devoure the love which they owe unto their Country More noble was the behaviour of Themistocles and Aristides who when they were ever imployed in the publique service of State left all their private enmities in the borders of their own Country and did not resume them til they returned and became private menagaine The last cause which I shall observe of Hatred may bee a setled and permament Intuition of the object a penetrating jealous and interpreting fancy because by this means a redoubled search and review doth generate a kinde of habituall detestation it being the nature of Evill commonly to shew worse at the second or third view And that first because the former Act doth worke a prejudice and thereby the after apprehension comes not naked but with a fore-stalled resolution of finding Evill therein and next because from a serious and fastoned search into the Object the faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it the former knowledge being a master and light unto the latter But light and wandring fancies though they may bee more sudden in the apprehensive of Evill and by consequence liable to an oftner Anger yet by reason of the volubility of the minde joyned with an infirmity and unexercise of memory they are for this cause the lesse subject to deepe and rooted hatred Vnto this Head may bee referred that Hatred which ariseth from excessive Melancholy which maketh men sullen morose solitary averse from all society and Haters of the light delighting onely like the Shrieke Owle or the Bitterne in desolate places and monuments of the dead This is that which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when men fancy themselves transformed into Wolves and Dogs and accordingly hate all Humane society Which seemeth to have bin the distemper of Nâ—…buchadnezar when hee was â—…hrust out from men and did eate grasse with the beasts Timon the Athenian was upon this ground branded with the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Man Hater because he kept company with no man but onely with Alcibiades whereof he gave this only account because hee thought that man was borne to doe a great deale of mischiefe And we read even in the Histories of the Church of men so marvelously averse from all converse or correspondence with men that they have for their whole lives long some of sixty others of ninety yeares immured themselves in Cels and silence not affording to looke on the faces of their neerest kindred when they travelled farre to visit them So farre can the opinion of the minde actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body transport men even ouâ—… of humane disposiâ—…on which the Philosopher telleth us is naturally a lover of Society and therefore he saith that such men are usually given to contention the signe and the fruit of hatred CHAP. XIIII Of the Quality and Quantity of Hatred and how in either respects it is to bee regulated I Proceed now unto the consideration of this Passion in the Quantity and Quality of its Acts which must bee observed according to the Evill of the Object for if that be unchangeable there is required a continual Permanency of the Passion in regard of the disposition of the Mind or if it be Importunaâ—…e and Affaulting there is required a more frequent repetition of the Act. The same likewise is to bee said of the Quality of it for if the Evill be of an Intense and more Invincible nature our Hatred must arme us the more if more Low and remisse the Passion may bee the more negligent Hero then is a fourefould direction of the Quantities and Qualities of our Hatred and it will hold proportion in the other passions First the unalterablenesse of the Evill warrants the continuance of our hatred Secondly the importunity and insinuation of it warrants the Reiteration of our hatred Thirdly and fourthly the greatnesse and the Remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred We may instance for the three former in sinne so much the worst of Evils by how much it is a remotion from the best of Goods First then Sinne is in its owne formall and abstracted nature Vnchangeable though not in respect of the subject in whom it dwelleth for a Creature now bad may by the mercy of God bee repaired and restored againe but this is not by a changing but by a forsaking of Evill by a removing of it not by a new molding it into another frame Sinne then remaineth in its owne Nature unchangeable and alwaies evill and the reason is because it is a Transgression of a perpetuall Law and a Remotion from an unalterable Will Sinne then is to bee hated with a continuall and peremptory hatred But in other things there is according to the nature of their evils required a conditionall and more flexible dislike they being evils that have either some good annexed unto them or such as are of a mutable nature And therefore wee see that in most things the variety of Circumstances doth alter the good or evill of them and so makes the passions thereabout conversant alterable likewise Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages which they might receive by reasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly for inconveniences now removed did dislike And in Morality likewise much dammage might be inferred both to private persons and to the publique by nourishing such private enmities and being peremptory in continuing those former differences which though happily then entertained upon reasonable grounds may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmefull by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a growne and strong than of a vanishing and lighter passion Secondly Againe as no evill altogether so