prove being now as I conceive sufficiently confirmed I hope it will not be inconsonant nor ungratefull certainly not unprofitable to you to derive some corallaries from it which may be usefull to us all for the institution of our lives and manners It followeth therefore in the first place from that which is already spoken that all pious men must take heed least being transported by a zeal to the glory of God they be carryed away to unlawfull Acts. There is no true Christian will deny but that the glory of God is the supreme and ultimate end of all our actions Whether we eat or drink or whatsoever we do it must be all done to the glory of God 1 Cor. 10 31. But being transported with too hasty and too prepostrous a zeal to the glory of God what contumelies what slaughters did not those men of that faction amongst the people of the Jews commit who peculiarly were called Zelots And amongst Christians in the memory of our Fathers the same things have been recorded by men worthy of belief and who were no ways ignorant of the transactions of the affairs of their times to have been done in Germany and other places by the Anabaptists in whose Chronologies such horrid acts and so far from all humanity are reported that we should hardly have given any belief unto them if we had not of late seen the same tragedies every day to be prodigiously acted to the life by their unhappy off-spring the dismal scene being translated into our Britannies XVI That none of you may be deceived therefore with so splendid a deceit and that you may not deceive others Consider with your selves in the first place that all Seducers the ministers of Satan and instructed by Satan himself the chief Seducer 1 Cor. 11. 14. who is accustomed to transform himself into an Angel of light have not more advanced themselves by any artifice nor imposed more upon the belief of the common people of Christendom nor more vigorously troubled the peace of our Churches and Common-wealths than under the pretence of the glory of God and of the reformation of Religion and of the propagation of the Gospell and of rooting out superstition and of the exalting of the Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ The most eminent of the Protestant Ministers in the preceeding age as Calvin Bucer Zuinglius and others have all along in their writeings grievously complayned of this Amongst whom Jerome Zanchius a man second unto few in learning modesty and piety hath this expression Ego non intelligo istam reformatorum mundi Theologiam Zanchius I do not understand this divinity of the new Reformers of the world I would to God that the experience of what is dayly acted amongst us did not confirm too much the truth of that vulgar Proverb In nomine Domini incipit omne malum Secondly Consider with your selves with how great and how perverse a heat of Spirit the glory of God is pretended to all wars tumults quarrelling contentions and unprofitable disputations of which the holy Apostles of our Lord Jesus did hardly ever make mention of and full often they have mentioned it but in order to peace and brotherly-love and that sweet deportment in things indifferent which especially becommeth Christians that so no man might abuse that liberty which we do by the benefit of Christ to be an offence or a stumbling-block unto his Brother In the third place consider that the man who doth propound unto himself the glory of God to be his End must also propound unto himself the Law of God to be the Rule of all his actions Ad Legem Testimonium to the Law and to the Testimony Isa 8. 20. Grant that the respect unto the glory of God is the final cause of thy acting as it is fit it should be so but the Rule and as it were the formal Reason of thy acting is not to be the glory of God but his revealed Will In the whole course of our lives the glory of God is to be looked upon as the mark or the Gole to which we run but we must look upon the Rule also that so we may go the right way which doth bring us to it lest that deservedly be objected to us which is commonly spoken Benè curritis sed extrà viam You run well but you run out of the way Lastly consider that the glory of God in the respect of singular actions hath the estimation of an end transcendental Now it is manifest that to a Transcendent no Individual can immediately be subjected so not of any singular Ens or being whether it be substantial or accidental is immediately subjected to the summum Ens or the chief being Therefore as Ens transcendentale the transcendental being is verified of every very being which is in one of the ten praedicaments whether it be universal or singular so the glory of God is the end of all duties of all acts thereto pertaining which expressly and virtually are contained in any praecept of the Decalogue God is to be worshipped our Parents honoured our Neighbours beloved our promises performed Justice Truth and Chastity preserved and other duties of Piety and Charity performed to the honour and glory of God Now as nothing hath truly the condition of an Ens or being which may not aptly be reduced to some species of it in some one of the ten praedicaments so no particular action let men that mind their own ends say what they will to the contrary can ever truly and properly be referred to the glory of God as to its end which is not reducible to some duty of piety and charity grounded in some one of the ten Commandments of the Law of God He but deludes you therefore whosoever he is who obstreperously cries out the glory of God the glory of God and yet is not able to tell you by what commandment in the Law of God he can maintain that which he vainly professeth that he performeth for the glory of God XVII From the Conclusion above named it followeth in the second place that they are in a great error who think it is lawfull for them to commit a lesse sin that a greater sin might be avoyded many things are alledged to maintain this error as in the first place that common saying which is in the mouth of every man * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 2. Ethic. 