of it do you think he would believe him But by this Doctrine he hath one evasion which I know not what to say to that is when I shall charge him with it he can reply it was onely an apparition of such an opinion or discourse but no such discourse I can prove it no other way but that these eyes of mine shewed it me in a book under his name called Humane Nature or another called Leviathan Sect. 9. But this being only a negative conclusion he proceeds further to a positive thus The things that really are in the world without us are those motions by which these seemings are caused Surely there was never heard or read so much nonsense and yet it tastes not of folly but a kind of madnesse or else he thinks the world is mad to receive such incredible fancies without colour of reason Is all without us nothing but motion Is the standing still of the earth nothing but motion Is the thing that moves nothing but motion motion moves somwhat that is not motion if so what doth it move whatsoever moves moves something and if that were motion the question goes on infinitely unless we find somthing to be moved which is not motion substances bodies c. are not motion rest is not motion much less are they these motions by which these seemings are caused I discern a stone hard cold heavy by sense are these things yea the stone it self for so they term the things that really involves it nothing but those motions by which they appeare These things confute themselves and yet I may go further many of these representations apparitions seemings are without motion in the object the house standing still unmoved sends forth its image to my eye without motion for all motion is but of six kinds generation and corruption about substances augmentation and diminution about quantities alteration about qualities lation or local motion about place he can find none of these in this house neither in its substance quantitie quality place but the motion is in mine eye no such thing neither mine eye is changed none of these wayes only an image brought to it which is undiscernable by any sense but it self neither is the power of the soul moved which then proceeds to discern the object for it is the same power it was before without any real alteration or change for it hath the same abilities it had neither more nor lesse but it is true there is an internal immament act which results out of that power without any motion or if it may in an improper and forced way be halled into the notion of motion in some unused acceptation yet this must be an internal motion within its self none of those things he speaks of a motion Much of this is needlesse that which sufficeth to shew the weaknesse of his reasoning is to shew that there are hundreds of things discerned by us which are not motions and that is most apparent He proceeds And this is the great deception of sense which also is by sense to be corrected If it were true that this were a deception I should think it a great one yea the most universal deception that ever was in the world but how it shall be corrected by sense that were worth the observing He hath shewed it thus For as sense telleth me when I see directly the colour seemeth to be in the object so also sense telleth me when I see by reflexion that colour is not in the object Sect. 10. First of all observe that if this were true yet being but a particular instance he cannot deduce that generall conclusion out of it concerning all sights much lesse concerning all other senses then observe upon a direct sight he puts onely a seeming to be in the object but upon a reflex peremptorily that it is not in the object when certainly a direct sight shews its object more clearly then any reflex But now to his instance why doth a reflex shew it not to be in the object he sets not down but perhaps he may say in a glass the image may seeme to be in the glasse and not in the object I say the image that which represents the object is there and I have known a Robin Red-breast fighting with his own shadow in a glasse To this I answer that the sight judgeth of colours and therein is not deceived when the distance is not too great nor the organ or medium ill disposed for that is its proper object over which it hath power to judg but in such things as are a common object to it and other senses it is easily mistaken of which kind are figures greatnesse or littleness distance of place and many the like Thus it mistakes the distance of the Moone from the earth the bigness of the stars but then besides these common objects there are other which are objectum per accidens as Logicians an object not out of its own nature affecting that act or faculty in its self but by reason of some other thing to which it is annext or happens to be joyned so we may say we see Socrates or Plato when we see them not but their colour and that colour of theirs is the onely thing by which they are discerned by sight Now there are mighty mistakes in our senses concerning these so when we see one man's cloaths worne by another we think him at the first to be the man whose cloaths he weares so when we see that man to have a red who had a pale face we think him not the same man My opinion of this mistake is because although the vision of the colour is an act of sight yet the applying that colour to the person seemes to be an act of reason a work out of the reach of pure sense This by the way of explication to make all plain that the Reader may the fuller apprehend my answer to this objection punctually then I answer first that there is no such judgment of sense as to say that colour is not in the object for although sense perhaps can onely discern the colour in the glass yet sense meddles not with that question whether the same colour can be in two subjects much less whether this be a real colour in the glasse or whether an intentional or whether it be in the glass or not but if it do meddle with this last yet in that speech which sayes it is in the glasse sense meddles beyond its sphere it judgeth in a cause which belongs not to its Judicature that may be disputed by reason between him and me and sense may give in evidence concerning what it knows circumstantially conducing to the truth but cannot judg of it it is not its proper object so then to say sense sees it in a glass therefore there is no colour in the object is vaine to reason which can discerne that every accident follows its subject remove the glass from the
betwixt the motion of the water which stayes a little while after the stone is stopt and this remaining of the Image that motion of sense is nulled and therein a quiescence of that act but as in all other Causes which are not necessary to the preservation as well as the producing their effects so here when the cause is gone the effect remains the Image apprehended in sense and then it hath no other convenience with that Motion then any other Cause Sect. 3. I râ—jâ—ct not his Etymologie but deny his Deduction Therâ—fore saith he Imagination is nothing but decaying Sence For although Imagination may be derived from Image yet it is something besides sense in its full notion for sense is the meer judgment upon a present Object but Imagination works upon an absent every Sense judgeth of a particular sensative Object so sight of Colours hearing of Sounds c. and no other but Fancy so here I involve the common sense with it because he excludes it and I will multiply no controversie judgeth of all senses and distinguisheth them This is visible this Audible yea conjoynes them together and makes a Composure sometimes for pleasure sometimes for grief of divers of them which sense cannot do sight cannot judge or act any way upon sounds or the ear upon colours as is evident a deaf man though seeing cannot hear yet if ever he did hear his fancy can imagine sounds So that imagination must needs be somthing besides decaying sense which operates where and when Sense cannot and is an act upon that which is the relick of Sense when Sense hath done its work there remains the Species which the Object sent forth and upon this Species the power of imagination works its proper operations Decaying Sense supposeth Sense to be but imagination works when Sense is not as upon Colours when the man that hath seen is blind afterwards there is not the sense of seeing but there is in that man an imagination of colours which he hath but cannot now see So in the dark men imagine colours but can see none I conclude therefore that imagination is something beside sense which exists when sense faileth Sect. 4. He goes on The decay of sence in man saith he waking is not the decay of the motion made in sence but an obscuring of it This I apprehend most untrue for when the Organ ceaseth to judge that motion which he calleth sence ceaseth and is no longer but those Species lie lockt up in the Memory and there is no act of sensation concerning them no not a decayed one That Philosophy which he delivers concerning the Sun and the Stars to illustrate this by I grant that the Stars do emit and send forth their Light when the Sun shineth but the excess of the Suns Light obscures that of the Stars yet his Application of it to this purpose is utterly vain for there both the Objects work like Natural Agents according to their utmost and the greater by its force masters the lesse but here in our businesse the Object is removed or the Organ and there is no operation of one upon the other at all the species being crept within the Organ the eye cannot judge of it and the object or Organ being diverted or indisposed cannot produce such an act any longer it is as if the Stars were removed out of the Heaven not shining with the Sun so that we fancy colors in the dark when no strength of another Object more powerfull doth work upon our sense and sometimes in the dark we do not imploy our Imaginations about colours and yet in that dark we have no vehement Object to obscure our fancy so that it is not the suppression or weakning of sense by another Object which maketh us not see but the cessation of sense by the removal of either Organ or Object one from another And again we may observe that although the Sun shine and the Objects external move never so powerfully yet the fancy is busied about some internal conceit or other things absent which could not be if only the vehement stroakes from the object did produce this act for then that being the fancy should likewise be Sect. 5. After this weak Discourse he draws a conclusion thus From whence it follows that the longer the time is after the sight or sense of any object the weaker is the imagination This hath some Truth in it but is not absolutely true for many instantly upon sight or hearing of a thing have no apprehension of it as we say it comes in at one eare and goes out at another men carelesly taking notice of it like a thing not heeded or cared for lose it presently we conceiving the memory like a Box which keeps these Images may apprehend attention like a Key to it which locks them up in that Box. Or apprehending the memory like wax we may imagine attention like that force which