person his Conscience doth passe its judgment on every one of them by the light of Reason which is infused and imprinted into his mind And seeing the Rule is the same concerning Acts to come as well as concerning Acts past it followeth that the Conscience as well in those Acts determined to be done as in those which are already done doth make use of the same light of examining judging and dictating as the Rule measure of those Acts. I here shall willingly take no notice of that Text in the fourth Psalm and sixth verse which is commonly produced by the Latin Fathers especially of the latter times and by the Schoolmen for a proof of this Conclusion the words are Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine Thy light O Lord is signed over us because that interpretation of the words are grounded on a bad translation seemeth not to appertain to the mind and scope of the Prophet XIII This is proved again by our common custom and manner of speech for we usually say that the man who acteth according to the light of his mind doth use a good Conscience although peradventure he hath committed or omitted that which was not to be omitted or committed by him and again that he who hath not obeyed those dictates of his mind but hath acted contrary to them hath used a bad Conscience St. Paul the Apostle Acts 2â— 1 doth professe that In all things he served God with a good Conscience even unto that day which words if they are to be extended to the former part of his life before he was made a Christian which interpretation hath been complacent to many and seemeth probable unto me we may conclude by them that although he was an open and a dangerous enemy to Christianity 1 Tim. 1. 13. and as he himself confesseth a persecutor and a blasphemer yet it may be said that even then in all good Conscience he served God because in all that time he acted nothing but what his Conscience according to the measure of that light with which it was then endued did prescribe unto him For indeed he then thought as he himself doth openly and sincerely professe in his Apology before King Agrippa that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he thought in himself Act. 26. 9. that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth But whatsoever may be determined of Paul and of his Conscience at that time most certain it is that God himself gave a testimony to Abimeleck Gen. 20. 6. who ignorantly sent for the wife of Abraham that he did it integritate cordis in the integrity of his heart that is with a good Conscience and for no other reason but for this only by which he did excuse himself for had he known her to have been the wife of another man he would not have sent for her unto his house The Conscience therefore by an ignorance of it self not much to be blamed peradventure erronious may be said to be good and right God himself being Judge not simply and absolutely but as but so far secundum quid as they speak it in the Schooles by reason of the conformity which it hath with the light of the mind thereof as its next and immediate Rule But that the Conscience may be said to be right 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is fully and in every respect there must another and a further Conformity be of necessity added unto it which is it must be conformable to its first and supreme Rule which what it is shall most diligently be now discussed XIV This therefore shall be our third Conclusion The holy Scripture or the written word of God is not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience Which in the first place is thus proved Beyond the Adaequate Rule of any thing whatsoever it is not necessary that for the same thing there should be any other Rule to be added to it for Adaequation doth exclude the necessity of any Supplement But it is necessary that there should be another Rule of Conscience besides the holy Scripture for otherwise the Gentiles who have not the Scripture should have no Rule for their Conscience which comes quite crosse to reason experience and the expresse testimony of the Apostle in the Text above mentioned Most certain it is that there is a Conscience in all men and that it is under a Law which is a rule to direct it For as the Apostle maketh mention and it is every where extant in History and confirmed by daily experience from whence do proceed those grievous accusations of Conscience those whips those pangs and torments of the Soul those furies expressed by the Tragedians but from the violated Law of Conscience of which if there were no Law at all those people that are most barbarous should be so much the more happy as they are the more far remote from the voice and sound of the Gospel because that then no crime of sin could justly be imputed to them For where there is no Law there is no transgression Rom. 4. 15. Sin being nothing else but the transgression of the Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Joh. 3. 4. That the power of Conscience is strong in both regards to fear every thing when it is guilty and to be in dread of nothing when it is innocent is not only cryed up by the Schools but by the Theaters of the Heathens who notwithstanding knew nothing of Moses or of Christ nor of the Law or the Prophets and never heard of the Gospel or the Apostles The Scripture therefore is not the sole and Adaequate Rule of Conscience XV. It is confirmed again in the second place from the proper end of the holy Scripture which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 3. 15. To make us wise to everlastâ—â—g Salvation by faith in Jesus Christ For when the light of natural reason could not raise us high enough to those things which do tend to a supernatural end both because of our natural light too much obscured and ecclipsed by the fall of Adam and because we must have supernatural helps to arrive to supernatural ends it pleased Almighty God in pity of our infirmities in his own word to open his own will unto us according to that measure which he himself thought good insomuch that by this gracious and saving Counsel not only those things by divine revelation may be made known unto us which properly do concern our faith and cannot be known by the light of nature but that more perfectly and more savingly we may be instructed in those things also which by nature are known unto us that so those works which nature enjoyneth to be performed taking their rise from a nobler principle which is the love of God and ordained to more noble ends to wit the Glory of God and the salvation of our souls may from moral become spiritual and be grateful and acceptable to God by