9. Of evils we must choose the least and to give a reason for what they say they alledge that of Aristot that a †〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. 5. Ethic. 7. lesse evil being compared with a greater may be taken for a good To which is added that of Gregorius magnus Dum mens inter minora et maxima peccata constringitur si nullus omninò sine peccato evadendi aditus pateat minorà semper elegantur When the mind is perplexed betwixt less sins and those of a higher nature if there be no possibility
same Gesture at the Sacred Table Can a Custom changed without any publick Authority sensibly so prevail that what before was not un-decent or un-lawful must now no longer be decent and no longer lawful Cannot a Law inacted by Publick Authority and established by an expresse consent of the people and allowed of by dayly use prevail that what upon no lawful reasons was ever found to be ever unlawful should be esteemed lawful again for the time to come Indeed where these two things Law and Conscience do fight between themselves as hardly they do in this case there is no man of a sober understanding but will acknowledge that Custome should give place to Law and not Law to Custome In the third place I demand of them do they seriously believe or do they not believe that he sinneth immediately in that Act who receiveth the Communion with bended knees If they shall say that he Sinneth seeing that every Sin is a transgression of the Law of God let them shew me some precept in that Law against which he that so doth Sinneth If they shall acknowledge that it may be done without Sin then by their own confession they will level their own Rise and overthrow all the force of their Arguments In the fourth place suppose that the said tricliniary gesture had been abolished before the first institution of the Holy Supper and that Sitting or Standing did succeed it so that Christ and his Apostles must have eaten either Standing or Sitting both of which could not be used at one time I demand if they had eaten Standing whether it were so necessary for us to stand also that we should have sinned if we had sate and on the contrary or whether we might have been free to have used which we would If they should say that we are free for both the Argument taken from the Example of Christ will be of no power and will fall to the Ground for he used only but one of the said Gestures and not both of them If they shall say again that we are precisely bound up to the observation of that posture which is supposed was used by our Saviour wherefore do these so severe Dictators and Controulers of the Liberty of every Church admit unto them an Indulgence of Standing or Sitting at the Holy Supper but not of kneeling or of that posture which it is most probable that our Saviour used In the fifth place I demand If the Example of Christ doth oblige us to the Imitation of it why is this obligation precisely determined in that posture which is but a subalternate Species and hath no reference to some higher Genus or why doth it not fall lower to some more inferiour Species To make it more obvious to your understandings seeing those three things are to be considered The gesture or Posture it self as a superior Genus the Posture at the Table as a Species subalternate to it And the Posture of lying along and leaning as the lowest Species And it is probable that Christ used the last according to the custom and practice of those Times and Climates why must the posture only at the Table which is but an intermedial and a subalternate Species be accounted necessary and sufficient to the true Imitation of Christ and not any other posture sufficient in the Genus of it or why may not the posture of Leaning and lying along be as necessary in the Species Lastly I demand Is the posture of leaning and lying along practised by our Saviour and the Apostles at the first institution of the Holy Supper to be imitated or not I am confident they will not deny that it is to be imitated for indeed they cannot deny it because from thence they do derive the chiefest ground and foundation of their Cause For thus they do propound the examples of Christ of necessity to be imitated by us that is to say not every example simply in it self but every example that may be practised by us I Only therefore in this argumentation take that which they of their own accord do grant which is 1st the proposition That every imitable example of Christ doth oblige a Christian to the imitation of it And 2ly the assumption that the posture in the Species of it which Christ used in the holy Supper whatsoever it was is imitable From these premises I infer this conclusion By the force therfore of this example say I Christians of the next age unto our Saviour were obliged to the same posture in the same Species which he used And in the same manner were Christians of the second and third age ever since unto these present times And it must accordingly be acknowledged that the Church of Christ even at this time also is obliged to the practice of the tricliniary or leaning posture if indeed Christ did use it or at least it must be shown at what time and on what account and by what Author and Authority the force of this obligation is made void XXII By these things which have been spoken it is manifest that all the force of their Argument which with