presseth these Images into it but without attention any sensitive object though discerned is lost immediately and doth not stay for time to weaken or wear it out when contrariwise it often happens that a thing long time forgot and not thought on may be reviv'd and quickned again and remain more lively in the fancy then things of a much later birth as I remember Seneca speaks of himself and I think most men may find in themselves to be true that the things which he learned when he was a child did stick faster and fresher in his memory then those things which he learned but a little before so that although there may be some truth in this that often it happens out that time wears out the sense or conceit of a thing yet because there are many other things conducing to the preservation and destruction of conceptions besides time therefore this is not universally true as he proposeth it yet should not have been censured by me but because it seems to conduce to the illustration of what went before which was an Errour not to be swallowed down Sect. 6. I let pass what is between and come to the upshot This decaying sense saith he when we would expresse the thing it self I mean fancy its selfe we call Imagination This that he calls decaying sense I confesse we call Imagination but I have shewed it not to be sense therefore not decaying sense But saith he when we would expresse the decay and signifie that the Sense is fading old and past we call it Memory Here are dâ—vers words of most distinct nature hudled together to confound the Reader old and past many things are now past yet not old and those past things although but just now are remembred although not old Then saith he Imagination and Memory are one thing which for divers considerations hath divers Names I deny that they are the same thing and prove it thus Sect. 7. They who have divers acts which cannot be performed by each other are not the
Reader observe here that the word we render made is the word which hath abid and will abide more dispute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is not in that Sentence to the Ephesians This word hath hard luck it is used to all purposes by them sometimes it signifye's to be sometimes to be re-made but I say alwayes made in St. John so that although they would shew me that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which are both used in that place and rendered Workmanship and created may be used for recreation yet it would not follow that this word which is not of kin to them should indure that exposition then let us consider that Text in the Ephes. need not to be forced to his sense for not to stand upon the expositions of learned men which have applyed it to the Creation that by Christ Jesus is mean't our Saviour according to his Divinity and so in him the word we were all created to good works but to take it according to the other sense that this Creation is mean't of creating those saving and justifying graces at which the Apostle seeme's to point and in regard of them we are said to be created those excellent and supernaturall qualities being our perfection so that as a man may be said to be made when his soul is put in him a table or any thing when that worke which give 's it the last complement and degree of perfection is added to it so we in the Text are said to be created but it doth not say men we are created another thing which God by these graces wrought us unto and I thinke is regeneration but this phrase doth not in its nature signify regeneration but it signifye's that which is applyed to men who are fallen from a better to a worse condition to such men it may import a regeneration because it bring 's them backe to their former state and make's them that which was their first condition and so this creation in the Text hath its most genuine and proper sense which making in my Text should not have when it is said that the world was made by him if by it should be understood the world was re-made or regenerated by him Againe consider that if this Text should be understood of regeneration I mean that Text to the Ephesians it must be by vertue of that phrase to good works created to good works for if the Text had barely said we had been his Workmanship created by him no man could have construed it regeneration but now in this Text the world was made by him there is no phrase to expound it to any thing else but the mere sense of the words and yet let us see another violence if this should be granted that this phrase made the world should be understood for regenerating and the world for men all the world that knowe's any thing of Christianity knowe's likewise that not half the world was regenerated then say they it must be understood of our Saviour's endeavour to regenerate the whole so that making must be taken for regeneration regeneration for an endeavour to do it when I dare say he nor they can shew me any place in Scripture where this word make is used for regeneration much lesse meerly for an endeavour to do it nay I do not think that they can shew me any place where make is taken for an endeavour but the very phrase intimating a produced effect is no where used for an ineffectuall endeavour Sect. 11. But I will leave this Comment of Socinus although countenanced by his followers and apply my self to Smalcius in his 13 cap. refutationis libelli de divinâ verbi incarnati naturâ pag. 75. upon these words The world was made by him We deny saith he that by the word World is signified the old world that by the word made is signified creation that by the phrase by him is signified a principal agent I shall undertake these in their order as he handle's them but his greatest endeavour is about the first word the world which he and I both first meddle with First he saith this word World hath divers significations it signifie's onely men it signifie's the future world now saith he when Saint John saith the world was made by him may be understood that we are reformed by him in which sense it is said that Christ enlighten's every man which cometh into the world as it is said in the preceding verse now as Christ is said to enlighten every man because he used sufficient means and endeavoured their enlightening so he is said to make the world that is the men in it by endeavouring to reform them This is a cruel thing to impose upon a man such expositions where making must be taken for reforming for although they can shew the same root for these words in Hebrew yet not in Greek nor any place in the New Testament where the word used for making is used for reforming and then that reforming must be understood onely an endeavour not an act as I have shewed His second way is to take this word World for the future World life eternal this is pag. 76. as this Life eternall is revealed and given by Christ see againe the violence of this exposition the world is taken for the future in Heaven this making of it by the word is the revealing of it by Christ then which never were there heard greater falsifications of any Text for illustration of which he bring 's the 17. Verse of this Chapter Grace and Truth is by Jesus Christ when there is nothing in these words which can give any light to any such sense in the other for how can it follow because Christ is the Agent by which his Servants receive grace and truth therefore his making the world should be understood of his revealing or giving eternall Life but Valkelius in his fifth Book de verà religione cap. 10. pag. 445. and 446. give 's other illustrations that this word World should signify the future World Hebrewes 2.5 2 Peter 3.13 these he put 's in the Margin to justify this acception of the World for the other and in all which places it is observable there is no one but the fourth to the Romans which hath this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render World in it and sometimes the word new added which might well expound his sense as in St. Peter and sometimes no such intent as he would have it to signify the future World so in those places to the Hebrews but then for this place to the Romans although there is this very word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it as the Hâ—ir of the world yet Christ was Heir of this world and the promise was made to Abraham that all nations in the earth should be blessed in his seed and so his Seed should be Heir Lord of all the world and have kingdom and
of St. John in his Revelation ibid. XV. The words Being with God signifie more then Known to God against Socinus and his followers 340 Eternall life before Christ's Incarnation known to the Angels blessed Souls Prophets Philosophers 341 Although not till afterward manifested to others 342 The Philosophers excell the Socinians in this knowledge ibid. XVI Socinus's other Text of no validity to his purpose 343 XVII The Discourse resumed concerning knowledge of the word before the preaching of St. John Baptist. ibid. XVIII Whether in the Socinian or Catholick sense may be more truly said The word was God 345 XIX God with them no proper name but an Appellative c. 346 Contrary to the use of it single throughout the New Testament ibid. XX. How Satan is called the God of this world c. 347 How the Belly God ibid. The Socinians criticisme about the article ibid. Answer'd 348 And Socinus's Instances ibid. How St. Cyrill's rule is to be understood ibid. XXI Socinus answer'd about Tautology 349 As likewise to that objection God cannot be with himself 350 Lord and God not both one 351 The Word God with though not of the Father ibid. CHAP. XXXIII I. The Socinians conceit of the Word being with God in the beginning 352 II. Improbable having no Evangelical authority 353 III. That they pretend to prove's it not ibid. The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated ibid. His Ascent into heaven which they insist on not corporeall 354 IV. His double capacity of Priest and Lay-man alledged by them discussed 356 V. How all things we made by him 357 St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation ibid. Which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy Scripture 358 VI. Christ's interest in the Creation re-inforced against the Socinians gloss 359 Wherein he was a principal no bare instrumental cause ibid. Their other slight objection answer'd 360 The use of words ibid. The benefit of Tradition ibid. VII How Life eternal and what else is to be understood ver 4. 361 How both that and the naturall life is said to be the light of men ibid. How Christ is called the light according to Socinus 362 How according to the Bishop ibid. VIII What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why render'd was ibid. Why the Evangelist chose to use it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 writing of St. John Baptist. 