same Gesture at the Sacred Table Can a Custom changed without any publick Authority sensibly so prevail that what before was not un-decent or un-lawful must now no longer be decent and no longer lawful Cannot a Law inacted by Publick Authority and established by an expresse consent of the people and allowed of by dayly use prevail that what upon no lawful reasons was ever found to be ever unlawful should be esteemed lawful again for the time to come Indeed where these two things Law and Conscience do fight between themselves as hardly they do in this case there is no man of a sober understanding but will acknowledge that Custome should give place to Law and not Law to Custome In the third place I demand of them do they seriously believe or do they not believe that he sinneth immediately in that Act who receiveth the Communion with bended knees If they shall say that he Sinneth seeing that every Sin is a transgression of the Law of God let them shew me some precept in that Law against which he that so doth Sinneth If they shall acknowledge that it may be done without Sin then by their own confession they will level their own Rise and overthrow all the force of their Arguments In the fourth place suppose that the said tricliniary gesture had been abolished before the first institution of the Holy Supper and that Sitting or Standing did succeed it so that Christ and his Apostles must have eaten either Standing or Sitting both of which could not be used at one time I demand if they had eaten Standing whether it were so necessary for us to stand also that we should have sinned if we had sate and on the contrary or whether we might have been free to have used which we would If they should say that we are free for both the Argument taken from the Example of Christ will be of no power and will fall to the Ground for he used only but one of the said Gestures and not both of them If they shall say again that we are precisely bound up to the observation of that posture which is supposed was used by our Saviour wherefore do these so severe Dictators and Controulers of the Liberty of every Church admit unto them an Indulgence of Standing or Sitting at the Holy Supper but not of kneeling or of that posture which it is most probable that our Saviour used In the fifth place I demand If the Example of Christ doth oblige us to the Imitation of it why is this obligation precisely determined in that posture which is but a subalternate Species and hath no reference to some higher Genus or why doth it not fall lower to some more inferiour Species To make it more obvious to your understandings seeing those three things are to be considered The gesture or Posture it self as a superior Genus the Posture at the Table as a Species subalternate to it And the Posture of lying along and leaning as the lowest Species And it is probable that Christ used the last according to the custom and practice of those Times and Climates why must the posture only at the Table which is but an intermedial and a subalternate Species be accounted necessary and sufficient to the true Imitation of Christ and not any other posture sufficient in the Genus of it or why may not the posture of Leaning and lying along be as necessary in the Species Lastly I demand Is the posture of leaning and lying along practised by our Saviour and the Apostles at the first institution of the Holy Supper to be imitated or not I am confident they will not deny that it is to be imitated for indeed they cannot deny it because from thence they do derive the chiefest ground and foundation of their Cause For thus they do propound the examples of Christ of necessity to be imitated by us that is to say not every example simply in it self but every example that may be practised by us I Only therefore in this argumentation take that which they of their own accord do grant which is 1st the proposition That every imitable example of Christ doth oblige a Christian to the imitation of it And 2ly the assumption that the posture in the Species of it which Christ used in the holy Supper whatsoever it was is imitable From these premises I infer this conclusion By the force therfore of this example say I Christians of the next age unto our Saviour were obliged to the same posture in the same Species which he used And in the same manner were Christians of the second and third age ever since unto these present times And it must accordingly be acknowledged that the Church of Christ even at this time also is obliged to the practice of the tricliniary or leaning posture if indeed Christ did use it or at least it must be shown at what time and on what account and by what Author and Authority the force of this obligation is made void XXII By these things which have been spoken it is manifest that all the force of their Argument which with so much pompe is dressed and held forth by them doth come to no more than this that it cannot more rightly or more commodiously be propounded for their own purpose than under this form The example of Christ and his Apostles doth so farre oblige as we think it expedient that it shall oblige but we think it expedient that it shall oblige to the not bending of the knee in the receiving of the Sacrament no further therefore so farre only and not a jot further is the extent of the obligation I am ashamed I confesse to furre your ears with the repetition of these vanities for it becomes not this place nor my age or manners to provoke to laughter in so serious a Subject But what shall we do with these men A bad cause indeed doth need such a Patronage and it cannot but come to pass that oftentimes they are enforced to speak many vain and incongruous things and if throughly they be examined very absurd ones whosoever they are who like unto those men do suffer themselves to be governed by affectation rather than truth I do speak from my heart and as indeed it is although in their writings we do meet with many things not solidly argued and sometimes not sincerely yet I do not remember that I have any where observed meer trifles to be carryed on with so much animosity and contention or the swelling Hills to bring forth a more miserable and ridiculous production than when the bare examples of good men in the holy Scriptures are so importunately urged either to excuse those acts which by the law of God do seem to be prohibited or to induce an obligation upon the Consciences of men for the observation of those things which do not appeare by any law of God to be commanded But I return from whence I have digressed if have transgress'd at all
