Selected quad for the lemma: sin_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
sin_n	apostle_n	law_n	transgression_n	5,619	5	10.4785	5	true

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A79884	Of scandal together with a consideration of the nature of Christian liberty and things indifferent. Wherein these weighty questions are fully discussed: Whether things indifferent become necessary, when commanded by authority? Neg. Whether scandalous things, being enjoyned, may lawfully be done? Neg. Whether a restraint laid upon things indifferent, without a reasonable ground, be not an infringement of Christian liberty? Aff. Who is to be judge, whether there be a reasonable ground or no, in such cases? How far forth we are bound in conscience to obey humane laws.	Clark, Samuel, 1626-1701.; Alsop, Vincent, 1629 or 30-1703, attributed name.	1680 (1680)	Wing C4495; ESTC R231493	83,945	180

Question The acute Author of the * Part 4. c. 2. sect 1. Dispute against English-Popish Ceremonies contends stifly that the extremes are good and evil and not necessary and unlawful On the other side The Bishops commission'd for the Review and Alteration of the Liturgy make the extremes to be commanded and forbidden not good and evil for they say expresly indifferent things may be really good Their words are these Those things which we call indifferent because neither expresly commanded nor forbidden by God have in them a real goodness Answ to Except N. 18. Sect. 8. Yea Mr. Bradshaw too goes this way Those things saith he are called in a moral respect indifferent which is the indifferency we are speaking of whether they be qualities inclinations habits or actions that have in them neither vertue nor vice Treat of Indifference c. 8. sect 6. Herein such actions of man's will are most frequent that are neither commanded nor forbidden in the word of God And so another learned person The nature of indifference lies not in any thing entermediate between good and bad but in something undetermined by divine Laws as to the necessity of it so that if we speak as to the extremes of it Stillingst Iren. c. 3. sect 8. p. 50. it is something lying between a necessary duty and an intrinsecal evil and so Ames and many others If this be any more than a Logomachy and the difference be not meerly verbal and if good and evil be understood of that which is Morally so for my part I think it will scarce amount to any more because nothing is morally good or evil but what is made so by some discovery of God's will then I cannot but cast in my mite and vote to the latter scale and accordingly shall give you the full notion and description of this Intrinsecal indifferency as I have gather'd it out of several rendring in the margent to every one his peculiar due Those actions are intrinsecally indifferent that have in their matter neither (a) Indifferency apparently carries in its notion a negation of Moral goodness and illness I say Signanter of Moral goodness and illness because the most indifferent actions are transcendently and may be naturally good Jeanes's Treat of Indiff pag. 2. Moral goodness nor illness (b) Bradsh Treat of Indiff c. 8. sect 6. vertue nor vice as being (c) Res mediae sunt quarum tota species nuliâ divinâ lege naturali vel positivâ aut pracipitur aut prohibetur Sanders de Oblig Consc praelect 6. sect 22. p. 235. Actus in suo genere indifferens est quando ejus objectum nihil includit quod pertinet ad voluntatem Dei vel prae cipientem vel prohibentem Ames Medull l. 2. c. 3. sect 14. Actiones quae neque imperantur neque prohibentur neque obedientiae neque inobedientiae rationem habent in suâ intrinsecâ naturâ sunt indifferentes aut mediae Ames Cas Consc l. 3. c. 18. sect 4. in their whole kind neither commanded nor forbidden either by the (d) Bradsh of Indiff c. 8. sect 5. Law of Nature Reason or Scripture but (e) The nature of things indifferent is neither to be commanded nor forbidden but left free and arbitrary Hooker of Eccl. Pol. p. 59. left free and arbitrary so that they may (f) These things are implied in an indifferent action 1 Absolute undetermination as to the general nature of the act by a divine Law that God has left it free for men to do it or no. 2 That one part has not more propension to the rule than the other 3 That neither part hath any repugnancy to the rule Stillingfl Iren. c. 3. sect 8. p. 50. either be done or not without sin or transgression of any Law Or more briefly in the Apostles words and therefore more safely 'T is that which neither commendeth nor discommendeth us to God by doing or forhearing whereof we are either better or worse more or less acceptable to him To this purpose the Apostle speaks 1 Cor. 8.8 concerning meat and eating i. e. not eating in general as some carry it for that is a duty of the 6th Commandment but eating this or that or any one kind of meat in particular that is indifferent and commends us not to God He that eats the fat and drinks the sweet is no more acceptable to God than he that eats the lean and drinks the sowr and this is applicable to a world of other things Once more That is indifferent which makes neither one way nor other or not more one way than another for the glory of God when equal glory is brought to God either way This notion of it I gather from Rom. 14.6 He that regardeth a day regards it to the Lord and he that regardeth not a day to the Lord he doth not regard it c. i. e. both of them aim at God's honour and real tribute of glory redounds to him either way and therefore both are lawful So then we may conceive the case concerning these Indifferencies thus some things are commanded (a) Illud secundum speciem bonum est quod lege Dei ita praeceptum est ut non sit fas homini illud negligere aut quicquam facere quod ei repugnet Et illud malum est quod lege Dei ita prohibitum est ut non sit fas homini illud admittere aut prascribere quocurque praetextu Forbes Iren. l. 1. c. 18. sect 13. in specie and in their whole kind as to pray hear give alms c. These are intrinsecally morally good or necessary and duties which are in their own nature pleasing and acceptable to God and whereby glory redounds to him so that in the general and abstracting from circumstances it is better and more agreeable to God's will and more pleasing to him to pray than not to pray and therefore though a man be not bound to pray at all times yet always to omit it and never to pray is sinful Other things are forbidden in specie as to steal lye commit adultery c. These are in their own nature evil and unlawful and therefore can never be made good by any circumstances whatsoever Others are neither commanded nor forbidden in specie but lye between both by way of contradiction as not forbidden or unlawful but lawful not commanded or necessary but arbitrary or unnecessary and so are left indifferent either to be done or not to be done according as (a) Indifferency taken in specie as to the nature of the act inclines neither way but supposing it lye under positive determinations either by Laws or Circumstances it then necessarily enclines either to the nature of good or evil Stillingfl Iren. p. 51. circumstances require so that though a man should never do them in all his life-time he should not sin as to laugh ride c. The first sort of actions are good per se and if

the Matter and Form if the Form alone cannot do it then the Matter must do something towards it Yet 3. Not every Command neither de materiâ licitâ does oblige because due circumstances also must be observed as was shewed before whereby it may be prepared and made habitable for the form to dwell in But 4. The matter must be lawful i. e. either necessary or indifferent at least and also duly circumstantiated He is the Minister of God to thee for good saith the Apostle Rom. 13.4 Therefore if it be not good at least extrinsecally and in respect of circumstances which an inconveniency or inexpediency is not he is not the Minister of God therein Then 5. That which is both lawful in its own nature and moreover cloathed with a handsome dress of circumstances when commanded becomes necessary and submission thereto a duty and must be done for conscience-sake and the neglect thereof is a sin I lay the formality of the obligation neither upon the matter nor form singly considered but upon the union or concurrence of both so as that the matter must have some kind of goodness either intrinsecal or circumstantial as the foundation whence there arises obligatio fundamentalis and then the command supervening upon that matter produces obligationem formalem both together make the obligation perfect and compleat Either alone is but like a single knot which does not tye hard but both together make a double knot which holds fast 6. That which is lawful in its own nature and generally convenient and has only some particular inconvenience attending it does also become necessary when commanded because the general respect outweighs the particular and therefore in general all are bound to obey for conscience-sake and those particular persons to whom it is inconvenient must either get a dispensation or undergo the inconvenience for the general good E. g. If the use of Fish be convenient for a Nation and thereupon a Law be made to enjoyn the eating thereof at such a time of the year then obedience is necessary and though this be inconvenient for some persons whose constitutions agree not with it yet they must either obey and so indure the inconvenience or procure a dispensation But 7. That which is lawful in its own nature if attended with some irregular circumstances which render it generally inconvenient and inexpedient though commanded does not become necessary nor submission thereto a duty nor neglect thereof a sin The reason is because bare authority without reason lays no obligation upon the conscience as was proved before but here is only bare authority without reason for the reason of the command where the matter of it is indifferent must be fetch 't from the expediency and conveniency of its circumstances which not being to be found here in the case supposed there is no reason neither and so obliges not the conscience Submission is not a duty we are not bound to obey for conscience-sake I know some are of opinion that it may be a duty to obey where it is a sin to command But against that Position I have this argument Obligation to obedience and authority to command are Correlates so that where there is no authority to command there can be no obligation to obey viz. by vertue of that Command for possibly an obligation may arise upon some other account as we shall see presently in Propos 9. But here is no authority to command for we suppose the Magistrate sins in commanding Now sure no man has authority to sin Besides the Magistrates authority reaches only to that which is good as was before shewed out of the Apostles words Rom. 13.4 and elsewhere he tells us all Ecclesiastical authority is for Edification only Eph. 4.12 Yet 8. Where the inconvenience attending the command is only such as keeps within the compass of some natural or civil evil and sinks not down into a sin or transgression of some Law of God there though obedience does not become necessary and a duty and I am not bound to obey for conscience-sake yet I may submit for wrath and for fear of such a penalty as will outweigh the advantage I shall have by non-submission And this by vertue of that Rule Ex duobus malis minimum it 's better to undergo an inconvenience than a mischief E.g. If I may not hear a Sermon with my hat on under penalty of 5 l. though it be something prejudicial to my health to sit uncover'd and so a natural inconvenience yet if the advantage I shall get by non-submission be not so great as the penalty I shall incur I may submit So if a Thief will either make me swear to conceal him or take away my life though it be a Political inconvenience yet rather than lose my life I may submit to it Nay 9. If the penalty be such as would hinder me from the performance of a necessary duty then obedience may accidentally and in that respect become (a) An inconvenient mode of worship is a sin in the imposer and in the chuser and voluntary user that might offer God better and will not Mal. 1.13 14. and yet it may be not only lawful but a duty to him that by violence is necessitated to offer up that or none Grand Debate Reply to Answ sect 5. necessary notwithstanding such a circumstantial inconvenience E. g. If that either I must kneel at receiving the Sacrament or cannot be admitted to partake thereof if I judge kneeling not unlawful in it self but only inconvenient in respect of its unsuitableness to the nature of the Ordinance then I am accidentally bound to kneel rather than to omit receiving a necessary duty for that inconvenience Again If I must either baptize a child at the Font or be deprived of the exercise of my Ministry though I judge Administration of the Sacrament of Baptism at the Font which always stands at the lower end of the Church where the Congregation cannot so well hear not so convenient as at the reading-Pew yet rather than be deprived of the exercise of my Ministry for such a circumstance I ought to submit to such an inconvenience So though I judge such a form inconvenient yet if I must use that or not exercise my Ministry the latter being a duty I ought to submit to the former On this ground I suppose Calvin went in using wafer-cakes in the Administration of the Lords Supper For at first he refused to administer the Communion with unleavened bread and wafer-cakes and was thereupon compelled to depart out of the City but afterwards he was received again upon his allowance of that same kind of bread De quo posteà restitutus nunquam contendendum putavit minimè tamen dissimulans quod alioqui magis esset probaturus saith Beza In all these cases Edification is the end Decency and Order the means now the end is that which principally we must be ruled by in these things and therefore where a more convenient

93. a. 3. dependance upon the Will of God nor coherence with it for then that would be a good and sufficient reason or is no way agreeable to the Will of God either in general or particular and therefore has no obligation following upon it for that (b) Leges humanae obligant homines in foro conscientiae ratione legis aeternae à qua derivantur Id. q. 96. a. 4. Obligation of a Law which we speak of is nothing but the necessity of obeying under pain of sin against God That is an excellent notion of Petrus de Alliaco for which I am beholding to a Reverend and Learned Divine Gilbert's Assize Serm. on Jam. 2.12 p. 12. That as the will of God exerting and putting forth his natural power or strength is in natural things the first efficient Cause so the will of God exerting his moral power or authority is in moral things the first obliging Rule And as all things in nature act dependingly upon the will of God putting forth his natural power as the first efficient cause so in Morality all Laws oblige dependingly upon the will of God putting forth his Moral power as the first obliging Rule Whence I infer That where there is no intimation of God's Will neither express nor implicit in the nature of the thing nor in any circumstance there can no obligation arise 3 That command which has no Conformity to the rule and end of all Laws the * Necesse est legem semper ad bonum commune ordinari Aqu. 12ae q. 90 a. 2. publick good can have no obligation at all following upon it for the due matter of a Law is wanting but such a command has no Conformity c. Ergo. 4 That the Command of Authority does not render such an indifferent thing necessary may be proved I think undeniably from that passage mentioned Matth. 15 1-9 Mark 7 1-13 concerning the Disciples eating with unwashen hands for which they are complained of by the Scribes and Pharisees those great Masters of Ceremonies to Christ as transgressors of the Tradition of the Elders But Christ is so far from condemning that he justifies and vindicates them for it and on the contrary condemns their Antagonists for standing so strictly and laying so much stress upon such unnecessary trifles Here I observe First That the Rite or Ceremony in question was in it self indifferent i. e. neither commanded nor forbidden by any Law of God and so far from being unlawful that it seems rather a matter of civil decency and good manners Secondly This was commanded by a lawful Authority for 1 the Scribes and Pharisees who here urged it and stickled for it sate in Moses's seat Mat. 23.2 i. e. were the Rulers of the people or some of them at least who did succeed Moses in the ordinary office of Teaching and Ruling the people And 2 it was a Tradition of the Elders Now the Elders were the Sanhedrim that is the Supreme Authority of the Nation and a Tradition of the Elders is a Resolution Constitution or Determination of such a case made by them who therefore are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Domini constitutionum juridicarum Thirdly This constitution of Authority did not render this indifferent practice or usage necessary as is evident from the whole drift and scope of our Saviour Christ's discourse here From all which the conclusion or inference holds firm and strong That an indifferent thing commanded by lawful Authority is not thereby made necessary For the further clearing hereof I shall pass from one end of my thoughts to the other by these steps having first prepared the way by these Distinctions First I distinguish between the Matter and the Form of a Command or between the thing commanded and the stamp of Authority set upon it to make it currant The ground of this distinction is plain in reason Secondly I distinguish between an Intrinsecal and an Extrinsecal Indifference as before Thirdly I distinguish between unlawful and inconvenient This I ground upon the Apostles words 1 Cor. 6.12 All things are lawful for me but all things are not expedient Where he supposes that things may be lawful in some respect but inconvenient or inexpedient in others Whence I gather 1 That unlawful and inconvenient are not the same no more than lawful and convenient for Contrariorum eadem est ratio 2 I further gather the nature of inconvenient or inexpedient and how it differs from unlawful viz. That inconvenient or inexpedient is only an irregular circumstance of something in its own nature lawful He is there speaking of indifferent things and tells us That though in their own nature these be all lawful to make use of yet they may be so circumstantiated as to render them inconvenient or inexpedient Which circumstantial irregularity puts on such a kind of evil as the good or rule it offends against is of if it be only against some debitum natura then 't is malum physicum or naturale as to fast to the detriment of a mans health to eat that which agrees not with his constitution If against good manners then 't is malum morale as to be slovenly in eating either of these irregularities render a thing but inexpedient But if it be against any Command of God then 't is malum Theologicum or peccatum and so falls in with unlawful Fourthly I distinguish between a particular inconvenience which is only so to some particular persons or at some particular time and a general inconvenience which is alike inconvenient to all persons at all times and in all places This distinction has common experience to warrant its validity Fifthly I distinguish between submission for wrath and for conscience-sake i. e. meerly for fear of the penalty or else for fear of sin and to avoid that which he should be guilty of in case of disobedience and non-submission This distinction the Apostle makes to my hand Rom. 13 5. Sixthly I distinguish between an arbitrary and a necessary submission where there is no sin in the submission and yet 't is not a duty but free and arbitrary and where there is sin in the non-submission and submission is a duty and necessary The ground of this distinction will appear afterwards Now these distinctions I apply thus Prop. 1. It is certain that the Command of lawful authority That Magistrates ought to be obeyed in things good and lawful does not arise from the authority vested in themselves but from the immediate command of God that in such things they ought to be obeyed Discourse conc Liturg p. 55. quatenus command i. e. the form of the Command doth not necessarily bring an obligation to obedience along with it The obligation does not arise meerly from the form for then every command or every thing having the stamp of Authority upon it should oblige which none will say Therefore 2. The Matter of the Command must have some influence into the obligation thereof There being only

of evil and scandal in these indifferencies that in the former it 's enough quòd de sui ratione habent quòd sint inductiva ad peccandum 22 ae q. 43. a. 1. as Aquinas speaks The possibility of Scandal subsequent does aggravate their evil and sinfulness though scandal does not actually follow as we see in that of Christ to Peter Mat. 16.23 Thou art an offence to me He does not say I am offended with thee but Thou art an offence He checks him for laying a stumbling-block in his way though he could not was not capable of being offended and stumbling at it yet this did not excuse him His sin was never the less but every whit as great as if the effect had followed But now in these Indifferencies it is only actual scandal following thereon that renders a man culpable and therefore I am not bound to forbear such an action except I know that it doth give offence 9. occasion The word or action or omission of one man can but occasion or be an imperfect cause or cause by accident of the sin of another for nothing is properly the cause of a man's sin but his own will Thus Aquinas Nihil potest esse homini sufficiens causa peccati nisi propria voluntas Et propter hoc non dicitur dans causam ruinae sed dans occasionem 22 ae q 43. a 1. 10. either to sin himself This seems to me to be that wherein the formality or at least the principal notion of Scandal in things indifferent doth consist and which mostly if not only renders culpable whenas another takes occasion thereby to sin For 1 The Scripture-use and acceptation of the word runs generally in this channel as was shew'd before and those effects attributed to it by the Apostle imply no less as wounding their weak conscience 1 Cor. 8.12 i. e. not only with a natural wound by grief but a moral spiritual wound by sin Verberatur alterius conscientia saith P. Martyr inloc quando malè aedificatur ad ea impellitur agenda de quibus aliter sentit which is a sin Rom. 14.23 and destroying Rom. 14.20 or causing to perish 1 Cor. 8.11 viz. morally too by inducing into sin which is the ruine and undoing of the soul 2 In this also agree all Divines that I have met with both ancient and modern Tertullian aedificans ad delictum Aquin. praebens occasionem ruinae Spiritualis c. 22ae q. 43. a. 1. quae est peccatum as himself explains it a. 2. quod aliis spiritualem perniciem affert Ames Medul l. 2. c. 16. sect 53. quo alii possint vel excitari ad peccandum vel impediri aut retardari à benefaciendo id fect 44. quo impeditur Evangelii cursus P. Martyr in 1 Cor. 8.8 quo alius deterior redditur Polan Synt. quo aliquis possit à pietate salute vel revocari vel impediri Lucas which is or may be the occasion of another man's halting or falling into sin or swerving from the straight way of righteousness Gillesp He only gives scandal who induces his Brother directly or collaterally into sin Dr. Jer. Tail 3 Because to be scandalized is sinful So Aquin. 22 ae q. 43. a. 2. Scandalum passivum semper est peccatum in eo qui scandalizatur non enim scandalizatur nisi in quantum aliqualiter ruit spirituali ruirâ quae est peccatum Now the particular sin which Scandal in things indifferent does occasion is ordinarily one of these two with their concomitants and consequents viz. Either 1 A like speech action or omission but with a condemning or at least with a doubting conscience Every example does animate and encourage him that observes it to do the like The eye affects the heart saith Jeremy Lam. 3.51 But if he that is scandalized either think it unlawful or be not satisfied of its lawfulness and yet takes example by the other he falls into sin This the Apostle calls being made weak Rom. 14.21 i. e. apt to fall brought into danger of sin This was the case Rom. 14. It was before the plenary promulgation of the Gospel and destruction of the Temple lawful to observe Jewish Festivals and distinction of meats and yet not necessary but indifferent v. 14. I know and am perswaded that nothing is unclean of it self because Christ was come in the flesh yet many of the New-Convert-Christians were not so fully acquainted with and satisfied about their Liberty in these things but did still esteem one day above another v. 5. and some meats unclean v. 14. and consequently did condemn or at least scruple the non-observation of those days and the eating of those meats Now such by seeing others which were higher Scholars perhaps in Christ's School than themselves to neglect those days and that distinction of meats were apt to be drawn to act against their own consciences and judgements which was a great sin for every man should be fully perswaded in his own mind v. 5. but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean to him it is unclean v. 14. and therefore such an one is damned or condemned by his own conscience if he eat v. 23. which was scandalizing and a heinous sin in those that did occasion it Neither was the case much unlike among the Christian Corinthians It was lawful to eat any meat bought in the shambles or set before them at their neighbours table 1 Cor. 10.25 27. yet sometimes some might be scandalized thereby which was when they did not think it lawful yet by another's example were emboldened to eat as the Apostle speaks c. 8. v. 10. 2 The other sin which the use of Liberty in things indifferent does occasion is Censuring such a word action or omission as unlawful and the person as licentious which because there is no ground for in the nature of the thing it being as I said indifferent it is the sin of rash judging condemned by Christ Mat. 7.1 That this is one way whereby the person scandalized may fall is evident by the Apostle's words 1 Cor. 10.29 Why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience q. d. I do culpably scandalize another by doing such a thing that I have otherwise liberty to do or not to do if another judges or censures me for it fo v. 30. For if I by grace be a partaker why am I evil spoken of for that for which I give thanks i. e. though I may lawfully and comfortably make use of my liberty yet if another take occasion to reproach or condemn me for it I do ill therein I ought not to do it And Rom. 14.16 Let not your good be evil spoken of Thus we use to say There is a scandal lies upon such a man for such a thing i. e. he is evil spoken of for it he is censured and condemned for it as a loose and ungodly person or at least as one that does amiss in that particular The case is