363 IX Socinus put 's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ ibid. Which is evidently affirmative of his Divinity 364 X. Socinus misinterpret's Creation by Recreation or Regeneration 365 And misapplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the Eâ—hesians 366 Another violence of his in wresting actuall Regeneration to Regeneration in endeavour 367 XI Smalcius's gloss ibid. His various significations put upon the word World ibid. Whereâ—n he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader 368 The Bishop's Animadversions 369 XII Their sense directly opposite to that evident in the Text. 370 XIII The genuine sense of the Terms not changed as they object 371 Smalcius's reply to Smiglecius ibid. Little becoming a Socinian 372 The World knew not the Word but by supernaturall grace ibid. What men apprehend of God by naturall abilities ibid. The Objection about St. John's upbraiding the world answer'd 373 The exposition of the words immediately following why omitted 374 XIV The Socinians word could not be made Flesh ibid. Their evasion 375 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospell ibid. Their heterodox interpretation of Flesh ibid. Not evident in Scripture cited by Socinus 376 The result of their Comment 177 The summe of ours ibid. XV. The union of the Divinity with the Humanity implyeth no mutation of God into Man 378 Notwithstanding the praedication God is Man ibid. Which is asserted and by a familiar instance illustrated ibid. Their Objection answer'd by the dependance of substances upon God ibid. Another Argument of Smalcius's 379 Answer'd by the manner of existing ibid. Christ a true man though a divine Person 380 Whose Conception and Gestation in the blessed Virgin 's womb conduced nothing to his personality ibid. The Divinity and Humanity united render him neither two Sons nor two Persons ibid. XVI Objection of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost 381 Answer which identity implie's not that they were made flesh with him ibid. As Scotus illustrate's excellently 382 The Bishop's Apology to the Reader ibid. XVII Smalcius's first Quaere c. Rectifyed Answer'd 383 All actions not alwayes necessarily according to the nature of him or that which act's ibid. Smalcius's second Quaere Answered and frustrated 384 His third Quaere Answered with reference to the discourse before concerning the Incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost ibid. XVIII Our Saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authority and plenitude of power in himself 385 Which he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles 386 CHAP. XXXIV I. The Socinians opinion of the holy Ghost 387 Confuted and this proved that he is a distinct Person of the Trinity not a mere Attribute of the Deity ibid. II. Not the Gospel of Christ as they pretend out of holy Scripture 389 III. Not the gift of God to certain men but by a figure 390 A defiance to them that call for reason in these mysteries 391 CHAP. XXXV I. Carthagena's little lesse then then blasphemous limiting God's power of enlarging the capacity of his Creature 392 II. What of God to be proved by reason and by whom to be attempted 393 III. Aquinas's first Argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the Trinity 394 The Bishop's Answer grounded upon Lully's demonstration by aequiparance ibid. IV. Aquinas's second Argument 395 The Bishop's first Answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith ibid. The Bishop's second Answer concerning the after-sight of Reason ibid. His third Argument from scorn and scandal 396 Answered by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture ibid. V. Trigosius and Carthagena passed by ibid. Truth not oppos'd to Truth ibid. The Bishop closeth with Raymund Lully whom he vindicateth against Vasques 397 And Aymericus who make's him an heretick ibid. His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about converting the Saracens 398 His devout enterprize according to it with successe ibid. His like adventure among the Moores ibid. Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance 399 The notable effect of his sufferings ibid. VI. Lully's undertaking according to Vasques ibid. Whose Arguments he recite's and forme's 400 The first prove's a personal plurality by concord ibid. Another from equality distinction ibid. Vasques's first Answer excepting against the supposition of a reall effective act in God ibid. The Bishop's reply that Lully not only suppos'd but prov'd iâ— ibid. His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity
bounds and rebounds for although the immanent acts are in the agents yet the things smelt and tasted are elsewhere Sect. 6. Last of all he cometh to the lowest sense of touch or feeling and of this sense he saith So likewise the heat we feele from the fire is manifestly in us and is quite different from the heat in the fire I believe that he speaks truth in this that the heat in my hand is not that particular heat which is in the fire but yet that word quite different was a large Phrase the difference is individual not specifical it is a stream of that Fountain and differs like a streame from the fountaine it loseth by the course it walkes in some degrees of those perfections which it enjoyed at its first seting out but that it is another appeares because take away the fire and the heat doth not instantly follow the fire but by degrees weares out of my hand just like a streame fed and supplyed by a fountaine stop the fountain the streames will in little leasure decay but not instantly be dried as light followes the Candle or as a shadowe the man whose shadowe it is This proves it to be another heate from that of the fire why do we read nothing of apparitions of bounds and rebounds this is nothing to his purpose that heat which is in my hand is the Object of my feeling and it is discerned by some species which expresseth its likeness as other objects and presents it to the sensitive soul which officiates this duty of judging of Touches in every part of a man which is animated by it as it discernes colours by the eye sounds by the Eare c. But which way doth this prove because heat is in my hand which is felt therefore there is nothing in the Object discerned The nature of those Prime qualities Heat Cold Drought Moisture is such that it multiplies their nature even to the Organ and thus onely immediately sends out its likeness whether this Organ be a nerve or something else I question not but second Qualities as light or heavy hard or soft touch but the outward skins only and there and thence transmit their Species which is so apparent as nothing can be more for take the weight of Lead and the lightnesse of a feather when discerned by a mans hand can any man say these are in the hand or Lead or feather So likewise when I feel a down pillow and a hard stone what is it I feel a softnesse or hardnesse in my self or a gamboll of a bound or rebound these things cannot be imagined these are reall things in that pillow in that stone but send forth intentional not reall Images into my hand of their natures Real they cannot be for if real then my hand should be light or heavy hard or soft when it discerns those Objects to be such for whatsoever hath these real Qualities in it is denominated by them and then some image there must be because whatsoever is known must be known by reception into that facultie which knowes it if not in its self yet in its Species or Image and so these who in their realities cannot come at the Organ must do it by their Species But this was much more then needed for a refutation of what he said but I have not done yet with him for although his Argument drawn from heat in my hand to prove the nullitie of an externall Object is vaine as I have shewed for this heat is external to the Organ of that Sense and although it be true that the heat in my hand differs from that in the fire which did produce it yet his Argument is most Illogical with which he endeavours to prove it thus Sect. 7. For saith he our heat is pleasure or pain according as it is great or moderate but in the coal there is no such thing First consider the Proposition then the inference In the Proposition he affirmes that our heat is a pleasure or paine which is a most strange speech in a Philosophical discourse where propriety of speech is expected and from that man in that discourse where like another Adam he would impose Names upon every thing and strives for nothing more then to give things convenient expressions To the business heate is neither pleasure nor pain in us it may produce both according to the convenience or inconvenience it hath with us but is neither heat is a cause of sense but sense is neither pleasure nor pain but they are results out of sense as things agreeing or disagreeing to it so that heate is a cause of both a remote cause but formally it cannot be said to be either Sect. 8. But suppose it be spoken figuratively which in these cases of Philosophical punctuall discourses is not proper the cause for the effect doth it follow that therefore because it is so in a man and produceth not that effect in the fire therefore it is not the same heat certainly causes alwayes work the same effect where the Subject is the same but not else heat hardens clay which is a common Instance but softens wax if fire had sense as a man hath it would find paine or pleasure as a man doth or if a man had no sense like fire he would have no pain or pleasure as the fire hath not the same thing works diversly according to the Subject or Object it is busied about This conceit of his I make no question but meeting with his understanding which was the Mother of it mightily pleased him or else he would never have printed it in two Books and in one have cited the other but certainly meeting with my dull braine infected with contemptible Universitie learning it displeaseth me exceedingly and therefore there is no arguing for the diversity of an Agent from the diversity of operation when the Object is diverse it works upon And here he concludes this businesse saying by this the fourth Proposition is proved c. But how let any man consider Now I thought to have concluded with him but number 10. he crowds together such a heap of Solecismes as must not passe without a consideration of them His number begins thus And from hence also it followeth that whatsoever accidents or qualities our sense makes us think there be in the world they be not there but are seeming and apparitions onely I never thought to have read such a Proposition from a reasonable man The Thief who is to be arraigned at the Bar would be glad he could make the Judge to be of this minde when the evidence shall sweare he saw him break up a house or cut a purse if he could perswade the Judge that it were but an Apparition there were no such thing it were well for him But suppose this Gentlemans hand were put into the fire and when he cryes out for paine a man should tell him there is no such thing but only an apparition
