the World good or bad to do any better than he doth 8. That all they love God sincerely amore amicitia who love God and Justice propter se as amiable in himself though they love their filthiest sins so much better and all their fleshly worldly interest as that they have but an uneffectual wish that they could leave them 9. That we must not say that Christ giveth men either a Power to do better than they do nor yet that Grace of Fear which they have as being below him And yet must say that he giveth multitudes this uneffectually sincere love which never saveth them 10. That a Habit of true faith may be many years in a man before i◠justifie him when as the word true must mean some other faith or else that same will never justifie him which did not justifie him so long 11. His Antinomian or Phanatick distinguishing Law and Grace as if Christ had no Precepts or Laws but Operations or else his Gospel and Covenant in signis were no part of his Grace 12. And thence his fiction that all that which is done by any Grace ad posse and in obedience to Christs written Law is a Legal Righteousness of our own and no part of Christs Righteousness These with what else I have before disclaimed I dislike in Jansenius his way And yet think that a man that can well distinguish words from things and will not be deceived by ambiguous terms may shew that even he and his adversaries are not so far disagreed as they seem E. g. Whether Christ dyed for all They are agreed that he dyed to procure for all so much Grace or Mercy as he giveth them and that among these a conditional Pardon and Gift of Christ and Life is one c. And they agree that he dyed not with any absolute intent of giving them any more than he doth give them What remaineth then but the Controversie de nomine Whether this much be fitly called his Dying for all which Scripture putteth out of doubt The like I might say of many of the rest of the differences §. VIII I Conclude with this summary determination of all these Controversies to satisfie sober minds 1. GOD our CREATOUR is the Causa prima the spring and Master and end of NATURE and accordingly having antecedently made the creature in such variety as pleased him 1. He Actively affordeth them all that general Influx by which the Being given them is supported and they are sufficiently furnished for their several motions operations or receptions 2. And his Infinite Goodness and blessed Will is their common End in which they are all finally terminated but variously thereby felicitated according to the variety of their capacities 3. And as the Governour of the Universe he sapientially ordereth all things and conducteth them from their Beginning to their End but variously as they are various II. So GOD our REDEEMER having in Christ made all necessary preparations and Redeemed mankind as to what belonged to a Saviour to do in Person upon earth and having antecedently made an Universal Law of Grace 1. Doth Reveal his Mercy to lost sinners commonly but in various degrees as he pleaseth And doth concurr with his Gospel by vouchsafing a Common Gracious Help which hath an aptitude and tendency to the recovery of lost sinners 2. And as the final Infinite Good he felicitateth all that are by Grace conducted to him as their end and on the rest will have his absolute will fulfilled and will not be frustrate of his End though sinners may be frustrate of theirs and be unhappy 3. And as Rector he sapientially conducteth man in the way to this felicitating End antecedently by the Gospel which is the same in it self to all that have it and consequently as Judge by his Rewards In which supposing his foresaid commoner preventing Grace he consequently giveth men such further degrees of co-operating grace or help and spiritual mercy as in the use of former grace they are fit to receive and justly and penally denyeth that to others which they have made themselves immediately unapt for or uncapable of in the way of this ordinary common operation But withall as a free Owner and Benefactor who may do with his own as he list as he diversifieth the works of Nature though Nature keep a constant course except in Miracles so he freely diversifieth the gifts of his Grace external and Internal though as Rector and the common Benefactor of lost sinners he alter not the terms and means of Grace which he at first determined of And the equality and constancy of his Rectoral and Judicial distributions is no way inconsistent with the diversity which as a free Owner and Benefactor he maketh either in his Decrees or Gifts So that he is the Cause of All Good though not every way equally to All to make All Good and happy And he hath made man capable of Improving his Gifts to return him his own with Usury which he will require But he is the Author of no evil of sin nor punisheth any but for sin and as a means to that Good which is better than the Impunity of the sinner But he ruleth and causeth the Effects of sin when he causeth not the sin it self The Order of his Productions may be much perceived by man and are fit for our observation Of his own Knowledge and Volitions of them we know no more but that It is not formally the same thing as Knowledge and Will in Man that It is most perfect and incomprehensible that It is his Essential Intellect and Will variously named as variously connoting the effects and objects that To dispute of any other internal order priority or posteriority in God's Knowledge or Will as if he had particular Thoughts Ideas and Volitions as man hath or any thing in Him were Caused by the object and to vex the Church with contentions hereabout is a presumptuous arrogance and prophaneness which God will punish and good and sober men should tremble at and hate and not
first giveth all creatures what they have and next faileth them and leaveth them in darkness as the Sun setteth and then Rising again revolveth all things into his original pure spirituality like the revolution of day and night Summer and Winter it is sure another thing than the Scripture describeth it which maketh it a noble part of that Sapiential frame of Moral Government which some despise § 37. IX But let it be noted that we hold that as the Almighty Father is the glorious Creator Motor and Life of Nature and the Eternal Wisdom Word and Son the Glorious Ordinator Rector and Redeemer so the Eternal Love and the Holy Ghost is the final Perfecter of believers even of Gods Elect and that this Sanctification and proficiency is by more than Moral Sapiential Regiment even by the Real shedding abroad Gods Love upon the soul or by a Quickning Illuminating felicitating Communication of Divine Life and Light and Love which yet maketh not the Sapiential Regiment vain § 38. And as to Free-will I further say that we are far from holding that it is a state of man in which he is Above God or Independent and as a God to himself or that God is any way a defective or idle as they call it Spectator of mans sins or free acts But that this rank and state of free agents is Gods own wisely-chosen work in which he is delighted And that he doth truly attain his ends in all § 39. Therefore as Mr. Sterry magnifieth the harmony which aâ—â—seth from Moral Good and Evil as designed and necessitated by God so we first admire the harmony which ariseth from Natural and free agents and their works which must not be dishonoured and left out § 40. And more than so we doubt not but all Gods works are perfect it being their perfection to be suited to his own will And the difference between us and Mr. Sterry Dr. Twisse c. is not Whether God be Glorious in all his works or they be perfect For we say that though mans sin be found upon Gods works and that sin be none of his works nor any means properly so called of Pleasing or Glorifying him nor at all willed or caused by him but hated and punished yet he loseth none of his complacency or glory by it but notwithstanding its malignity shineth gloriously in the perfection of all his works § 41. Yea more we say that men sin under his Disposing power and that he will make use of their evil unto Good and sin shall become an occasion of that Glory to God as sickness to the Physicion of which it is no Cause or proper Means nor of it self condâ—ceth thereunto Yea and that no Act as an Act how sinful soever is done but by Gods causation as he is the fountain of nature and prime Motor Yea more that all the Effects and Consequents of sin that are not sin it self are under the Causal Government and disposal of God who will attain his Ends in all § 42. Therefore we differ but in this Whether God get not all that glory which Mr. St. floridly describeth notwithstanding sin or on supposition of it as barely permitted negatively but with a Decree or Volition of all the good consequents occasioned by it rather than by sin it self as a willed designed effect of his own necessitating Negations and in the positive part of the acts as circumstantiated of his determining premotion Whether mans permitted sin be any of Gods works And whether Gods glory be not rather non obstante peccato and also by occasion of it supposed to be mans work only and by all the good consequents caused by God than by the sin it self as a Means conducible or a Cause § 43. For we deny not that God could have prevented all sin if he had so resolved and yet we believe not that such a permission is equivalent to a necessitating Motion or Privation as Mr. Sterry would perswade us To make a creature no better than such as can do good if he will and can be willing with a decree to make many willing is much different from making the creature bad and then condemning him to Hell for being so as an act of Justice Yet we doubt not but the Divine Light will shortly give us all a fuller discovery of that which shall vindicate the Wisdom Goodness and Justice of God in his Government of man than yet the wisest mortals have § 44. Either you suppose that God doth all that he can do or not If yea then you suppose that he cannot nor ever could make any one Creature Worm or Grass more or less greater or smaller sooner or later or otherwise than he doth which few will believe It being not for want of Power but through perfection of Wisdom and freedom of Will that he doth no more But if God can make one creature more or one Motion more and yet doth not I ask Whether you dare call that non-agency by the name of Idleness or deficiency If not why should the Non-causation of sinful Volitions in specie morali or the leaving free-will to its own determination be so called Not to make more creatures or more physical motion or not to give more Grace and Glory is as much a non-agency as not to determine a sinning Will. § 45. As to all Mr. Sterry's Reasons against Free-will they are so Rhetorically rather than Logically delivered that I think it not meet to trouble the Reader with any further answer of them or to suppose them to have any more strength than those that other men plainlier have delivered § 46. I conclude with this repeated profession that I am fully satisfied that all the rest of the Controversies about Grace and Nature and Predestination and Redemption as they stand between the Synod of Dort and the Arminians are of no greater moment than I have oft expressed in this Book nor worthy any of that stir and contention which men that sufficiently difference not Words Methods and Matter have made to the mischievous injury of the Church And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties is in this controversie between the defenders of Necessary Predetermination and of Free-will that is not What free-will sinners have left but Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man there was such a thing as a will that can and ever did determine it self to a Volition or Nolition in specie morali without the predetermining efficient necessitating premotion of God as the first Cause or as Hobbes speaketh Whether ever a created will did act without a necessitating premotion And whether to will and to will freely be all one And whether the will except as to the kind of action be not as much necessitated to will or not will as my Pen to write or not write are we call not its acts Contingent or free either because they are what they are Volitions or though Ignorance because we see not the moving Causes § 47. And if
this hold for my part I must confess that I think the Religion which agreeth with it must neither be so good as Dr. Twisses Rutherfords Bradwardines or Alvarez's nor yet so bad as Hobbes's or Spinosa's but just such as Mr. Sterry's or the old Platonick or Stoick Philosophers I mean not such as Mr. Sterry's was for I hear he was an excellent person but such as his Book though obscurely intimateth And if any of that judgement have a better or worse it is not in consistency with his own principles FINIS Catholick Theology The Second BOOK The SYNODISTS and ARMINIANS CALVINISTS and LUTHERANS DOMINICANS and JESUITES Reconciled OR AN END OF THE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT GODS DECREES and GRACE and MANS FREE-WILL MERIT c. If men are willing A RETREAT TO THE MILITANT DIVINES WHO HAVE TOO LONG WARRED ABOUT WORDS and UNREVEALED THINGS and KEPT THE CHURCH OF GOD IN FLAMES and DRAWN CHRISTS MEMBERS TO HATE REPROACH and PERSECUTE EACH OTHER FOR THEY KNEW NOT WHAT In a Dialogue between C. a â—alvinist A. an Arminian and B. the Râ—concâ—ler and others By Richard Baxter Tim. 2. 14 15 16. Of these put them in remembrance charging them before the Lord that they strive not about words to no profit but to the subverting of the hearers Study to shew thy self approved unto God a Workman that needeth not to be ashamed rightly dividing the word of Truth But shun prophane and vain bablings for they will encrease unto more ungodliness and their word will eat as doth a Canker LONDON Printed for Nevil Simmons at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-Yard 1675. THE CONTENTS OF THE Second Book The first days Conference about Predestination THe need of conciliatory endeavours p. 1 2. What this undertaking is p. 3. Predetermination to Sin excluded the case briefly opened p. 4. The first Crimination by the Arminian Of eternal absolute Reprobation p. 6. Whether a thing not existent may be a Moral cause or God's Acts have Causes p. 7. How far Gods Decrees may be said to have extrinsick Causes p. 8. The second Crimination Of God's decreeing Sin either to predetermine it or the event or his permission p. 9. The third Crimination Necessitution of Sin by Negative decrees Negation of decrees opened p. 11. The fourth Crimination The pure Masse whether the object of Predestination p. 12. Decrees distinguished p. 13. The fifth Crimination Do the Decrees proceed according to the order of Intention or of Execution p. 14. The sixth Crimination Denying all Conditional Decrees p. 16. The seventh Crimination Of absolute Election p. 17. The eighth Crimination Leading men to presumption hereby p. 18. The ninth Crimination Setting necessity and fate p. 19. The tenth Crimination Making God a Respecter of persons by unequal Decrees p. 21. The eleventh Crimination Making God and Ministers Dissemblers p. 22. Crim. 12. Of a vain power given p. 23. The second days Conference The Criminations by the Calvinist What good this conciliatory attempt may do p. 24. The first Crimination Denying election uncomfortable The second Crim. An election of Things instead of Persons p. 26. The third Crim. Denying a decree of the first special Grave The fourth Crim. of Scientia Media p. 27. The fifth Crim. Denying Absolute Reprobation Reprobation opened p. 29 30. Whether God will Sin p. 30. or the Act p. 31. How far man can cause his act undetermined p. 32. Pretences for Gods causing Sin answered How God causeth the effect and not the Volition p. 85 c. What God doth about Sin p. 37. The sixth Crim. Of Conditional decrees p. 38. The seventh Crim. Of foreseen Merit p. 39. The eighth Crim. Of making many Elections p. 40. The ninth Crim. Ordering the Decrees according to Execution p. 41. How God doth Velle finem The Case opened p. 42. The tenth Crim. denying an eternal cause of futurition p. 45. Whether futurity be any thing and have any cause p. 48. The third days Conference Of Universal and Special Redemption The first Crim. Of the Armin. denying Christ's office to the world p. 50. Calvinists for universal Redemption what all agree in p. 54. * To which I here add the Church of England Homil. li. 2. p. 185. God so loved the world that he gave his only Son c. But to whom did he give him He gave him to the whole world that is to say to Adam and to all that should come after him O Lord what had Adam or any other man deserved at God's hands that he should give us his only Son We are all miserable Sinners damnable persons justly driven out of Paradise justly excluded from Heaven and justly condemned to Hell See a Learned Gentleman's Reasons for Univers Redemp yet living Mr. Polehill of Gods Decrees Did Christ die equally for all p. 55. The second Crim. Denying express Scripture p. 57. The Synod of Dort vindicated p. 59. The third Crim. They deny the Gospel Covenant it self p. 61. The fourth and fifth Crim. Making an impossibility or falshood the object of faith p. 62. The sixth seventh and eighth Crim. Disabling Ministers to Preach leaving most men remediless teaching Infidels impenitence p. 63. The ninth tenth eleventh and twelfth Crim. Exempting men from Hell torments justifying Ingratitude denying Christ's Kingdoms tempting men to Infidelity p. 64 65. The fourth days Conference The Calvinists first Crim. Making Christ dye in vain for them that he knew would perish p. 66. The second Crim. An imperfect Saviour p. 67. The third Crim. Dying for men in Hell p. 67. The fourth Crim. To die for those whom he would not pray for p. 68. The fifth Crim. Making Christ not to purchase faith p. 69. The sixth seventh eighth and ninth Crim. Uncertain conditional Redemption no more for the saved than the damned Christ's sheep to know him before he know them Pardoning Original Sin to all p. 70. Crim. 10. To die for the Seed of the Serpent p. 72. The fifth days Conference Of Man's Sinfulness and Impotency and of Free-will The Armin. Crim. 1st Denying all free-will they deny all Morality p. 73. What Liberty is here meant largely discussed to p. 79. What Liberty we hold p. 79. Doth Original Sin necessitate all evil p. 82. The second Crim. Denying Power to believe p. 85. What Power can and cannot mean p. 86. fullier opened p. 87 c. Questions hence answered p. 96 c. The advantage of some by denying Habits besides Power and Acts p. 99. Habits proved p. 100. Crim. 3. Making all men utterly and equally bad p. 101. Crim. 4. Infants Heathens and most men made and necessitated to sin and damnation p. 103. Of Infants remedy p. 104. Parents sin defileth them p. 105. Of Heathens Case p. 106. Crim. 5. That none can do more good or less evil than he doth p. 107. The sixth days Conference The Calvinists Crim. 1. Denying original sin p. 109. Original sin opened p. 111. Crim. 2. That men can use their Naturals to prepare for Grace p. 113.