so much pompe is dressed and held forth by them doth come to no more than this that it cannot more rightly or more commodiously be propounded for their own purpose than under this form The example of Christ and his Apostles doth so farre oblige as we think it expedient that it shall oblige but we think it expedient that it shall oblige to the not bending of the knee in the receiving of the Sacrament no further therefore so farre only and not a jot further is the extent of the obligation I am ashamed I confesse to furre your ears with the repetition of these vanities for it becomes not this place nor my age or manners to provoke to laughter in so serious a Subject But what shall we do with these men A bad cause indeed doth need such a Patronage and it cannot but come to pass that oftentimes they are enforced to speak many vain and incongruous things and if throughly they be examined very absurd ones whosoever they are who like unto those men do suffer themselves to be governed by affectation rather than truth I do speak from my heart and as indeed it is although in their writings we do meet with many things not solidly argued and sometimes not sincerely yet I do not remember that I have any where observed meer trifles to be carryed on with so much animosity and contention or the swelling Hills to bring forth a more miserable and ridiculous production than when the bare examples of good men in the holy Scriptures are so importunately urged either to excuse those acts which by the law of God do seem to be prohibited or to induce an obligation upon the Consciences of men for the observation of those things which do not appeare by any law of God to be commanded But I return from whence I have digressed if have transgress'd at all
person his Conscience doth passe its judgment on every one of them by the light of Reason which is infused and imprinted into his mind And seeing the Rule is the same concerning Acts to come as well as concerning Acts past it followeth that the Conscience as well in those Acts determined to be done as in those which are already done doth make use of the same light of examining judging and dictating as the Rule measure of those Acts. I here shall willingly take no notice of that Text in the fourth Psalm and sixth verse which is commonly produced by the Latin Fathers especially of the latter times and by the Schoolmen for a proof of this Conclusion the words are Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine Thy light O Lord is signed over us because that interpretation of the words are grounded on a bad translation seemeth not to appertain to the mind and scope of the Prophet XIII This is proved again by our common custom and manner of speech for we usually say that the man who acteth according to the light of his mind doth use a good Conscience although peradventure he hath committed or omitted that which was not to be omitted or committed by him and again that he who hath not obeyed those dictates of his mind but hath acted contrary to them hath used a bad Conscience St. Paul the Apostle Acts 2â— 1 doth professe that In all things he served God with a good Conscience even unto that day which words if they are to be extended to the former part of his life before he was made a Christian which interpretation hath been complacent to many and seemeth probable unto me we may conclude by them that although he was an open and a dangerous enemy to Christianity 1 Tim. 1. 13. and as he himself confesseth a persecutor and a blasphemer yet it may be said that even then in all good Conscience he served God because in all that time he acted nothing but what his Conscience according to the measure of that light with which it was then endued did prescribe unto him For indeed he then thought as he himself doth openly and sincerely professe in his Apology before King Agrippa that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he thought in himself Act. 26. 9. that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth But whatsoever may be determined of Paul and of his Conscience at that time most certain it is that God himself gave a testimony to Abimeleck Gen. 20. 6. who ignorantly sent for the wife of Abraham that he did it integritate cordis in the integrity of his heart that is with a good Conscience and for no other reason but for this only by which he did excuse himself for had he known her to have been the wife of another man he would not have sent for her unto his house The Conscience therefore by an ignorance of it self not much to be blamed peradventure erronious may be said to be good and right God himself being Judge not simply and absolutely but as but so far secundum quid as they speak it in the Schooles by reason of the conformity which it hath with the light of the mind thereof as its next and immediate Rule But that the Conscience may be said to be right 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is fully and in every respect there must another and a further Conformity be of necessity added unto it which is it must be conformable to its first and supreme Rule which what it is shall most diligently be now discussed XIV This therefore shall be our third Conclusion The holy Scripture or the written word of God is not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience Which in the first place is thus proved Beyond the Adaequate Rule of any thing whatsoever it is not necessary that for the same thing there should be any other Rule to be added to it for Adaequation doth exclude the necessity of any Supplement But it is necessary that there should be another Rule of Conscience besides the holy Scripture for otherwise the Gentiles who have not the Scripture should