not dayes Sect. 13. This doctrine is most agreeing to the Scriptures which teacheth the truest Philosophy for the Scripture makes him to be the Creatour of the world if so then before the world then Eternall then these durations which are measures of our worldly things cannot be affirmed of him nor time nor parts of it which are onely measures proportioned to those things of this world which are successive I need not name the places but there are many of Scripture which expresse this eternal being of God so Psal. 90.2 Before the mountains were brought forth or ever thou hadst formed the Earth and the World even from everlasting to everlasting thou art GOD Here in this one place is all the Philosophy I have delivered of Gods eternity here is contained his Eternal being when the world was not in that is said before c. when they were not he was Secondly here is expressed the totall being of the Eternal together in that is said Thou art God from everlasting to everlasting not thou wert or wilt be only but before them thou art and here is expressed likewise that in respect of other things the Creatures he may be said to have these relations before and after though not in relation to himself but yet no set terme as to say a day or two dayes or years before I am confident there is no one place of Scripture which expresseth any certaine measures of duration belonging to him I know it may be objected to this that in the Epistle to the Hebrews Chap. 1. vers 10 11 12. The Apostle speaking of the Eternity of our Saviour according to his Divinity saith Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the Earth and the Heavens are the works of thy hands Verse 11. They shall perish but thou remainest and they all shall wax old as doth a garment Verse 12. And like a vesture shalt thou fold them up and they shall be changed but thou art the same and thy yeares shall not faile In this place the eternity of Christs divinity is called yeares and therefore those measures of our times must be applied to that Eternity and then dayes may of which years are composed To this we may most reasonably answer that the Apostle accommodates his manner of language to the capacity of the vulgar and the language of men concerning durations so well as actions so before he said the Heavens were the works of Gods hands as if he had said because all great works are wrought by hands amongst men God had hands by which he wrought those heavens So thy yeares shall not faile that is thou art Eternal because men reckon their duration by yeares and yet observe the language it is said they are indeficient yeares yeares which faile not all our yeares faile the last yeare is gone this farre in going and untill the end of the world mans yeares the worlds yeares and their durations will faile but Gods yeares no part of his duration reckon it what you will shall faile This is the sense of the Scriptures and men cannot without a contradiction expound it of our time every part of which is deficient Thus the Philosophy I have delivered being framed according to Scripture I shall answer his Argument The dayes which may be attributed to God and the measures of our time can onely be in regard of his coexisting with time in this world and therefore he doth not nor can be said to be of more dayes then the world hath for he who affirms he hath more dayes or any such Computation affirmes a falshood there were not more dayes therefore not a coexisting with them and therefore he had more dayes when Isaac was born then when Abraham but in neither of them had he an infinite number but finite numbers of dayes nor doth the world yeeld more his durance is without number of weeks or dayes what successive thing soever we accompt by and therefore that Argument against the worlds eternity hath no force applied to God Sect. 14. I proceed with him Ita ab hoc absurdo c. Therefore saith he from this absurd thing they fall into another being constrained to say that Eternity is a standing instant and an infinite number of numbers is an Unity which is much more absurd There are two parts in this Objection the first concernes the nunc stans or permanent instant the second of innumerable numbers c. for perspicuity I take them apart and handle them distinctly And first for his absurdity that he conceives to be in a standing instant if it doe not stand still and when it doth not it is no longer nunc or an instant but time or at the least two parts of time but instant it is not now certainly that which hath no mutation cannot choose but perpetually eternally stand still and that which to mutable things would be time to him must be instant I can shew him one instant that stood still neare two thousand yeares of time and therefore if time could be infinite would last eternally which is Iohn 8.58 When the Iewes wondred that our Saviour should have seen Abraham he answered before Abraham was not I was but I am There is a difference in exposition some say that this speech is understood of his Humanity that his humanity was in the thoughts of God and his Decree before Abraham but this cannot be the sense for Christ being the son and posterity of Abraham even in the knowledge and decree of God as well as in his birth in the world therefore it could not be spoke of his humanity that it was in the Decree of God before Abraham for Abraham in the same Decree must be before Christs humanity as the father of him But suppose it were let me enquire was that being which Christ had then in the knowledge or being of God before Abraham was that being existing when he spake these words or no If no then he could not say I am but I was if so it proves my Conclusion that there was a nunc stans a standing instant neare two thousand years But I am well satisfied that that speech of his was meant of his Divinity which is eternally the same and was before Abraham when Abraham was and after him he being that which is which was and is to come Revelation 1.4 And certainly there must needs be the same reason that that instant must be Eternall as that it should stand still so long as before Abraham to our Saviour But his words presently after seeme to make another reason of the absurdity in nunc stans thus Sect. 15. Cur enim Eternitas Why saith he should Eternity be called nunc stans now standing rather then tunc then standing there must therefore be either many Eternities or now and then must signifie the same Thus he for answer this terme stans or standing is indifferent to time passed or to come when applyed to either positively but
in that down right sense which the words seem at first to beare and they who object it would inferre For Invocation or calling upon the name of the Lord as it is many times it being a principal piece of it is taken for the whole worship of God it cannot be that men should now begin to do that which without doubt Adam Abel Seth and all such as were godly must needs have done long before Nay although this Story of the Fathers is delivered by Moses in exceeding short notes yet in the 3. and 4. vers of this 4. Chap. it is recorded that both Cain and Abel brought Oblations to the Lord which was an Act of Religion so that Religion did not now begin There are many witty Expositions given and some in their Expositions destroy the Text but what seem's most probable to me is that as in every age men desirous of Gods honour studied which way to act it most laudably and give any addition to it so now they might at this time adde something to their natural worship by prostration on the ground and Oblaeions and sacrifices as Hymmes and Invocations of God which were not used before Men began to call upon the name of the Lord in such a way which afterwards improving it selfe to a generall Devotion amongst the sonnes of God as I think pious men were called in those dayes it gained that name in a peculiar manner to be attributed to it so that men began that worship which was known by the name of calling upon God As you may see in Confession every acknowledgement of a mans sins or God's goodnesse is Confession yet if you aske have you been at Confession It is understood of Confessing to a Priest and accounting your sinnes to him Instances might be very many in this kind take one more perhaps a little closer We know that every pious act is a service to God yet for the eminence and excellence of it The Common Prayer used in the Church hath so appropriated that name that if a man asked were you at Service to day it will be understood of Common Prayer If the Question be at what time did service begin The answer will be Nine Ten Two Three a clock and be applyed only to the beginning of serving God with it yea I have heard many answer I was at Sermon not at Service so distinctly is the word applied to that of Common Prayer I can adde one Instance more almost in the very words before specified that Doxologie which is used in the Church at the end of every Psalm and some other times in the Common Prayers used in divine Service Glory be to the Father c. did so gaine the approbation of that name Gloria Patri that although all religious devotions payd to God are honouring and glorifying of him yet when we heare men speake of Gloria Patri we know they meane this Doxologie and we can say of it that Gloria Patri began with Flavianus as Theodoret assisted by St. Chrysostom and Nicephorus so that although in the end of this Doxologie it is said As it was in the beginning is now c. that is that in all ages men did give Glory to the Father c. Yet we can say that at that time began Glory to the Father c. So was it in this occasion then began the Name of God to be glorified with some particular service although men did in all ages before glorifie him So that we may well beleeve that in that time of the birth of Enos or some years after began that piece of worship which for some eminency had that name of calling upon God by the use of speech appropriated to it Whether this addition was by the Institution of God immediately or Divine men as Seth or Enos introduced it in the Publique Religion I determine not being not revealed but conceive this the most reasonable way of expounding that place which cannot be understood in that grosse way it is urged Sect. 3 A second Argument to prove that there was an Idolatrous worship before the Floud is thus framed The punishment of Sinnes is proportioned to the Sins which are punished now the Floud being the greatest punishment that ever God afflicted the world with it is necessary that it should be for the worship of false Gods or Idolatry which are the greatest Sins To this is rightly answered that the punishment of Sins in this world is not alwaies proportioned to the sins All the temporal punishment that men have is lesse then they deserve and therefore may in justice be moderated according to Gods equitable kindnesse what punishment God layd upon these men who perished in the Floud after death was not revealed but the judgement was most right because they held the truth of God in unrighteousness as St. Paul Rom. 1.18 and as it is in the 21. verse of the same Because they knowing GOD glorified him not as God neither were thankful but became vaine in their imaginations So that the Condemnation upon the Gentiles was not alwaies for Errours in judgement but Errours in practise that although they did know God aright yet they did not worship him as God And therefore we may be satisfied concerning their sins with what the Scripture revealeth and need not make them worse then they were described there which sayes That the wickednesse of man was great in the Earth and that every Imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evill continually Gen. 6.5 and it is the same which S. Paul before they became vaine in their Imaginations that is their desires and affections as was described before they were given to all Luxury and sensuality So that here was a large scope for Gods justice to punish and the temporal punishment of this world Death by drowning was vehemently called for by the sins of those men who lived in that Age without any addition of false worship I therefore conclude for that first age in the first sense in respect of the God they worshipped there was none but the right God worshipt in the world but in regard of the second sense the manner of worship in their Religion to him unlesse these Oblations before spoke of we find nothing recorded before the Floud that is necessary to be assented to Sect. 4. For both these we cannot conceive that this Religion so formed was founded upon the Faith c. For although we may justly think that men who have either by an Innate principle or else by reason knowledge that there is a GOD of an infinite excellency to whom out of duty they owe this divine Worship which is called Religion we may likewise think that it is impossible for their capacities to find out what worship would be pleasing to him unlesse he reveale it and therefore did act all they did in that worship by his direction yet because there is no mention