What man can do further opened p. 114. Crim. 3. Holding free will to good p. 121. A manifold Liberty evinced by many Questions p. 122. Whether any that use it not have liberty to believe p. 124 125. Crim. 4. That men are not dead in sin p. 125. Crim. 5. That man is not meerly passive in his first conversion p. 126. Crim 6. None damned for Adam's sin only p. 128. The seventh days Conference Of Sufficient and Effectual Grace Crim. 1. Of the Armin. Denying sufficient Grace they damn men for meer Impossibilities p. 130. Had Adam sufficient Grace p. 132. Of the 13th Artic. of the Church of England p. 133. How God willeth mens Salvation p. 134. Crim. 2. Making Grace unresistible p. 136. How far they do so The eighth days Conference Crim. 1. Of the Calv. They assert universal sufficient Grace p. 139. Queries evincing Common Grace p. 139. The greatness of their error that deny it p. 141. Doth this satisfie while God that can save men will not p. 143. What Grace and what sufficient Grace is p. 145. Whether the same measure of Grace called meerly sufficient be ever effectual p. 148. What the Grace in that question is Whether a vis impressa Of determination by God and by the Intellect p. 151 152 153. Crim. 2. By Grace they mean Nature as Pelagius p. 156. What Nature is Grace how far supernatural p. 158. Crim. 3. Making Grace but a Moral swasion p. 160. Physical operation what p. 162. Crim. 4. They hold faith to be acquired and not infused p. 162. What acquired and infused means p. 163. Dr. Twisse about this noted p. 167 c. Crim. 5. They hold Grace given according to works or preparation p. 169. Crim. 6. They make the Will to have no sin or Grace p. 171. Crim. 7. They make Grace resistible p. 172. The case further opened p. 173 174 c. Is there any universal second cause of Grace under God as the Sun in Nature which worketh resistibly and God by it ad modum recipientis p. 177. Christ how far such ib. Crim. 8. They make mans Will to make himself to differ c. p. 180. What differing is what the causes as to believing ib. How far God worketh by universal Grace p. 185. Who made thee to differ opened p. 186. Crim. 9. Man's will maketh Gods Grace effectual and not Gods p. 186. Whence Grace is effectual p. 189. Differencing Grace what p. 192. It not all the question of the Divine Impress p. 193 194. The case summarily opened p. 196. The ninth days Conference Of Perseverance The Arm. Crim. 1. They make fear and care to be folly p. 198. Crim. 2. They cherish all sin p. 200. Crim. 3. Their Doctrine is uncomfortable on pretence of confuting p. 200 201. Both sides charge each other thus A middle way about Perseverance avoiding both p. 204. Crim. 4. They dishonour Gods Image making heinous sin consistent with it p. 204. Crim. 5. Immodesty and singularity contradicting all the ancient Church p. 206. Crim. 6. Contradicting express Scripture p. 207. The tenth days Conference The Calv. Criminations about Perseverance Crim. 1. They overthrow the comfort of believers that deny Perseverance p. 208. What comfort may be had by such p. 211. Crim. 2. and 3. They make God or his Covenant mutable p. 212. Crim. 4. They deny the Promise of Perseverance p. 213. Crim. 5. They infer a second Regeneration p. 214. Crim. 6. They go against the Doctrine of Augustine c. p. 215. The just extenuation of this last controversie p. 215. The eleventh days Conference with a Libertine called Antinomian vindicating sound Doctrine against divers accusations Chap. 1. Whether we must call men to come to Christ without Preparation p. 220. Chap. 2. Of denying our own Righteousness p. 223. Personal Righteousness necessary p. 224. Of Reward and worthiness or Merit p. 225. The truth largely opened about merit and reward p. 230. Reasons for it p. 232 c. Ch. 3. Whether our own Righteousness conduce to our Justification Or we are any way justified by it p. 238. Ch. 4. Whether the Gospel be a Law of Christ p. 243. Ch. 5. Whether Christ and not we be the only party in Covenant with God p. 245. Ch. 6. Whether the new Covenant have conditions p. 247. Ch. 7. Whether justifying faith be a believing in Christ as Teacher Ruler c. or only a receiving his Righteousness p. 251. Ch. 8. Of Faiths Justifying Instrumentally p. 251. Ch. 9. Whether Faith it self be Imputed for Righteousness p. 252. Ch. 10. Whether it be a change in God to justifie the before unjustified p. 256. Ch. 11. Whether a justified man should fear becoming unjustified ibid. Ch. 12. Of mans power to believe and our calling the unregenerate to Duty p. 258. Ch. 13. Of the witness of the Spirit and of Evidences of Justification p. 261. The Conclusion The twelfth days Conference with a learned Lutherane Whether the difference among Christians about Merit be as great as some think it p. 263. Some Protestants and the late Lecturers Reasons against Merit proposed p. 265. and the case opened Of the Doctrine of the Council of Trent p. 266 c. Of condignity p. 267. The Doctrine of Vega Scotus Waldensis Eckius Marsilius Bellarmine Greg. Armin. Durand Brugens Cusanus Stapleton Bradwardine Soto Bonaventure st Clara and all the Schoolmen as he judgeth Carthus Cassander p. 270. Holiness and Glory a greater gift than Glory without holiness p. 271. Aquinas judgment His confusion occasioned by his opinion that the new Law is that which is in the heart and not written viz. the Spirit as the Quakers hold ib. Vasquez denyeth Commutative Justice in God with all the School Doctors 17 of them cited He confuteth it even as to Christ He denyeth proper Distributive Justice also in God citing Bonavent Scotus Durand Palud Gabriel Alexand. Aquin. c. p. 272 c. Aquinas sense in Carbo's words p. 275. Many Schoolmen deny as much as Legal or Governing Justice in God Ruiz citeth for this Argent Bassol Suarez Pesant Suarez saith God's promises are but naked Assertions declaring his Will Durand that promises signifie not obligation Greg. Armin. That the Crown is no Debt but of free Ordination Marsil That God is no Debtor but free Giver Scotus Major Ricard deny God to be a Debtor by his promise but hold that Merits are such by Promise Ruiz saith against Suarez That Promises are more than Assertions but that God's obligation is to himself p. 276. Medina against Meriting Remission p. 277. Against Preparation p. 277. Contarenus judgment Fisher's of Rochester p. 278. The words of Tolet p. 280. The thirteenth days Conference with a Sectary Of the great errors sin and danger which many Ignorant Professors fall into on the pretence of abhorring and avoiding Popery p. 283. The sins of such as Calumniate sound Teachers as favouring Popery p. 285. Errors vended by some Protestants through an injudicious opposition to
but God himself 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man nor of the same formal Conception And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man and not as in God and so this to us is the prius significatum 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sence formaliter but only eminenter 6. And lastly That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man All this you must grant me or be singular and ignorant A. All this is past denial but proceed to the Case B. Do you differ from us de eventu whether there be a Hell or yet of the number of those that are damned A. No or if we do about the Case of Heathens that belongeth not to this Point B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of mens Damnation We say that God damneth no man but for Sin yea for Sin impenitently continued in to the last against all the mercy which tended to their Cure A. So far we are agreed But it 's not the cause of damnation which I speak of but the cause of the Decree B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth he willeth to do A. Yes God doth nothing without a will to do it at least consequently B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day which he willed not yesterday and so from eternity A. No we do not with Vostius make God mutable B. Good still you grant then that God damneth men that he damneth them for sin that he doth it willingly that he willed it from eternity And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity A. Not in esse reali but there was in esse cognito B. So now the game begins Thus the World is cheaâ—ed and troubled by Logical Notions and meer words Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing If nothing it is no Cause If any thing is it God or a Creature It can be no Creature because it is eternal If God you do but say That God caused his own Will A. It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin which causeth his Decree or Will B. 1. Even fore-knowledge it self say the Schools is but the same with knowledge and spoken say they but to the respect and sense of man There being neither priâ—s vel postoriâ—s before or after in eternity But this I now insist not on 2. It is commonly taken for blasphâ—my to talk of a Cause of God or any thing in God If Gods Will be his Essence it hath no Cause He causeth not himself being no Effect 3. If this were so as you say yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge * Vasquer in 1. Thâ— d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree Divinâ— voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem motivam per modum objecti sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud sed solam suam bonitatem Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem causam alterius italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam quia â—na est causa altâ—rius Non ergâ—â—â—â—â— mus an aliud â—â—â—â— ratio â—â—tiva Deo per modum â—â—â—â— ut velit nos prâ—dâ—stinare praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest Id. ib. disp 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujâ—s gratia ratio nolendi aliquid sed propter quod câ—tera esse vult Deus For Siâ— fâ—re-seen is no Sin and nothing is no Cause so that you your self resolve all into God And indeed what can be a cause of the first Cause or any thing in him Use not tergiversation and vain words now and tell me what you have to say A. A thing not existent but fore-seen may be â— moral Cause though not a physical and so fore-seen Sin may be to God B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God There is nothing in God but God To be a cause of his Will is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence And shall so base a thing aâ— Sin cause God 2. We are still at the cheating Game of playing with â—rbitrary Notions What mean you by a moral Cause If a true cause of moral Being that 's one thing If any thing that is not physically or properly but by moral imputation only a cause of any event that 's another thing The first you dare not own as if any thing which is nothing Sin not existent were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica It is really no Cause but that for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that â—â—â—â— equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word Cause equivocally your rule is false Nothing is no moral Cause You will instance in good destrâ—d in fine nondum existente c. But I answer you Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes which are never found but in an existent entity or subject A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum That which is not is not good or amiable Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause But if we will let go the toy and come to the matter It is no other good but the desire of good or the apprehension of the â—â—â—â—rity of good which causeth so that all the Cause is in the Agent 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge that when any mâ—n saith That sin which is no sin and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will he must needs mean no real cause Because to be a cause is tertium Adjectum and presupposeth to be That which is not is not a cause much less of God or of his Will A. I can shew you that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick For if this hold true then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings c. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin and save Souls to â—hose under the Promise before the Incarnation B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter but advantageth you not at all Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this that nothing can do nothing nor cause nothing It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering not yet existent that caused Gods Will tâ— pardon Sinners Nor had Gods Will any proper cause But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another he willed that
disp 92. c. 2. Certum est praedestinationem gratiae ipsam primam gratiam quod idem est non esse in nostra potestate sicut praedestinationis ipsius gratiae nullam causam aut occasionem ex nobis praecedere B. You wholly mistake and misreport us If we differ from you it is by going further from the matter of the Objection than you do your selves 1. We hold that God giveth many men power to do more than they do And consequently that he decreeth to give it them Men do not do all that they can do Indeed we hold That no man can do any thing which God doth not give him power to do and decree to give it him And dare any of you deny this There is no power but of God 2. I hold not that God hath any Will or Decree in proper sense Not to give Grace not to give Faith not to give Repentance Help Means c. But only that he doth not decree to give it where he giveth it not indeed But as Lombard afore-cited saith He neither Willeth nor Nilleth Aquin. de Repub. a. 3. q. 23. ad 3. Reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati Unde cum dicitur quod quod reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci non est intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem absolutam sed conditionatam it My Reasons are 1. Only Good is the Object of Gods Will and Evil of his Nolition But nothing is not Good nor Faith Repentance c. nor Grace evil Therefore God doth not will nothing or nill the said good 2. Frustra fit per plura c. It is presumptuous to feign needless Decrees and Volitions in God But the Decree of nothing of not giving Grace is vain For nothing will be nothing without any Decree or Volition of God as well as without any efficiency If God neither make nor will more Worlds more Sons more Men there will be no more though he have no Will or positive Decree that there shall be no more 3. No man knoweth where to bound the Doctrine of Decrees de nihilo And to make them infinite or boundless soundeth so presumptously and profanely that common reason doth disclaim it It is possible that there be as many more sands pebbles straws c. made as are It is possible to make every stone or sand an Animal or the choice of a thousand other things It 's possible to give each man and Creature the choice of a thousand other names places circumstances And must we feign in God a positive Will or Decree of every one of these possibles that they shall never be That this Sand shall not be a Man nor that Bird a Stone Id. ib. ad secundum Praedestinatio est causa ejus quod expectatur in futurâ— vita a praedestinatis scil Gloriae ejus quod praecipitur in praesenti scil Gratiae Reprobatio verâ— non est causa ejus quod est in praesenti scil culpae sed est causa derelictionis â— Deo est tamen causa ejus quod redditur in futurâ— scil poeâ—ae aeternae c. It is enough to conceive that Gods infinite Wisdom knoweth what is fittest to be and that all that he willeth shall be and that he willeth no more and therefore no more Creatures will be But he willeth to give power to free Agents to do or not do certain acts in specie and therefore they can do more than he decreeth they shall do 2. And as to the necessity of mens sin or misery you lay as much of it upon God as we that is no causal necessity at all as Rob. Baronius distinguisheth it well in his Metaphysicks To omit all the Distinctions of necessity which Hereboord and many others give us that we need not it is here sufficient to distinguish between meer Logical necessitas consequentiae in order of argumentation and Physical or causal necessity in order of Being God's fore-knowledge which you deny not inferreth the former For it is a good argument what ever God fore-knoweth will come to pass But God fore-knoweth the sins of all that sin Ergo they will come to pass The major is a necessary proposition and so is the minor therefore so is the conclusion But yet God's knowledge causeth not sin nor is it necessitated in any Dr. Twisse who goeth as high as predetermination doth yet grant Arminius that it is only necessitas consequentiae and not consequentis which Gods Decree or Will doth infer as to mens sin and misery and professeth that all the School-men say the same and blameth Arminius for pretending that we infer a necessitatem consequentis And the other Arminius owneth And are they not then agreed whether they will or not I doubt not but predetermination inferreth necessitatem consequentis causally though this be denied by them that hold it But so doth nothing which we assert The fourth Crimination A. You will make either the pure mass or man as man or the corrupted mass to be the Object of Predestination Election and Reprobation And so make God desert most men in Adam's sin as he did the Devils in their sin without remedy or hope * Vasquez holdeth in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 8. d. 9. q. 4. c. 2. that Christ merited our Election out of the corrupted mass not as Election is in God but in the Effect And that Paul Eph. 1. Elegit nos in Christo c. utitur nomine electionis quae est separatio illa a massa perditionis in qua multi relicti sunt B. These are words of confusion which when opened will appear nothing and that we are all of a mind Either you will distinguish Gods Decrees by the Objects or not If not you must not distinguish between Election and Rejection willing and nilling loving Peter and hating Judas c. If yea then you must not take up with the unexplained words Reprobation and Election 1. By Reprobation is meant either Gods Will to punish men 2. Or his Will to give them no special saving Grace 3. Or his not-willing to give it them For the first I told you before that the Object of Godâ— Will to punish men in Hell is a Sinner fore-seen finally rejecting Mercy 2. The Object of his Will to punish men with positive temporal punishments is the Sinner fore-seen in his immediate capacity for them 3. Whether punishment by not giving that Spirit for Faith Repentance and Holiness be decreed being nothing but a not-giving is before discust But if it could be proved yet the Object of Gods denying further Idem d. 95. 1. Ferrariens plane indicat Deum neminem damnare aut rejicere a regno suo voluisse quod ipse appellat deserere nisi pravisa culpa mercy and help is evermore one that hath abused former mercy or refuseth that as offered to him 4. But Gods non-Volition to give Grace iâ— no act and hath no Object But we judge
proponuntur dum simplicium animis injicâ—untur varii sâ—rupuli quos disputaâ—ionum ars eloquentia satis postea discuterâ— non potest And he mentioneth the things which he would have us take up with which we are agreed in viz. Quicquid boni â—obis â—nest a nobis fit Diviâ—ae graâ—iae deberi Deunâ— esse qui omne bonum in nobis operatur sine Christo spiritus illius aâ—xiâ—io in â—â—s quae aeternam salutem promovent nâ—bil nos quiâ—quam posse c. Dâ—um â—amen siâ— per gratâ—am suam in nobis operari â—t libertati nostrae niâ—â—l decedat â—mp o qâ—i male agunt nullâ—m occasionem habere aâ— Deo quaeâ—endi c. But these Reconcilers do but halâ— between two Opinions and while they will be of neither side they are likeâ— and loved by neither B. Blessed are the Peace-makers for they shall be called the Children oâ— God We will seek to please all men for their good to edification anâ— yet seek to please no man before God nor in sin nor place any of ouâ— happiness in their favour nor think much to bear their displeasure oâ— contempt For if we so seek to please men we are no longer the Servants of Christ If Gods favour were not enough for us he were not our God C. I am afraid your study of Syncretism or Concord will tempt you to warâ— and turn half an Arminian and forsake the Truth B. I thank you for your care of me and I wonder not at your fearsâ— as long as you mistake one another as you do As all persecution oâ— Gods Servants is raised by mis-reports and misapprehending them to be very bad and dangerous persons and as all sinful Schisms and separations in Churches arise from mens thinking one another to be very bad and unfit for communion Even so these factions and Church-dividing Contentions come from a false conceit that each side is so dangerously erroneous as that all good men must stir up their zeal and with all their disputing-skill and contending-fervency must arm to defend the Truth against them and to save the Church and the Souls of men from the infection of their Errour Since I saw the nature of these present Controversies it filleth me with shame and pity to think what fierce and fiery workâ— there hath long been what hatred slanders scorns persecutions what volumnious Contentions what Snares laid for young Students what factious Oppositions to each other among Pastors and People throughout much of the learnedst part of the Christian World and all in a dream for the most part about meer names and words or things that none of them at all understood nor ever will do in this World O subtile Tempter O foolish men even wise and learned men O lamentable Churches O miserable World C. I pray you tell me what good you look for by this attempt Do you noâ— know how many such have come to nothing B. I 'le tell you what good I expect I expect that here and there an impartial sober Divine should search into and find pacificatory truth And that divers Students not yet engaged in any Faction should discern it And that most of the idle ignorant and factious who find it most for their interest ease and honour to be servent for the Opinion which that party holdeth with whom they do embody will reproach my self and these attempts and call me a Calvinist or an Arminian or one that holdeth dangerous Opinions and self-conceitedly over-valuing my own apprehensions do trouble the Church and strengthen the Adversaries by pretended Reconciliation But I look that those that receive the Truth should themselves be saved from the guilt of all that uncharitableness faction and injury to others which is caused by mens mistakes And also that they should be a seed of Peace-makers to propagate Truth to Posterity till the Age come when God will heal the Churches and banish contentious Error from among them And in the mean time I look for peace of Conscience in the Service of God and in his approbation And it will be reward enough to live out of the fire of Contention my self and to escape the Feaver of that zealous Wisdom which is earthly sensual and devilish and with envy and strife doth bring in confusion and every evil work And to feel the sweetness of some of the Wisdom from above which is first pure then peaceable c. Jâ—â— 3. 14 15 16 17. And I am the more resolved not to omit my Duty through dispair for the experience which I have already had I remember the time when in the Country where I lived Sacraments and Discipline were neglected through the distances of the Episcopal Presbyterians and Iâ—dependants about the way of Administration and we looked strangely at each other I thought it our Duty to joyn in love and practice so far as we agreed and pass by the rest till we could better see our way But many years I thought I should be but scorned if I attempted it and so for bore it in dispair But at last attempting it almost all consented with whom I did endeavour this way of Concord and I found no conderable opposition and many other Countries began to follow our example After this I saw that whilst Ministers only preached publickly and spake but now and then occasionally with the people personally they were ignorant of their own Flocks and edified them but little and occasioned Disputes about examining them before a Sacrament and many other inconveniences And I earnestly wisht that they would set up the course of Catechizing and familiar Conference with all from Family to Family in order through each Parish And I thought that if a few Ministers should attempt this without the consent and concurrence of the rest they would but be contemned by the people But if all the Ministers of Reputation would consent it might happily go on But to motion such a thing I thought as vain as to attempt that which seemed next to an impossibility But when I did attempt it at last I found little or no opposition but the Ministers readily consented and other Countries began the like In so much that some Ministers of Helvetia sent to me their desires of setting on foot the same course there These instances confute dispair the great Enemy of all good and make me resolve to do my part in any good Work and leave the issue to God I confess and it s too well known that some attempts since these for concord between Church contenders in England were without success But they have afforded my Conscience that peace which doth abundantly compensate all my sufferings When I pray Thy will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven I mean Let us with the most holy alacrity perform thy preceptive Will and do our Duty and then with confidence expect and with complacence rest in thy disposing Will what ever be the event C. I have read your Undertaking and what you