unchangeable as Sinne so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a Multiplicity and Reiteration of our hatred in regard of its importunity and insinuation that as there is an impudence in the assault so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it Some Evils there may be which require onely a present and not a customary exercise of this passion Present I say when the Object is offensive and not customary because as the Object so the Passion likewise may be unusuall Sinne onely is of all other evils the most urging and active furnished with an infinite number of stâ—…atagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures though best armed against such assaults and therefore here onely are necessary such reiterated acts as may keepe us ever on our guard that we be not unprepared for a surprize Thirdly Then for the Quantity of an Evill because that is not in any thing so intense as in Sinne whither wee consider it in its owne Nature as a Rebellion against the highest good or in its effects either in regard of the diffusion of it it being an overspreading pollution or
other strong sented Herbes because these draw away unto them any fetid or noxious nourishment so the eye and nearenesse of an enemy serveth by exciting Caution and diligence to make a mans life more fruitfull and orderly then otherwise it would have beene that we may take away occasion from them that would speake reproachfully And thus Hector sharpely reproving the Cowardice of his brother Paris who had beene the onely cause of the Warre and calamity when he fled from Menelaus draweth his rebuke from hence and telleth him that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. To Father City People losse and blame Ioy to his foes and to himselfe a shame Secondly Hatred worketh Confidence and some Presumption and good assurance of our owne or some assisting strength against evils Which ariseth first out of the former for Cauâ—…lousnesse or Furniture against the onset of evil cannot but make the mind more resolute in its owne defence than if it were left naked without Assistance Againe of all others this is one of the most confident Passions because it moves not out of sudden perturbations but is usually seconded and backt with Reason as the Philosopher observes and ever the more Counsell the more Confidence Besides being a deepe and severe Passion it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes There is no Passion that intendeth so much evil to another as Hatred An-ger would onely bring Trouble but Hatred Mischiefe Anger would onely Punish and Retaliate but Hatred would Destroy for as the Philosopheâ—… notes it seeketh the not being of what it Hates A man may be Angry with his friend but hee hates none but an enemy and no man can will so much hurt to his friend as to his enemy Now the more hurt a passion doth intend the more strength it must call out to execute that intention and ever the more strength the more Confidence Thirdly it worketh some manner of Victory over the evill hated for Odium semper sequitur 〈◊〉 animi elatione as Scaliger out of Aristotle hath observed It ever ariseth out of pride and height of mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injury ever comes from some strength and is a kind of Victory For so farre forth as one is able to hurt another he is above him And this effect holds principally true in morall and practick courses wherein I think it is a generall Rule Hee in some measure loves an evill who is overcome by it for conquest in this nature is on the Will which never chooseth an object till it love it There onely we can have perfect conquest of sinne where will be a perfect hatred of it Here in the best there is but an incompleat restauration of Gods Image the body of nature and the body of finne are borne and must die together Fourthly it hath a good effect in regard of the evill hated in reasonable Creatures namely the Reformation of the person in whom that evill was For as countenance and incouragement is the fosterer so Hatred and contempt serveth sometimes as Phisick to purge out an evill And the reason is because a great part of that goodnesse which is apprehended to be in sinne by those that pursue it is other mens approbation Opinion puts valew upon many uncurrent Coynes which passe rather because they are receiued than because they are warrantable And therefore if a man naturally desirous of credit see his courses generally disliked he can hardly so unnature himselfe as still to to feed on those vanities which hee seeth doe prouoke others unto loathing though I confesse it is not a perswasions of mens but of Gods hatred of sinne which doth worke a genuine and thorow Resormation I now proceed to observe those Effects which are corrupt and hurtfull and here wee may observe First the rule of Aristotle whose maxime it is that Hatred is alwaies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against the whole kinde of its object so then all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt which are not Generall but admit of private Reservations and Indulgences For since tho nature and extent of the passion is ever considered with reference to its object there must needs bee irregularity in that affection when it is conversant about an uniforme nature with a various and differing motion And this is manifestly true in that which I made the principall object of a right hatred Sin In which though there is no man which finds not himselfe more obnoxious and open to one kind than another it being the long experienced policie of the Devill to observe the diverse conditions of mens natures constitutions callings and imployments