mine and thine you may reade a most excellent passage in the 23. of Gen. with what civility of discourse and reciprocal courtesies Abraham bought the field in Machpelah of Ephron the Hittite First I collect thence that Abraham judged there was a legall interest in Ephron for else he would not have payd such a round price for it as foure hundred shekels of Silver and then you may observe how sacred amongst all people the preservation of interest was for in the last of Gen. you shall find that Jacob when he died in Egypt a great way off in another Nation having both he and his left the Land neare two hundred yeares after the purchase when he and his without doubt were not known scarce remembred Iacob gave order for the burying of his body there and it was performed without any disturbance so sacred did those people without any positive law but the principles of nature observe the particular interest of particular men even such who at the time of the Purchase were but sojourners among them and at the time of the last usage were not so much as cohabitants but strangers in another Country and Nation so that we see as men have had alwaies Consciences which directed them in their actions so those Consciences have had a sense of intruding upon another's interest and Abraham was assured that it was such amongst them for upon that presumption he paid so great a price for that field Sect. 11. If it should be asked how men should come to get these interests I will not here scan all wayes one is evident that is Occupancy taking possession of it first for all the things in this world being but Bona utilia and the profit they have is their service to man he who first gets possession of them is Lord of them thus Fowles and Fishes even in planted Nations which are no mans possessions being caught by any man are his to make profit and when one man hath caught them that they are his possession it is thievery to rob him of them I speak not here of Deere Conyes Hares nor Fishes in ponds c. which are impaled and so for their habitation by our laws are made to pay their host with their lives nor such things which our lawes indulging the pleasures of Gent. and men of quality have appropriated to certain persons and places as Pheasants and Partridges and the like but whatsoever no nationall particular Law hath given to another that the law of Nature gives to the first possessor and this law men find before any positive law of Nations in the practise of the world so that then it is apparent that without positive laws or an outward humane coercive power the law of Nations hath alwaies given a propriety in this world's goods to the sons of men Thus I have passed my opinion upon his 13. Chapter and I think have given reasons for what I spake but if this be not enough let the Reader consider what I shall speake to the next Chapter and that will the more fully discribe the mist of his opinions and confirm mine more stronger Censures upon the 14 th Chapter of LEVIATHAN which is entituled The first and second naturall Lawes and of Contracts which thus begin's CHAP. XXII Concerning the pretended necessity in Nature for the preservation of life The prospect of an happiness beyond it Death represented more terrible than it is c. Sect. 1. THE right of Nature which Writers commonly call jus Naturale is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature that is to say his own life and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto Here is a description of the right of Nature which is that he saith Writers call Jus Naturale I believe this Gentleman never in his life read Jus Naturale so described in any Author It is true to preserve a mans own life is a branch of the right of nature but it doth not contain the whole nature of it as if the right of nature extended to nothing else but the preservation of a mans own life there are many other things which the right of nature enables us to doe but because I find this question in my opinion more methodically and Schollarly delivered in his Book entituled De Copore Politico Cap. 1. I shall therefore consider that first and having cleared that discourse apply my self to this description and I will begin with his 6. Number That number begins thus Sect. 2. Forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire that which is good for themselves and to avoyd that which is hurtful but most of all the terrible enemy of nature Death from whom men expect the losse of all power and also the greatest of bodily paine in the loosing The phrase which I here censure first is that necessity makes us do this I know this word Necessity is often used for what we terme want or poverty because such a man need 's somewhat therefore we say he is in necessity and in this sense there may be some truth in that Proposition for because men's lives have lack of supplies and according to this Gentleman all the world are his enemies or what is the truth no man will have so much care to supply him as himself therefore he must doe it but then take necessity as it opposeth contingency which is the common logical sense it is absolutely false for many men throw and take away their own lives now that which is necessarily done cannot be otherwise men cannot choose but doe what they doe out of necessity the phrase were much more proper to say that the law of nature enjoyne's them to provide for themselves for the great Natura naturans God as I said before know's our necessities and like a wise law-maker makes lawes to provide for them and so infinitely wise are those laws that what he hath not by some law or other provided for it is not necessary for any man whatsoever and certainly therefore where is no lawfull and honest way to preserve it life its self is not necessary he seem's therefore to expresse himself better in Corpore politico then in Leviathan because in Leviathan he restrain's this right of Nature only to the preservation of his own life but in this I now write against he saith not only but most of all his own life other things he may have a right unto but most of all or chiefly the preservation of his own life or rather the avoyding of death Sect. 3. What he saith that necessity of nature makes us desire our own good and avoyd that which is hurtful is true in that generality but applyed to any particular is false for there is no particular but may appeare to some men good and to others hurtfull even
true I read of Iob and many others that have had a restitution of worldly comforts but that is not so with all and those that dye for him leave the world can have no reward in this world Againe is it possible that this God of an infinite excellency wisdome power justice c. should suffer so many villaines to eat up his Children and Servants as it were bread to commit Sacriledge in all kinds perjury blasphemy and the like persevering in those sins to passe without any punishment whâ—ch some doe in this world although but a few supposing a God men cannot think so and therefore supposing a God it is not to be imagined but that there is an eternall happinesse provided for such as serve God which is all I contend for Sect. 9. Againe let us consider man in himself as he is a fellow creature wiâ—h beasts plants stones c. we shall upon consideration of all the Creatures in the world find that every Creature hath an object fitted to any power it hath and some matter or other fit to fill every empty roome in it and satisfie every natural desire in it to see this cleare let us first view the lowest sort of things stones earth water aire c. which have no life in them if they have power to operate by their qualitie to heat or coole there are objects in the world fit for such actions if they have appetites of this place or that high or low there are room 's in the world to receive them if the matter as Aristotle desire's formes there are formes to fit it you may find this truly applyed to any thing according to that sacred Axiome so often urged by both Divines and Philosophers Deus et Natura nihil faciunt frustra whereas if there were nothing to satisfy those powers and appetites they were in vaine if we climb higher to plants and Trees which have life and no sense it is evident in them that their powers and desires of nutrition generation augmentâ—tion by which they exceed these inferiour things have whilest they are in this world enough plentifully in this world to satisfy these appetites as well as those which they have in common with those other inferiour things Then come to that other degree higher to beasts and such things which do not live only but have a power of moving themselves of apprehending by Sense of delighting themselves in sensual things these appetites have that which can satisfie yea fill their desires so that more cannot be desired yea there is to be had in this world not onely a Satisfaction but a satiety of sensual pleasure not a belly full onely but enough to surfeit so that for all those things below man whatsoever they are there is something which can sufficiently satâ—sfy all the powers and appetites they have Can we think God is so liberal to these things and lesse to man As the Apostle dispute's doth God take care of Oxen that is in comparison of us men As our Saviour if he so clothe the grasse of the field shall he not much rather take care for us if he hath so provided for them in these mean faculties and appetites which have here as the Schoolemen speake vestigium Dei onely a footstep of God in them shall he not much raâ—her for these noble powers and appetite