may be said that God indeed is some cause of that without culpability yea by his Holiness and Power For as the Relations of Curvitude and Dissimilitude result from the Relate's fundamentum as compared to the Correlate or terminus so he that causeth any of them hath some hand in causing the Relation as a Relation And so God by forbidding Adultery Lying c. by his Law doth by Institution make those acts to be sin that is He layeth down the rule from which they are so denominated when committed That Adultery is committed is long of man that it is a sin when committed is long of God and man God by his Law and man by his Act. So that when you say God causeth not the essence but the existence or futurity you are so far out as that less of causality is to be ascribed to him as to the existence than the essence 2. But what is the existence but the essence existing or extra causas And what is it to cause sin but to cause it to exist And what is it to cause it to exist but to cause it or give it a being And what is it to will that sin shall exist but that the essence of it shall exist And what is it to will the event or futurity but to will that sin shall be And what more can man will or do about it to shew himself to be bad as Estius and others fully manifest C. I cannot but think that God may will that Act which is sin so he do not will it * Twiss Vind. li. 2. Digress 4. p. 201. Falsum est peccatum fieri ab hominâ— ut est peccatum Licet sit peccatum ut fit ab homine non tamen fit ab homine ut est peccatum hoc est sub ratione peccati Quanto minus in divinam voluntatem cadit cum hoc â—â— in humanam voluntatem competat as sin and so may cause it Quod peccatum but not Qua peccatum B. Here are three things before us 1. The common substratum or â—atter of the sin which is the Faculty and the Object and the Act only in genere act us or as not cloathed with the forbidden circumstances 2. The Act thus circumstantiated 3. The Relative form of sinfulness 1. No doubt but God doth cause all the first the Faculty Object and the Act as an Act e. g. In David's Adultery and Murder and Peter's denying Christ God gave them the Faculty by which they did it He â—pheld their natural power and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act But 2. The Act as thus circumstantiated he neither caused nor willed but permitted only that is that David should hic nunc lust after her that was another mans wife that he should vitiate her that he should choose out Uriah to the Sword that Peter should speak those particular words c. In the first sense God willeth the Act which is sin and the Faculty which is sinful but not in the second as sinfully circumstantiated And as for your Qua peccatum I tell you again few Sinners if any will it qua peccatum C. What say you to this undeniable Argument If God will not that Act which is sin he willeth almost nothing that men do For we sin in all someway or other And so God hath little to do in the world B. The last answer fully serveth to this If we sin in every Act yet all that is in every Act is not sin or prohibited All that is good in the Act is of God and willed by him But it is the prohibited circumstances of the Act which God doth not cause or Will which morally specifie it as sin As when I pray I sin in praying coldly unbelievingly with wandring thoughts God causeth not these though he cause the Prayer Or to come from compound Acts to simple Those wandring thoughts are not my sin as they are thoughts but as they are upon an undue Object A lye is not a sin as it is a word but as this word which is false And so in all others C. But some Acts are simply forbidden in themselves and not only in their circumstances Therefore if God there cause the Act he causeth the Sin B. No Act as an Act is forbidden but as circumstantiated by Object Time Mode Place c. Mr. Capell * Lib. of Tempt chooseth lying only as an instance of prohibitum per se But I answered before that all the Act in lying is Volition Intellection and Speech And these as such are not forbidden But only these particular words which are false The common instance is Odisse Deum But here hatred in it self is not the sin but â—s unduly terminated on God as the Object And this God willeth not C. By this you deifie man For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of And so man is made a first cause that is a God For the particularizing of the Object and the circumstantiating of the Act is aliquid something and must have some first cause B. The truth is this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants Which I have answered in due place and here briefly tell you 1. That when two Objects are before me a commanded and a forbidden one there is * I have noted after that Dr. Twisse saith Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile neque necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati And these have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale Armi. dic Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile jucundum in many instances And God maketh the Object e. g. Honey or Eves fruit and God maketh the Appetite so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity that is that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee But whether thou wilt eat it he hath left free so that if God also caused that determinate act he caused all And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law the Object and the man and thereby maketh that if thou wilt cause such an Act so disordered it shall be thy sin and misery so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin And they that ascribe the Act in suo modo to him ascribe all to him But as to Bonum utile he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile For it may be Conducibile ad malum interitum But it is not utile unless it be conducibile ad bonum yea ad finâ—m ultimum For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a mans ends or will And God is the Author
is the greatest Lover of Sin in all the world judge by their confuted words in the former Book 1. They deny not nor can do that Love and Volitiâ—â— in God are all one Gods Love is not a Passion but his Will 2. They say that God willeth that sin exist 3. And that as summè unicè conducible to his Glory 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good 5. That God is pleased finally in what he willeth antecedently 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being so is he in the greatness and power and efficacy of his Volitions 7. And that man loveth not nor willeth not evil as evil or sin as sin but for inferior good infinitely below Gods Glory for which he willeth its existence And is not this to say that he is the greatest Lover of it that is C. Yet it sticks with me that God should be the Omnipotent Governor of the World and all Sin which is the common work of the World should be without or against his Will Providence is wronged by this B. You mistake the matter 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their Free-will under moral Government was not from impotency as if he could have made man no better or more necessary an Agent But of his Wisdom and Freedom by which he made the Bruits without Reason and Stones without Sense 2. All sin is done against the Law or commanding Will of God which determineth only of Duty and not directly of Event But it is not done against his absolute Will de eventu For God is not overcome nor frustrate of his Decrees 3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the first â—ook that Gods Providence doth about mans sin and then you will â—ot say that he is Idle or neglecteth his Government unless he cause Sin I. It is God that made man an Intellectual free Agent in his own Image and the Lord of his own Acts as a Creature morally governable by Laws And so all his free power is of God who still upholdeth it II. As God is the Fons Naturae he is the Principium motus and he concurreth as the first cause to all Action as Action in genere and so to all that hath a physical entity and reality in sin And I do not believe that Aureolâ—â— Duraâ—d or Lud. à Dola thought otherwise though they differ in expressing the mode of concurse III. God giveth men all the mercies which they turn to sin and is the cause of all those Objects which they inordinately love and abuse IV. God himself concurreth with Sinners in causing the same effects which they cause also by prohibited Volitions and Actions as in generation c. even when custom giveth one name to the sin and the effect And that by all the ways fore-named and many more V. God as the Worlds Governor and Benefactor maketh mens sins the occasions of much good and ordereth and over-ruleth all Wills and Events so as not to miss of any of his ends But will attain all his ends while the Sinner seeketh his own VI. All this that God doth he decreeth to do And all that Sinners do he fore-knew And neither his Wisdom Goodness or Power is ever over-come by sin or defective in any thing about it And is not all this enough for you but yet God must be the chief willer of sin C. I confess that God can govern the sinful World by this much B. Take in but one thought more which I afterward suggest Ockam laboriously endeavoureth to prove that the outward Act hath no peculiar sinfulness in it self distinct from that of the Will I have told you my Opinion of his tenet But this is granted him that no outward Act hath any sinfulness but secondary and participative as animated by the Will and that sin is primarily in the Will alone Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alledged by Dr. Twisse and Rutherford it is not the Will of the Sinner that God is made the Author of but seemingly of the Act indeed of the Effect Now God cannot be the cause of any mans sin unless he cause the sinful Volition But I have anticipated our Dispute of Providence in all this because it is here usually handled as the matter decreed And therefore when we come thither you must excuse me from repeating it or pardon what you put me to do The sixth Crimination C. My next offence against them is that they make Gods Will and Decrees conditional and so make God dependent upon man B. This is opened in the Second Book * Vasquez in 1. Tho. disp 91. c. 1. Cum quaeritur an divinae praedestinationis detur causa qu. non est de actu divinae voluntatis quatenus est ipsa essentia divina res increata sic notant scholastici omnes clarum enim est divinae praedestinationis hoc modo non esse causam sed est de effectibus Et perinde est quaerere causam praedestinationis ex parte nostra atque causam aliquam totiuâ— effectus praedestinationis in nobis quae effectibus illis non sit annumeranda Nam si quidpiam ponitur effectus praedestinationis nequit illud ulla ratione esse causa totius effectus In Deo 1. Ipsa essentia Dei 2. Respectus rationis ad res cognitas et volitas Hic nascitur ex objectis Ejus igitur possunt esse causae Indeed they differ not from the Synodists or Dr. Twisse himself I think in this That is 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations Promises and Threatnings in his Word 2. And that God may truly be said to Will and Decree his own Word and all that is in it with its conditional mode 3. And as Aquinas and Twisse and all say Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc sed non hoc vult esse propter hoc Gods Will doth not depend on the Condition but Gods Will is that the Effect or Event shall depend on the Condition When the Condition is performed it is not a medium of Gods Volition but of the Effect 4. But yet this all must confess that as to the bare extrinsick denomination from the Object as Gods Will is variously denominated from things past present and future so it may be from absolute and conditional Grants and Promises which you will not deny but God hath made 5. And in case of sin and damnation sin fore-seen is an objective condition disposition or qualification sine qua non of such as Gods velle damnare is immediately terminated on as they confess at the Synod at Dort and Molinaeus there openeth in his judgment at large C. But this decreeing upon fore-sight of somewhat in man maketh God to follow the Creature and depend upon it B. It maketh him no way dependant at all For the Creature neither causeth any Act of God nor hindreth him from any thing which he would do It is
peruse the Citations of them in Jansenius and see specially Alex. Al. 2. p. q. 72. numb 3â— a. 3. Aquin. qu. 10 de Potent a. 2. ad 1. ejus sequacem Viguerium Institut c. 3. sect 3. vers 1. Cum plu ibâ—â— aliis Thomistis Bonavent in 2. d. 7. 4. 3. d. 25. q. 2. And the Scotists and some Nominals I have else-where cited Especially Reader if you would see more on the Subject Ripalda nameth you enow Expos Magist l. 2. d. 5. qu. 12. that go several ways But note with Jansenius de Grat. Salv l. 6. c. 37. that the necessity of voluntary acts as Scotas saith is not previous to the Will that the Will should be thought to fall under necessity as impelling it to and fixing it in the act For if it were so Voluntas ageretur non ageret nec staret in tali actu libertas sed est necessitas concomitâ—â—â— it a quod ipsa intelligatur cadere sâ—b voluntate sic quod voluntas propter firmitatem libertatis sua sibi ipsi necessitatem impoâ—it in eliciendo actum in perseverandâ— If we are agreed in all these twenty particulars and that in some of them we are under necessity and in some next to it and in others are under no small dangiâ— and that none of all these denied is the Liberty of Will which you contend for we are very unhappy if we do not all agree of the necessity of Gods Grace and if yet there remain any other sort of Liberty about which we must needs contend I pray you now tell me What Liberty it is that you accuse your Brethren for denying Is it a Liberty to good or unto sin A. Both 1. They make mans Will necessitated to sin and good to be impossible to it And 2. They make Gods Grace to work so irresistibly as to take away the liberty of sinning B. 1. What necessity is it that you mean Is it more than in all that aforesaid your self hath granted 2. And who thinketh that man obeyeth Grace and forbeareth resistance or committeth sin for want of either Power or Liberty O that we could be so happy as to take away our own and other mens Liberty to sin and to resist God and to undo themselves A. Tell me first what Liberty of Will you maintain and then I shall best tell you in what in we differ even as I have told you what Liberty we deny B. The method is convenient I. We grant that we have a Will which is naturally a self-determining Principle and Lord of its own acts able to determine it self with due Objects and helps without extrinsick predetermining physical motion either of God or Creatures II. We grant that this Will hath the command of other faculties respectively that is of some politically as they use to say and indirectly or imperfectly and of others despotically or directly and more perfectly III. We hold that this Will is directly and properly subject to none but God IV. For instance neither Angels or Devils can determine it antecedently to its own self-determination to its hurt though Angels may help it and Devils may tempt it V. No men by the greatest Power or Violence nor by the subtilest Oratory or Deceit can necessitate or predetermine it though they may do much to induce it to self-determination VI. No Objects though they necessitate the sense and appetite and the first apprehension of the Intellect can necessitate the Will to Election or comparative self-determination nor do Objects carry us by necessity as they do the Bruits VII Neither our external or internal senses or imagination can predetermine or necessitate the said elective or comparative Will VIII Though our passions and motions of the Spirits may much molest and hinder the Will they cannot necessarily predetermine it in the said election and comparative acts IX Though the Intellect may direct it to that which it will determine it self to in some cases necessarily ex principiis naturae and in others not necessarily and being it self deceived may mislead it to mischoosings and refusings yet is it not the commander of the Will but the guide as the eye to the Body which causeth us not to go but to go the right way And being it self under the Wills command quoad exercitium doth not efficiently predetermine it nor can necessitate it to sin or misery unless it be first the culpable unnecessitated cause it self X. And as none of these can necessitate the Will originally to evil Acts so much less can they necessitate it to any evil habits or inclinations nor take away those that are good XI I hold that this Free-will is joyned with necessity not constrained but convenient by its nature or inclination 1. In the specification of simple Volition of our own felicity 2. In the specification of simple Volition or Love to sensible good as such 3. In the specification of the Volition of that which is fully perceived to be the only means of our only felicity and to be only good But that it is separated from natural necessity and such necessitation as is before denied 1. In its subjection and love to God as its Creator or first efficient of good 2. In its love to and simple Volition of God as our Ultimate end 3. In the election of any end where divers things are Competitors to be our end besides our felicity whether God or the Creature 4. In the election of means where divers are offered 5. In the exercise of the act of intending our end 6. In the use of the means and commanding the imperate faculties therein XII I hold that this Liberty of the Will is of three sorts though but two are commonly held 1. Contradictionis vel exercitii viz. Velle aut non velle nolle aut non nolle 2. Contrarietatis seu specificationis quoad Actum viz. Velle aut nolle hoc 3. Competitionis vel comparationis i. e. Contrarietatis seu specificationis quoad Objecta viz. Velle aut hoc aut illud nolle aut hoc aut illud vel hoc potius quam illud XIII Out of all these freedoms of the Will it self resulteth the Liberty of the PERSON usually called largely Liberum Arbitrium or Free-choice which is 1. That no man can be compelled to moral good or evil against his Will 2. No man can deserve Rewards or Punishments of God against his Will 3. No man can be happy against his Will nor unhappy unless it be the Cause XIV All this that I have hitherto named is but mans natural liberty as a man which all men have and is part of that common natural Image of God which differenceth us from Bruits and is mentioned Gen. 9. 6. XV. Besides this there is a political or civil Liberty according to which no Man or Angel hath power to command us to sin against God or to cast away our Innocency or Happiness or undo our Souls XVI And God as our Governour