and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will insomuch that a man may here in happily deceive himselfe with an opinion of loathing some evils with which either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance or the difficulty in compassing disgrace in practising or other prejudices perswade to a casuall dislike thereof yet I say it is certaine that if a mans Hatred of Sinne be not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Vniversall and transcendent Hatred against all sinne even those which his personall relations make more proper unto him if hee doth still retaine some privy exceptions some reserved and covered delights be his pretences to others or his perswasions to himselfe what they will this is rather a personated than a true hatred a meteor of the braine than an affection of the Soule For as in the good so in the ill of things notwithstanding there seeme to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes as Seneca saith Scelera dissident that sinnes do disagree yet indeed there is in that very contrariety such an agreement against God as in Herod and Pilate against Christ as admits not of any in order unto God but a gathered and united passion And hence is that of Saint Iames Hee that offendeth in one is guilty of all because in that one hee contemneth that Originall Authority which forbad all There are no tearmes of consistence betweene love and hatred divided upon the same uniforme Object It is not the materiall and blind performance of some good worke or a servile and constrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the Law that can any more argue either our true love to the Precept or our hatred to the Sinne than a voluntary patience under the hand of a Chirurgion can prove either that we delight in our owne paine oâ—… Abhorre our owne flesh It is not Gods Witnesse within us but his Word without us not the Tyrannie of Conscience but the goodnesse of the Law that doth kindly and genuinely restraine the violence and stop the Eruptions of our defiled nature Or though perhaps Feare may prevent the exercise and sproutings nothing but Love can pluck up the root of sinne A Lacedemonian endeavouring to make a dead carcasse stand upright as formerly it had done
like an Itch or Vicer in the Body which is with the same nayles both angered and delighted and hath no pleasure but with vexation Thirdly they are ever attended with Repentance both because in promises they disappoint and in performances they deceive and when they make offers of pleasure do expire in pains as those delicates which are sweet in the mouth are many times heavy in the stomacke and after they have pleased the Palat doe torment the bowels The Minde surfets on nothing sooner than on unnaturall Desires Fourthly for this reason they are ever changing and making new experiments as weake and wanton stomacks which are presently cloy'd with an uniforme dyet and must have not onely a painefull but a witty Cooke whose inventions may be able with new varieties to gratifie and humour the nicenesse of their appetite As Nero had an officer who was called Elegantiae Arbiter the inventor of new Lusts for him Lastly unlimited Desires are for the most part Envious and Malignant For he who desires every thing cannot chuse but repine to see another have that which himselfe wanteth And therefore Dionysius the Tyrant did punish Philoxenus the Musitian because he could sing and Plato the Philosopher because he could dispute better than himselfe In which respect hee did wisely who was contented not to be esteemed a better Orator than he who could command thirty legions Secondly unbounded Desires doe worke Anxiety and Perturbation of Minde and by that means disappoint Nature of that proper end which this Passion was ordained unto namely to be a means of obtaining some further good whereas those Desires which are in their executions Turbid or in their continuance Permanent are no more likely to lead unto some farther end than either a misty and darke or a winding and circular way is to bring a Man at last unto his journeyes end whereof the one is dangerous the other vaine And together with this they doe distract our noble Cares and quite avert our thoughts from more high and holy desires Martha her Many things and Maries One thing will very hardly consist together Lastly there is one Corruption more in these unlimited Desires they make a man unthankfull for former benefits as first because Caduca memoria fâ—…turo imminentium It is a strong presumption that he seldome looks backe upon what is past who is earnest in pursuing some thing to come It is S. Pauls Profession and Argument in a matter of greater consequence I forget those things which are behind and reach forth unto those things which are before And secondly though a man should looke backe yet the thoughts of such a benefit would be but sleight and vanishing because the Mind finding present content in the liberty of a roving Desire is marvellous unwilling to give permanent entertainment unto thoughts of another Nature which likewise were they entertained would be rather thoughts of murmuring than of thankful fulnesse every such man being willing rather to conceive the benefit small than to acknowledge the vice and vastnesse of his owne Desires The next rule which I observed for the government of these Passions do respect those Higher and more glorious Objects of Mans Felicity And herein 1 Our Desires are not to be Wavering and In constant but Resolute and full of Quicknesse and Perseverance First because though we be poore and shallow vessels yet so narrow and almost shut up are those passages by which wee should give