of Reason and Will in man which are made after his image certainly it were a high ingratitude to think so well then let us inquire what satisfaction there can be found for these humane powers of Reason and Will by which he excells all other things that must be it which a man desire's for every thing endeavour's the perfecting of its powers and the satisfaction of its appetite which is truly the good of that thing to which it belong's Sect. 10. It is an undoubted conclusion a Principle if not the Principle which the inbred Law of nature which governe's man hath taught every Child of man and so powerfully imprinted it in him thâ—t no Child which hath reason will deny but that he would be happy and in particular if he understâ—nd the Tearmes that that is his happinesse to have all his desires to have his Will satisfied for untill that be he hath some deficiency there is something farther to be enquired after he is not at hâ—s journey's end â—hus it is with all things there is enough for any thing below man to fulfill its appetite to â—urfeit but not so for mans appetite this will appeare ouâ— of the consideration of the things in this world which are reputed good those that are bodily sensuall intellectuall bodily strength beauty health these cannot satisfy a man's soule though altogether joyn to these all sensuall delights meates drinkes luxuriousnesse in any kind for hearing seeing smelling let a man have all those are but things which beasts may enjoy as well as he and in these he cannot excell them yea they excell him in a fuller fruition of them then he can have then they are apt to have many casualties to deprive us of them and a certainty that one day they must be lost which to a man that hath a forecast with him which other inferiour Creatures have not must needs disturb the content he might take in enjoying them consider those humane intellectual things which have pretended a title to man's felicity either the Stoick's Apathy freedome from passion or the Aristotelian way of governing Passions by Reason although those were handsome and ingenious and those men trod some steps towards felicity yet they were but the first Steps onely and those the lowest for if the Subjects be tumultuous the King cannot be in safety The Stoicke instead of ruling would kill his Subjects take away all Passions and then the King in man will lack fitting instruments to effect his businesse the Aristotelian governed or at the leâ—st prescribed rules to governe the Passions but left the Palace of Reason unrectâ—fied and although he freed it from the rebellion of Passions yet satisfied it noâ— with plenty at home to conclude that which make's a man happy and satisfie's his Soule must be something in him by which he excell's beasts that must be his Reason and reasonable Will this Will is not satisfied but by knowledge no satisfaction of it but the enjoying that it love's no love without knowledge and therefore though the Will be the seat of happinesse yet the Understanding is the Conduit by which thâ—s happinesse is brought to the Will Sect. 11. Now let us then examine what there can be in the Will brought by the Understanding which can satisfie it and make it happy in this life certainly all the things in the world cannot doe it for although a man desire 's to know any thing every thing yet he cannot be happy in knowing all the things in the world I will not dispute concerning those things which men doe know for alas it is mighty short of
battails as God directed and to judge their Causes according to God's Lawes which he had given them and we shall find that Moses used that Authority but sparingly for he had recourse to God still in any weighty matter of that nature and would not judge any thing besides the letter of the Law So you may find Leviticus 24.11 12 13 14. that the Lord himself gave sentence upon him who had blasphemed his name he was in the 12. verse put in ward that the mind of the Lord might be knowne in the 13. verse the Lord spake unâ—o Moses not his person but his Officer bring forth c. verse 14. See likewise Numbers 15.35 The Lord declared to Moses what should be done to the man who gathered stickes on the Sabbath day and the like you may find in the Case of Zelophehad Numbers 27. verse 1. and Moses brought their cause before the Lord verse 5. and verse 6. the Lord spake unto Moses saying c. so that Moses was so far from personating God that he did nothing but as a Messenger and Mediatour betwixt God and them delivering God's will to them their requests and many times his owne for them to God and therefore though God in 32. of Exodus when he was angry with the abominations of the Israelites would disown them and his peculiar interest in them he as it were threw them off to Moses and called them his people yet Moses pleading for them verse 11. c. returne's them to God againe and calle's them his people which he brought forth of the Land of Egypt he owned none of those glorious workes to be his of which he was but an Instrument but attributed all to God Well then we see Moses was but an instrument a Judge a Generall and those Offices in a weake manner performed not without a perpetuall direction from God but in nothing did he personate him so that I think Mr. Hobbes was deceived in using this unheard of phrase concerning Moses but I would he had rested in this and had gone no further me thinke's I could have forgiven this although somewhat too bold a language taking personating in a very large sense that Moses and all Kings might be sayd in a little weake manner to personate God although I did distast it but what followe's is worse CHAP. XXXI Christ personated not God being really God himsâ—lfe His Divinity asserted against Smalcius and other Socinians Christ's bloud not the bloud of the Father the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appropriating it to him Acts 20.28 His Filiation and eternal Generation vindicated from the Subtile exceptions of Valkelius c. And our Saviour justified in his first name of being the Sonne of God Sect. 1. SEcondly by the Son of man his own Son our Saviour Jesus Christ I will stop here and leave the intent of our Saviour's coming to another place he make's here our Saviour to personate God he call's him truly the Sonne of man and the Son of God but in saying he personated God he used a phrase no whit comely to expresse such a sacred Mystery by no man can properly be said to personate another who is that other now this son of man is the son of God and he is God and thought it no robbery to be equall with God if he be God he cannot be said in any propriety of speech to personate God for he who personate's another is not really that other but counterfeitly onely Now our blessed Saviour is really God which he would have him personate and therefore cannot personate God This truth not long since had had no need to have been spoken of amongst Christians whosoever heretofore professed the name of Christ did readily assent to it but of late it hath been denied by many in Polonia and the infection hath come into our nation and that infection hath Antidotes prepared for it which are able to remove it from the heart of those who would cordially apply it to them so that there need no more to be said to it yet because they who read this little treatise may perhaps not have opportunity or leasure to look upon other writers I shall adde a word or two to satisfie the Reader concerning this businesse and shew that Mr. Hobbes hath very unhandsomely expressed himself in it and deâ—ogatorily from the eternall deity of our most blessed Saviour and first in saying he doth personate God for although he say he is the Sonne of God his own Son which in its self were enough to satisfy a Reader that he must be of the same nature with his father for every Son is such yet since the waywardnesse of men hath studied so many foolish distinctions to beguile the simple amongst which that is one of a naturall and adopted Son of an eternally and a temporary begotten Son to which sense are expounded that Christ is his Son but an adopted Christ is his own but a Temporary begotten Son either when the holy Ghost overshadowed the blessed Virgin as soon or before the world was made as others â—his phrase of his cannot shelter him from many peevish and perverse doctrines when he make's him not to be but to personate God I shall first shew that he is God and then how it is not incongruous to reason to say it labouring in all to make my Reason ascend up to my Faith not my Faith descend to my Reason crosse to which I have thought since first I was acquâ—inted with their writings that the Socinians first laid a plot for Religion by Reason then laboured to wrest Scriptures to that plot Sect. 2. In proving our blessed Saviour to be God I shall not use many places of Scripture one or two will be enough so they be cleare and evident the first shall be Acts 20. where you shall find that St. Paul verse 17. did at Miletum sâ—nd to Ephesus for the elders of the Church which were there and verse 28. he gave them a charge in these words Take heed therefore to your selves and to all the flock over which the holy Ghost hath made you overseeers to feed the Church of God which he hath purchased with his own bloud I observe that the Church is called the Church of God which he hath purchased with his own blood this Article he can relate to none but God he therefore who hath purchasâ—d this Church with his blood is God I will spare nothing that I find brought by any in the way of answeare but doe hope this place will vindicate its selfe and this cause very cleerely First then Bernardinus Ochinus in his second book of his Dialogues Dialogue 19. but the first of that book page 100. in mine edition bring 's this place and answeares it thus First that this is not spoke of the blood of God but of Christ of whom a little before Saint Paul spake but this is so faâ—re from all reason as nothing can be more for the Apostle