doth not only give all men leave and liberty to be holy but offereth them Life and giveth every man his choice whether he will repent and live or refuse Grace and perish And much more then Liberty he giveth them by Commands Threatnings Promises Mercies Means Helps Intreaties Afflictions c. urging them to repent and live XVII And this political Liberty containeth a freedom from all punishment from God to those that cause it not by wilful sin And more than so a certainty of the Reward of Glory XVIII Besides these fore-mentioned Liberties natural and political there is also an ethical or moral Liberty from sinful Habits and Acts And of that we hold that every man is delivered from these sinful Habits and Acts so far as he hath and useth Gods Grace And so that the sanctified are delivered from the reign or servitude of sin XIX And we hold that yet the habits of Grace do not necessitate this or that particular act of Obedience or Love but it is too possible to sin by Omission or Commission notwithstanding these habits XX. And we hold that the ordinary habits of Vice in the wicked do not absolutely necessitate them to this or that sinful Commission in particular at least not to very many sins but that it is possible for them to do some Duties and forbear many sins notwithstanding Original and superadded pravity XXI I add to the XI Sect. before as an instance that mans Will is not by any natural necessity determined to will it s own felicity by the comparate electing Act of the Will but hath Power and Liberty to refuse or nill it This many will think strange but I am sure that it is true For man was made and redeemed and is sanctified for a higher End than his own felicity yea more than one even the Glory and Pleasing of God and the common Good And reason telleth me undoubtedly that I ought to love that best which is best in it self and that if my annihilation would conduce to the saving or happiness of the World or of one Kingdom or of thousands of Persons I ought to consent to it for such ends yea were it but to keep the Earth from perishing and the Sun from being useless to this World And though God in mercy hath so united my felicity with his Glory and the common Good that there never will be use for such an option or choice yet it followeth not thence that I may not say that hypothetically if I were put to it such a thing is possible and would be due And as Paul said I could wish my self accurst from Christ for my Brethrens sake the Jews not I do wish it but would this save them I could wish it because the salvation of thousands and their Service to God is better than Ours even so may we Annihilation is inconsistent with Felicity But Annihilation might and should be chosen before the Annihilation of the World or the perdition of millions if God had called us to it Yea Christ that saith It were good for that man that he had never been born implyeth that a damned man would choose it as a minus malum yea many a one that I have known my self desired it Therefore it is a thing that the Will may do XXII And as another Instance I need not prove that the bonum sensibile which is necessarily loved or willed by some complacency or simple Volition is not necessarily chosen but may freely be rejected Otherwise no sin scarce could be avoided All these sorts or Acts of Free-will we hold and are agreed on And are we yet unfit for concord and coalition for want of acknowledging the freedom of the Will A. I must confess that you have acknowledged much B. And I confess that so have you on the other side I pray you now tell me where lieth our disagreement A. You overwhelm me with Distinctions and numerous particulars so that I suspect you do but by this dust intend to blind our eyes A man may make any thing good by such minute distinguishing and atomizing matters to make them imperceptible Did you deal plainly I could answer you B. Is this an answer fit for a learned or ingenuous man Is confusion plainness with you such plainness too many plani have deceived the Church with and set well-meaning Christians together by the ears so that the Christian World hath long pleased the Devil and found him sport as fighting-Dogs and Cocks do to men and all by the cheats of ignorant confusion Kingdoms and Factions fight about words which they never understood Like the consulting Physicians who could not agree whether their Patieâ—ts Ischury should be cured by Succinum or by Electrum or by Carabe or by Ambarum and the poor man died because they could not consent If I distinguish vainly or falsly sine differentia cannot you shew where the vanity or falshood is How can you tell it is false or vain if you know not where the falshood or vanity is Will you say It is somewhere but I know not where Let that answer from others then to all your reasonings seem sufficient Your reason is false and your argument naught but we know not were the falshood lyeth A ready confutation fit for our Church-troublers I have purposely in the First Book given you all the distinctions about Liberty which I use in an orderly Table that you may easily understand them by seeing them together so that if there be falshood or vanity in them they are open to your easie search and view Tell me what freedom is denied you or else for shame contend no more A. They hold that Original Sin doth necessitate all the unregenerate to do evil and to forbear good so that they cannot possibly forbear Sins of Commission or Omission II. They hold that Grace doth irresistibly neâ—â—ssitate the Elect to believe and love God and forbear Sin so that they cannot do otherwise B. I. Stay a little 1. You must distinguish of several sorts of Good and Evil 2. And of several sorts of Necessity 1. I hope you will not think it false vain or curious to distinguish between 1. An ungodly course of Life and some one particular act of Sin 2. The omission of the predominant Love of God and a course of holy living and special saving acts and the omission of this or that commanded act 2. And I hope I may advise you to distinguish between 1. A constrained Necessity against our Will and a voluntary Necessity of diseased vicious inclination 2. And between a necessity in sensu composito and in sensu diviso 3. And between an uncurable and a curable necessity And then I answer I. We hold that an ungodly man by his Original and superadded pravity is so strongly and fixedly inclined to a sensual ungodly life that in sensu composito while he is such he will certainly live such a life in the main course of it And do not you think so too
Deum quoque Affectus nostros partem illam sensitivam corrigere bonis desideriis quorum objecta monstrat intellectuo actus vero imperat voluntas afficere Quibus affectibus magis magisque correctis castigatis in ordinem redactis promptior facilior ac minus impedita postmodum redditur voluntas ad exerâ—endos pietatis actus non usque adeo ut ante reluctantibus affectibus lege illa in membris belligerante Qui asserunt eum quem Deus movet ad actum bunc necessario aut illum necessario agere Alij vero pertendunt nulla proprie dicta necessitate illum ad agendum impelli Verbis quidem discrepant idem autem reipsa seâ—tiunt Blank de Libertat Absol Thes 22. See his proof following They deny the Unregenerate to have any power to believe repent or to do any good And so they feign God to command men things impossible and to condemn men for that as Sin which they could not possibly avoid and for not doing that which they could no more do than make a World and so to put men under a necessity of sinning and being damned B. This is in sense the same with that about Liberty fore-going though under the other notion of Power But the truth is it is the very core and true sum of all our Controversies and if I prove this to be nothing but words I shall prove them all so about the four first Articles I will here take it for granted that you speak not of any meer Passive or Obediential Power as it 's called but of a proper active Power and that truly so called and not only hypothetically on supposition of things to make it up which are not existent nor to be supposed I know of nothing in the Soul of man for our enquiry but 1. The natural-faculties or virtues inclined naturally to their necessary Objects 2. The right disposition or adventitious inclination or habits of these faculties 3. And the Acts. Tell me first Do you know of any more A. Not that I can remember B. It is therefore the Faculties or Dispositions that we differ about or nothing For it is not the Acts Tell me then Quest. 1. Do you â—now of any that deny all mens Souls to have the three faculties of Active Power or Life Intellection and Volition which the Thomists say are Accidents immediately and inseparably emaning from the Essence and the Scotists better say are the very formal Essence of the Soul it self without one of which a man is no man A. No none doubt of this in sense though some number them as three and some but as two B. Do we differ about the second Do you believe that a Drunkard hath the habit of Sobriety or a Fornicator of Chastity or at least that an ungodly man hath a holy habit or disposition to love God and trust him above all and to believe in Christ and repent of Sin and live in Holiness A. No no man saith that he hath such a habit But he hath a power to do them though not a habit B. Is it any thing that you call a power besides the natural faculties and their habits or dispositions A. No but the natural faculty is still a power to believe love God live holily c. without a habit B. Do you not believe that an ungodly man is disposed yea habituated to the contrary viz. To a fleshly and worldly mind and life and against a life of Faith and holy Love A. Yes at least some are And I will not deny Original Sin and therefore grant such a dispositive pravity in all though not so much as in some is superadded But yet these ill dispositions and habits are not so strong but that the Sinner can for all that believe and repent c. B. No doubt but if he believe not it is not for want of natural faculties He hath an Intellect a Will and a vital and executive power And these all have that force or strength of natural activity which is necessary to Faith Love and every holy Duty For these are the unalterable Essence or Properties of man as man And if Sin deprived us of them it should change our Species And if Grace gave them it should restore our Species and we should be men by Grace only and not by Nature But you confess that these powers want their right disposition to act A. But yet I say that this undisposed ill-disposed Soul is able to act contrary to its accidental disposition B. I tell you once for all that the shaming and ending of all the Controversies between the Synodists and moderate Arminians or Jesuites lieth in the true opening of the ambiguity of this one syllable Can And unhappy is the Church when its Pastors have neither skill nor love enough to forbear torturing and distracting it by one poor ambiguous syllable not understood by the Contenders But to compel you to conviction Quest. 1. Do you mean by Can or Able or Power any thing besides the natural faculty and the disposition A. No I mean the natural faculty as related to this Act or Object now in question e. g. believing and loving God B. Quest 2. Is not natural strength or power a thing belonging to man as man which Sin destroyeth not and Grace restoreth not And have not all the Churches disowned Illyricus * Beâ—a angrily calleth him Turpis iste Illyricus and Peucer and Strigelius and other Disciples of Melanchthon have defended the moral causation of Grace against him and such Lutherans who went too much the other way though a very learned laborious godly Divine for making Original Sin the substance of the Soul it self A. All this is granted you B. Quest 3. Therefore if Adam had natural power to love God and if the sanctified have it yet doth it not follow that all men have it Because it belongeth to man as man and is not changed by Sin and Grace except in its Dispositions and Acts A. Thus you make all the wicked able to love God B. Yes As to that sort of Ability which is but the natural faculty they are all able but there is somewhat else they want A. But the Name Power you confess your self is Relative to something that is to be done or to an Act with its Object And when the natural faculty is not changed but is the same in all men yet the Relation of Power in it may be changed as by a change of the Object * Casp Peucer Histor Carcerum against the Lutherans physical motion asserteth pag. 720. That Concurrentibus in conversione his tribus causis verbo spiritu S. volantate hominis agentibus suo loeo ordine viribus in homint quamqam ex se natura sua prorsus invalidis ad spiritualia rationalibus tamen inter se differentibus eoque ordine quo conditae sunâ— a sp sancto per media verbi sacramentorum in ordinato Legitimo singulorum
Volitions is done by a suitable external means As by a more clear and lively awakening Ministry by some notable Providence especially by surprizing sufferings and distress A Thief when he is taken or judged a Fornicator when he is found in the shame of his Sin a Prodigal in Jail or want a Drunkard or Glutton when he is brought by it to the Gout or other pain and sickness c. have quite other apprehensions usually of the folly of sinning than ever you could bring them to before by any other the certainest convictions VII As we are certain by experience that the Acts called Intellection and Volition now are such operations of the Soul as ever stir and use the Spirits and we perceive both together as if it were a compound operation and know not by experience what any Knowledge or Volition is which useth not the Spirits so we find by true experience that the suscitation of the said Spirits or igneous particles in us much conduceth to the suscitation of the faculties of the Soul By which fervent speaking and awakening Providences do much And also that they that have clear and quick Spirits are easiliest awakened VIII We find also by experience that the internal sensitive faculty hath a great share in these effectual operations For the certainest apprehensions of the Intellect work but defectively on the Will unless they are accompanied with or stir up some Sense Affection or Passion either Fear Hope Love Desire Delight Anger or some other proper passion And Volitions themselves are but sluggish uneffectual Acts as to the imperium or command of the executive Powers or Thoughts unless they stir up some Passion to their aid And therefore lifeless wishes are common with sluggish and unreformed men IX The Spirit of God can and we have reason to think sometime doth stir up the faculties of the Soul to holy Cogitations Apprehensions and Volitions without any other means known to us than what the person before used uneffectually And when means are effectual to sanctifying Acts it is principally by the operation of the Holy Ghost and less principally the aptitude of the means X. The first received influx ad actum is not it which we call a Habit For a Habit is a fixed promptitude to act XI An habit in the Intellect is skill or intellectual promptitude to Act rightly and easily An habit in the Will is inclination and love it self radicated or aversation and radicated hatred And a habit in the vital executive Power is a promptitude and vivacity to the right executing of the Wills commands and first exciting it to act XII A habit infused is of the same Species with acquired habits though it be otherwise caused and of a more excellent use And in both we have reason to think that the Act goeth before the Habit Though the Holy Ghost can fix a Habit by one Act when acquired Habits are caused but by custom or many Acts. XIII In the strict sense as Acts so Habits are specified by their Objects and are not found but in such Species But in a larger sense and less proper we may say that there are more universal Habits not denominated at all from any sort of Objects that is the right Diposition of the Soul to its due operations But this is but an inadequate universal conception of the same Habit and not another thing I think XIV A habit of the Intellect about Principles is a Disposition to the knowledge of conclusions or consequents And a habit of the Will ad finem is a Disposition to the choice and use of the known means but not strictly a habit to them XV. Motion tendeth to further motion One Act of the Soul disposeth it to or furthereth another And as water that hath got a Chanel and is set in motion floweth still the same way and fire by burning the more forcibly proceedeth to burn so the Soul by acting the more readily holdeth on that course of action XVI The Soul hath at once more Acts than one and upon more Objects As at once it understandeth and willeth so at once it operateth on and towards the end and on and in the means But one of them specially ad finem is usually deep and not observed sensibly by the Agent And the other is uppermost and using the sense and fantasie more and the Spirits is easily perceived And so a man in his travel hath a deep unobserved but most constant and ruling Knowledge and Volition of his end or home though yet he seem to himself seldom to think of it but only of things obvious in his way XVII By all this its easie to perceive how hard it is to have the formal knowledge of the quiddity of a Habit when we have presupposed all this before-said 1. That the Soul is essentially of an active nature and as naturally contrary or averse to cessation or non-action as a stone is to action 2. And that it hath inseparably in its nature an inclination to Truth and Goodness as such and to its own felicity 3. And that it hath multitudes of exciting Objects and extraordinarily awakening Preachers and Providences specially dangers and sufferings naturally apt to excite the Soul into act 4. And that it hath the use of the sense and sensitive passions which things sensible are apt to excite by which it may be it self excited 5. And that it hath a certain degree of necessity of knowing by simple perception things received by the sense and fantasie men may know much of Good and Evil Duty Sin Danger whether they will or not 6. And that the Will hath a natural inclination to follow the Intellects apprehensions about Good or Evil in its Volitions and Nolitions though not always necessarily 7. And that the Soul excited to one Act is the more apt to another of the same sort 8. And that a cursus actionum with the fore-said inclinations is like a course of corporal motions which strongly tendeth to continuation so that they that are accustomed to do evil hardly do well 9. And that the potentiae secundae the sensitive powers and the Spirits by custom attain the same propensity to that way of action in themselves and so become to the active Intellect and Will what the Chanel worn by course is to the Torrent or River which with the natural gravity causeth the continuance of its course that same way Or as a Horse trained by custom who hath got his own peculiar habit is to the Rider 10. And that the Soul hath its profound or not noted Action which is constant and maketh so little use of the spirits sense imagination or passion as that it is unobserved while it is predominant such as is the aforesaid intention of the end in the use of means And doubtless the Soul is never unactive an instant no not in sleep but hath this kind of deep insensible action It is knowing it self loving it self intending its own Felicity deeply secretly insensibly
and believe or not is never the more ascertained for Grace if it give men but a power For you leave it still to Free-will to use that power or not use it I speak but of some of you 2. And hereby you contrive Grace into this conception that it is but some common thing like nature and as a man that hath power to sit or stand or go may use that power as he will himself so all men where the Gospel cometh have a power to obey it which they may use as they will But to the Will it self Grace giveth but this power And if that were true that a habit of the Will were but a power to will fair fall Pelagius A. It 's well you charge us not all with that Opinion But I confess I am not yet satisfied that it is false and that the Will hath any thing but power and act But power facilitateth the act B. You may say it facilitateth because â—it maketh it possible which is easier than that which is impossible Is that facility But mark 1. If that Opinion be true then 1. Gods inward workings are not suitable to his outward means For his means are Perswasions and Exhortations and Mercies and Corrections which are not only to make men able but willing And if they make them willing they do in primo instanti dispose them to be willing and then procure actual willingness and then fix the Will in an habitual propensity 2. If that Doctrine be true then a habit hath no moral good or evil in it it is no Virtue or Vice And then there is no Virtue or Vice that is no such thing as moral Habits but only Acts. For no man should call meer power or impotency which is neither habitual dispositive or actual willingness or unwillingness by the name of Virtue or Vice It is not goodness meerly to be able to do good nor evil to be able to do evil unless as eating walking may be good or bad materially by participation so far as voluntary 3. If that Doctrine be true the Will as a Will should be an unsanctified or unrenewed faculty further than it is found in action For its disposition is its holiness and rectitude 4. And a man should have no Grace in his sleep or when he is minding natural things alone unless you will say as I hinted before that sleeping and waking he hath still a Latent insensible Volition in act which is it that we call a habit But if you acknowledge such a habit even a fixed latent deep constant act inclining to other holy acts the strife then is but about a name 5. It is certain that the Soul hath in it besides power and observed acts a natural inseparable inclination The form of the Soul is not only potentia but potentia seu vis vel virtus inclinata Man is not only able to love good as good and felicity as such and sensible Pleasure as such but he is inclined to it And if there be such a thing as natural inclination or propensity besides power and act then 1. It is possible and probable there may be a gracious inclination 2. Yea and if the whole Soul be sanctified must not its inclination be sanctified 6. Why else are we said to be New Creatures and have soft and tender hearts and to be made partakers of the Divine Nature Nature in active things is a principle inclined to action and not only able for it And surely a Divine Nature can signifie no less than an inclination to holiness and the love of God 7. Whence can you imagine that a wicked man should rise every morning so ready to go on in wickedness again that sleep doth not end his sin yea that he is so obstinate in such acts if besides the act he hath nothing but a power to do evil If you say that it is also a disability to do better or forbear 1. You will extenuate his sin by saying that he can do no better 2. Experience telleth you that his sin is sensuality And Appetite inordinate which ruleth him is more than Power Impotency or Act It is also an inclination to that Act. 8. No doubt but each faculty hath Grace suited to its nature and use And therefore as the potentia vitalis activa executiva hath its power and vivacity so the Intellect hath Illumination and the Will holy Love in disposition and in act 9. Lastly The Scripture calleth that which is given us by the name of the Spirit of God and I would the Church would hold to that name and say Men have or have not the Spirit of holiness But the word Spirit cannot be judged to signifie nothing but power and act Yea it is expresly named in reference to our three sanctified faculties the Spirit of Power and of Love and of a sound Mind 2 Tim. 1. 7. And the Spirit of Love or Adoption Gal. 4. 6. Rom. 18. 16 26. is not only a power to love A Child hath more than a power to love a Father It is a filial loving nature which is called our regenerate state And if it were only the Act also why is it called a Spirit and Nature A. To confess the truth you have said much to prove that we have ill managed this Controversie about Power and Impotency to repent and believe And for my part I mean hereafter to use most the common and Scripture phrase and say as to the efficient that men have or have not the Spirit and as to the effect that Power Disposition or Inclination Act or Habit are things to us observable in the Soul and that cannot and will not must not be confounded And if it be moral or logical Power that I speak of I will mention it properly as it is in the effect or event called Possible or Impossible rather than as it connoteth the faculty called Potent or Impotent thereto lest I deceive men And I will let them perceive an impossibility of consequence from an impotency of sufficiency For I know that when it 's true that logically in ordine dicendi it cannot be that is be true that God fore-seeth or decreeth that Peter will not sin and yet that he will sin yet it is not true that Peter had not power to sin But I proceed The third Crimination A. They make man so corrupted and that by Adam's sin without his own consent as that there is no good in him But he is dead in sin And so all men should be utterly and equally wicked B. * Melanct Loc. Com. de lib. arb c. 7. Etsi peccatum Originis vitiat naturam non prorsus aufert eam nec delet nec mutat eam in aliam speciem Et sp sanctus non abolet sed adolet naturam non destruit sed sanat Et Ambros de Voc. Gent. l. 1. c. 3. Nec quia spiritu Dei agitur ideo putet se libero arb carere quiae nec tunc perdidit quando
diabolo voluntate se dedit a quo judicium voluntatis depravatum est non ablatum Non enim homo voluntate sed voluntatis sanitate privatus est cum a diabolo spoliaretur cum igitur homo ad pietatem redit non alia in co creatur substantia sed eadem quae fuerat labefactata reparâ—tur The answer to the former might serve to this But still I see that Names must be our quarrel Is the question of the Thing or of the Name whether it be to be called Good 1. As to the thing they deny not that there are first notices and common principles of morality in all mens understandings 2. Nor that the Intellect is inclined to truth as truth 3. Nor that the Will is inclined to good as good 4. Nor that natural Conscience doth somewhat for God and Duty and against Sin in bad men 5. Nor that a Heathen may have as much good as experience proveth some of them to have had as Antonine Alexander Severus Cato Cicero Seneca Epictetus Plutarch Socrates Plato c. 6. Nor that common Grace when the Gospel cometh may prepare them for special Grace and make them almost sanctified Believers In a word almost all agree that 1. Nature as now upheld by Mercy may have all the good aforesaid 2. That common Grace with the Gospel may go further 3. And that it prepareth for special saving Grace If you deny this you accuse them contrary to the fullest evidence that you could expect whilst our British Divines at Dort tell you so largely how far universal or common Grace goeth in this preparing work and when there are such a multitude of Treatises written by the strictest English Antiarminians on two Subjects 1. Of preparation to Conversion 2. How far an Hypocrite or unregenerate Person may go in Christianity the Title of one of Perkins's Books 2. But if it be de nomine whether this may be called good it is a question unfit to trouble the Church with All are agreed that is materially something commanded by God partly conformable to the Law of Nature or Scripture and that it tendeth towards the well-fare of him that hath it and of others and is better than its contrary But if we mâ—st set up a metaphysical Theater to dispute de ratione Boni by that time on as good reason we have prosecuted our disputes de ratione entis uniâ—s veri also we may fall out with all that agree not in Suarez his Metaphysicks or at least in Aquinas or Buridanes's Ethicks I pray you begin your self and tell me what is bonum goodness in your question A. You shall not tempt me into so difficult a metaphysical or moral dispute which I know the learned are so little agreed in For you would but make use of it to insult over me B. And yet is this one of your Accusations of your Brethren that they agree not with you in the sense of such a word as you dare not definitively tell your own sense of Moral good in man is his conformity to the holy regulating Will of God by resignation of our selves to him as our Owner subjection to him as our Ruler and love to him as our End or perfect Good with all the exercise of these Now 1. In the strictest sense men say Bonâ—mest ex causis integris and so where there is any sin there is not good in that sense that is unmixed perfect good And in that with a more transcendent sense Christ saith That none is good save God only I hope you will not quarrel with him for it And yet the Papists commonly reproach the Protestants as teaching that all that we do is sin and no good because we say that all is mixt with sin and imperfectly good I profess for my self that I never loved trusted feared obeyed God in all my life without imperfection And I take that imperfection of my love to God c. to be the great and grievous sin of my Soul so that I groan out all my days the last dying-words of Arch-bishop Usher Lord forgive my Sins of Omission And if the School-men almost agree that moral evil is privatio boni me-thinks a Papist should hardly dream that his greatest Faith and Love have no degree of such privation 2. But as the word Good signifieth that which is sincerely so though imperfectly being more predominant in heart and life than the contrary evil and proveth the persons acceptation with God and right to Salvation and is the imperfect Image of Gods holiness repaired so all and only the sanctified are good 3. But in the third sense as goodness signifieth such Inclinations and Actions as are good but in a low degree and bad predominantly so none deny but bad men have some good Inclinations and Actions And de nomine here Divines agree not either Protestants or Papists some and most commonly call all such Actions good in their degree Others say That quia finis deest none of it is to be called properly good It may end all to say that it is good analogically as accidens is ens or secundum quid though not simpliciter The fourth Crimination A. * So do the Jesuites as you may see in Vasqu in 1. Tho. q. 23. passive They damn multitudes of Infants for Original Sin which they could not avoid yea and the Adult too as necessitated by it to sin for the prevention or cure of which they have no remedy especially all the Heathen World in comparison of which from Adam's days till now the rest are very few so that they make the World to be made or born purposely for unavoidable damnation in Hell fire B. Here are several things which must be distinctly spoken to I. Of Infants II. Of the state of the Heathen World III. Of the necessity of sinning IV. Of the necessity of punishment for sin Of these in order 1. For the case of Infants there are three questions to be handled 1. Whether they have Original Sin 2. Whether they are worthy of punishment for it 3. Whether they are punished for it and how many and how 1. For the first I have proved in a peculiar Disputation that Infants have Original Sin that is moral Pravity in disposition with their participation in the guilt of Adam's sin as being seminally and virtually in him And I find you not yet denying it 2. For the second no Christian doubteth I think but that all sin deserveth punishment But the desert of Actual Sin and of Original Sin are as different as the nature of the sin Habitual or Dispositive Pravity is a Dispositive preparation or worthiness of punishment And actual Sin is an actual preparation for it but all deserve it that is are Subjects morally fit for it to demonstrate holy Justice 3. For the third Scripture and experience put it past controversie that Infants suffer For 1. They are deprived of the Spirit of Holiness as quickly appeareth by their early practice
comparison of the ratio poenae in it But I much suspect that there is much Logomachie in the controversie and that it is mostly de nomine peccati non de re For I perceive some of them conceive of peccatum as a word that hath only an active signification from peccare And because an Infant doth not peccare actualiter therefore they say that Original Sin is not strictly called Peccatum meaning that the Name properly agreeth only to an evil Act. And can a Controversie de nomine make a heresie Ask them these Questions 1. Whether an Infant be not animal rationale liberum as having the same natural faculties with the Adult 2. Whether he be not then capable of virtuous and vicious Dispositions 3. And whether these are not bonum malum morale If he be not capable of malum morale than neither of bonum morale And if so then not of Holiness nor any moral aptitude for Heaven any more than a Beast This they all deny and therefore must needs say that their vicious inclinations are malum morale adapting them not only physically for physical evil but morally for punishment And truly if they will call Sin such a moral evil I will not break communion with them about the sense of Peccare C. But Amesius tells Grevinchovius that it may be proved by good witnesses that he denied Original Sin which Dr. Twisse many times over and over reciteth contra Corvinum B. As the instance of three or four single persons is nothing to my business so I am no judge of any such Reports unless I had heard the witnesses my self I have had so many notorious lyes confidently reported of me by men not contemptible that it hath taught me to be backward in receiving any Accusations and judging before I hear the accused Especially a man that writeth much is more to be judged of by his Writings than by Back-biters Reports C. But Episcopius is no way to be excused Nor Bishop Jer. Taylor who copiously plead against Original Sin B. Therefore they are not the persons that I have now to do with but have else-where as copiously proved Original Sin and confuted such Arguments as they use But the chief of my Arguments they touch not The second Crimination C. They say that man before regeneration can do that which is spiritually good and hath power to use his naturals well so that by degrees he may thereby come up to a state of saving Grace or be fitted to be a Believer And that some can believe and repent that do not Whereas the Scripture maketh men dead in sin and out of Christ we can do nothing B. This unhappy CAN I tell you is our Cannon that battereth our Peace and Love and pardon me if I tell you as I did them that I doubt whether you understand well what it signifieth Tell me Quest. 1. Have not wicked men natural life Or are they dead C. No man doubteth of that B. Quest 2. Have they not natural powers or faculties for natural Acts C. Nor is that denied by any man B. Quest. 3. Is it not the same natural faculty of Intellection by which we understand and believe things common and spiritual And the same natural faculty of willing by which we love or will them both C. Nor is that questioned by any B. Quest 4. Is there not such a thing as common Grace distinct from and short of true Regeneration or Sanctification C. Yes we are all agreed of that B. Quest. 5. Is there any Nation or People in the World that are not obliged by God to use some means towards their own Conversion and to forbear their Sin C. No doubt of it but they are obliged to perfect Obedience and they are specially obliged to repent and use some means thereto B. Quest 6. Is there not such a thing in the World as a true power to do something that never is done and forbear what is not forborn C. I know not what to say to that An hypothetical power and secundum quid so called there is But of proper power I doubt Dr. Twisse against Hord li. 1. p. 71. saith Suppose all men had power to do any good If God will not give them velle quod possunt is it possible that they should velle bonum if God will not work it in them B. It is a logical impossibility of consequence nothing to the purpose which also fore-knowledge would infer But as to real power denominating the Object possible it is a palpable contradiction to say I have true power to do an impossible thing when to say I have power to do it and to say it is possible to me are all one Else-where Dr. Twisse can say that Gods velle eventum is not necessary ad possibilitatem sed ad eventum Do you doubt whether Adam was able to have forborn the sin and so sinned for want of power to do otherwise C. An obediential and passive power he had and faculties that were able hypothetically if God had predetermined them by premotion and effectual Grace But of the rest I doubt B. We will not be diverted with empty words A dead man hath an obediential passive power as the School mean it An hypothetical or conditional power is no power when the condition is not existent If you say Adam could not but sin you make his standing a natural impossibility and God the cause of all his sin whom he could no more overcome therein than make a World And will men then believe that God hateth that sin which he unresistibly causeth and sent Christ to die for it and will damn men for not doing natural impossibilities C. Well! suppose as commonly we do that Adam was able to have stood and consequently that there is a true power in the World that 's never acted B. Quest. 7. Is no man by Nature with common helps and Grace able to do more good than he doth and forbear more sin C. No doubt he can if he will But the doubt is of his Will B. Quest. 8. Is no man by Nature and common Grace able to will the doing of more good and forbearing more evil than he so willeth C. His Will hath natural power but it is contrarily disposed B. Quest 9. Can no man by Nature and common Grace notwithstanding the undisposedness of his Will yet so far restrain or prevail against his undisposedness as actually to will and do more good and less evil than he willeth and doth C. If Adam could have forborn all sin I must think common Grace Pâ—aecipitur nobis bene agere non quod possimus ex nobis illud facere sed quia si faciamus totum quod in nobis est semper Deus paratus sit facere quod in se est Aegid Colum. Quodl 2. qu. 30. p. 121 122. Nostrum est enim secundum Damascenum sequi Deum vocantem ad virtutem vel diabolum vocantem ad malitiam unde Damas l. 2.
Faith is become necessary when a man hath it necessitate existentiae But the asserting power to sin and to be an Unbeliever I will never charge on the Arminians when I would blame them for advancing man C. But it is a power to overcome Gods Grace which they assert B. Read but Dr. Twisse his judgment of Resistance and you will call it no more an overcoming any otherwise than a weight overcometh my strength which I can lift up and will not But I tell you I will not be cheated with ambiguous words 1. Either you mean an active or passive overcoming 2. And either you mean an overcoming of Gods utmost exerted Power by a greater Power or you mean an overcoming of Gods Will and his Power exerted with an absolute Will of efficiency or you mean the non-efficiency or non-prevalency of such an Act of God as cometh without any Decree or absolute Will of prevailing but with a Will of leaving the success to mans free Will as in Adam's case 1. Speaking improperly you may say that all men that are not softened convinced converted by the means which God thereto appointeth overcome God in that they overcome the means 2. Thus in not-repenting not-believing not-loving c. the less power any man hath the more he passively overcometh as a hard stone overcometh the Hammer that breaketh it not 3. No Arminian holdeth that man is stronger than God and overcometh his Power by a greater Power Out of Bedlam none have such thoughts that are awake 4. None of them think that any Act of Gods Power is overcome or is unsuccessful which is exercised with his absolute Will or Decree of prevailing or of the effect 5. But they think that in some cases yea ordinarily Gods Will is freely to exert no more of his power towards the causing of a commanded act than what shall give man a power to obey with some assisting motives and leave the success or effect to his free Will That God doth so sometimes is proved by the case of Adam Now whether you will call this overcoming or not and whether you will say Adam overcame Gods Grace or Gods Grace overcame not Adam's Will is but a Logomachy The thing in question is nothing but sinning against that degree of Grace which enabled man to have done better But all this belongeth to the controversie of Grace and not of mans power unless you think sin a powerful honourable act C. At least in this they over-value mans power in that they hold That mans Will hath power to determine the influx of God and so man shall rule his Maker when Gods influx or premotion shall but leave it to the Will of man what shall be the success B. This toucheth physical predetermination and needeth no other answer than is oft given 1. You wrong them They hold not all properly that mans Will determineth Gods Will either as to the essence of the Divine Will or as to the Act connoting the meer Object But only that it can determine of a common effect which Gods and mans Free-Will would produce if both concur 2. They do not think that mâ—â—â— Will hath any the â—least operation causally on Gods Will in it self but only that variations are made by variety of recipient dispositions where the influx of the Agent is universal and equal And so that mans receptive indisposition may be a cause that Gods Influx work not the same effect on him which it would do on a disposed subject 3. And they say not this of Gods absolute Will and Power but of his power operating restraiâ—edly by his own free Will when he will exert no more than what shall be successful only on a free concurring and disposed Subject and not on a resisting undisposed one It pleaseth God that the Sun shall operate but with a common Operation variable in the effects by the various disposition of Recipients The Flowers spring and are sweet and Weeds stink Trees grow and Stones grow not humanity is acted by it in men and not in Fruits God could have made the Influx of this Sun to have been causa specialis and to have turned a Weed into a Rose or a Stone into a Tree if he had pleased but he doth not Now will you say that we are erroneous and over magnifie the recipient if we say that its disposition is the cause of much of this diversity and that the stone is stronger than the Sun and overcometh it No the Sun did all that was properly intended Its beams came down on the Stone as well as on the Animals and Plants It warmed it though it did not quicken it So God doth his work on the Will of Sinners His Influx is terminated on their Will and had he sent it with a resolution to convert him it should have done it But seeing he sent it limitedly only to enable a man to Will and to concur so far as shall prevail if he do what his own Will is able to do by self-excitation it s no overcoming God if the man sin Once more I say that men that fear God should be very cautelous what they say in all Controversiès which are resolved into the nature of Divine Volitions and their way of efficiency Seeing 1. Will in God is not the same thing as in man an Appetite 2. It s own determination and the way of its determining us are confessed by the subtilest to be utterly unsearchable Saith Vasquez in Thom. q. 19. disp 80. p. 503. Quo autem pacto Deus seipsum determinet ad hoc potius quam ad illud ineffabile sane est nisi-quod nostro modo intelligendi intelligimus essentiam Dei quae est ejus voluntas habere circa futura peculiarem rationem voluntatis cum respectu illo rationis Et ideo dixi in hac controversia intelligi posse certa ratiocinatione Quid not sit Quid tamen sit quo pacto voluntas determinetur explicari non posse So that what Gods Act of willing or working is besides his essence and the effect they all confess that they are ignorant And yet shall the more ignorant contend The third Crimination C. They hold free-will to good that unregenate men have free-will Austin li. 1. de Gâ—n Contr. Manich. c. 3. professeth That all men may believe if they will and justifieth it in his Retractations But if the Will of man be corrupt and averse from believing we justly say such a man cannot believe yet this is an impotency moral only which is to be distinguished from impotency natural For notwiâ—hstanding this it may be truly said that all men may believe if they will And herein consists the natural Liberty of the Will The moral Liberty consisteth rather in a sanctified inclination unto that which is good whereby it is freed from the power of Sin and Satan c. But I never find that Arminians do distinguâ—sh these Twisse against Hoord li â— p. â—â— without Gods special Grace and
Objects C. I say not so For Objects are not efficient B. True as Objects they are not Therefore they effect not Therefore they do not necessitate properly which is an efficiency Indeed they are but causae quasi materiales actus in specie seu individuo and constitute it and no act is without its Object But they effect it not C. Doth not the Sun effect our sight by its light B. Yes but not as a meer Object for so it only terminateth and constituteth it as the matter But it causeth it efficiently as an Agent C. Well! I will suppose that so far as a wicked man is necessitated to sin it is his pravity that doth it circa objectum ut sine quo non and not the Object it self efficiently and in proper speech B. Quest 9. Is the Will efficiently necessitated by the senses or phantasie C. No otherwise than as by the Objects which they do present B. Quest. 10. Is it so necessitated by the Passions C. I know not whether I may say the Passions do it or its own pravity when the passions do disturb and tempt it B. Quest 11. Is it so necessitated by the Intellect C. So Camero and several others thought and consequently by the Objects But I have many reasons against that Opinion quoad media in comparate elections But the Intellect may necessitate it circa finem 2. And quoad media in specificatione etsi non quoad exercitium actus B. 1. Quoad finem it is not the Intellect that necessitateth but the natural inclination of the Will Intellection is but a previous act sine quo non 2. Where there is no exercitium actus there is no specification Therefore you can only say Non specificatur sine ductu intellectus but the Will can prevent that ductum intellectus if not suspend its act also after it Quest 12. Can any one but God by force impress ill habits on the Will C. No we were miserable if any could make us wicked B. Quest 13. Will God ever make any such evil habits in the Will C. As a habit he may cause it but not as evil B. Quest 14. Do you think that a Sinner is necessitated to every sin that he committeth or to every Duty which he omitteth so that he could not do otherwise C. I think he is under a necessity of sinning but I cannot say it of every sin which he committeth B. You before granted many things to be in the power of the Will And can you deny that power to be free that the same things are in its liberty I will tire you no more but desire you 1. To peruse all your former concessions about mans power And 2. To peruse all the twenty Concessions of A. Confer 5. Criminat 1. where he denieth Free-will in all those senses and then tell me where is the difference C. They think that our freedom is inconsistent with necessity but so do not we who think that Decree and Predetermination do necessitate B. I have forced you before to confess your concord here A Logical necessitas consequentiae in ordine probationis Arminius and almost all men confess doth result from meer prescience And Dr. Twisse professeth that neither the Protestants or the School-men hold any other necessity to result from Decree or Predetermination C. But the pravity of the wicked necessitateth their Wills to evil B. 1. Not to all evil For 1. Men commit not all 2. And you before confessed that men can do more good and less evil than they do 2. The truth is as I distinguished power before into Physical and Moral so must we do Liberty and Necessity The Will hath its physical Liberty and is free from physical necessitation in all the sin that men commit and in all the good they do I think though not from all Divine predetermining necessitation to good Men do not good and evil as Bruits do their acts But the Will hath a kind of moral necessity of doing evil by radicated habits and hath no further moral Liberty than it is freed from the power of those evil inclinations But these habits necessitate not physically but morally and that only to some sin but not to all A man can act contrary to a good or evil habit as common experience proveth But because mens Volitions and Actions are ordinarily or much agreeable to their fixed inclining habits therefore we use to say that morally such can do no better meaning that they will not C. But sure you would not have me believe that there is no difference betwein us and the Arminians in the point of Free-Will B. If there be any either you know it and can name it your self or you know it not and then may be ashamed to contend about it Quest 1. Tell me plainly Is not all the Liberty which you deny a moral Liberty a malo from sinful dispositions of the Soul C. There is much dispute about Liberty from Divine predetermination But I will not meddle any further with that I never contended against any Free-will but freedom from sinful habits as supposed to be in men more than it is B. Quest 2. Do you not hold then that all men have Free-will so far as they have effectual Grace and Sanctification C. Yes in that degree For voluntas per gratiam liberata est libera B. Quest 3. Do the Arminians hold that the VVills of the graceless and unsanctified are freed from sinful habits and so are morally free to holy acts C. No I confess they do not Corvinus and others oft say that it is Grace that giveth us the vires credendi which we had not before But some of them deny any habits to be in the Will But these say the Understanding must be enlightned before we are able to choose aright B. Quest. 4. Doth not common Grace give men a moral Liberty to common good from all necessitating inclinations to the contrary C. Igranted it before as to Power and therefore must as to Liberty B. Where then is the difference between you C. I take it to be here that the Arminians and Jesuites say that the Wills of the Unregenerate are not only free to common preparatory good acts but to the special acts of Faith and true Repentance and Conversion unto God which we deny B. Either you mean this of all unregenerate men or but of some 1. Of all they say it not For the Synod of Dort chargeth them but with saying that men can use their naturals so as by degrees to come up to Faith They commonly hold that ordinarily the Will must be prepared by commoner Grace before it morally can believe though such are freely Unbelievers having a natural liberty or power to the contrary though undisposed and have a moral power and liberty to some preparatory acts 2. But if you mean it of those that are come up to the highest preparatory acts and also have Gods Grace ad posse credere where there is the