have no Rule for their Conscience which comes quite crosse to reason experience and the expresse testimony of the Apostle in the Text above mentioned Most certain it is that there is a Conscience in all men and that it is under a Law which is a rule to direct it For as the Apostle maketh mention and it is every where extant in History and confirmed by daily experience from whence do proceed those grievous accusations of Conscience those whips those pangs and torments of the Soul those furies expressed by the Tragedians but from the violated Law of Conscience of which if there were no Law at all those people that are most barbarous should be so much the more happy as they are the more far remote from the voice and sound of the Gospel because that then no crime of sin could justly be imputed to them For where there is no Law there is no transgression Rom. 4. 15. Sin being nothing else but the transgression of the Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Joh. 3. 4. That the power of Conscience is strong in both regards to fear every thing when it is guilty and to be in dread of nothing when it is innocent is not only cryed up by the Schools but by the Theaters of the Heathens who notwithstanding knew nothing of Moses or of Christ nor of the Law or the Prophets and never heard of the Gospel or the Apostles The Scripture therefore is not the sole and Adaequate Rule of Conscience XV. It is confirmed again in the second place from the proper end of the holy Scripture which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 3. 15. To make us wise to everlastâ—â—g Salvation by faith in Jesus Christ For when the light of natural reason could not raise us high enough to those things which do tend to a supernatural end both because of our natural light too much obscured and ecclipsed by the fall of Adam and because we must have supernatural helps to arrive to supernatural ends it pleased Almighty God in pity of our infirmities in his own word to open his own will unto us according to that measure which he himself thought good insomuch that by this gracious and saving Counsel not only those things by divine revelation may be made known unto us which properly do concern our faith and cannot be known by the light of nature but that more perfectly and more savingly we may be instructed in those things also which by nature are known unto us that so those works which nature enjoyneth to be performed taking their rise from a nobler principle which is the love of God and ordained to more noble ends to wit the Glory of God and the salvation of our souls may from moral become spiritual and be grateful and acceptable to God by
presently as soon as ever they are published according to the manner of the Country oblige all those Subjects to whose notice they are arrived or where it was not in the fault of the Lawmaker but that they might have come to the knowledge of them For seeing the obligation of the Law dependeth on the will of the Law-giver and not on the notice of the Subject it followeth that the obligation of the Law is of force when the Law-giver hath sufficiently expressed his will to his Subjects by some outward sign whether it were made known to all his Subjects or whether it so fell out that some of them peradventure were ignorant of it For grant but the Law and the obligation is granted which hath its dependency on the Law as it is a Law and necessarily followeth it as every necessary Effect doth follow its proper Cause as already we have often mentioned Therefore there being nothing wanting to a Law that is required to the compleating of its essence after that it is made and sufficiently published it altogether followeth that a Law so made and published ought presently to inferre an obligation neither is it any wayes inconvenient that an obligation be made and become ours by the will only Act of another we not knowing it if the said obligation doth carry with it the nature construction of a moral Debt as the Schoolmen speak it Although from obligations and debts w ch arise from contracts the case is otherwise VII The fourth Doubt How the Law doth reach unto those who though after a sufficient publication of it and the elapse of the time prefixed by the Law have not yet actually any knowledge of it Which is to demand whether he to whom the Law is not actually known be so guilty of the fault that he transgresseth if he doth any thing against it and thereupon deserveth that punishment which that Law inflicteth on the transgressors of it The reason of this Doubt is on the one side because that obligation is vain or rather none at all which obligeth neither to the fault nor to the punishment And on the other side both because it is absurd to be bound to that which is impossible but to observe a Law which we know not is certainly impossible as also because from the two Offices of the Law above specified it is necessary that the power of directing as first by Nature must go before the other power of obliging so that the Law cannot oblige any but whom it directeth and it cannot direct any but those to whom it is known This being laid down in the first place which admits of no scruple viz. that the Subject to whom the Law is known is obliged both to the fault and to the punishment As for those that know not the Law I answer to the propounded doubt and say in the first place that he who by his grosse negligence is ignorant of the Law when it proceeds from his own fault that he is ignorant of it is no lesse or at least not much lesse guilty of the fault and deserveth punishment as well as he who doth know the Law and doth it not For the Ignorance of that thing which every man ought to know and may know doth excuse no