admittance unto the matter of our true happines yea so full are we already of contrary qualities as that our greatest vehemency wil not be enough either to empty our selves of the one or to fill our selves with the other And therefore the true Desires of this Nature are in the Scripture set forth by the most patheticall and strong similitudes of Hunger and Thirst and those not common neither but by the pantâ—…ng of a tyred Hart after the rivers of water and the gaping of the dry ground after a seasonable showre Secondly overy desirable Object the higher it goes is ever the more united within it selfe and drives the faster unto an unity It is the property of Errours to be at variance whereas Truth is One and all the parts thereof doe mutually strengthen and give light unto each other So likewise in things Good the more noble the more knit they are Scelera disiâ—…dent It is for sinnes to be at variance amongst themselves And those lower Goods of Riches Pleasure Nobility Beauty though they are not Incomparable yet they have no naturall Connexion to each other have therfore the lesse power to draw a conslaâ—… and continued Desire But for nobler and immateriall goods wee see how the Philosopher hath observed a connextion betweene all his morall vertues whereby a man that hath one is naturally drawne to a desire of all the rest for the minde being once acquainted with the sweetnes of one doth not onely apprehend the same sweetnesse in the others but besides findeth it selfe not sufficiently possest of that which it hath unlesse it bee thereby drawne to procure the rest all whose properties it is by an excellent mutuall service to give light and lustre strength and validity and in some sort greater Vnity unto each other And lastly for the highest and divinest good the truth of Religion that is in it selfe most of all other One as being a Beame of that Light and Revelation of that Will which is Vnity it selfe And therefore though we distinguish the Creed into twelve Articles yet Saint Paul calleth them all but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one Faith as having but one Lord for the Object and End of them Now then where the parts of good are so united as that the one draweth on the other there is manifestly required united desire to carry the soule thereunto II. The last Rule which I observed was that our Desires ought not to bee faint and sluggish but industrious and painefull both for the arming us to avoid and withstand all oppositions and difficulties which we are every where likely to meet withall in the pursuit of our happinesse and also for the wise and discreet applying of the severall furtherances requisite thereunto And indeed that is no True which is not an Operative Desire a Velleity it may be but a Will it is not For what ever a man will have hee will seek in the use of such meanes as are proper to procure it Children may wish for Mountaines of gold and Balaam may wish for an happy death and an A theist may wish for a soule as earthly in substance as in Affection but these are all the ejaculations rather of a Speculative fancie than of an industrious affection True desires as they are right in regard of their object so are they laborious in respect of their motion And therefore those which are idle and impatient of any paines which stand like the Carman in the Fable
see sundry times strength takes off the yoake of Obedience not only in the civill government of men but in the naturall government of creatures by men to whom by the law of Creation they were all made subject yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to ferget their originall Subjection and in stead of Fearing to terrifie man their lord and when ever we tame any of them and reduce them to their first condition this is not so much an act of our Dominion wherby we awe them as of our Reason whereby we deceive them and we are beholding more therein to the working of our Wit than to the prerogative of our Nature and usually every thing which hath knowledg enough to measure its owne abilities the more it hath of Strength the lesse it hath of Feare that which Solomon makes the strongest the Apostle makes the fittest to expell Peare to wit Love So likewise on the other side Immunity from Subjection in the midst of Weaknesse removes Feare Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons who notwithstanding their Weaknesse yet when once by the priviledge of their Sanctuary or mercy of their Iudge they are freed from the obligation of the Law though not from the Offence their former Feares doe presently turne into Ioy and Gratulations and that is the reason why Good men have such Boldnesse Confidence and Courage that they can bid defiance unto Death because though they be not quite delivered from the Corruption yet they are from the Curse and Condemnation of Sinne though by reason of their Weaknesse they are not delivered from the mouth yet they are from the teeth and stings of Death though not from the Earth of the Grave yet from the Hell of the Grave though not from Sinne yeâ—… from the Strength and Malediction of Sinne the Law ouâ—… Adversary must be strong as well as our selves weake if he looke for Feare The Corruption then of this Passion as it depenâ—…eth upon these Causes is when it ariseth out of too base a conceit of our owne or too high of anothers strength the one proceeding from an errour of Humility in undervaluing our selves the other from an errour of Iudgement or Suspition in mistaking of others There are some men who as the Orâ—…our speaks of despairing Wits De 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…rentur who are too unthankfull unto Nature