posse morale there is moral Liberty so far But whether this be really any mans case or how many to have Grace to enable them to believe who yet never do believe is a Controversie which I find not Protestants apt to meddle with And it is too hard for us to decide C. That is the very heart of the Controversie whether ever God give immediate Power and Liberty to believe to any one who never believeth and useth it B. Where do you find this Controversie much meddled with unless by the School-men who assert sufficient uneffectual Grace to believe But this belongeth to the next Article of Grace though here you anticipate it But if this must be it I shall briefly dispatch it 1. Adam's instance hath already made you confess that such a thing there hath been as Grace ad posse non ad agere called sufficient but uneffectual Grace And your confession of all the foresaid powers that men have by common Grace to do more good and forbear more evil than they do yieldeth that yet such a sort of sufficient Grace ad aliquid there is 2. The course of Gods Administrations maketh it seem most probable that some and many have such a meer sufficient Grace to believe and repent For if Adam had such a Grace enabling him to have fulfilled the whole Law of Innocency it seemeth proportionable that the Rector of the World give some such a Grace to fullfil the mediate Law of believing and repenting who use it not 3. It 's common with Dr. Twisse to cite Augustine with approbation as saying Posse credore est omnium credere vero fidelium and to make this the great difference of effectual Grace from that which is more common that it giveth not only the Posse velle credere but the Act. 4. But yet because we can know no more of Gods secret workings than he discovereth I take it to be dark and dubious But that this is certain that whoever wanteth the power or liberty of Will moral to repent and believe they are penally denied it for not using that power and liberty which they had to inferior preparatory Acts. And you can carry this Controversie of Free-will no further And is it not then a horrid shame to hear honest people so seduced into Love-killing factious sidings by their Teachers as that Boys and Women speak of wiser and better persons with disaffection and reproach saying O he is a Free-willer or he holdeth Free-will when they know not what they talk of but are made believe that it is some monstrous impious Opinion making a man almost an Heretick VVhen even you that lead them are unable to shew me any proved at least considerable difference at all C. Are there so many Books written de libero arbitrio between Jesuites and Arminians and us and yet is there no difference B. 1. I do not say that no man that ever wrote of it hath wrangled himself into any words of ill signification or taking up any more than is defensible 2. But if the main Controversie be not Logomachy why do not you tell me what the real difference is It is not fair-dealing to make me ridicuous for calling to you to name the difference and yet your self refuse to name it and make it good VVill you assert what you know not and accuse men without proof The fourth Crimination C. They hold that the Unregenerate are not dead in sin and void of all spiritual good * Of this read Milancthâ—n's Answer to all their Objections in Lâ—â— com de liber arâ— c. 7. and Strigelius on him B. Do you think that they differ from you herein This was spoken to before 1. They hold that the Unregenerate have natural life and so do you 2. They hold that their faculties are bonum naturale and so do you 3. They hold that common Grace is bonum morale at least Analogically so called and so do you Indeed as bonum is ex causis integris none on Earth is morally good no nor doth any thing that is bonum morale because it is imperfect and so our defective holiness is not bonum morale in that sense But as good is so called from the predominant Will the godly have bonum morale And as it is denominated from that which is not predominant yet real in the VVill the Unregenerate in their common Grace have bonum morale For common Grace is not meerly quid physicum nor meerly sin 4. De nomine whether we shall call this spiritual good or not when we have a Grammar written from Heaven or by Apostles we shall have more mind to dispute with you But I told you once already that 1. As to the efficient it is spiritual that is common Grace is wrought by Gods Spirit 2. As to the end slightly and uneffectually wished it is spiritual But as to the truest end the pleasing and glorifying of God predominantly and effectually willed and intended it is not spiritual 3. Nor as to the manner if the exercise of such an intention be called the manner Tell not men that we differ because you can bring forth ambiguous words and there dream of a difference but plainly tell me Are not you and they thus far agreed and is not this all that 's in your charge The fifth Crimination C. They hold that man is not meerly passive in his first Conversion to God which is contrary to us and to the Truth B. VVhen will the Lord give his Ministers as much skill to heal as to wound to find out real concord as to make differences in their Dreams and Fictions Do you think indeed that you differ in this point * The Jesuiâ—es with the other School-men commonly distinguish with Augustine the Grace which sine nobis in nobis operatur from that which after cum nobis operatur The first they call Operantem the second Co-operantem The first preventing the second con-comitant the first infused the second governing the first exciting the second Adjuvant Of which see Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp 88. c. 9 c. Alvar. l. 12. disp 116. p. 473. In omni libero arbitrio creato qua ratione creatum est reperitur aliqua indifferentia seu potentia passiva secundum aliquam rationem Nam 1. Lib. arb creatum non est purus actus nec lib. per essentiam ' ut Deus 2. Ex sua natura est percabile 3. Non est impliciter primum se movens sed movet se libere motum tamen a Deo prius rationâ— Here a Jesuite Vasqu 1. Tho. disp 12. n. 4 Prima gratia non datur bene laborantibus neque expectantibus neque quâ—rentibus ut definitur Concil Aransic 2. Can. â— 4. 5. 6. sed sedentibus in tenebris umbra mortis C. Or else I must think that we may be ashamed to shew our faces to the people if we make them believe that we differ when we do not and thereby
Grat. Univers p. 113. saith Sed non quemadmodum Pomificii alii qui eorum sententiam vel sequuntur vel interpolant nobis imponunt ita ut plane negemus sufficientis Gratiae phrasin posse usurpari aut dicamus nullam esse sufficientem ullo modo quae efficax non sit vel nullam esse efficacem quae ad conversionem salutem non sit efficax Id tantum dicimus non dari omnibus talem Gratiam sufficientem quae ita moveat omnium hominum voluntates ut sit in potestate electionis motioni aut obtemperare aut resâ—agari adeoque nullum esse qui per talem gratiam non possit ad salutem pervenire Deumque id velle omnibus intendere You see that he will own no more but the denial of a universal sufficient Grace for Salvation intended of God to all men And you your selves confess 1. That God intendeth not Salvation for all men unless conditionally if they believe and repent which from eternity he knew before he made them that they would not 2. And that all men have not sufficient Grace to Salvation no nor to believe but only to make them better and bring them nearer it and prepare them for it which some call Grace mediately sufficient to Salvation but that 's an improper Speech as long as for want of their Obedience they never attain to much that is absolutely necessary For my part I doubt not to assert 1. That no man in the World hath Grace sufficient for Salvation that is Glorification an hour before he dieth For he cannot be saved without more that is without the Grace of perseverance to the end But every believing Penitent hath Grace sufficient and effectual to give him a present Right to Salvation And 2. I add that there is no such thing as Grace sufficient to Salvation which is not effectual and doth not save Seeing all that persevere in holiness are saved and they that do not have not Grace sufficient that is necessary to Salvation 3. And I add that no man hath Grace sufficient to give him a Right to Christ and Pardon and Salvation which is not effectual and doth not procure it For every penitent true Believer hath that Right to Christ Pardon and Life And he that is not a penitent Believer hath not Grace sufficient to obtain that Right A. Yes if he have sufficient to help him to believe B. Not so unless he actually believe For is not Faith in act somewhat more than power to believe When you confess that men are damned that have the Power but not that have the Act. A. Yes but man causeth the Act oft when God hath given only the Power and necessary concurse to the production of the Act. B. Corvinus and others of you ordinarily confess that Faith it self is the Gift of God and that Faith is more than a power to believe And we denominate Gods Grace by the various effects Therefore I may say that a man that hath Grace sufficient to believe yet hath not Grace sufficient to Justification till he have 1. The Grace of Faith 2. And so the Grace of the moral donation of the Covenant which is the justifying pardoning Instrument A. You seem then to deny sufficient Grace your self B. I assert 1. That godly men have power or sufficient Grace to many acts of Faith Love and Duty which they never do 2. And that all men by common Grace or sufficient are able to do better than they do in preparation for special Grace 3. And that they are bound so to do in order to their Salvation And so that all men have some helps and Grace in its kind sufficient to enable them to seek Salvation and that God will not forsake them till they forsake him * But I am not able to prove what Vasqu asserteth in 1. Tho. q. 23. disp 98. c. 4. Nunquam occurrere nobis obligationem praecepti aut tentationem sine sufficienti cogitatione qua hanc vincere illud observare possimus Loquor de praeceptâ— affirmativâ— cui non solum tempuâ— adest quo solet obligare sed etiam cujus obligatio memoriae occurrit And he addeth a great untruth Nam si nulla illius in mentem subiret cogitatio nulla nobis ejus obligatio inâ—umberet unless by sufficient Grace he meant meer natural power and by cogitation the natural power of cogitation this is odious As if a man were bound by no. Law of God or Man if he could but make himself ignorant contemptuous and wicked enough never so much as to think of iâ— A. But doth not your Church of England Art 13. say Works done before the Grace of Christ and the Inspiration of his Spirit are not pleasant to God forasmuch as they spring noâ— of Faith in Jesu Christ neither do they make men meet to receive Grace or as the School Authors say deserve Grace of congruity yea rather for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done we doubt not but they have the nature of sin B. This Article is intended against merit of congruity in the works of wicked men And it is certain that all their works are sin in that they are in defectiveness of ends and manner and in perverseness the violations of the Law of God as to pray to God only to be saved from Hell without love to God and Holiness or hatred of Sin to give Alms for the same ends c. where the love of God the true end is left out the action must needs be sin But we say not that it is only sin or totally sin It is good and pleasing to God secundum quid though not simpliciter And such Actions as are sin by deficiency may have a tendeney to better Actions and so to Salvation by that good that is in them He that in meer love to his own Soul will pray hear meditate avoid sin c. is in a likelier way to Grace and Life than he that will do none of this And 2. The Authors of the Artiâ—le by merit of congruity meant somewhat more than preparation for Conversion For no English Divines I think have denied that 3. And by Works done they meant such as the Papists taught men too much to trust in as giving Alms building Hospitals going on Pilgrimages c. which went under the notion of Sacrifices and Oblations under the old Law when God said He abhorâ—d the Sacrifice of the Wicked and bid them be readier to hear than to offer the Sacrifice of Fools But it is not I think Soul-humbling Repentance Confession begging for Grace considering their Ways hearing the Word c. though but such as preparatory Grace may do which they meant by Works 4. And that is not done without Grace and the Spirit of Christ which is done but by his common Grace And yet I could wish the Article had been better worded But if you will see the consent of an
nearer Salvation and do better than they do though not immediately to do all that is necessary to Salvation And he that can do it if he will and also hath power to will it is said to have sufficient Grace which if he use not the fault lieth in his wilfulness 2. The Act nor the just Disposition or Habit they have not But that is their own fault who had those Means those Objects and that Power by which they could and might have attained them C. Is any one ever converted by this sufficient Grace or not If not frustra fit potentia c. If yea then it is effectual Grace B. Now you have brought the Controversie to the parting point where the two Parties use to part As you may see in Dr. Sanderson and Dr. Hamond's Letters I will first answer your Consequences 1. Non frustra fit talis potentia though it never act For 1. It attaineth other good ends though it attain not their Salvation 2. If one of a thousand should not use their power or if a thousand to one do use it that varieth not the case For it is still as much vain to that one man as if no one used it But 2. So far as it is vain that is to their own Salvation they make it vain themselves and must blame themselves 3. I ask you whether you think not your self that 1. All wicked men by common Grace 2. And all godly men by special Grace have power to do more good and forbear more evil than they do If so Do you hold that all that power which they never use to any of those omitted acts is vain If not why should this in question be accounted vain But to the great difficulty it self I answer 1. You must not forestall the Truth by any of these false suppositions 1. That there is any man to whom God giveth a meer Power neither disposed nor provoked to the Act. For 1. Mans natural faculty it self besides natural power hath all these aptitudes to the Act. 1. Man hath self-love and a desire of felicity and an unwillingness and fear of Hell and Misery and of all that he knoweth doth tend to it as such He can seek for Glory Honour and Immortality Rom. 2. And therefore God thus argueth with men Ezek. 33. Turn ye why will ye die And 1 Pet. 3. 10. He that loveth life and would see good days c. as making use of a common principle 2. Man hath reason to understand what is told him of Good and Evil in some sort and Nature containeth a Law written in the heart Rom. 3. by which the Heathens did much of that which was written in the Scripture 3. Man hath a Conscience to accuse and excuse 4. He hath misery and necessity to move him which may be known to him by common light and experience 5. Sin as sin is in common disgrace in the World And Nature teacheth Mankind to distinguish moral Good and Evil so that the worst do not love and own sin as sin And did not Satan hide it with some vail of goodness he could not draw them to it Even those that murdered Christ did it on a false pretence that he was a Sinner 6. Mans nature hath an enmity to Devils and a fear of them And therefore will fly from evil so far as they perceive the Devil in it for the most part For he is their known Enemy 7. Lastly All do known that they must die and that this World will serve them but a little while And they have great experience of its vanity and vexation And Nature teacheth most and the Gospel much more that mans Soul is immortal and therefore that there is a Reward for the Good and Punishment for the Bad hereafter 2. And as depraved Nature it self hath certainly all these advantages for good so God addeth by his Works and Word many vehement Motives Perswasions and urgent Exhortations Examples Mercies and Corrections And all these may give the Soul much more than a bare power to many good acts For many such are really done by bad men And to others they are almost perswaded when they disobey 2. You must not suppose that just the same degree of means or help is necessary to one man as to another or to the same man ever at several times For one mans Soul may be more undisposed and ill disposed than anothers And the same mans more at one time than at another And temptations and impediments may be greater at one time and to one man than another Experience assureth us that less teaching will inform one mans understanding than anothers C. Have not all men the same degree of Original Sin What can be said more of any than is said of all that they are dead in sin B. 1. The same word Dead may be used of all if it were words only that you plead for But that word proveth not that all are equally either guilty or corrupted For though Adam's sin be the same to all yet I have before told you and shewed you besides Scripture Augustine's judgment for it that there is also a participation of Guilt of nearer Parents sins by Infants And consequently of Pravity Were it but the ill temper of body which many Drunkards and Adulterers convey to their Children experience telleth us that it doth much in hindering the Soul And all are not equal in this derivation of Original Sin 2. And Adam's sin with all other being pardoned to faithful Parents is in them pardoned to their Infants dedicated to God And we have reason to think that where the Guilt is pardoned the Vice is not equally transmitted as to others that are not pardoned in their infancy 3. And it is not only Original Sin but much additional Pravity and particular habits of sin contracted by practice which is the impediment of Conversion 4. Yea and actual sin it self which temptations stir up as well as those habits 5. And also the great guilt which all those acts and habits do contract by which Gods Grace is yet more forfeited All these are a great disparity and shew that more Grace is necessary to some than others C. Well! Go on with your Answer to the main Question B. My Answer is that if you will not turn Vorstians but will receive the common metaphysical School Divinity about God to deny which is commonly called Blasphemy by all Parties I do not yet see any place for a disagreement For the Question Whether the same measure of Grace which we call meerly sufficient is ever effectual is meant either 1. Of Gods Agency or Influx as it is Agentis 2. Or of the Means 3. Or of the Objects 4. Or of Effects in the Soul * Malderus in 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. d. 8. Omnis gratia excitans est efficax rata respectu sui effectus formalis quo homo excitatur quem sine consensu libero in homine ponit non enim potest gratia
proportion of gracious means * Protestant Divines do commonly conjoyn the operation of the Spirit and Word as well as Papists and in some cases more Thom. docet q. 22. de Ver. a. 8. Deum inclinare Voluntatem ad aliquid appâ—tendum eam â—fficaciter physice praedeterminando non solum immediate sed etiam mediate aliqua entitate recepta in voluntate ex mente D. Tho. Deus movet omâ—â—s causas secundas eas applâ—â—a ' ad suas operatioâ—â— ita ut etiam quando â—â—â—â—â—t voluntatem aliquid â—â—â—imit in illam per moâ—â—â— transeuntis Alvaâ—ez de Aux disp 23. p. 114. and helps than to others but leaveth them under the common helps which convert the more prepared Souls Not that God always doth so For oft times to his Elect he doth as he did by Paul or the Eunuch vouchsafe them extraordinary means For as a Benefactor he is free and may do with his own as he list and may make Vessels of Mercy and Honour of them that deserved worst And the case of the Tyrians and Sidonians compared with theirs of Capernaum and Bethsaida doth prove that less means are proportionable to some as being less ill-disposed when greater to others may be uneffectual III. And then as to objective Grace it being the same God the same Heaven the same Christ and the same Promise which is set before all that have the Gospel this cannot be the Controversie Though the revealing means be divers with many so is not the Object nor the Means to all IV. All that remaineth then to be questioned is the Effect which is subjective Grace whether that Grace in one man which is but sufficient be efficient in another or in the same man at several times And here by this subjective Grace is meant either 1. The vis impressa 2. Or the Power 3. Or the Act produced 4. Or the Disposition or Habit. The two latter are shut out of the question which is not whether the Act or Habit be sufficient and effectual but whether the Grace be so that is to cause them Whether this vis impressa be always caused by means with Gods Power set home as the impress of a Signature by the Arm and Seal or be caused immediately by God without any proper means the word being but a Concomitant and not mediate Operator is made a Controversie by some But he that well considereth the Scripture here abouts and the experience of man will be likelier to think that it is God by means that ordinarily maketh the impress on the Soul and that the same impress is the effect of both though extraordinarily God can do without means For 1. It is most likely that God should work on man most agreeably to his nature and to his subject state under God his Governor 2. And Christ himself as our Teacher and Example and all his Gospel are appointed to this use 3. The Ministry and Ordinances are appointed to the same end And Ministers commanded to fit their teaching to that end 4. No man can prove that ever any came to actual Knowledge Faith or Love but by some means Experience telleth Gods Servants that he worketh by them 5. The most apt and powerful usually have best success and those prosper most in Grace that use means best and those speed worst that use them least 6. God strictly commandeth the use of the means as means for that end that his Grace may be wrought by them 7. God promiseth his blessing on the means Act. 26. 17 18. 1 send thee to open their eyes c. Rom. 1. 16. The Gospel is the Power of God to Salvation 2 Tim. 4. 16. Thou shalt save thy self and them that hear thee Jam. 6. last He that converteth a Sinner saveth a Soul from death c. 8. When God forsaketh a Nation by taking away the means he usually forsaketh them as to further Grace 9. The Devil seemeth to know this by his earnest opposition to a holy powerful Ministry and other means throughout the World so that we may say with Cypriam Epist. 69. ad Pupian Ut etiam qui non credebant Deo Episcopum Constitâ—enti vel Diabâ—lo credebant Episcopum proscribenti But whether it be by means or not it must be somewhat different from Gods own Essence which is imprinted or communicated And to get a formal conception of it what it is if it be not the Power Disposition Act or Habit is past mans reach Whatsoever it is this is certain 1. That God doth not give an Act as a thing pre-existent but giving Faith is but causing us to believe or do that act our selves which was none till we performed it 2. That quoad effectum disposed Power and Act also are more than Power and Disposition without the act 3. Undoubtedly Dr. Fairfax Of the Bulk c. of the World pag. 5. 6 7 c. Though God be the Maker of every Being that is physicaly so it follows not that he is so of every Being that is morally so It is enough that God is the Maker of the Power to do evil which being good may spring from him c. All that God doth towards sin is to leave us to our selves to bring it forth if we will and instead of driving on to it as a fellow-helper or procatarktick cause he draws from it and towards the good with unspeakable endearments of wooing and drives from it by forbidding the Evil with all that earnestness of threatning which may beget in man the utmostness of dread Nor is he any nearer the physical cause of it than to give that good power which is not the cause at all as it looks towards him for by giving this power he is at the same time the evil is done as much the cause of the good that is not done therefore he is not the cause at all Besides this power is not only good but also needful For though the the perfection of the Will in the next life will not be in a wavering alike towards Good and Evil but only in a selfwillingness to Good yet in this life I think it mainly does and must For this is a life of doing or believing as it looks on to reward in that to come and that is a life of rewarding as it looks back to doing or believing here c. Hence we may answer the old 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For â—s sin is a moral thing c. unbounded Wisdom and Goodness having â—aid out endless happiness as a reward for Obedience and endless wretchedness as punishment for sin without this Obedience there could be no Heaven without Sin no Hell And without a power not to do in both there could be neither So then that God may have leave to make man happy for holiness man must needs have power to make himself wretched for sin That evil should always flow from evil in a chain of Breeders is a great misunderstanding Object Then man may