man And in the interpretation of the Law there is no great difference betwixt a wilful Ignorance and a fault committed VIII I say in the second place That he who is therefore ignorant of the Law because he was a little more carelesse or negligent than in a businesse of that moment he ought to be although the fault be never so light as the Civilians term it yet because it is manifest it was done by a fault and by his own Fault he is not altogether free from the obligation of the Law My Reason is because that Ignorance was vincible as the Schoolmen speak that is which could be overcome for if the Subject had been so diligent as he ought to have been and as the dignity of the cause required and as wise men use to be in their imployments of greater weight he could not be ignorant it is presumed of the promulgation of the Law Now his Ignorance of that Law according to which every man is bound to direct his Actions being in him an ignorance that might have been helped this Ignorance cannot be but culpable and if culpable in whatoever degree it be it cannot but accordingly be inexcusable It may be argued But by how much the lighter the fault is the Ignorance in both Courts is so much the more excusable and amongst the equal Arbitrators of things doth deserve a more easy pardon It is to be answered that he was before obliged by the Law although he was ignorant of it And it is manifest by this because as soon as ever by the Testimony of some man of Reputation he understood that the Law was published he immediately in his own Conscience judged himself to be obliged by that Law now there could arise no obligation from a new report or by the Testimony of this man neither is there any power of obligation either in himself or in his Testimony therfore without doubt he was obliged before by that Law although he had neither notice of the Law nor any Conscience of the Obligation IX I say in the third place He who in earnest and invincibly either by accident or any other impediment and by no neglect of his own is ignorant of the promulgation of a Law as if any man should be visited with madness or labour under some long or grievous disease or being newly returned from forein Countries should never hear of the publication of such a Law nor indeed could hear of it he is not by that Law obliged either unto the fault or any punishment of the fault so properly named Nevertheless by the same Law which he is invincibly ignorant of he may become so far lyable to a punishment improperly so called that is to some losse to be sustained The first part of this position is thus proved No man committeth a fault or deserveth punishment who doth not Sin but he who keeps not a Law of which he is invincibly ignorant doth not Sin for if he should sin he were obliged to that which is impossible therefore he cannot deservedly be blamed nor justly punished But that he may be obliged to some dammage to be sustained by that Law which is the other part of our assertion shall appear to be most clear by this example Suppose there be a Law prohibiting some certain kind of Trassiquings and Contracts by which Law amongst other things it is decreed that all such contracts made one month after the promulgation of the said Law shall be altogether void and of no effect If any man after that month is run out being in good earnest and invincibly ignorant of the promulgation of that Law shall strike such a bargain which is by the said Law forbidden he will be
silent I answered howsoever and what was too true indeed that unless some Necessity did inforce me of which I was not then capable being out of the Readers place it could not be As a faint-hearted souldier whom only Desperation makes valiant grows then hot and is fiercely carryed on unto the Fight when no subterfuge is left for him so is my wit give it leisure space and time nothing is done Hotat Sat. 3. The Quill in vain is vexed my mind is unsettled it roams and rambles and degenerates into sloath Use compulsion to it and check it it unites and is entire it is stirred up and recollecteth strength and what force it hath since there must be care and Industry it puts it all forth at once and in one word it doth that which is necessary to be done So the Beams of the Sun diffused in a free and open air do so gently warm us that we are hardly sensible of it but being united and contracted into the round of a hollow Glasse as into a Center they do vehemently burn Being by long use instructed from my youth to this age I have learned how true is that Hemistich of Pythogoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pythag. aur Carâ—â— Performance is a near Neighbour and dwelleth at the next door to Necessity And although this imperfection of a slothful mind may to many men appear to carry before it some show of modesty yet it seems to me that it cannot be handsomely defended unless it be by this excuse that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so born and bred up with some men and I am in the same number with them that in vain he laboureth whosoever he is that hopeth by any Art to correct it or by industry to overcome it But enough and too much of so unpleasing a Subject Peradventure you will demand for as yet we are come up to â—o certainty and are returning back still where at first we were If as you say you are so slow of your self and so contumacious to your friends from whence at last came this Edition Certainly from nothing else but from this very Necessity of which but even now was our discourse and which usurpeth so vast a Dominion over the affairs of men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Euripid. For wise men speak it Helen and not only we Nothing so strong as dire