Duty so from a double Duty there ariseth a double Obligation for every Duty doth infer an Obligation and every Obligation doth suppose a Duty Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws is that by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it self and the other by which they are bound to submit themselves to the power of the Law-giver one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience the other unto that Obedience which is called passive and to which we give the Name of Submission III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Consciences of the Subject It is to be said in the first place that all Laws made by one invested by a lawful Power do oblige to Subjection so that it is not lawful for a Subject to resist the Supreme Power by force of Arms whether things just or unjust be commanded This wâ—â— evermore the mind and practice of the Christians in the first Age of the Church living under the most grievâ—us Tyranny of the greatest Enemies to the name of Christ to make no mention herein of the Conduct and the instinct of Nature and the light of right Reason this is most manifest by the Doctrine of the two chiefest of the Apostles For so Peter the Apostle of Circumcision doth diligently instruct the Jews And so Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles doth as carefully instruct the Gentiles St. Peter in the first book and second chapter commands Servants to be subject to their Masters not only good and gentle Masters but those severer ones who would punish them with Scourges when they had not deserved it Saint Paul Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the necessity of Subjection but granteth unto none the Liberty of Resistance be their case or their pretence never so good In the second place I say That although this Subjection is simply necessary yet it is not satisfactory as to Duty unlesse the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conscience in all things that are lawful and honest Hence it is that this word be Obedient is so often and so expressely inculcated by the Apostle Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places In the third place I say Where the precept of the Law cannot be observed without sin if the Subject shall patiently submit himself to the Power of the Law-giver he hath satisfied his Duty and is not obliged in Conscience to perform that which the Law commandeth nay he is obliged not to do it for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful It is alwayes necessary therefore to be subject but not alwayes necessary to obey IV. Furthermore seeing both are certain that the Consciences of Men are free Servitus in totum hominem uon descendit Sen. de Bencf 20. and ought to be so which Liberty no Humane Power can or may infringe And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond and doth induce a necessity which seemeth to be opposite and to fight with just Liberty for neither is he any wayes free who is bound neither can he be free to both who by some necessity is bound to either that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conscience of which we now do treat may consist with the just Liberty of Conscience we must necessarily in this place give you another distinction which is that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes either formally for the Act it self of giving the precepts or materially for the thing precepted If the Law-giver therefore should intend an Obligation or impose on the Subject a necessity of obeying from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially that is from the necessity of the thing it self which is precepted which notwithstanding in the truth of the thing was not necessary before that Law was made he in that very fact should lay a force upon the Conscience of the Subject which should be repugnant to the Liberty of it But if he should derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally thâ—â— is from the legitimate Authority with w ch he himself is invested that gives it a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining and in the same state in which it was before the Law was made although the obligation followeth which imposeth on the Conscience a necessity of obeying yet the inward Liberty of the Conscience remaineth uninjuried and intire V. If this seems obscure to any I will illustrate it unto him by an Example A Civil Law being made that no man should eat flesh during all the time of Lent if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law should signify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects because it were ungodly and unlawful for them in that time to eat flesh This were to throw a Snare on the Consciences of his Subjects as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty But if expressely he should signify that the thing being otherwise free in it self he did so ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church should thereby take an occasion to exercise a more abstemious and severer Discipline or if by the words of the Law it self or elsewhere it might appear that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to fasten any opinion of necessity on the thing so commanded there would on this account no injury be done to the Consciences of the Subjects and the liberty thereof For there is a great difference when one thing is commanded by the Magistrate because it is thought to be necessary oris prohibited because it is conceived to be unlawful And when another thing begins then only to be thought necessary and lawful after that it is commanded by the Magistrate and unlawful because it is forbidden by him The first Necessity which anteceded the Law and is supposed by it to be some cause of it is contrary to the liberty of the Conscience but the other which followeth the Law and proceedeth from it as an essect thereof is not repugnant to it The reason of this difference is because the antecedent necessity which the Law supposeth doth necessarily require some assent of the practical judgement but to the following necessity which proceedeth from the Law the consent of the will is sufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience as an Act of the judgment doth for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience as the effect followeth its cause but the Act of the Judgment doth precede those Dictates as the Cause goeth before its effect VI. These distinctions being premised I proceed unto the Doubts where in the first place those which we meet with concerning the material Cause