thank himself too for all the good he does that Being as much of him as the other c. Answ It follows not For 1. Of all the good that man doth God is still the moral Cause egging on to it by all c. 2. And the same Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightning the Mind renewing the Will healing the spring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it and in a word making it every way more it self God must be more an Owner than man And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will because it flowed from Divine Goodness That which is good in man by way of Off-spring being so in God by way of Well-spring Ibid. p. 10. the same degree of impress or influx or force which causeth one man to believe or act is not sufficient to cause any other worse disposed man to believe or act nor the same man when he is more ill disposed and hindered 4. If we put the case of men equally disposed it is impossibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally disposed Nay it is most probable that they are not Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cause a difference than their countenances have of particles making the wonderful diversity which we see Nor is the same man long equally disposed 5. Men equally disposed if such there were may have unequal impediments without and in their bodies and temptations which may cause them to need unequal help of Grace 6. The same individual Impress which causeth no more than a Power causeth not the Act also For that is a contradiction to cause the Act and not to cause it 7. But a less degree of impulse or help may cause the act in one when a greater degree causeth it not in another 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in â—ll other diversities in the World by the diverse receptive dispositions of the Patient Which made Johan Sarisberiensis in Nugis Curial and many School-men to liken God with some acknowledged difference in his Operations to the Sun which by one invaried efflux of motive illuminative and calefactive power causeth innumerable varieties of effects as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Dispositions 9. But all good disposition or preparation is of God But by such ways of operation as we are searching after But all ill disposition is from our selves 10. To conclude God giveth men sometimes as much power to Will or Act when they do not as they have when they do But usually not an equal predisposition some having more indisposed themselves which is to be changed by contrary acts But whether de facto men equally enabled predisposed helped and hindered do yet without any cause but their own free-will it self act or will variously is a question that these Controversies need not come to That such were there such in the World could do it I take for granted what-ever they do The Controversie is well known which Hobbes hath raised in the World who saith That to be free and to be willing is all one and that every act of the Will is as truly necessitated by physical premotion as the motions of any Engine are And that we talk of liberty and contingency in the dark not that there is any such thing indeed but when we know not the train of Causes we use those names which signifie but our ignorance And that the first Cause and other superior Causes do by premotion as much necessitate each Volition as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow And the Dominicans predetermination and Camero's necessitation by a train of second Causes is the same I think But I think God hath made a very good use by his over-ruling ordination of the Doctrine of Hobbes learnedly and timerously or cautelously seconded by Gassendus and improved by Benedictus Spinosa an Apostate Jew in his Tractatus Politico-theologicus For the goodness and learning of such worthy men as were Alvarez Twisse Camero in all other points moderate and admirably judicious hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine which Hobbes and Spinosa having plainly and nakedly propounded is now detested by almost all good men For from thence they have plainly inferred the subversion of all morality as distinct from physical motion and consequently of all true Religion I deny not that I find my self the Controversie in it self exceeding difficult and that I have not been without temptations to their Opinion nor yet am And that indeed all pretended middle ways between Hobbes his Necessitation Physical and true Free-will are but fancies as far as I can perceive And if I leave true Free-will I must turn to their necessitation I confess their arguing is very plausible that there is no Effect without a Cause and that when ever the Will chooseth one thing and refuseth another there is some antecedent Cause in the power disposition or external things and that the same Cause in the same state and mode having no difference in it self doth always produce the same effect Otherwise the diversity should have no cause And that the Will being in the same disposition and having all the same objects helps impediments and other circumstances will have the same acts All this is plausible But 1. If I receive it I must let go almost all Religion as well as Christianity of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion And we must not reduce certainties to the obscurest unsearchable uncertainties 2. And in God himself their foundation is confuted For he that is the first Cause eodem modo se habens sine ulla diversitate unicus plurima immo omnia causat Therefore their Principle is false 3. And finding man made after the Image of God not only as holy but as man Gen. 6. I have great reason to think that Free-will is part of his natural Image and that as God is a causa unica plurimorum so may Free-will be And that as a God is causa prima entium so Free-will may be a kind of causa prima not actionis qua talis but of the comparative moral species of its own acts as choosing this thing rather than that which is no addition to real entity but a wonderful mode of it which man cannot tell whether he should call something or nothing 4. I say therefore that here is no Effect without a Cause Free-will may be the cause of various Effects without a various predisposition C. Doth not the Will act as it is disposed to act B. That it acteth not always according to Habits which are more than dispositions is certain by experience For objects oft prevail against habits and habits do not necessitate C. That is because the Will is otherwise disposed by some contrary stronger habits As either
by the habit of sensuality or the natural inclination to felicity as such which may bear down weaker particular habits or inclinations B. No doubt but the Will is quaedam natura and hath its natural inclination to good and felicity which is its pondus and radical disposition to its acts from which every act is caused that is done But I say not that ever it goeth contrary to these radical necessitating inclinations to goodness But de mediis it may have inferior particular habits which it oft goeth against C. That is because the Understanding conceiveth that another thing is best and so it is necessitated by the Understanding B. The Understanding guideth but doth not necessitate That we Will rightly is caused by the Understanding as that I hit the way is by my eye-sight but not that I exercise the Act it self Though we Will not without or against the last strongest dictate of the practical Intellect yet 1. Note that the Intellect hath divers perceptions at once which is not commonly noted It doth at once act a deep simple apprehension that e. g. bonum sensible is pleasant and good and amiable and that bonum spirituale which cometh into competition is yet better may be at the same time perceived with so low dull and weak an apprehension as that the Will may tenaciously so adhere to the first simple apprehension by a strong simple Volition as that the second weak comparate apprehension may not move it to Election 2. For we find that it is not the objective truth of an apprehension which turneth the Will without some answerable clearness and liveliness And as a Preacher that dreamingly speaketh of great things uncontroulably but coldly moveth not the hearers so is it with the Intellect it self And 3. The Will being principium exercitii can hinder the Understanding from perceiving truth by hindering it from thinking of the evidence 4. And the Will it self can suspend its own act contrary to the understandings fluggish dictate And not acting when it can towards God and true goodness is the beginning of all the disorders of the Soul C. But saith Camero c. the Will is appetitus rationalis And if it act against reason it acteth not as a Will And so also if it act without reason Therefore it cannot forbid the Intellect to think by nolition unless the Intellect first say Non cogitandum est Nor can it choose but velle cogitare if the Intellect say cogitandum est Otherwise the Will were a bruitish and not a rational appetite B. 1. The Will acteth by reason when it cleaveth to that good which is simply apprehended by the Intellect The simple apprehension goeth first e. g. That this Fruit offered Eve is good and desirable This is true and here the Will adhereth to it as good Then should the understanding think comparatively of a greater Good and say This is evil as forbidden and as it hindereth a greater Good And this it performeth not because the Will is here the beginner of the Sin not perhaps by a positive nolition or forbidding the Intellect the comparing Thought for that it doth not without shew of reason but by neglecting or omitting to excite the Understanding ad exercitium which it is brought to in Adam and Eve 1. By diversion being before taken up with the Creature 2. By voluntary neglect or sloth For the Will can omit its act without reason and yet be a rational appetite And the beginning of the Sin may be this omission of the Will or it s over tenacious adhering to sensible good apprehended truly by the Intellect 2. And we have not so much acquaintance with the faculties of our own Souls as to be sure that sense and passion and phantasie can do nothing immediately on the Will to help or hinder it We find that the Will easily followeth Passion and very hardly goeth against it 3. Nay we are not certain but there may be more bruitishness and less reason in many Sins than most imagine and that the violence of the sensitive appetite and passion may not prevail both with the Will to forbear the excitation of the Intellect and with the Intellect to omit its opposite Judgment though neither Will or Reason in the first instant give consent There are some also that think that we are scarce sure that the Will and the sensitive Appetite are two several faculties rather than one between two guides I say not as they But this I will say that I grow daily more confident that they that make the rational and sensitive Soul in man to be two and their Brethren that without all shew of proof magisterially face us down that the Soul at death puts off all sense because it exerciseth it not by the same Organs which were adapted to the Bodies use do both of them hainously wrong the Church and darken many Truths and open the way to Infidelity C. But you cannot lay the beginning of sin on the Wills omission to put the Intellect on the comparing thoughts for the Intellect can understand against our Wills as many know that which they had rather be ignorant of And therefore needs not the Will ad exercitium B. The Intellect may be forced But it is not so always Things sensible and near at hand may force the Intellect But things unseen and distant must be voluntarily thought on and studied or else they will not be understood C. If e. g. Eves Will had said to the Intellect Cogita Comparative either the Intellect must first have said to the Will Comparative cogitandum est or not If not then that Will would have been no rational Will If yea then the Will must have consented or else been unwilling against reason and so be bruitish still Therefore Sin must begin at the Intellect B. 1. The Intellect did not say Comparative cogitandum est not only because it was not commanded so to say by the Will but because the Will was so entangled before by the simple Love of the Creature as diverted the thoughts from the Creator 2. Suppose the Intellect did say coldly Comparative cogitandum est the Will did neglect it being not necessitated thereby and so the Intellect went no further C. If the Will do velle bonum qua bonum necessario it must needs necessarily velle bonum cognitum and so must follow the Intellect B. It doth necessarily velle bonum quando vult i. e. non malum but it doth not necessarily velle hoc vel illud bonum inter plurima Nay though the Intellect say nothing against it yea something for it the pre-engaged Will may neglect it And yet possibly Eves Intellect did perform one comparative act which occasioned her further sin viz. If thou turn thy thoughts towards Gods prohibition thou wilt lose the pleasant good before thee And this was true C. But if Eve's Will first over tenaciously stuck to the forbidden Creature when the Understanding never said It must do so In
so doing it was not a Will but bruitish Appetite B. The Understanding said truly It is pleasant and Appetible and so the Will in its initial desire sinned not But that it looked no further and excited not the Intellect to remember and it self to desire more to please God was by an abuse of its power and liberty of self-determining and so the sensible good prevailed because the superior good was forgotten and neglected And the Will may thus suspend its act after an intellectual perception without being bruitish though it so â—ar disobey Reason its guide C. These things are exceeding intricate and difficult for all that you say B. They are so * The same I say of objective and intellectual necessitation of the Will saith H. Kipping truly Inst Philos Nat. li. 9. c. 10. pag. 416. Errant Scholae reformatâ— doctores qui asserunt voluntatem ad actum suum determinari a judicio intellectus ita ut voluntatic libertas nulla sit constricta vero sit ad intellectus ductum a quo semper determinatur Joh. Camero Mart. Schogkius Hornbeck Maccovius Heerbord Hos prolixe bene refellit Episcopius But forget not that the great difficulty is between us and the Hobbists or Infidels and Fatists and not between the true Christians among themselves as to our present Controversies I confess that the confuting of their Opinion that all Volitions are necessitated unavoidably by Gods Operation is a far harder work than the reconciling of the Lutherans and Calvinists who go upon no such Principles Tell me Is this it that you would come to or not If you once perswade me that God causeth all sinful Volitions as necessarily as he causeth a Tree to grow and that man can no more avoid them and that liberty of Will signifieth no more than velle or not nolens velle and so that God is the prime irresistible cause of all Sin as much as of all Good so far as it is capable of a Cause I must needs next believe 1. That God hateth not his own Work yea that he loveth it 2. That he hateth no man for it 3. That moral Good and Evil is nothing in man but such as obeying or disobeying proportionably in a Horse or Dog 4. Yea far less because man doth â—ut as my pen which writeth as I move it in respect to God But so is not my Horse or Dog to me 5. And how then to judge of all the Scripture the Ministry of the Incarnation and Death of Christ of the Duties of a Christian life of Hell c. it 's easie to perceive viz. That as God differenceth Men and Toads meerly because he will do so even so doth he the good and the bad in the World and that Sin is no evil any way but to our selves and that God is as much the cause of it as of Sickness and is as well pleased with the Worlds Infidelity and Impiety as with the Churches Sanctity And that he will no otherwise damn men for Sin than erbitarily to make such baser than others as Dogs are than men Benedictus Spinosa hath given you the Consectaries more at large O how heartlesly should I preach and pray how carelesly should I live if once you brought me to this Opinion that all sin is the unresistible Work of God so far as it is a work as much as holiness is C. If there be no middle between Free-will and this Impiety as I confess I cannot disprove your Consectaries it's time for us to turn our studies against the common Enemies of all Religion and Morality instead of contending with one another specially when they have so much to say B. And do you think they do well and friendly by the Church who take these mens part and own their Cause in the foundation and entangle poor Souls in such intricate difficulties when we that know not the least of Gods Creatures or the mysteries of any of his Works do little know all the quick and intricate actions of our own Souls In a word man hath more power to good than he useth and that power is called sufficient or necessary Grace to the act though there be many difficulties which no one of either side can resolve The second Crimination C. But I fear many of them with Pelagius by GRACE do mean nothing So Dr. Twisse frequently repeateth that meeâ— posse credere is but Nature and not Grace because it is equally a posse non credere But 1. A natural power reprieved by Grace and preserved and given for gracious ends 2. And many and great helps of Grace to excite and rectifie it may be called an effect of Grace but Nature it self at least when they speak of the Heathens who they say have some kind of Grace B. Turn your eyes a little from the name of Pelagius and every thing else that useth to blind Disputers with prejudice and partiality and then answer me these following questions Quest. 1. Do you think that Mercy contrary to sinful Commerit is not properly Grace C. I confess it is B. Quest. 2. Is not the whole frame of Humane Nature and our Utensils put into the hand and power of Christ the Redeemer to be managed by him to his Mediatory ends Joh. 17. 2. Math. 28. 19 20. Joh. 13. 3. Ephes 1. 22 23. Phil. 2. 7 8 9 10 11 12. For this end he died rose and revived that he might be Lord both of the Dead and Living Rom. 14. 9. Joh. 5. 22 23 24. The Father judgeth no man but hath committed all Judgment to the Son c. And is not the very reprieval of the World from deserved ruine and misery so many thousand years an Act of Grace and Nature now continued used and improved by Grace and so far may be said to be of Grace C. This is plain truth and must not be denied B. Quest 3. Is it not undeserved Mercy to all Mankind that ever since Adam's Sentence Gen. 3. 15. they are all ruled by a Law of Grace and not the Law of Innocency alone and by that Law of Grace must all be judged C. If you before evinced that any thing is truly mercy to the Reprobate I must confess it But I have not before so much thought of this what Law the World is under as the case deserveth But I remember Camero in the fragments of his dispute with Courcellaeus taken by Testardus though he deny not that the Covenant of Grace was made with all mankind in Adam and Noah yet saith That by or for their nearer Parents sins the Infants of Infidels are out of that Covenant B. 1. It 's well you note that it is not only Augustine Enchir. ad Laâ—rent and I that are for the Imputation of nearer Parents sin in some Vid. Pet. Martyr in Rom. 5. confessing Augustine's judgment sort as well as Adam's 2. He speaketh there of the Covenant as mutual and not as a Law or an offered Covenant or Divine