Necessitie Act. 2. But to hold you no longer in suspence I will in a few words declare the whole business to you All this contumacy was broken as it were at one blow by Mr. James Alleâ—â—â—y Book-seller of London who in his Letter to me did acquaint me that two Copies of these Lectures were brought unto him and that he had them then in his own custody in his own house that he who brought them to him was in hand with him that either by himself or at least by his procurement they should be printed which he denyed to do without my consent He warned me withal there being other Copies abroad iâ— hardly could be prevented if I neglected it but that they would be published by some one else I not knowing of it I did commend nay I did love in a man at that time utterly unknown unto me the candour of his mind and his reverent respect to Equity especially being of their profession who almost do make their gain their only businesse I therefore wrote back unto him to send me one of the Copies that seemed to him to be the fairest of the two and the most perfect and in the mean time I would consider with my self what was needful to be done To be short he sent it I did read it and examine it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Every Page was turned over and nothing was found sound nothing perfect for besides the innumerable faults of the Transcriber not a few things which in my first meditation were written by my self with too hasty a Pen did seem as they indeed ought to be called back again to the Anvel and the Hammer Hence I perceived I was to undergo a troublesome and tedious task to write over the whole work anew which neverthelesse was to be endured I indured it and wrote it over and did perfect it as I could and if no man be a Debtor beyond his power as I ought If not as I would I require this one thing as reasonable nay as due unto him who doth as much as lies in his power Pardon The Summary of the first Lecture 1. The reason of the undertaking the work 2 2. The Definition of Conscience is proposed 2 3. The name of the Thing defined 3 4. c. And the original of that name 5 7. c. Illustrated from the Ambiguity of the word Science 9 10. c. And the Hâ—monymy of the word Conscience 10 14. Of the Genus of Conscience 17 The first opinion that it is an Act is confuted 18 15. The second opinion that it is a Potentia 16. Which is confuted also 19 17. The third opinion that it is a Habit Innate 18. Or a Faculty is stated 19. And unfolded 21 20. The Subject of Conscience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or of which 23 21. And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in which 24 22. c. The Object of Conscience 26 24. c. The first Act of Conscience 29 27. And the following Acts. 31 28. Many things are obscured rather than illustrated by defining them 33 The Summary of the Second Lecture 1. c. The twofold respect of Conscience 37 3 The erronious and deceitful Rules of Conscience 39 4. A good Intention doth not suffice to the gâ—odness of the Act. 40 5. Which is proved first by the words of the Apostle 41 6. c. Secondly from the nature of Evil. 43 9. Thirdly from the conditions required to the goodness of an Act. 46 10. c. An Objection is answered 48 12. Fourthly by the perfection of the Divine Law 51 13. Fourthly by the perfection of the Divine Law 51 13. Fifthly by the revenge of God punishing the transgression of a Law although done by a good Intention 52 14. Sixthly from the Inconveniencies of the contrary opinion 54 15. c. The first Corrollary we must take heed lest under a pretence of Zeal to Gods Glory we be not carryed away to the committing of unlawful and forbidden things 56 17. c. The second a lesse sin is not to be committed by us to avoid a greater sin in another 59 19. c. Whether it be lawful for any man to perswade to a lesse sin to avoid a greater 63 21. c. The Third Corallary one evil is not to be driven out by another 65 The Summary of the Third Lecture 1. The reason of the method that is here observed 70 2. c. The Fact of Paul reproving Peter 72 6. c. All the deeds of the Saints barely recited in the holy Scripture are not to be imitated 77
to escape without sin the lesse sins are always to be chosen Neither to this are wanting the examples of godly men in which that Act of Lot is remarkable above all the rest for in the nineteenth of Genesis we do find that he perswaded the filthy and most impure Inhabitants of Sodom to the Act of incontinency with his own Daughters to divert them from more nefarious lusts I should appear too tedious if I should here insist upon too many examples to contract much therfore into few words I say first of all that those words Of evills the least is properly and primarily to be understood of the evills of punishment as they call it not of the fault that is to say not of Sir but of Externall evills compared amongst themselves In the same sence as David did who the choyce of three evils being propounded to him 1 Sam. 24. 