be the better or the worse As if a man should partake of the Supper of the Lord to that end to put himself in remembrance of the death of Christ the more entirely that he applyes the mind to the remembrance of his death the better he performes the duty of a true Communicant Again if a man should slander his neighbour intending the ruine of him by how much the more violently he intends it by so much the worse is his Act of Calumnation The quantity therefore of a good or an evil Act is correspondent to the quantity of the goodnesse or the evilnesse of the Intention and is commensurate with it if the Intention be understood according to the Act of intending and not as to the thing intended But the intention taken either way doth not suffice to prove this that any Act which otherwise is evil should be made good V. This conclusion is proved by many and most strong arguments first by the words of the sacred Text in the third Chapter of the Romans where the Apostle not without indignation doth detest that grievous slander by which it was said to be taught That evil may be done that good should come thereof That the sence the scope and the force of this place may be the better understood that St. Paul amongst all the Apostles was abundantly the most copious in asserting every where the mercy of God by Grace making a Covenant of grace with sinfull men and faithfully fulfilling the Evangellical promises notwithstanding all that unrighteousnesse and unbelief of men which lyeth within their hearts and openly and abundantly doth declare it self in their dayly lives and conversations which he professeth to be so far from making these promises of God by Grace to be in vain that on the contrary they do render the glory of his grace and truth to be far more illustrious Rom. 5. 2. for where that the offence abounded there it is manifest that Grace superabounded From hence the Sophisters and Imposters took on one side to themselves an advantage to slander and to diminish if they could the authority of the Apostle On the other side the Hypocrites and profane did take an occasion to live more licentiously and to sin more securely For if that be true said they which is preached by Paul that the sins of men do redound to the greater glory of God there is no reason that God should punish sins or be angry with sinners There is no reason that a man or woman should abstain from sinning nay they should sin more abundantly that God might receive the more abundant glory and evil things are altogether to be done that good things may come thereby The other objections the Apostle confuteth but to this let us do evil that good may come of it he doth not vouchsafe any answer at all he only cryeth out that it is a manifest slander and near of kin unto blasphemy and unless they repent the just judgment of God is threatened to such importunate slanderers as if this Sophism was of that kind of arguments which Aristotle adjudged not to deserve an answer but rather a reproof It is hence manifest and all Interpreters do acknowledge it that the Apostle most constantly denyeth that any evil ought to be done for any intention be it never so good It much availeth saith St. Augustine to consider what Aug. contra meudaciam what end what intention such a thing is done but those things which are manifest sins ought not to be done under any pretence of a good cause or a good end or of a good Intention This is the first argument VI. The second it is taken from the nature of evil or of sin which of its own nature is not first to be chosen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hiercl pag. 78. neither is it secondly ordinate to a good end neither is it thirdly apt of it self to produce any good first it is not eligible or it is not to be chosen by reason of its own nature qua tale as it is of such a nature for there is nothing eligible which is not also Expitible and all things that are desired are desired under the account of good Neither is evil of its own nature ordinable to any good end for if it were it were also to be desired for the appetite in Philosophy is not only carryed to the end propounded by the Agent but to those things also which seem to conduce for the obtaining of that end If you object God doth dispose of our evils into a good end of his own and therefore it is not against the nature of evil to be ordinated to a good end I answer in the first place that the ways of Almighty God who is the Lord of Nature and according to his good pleasure can produce good out of evil are farre different from ours who have not the same right or the same power neither is it for us either too curiously to enquire or too magisterially to pronounce any thing of the Providence of God concerning evil In the second place I answer that God indeed is able and accustomed to make use of our sins to serve his Glory Grace and Providence and that it is lawfull for us also as opportunity shall serve to follow his example and to make use of the sins of other men for our spirituall or temporall advantage Notwithstanding as God although he maketh use of the evil of others and produceth Good out of it yet he never doth evil himself that from thence he might abstract good so neither is it lawfull for us to do evil that good might proceed from it It is one thing to make use of the evil of others and turn it into good and another thing to do evil with an intent of good Thirdly I answer a thing may be said to be ordinated in a twofold respect either improperly in the same manner as a thing which way soever it is made use of by the Agent doth notwithstanding tend to its end being so done by the wisdome and power of the supremer Agent contrary to the will and intention of him that did it or it is taken more restrictly and properly and so that only is said to be ordinated to its end which antecedently is chosen by the Agent as a medium that by the nature of it is convenient and conducible to such an end In the first sence that is to be understood when we say that God doth ordinate and dispose of evil to a good end that is when God Non coâ—venire homo viro Vitiis uti Quint 6. Instit 1. out of his infinite mercy and power either abstracts good from evil or turneth evil into good But we must above all things take heed that these expressions be not understood in the latter and proper sence as if God antecedently did well approve or make choice of any evil as a medium convenient by the nature of it to the assecution of
it like a nose of wax and to inforce it to an interpretation for their own profit according to their own sence And as that Lacedemonian said that all things at Sparta were honest which were profitable these sparks of Sparta think nothing is filthy enough nothing is to be avoided that may be subservieâ—t to their advantages But fie on this mad Divinity let it be fâ—r from our Schools Pulpits and Brests The holy Apostles of our Saviour have far otherwise instructed us who would give no place to that question Is it expedient or not 1 Cor. 10. 23. before they were fully satisfied in that other question is it lawfull or not Nay the more sober sort of the Heathens themselves were of another judgment who as often as Honesty did seem to disagree with profit they so always have made the reconcilement that they have pronounced that the same is not profitable which is not also honest XXIII But to make no long digression St. Paul in this verse doth altogether deny that any evil is to be done that good may come thereby than which words what can be spoken more plainly or effectually to prove our conclusion But not long since I heard with these ears when those words of the Apostle were urged and some then present could not otherwise defend what they so much desired to maintain they made use of this distinction that it was not lawfull indeed for a private man to do evil at his own pleasure that good may come thereby and this was only that which St. Paul in these words did prohibit but it was lawfull notwithstanding for the common-Council of a Nation to whose care it doth belong that the Common-wealth should receive no detriment to do it if the publick necessity and the safety of the people do so require What and how much is to be done for the safety of the people I shall hereafter God willing examine and determine In the mean time it is in the first place to be observed that this is but an extravagant suggestion and that there is nothing in the whole discourse of St. Paul on which that distinction may rely Secondly If we shall mark the force and the scope of St. Pauls argument in this place we shall perceive that all such limitations and ridiculous inventions of deceitfull men for the Apostle here meets with the objection for promoting the glory of God by the sins of men he denyeth that evil is to be done for that end to render the glory of God more illustrious It followeth therefore a fortiori from the stronger that no evill things are to be done for any thing that is inferiour to the glory of God And seeing the glory of God is infinitely to be preferred to all humane good whatsoever whether publick or private and it is not lawfull notwithstanding to do evil for Gods glory certainly it is not lawfull for a private man or for the Representatives of a whole Commonalty for the redresse of any publick or private inconvenience to do evil themselves or to commend it to be done by another XXIV Let us meditate I beseech you my hearers on these things with our selves and that most seriously and the worse that the dayes are and the more that the snares of temptation are and the assaults more violent let us walk the more exactly and look unto our steps with a greater circumspection let us not suffer our selves by any machinations of the Devills or allurements of flesh the world to be led aside though never so little from that right that streight path of the Commandments of God carrying allwayes in our memoryes that the evils which wittingly and willfully we have committed shall find no excuse in that day when God shall be our Iudge and our Consciences our witnesses And thus much concerning the pretence of a good Intention what remaineth to be spoken concerning the examples placits of men so far as it appertaineth to the regiment of conscience I will God willing proceed to give you a full account of it in my following Lecture THE THIRD LECTURE In which is declared that neither in the examples of good men nor the judgment of experienced men there is protection enough to secure the Conscience GAL. 2. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the other Jews dissembled likewise with him insomuch that Barnabas was brought into their dissimulation also HAving propounded to my self to examine and discover to you the adaequate rule of Conscience which is to be the certain and safe Law how to lead our lives I conceived it in the first place most necessary to declare unto you in what a grievous dangerous errour they are who think in the things they do they provide well enough for the security of their own Consciences if either by the flattering intention of some good end or the example of some holy man or the authority and judgment of a man famous for learning and piety they can any ways defend themselves and what they have done And truly how little protection there is in a bare good intention either as to the benefit of the Conscience or the confidence of any good work without the other concomitants of it I think hath been sufficiently declared by me in my former Lecture where by many reasons I have convinced that no evil is to be done that good may ensue thereby It remaineth that this day I do represent unto you that neither the example nor the judgment of any man ought to be of so great authority with us that our Consciences may securely rest in either of them and neither from that alone can we duely conclude that all things which are passed are rightly done or those things for the time to come are simply lawfull to be done which another man indued with never so much learning and sanctity hath either done himself or hath judged lawfull to be put into practice by another II. Moreover how unsafe it is to frame our lives and actions to the examples of other men and how unsatisfying it is to the security of the Conscience to defend our selves by alledging that whatsoever we have done or are about to do hath been done already by some pious man before us may by a most cleer argument appear by the words of the proposed Text especially if we shall go a little higher and derive the ground and the occasion of them from the History of the thing performed St. Peter the Apostle living at Antioch amongst the Gentiles converted to the Christian faith who were not bound inconscience to the observation of the Law of Moses did freely eat with them and did partake of whatsoever meats were set before him as well prohibited as permitted to the people of the Jewes without the least scruple according to the liberty which he had in Christ But when some Christians of the nation of the Jewes came to Antioch from Jerusalem whither they were those false brethren 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
Barnabas and others also who followed him and did consent to the same dissimulation were to be noted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as men that did not tread with an upright foot nor walked according to the simplicity of the truth of Christ By which it is most evident that St. Paul being Judge it would render no great advantage unto uncertain Barnabas and halting as it were betwixt Judaism and Christianism to call into the patronage of his dissimulation the example of St. Peter although of the highest estimation amongst the Apostles but grant that Peter was worthy of a sharper reprehension because that by his example he became a stumbling block to another nevertheless Barnabas is not the more to be excused that he transgressed by following the example of another And this may suffice concerning our first argument taken from the Text of St. Paul VI. The second argument is derived from the difficulty of judging for seeing that all the deeds of the righteous are not to be imitated it is no obvious thing to understand what deeds of theirs are to be examplar and what not and that by reason of a twofold uncertainty that is in them For it may so come to passe both ways that what a righteous man hath done may not be well done and hath been well done by him is nevertheless not to be imitated by us In the first place most certain it is that those deeds of theirs which are ill done are not to be imitated and that the most holy of men have had their blemishes and infirmities it having pleased the most wise God to permit them to fall sometimes into the most grievous sins of murder adultery idolatry and the renouncing of their faiths that they might consider that they are but men and by their own experience that they as well do pertake with as they do pardon the mistreadings of another that so they might not trust in their own strengths against temptations but depend altogether on the assistance of God and if unconquered unshaken or unhurt they have sustayned the most violent assaults of temptations that they may acknowledge it to proceed wholy from the providence and the grace of God and it hath pleased him who worketh all in all according to the counsels of his own will that some of their foulest defects should punctually be expressed in the book of holy Writ that so illustrious and never dying examples should remain unto all ages on the one side of humane frailty and inconstancy and on the other of the Divine goodness and mercy VII Peradventure it will be here objected It is true indeed that those Examples of the Saints are not to be imitated which in the word of God are expressely noted to be ill done for what sober man will propound unto himself either the abnegation of St. Peter or the adultery of David as examples for him to imitate Neverthelesse it doth seem that we may safely take examples from those acts of theirs which are so recorded in the Scriptures that they are there as free from dispraise as from any tincture of guilt I make answer that this is not to be done for in the Scriptures as every where in other Histories the deeds of many men are only historically and nakedly related just as they were done are neither expressely commended or discommended by the Writers notwithstanding it is not to be doubted that some of them were unjust some of them dishonest and far from the duty of a godly man And many other things there are recorded of which we may not undeservedly doubt whether they were well done or ill done concerning which the Interpreters are accustomed to express themselves probably and liberally on both sides Of such a nature is that act of Lot offering the violation of his Daughters Virginities to the impure Citizens of Sodom and that act of Joseph swearing as it is thought by the life of Pharaoh Gen. 19. â— 42. 15. 16. and that act of Jacob craftily stealing from Esau his brother the benediction of his father and many other examples of the same nature which if any man shall adventure to follow on this presumption only that he hath read the same things to be acted by godly men and not to be condemned he shall object himself to a most certain danger of errour and of sin by subjecting his Conscience to a most uncertain Law VIII But you will say we may safely howsoever follow those examples which expressely are commended in the world of God I make answer that even this also is not simply to be granted for in the first place I say that whatsoever deeds of men are openly condemned in the word of God to be vitious they are simply to be eschewed for the strength and use of bad examples are more powerfull to argue negatively upon them than of good examples to argue affirmatively which manner of arguing out Apostle useth 1 Cor. 10 6. c. where having propounded out of the Hostory of the old Testament the examples of several sorts of sins as also of the judgments of God upon the prevaricators of his Law he doth admonish that all of us would look upon them as types and examples not to imitate but to eschew them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ut fugerem exemplis vitiâ—rum quaeque notaâ—do 1 Satyr 4. That we may not lust after evil things as some of them lusted nor worship Idols nor commit fornication nor tempt Christ nor murmur in afflictions as they have done Hoc quidem non bellè nunquid ego illi Imprudens olìm faciam simile Horat. ibid. This is not well but filly Elf Shall not I do the like my self IX In the second place I do affirm that what Deeds in the Scriptures are expressely praysed and are so praysed that they may seem to be propounded to us for Examples are notwithstanding not suddainly and headily to be followed by us neither must we imagine that the whole aggregate Action as it was at first performed is commended unto us to imitate But we must use choyce and caution to imitate those things which are commendable on that part only of them and intirely on that account for which they are commended The reason of this Caution is because that God oftentimes in a mixt Action according to his infinite goodnesse doth approve and look upon that only in it which is Good and doth passe by and as it were takes no notice of that in it which is Evil As in the 16 Luke 8. The Lord praysed the unjust Steward because he had done wisely although in the same Act he had hazarded the Reputation of his Trust The Wisdome therefore and not the Injustice of that Steward is to be imitated Again in that commended Example of the Egyptian Midvives preserving the new-born of the Iâ—raelites and by a Lye excusing their contempt of the Kings Commandement their Lye is not to be numbred with their humanity and their piety but carefulâ—y
the material Cause of which we do now discourse if the Law doth command any thing that is base dishonest or any wayes unlawful the said Law is unjust for the defect of that Justice which is called Universal which requireth a due rectitude in every Action And this alone is so far from obliging the Subject to obedience that it doth altogether oblige him to render no obedience to it XV. It is demanded in the fifth place What Justice is required and how much of it will suffice as to this that a Law may be said to be just and esteemed obligatory For answer I say in the first place It is not necessarily required that what by the Law is commanded should be just positively which the Philosophers call Honest that is that it may be an Act of some Virtue but it doth suffice if it be just negatively that is if it be not unjust or shameful as are the Acts of all Vices Otherwise there could no Laws be made of things of a middle nature or of things indifferent which notwithstanding as by and by shall be manifest are the most apt matter of Laws I say in the second place Grant that some Law be unjust in regard of the Cause efficient or the final or the formal Cause in any of those respects newly mentioned yet if there be no defect of Justice in respect of the material Cause that is If by the force power of the Law the Act to be performed by the Subject be such that he may put it in Execution without any sin of his own that Justice of it is sufficient to induce the obligation XXVI But lest the Subject too licentiously to withdraw himself from the yoak of the Law should give some pretence for his disobedience as it is a wonder to see how many men do suffer themselves to be deceived by this paralogism and should allege that the Law doth seem too unjust unto him and which with a good Conscience he cannot obey therefore ought not to obey for this they say were to obey with a doubting Conscience which cannot be without Sin as the Apostle teacheth Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin It is necessary therefore in the sixth place to inquire farther and to demand What certainty is required to know whether any Law be unjust or not that so a Subject may be secure in his Conscience whether he be bound or not bound to the observation of it I answer in the first place If the Law be manifestly notoriously unjust it is certain that the Subject is not bound to the observation of it which is also to be affirmed if by any moral certainty after some due diligence in searching out the Truth he judgeth it to be simply unjust I say in the second place If out of any confirmed Error of his Judgement which it is not easy for him to leave he thinks the Law to be unjust when indeed it is not yet for all that Error in his mind the obligation of the Law doth still remain insomuch that he is guilty of Sin if he doth not obey it but should Sin more grievously if that Error not yet left off he should obey it Of this Case we shall have a greater opportunity to speak when if God shall permit we shall come to the Comparison of both the sorts of obligations I say in the third place If out of some light doubt or scruple he suspects it may be so that the Law is unjust that scruple is to be contemned the Law altogether to be obeyed And no man under the pretence of his tender Conscience is to excuse him self from the necessity of giving obedience to it XVII I say in the fourth place And I would to God that those whose Custom it is to defend their grosse disobedience under the pretence of their tender Consciences would give due attention to it If because of some probable Reasons appearing on both sides the Subject cannot easily determine with himself whether the Law be right or not insomuch that his mind is in a great incertainty and knows not which way to incline he is bound in this case actually to obey it so that he sinneth if he obeyeth it not and doth not sin if he obeyeth it My reason is First Becaâ—se by the Rule of Equity In dubiis potior est conditioâ—â—ossidentis In doubtful things the Condition of the Possessor is the better Therefore when there is a Case at Law betwixt the Law-maker and the Citizen unlesse there be some apparent reason to the contrary it is presumed alwayes to be on the side of the Law-maker against the Citizen as being in the Possession of Right But if there appears any sound reason to the contrary the Case is altered because it is against the supposition of Reason for we then suppose that they contend in Law one having as much Right as the other The second Reason ariseth from another Rule of Law In re dubia tutior pars est eligenda In a doubtful Case the safer part is to be chosen And its safer to obey the Conscience doubting than the Conscience doubting not to obey Because it is safer in the honor due unto Superiors to exceed in the mode that is due unto them than to be defective in it The third Reason proceedeth from the same Rule for generally it is safer for a Man to suppose himself to be obliged when he is free than to suppose himself free when he is indeed obliged For seeing by the inbred depravation of the Heart of Man we sin oftner by too much Boldnesse than by too much Fear and are more prone than it becomes us to the licentiousnesse of the Flesh and lesse patient to bear the burthen unlesse we were throughly before hand resolved to obey those Laws which are not apparently unjust the Wisdom of the flesh the Craft of the old Serpent would suggest unto us excuses enough which would retard and hinder us from the performance of our Duties And so much of the fourth doubt XVIII The fifth followeth Of the permissive Law of Evil Wether it be lawful and how far lawful And whether it be obligatory and how far obliging Where in the first place we are to observe That an evil thing may three wayes be admitted by the Law that is to say privatively negatively and positively Privatively to be permitted is the very same which is pretermitted by the Lawgiver And in this sense all those things are permitted concerning the forbidding of which or the Punishing of which the Laws do determine nothing That negatively is permitted the excercise whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain bounds within which those are safe and without fault who do contain themselves but those who do exceed them are to be punished by the Law And in this sense the Laws of most Nations do permit of Usury Thirdly that is permitted positively the excercise whereof is tolerated under a