he would rather have used renovation regeneration making new then absolute making againe it is evident that St. John in this beginning of his Gospell describe's the nature of Christ according to his Divinity when he was in the beginning where he was with God what he was in himselfe he was God in his effects he made all things then he come's to the preparation of the Gospell by John Baptist and his Gospell by its selfe to his incarnation he was made flesh this I put down to shew the Reader that to us who observe this method in the Evangelist that conceipt of the Gospell that these words should relate to it can have no sense and againe I say let the Reader observe the places commonly cited by them to this purpose that this phrase must be understood according to the subject matter he shall find that there is something obvious in them to shew a Reader that they have such an intention those places are these Matth. 17.11 Mark 13.23 John 4.25 and 14 26. and 19 28. and some other which are needlesse to put down and would be tedious too but in all of them there will appeare somewhat inviting a man to that understanding but in this nothing and let the Reader consider what an uncouth exposition this is by which I can put the Contrary to every proposition and by their glosse it will be more true then the Text as thus The word was not God the Word did not make all things for when the beginning was he was not by them nor thousands of yeares after with God he was not otherwise then every thing in the World was with him in his presence and knowledge and that long after the beginning contrary to the Text and he was so farre from making all things that indeed by them he made nothing but instituted some Lawes and Covenants onely now what a horrid way is this of expounding Scripture onely because they are resolved against our Saviour's eternall Divinity let us go on Sect. 6. And without him was nothing made that was made I believe that before their glosses had come to this Text a man could not possibly have put down more distinct Words was Heaven or Earth or any thing else then what is comprised in all if not then it was not made without him he made it who made all things yea but say they this must be understood of all the things of the Gospell I aske were other things made if they were then they were made by him and without him nothing was made that was made I know they will returne to their former answear and say it must be understood of the subjecta materia which was the Gospell that none of those things that were made were made without him but let a man consider whether it be reasonable to refer this all things to such a business which is treated of two or three verses after or rather to those things which immediately follow that is the things that are made they have an exception likewise against this Word by all things were made by him that signifye's an Instrument say they and by this Christ should be onely here an Instrumentall Cause by which God wrought these things so Smalcius in refutatione libelli de divinâ verbi incarnati naturâ cap. 11. pag. 68. in my edition 1614. it is true he grant's that this Word by is often used for a principal cause as is most evident as we say that this house was built by this man not by his Axe or Hammer no not by his Servants yea all things are said to be made by God but he saye's they who urge this Argument must prove that it is never used otherwise I say that is not necessary in Logick it will be enough if he can prove that it cannot be used otherwise in this place and that I hope to do first against those who allow our Saviour to make all these things concerning the Gospell he was the Author of them and he must not be understood as an Instrument in respect of the sense that they give to by here which make's him to be barely an instrumentall Cause then next taking all things as we do and surely it must be so if we understand that this Word is an Instrument in the making the world the Heaven and Earth he must be long before he was born of the Virgin even before these things themselves were made which although it will not be of force against the Arrians yet is against them so that let this phrase all things be understood which way ye will as they or we yet this Word by cannot be accommodated to their exposition for a bare instrumentall Cause There is another slight objection that the Father is not made by him nor the holy Spirit but the Text answer's this when it saith without him was nothing made that was made but let the Reader observe the same Contrariety to the Text here that was before there was more a hundred times made without him then by him and if where the full and clear sense of a Text will go one way it be lawful to expound it otherwise because some Word or Words are otherwhere applyed to another meaning it is impossible to prove any thing by words for the liberty of language doth allow it and the expressions of all Authors make use of it to apply the same Words to diverse occasions and if this licence should be granted to Expositors there is no refuge but tradition which deliver's the sense not the words and by that a man may know how and in what sense such language was understood either in the Apostolical or next adjacent times for it is reasonable to think that they had with the words the sense likewise delivered Thus I write because as appeare's these men do use such violence to these Scriptures as is unreasonable and without any consent to their own intent as I have shewed Sect. 7. It followe's In him was life here in these words I find little Opposition Smalcâ—us handle's them not as not materiall Socinus saith this word life must be understood of Life eternall I will not deny that life eternall may be mean't and principally mean't here but I am confident likewise that all the life of every thing in the world may truly be said to be in him in the word as in the fountaine from whence it came and is still preserved equally as the other but for Life eternall it may be said in him besides that way as in a fountaine to be in him likewise as the mâ—ritorious cause yea as in the object for in the knowledge of him will consist much of our eternall happinesse hereafter I will proceed and this Life was the light of men that is if we understand it of the naturall Life this Life which originally and preservingly is in the word is that light which enlightneth the understanding in reasonable
rule over all nations ever here on earth These are the principall things I observe amongst them to justifie their Comment upon that Text and it appear's that they have not shewed that this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render made was ever used for regenerating much lesse for the intention of it again we may marke that this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is never used for the world to come or heaven without an addition when it is put absolutely as here it signifye's the present World It will be now time to set down mine own conceipt and vindicate it from such exceptions as they make against it he was in the world that is the word not the light because in the last Clause where it is said the World knew him not him is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Masculine gender which agree's to the Word not to the Light which is the Neuter gender Well then he was in the world the great world the universe is what was mean't by the word was in the world and this must be true because the Word was God and he is every where he in the world and the world in him and this is something that a man learn's here for his Faith that God is alwayes in the world preserving and looking to it but suppose a man should take the word in their Conceipt for a man who preached and taught other men the will of God were it not a strange needlesse speech for a man to say that he was in the world Take the world how they will for the great World which we inhabit or for the company of men who live in it for onely in these two senses they understood World in this place but to say that the Word the Word God was in the world here is something delivered that men would listen to Sest 12. And the world was made by him that is as he is with it in preserving so he was with it in making it at the first when it was made let us view the sense of their way compared with this the Word which is Christ in his humanity by his Sermons Miracles and Life made that is either reformed the world that is men which were in the great World and this reformation was intentionall onely he did not do it in a flat opposition to the Text as can be or else the same Christ made that is prepared and fitted to that Heaven that place of happinesse into which his Servants shall enter hereafter when in the whole Bible they cannot find this word which is used here for world single and alone used for Heaven or for the reformed or regenerated part of men nor that this word which is here rendred made is taken for regeneration Reader this is a strange way of expounding Scripture Sect. 13. And the world knew him not that is the same world which he made and in which he was knew him not did not take such notice as they might by revelations which were made of him by the Creature and the Law written in their hearts here they except against this exposition of the Term World that we vary and change the Terme from what it was used for in the former expositions there we took the world for the great Masse of created things but here we take it for the world of men I say we do not change the sense of any Term from the most genuine and naturall signification it hath for although very many and the greatest number of Expositors do say that this Term World doth signify the men in the world yet that very exposition differ's not in sense from that I have given no more then if a man should say that Socrates did see such or such a thing or that Socrates his eyes saw it which is all one for men are the eye of the World by which it is able to discerne any thing and when it is said the world knew him not it must needs be understood that the men in the world knew him not because the World can know God by nothing but its understanding part which is men It seeme's by Smalcius in refutatione libelli de divina verbi incarnati natura pag. 18. that Smiglecius had made an answer somewhat like this of mine to which Smalcius replye's that this answer profit's nothing for it remaine's firm still that the word World is taken in another sense in the third Sentence then it was in the second since it is certain that the world which did not know Christ is another world from that was made by him and to the similitude he answer's that the men who did not know Christ are not such a part of the World as the eye is of man for when a man see 's not the whole eye see 's not but that men knew not Christ is onely affirmed of part of men and that the worst part of men not all men so that when it is said that the world knew him not it must be understood of man in generall not of the ill the worst part of men I return to this first that such an answer cannot become a Socinian who do in generall make this Synechdoche pars pro toto understood here and it is their own way and not unusuall in Scripture but secondly I say again that it is true of the whole World and each particular man that neither the whole nor any particular man in the world did know him as they were the world the created World but by an addition of supernaturall favour and grace this kind of phrase is used by Saint Paul 1 Cor 15.50 Flesh and bloud cannot inherit the kingdom of God it is quatenus as it is flâ—sh and bloud but when that corruption hath put on incorruption when that flâ—sh and bloud is sanctifyed when it is glorifyed and indued with supernaturall grace then it shall inherit and possesse the kingdom of God and with these eyes they shall see their Redeemer so the 1 Cor. 2.14 the naturall man receiveth not the things of the Spirit but even St. Peter and St. Paul were naturall men they could not have dyed else but quatenus as naturall he cannot do it that man who is a naturall man can but not as he is naturall by the vertue and force of his naturall abilities so it is here the World knew him not that is by any naturall abilities in that worldly condition in which it was made unlesse perfected by some more excellent endowmenâ—s and blessings The Prophets knew him but they had supernaturall assistance the Shepheards they discerne him at his birth but Angels told it them to conclude we cannot apprehend him as he is by any worldly assistance I am perswaded that men have by the naturall abilities which God hath given them and the consideration of his Creatures found out and known that God made the world and that he rule 's and governe's it by a most exact