14. viz. of War Famine and Pestilence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vid. Suid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did make choice of the least of those three In the second place I affiirm that the same proverb in the interpretation of it is extended to a further sence For two evils being propounded the one of punishment the other of the fault if neither of them can possibly be avoyded but of necessity one of them must be chosen the evil of the punishment is to be made choice of and not the evil of the fault for it is the least evil of the two to suffer evil than to do evil We ought therefore rather to choose to lose our goods than to renounce our faith and to suffer banishment than to be guilty of perjury And from hence it is that the Martyrs of old were indued with such a gallantry strength of courage as to be plundred and tormented and to lose their lives rather than to burn incense uâ—to Idols or to consent to any thing which were dishonest or unworthy the name of a Christian In the third place if it were propounded to any one to commit two sins and most manifest it is unto his Conscience that both of them are sins I do affirm that he is not to make any choice of either but to eschew both of them If you object that put the case that neither of them can be avoided but one of them must of necessity be committed as those words of Gregory do manifestly imply what will you perswade a man unto being in these streights I answer that this cannot be supposed for seeing that all sin is so voluntary that if it were not voluntary it were not sin as St. Augustine truly affirms it cannot be that any man should be brought into such a streight that of necessity he must sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 2. Eudem 11. he therfore doth contradict himself who shall affirm that he committed such a sin being compelled by meer necessity for there is no man sinneth unlesse it be by his own Will and the will is so free that it cannot be compelled And surely this is the sence of St. Gregory although at the first sight the words do seem to bear another construction Nulla est necessitas delinquendi quibus una est necessitas non delinquendi Tert. de Cor. Mil. Cap. 11. these words especially Si nullus sine peccato evadendi aditus pateat But if it be impossible to make any evasion without the committing of sin For St. Gregory doth not here speak of two things propounded to be done both whereof are sins which is the subject of which we now do treat but of two things whereof it is manifest to the person that doth commit them that one is a sin and the other by a mistake of the Conscience is conceived by him to be a sin when indeed it is not so but upon some ungrounded suspition or some new scruple that doth invade his Conscience he is affraid lest peradventure it be a sin which case is different from our present institution XVIII If you demand is it lawfull for Caius to admit unto himself a less sin to hinder a far greater one which Titius otherwise would have committed as to be guilty of some petty larceny that the other might not commit a murder I say with St. Augustine that it is not lawfull his words are these Si quaeratur quid duorum potius debuit evitare qui utrumque non potuit sed alterutrum potuit respondeo suum peccatum potius quam alienum levius potiùs quod suum quà m gravius quod alienum If it be demanded of me saith he what of the two he ought rather to avoid who cannot eschew both sins but may one of them I answer his own sin rather than anothers and more easily his own than anothers The reason is ready for it is in my power that I do not sin but not if another sinneth And thus he proceeds Ego utrumque malum fieri nollem sed id tantum cavere potui ne fieret quod erat in mea potestate I would have neither of the two evils committed but I could only be cautious in this that the evill should not be committed which was in my power But man-slaughter is a greater crime then theft St. Augustine doth confesse it and makes answer that nevertheless it is worse to act a theft then to suffer a man-slaughter And to the same purpose he expresseth himself in another place Quantumlibet distet inter tuum aliennm hoc tamen erit tuum illud alienum Let the crime be never so rightly stated yet this shall be thy own and that shall be another mans This is cleer and I need no longer to insist upon it XIX In the fifth place if it be yet demanded is it lawfull at least for any man to perswade a less evil to him who is ready to commit a greater as if a man be ready to cut the throat of his enemy to perswade him to inflict only some slight wound upon him The speech of Lot to his fellow Citizens tendeth to this purpose And there are many who differ in their judgment concerning it I do not much wonder that Chrysostome doth excuse it for it is the inclination of his Genius and in the same manner he excuseth all the infirmities of the Patriarches Ambrose doth excuse him also and so do many more especially the Antients But St. Augustine doth censure him as guilty of sin and his judgment hath been approved of by many who since have followed him and undoubtedly it doth appear that this holy man out of a pious affection to his Guests being extreamly sollicitous that no force or injâ—ry should be offered to them did some things and peradventure spoke more out of the distemper of a troubled mind than might easily be excused Therefore to passe over this fact of Lot we will return from the Hypothesis to the Thesis or to the question now in hand I do conceive that it is lawfull for a
propounded and he doth not violate the Law unless he doth neglect them both XXIV This which was to be spoken of the obligation of a Law purely penal being as I conceive sufficiently unfolded let us now passe to the consideration of a penal Law mixed Concerning which I make this my third conclusion A penal Law mixed to wit which openly commandeth something to be observed and that it more diligently may be performed which is commanded doth appoint a penalty to the transgressors doth oblige both to the fault and to the punishment insomuch that he neither satisfies the Law nor his Conscience who undergoes the punishment unless he doth perform that also which is commanded by the Law There is none can doubt that such a Law doth oblige to the punishment for otherwise of what use would the punishment be that is added to it And it is manifest that it obligeth to the fault because it containeth a manifest command And every command obligeth to the fault For a Fault or a Sin is nothing else but the transgression of some precept 1 Joh. 3. Neither can that be probably spoken which is said to be the opinion of Navarr that the Law-maker by inserting the punishment doth signify that he hath no intention of obliging but only to that punishment which is annexed Observe I pray you how perverse it is so to interpret the appointing of a punishment which it is certain is for that end annexed to the precept that the said precept by the fear of punishment might more diligently and more accurately be observed as to make weak and take-away the obligation of the said precept Numberlesse are the Laws which throughout the world are made against Thieves Murderers perjured Persons and other wicked and nefarious people God also gave a Law to our first Parents by which he forbad them to eat of the fruit of the Tree which was in the midst of Paradise having annexed to the prohibition the punishment of death if they should eat thereof Gen. 2. Can any man be found so dâ—stitute of reason as to think that Adam was obliged by this Divine Law and that others are obliged by Humane Laws to the punishment only and not unto the fault Who will affirm to omit humane Laws that Adam was not obliged in Conscience by that Divine Law to abstain from the forbidden fruit but to this only that if he did eat thereof he should be ready to undergoe the setence of death The opinion therefore of Navarre being exploded as dangerous and by all men confuted if indeed the opinion was his which I shall hardly believe he being a man of so reverend a fame we are to affirm that a penal Law mixed being both penal and preceptive doth oblige both to the punishment and to the Fault to the punishment as it is penal and to the Fault as it is preceptive XXV The third Doubt remaineth How and how far the transgressor of a penal Law is bound to undergoe the punishment in the fact it self that is appointed by the Law I must make haste I will therefore be as short as I can I say therefore in the first place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that it imposeth not any thing upon the transgressor to be either done or suffered by him but consisteth rather in an inability to do something which was commodious for him to do or in an incapacity of receiving somthing which would be profitable for him he is guilty of the Law so violated and is bound ipso facto to undergo the punishment There are many Laws which do forbid transgressors to do this or that as the Civil Laws for certain causes do forbid translationem Dominii the alteration of power or free-holds There are also many Laws which for such a certain time do make Delinquents incapable of such a place or dignity As if a Disturber of the peace by a statute of the University be prohibited to have his Grace propounded in the Congregation House for the space of two years after the fault committed In such the like cases where the punishment consisteth only in the Inability or the Inâ—â—pacity because to undergoe this punishment there is no Cooperation required of the person to be punished but rather a certain Cessation of operating He who hath violated the Law is obliged willingly to suffer the punishment although he be not required I say in the second place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that a cooperation of the person offending be necessarily required to the Execution of the Law that is that he who is to be punished is to act something himself in his own punishment he is not obliged ordinarily to undergoe the said punishment ipso facto before the Judge hath pronounced the sentence or which is the same before the punishment be exacted of him by a person to that purpose invested with lawful Authority The guilty person is bound indeed to suffer the punishment but if he called to it otherwise he is not bound I say in the third place that a guilty man after the sentence pronounced by the Judge or after he is required to it by a person invested with lawful Authority is obliged to a willing undergoing of the punishment yea and with some Cooperation of his own if this Cooperation be not against the Laws of humanity though otherwise very grievous and extremely painful For examples sake If an offendor be commanded to pay a great sum of money under the name of penalty or to depart the Kingdome he is bound by the power of the Law to the performance of it but if the punishment imposed be not only grievous but something also that is inhumane as if a malefactor be commanded to scourge himself to cut off his own hand to drinke poyson or the like in these cases the guilty person is obliged to undergoe the punishment passively but he is not obliged actively to cooperate in it w ch he knows to be ordained by the Law and which by his default he hath deserved And let this suffice to be spoken of the necessity of the Promulgation of Laws and of the Obligation of those penal Laws which may seem to have any reference with the Formal Cause of Laws THE NINTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in respect of the Final Cause thereof 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godlinesse and Honesty IN our former Lectures we have treated of the Obligation of Humane Laws as to their Material Efficient and formal Causes in some places peradventure more largely and in others again peradventure more concisely than was requisite It remaineth that we should proceed to the explication of those things which do pertain to the final Cause of Laws But before we do come to dissolve these doubts we are first to premise and pronounce as an undoubted Truth That the ultimate end