Children and not to strive by needless disputes I pray you be you the Teacher and I will be the Learner and tell me what you would have us believe in these particulars which you have named And first of the first Lib. I. Men must be taught to come presently to Christ without staying for Preparations and not discouraged delayed or kept off The first Charge P. By Coming I suppose you mean Believing and Accepting I pray you teach me further then Quest 1. Must men believe in Christ before they Hear of him Lib. No How shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard P. Quest 2. Must they Believe that he is the Mediator between God and man before they have learned that there is a God and that this God is True and Just Quest 3. Or before they have learnt that man is a sinner and deserveth death and what sin is Quest 4. Or before they have learnt that we cannot redeem and save our selves Lib. No That were a contradiction P. Quest 5. Must men Believe that Christ is the Son of God and the Saviour of his Church before they have learnt what it is to be the Son of God or what a Saviour is and what is the salvation which he hath wrought and will vouchsafe us before they understand the Articles of the Christian faith that he was conceived born suffered was buried rose ascended is glorified and the like Lib. No man can Believe that which he doth not Understand P. Quest 6. Must men take Christ for their Saviour before they heartily peâ—ceive that they want a Saviour through sin and misery and that they are lost for ever if he save them not and that no other can do it Lib. No this is an impossibility and contradiction P. Quest 7. Must a man take Christ for his Saviour before he is willing to be saved Lib. Yes He must come to Christ to make him willing and not think that he must bring willingness with him This is your Legal doctrine P. Quest 8. Is not Accepting Christ an Act of the will a willingness that he shall be my Saviour And do you say that a man must be willing to have Christ before he is willing and not stay till he is willing Lib. You would make me ridiculous I say not that he must take Christ before he is willing But he must come to Christ for a will P. In despight of edification you will stick in the Metaphor Come to Christ What mean you by coming Lib. Poor blind soul If you had been taught of God you would have known what it is to Come to Christ But you will not come to him P. With such exclamations you cheat the ignorant Cannot you tell your own meaning What mean you by Coming to Christ Lib. I mean Believing in him and casting my self wholly on him P. Still you stick in Metaphors Can you cast your self upon him for a will before you are Willing Is not that casting your self the act of your will which we call Trust or Affiance Lib. You would hide your Lyes with words You teach that men must have good desires before they come to Christ as if they must bring with them good desires of their own or by Preparatory Grace P. Quest 9. Can a man Accept of Christ as a Saviour to save him from sin and punishment and Gods displeasure and to justifie sanctifie and glorifie him before he hath any desire to be saved from sin or punishment or Gods displeasure or to be justified sanctified or glorified Lib. He that hath no such Desires must come to Christ for them and believe P. Still Coming must hide your sense Doth Christ give these Desires to be saved before we Take him for our Saviour by Consent Or after Lib. You are catching me by craft If I say Before you will say Then it is Preparatory to our Consent If I say After you will say that it is impossible to consent to the Means till a man desires the end and to Accept a Saviour before he is willing to be saved But besides this you tell men that they must not come to Christ till they are broken hearted and sorrow for their sins You heat the Winâ— of the Gospel so hot that it shall burn mens lips and then invite them to it P. Quest 10. Is it possible for a man Heartily to perceive that he is a heinous sinner and hath displeased God abused mercy hilled Christ undone his soul and wronged others and not be sorrowful for it nor be vile in his own eyes or feel that he is a lost sinner Lib. No but all this he must come to Christ for or Believe for P. Do you mean that he must first Believe that the Gospel is True and that Christ is an Offered Saviour or else do you mean that he must first Accept him as offered for a Saviour or do you mean that he must first Believe that he is his Saviour accepted or do you mean that he must first Trust in him as his Saviour All these are different acts Lib. You would confound us with your distinctions to keep out the light This is the trick of such carnal Sophisters P. Saul You hear what this man hath to say against us You hear that when he hath cryed out against Preparations to Believing that here are ten several Preparations which he cannot deny I will now tell you what is our Doctrine and the truth about Preparations We hold that Christ is the True Light who lighteth every man that cometh to God but in various degrees by various means He is the Lord of Nature as its Restorer Rom. 14. 9. All power in Heaven and Earth is given to him and all things put into his hand Matth. 28. 18 19. John 17. 2 3. John 5. 22. He teacheth those that have not the Gospel and those that have it first by the Light of Nature many Natural Truths as that there is a God who is Almighty Wise and Good that we owe him our Love and duty that he is Just c. As the Sun enlightneth the earth at its rising before it appear it self so doth Christ the world By the Gospel he teacheth us more even supernatural truths about himself and our Redemption c. Some commoner co-operation of his Spirit goeth along with the Gospel convincing and moving many that are not yet or at all converted Those that Christ converteth savingly are first in order brought to understand the Meaning of the word and next to Believe the Truth of it and so to Believe what Christ is and what he hath done and suffered for us and what need we have of him by sin and misery and how freely he is offered to our salvation And they are moved so seriously to consider all this till it prevail with their wills first to desire not only their own deliverance from Hell and misery as all men may do but also from a state of sin and then to desire
not by such talk as this believe either that God Rewardeth himself or that he Rewardeth not us But we easily grant that he rewardeth us for nothing which cometh not from his free bounty For no creature can have any other good 2. But if Faith and Love and Obedience be not commanded to us but only given us then they are no Duties but Gifts only and unbelief hatred of God and disobedience is no sin nor brings no punishment Lib. At least they are no Conditions of the Covenant P. Do you think that they are any proper Means of our Justification and Salvation as their End or not Lib. Yes I dare not say that they are no means at all Faith and Repentance are Means of our Pardon and Holiness and Perseverance of our Glorification P. What sort of means do you take them to be Lib. They are such Gifts of God as in order must go before Salvation P. Going before signifieth only Antecedency and not any Means Lib. One Gift maketh us fit for a thankful improvement of another P. This speaketh them only to be a Means to our Thankful improvement and not to our Right to the things to be improved Lib. I do not think that they are a means of our Right or title P. Rev. 22. 14. Blessed are they that do his Commandments that they may have Right to the tree of life c. Lib. It may be translated that wash their garments and that they may have power upon as Dr. Hammond noteth P. 1. The Alexandrian Copy which giveth him this occasion is singular and not be set against all other though the Vulgar Latin go the same way Beza who yet thinks that a transposition of two Verses hath darkned these Texts this Book being negligently used because many for a time took it not for an Apostolical Writing or Canonical yet saith that it is contra omnium Graecorum codicum fidem that the Vulgar goeth 2. But all 's one in sense For to wash their Garments is to be sanctified or purified from sin and not only from guilt of punishment And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth such a Power as we call Authority oâ— Right usually But what maketh you deny Conditions on mans part Lib. Because 1. It is supposed that a condition is profitable to him that requireth it 2. It is some Cause of the benefit 3. It is to be done by the performers own strength whereas God giving â—s Faith that can be no condition on our part which is first a Gift from him that requireth it For to give it first maketh it no condition of ours P. Here we see what it is to quarrell about ambiguous Words No one of these is true that you say of the common nature of a condition or at least as we mean by that word 1. Civilians define a Condition to be Lex addita negotio qua donec praestetur eventum suspendit As it is Required it is only Modus promissionis donationis vel contractus as Performed it is only a Removal of an Impediment and a Disposition of the Receiver So that as the Non-performance is but the suspension of a Causation so the performance of a Condition as such is no Cause efficient But it is dispositio subjecti which you may call a necessary Modus of a Material Cause as the Recipient may improperly be called Dr. Twisse therefore calleth faith Caâ—sa justificationis dispositiva 2. So it be an act of our own it is no way necessary that it be done without the Commanders help or gift For he that giveth us to believe doth give it by this means even by commanding it and making it a Condition of his further benefits that so he may induce us as rational free agents to perform it ex intuitu mercedis or by the motive of the end or benefit For he causeth it by suitable means And no doubt but faith and the rest are free acts of ours though caused by Gods grace 3. And it is accidental to a Condition that it be any way commodious to the Imposer What profit is it to a Father that his Child put off his Hat and say I thank you And yet he may make that a condition of his gift What profit is it to a free Physicion that the Patient observe his order in taking his Medicines And yet he may give them on that condition But yet I will add that as usually men make that the condition of a Gift or Contract which the person obliged is backward else to perform and that which is somewhat either for the Donor or Contracters Interest or the Ends of his contract so God who taketh his Glory and Pleasure in his Childrens Good to be as his Interest and the End of his Gifts and knoweth how backward we are to our duty doth on these accounts impose on us our duty and conditions his Pleasure and Glory being instead of his Commodity But if If be a conditional Particle and if Gods suspending by the tenour of his Donation our Right to Justification upon our free believing and our Right to Salvation on our free obedience do prove Conditionality as it doth all that we mean then you see that the new Covenant hath conditions Lib. Doth not God promise us the first Grace even to take the hard heart out of our bodies and give us hearts of flesh and new hearts c. And I pray what condition can the first grace have unless you will run in infinitum to seek Conditions of Conditions P. 1. This is a Cause of great moment of which I have my self had darker thoughts than now I have 1. If one Benefit of the Covenant have no Condition viz. the first will it follow that none of the rest are given upon condition May not God in Baptism give us a Right of special Relation to the Father Son and Holy Ghost his Love Grace and Communion Pardon Adoption and Glory on condition of Faith and Repentance and yet himself give us that Faith and Repentance which is the condition of the rest 2. But upon fuller consideration it will appear that It is not the first Grace that those promises mean by a new and soft heart For who ever will examine them shall find that the Texts mention Conditions and also antecedent Grace And indeed A new and soft heart is but the same thing which the New Testament calleth Sanctification And yet that Sanctification is promised as consequent to Faith as its condition And our ordinary Divines do accordingly distinguish of Vocation and Sanctification holding that in Vocation the Act of Faith and Repentance are caused by Gods Grace before proper Habits and that Sanctification is the Habits specially of Love and Holiness following them vid. Ames Medull de Vocat Rolloc de Vocat Hookers Souls Vocat Humil. Rogers of Faith c. And this is the new and fleshy heart But what need we more to prove that Covenant Conditional which I mean when it is nothing
by the free disposition of a gift Scotus holdeth our acts are called Merit as relating to Gods free Covenant or Promise to reward them and not otherwise but he absolutely denyeth yet that God is thereby made our Debtor 4. d. 46. Major 2. d. 27. not only followeth him but saith God may deny Glory to good works but he meaneth as the rest Richard 2. d. 27. q. 3. a. 2. ad 3. seemeth to deny even Debt upon the title of promise Bonâ—vent 2. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3. saith but that God is quodammodo in some sort obliged to glorifie them that love him Ruiz who is against all this and maketh Gods Promises to be proper promises and Covenants and more than bare assertions and that God is become a kind of Debtor by his Promise and so it is not his Veracity only that is our security as Suarez thinketh yet holdeth that It is but the Things promised that are Due or obliged to us and that Gods obligation is properly to Himself that he hath indeed true Governing or Legal Justice but tanquam objectum Formale primarium respicit universalissimum bonum praestantissimum quod est Ipse tanquam Materiale secundarium objectum respicit universale bonum totius mundi constantem ex omnibus creaturis quod praeponit particularibus bonis singularum creaturarum Indeed he saith that this Justice in God is that Quae solo naturâ— lumine demonstrari potest ac proinde nullam supponit liberam Dei promissionem aut pactum nullumque supernaturalem concursum aut gratiam But this is meer confusion by ambiguous words These men talk as if they considered not that Creation was a free act of God and made man a Law in the Nature of himself and the circumstant creatures And in this Law of Nature is a signification of Gods will to do good to the good and reward the obedient and this is a Natural promise There could be no obedience and so no merits were there no Law And if there be a Law of Nature and so God even by making us Rational free Governable Creatures was himself our Governour these things supposed to be done by the very act of Creating it is a contradiction to say that God is our Governour and not a Just Governour being perfect as he is God or to be Just and yet not Resolved to use the obedient better than the disobedient To be Governour is to be the Orderer of Moral Agents And what Moral Order is there where the good and bad are not differenced in retributions But the Papists conceits of all Promises to Adam and his merits being meerly supernatural confound them in many such dispuâ—atiâ—â—s L. But do they not hold that a man may merit the remission of his own sins yea and of the sins of others and justification also R. Let Medina answer you in 12. q. 113. a. 1. p. 651. Ad authoritates sonantes quod non meremur Remissionem peccatorum nec vero justificationem non oportet satisfacere Nam omnes convenimus in hanc sententiam Catholicam irrefragabilem quod non meremur remissionem peccatorum ut Augustin Nulláne sunt merita justorum Sunt plane quia justi sunt sed ut justi fierent merita non fuere None merit Remission or Justification with them L. Not by merit of Condignity but they say that by merit of Congruity a man may merit Remission and Conversion and Justification R. Medina ibid. p. 652. Sed cum Meritum de Congruo non innitatur Justitiae sed Congruentiâ— proprie appellationem meriti non meretur And so say many others of them L. But at least they hold that we may prepare our selves for Justification or Conversion without Grace or special Grace R. Preparatory Grace is not the same that the Grace to which it prepareth us But let the same Medina answer you q. 109. p. 592. Deus expectat nostrum consensum inquit Pelagius ut nos convertat ergo ex parte voluntatis nostra est prâ—paratio ad gratiam suscipiendam Sed hâ—c sententia est haeretica contra Scripturas Concilia Veritas Catholica est quod Gratia Justificans datur sine meritis quod nemo se valet ad â—am praeparare sine auxilio speciali Et p. 593. Ultima dispositio ad gratiam ad quam infallibiliter se quitur Gratia non habetur ex facultate naturae sed tantum dono Dei speciali Do you say any more against Preparation for Grace without Grace or against mans power to prepare himself or against merit than all this L. But sure Luther and his fellow Reformers had never so much inveighed against the Papists in the point of Works Merits and Justification if they had all taught no worse than these which you have cited There are sure many others that say worse R. No question but the Ignorance of the Priests was so great and the carnal ends so powerful with covetous proud men which were served by the abuse of the Doctrine of Merits and Good Works that multitudes of such did ordinarily abuse it If all Protestants taught the Protestant Doctrine uncorruptly we should not have had so many differences and divisions as we have had nor would one condemn another as you do us L. But though the old Schoolmen might mean better those that Luther had to do with did sure speak much worse R. I tell you the Carnal and Ignorant sort of Priests and Fryers did each man talk according to his model and so do all Sects Few had the Wit and Skill to open aright the common Doctrine But 1. Our Dr. Field of the Church undertaketh to prove that excepting the tyrannical Papal faction and the carnal and ignorant that served their ends and by violence bore down the rest the chief of the Doctors in the Church of Rome it self did hold the great Doctrines which the Protestants against the Papists do assert 2. To tire you now with no more I will cite but two of Luthers own adversaries in his dayes 1. The first is the Learned Cardinal Contacenus who lived in the time of Luthers Reformation Read but his Notes on Luthers Articles and his Tract of Justification Free-will and Predestination and you will see that he saith almost as much for what you plead as you would do your self I am loth to tire the Reader with the citation of his words at large Turn to them and read them and see where he differeth from us I confess the man was moderate but never accused as differing herein from the Church of Rome as in an Article determined of by their Councils But their Doctors variously express themselves The other is Fisher Bishop of Rochester one of the chief Martyrs of the Roman Cause beheaded by Henry the Eighth for denying his Supremacy in Causes Ecclesiastical who in Opuscul de fiducia misericordia Dei Printed Colon. 1556. speaketh as much and plainly for the interest of Faith and
Theologie is valued by many as the Mathematicks are as a pleasant sort of knowledge and by others as the Jews were zealous of their Law by a formal sort of Religiousness one sort being zealous for their Opinions and another for their Ceremonies from the like principle of formality 3. Yet Nature that would know much is dull and slothful and loth to be at that great and long study and labour necessary to obtain it 4. And it is but few that are born with a quick natural capacity 5. And it is not the most that have the happiness of very wise experienced and throughly Learned Teachers but most are instructed by half witted men And young persons know not how to choose the best for themselves nor their Parents neither ordinarily 6. Ease and Interest or the Veneration of certain persons maketh men fall in with those Opinions that are in best esteem in the places where they live and among the persons whom they most value 7. Reason is mans noble faculty and therefore that which man is aptest to be Proud of And though few have much knowledge and wisdom almost all would be thought to have it and are too proud to endure to be accounted ignorant or erroneous 8. The Dignity of the Pastoral Office and Academical Degrees maketh men think that the Honour of knowledge is their due and necessary to their work And therefore they will expect and claim it that deserve it not and it shall be taken for Pride and Singularity for any man to convince them of ignorance or error 9. Many of them are godly men and excellent Preachers and cryed up deservedly by good people And therefore they take the reputation of more knowledge than they have to be their due and the people are ready to joyn with them in reproaching all that differ from them 10. Great knowledge being rare the half-knowing men are still the major part by far alas how far And so if Synods be called or most Voices heard these will still pass for the Orthodox men and a more judicious man will scarce be heard among them 11. Learning is of many ages got into certain forms of words and he that hath got some organical arbitrary Notions passeth for a Learned man or he that can speak many Languages while true real wisdom which consisteth 1. In knowing the Greatest Things and 2. In fitting words to things is much neglected whereby as hypocrites deceive themselves and others with forms of piety so do Scholars with forms and notions instead of knowledge 12. These humane formalities of wisdom have prevailed to bring the Scripture and the best part of wisdom into disesteem as a dull and low kind of knowledge as if Logical Physical and Metaphysical trifling were a higher matter 13. No man is sufficiently apprehensive of the greatness of the Curse in the confusion of Tongues whereby as we can preach but to few Nations in the World so we cannot intelligibly converse with one another All words being arbitrary signs are Ambiguous And few Disputers have the jealousie and skill which is necessary to discuss equivocations and to agree of the meaning of all their terms before they use them in disputing And so taking Verbal differences for Material doth keep up most of the wretched Academical and Theological Wars of the World 14. And nothing here undoeth all the World in point of wisdom so much as over-hasty judging or prefidence It is natural to almost all to fasten presently upon the first appearances and to be confident before they have half tryed In cases where seven and seven years serious study is necessary to a through digested knowledge every Novice will presently conclude as if he were sure And then as every one is apt to be confident so to be tenacious every error leading on more and the reputation of the person being concerned in it mutability being a shame And so it becometh a very difficult thing to unlearn the errors once learned as white Paper is easier written on than that which is written on before 15. And then no man knoweth his own error else it were no error nor knoweth what another mans perceptions are nor what any other man knoweth more than he 16. And lastly the odious names of dissenters the common usage doth quickly affright even beginners from thinking well of their Opinions yea or of their persons and piety usually And by all these means almost all are of the opinion of the Countrey where they live or of those that they most reverence or which are most for their interest and boldly condemn the rest not understood III. And the pretence of HOLINESS or a blind practical Zeal and Superstitious Religion both in Hypocrites and many honest ignorant people hath not a little hand in the distractions of Christs Church It was the appearance of more Spirituality and Strictness which drew Tertullian to the Montanists and which promoted a great part of the Heresies which have torn the Churches This bore up the Cause of the Priscillianists and of those that Bernard and Cluniacensis so much inveigh against I suppose Manichees with some better persons mixt This kept up the Donatists but above all the Novatians long in great reputation This was the strength of the Anabaptists in Germany and the Low Countreys as their adversaries confess Saith G. Wicelius Meth. Concord c. 12. p. 42. Retinctores hac una parte duntaxat sapiunt tenentes doctrinam Ecclesiae Catholicae speaking of the necessity of a holy life This is the strength of the Quakers among us now and of almost all the separating and Censorious Sects And were not so excellent a thing as Godliness the Motive abundance of good people durst never have done the great evils which we have seen done in this age to the great shame of our profession and the sad calamities of Church and State And if I my self have formerly in my unexperienced youth promoted any dividing or unwarrantable wayes it was upon this and the former mistake which I beg daily of God to discover to me to the full and beg the pardon of the miscarriages which I know and which yet I know not of And if you Consider these things following you will not wonder that mistaken Godliness should cause divisions 1. Holiness and Gods Love or well-pleasedness with man is the best thing in this world or that man is capable of And therefore is most Desireable and most Honourable 2. Therefore all good men prefer it before all other things And are justly more averse to any thing that is against it than to any worldly loss or suffering 3. Yea it is Gods Interest more than their own And all good men are against all that displeaseth God so far as it is known 4. We all know but in part and as in a glass and darkly Even the most of Teachers take abundance of things for True and Good that are False and Evil and for False and Bad which are True and Good Much