in a slâ—…ight esteeme of the abilities shee â—…ath given them and deserve that Weakenesse which they unjustly complaine of The sight of whose Iudgment is not unlike that of Perspective Glasses the two ends whereof have a double representation the one fuller and neerer the truth the other smaller and at a farre greater distance So it is with men of this temper they looke on themselves and others with a double prejudice on themselves with a Distrusting and Despairing Iudgement which presents every thing remote and small on Others with on Overvaluing and Admiring Iudgement which contrariwise presents all perfections too perfect And by this means between a selfe-dislike and a too high estimation of others truth ever fals to the ground and for revenge of her selfe leaves the party thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Timorous For as Errour hath a property to produce and nourish any Passion according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about so principally this present Passion because Errour it selfe is a kinde of Formido Intellectus a Feare of the Vnderstanding and it is no great wonder for one Feare to beget another And therefore when Christ would take away the Feare of his Disciples he first removes their prejudice Feare not those that can kill the Body onely and can doe no more Where the overflowing of their Feares seemes to have been grounded on the overiudging of an adverse power Thus much for the Root and Essentiall cause of Feare these which follow are more casuall and upon occasion Whereof the first may be the Suddennesse of aâ—… Evill when it ceiseth upon as it were in the Dark for all Darknesse is comfortlesse and therefore the last terrible Iudgement is described unto us by the Blacknesse and Vnexpectednesse of it by the Darknesse of Night and the Suddennesse of Lightning All Vnacquaintaince then and Igno rance of an approaching Evill must needs worke Amazement and Terrour as contrarily a foresight theâ—… of worketh Patience to undergoe and Boldnesse to encounter it as Tacitus speaks of Caecina Ambiguarum rerum sciens eoque intrepidus that hee was acquainted with difficulties and therefore not fearfull of them And there is good reason for this because in a sudden daunt and onset of an unexpected evill the spirits which were before orderly carried by their severall due motions unto their naturall works are upon this strange appearance and instant Oppression of danger so disordered mixed and stiâ—…lled that there is no power left either in the Soule for Counsell or in the Body for Execution For as it is in the warres of men so of Passions those are more terrible which are by way of Invasion then of Battell which set upon men unarmed and uncomposed then those which find them prepared for resistance and so the Poet describes a lamentable overthrow by the Suddennes of the one side and the Ignorance of the other Invadunt urbeâ—… somno vinâ—…que sepultam They do invade a City all at rest Which ryot had with sleep and Wine opprest And this is one reason why men inclinable to this Passion are commonly more fearfull in the Night than at other times because then the Imagination is presenting of Objects not formerly thought on when the spirits which should strengthen are more retyred and Reason lesse guarded And yet there are Evils too which on the other side more affright with their long expectation and traine than if they were more contracted and speedy Somâ—… set upon us by sleath affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze others with a train and pomp like a Comet which is ushered in with a streame of fire and like Thunder which hurts not only with its danger but with its noise and therefore Aristotle reckoneth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the signes of an approaching evill amongst the Objects of Feare Another cause of Feare may be the Neernesse of an Evill when we perceive it to be within the reach of us and now ready to set upon us For aâ—… it is with Objects of Sence in a distance of place so it is with the Objects of Passion in a Distance of Time Remotion in either the greater it is the lesse present it makes the Object and by consequence the weaker is the impression there-from upon the faculty and this reason Aristotle gives why Death which else where he makes the most terrible evill unto Nature doth not yet with the conceit thereof by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance worke such terrour and amazement nor so stiffe Reason and the Spirits as Objects farre lesse in
progresse in any Inquiry but Iudgement is the Ballace to Poise and the Steere to guide the course to it s intended End Now the manner of the Iudgements Operation in directing either our Practise or Contemplation is by a discourse of the Mind whereby it â—…educeth them to certaine Grounds and Principles whereunto they ought chiefly to be conformable And from hence is that Reason which Quintilian observes why shallow and floating Wits seeme oftentimes more fluent than men of greater sufficiencies For saith he those other admit of every sudden flash or Conceipt without any Examination but apud Sapientes est â—…lectio Modus They first weigh things before they utter thâ—…m The maine Corruption of Iudgement in this Office is Prejudice and Prepossession The Duty of Iudgement is to discerne between Obliquities and right Actions and to reduce all to the Law of Reason And therefore t is true in this as in the course of publique Iudgements That respect of persons or things blind the Eyes and maketh the Vnderstanding to determine according to Affection and not according to Truth Though indeed some Passions there are which