that of St. John in his Revelation The words Being with God signifie more thâ—n Known to God against Socinus and hâ—s â—ollowers Eternal life before Christ's Iâ—carnation knowne to the Angelâ— blessed Souls Prophets Philosophers Although not till afterward manifested to others The Phâ—losophers excell the Socinians in this knowledge Socinus's other Text of no validity to his purpose The Discourse resumed concerning the knowledge of the Word before the preaching of St. John Baptist Whether in the Socinian or Catholick sense may be more truly said the Word was God God with them no proper name but an Appellative â— Contrary to the use of it single thâ—oughout the New Testament How Satan is called the God of this World c. How the belly God The Socinian's Criticisme about the Article Answered And Sociâ—uâ—'s Instances How St. Cyrâ—ll's rule is to be understood Smalcius answered about Tautology As likewise to that objection God cannot be with himself Loâ—d and God not both one The Word God with though not of the Father The Sociniaâ—s conceit of tâ—e Word being with God in the bâ—ginning Improbable having no Evangelical authority That they pretend to prove's it not The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated His ascent into heaven which they insist on not corporeal His double capacity of Priest and Lay-man alledged by them discussed How all things were made by him St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation Which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy Scripture Christ's interest in the Câ—eatiâ—n reinforced against the Socinians glosse Wherein he was a principal no bare instrumental Cause Their other slight objection answered The use of words The benefit of Tradition How life eternall and what else is to be understood ver 4. Hâ—w both that and the naturall life is said to be the light of men How Christ is called the lâ—ght according to Socinus How according to the Bishop What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why rendred was Why the Evangelist chose to use it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 writing of St. John Baptist Socinus put 's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ. Which is evidently affirmatâ—ve of his Divinity Socinus misinterprets creation by recreation or regeneration And in supplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the Ephesians Another violence of his in wresting actuall regeneration to regeneration in endeavour Smalcius's gâ—oâ—â—e His various significations put upon the word World Wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader The Bishop's Animadversions 〈◊〉 sense â—irectly opposite to that evident in the Text. The genuine sense of the Terms not changed as they object Smalcius's reply to Smeglecius Little bâ—câ—ming a Socinian The World knew not the Woâ—d but by supernaturall grace What men appâ—ehend of God by naturall abilities The objection about Saint Johâ—'s upbraiding the world answered The exposition of the words immediately following why omitted The Socinians Word couâ—d not be made Flâ—sh Their evasion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospell Their heterodox interpretation of flesh Not evident in Scripture Cited by Socinus The result of their Comment The summe of ours The union of the Divinâ—ty with the humanity implieth no mutation of God into Man Notwithstanding the predâ—cation God is Man Whâ—ch is asserted â—nd by a familliar instance illustrated Their Objection Answer'd by the dependaâ—â—â— of substances up on God Another Argument of Smalcius's Answer'd by the manner of existing Christ a true man though a divine persâ—n Whose conception and gestation in the blessed Virgin 's wâ—mb conduced nothing to his personality The Divinity an humanity uniâ—ed render him neither two Sons nor two persons Object Of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost Answer Which identity implies not that they were made flâ—sh with him As Scotus illustâ—ate's excellently The Bishop's apology to the Reader Smâ—lcius's fiâ—st Qâ—erie c. Rectifyed Answered All actions not alwayes necessariâ—y according to the nature of him or that which act 's Smalius's second Querie Answeâ—ed and frustrated His third Querie Answered with reference to the discourse before concerning the incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost Our Saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authoriâ—y and plenitude of power in himself Whâ—ch he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles The Socinian's opinion of the holy Ghost Confuted and this proved that he is a distinct person of the Trinity not a mere Attribute of the Deity Noâ— the Gospel oâ— Christ as they pretend out of holy Scripture Not the gift of God to certain men but by a figure A defiance to them that call for Reason in these mysteries Which notwithstanding may be subservienr to Faith Câ—rthagâ—na's lâ—tle lesse then blasphemous intimating God's power of enlarging the capacâ—ty of his Creature What of God to be proved by Reason and by whom to be attempted Aquinas's first argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the Trinity The Bishop's answer grounded upon Lulli's demonstratâ—on by aequiparance Aquinas's second Argum. The Bishop's first answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith The Bishop's second answer concerning the after-sight of Reason His third argument from scorn and scâ—ndal Answer'd by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture Trigosius and Carthagena passed by Truth not oppos'd to Truth The Bishop closeâ—h with Raymund Lully whom he vindicateth against Vasques And Aymericus who make's him an haeretick His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about convertâ—ng the Saracens Hiâ— devout enterprize according to it wâ—th successe His like adventure among the 〈◊〉 Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance The notable effâ—ct of his sufferings Lully's undertaking according to Vâ—sques Whose Arguments he recite's and forme's The first prove's a personal plurality by concord Another from equality distinction Vasques's first Answer excepting against the supposiâ—ion of a reall effective act in God The Bishop's Râ—ply that Lulâ—y not only suppâ—sâ—d but proved it His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity or being idle which could nâ—t be Vasques chargeth Lully with a mâ—stake of a formal cause for an efficient Who is mâ—staken by him And the cause proved no less efficient then formal The discourse drawn into perfect syllogisme provâ—ng the eternall plurality of persons by production The Objection urging the Angel cannot produce the like effect answer'd Vasquâ—s's satisfactâ—â—y answerâ— to Lully's arguments for his second Conclusion The Bâ—shop proceed's upon other grounds of his to prove the Trinity God's infinite Simpliciâ—y and Uniâ—y His spiritual faculties Understandâ—ng and Will Himself the infinite objâ—ct of his Understanding Which is eternally productive of his internal Word And that word substâ—â—tiâ—â— the same with himself The Bishop guided to this discovery by Scripture as the Wise-men by a Sâ—ar God's Will as fruitful by love as hiâ— Understanding by knowledge And so productive of a third person which is likewise God These divine productions not to be multiplyed because infinite by which an objection's answered The objection made by the Assertors of the Greek Church answered accordâ—ng to the sense of the Catholick touching the procession of the holy Ghost Illustrated by a similitude to facilitate in part our apprehension of it How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and Holy Spirit Why they are called three persons being no Scripture-language and â—ow long ago debated by St. Augustâ—ne The extent or limits of this personal distiâ—ction the Bishâ—p â—eveâ—ently forbear's to determâ—ne And dislâ—ke's the rash curiosity of the School-men His Lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason And seldom quoting the Fathers A digression to the Reader Select Aphorâ—smes out of which the Author draw's his Discourse A good foundation of his to build upon His noble Quaeâ—e Animadversions upon his ambiguous sense touching the conservation of life His study of it as to his own particular All men may not have like reason to be so intent The parts and faculties of men not to be levelled with those of beasts The publick interest to be prefer'd and preserv'd before the personal or more private What right a man hath to the mâ—aâ—s of preserviâ—g life and how he is to use them Each particular man cannot pretend a right to the whole world Nor to things conducing onely to mediate and particular ends The danger of pretending a right to all and so having a right judgment of it Two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time All cannot be usefull to one particular perperson Nor every thing to evâ—ry one Of which no right judgment can be made for want of knowledge The use of some known interdicted to whom hurtful Oâ—her ruleâ— by which to institâ—te a right judgment beside reason How all creatures are granted to man's usâ— limited Hiâ— impossible supâ—osition His falâ—acy à bâ—ne divisiâ— c. The equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all The case of necessity imply's no such universal right Nor dissolution of any Common-wealth An Objection fram'd by the Author A second of his not so strong The first but weakly answer'd by him without regard to God's end His first Argument for universal right returning extreme necessity The Bishop's severall answers to it His second Argument for ancient right in a lawfull defense How the force oâ— invalidity of this argument mâ—y be understood and how the practice moderated His Objection And answer The Bishop's Animadversions shewing the difference between just 〈…〉 invasion staâ—ing the râ—ght of possâ—ssion Fear entitle's a man to nothing but a guard of himself Propriety withouâ— Covenant The râ—ght to goodâ— gotten by conquest what His third Argument The Bishâ—p's answer from the fallibiliâ—y of judgmâ—nt His argument against the right of Occupancy Which the Bishop shew's to hold well against Covenant What is the râ—ght in necessity Discovery 〈◊〉 not an equal right with Occupancy The imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case The Author 's two Propositions destructive to humane Society and Trade The difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates Little peace to be expected if that of Occupancy be not allowed