propounded and he doth not violate the Law unless he doth neglect them both XXIV This which was to be spoken of the obligation of a Law purely penal being as I conceive sufficiently unfolded let us now passe to the consideration of a penal Law mixed Concerning which I make this my third conclusion A penal Law mixed to wit which openly commandeth something to be observed and that it more diligently may be performed which is commanded doth appoint a penalty to the transgressors doth oblige both to the fault and to the punishment insomuch that he neither satisfies the Law nor his Conscience who undergoes the punishment unless he doth perform that also which is commanded by the Law There is none can doubt that such a Law doth oblige to the punishment for otherwise of what use would the punishment be that is added to it And it is manifest that it obligeth to the fault because it containeth a manifest command And every command obligeth to the fault For a Fault or a Sin is nothing else but the transgression of some precept 1 Joh. 3. Neither can that be probably spoken which is said to be the opinion of Navarr that the Law-maker by inserting the punishment doth signify that he hath no intention of obliging but only to that punishment which is annexed Observe I pray you how perverse it is so to interpret the appointing of a punishment which it is certain is for that end annexed to the precept that the said precept by the fear of punishment might more diligently and more accurately be observed as to make weak and take-away the obligation of the said precept Numberlesse are the Laws which throughout the world are made against Thieves Murderers perjured Persons and other wicked and nefarious people God also gave a Law to our first Parents by which he forbad them to eat of the fruit of the Tree which was in the midst of Paradise having annexed to the prohibition the punishment of death if they should eat thereof Gen. 2. Can any man be found so dâ—stitute of reason as to think that Adam was obliged by this Divine Law and that others are obliged by Humane Laws to the punishment only and not unto the fault Who will affirm to omit humane Laws that Adam was not obliged in Conscience by that Divine Law to abstain from the forbidden fruit but to this only that if he did eat thereof he should be ready to undergoe the setence of death The opinion therefore of Navarre being exploded as dangerous and by all men confuted if indeed the opinion was his which I shall hardly believe he being a man of so reverend a fame we are to affirm that a penal Law mixed being both penal and preceptive doth oblige both to the punishment and to the Fault to the punishment as it is penal and to the Fault as it is preceptive XXV The third Doubt remaineth How and how far the transgressor of a penal Law is bound to undergoe the punishment in the fact it self that is appointed by the Law I must make haste I will therefore be as short as I can I say therefore in the first place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that it imposeth not any thing upon the transgressor to be either done or suffered by him but consisteth rather in an inability to do something which was commodious for him to do or in an incapacity of receiving somthing which would be profitable for him he is guilty of the Law so violated and is bound ipso facto to undergo the punishment There are many Laws which do forbid transgressors to do this or that as the Civil Laws for certain causes do forbid translationem Dominii the alteration of power or free-holds There are also many Laws which for such a certain time do make Delinquents incapable of such a place or dignity As if a Disturber of the peace by a statute of the University be prohibited to have his Grace propounded in the Congregation House for the space of two years after the fault committed In such the like cases where the punishment consisteth only in the Inability or the Inâ—â—pacity because to undergoe this punishment there is no Cooperation required of the person to be punished but rather a certain Cessation of operating He who hath violated the Law is obliged willingly to suffer the punishment although he be not required I say in the second place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that a cooperation of the person offending be necessarily required to the Execution of the Law that is that he who is to be punished is to act something himself in his own punishment he is not obliged ordinarily to undergoe the said punishment ipso facto before the Judge hath pronounced the sentence or which is the same before the punishment be exacted of him by a person to that purpose invested with lawful Authority The guilty person is bound indeed to suffer the punishment but if he called to it otherwise he is not bound I say in the third place that a guilty man after the sentence pronounced by the Judge or after he is required to it by a person invested with lawful Authority is obliged to a willing undergoing of the punishment yea and with some Cooperation of his own if this Cooperation be not against the Laws of humanity though otherwise very grievous and extremely painful For examples sake If an offendor be commanded to pay a great sum of money under the name of penalty or to depart the Kingdome he is bound by the power of the Law to the performance of it but if the punishment imposed be not only grievous but something also that is inhumane as if a malefactor be commanded to scourge himself to cut off his own hand to drinke poyson or the like in these cases the guilty person is obliged to undergoe the punishment passively but he is not obliged actively to cooperate in it w ch he knows to be ordained by the Law and which by his default he hath deserved And let this suffice to be spoken of the necessity of the Promulgation of Laws and of the Obligation of those penal Laws which may seem to have any reference with the Formal Cause of Laws THE NINTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in respect of the Final Cause thereof 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godlinesse and Honesty IN our former Lectures we have treated of the Obligation of Humane Laws as to their Material Efficient and formal Causes in some places peradventure more largely and in others again peradventure more concisely than was requisite It remaineth that we should proceed to the explication of those things which do pertain to the final Cause of Laws But before we do come to dissolve these doubts we are first to premise and pronounce as an undoubted Truth That the ultimate end