rather hood-winke then distemper or hurt the Iudgement so that the false determination thereof cannot bee well called a Mistake but a Lye Of which kind flattery is the principall when the Affections of Hope and Feare debase a man and cause him to dissemble his owne opinion CHAP. XL. Of the Actions of the Vnderstanding upon the Will with respect to the End and Means The Power of the Vnderstanding over the Will not Commanding but directing the Objects of the Will to bee good and convenient Corrupt Will lookes only at Good present Two Acts of the Vnderstanding Knowledge and Consideration It must also be possible and with respect to happinesse Immortall Ignorance and Weaknesse in the Understanding in proposing the right means to the last End HItherto of the Actions of the Vnderstanding Ad extra in regard of an Object Those Ad Intra in regard of the Will Wherein the Vnderstanding is a Minister oâ—… Counsellor to it are either to furnish it with an End whereon to fasten its desires or to direct it in the means conducible to that end For the Will alone is a blind Faculty and therefore as it cannot see the right Good it ought to affect without the Assistance of an Informing Power So neither can it see the right way it ought to take for procuring that Good without the direction of a Conducting power As it hath not Iudgment to discover an End So neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right Means whereby that may be attained So that all the Acts of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding Acts in the Vnderstanding whereby they are pro portioned to the Rules of right Reason This Operation of the Vnderstanding is usually by the Schoole-men called Imperium or Mandatum a Mandate or Command because it is a Precept to which the will ought to be obedient For the Rules of Living and Doing well are the Statutes as it were and Dictates of right Reason But yet it may not hence be concluded that the Vnderstanding hath any Superiority in regard of Dominion over the Will though it have Priority in regard of Operation The Power of the Vnderstanding over the Will is onely a Regulating and Directing it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power For the Will alwaies is Domina sâ—…orum actuum The Mistresse of her owne Operation For Intellectus non imperat sed solummâ—…dò significat voluntatem imperantis It doth only intimate unto the Will the Pleasure and Law of God some seeds whereof remaine in the Nature of man The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands because they are proposed by way of Man date but therfore they are in that manner proposed because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior Power And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our Vnderstanding but to sinne against our Law giver As in Civill Policy the offences of men are not against inferiour Officers but against that soveraigne Power which is the Fountaine of Law and under whose Authority all subordinate Magistrates have their proportion of government Besides Ejus est imperare Cujus est punire For Law and Punishment being Relatives and mutually connotating each the other it must necessarily follow that from that power only canbe an imposition of law from which may be an Infliction of Punishment Now the Condition under which the Vnderstanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end or means convenient to the Nature of the Will and of Sufficiency to move it are that they have in them Goodnesse Possibility and in the end if we speak of an utmost one Immortality too Every true Object of any Power is that which beareth such a perfect Relation of convenience fitnes therunto that it is able to accomplish all its desires Now since Malum is Destructâ—…vum all Evill is Destructive It is impossible that by it selfe without a counterfeit and adulterate face it should ever have any Attractive Power over the Desires of the Will And on the other side since Omne bonum is Perfectivum since Good is perfective and apt to bring reall satisfaction along with it most certainly would it be desired by the Will were it not that our Vnderstandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions and the Will it selfe corrupted in its owne Inelinations But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved that he is not able as he ought to will any Divine and Perfect Good yet so much he retains of his Perfection as that he cannot possibly desire any thing which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable destructive to his Nature since all Naturall Agents ayme still at their owne Perfection And therefore impossible it is that either Good should be refused without any apprehension of Disconvenience or Evill pursued without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction That it may appeare therefore how the Vnderstanding doth alwaies propose those Objects as Good to the Will which are notwithstanding not only in their owne Nature but in the Apprehension of the Vnderstanding it selfe knowne to be evill And on the contrary why it doth propose good Objects contrary to its owne Knowledge as Evill We may distinguish two opposite conditions in Good and Evill For first all Evill of Sin though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature as it is Destructive yet on the other side it hath agreement thereunto as it is crooked and corrupt As continuall drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropticke Body though most disconvenient to its present welfare Now then as no man possessed with that disease desires drinke for this end because he would dye though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite So